Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Strategy Bridge

On Crossing Bridges: 10 Years of The Strategy Bridge Journal

On Crossing Bridges: 10 Years of The Strategy Bridge Journal

For over a decade, The Strategy Bridge has helped to lead a conversation among practitioners, scholars, and students about strategy, national security, and military affairs. Written early in 2013 our guiding principles reflect what we have always tried to do here. We believe these principles to be as true today as they were when written a decade ago. The Strategy Bridge built an amazing community and helped shape an online publication world that looks remarkably different. We hold great faith in the next generation of strategy thinkers and practitioners. While we fervently believe that there remains much work to be done, we also believe that the time is right for that work to occur elsewhere.

A Year in #Reviewing

A Year in #Reviewing

Michael Howard, the great British historian, once advised that military officer who wish to avoid the pitfalls of military history should study in width, depth, and context—studying the great sweep of military history to see what changes and what does not; studying a single campaign in all its complexity to “get beyond the order created by the historian;” and studying the nature of the societies that fight the wars we seek to understand. Here at The Strategy Bridge, we feel very much the same way about the study of strategy, and we work hard to realize this width, depth, and context in the books we review each week.

Beyond the Neutral Card: From Civil-Military Relations to Military Politics

Beyond the Neutral Card: From Civil-Military Relations to Military Politics

How should senior military officers in democratic states influence their domestic political environments? The flippant answer is that they should not: they should do as they’re told. The American civil-military relations literature, written largely in the shadow of Samuel P. Huntington’s myth of an apolitical military, has consistently downplayed the positive role officers play in politics, to such a degree that we have only a dim outline of what constitutes appropriate and effective political influence by officers Thus, in practice, we fear that too many officers find that their professional military education fails to prepare them for the realities of being a commander.

Guardianship and Resentment in Precarious Civil-Military Relations

Guardianship and Resentment in Precarious Civil-Military Relations

The recent coups in sub-Saharan Africa have ushered in a new era in civil-military relations in the Francophone states of the continent. While military intervention and insurgency have long been a feature of politics in the region since decolonization, the quick succession of regime change and the seizure of power by a new generation of juntas against long standing personalist dictatorships suggests a break in previous political patterns.

Legislative Oversight Over the Armed Forces Is Overrated

Legislative Oversight Over the Armed Forces Is Overrated

In most democracies, legislatures have far less oversight power over their militaries than we might expect. The U.S. Congress and its relationship with the American armed forces is the exception, rather than the rule. Indeed, many legislatures around the world lack some of the basic instruments required to understand what their armed forces are doing, notably security clearances, subpoena power, and adequate staffing.

The State of Civil-Military Relations: A Strategy Bridge Series

The State of Civil-Military Relations: A Strategy Bridge Series

Taken together, the articles in this quarterly series guide the reader through three continents to offer multiple perspectives on civil-military relations. They do so while touching on multiple intersections of Clausewitz’s trinity of the government, military, and society, an arguably more useful and timeless perspective than Samuel Huntington’s increasingly dated ideas.

Past and Present: The Strategy Bridge, Ten Years On

Past and Present: The Strategy Bridge, Ten Years On

It is with sincere gratitude that The Strategy Bridge team offers thanks to our entire community. To those who have contributed to our archive, to those who have participated in our events, and to those who have given of their time and their skills to further our endeavor we say, “Thank you for ten wonderful years!” We hope that as members of this community, each of you has gained by the experience some small fraction of the benefit you have bestowed upon us by your participation.

4Q23 Call for Strategy Bridge Submissions: The State of Civil-Military Relations

4Q23 Call for Strategy Bridge Submissions: The State of Civil-Military Relations

The Strategy Bridge explores the state of civil-military relations in the United States and beyond for the final quarterly series of 2023. What are the most pressing issues to consider? What overlooked issues may be key to understanding, influencing, and managing the future of civil-military relations? These two-wide ranging questions could be framed in a number of ways, but we envision publishing essays providing our readers with insights into the broad sweep of contemporary civil-military relations.

Writing Strategy 2023

Writing Strategy 2023

Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked civilian and military students around the world to participate in our seventh annual student writing contest on the subject of strategy. The response was once again amazing. We’ll publish the winners and some additional submissions earning an honorable mention in the coming weeks. In the meantime, congratulations to all the winners!

2Q23 Ukraine 1 Year On: The State of Our Assumptions

2Q23 Ukraine 1 Year On: The State of Our Assumptions

To mark the passing of a year since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent return of high intensity conflict to Europe, we wanted to look to the recent past instead of to an unknown future. We asked: How then should we reflect on this experience? What happened to our previously held assumptions in the wake of Russia's aggression? Which assumptions were challenged; which were validated?

