Kazakhs in China: Difference between revisions
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==History== |
==History== |
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=== Early history === |
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[[File:Saukele, Kasakh nomades, 19th century.jpg|thumb|Kazakh nomads in the 19th century]] |
[[File:Saukele, Kasakh nomades, 19th century.jpg|thumb|Kazakh nomads in the 19th century]] |
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In 1936, after [[Sheng Shicai]] expelled 30,000 Kazakhs from Xinjiang to Qinghai, [[Hui people|Hui Chinese]] led by General [[Ma Bufang]] massacred Kazakhs, until there were only 135 of them left.<ref>{{Cite journal |last= |first= |year=1951 |title=Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2t5VAAAAYAAJ |journal=American Academy of Political and Social Science |language=en |publisher=A.L. Hummel |volume=277 |pages=152 |access-date=28 June 2010 |quote=A group of Kazakhs, originally numbering over 20000 people when expelled from Sinkiang by Sheng Shih-ts'ai in 1936, was reduced, after repeated massacres by their Chinese coreligionists under Ma Pu-fang, to a scattered 135 people.}}</ref> |
In 1936, after [[Sheng Shicai]] expelled 30,000 Kazakhs from Xinjiang to Qinghai, [[Hui people|Hui Chinese]] led by General [[Ma Bufang]] massacred Kazakhs, until there were only 135 of them left.<ref>{{Cite journal |last= |first= |year=1951 |title=Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2t5VAAAAYAAJ |journal=American Academy of Political and Social Science |language=en |publisher=A.L. Hummel |volume=277 |pages=152 |access-date=28 June 2010 |quote=A group of Kazakhs, originally numbering over 20000 people when expelled from Sinkiang by Sheng Shih-ts'ai in 1936, was reduced, after repeated massacres by their Chinese coreligionists under Ma Pu-fang, to a scattered 135 people.}}</ref> |
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=== Modern history === |
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The arrival of the People’s Republic of China at the end of The Civil War led to significant changes in Xinjiang. The Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in the region were granted autonomy around governance, language, and religion at first, but the end goal was for the Kazakhs to integrate into the new Chinese State.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107. |
The arrival of the People’s Republic of China at the end of The Civil War led to significant changes in Xinjiang. The Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in the region were granted autonomy around governance, language, and religion at first, but the end goal was for the Kazakhs to integrate into the new Chinese State.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107. |
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In more outward ways, Xinjiang began to change as well. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps began a series of projects aimed at urbanising the region.<ref>Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99 |
In more outward ways, Xinjiang began to change as well. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps began a series of projects aimed at urbanising the region.<ref>Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99 |
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</ref>This, combined with the arrival of Han settlers led to a demographic shift as Kazakh areas were no longer majority Kazakh.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107. |
</ref> This, combined with the arrival of Han settlers led to a demographic shift as Kazakh areas were no longer majority Kazakh.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107. |
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</ref> This period also saw concerns over separatism, as worsening Sino-Soviet relations saw the USSR stirring up nationalist sentiments.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107. |
</ref> This period also saw concerns over separatism, as worsening Sino-Soviet relations saw the USSR stirring up nationalist sentiments.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107. |
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</ref> |
</ref> |
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⚫ | The end of the Cultural Revolution and rise of Deng Xiaoping led to a loosening of restrictions. The representation of Kazakhs rebounded, especially with the return of purged political leaders and Kazakhs who fled the country.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.</ref> The collectivisation policies were also rolled back, but ethnic tensions between Kazakh and Han persist.<ref>Zhang, Z; Tsakhirmaa, S, (2022) 'Ethnonationalism and the Changing Pattern of Ethnic Kazakhs’ Emigration from China to Kazakhstan', China Information, 36(3), pp. 318-343. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0920203X221092686</ref> |
