User profiles for Radu Jurca

Radu Jurca

Google Inc.
Verified email at google.com
Cited by 2353

An incentive compatible reputation mechanism

R Jurca, B Faltings - Proceedings of the second international joint …, 2003 - dl.acm.org
Traditional centralized approaches to security are difficult to apply to large, distributed, multi-agent
systems (MAS). Developing a notion of trust that is based on the reputation of agents …

Mechanisms for making crowds truthful

R Jurca, B Faltings - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2009 - jair.org
We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large
groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, …

Towards incentive-compatible reputation management

R Jurca, B Faltings - Trust, Reputation, and Security: Theories and …, 2003 - Springer
Traditional centralized approaches to security are difficult to apply to large, distributed, multi-agent
systems. Developing a notion of trust that is based on the reputation of agents can …

Reliable QoS monitoring based on client feedback

R Jurca, B Faltings, W Binder - … of the 16th international conference on …, 2007 - dl.acm.org
Service-level agreements (SLAs) establish a contract between service providersand clients
concerning Quality of Service (QoS) parameters. Without properpenalties, service providers …

Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback

R Jurca, B Faltings - Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on …, 2006 - dl.acm.org
Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested
agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting and the potential …

Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments

R Jurca, B Faltings - Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on …, 2007 - dl.acm.org
Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self-interested
agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the potential gains obtained from …

Incentives for effort in crowdsourcing using the peer truth serum

G Radanovic, B Faltings, R Jurca - ACM Transactions on Intelligent …, 2016 - dl.acm.org
Crowdsourcing is widely proposed as a method to solve a large variety of judgment tasks,
such as classifying website content, peer grading in online courses, or collecting real-world …

Enforcing truthful strategies in incentive compatible reputation mechanisms

R Jurca, B Faltings - International Workshop on Internet and Network …, 2005 - Springer
We commonly use the experience of others when taking decisions. Reputation mechanisms
aggregate in a formal way the feedback collected from peers and compute the reputation of …

Incentives to counter bias in human computation

B Faltings, R Jurca, P Pu, BD Tran - … of the AAAI Conference on Human …, 2014 - ojs.aaai.org
In online labor platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, a good strategy to obtain quality
answers is to take aggregate answers submitted by multiple workers, exploiting the wisdom …

Truthful reputation mechanisms for online systems

R Jurca - 2007 - infoscience.epfl.ch
The internet is moving rapidly towards an interactive milieu where online communities and
economies gain importance over their traditional counterparts. While this shift creates …