Papers by Matenia L I C K F E T T Sirseloudi
The Use of the Internet in Financing Terrorism and Terrorist Recruitment, 2012
Radicalisation processes in European diaspora communities are subject to different causation clus... more Radicalisation processes in European diaspora communities are subject to different causation clusters. Private motivations such as the need for public attention; an identity crisis or feelings of discrimination in the country of residence; the special role of religion in diaspora situations and certain radical religious currents play a determining role. Special relevance can be
observed regarding political conflicts in the diaspora community countries of origin or in
countries with Muslim majorities in general. These conflicts seem to contribute to
radicalisation processes in Europe via different channels.
Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2017
Eine Studie zeigt: Feindbilder formen das Selbstbild radikaler Gruppen und dienenihnen als Legiti... more Eine Studie zeigt: Feindbilder formen das Selbstbild radikaler Gruppen und dienenihnen als Legitimation für Gewalt. In den Szenediskursen von muslimfeindlichenGruppen nehmen Salafisten großen Raum ein und umgekehrt. Gleiches gilt fürRechts- und Linksextremisten. Was folgt daraus für die Prävention?
Interventionen. Zeitschrift für Verantwortungspädagogik, 2019
Die verheerenden Anschläge in Europa durch Mitglieder des dschihadistisch motivierten selbsterna... more Die verheerenden Anschläge in Europa durch Mitglieder des dschihadistisch motivierten selbsternannten „Islamischen Staates“ (IS), 2015 in Paris sowie 2016 in Brüssel und Berlin, wurden teilweise von Individuen mit krimineller Vorgeschichte verübt. Sie waren in ihrer Vergangenheit in kriminelle Machenschaften, wie Kleinkriminalität, organisiertes Verbrechen oder illegalen Handel, verwickelt, bevor sie sich dem IS, der wohl bislang „erfolgreichsten“ terroristischen Organisation, zuwandten. Diese Erkenntnis wird von empirischen Analysen wie dem internationalen Forschungsprojekt "From Criminals to Terrorists and Back" ebenso gestützt wie von der Analyse deutscher Sicherheitsbehörden zu den biographischen Hintergründen deutscher Syrien- und Irak-Ausreiser, die aufzeigt, dass zwei Drittel derer, die aus Deutschland ausreisten, um sich dschihadistisch motivierten Organisationen, wie dem IS oder dem lokalen al Qaida-Ableger der al-Nusra Front, anzuschließen, bereits vor ihrer Ausreise kriminell aufgefallen waren.
With the counter-terrorism policies of the US Government causing so much concern globally, it is ... more With the counter-terrorism policies of the US Government causing so much concern globally, it is necessary that an alternative discourse is initiated in Europe. This needs to be from the bottom-up and be a true representation of modern societies' values. Europeans need to engage in the debate about drones in order to preserve key democratic values such as transparency, accountability, and rule of law. The US drone program, and specifically the practice of targeted killings, pose legal, strategic, and political challenges and is of great significance for the acquisition of armed drone technology by European countries. The practice of targeted killing as a part of counter-terrorism strategies is not new. Still, the relevance of the topic today should be seen in light of the rapid progression in such operations. The use of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), popularly referred to as drones, has expanded the toolbox of counter-terrorism, as they represent an advancement in weapons technology that allows for low-risk missions in areas that were formerly unreachable. By looking at the current conduct of US drone programs in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the current US discourse on its legitimacy according to international law, and at its efficiency as a counter-terrorism strategy, lessons concerning the potential use of armed drones by European countries can be drawn. Given the probability of a spill over of US strategic culture via NATO programs and engagements, the need for an intrinsic European public debate closely related to European strategic culture(s) becomes unavoidable. Without European ownership of the debate, European countries risk an unquestioned procedural and operational spill over of the US
Financing of Organised Crime: Human Trafficking in Focus, 2019
The report Financing of Organised Crime: Human Trafficking in Focus contributes to a better under... more The report Financing of Organised Crime: Human Trafficking in Focus contributes to a better understanding of the financial aspects of this infamous phenomenon. The analysis explores the sources and mechanisms of the financing of trafficking in human beings, settlement of payments, access to financing in critical moments, costs of business, and the management of profits. The report draws on the findings of nine in-depth country case studies in Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Based on the results of the analysis and the examination of the current practices with regards to financial investigations, the report also suggests recommendations for tackling this crime.
Financing of Organised Crime: Human Trafficking in Focus, 2019
The report Financing of Organised Crime: Human Trafficking in Focus contributes to a better under... more The report Financing of Organised Crime: Human Trafficking in Focus contributes to a better understanding of the financial aspects of this infamous phenomenon. The analysis explores the sources and mechanisms of the financing of trafficking in human beings, settlement of payments, access to financing in critical moments, costs of business, and the management of profits. The report draws on the findings of nine in-depth country case studies in Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Based on the results of the analysis and the examination of the current practices with regards to financial investigations, the report also suggests recommendations for tackling this crime.