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⚫ | But, there were limitations to the loosening of restrictions. The 1990s saw a wave of popular unrest and terrorist attacks that led to the Chinese Government instituting the Strike Hard campaign aimed at suppressing separatism and restoring security.<ref>Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf - </ref> This and the political climate after 9/11 led to a change in policy away from cultural assimilation to securitization, as the Chinese state increasingly cracked down on separatists and Islamist terrorists.<ref>Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf - </ref> |
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⚫ | The end of the Cultural Revolution and rise of Deng Xiaoping led to a loosening of restrictions. The representation of Kazakhs rebounded, especially with the return of purged political leaders and Kazakhs who fled the country.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.</ref>The collectivisation policies were also rolled back, but ethnic tensions between Kazakh and Han persist.<ref>Zhang, Z; Tsakhirmaa, S, (2022) 'Ethnonationalism and the Changing Pattern of Ethnic Kazakhs’ Emigration from China to Kazakhstan', China Information, 36(3), pp. 318-343. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0920203X221092686</ref> |
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⚫ | But, there were limitations to the loosening of restrictions. The 1990s saw a wave of popular unrest and terrorist attacks that led to the Chinese Government instituting the Strike Hard campaign aimed at suppressing separatism and restoring security.<ref>Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf - </ref> This and the political climate after 9/11 led to a change in policy away from cultural assimilation to securitization, as the Chinese state increasingly cracked down on separatists and Islamist terrorists.<ref>Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf - </ref> |
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=== Kazakh claims against other ethnic groups === |
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From 1934 to 1938, Qumil Elisqan led about 18,000 Kerey Kazakhs to migrate to Gansu and Qinghai.<ref name="Benson1988">{{cite book|first=Linda|last=Benson|title=The Kazaks of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ntpwAAAAMAAJ&q=%2818%29+If+one+goes+by+the+authors+or+the+documents+of+this+period,+the+number+of+Kazaks+who+went+to+Gansu+was+18+000.+...+%2821%29+While+we+were+living+there+during+these+2+years+the+people+who+were+resident+in+Qinghai+and+Gansu+were+Tibetans+.|year=1988|publisher=Ubsaliensis S. Academiae|isbn=978-91-554-2255-4|page=195}}</ref> Over the span of 2 years of battles, 5,000 Kazakhs were killed by Hui Muslim Chinese and Tibetans in Gansu. Led by Eliskhan Batur Elifuglu (1919–1943), the 13,000 survivors fled towards India in September 1940.<ref name=":0" /> |
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Tibetan troops robbed and killed Kazakhs 400 miles east of Lhasa at Chamdo when the Kazakhs were entering Tibet.<ref>{{cite book|title=Blackwood's Magazine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=p-LQAAAAMAAJ&q=%28I+subsequently+obtained+interesting+confirmation+of+the+Kazaks%27+sojourn+in+Kansu+;+for+one+day+the+Khan+Bahadur+brought+...+when+they+were+held+up+by+a+detachment+of+Tibetan+soldiers+and+officials,+who+killed+some+of+them+and+looted+much+of+...|year=1948|publisher=William Blackwood|page=407}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> To stop the migrants, a Tibetan cavalry numbering 1,000 attacked and fought the Kazakhs for three days in north Tibet, but ultimately lost.<ref name=":0" /> Afterwards, the Tibetan government sent the Kazakhs to the [[Ladakh]] region of [[Kashmir]] in British India.<ref name="Lin2011p231">{{cite book|author=Hsaio-ting Lin|title=Tibet and Nationalist China's Frontier: Intrigues and Ethnopolitics, 1928–49|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=osn1WrRCelcC&q=kazakhs+kansu+tibetans&pg=PA231|date=1 January 2011|publisher=UBC Press|isbn=978-0-7748-5988-2|pages=231–}}</ref> When they arrived at the Kashmir border, many Kazakhs died when the British ordered Indian guards to shoot. Once it was realized that they were civilians, the 3,039 surviving Kazakhs were let into India via Chuchul checkpoint in September 1941. Over these 3 years, 15,000 Kazakhs were killed.<ref name=":0" /> |