The 2023 Strategy Bridge Student Writing Competition on Strategy

The 2023 Strategy Bridge Student Writing Competition on Strategy

The competition is open to students attending civilian universities and military war or staff colleges at every level—including distance learning, correspondence, and fellowship programs—between 1 Jun 2022 and 31 May 2023. The competition deadline is 4 Jun 2023.  Winning articles will be announced in August 2023 and published on The Strategy Bridge thereafter.

1Q23: Historical Lessons and an Unknown Future

1Q23: Historical Lessons and an Unknown Future

To begin 2023, we wanted to explore the relationship between historical lessons and preparation for an unknown future. This quarterly thus examines preparation for future warfare based on historical lessons, learned or not. How have states and other actors envisioned future warfare? How did they prepare, or fail to prepare, for future warfare? Are these lessons of use to states and other actors as they prepare for future conflict?

A Year in #Reviewing

A Year in #Reviewing

Ralph Waldo Emerson is said to have observed, “I cannot remember the books I've read any more than the meals I have eaten; even so, they have made me.” As we do each year at The Strategy Bridge, we pause to reflect on our #Reviewing series, the books and movies and other work we’ve consumed as a community—the intellectual meal we’ve shared—and consider what they have helped us to make of ourselves, what they’ve helped us become.

1Q23 Call for Strategy Bridge Submissions

1Q23 Call for Strategy Bridge Submissions

To begin 2023, we want to explore the relationship between historical lessons and preparation for an unknown future. A wide array of thinkers have inspired this theme, including Lawrence Freedman. In The Future of War: A History, Freedman explains that the future is so difficult to predict because “it depends on choices that have yet to be made, including by our own governments, in circumstances that remain uncertain.” Freedman continues to unpack this notion, stating:

“History is made by people who do not know what is going to happen next. Many developments that were awaited, either fearfully or eagerly, never happened. Those things that did happen were sometimes seen to be inevitable in retrospect but they were rarely identified as inevitable in prospect.”

For 1Q23, we want to hear your perspectives on the most useful point Strategy Bridge readers should consider regarding preparation for future warfare based on historical lessons, learned or not. How have states and other actors envisioned future warfare? How did they prepare, or fail to prepare, for their future warfare? Are these lessons of use to states and other actors as they prepare for future conflict?

Operationalizing Strategic Empathy: Best Practices from Inside the First Island Chain

Operationalizing Strategic Empathy: Best Practices from Inside the First Island Chain

To operationalize the concept of strategic empathy, this article argues that strategic leaders must appreciate three critical factors: geography, history, and domestic politics. These three factors are the pillars of the framework employed by U.S. Army Japan, a theater-strategic headquarters in the Indo-Pacific theater.

4Q22: Perspectives Matter

4Q22: Perspectives Matter

In recent quarterlies published by The Strategy Bridge, many authors have tended to center the United States in discussions about strategic competition. In doing so, they have illuminated perspectives about the national security challenges facing that nation. Such an approach can be limiting, however, because it is narrowly specific in its framing. As a U.S.-based journal—with a majority of our readers historically from the United States—it is perhaps natural that contributors argue from this perspective, but it can be troublesome to view challenges with a too-consistent perspective. And, if alliances are a strength of the United States and Western nations in strategic competition, then it is more important than ever to view strategic competition from the perspective of a variety of nations to better understand their complex positions due to economic, diplomatic, political, military, and other circumstances.

Defense Acquisition Realignment & Modernization

Defense Acquisition Realignment & Modernization

The U.S. defense budget is larger than the defense spending of the following eleven countries combined, partly due to the maintenance of aging platforms. At the same time, other countries are winning the race to new capabilities. An expert joint program review and modernization board can help America realign its priorities and regain its technological advantage.

Reconstructing the Ladder: Towards a More Considered Model of Escalation

Reconstructing the Ladder: Towards a More Considered Model of Escalation

In the field of geopolitical analysis and strategy, models and frameworks are crucial. They inform the focus of the analyst, how to measure and evaluate the area of attention, and what to expect in the future. This process can occur consciously as part of a formal analytical procedure, or subconsciously, through the mental models that an analyst internalises. The escalation ladder is one such model. It advises an analyst to focus on how a state escalates and de-escalates against its competitors, and how to measure actions against the different escalation levels, or steps, on the ladder.