The Western Balkans at a crossroads. NATO Defense College Foundation, 2018
Our qualitative analysis of biographical profiles of Germans arrested for terrorism offences in 2... more Our qualitative analysis of biographical profiles of Germans arrested for terrorism offences in 2015 supports the hypothesis of a crime-terror nexus. However, not all cases were related to jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. On the contrary, our analysis also considers the case of a thwarted homegrown terrorist and an individual with links to a victim of the right-wing terrorist group the NSU (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund).
The above case studies reflect the diversity of profiles analysed in this report. These include the 58-year-old ringleader of a broader network that was deeply involved in recruitment processes and the transfer of goods and vehicles to Syria, as well as a man with psychiatric problems who attempted a homemade bomb attack at a bicycle race. Also, there is the paradigm crime-terror nexus case of a young man sentenced for burglary offences who became more radical in prison and, upon release, went to Syria to join Islamic State.
All the profiles analysed in this report are male. And with the notable exception of one rather successful schoolboy—who was diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome, probably self-radicalised and who returned from Syria completely disillusioned—most come from a challenging socio-economic background in which violence and criminality were both known and oft-accepted patterns in the broader social context.
The profiles analysed so far confirm the broader assessment that the radicalisation of individuals with criminal backgrounds is becoming a common pattern in one particular segment of the Salafi-jihadi scene. Moreover, such intensely intertwined crime-terror biographies appear to be prevalent among the lower ranks of the jihadi movement. In the case of Germany, most of the profiles are linked to the flow of foreign fighters towards Syria and Iraq and the support of jihadi groups in this region.
Countering Terrorist Recruitment in the Context of Armed Counter-Terrorism Operations, 2016
Birgit Enzmann (Hrsg.), Handbuch Politische Gewalt
Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie (E & D), 2014
Zur Früherkennung terroristischer Kampagnen
Konfliktregelung und Friedensstrategien, Jan 1, 2011
Dem früheren US-Präsidenten Reagan wird der Satz zugesprochen, was des einen Terrorist, ist des ... more Dem früheren US-Präsidenten Reagan wird der Satz zugesprochen, was des einen Terrorist, ist des anderen Freiheitskämpfer. Dieses Bonmot weist auf das Fehlen einer allgemein akzeptierter Definition dessen, was unter dem Begriff Terro-rismus zu verstehen ist.1 ...
Uploads
Papers by Matenia L I C K F E T T Sirseloudi
observed regarding political conflicts in the diaspora community countries of origin or in
countries with Muslim majorities in general. These conflicts seem to contribute to
radicalisation processes in Europe via different channels.
The above case studies reflect the diversity of profiles analysed in this report. These include the 58-year-old ringleader of a broader network that was deeply involved in recruitment processes and the transfer of goods and vehicles to Syria, as well as a man with psychiatric problems who attempted a homemade bomb attack at a bicycle race. Also, there is the paradigm crime-terror nexus case of a young man sentenced for burglary offences who became more radical in prison and, upon release, went to Syria to join Islamic State.
All the profiles analysed in this report are male. And with the notable exception of one rather successful schoolboy—who was diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome, probably self-radicalised and who returned from Syria completely disillusioned—most come from a challenging socio-economic background in which violence and criminality were both known and oft-accepted patterns in the broader social context.
The profiles analysed so far confirm the broader assessment that the radicalisation of individuals with criminal backgrounds is becoming a common pattern in one particular segment of the Salafi-jihadi scene. Moreover, such intensely intertwined crime-terror biographies appear to be prevalent among the lower ranks of the jihadi movement. In the case of Germany, most of the profiles are linked to the flow of foreign fighters towards Syria and Iraq and the support of jihadi groups in this region.
observed regarding political conflicts in the diaspora community countries of origin or in
countries with Muslim majorities in general. These conflicts seem to contribute to
radicalisation processes in Europe via different channels.
The above case studies reflect the diversity of profiles analysed in this report. These include the 58-year-old ringleader of a broader network that was deeply involved in recruitment processes and the transfer of goods and vehicles to Syria, as well as a man with psychiatric problems who attempted a homemade bomb attack at a bicycle race. Also, there is the paradigm crime-terror nexus case of a young man sentenced for burglary offences who became more radical in prison and, upon release, went to Syria to join Islamic State.
All the profiles analysed in this report are male. And with the notable exception of one rather successful schoolboy—who was diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome, probably self-radicalised and who returned from Syria completely disillusioned—most come from a challenging socio-economic background in which violence and criminality were both known and oft-accepted patterns in the broader social context.
The profiles analysed so far confirm the broader assessment that the radicalisation of individuals with criminal backgrounds is becoming a common pattern in one particular segment of the Salafi-jihadi scene. Moreover, such intensely intertwined crime-terror biographies appear to be prevalent among the lower ranks of the jihadi movement. In the case of Germany, most of the profiles are linked to the flow of foreign fighters towards Syria and Iraq and the support of jihadi groups in this region.
1.1. Zielgruppen und Funktionen terroristischer Kommunikation
2. Rolle von propagandistischer Gewalt während des
Radikalisierungsprozesses
2.1. Gewaltpropaganda im „Cognitive Opening“-Prozess
3. Jihadistische Propaganda
4. Exkurs - Interaktive Dynamiken