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Upon crossing the border, however, the Kazakhs were unwelcome in Kashmir, and were confined to an open mountainous camp on the outskirts of [[Muzaffarabad]]. Due to poor living conditions and the monsoon rains, more Kazakhs and their livestock died daily. In April 1942, with the help of local Muslims, the Kazakhs were allowed to move to Gari Habibullah, and then Ternova village, where Indian Muslims hosted them. Nevertheless, additional Kazakhs died from illness, poor diet, and the warm climate. The remaining Kazakhs were granted residence permits, and with the help of regional [[nawab]]s, resettled elsewhere, with most eventually ending up in Pakistan after the [[Partition of India]] in 1947.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Devlet |first=Nadir |date=2004 |title=Studies in the Politics, History and Culture of Turkic Peoples |url=https://www.academia.edu/4534001 |publisher=Yeditepe University |pages=191, 192 |format=PDF |publication-place=Istanbul |via=academia.edu}}</ref> |
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==Distribution== |
==Distribution== |
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[[File:Kazakh autonomous prefectures and counties in China.png|right|thumb|350px|Kazakh autonomous prefectures and counties in China]] |
[[File:Kazakh autonomous prefectures and counties in China.png|right|thumb|350px|Kazakh autonomous prefectures and counties in China]] |
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==Language and Culture== |
==Language and Culture== |
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[[File:Kazakh Yurts.jpg|thumb|Kazakh [[yurt]]s]] |
[[File:Kazakh Yurts.jpg|thumb|Kazakh [[yurt]]s]] |
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⚫ | The Kazakh population in China has a distinct culture, mostly based on a series of genealogical records that in addition to stipulating lineage, keep the traditional ways of life alive.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Salimjan |first=Guldana |date=2020-11-15 |title=Mapping loss, remembering ancestors: genealogical narratives of Kazakhs in China |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2020.1819772 |journal=Asian Ethnicity |volume=22 |issue=1 |pages=105–120 |doi=10.1080/14631369.2020.1819772 |issn=1463-1369}}</ref> Some Kazakhs are nomadic herders and raise sheep, goats, cattle, and horses. These nomadic Kazakhs migrate seasonally in search of pasture for their animals. During the summer the Kazakhs live in [[yurt]]s, while in winter they settle and live in modest houses made of adobe or cement blocks. Others live in urban areas and tend to be highly educated and hold much influence in integrated communities. The Islam practiced by the Kazakhs in China contains many elements of shamanism, ancestor worship, and other traditional beliefs and practices.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Elliot |first=Sheila Hollihan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BEwUAAAACAAJ |title=Muslims in China |publisher=Mason Crest Publishers |year=2006 |isbn=1-59084-880-2 |location=Philadelphia |pages=62–63}}</ref> |
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The Kazakh population in China has a distinct culture, mostly based on a series of genealogical records that in addition to stipulating lineage, keep the traditional ways of life alive.<ref>Salimjan, G. (2021) 'Mapping Loss, Remembering Ancestors: Genealogical Narratives of Kazakhs in China', Asian Ethnicity, 22(1), pp. 105-120. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1080/14631369.2020.1819772</ref>Kazakh is still spoken in the community, although unlike Kazakh varieties in Kazakhstan, it takes influences from Mandarin and is written in the Arabic script.<ref>Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99</ref> Chinese Kazakhs almost always speak Uygur or Mandarin in addition, both of which are used for interethnic communication.<ref>Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99</ref> Thus, Kazakh remains important but is seldom spoken outside the home, with the exception of Kazakh-majority areas.<ref>Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99</ref> Many Kazakhs feel ethnically distinct from other groups in Xinjiang and connected to Kazakhs across the border in Kazakhstan.<ref>Zhang, Z; Tsakhirmaa, S, (2022) 'Ethnonationalism and the Changing Pattern of Ethnic Kazakhs’ Emigration from China to Kazakhstan', China Information, 36(3), pp. 318-343. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0920203X221092686</ref> However, the rollback of Kazakh-medium education and the Russification of post-Soviet Kazakhs across the border means this feeling is not quite universal..<ref>Zhang, Z; Tsakhirmaa, S, (2022) 'Ethnonationalism and the Changing Pattern of Ethnic Kazakhs’ Emigration from China to Kazakhstan', China Information, 36(3), pp. 318-343. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0920203X221092686</ref> |
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⚫ | Some Kazakhs are nomadic herders and raise sheep, goats, cattle, and horses. These nomadic Kazakhs migrate seasonally in search of pasture for their animals. During the summer the Kazakhs live in [[yurt]]s, while in winter they settle and live in modest houses made of adobe or cement blocks. Others live in urban areas and tend to be highly educated and hold much influence in integrated communities. The Islam practiced by the Kazakhs in China contains many elements of shamanism, ancestor worship, and other traditional beliefs and practices.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BEwUAAAACAAJ|title=Muslims in China |
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='''Surveillance'''= |
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==='''Types of Surveillance'''=== |
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The Chinese surveillance apparatus employs extensive data collection and advanced artificial intelligence to create a more agile version of authoritarian governance, enabling it to exert unparalleled social control Chinese leaders are confident that by collecting large amounts of data, they can foresee potential threats and issues before they manifest The Chinese Communist Party has been integrating traditional surveillance techniques with cutting-edge technological innovations and biometric information to create a substantial surveillance system in Xinjiang. This surveillance system pertains to a range of measures from biometric data collection (facial and iris recognition) to vehicle and drone surveillance and smartphone applications These surveillance measures extend to every aspect of life in Xinjiang, such as technology use and social interactions, which puts pressure on ethnic minorities to conform to government standards |
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Impact of Surveillance |
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==='''Social and Cultural Impact of Surveillance on Kazakhs'''=== |
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For many years, the cultural landscape permitted traditional Kazakh shrines, festivals, and religious observances, such as the annual pilgrimage to the Imam Asim shrine. However, anti-terrorism and social stability policies have limited Kazakhs' freedom to express their religious beliefs and participate in communal cultural practices. This infrastructure has further facilitated extensive surveillance of community gatherings, festivals, and religious practices, affecting the ability to openly practise Islam . Since 2017, the CCP has adopted a more preventative approach to its policy in Xinjiang, allegedly detaining over one million people in re-education facilities. Hundreds of testimonies from minority Kazakhs who have been detained and released from these facilities have emerged online in the years since. One prominent account, given by Gulbahar Haitiwaji, details the physical and emotional abuse endured by detainees at the camp, where silence was enforced and military-style exercises were carried out every day, sometimes for multiple hours. |
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==='''Psychological and Behavioural Impacts of Surveillance'''=== |
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As there are no strict guidelines for assessing and determining potential 'transgressions,' local authorities are given prerogative in interpreting and administering these guidelines, further entrenching Beijing's 'preventative approach' to dealing with separatist activism within Xinjiang. In addition, when the ‘Grid Management System’ was implemented in Xinjiang, dividing communities into administrative zones, each given a group of party members with great discretion in implementing local tactics and strategies. Their job is to conduct surveillance on any activities that are thought to pose a threat to ‘social stability.’. This pervasive surveillance system has disrupted trust among the Kazakh community. Residents are incentivized to report any ‘suspicious’ activity amongst their neighbors, fostering a widespread sense of mistrust . This has significantly eroded the social fabric of Xinjiang, diminishing solidarity within the Kazakh community as individuals grow increasingly wary of one another. |
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==='''Surveillance and ‘Re-education’ Camps'''=== |
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Impact of Re-Education Camps: 2017 saw the launch of a contentious, forceful new approach to address what was labelled the ‘three threats’—terrorism, separatism, and religious radicalism. Many Kazakhs were sent to ‘re-education’ centres as part of the surveillance regime, removing them from the workforce temporarily. As aforementioned, this strategy led to multiple cultural communities, including Kazakhs, undergoing 'ideological and professional development' in re-education facilities. Such actions have resulted in considerable limitations on individual liberties and an intensified monitoring system, compelling people to self-censor, both online and in person. This forced absence creates financial strain on families, who must then survive without a primary wage earner. |
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Financial and Labour Market Surveillance: The financial effect on ethnic Kazakhs is significant, particularly for those who once participated in both cross-border commerce with Kazakhstan and the local labour market, as being flagged by the state puts employees at high unemployment risk. Those who have been tracked or scrutinised face discrimination in hiring, limiting their job opportunities. Surveillance regulations—as well as hindering commercial dealings—subject Kazakhs to perpetual observation. Business transactions in Xinjiang are highly monitored, and strict regulations hinder their capacity to engage in commerce openly, affecting the financial stability of Kazakhs more generally. |
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Kazakh is still spoken in the community, although unlike Kazakh varieties in Kazakhstan, it takes influences from Mandarin and is written in the Arabic script. Chinese Kazakhs almost always speak Uyghur or Mandarin in addition, both of which are used for interethnic communication.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=S.Zh. Tazhibayeva |first=S.Zh. Tazhibayeva |last2=I.A. Nevskaya |first2=I.A. Nevskaya |last3=A.K. Mutali |first3=A.K. Mutali |last4=A. Kadyskyzy |first4=A. Kadyskyzy |last5=A.A. Absady |first5=A.A. Absady |date=2023 |title=Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.32523/2664-5157-2023-4-130-145 |journal=Turkic Studies Journal |volume=5 |issue=4 |pages=130–145 |doi=10.32523/2664-5157-2023-4-130-145 |issn=2664-5157}}</ref> Thus, Kazakh remains important but is seldom spoken outside the home, with the exception of Kazakh-majority areas.<ref name=":0" /> Many Kazakhs feel ethnically distinct from other groups in Xinjiang and connected to Kazakhs across the border in Kazakhstan.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Zhang |first=Zhe |last2=Tsakhirmaa |first2=Sansar |date=2022-05-11 |title=Ethnonationalism and the changing pattern of ethnic Kazakhs’ emigration from China to Kazakhstan |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0920203x221092686 |journal=China Information |volume=36 |issue=3 |pages=318–343 |doi=10.1177/0920203x221092686 |issn=0920-203X}}</ref> However, the rollback of Kazakh-medium education and the Russification of post-Soviet Kazakhs across the border means this feeling is not quite universal.<ref name=":1" /> |
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Mobility Surveillance: |
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As a result of intensified monitoring measures introduced in recent years, especially following 2016, ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang have encountered greater limitations on travel, particularly regarding passport acquisition. This restriction has hindered numerous individuals eager to relocate to Kazakhstan from departing China, as their requests for passports and other travel documents face denial or postponement due to heightened examination by local officials. Surveillance limits Kazakhs’ freedom of movement, as they are frequently stopped at checkpoints requiring ID verification, facial scans, or biometric data entry. These checkpoints inhibit their ability to travel freely for work, education, or family visits. |
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==Notable people== |
==Notable people== |
Revision as of 03:55, 5 November 2024
Total population | |
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1,462,588 | |
Regions with significant populations | |
Xinjiang (Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Aksai Kazakh Autonomous County, Barkol Kazakh Autonomous County, Mori Kazakh Autonomous County) | |
Languages | |
Kazakh, Mandarin | |
Religion | |
Majority Sunni Islam, minority Tibetan Buddhism or unaffiliated | |
Related ethnic groups | |
Uyghurs, Salar people, Kyrgyz in China, Uzbeks in China |
Kazakhs in China | |||||||
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Chinese name | |||||||
Simplified Chinese | 中国哈萨克族 | ||||||
Traditional Chinese | 中國哈薩克族 | ||||||
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Dunganese name | |||||||
Dungan | Җунгуй хазахзў | ||||||
Kazakh name | |||||||
Kazakh | جۇڭگو قازاقتارى Қытайда қазақтар Qytaida qazaqtar [qɤ̆tʰaɪtá qasaχtʰáɚ] |
Part of a series on Islam in China |
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Islam portal • China portal |
Kazakhs in China form the largest community of Kazakhs outside Kazakhstan. They are one of the 56 ethnic groups officially recognized by the People's Republic of China. There is one Kazakh autonomous prefecture – Ili in Xinjiang – and three Kazakh autonomous counties – Aksay in Gansu, and Barkol and Mori in Xinjiang.
History
Early history
During the fall of the Dzungar Khanate in the mid-18th century, the Manchus of the Qing Dynasty massacred the native Dzungars of Dzungaria in the Dzungar genocide, and afterwards colonized the depopulated area with immigrants from many parts of their empire. Among the peoples that moved into the depopulated Dzungaria were the Kazakhs from the Kazakh Khanates.[1]
In the 19th century, the advance of the Russian Empire troops pushed the Kazakhs to neighboring countries. Russian settlers on traditional Kazakh land drove many over the border to China, causing their population to increase in China.[2]
During the Russian Revolution, when Muslims faced conscription, Xinjiang again became a sanctuary for Kazakhs fleeing Russia.[3] During the 1920s, hundreds of thousands of Kazakh nomads moved from Soviet Kazakhstan to Xinjiang to escape Soviet persecution, famine,[note 1] violence, and forced sedentarization.[4] Kazakhs that moved to China fought for the Soviet Communist-backed Uyghur Second East Turkestan Republic in the Ili Rebellion (1944–1949).
Toops[who?] estimated that 326,000 Kazakhs, 65,000 Kirghiz, 92,000 Hui, 187,000 Han, and 2,984,000 Uyghur (totaling 3,730,000) lived in Xinjiang in 1941. Hoppe[who?] estimated that 4,334,000 people lived in Xinjiang in 1949.[5]
In 1936, after Sheng Shicai expelled 30,000 Kazakhs from Xinjiang to Qinghai, Hui Chinese led by General Ma Bufang massacred Kazakhs, until there were only 135 of them left.[6]
Modern history
The arrival of the People’s Republic of China at the end of The Civil War led to significant changes in Xinjiang. The Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in the region were granted autonomy around governance, language, and religion at first, but the end goal was for the Kazakhs to integrate into the new Chinese State.[7]
In the early stages, this meant high spending on infrastructure and education, aiming to boost agricultural output and literacy respectively.[8] The arrival of the Cultural Revolution saw the end of permissiveness and the beginning of a more hardline policy, as Kazakh party cadres were purged, Islamic practice restricted, and pastoralist herds collectivized.[9] The end of pastoralism was especially harmful, as the connection to the land and nomadic lifestyle remains an important part of the Kazakh identity.[10]
In more outward ways, Xinjiang began to change as well. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps began a series of projects aimed at urbanising the region.[11] This, combined with the arrival of Han settlers led to a demographic shift as Kazakh areas were no longer majority Kazakh.[12] This period also saw concerns over separatism, as worsening Sino-Soviet relations saw the USSR stirring up nationalist sentiments.[13]
The end of the Cultural Revolution and rise of Deng Xiaoping led to a loosening of restrictions. The representation of Kazakhs rebounded, especially with the return of purged political leaders and Kazakhs who fled the country.[14] The collectivisation policies were also rolled back, but ethnic tensions between Kazakh and Han persist.[15]
But, there were limitations to the loosening of restrictions. The 1990s saw a wave of popular unrest and terrorist attacks that led to the Chinese Government instituting the Strike Hard campaign aimed at suppressing separatism and restoring security.[16] This and the political climate after 9/11 led to a change in policy away from cultural assimilation to securitization, as the Chinese state increasingly cracked down on separatists and Islamist terrorists.[17]
Distribution
By province
By county
(Only includes counties or county-equivalents containing >1% of county population.)
Сounty/City | % Kazakh | Kazakh pop | Total pop |
---|---|---|---|
Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region | 6.74 | 1,245,023 | 18,459,511 |
Aksay Kazakh autonomous county | 30.5 | 2,712 | 8,891 |
Ürümqi city | 2.34 | 48,772 | 2,081,834 |
Tianshan district | 1.77 | 8,354 | 471,432 |
Saybag district | 1.27 | 6,135 | 482,235 |
Xinshi district | 1.06 | 4,005 | 379,220 |
Dongshan district | 1.96 | 1,979 | 100,796 |
Ürümqi county | 8.00 | 26,278 | 328,536 |
Karamay city | 3.67 | 9,919 | 270,232 |
Dushanzi district | 4.24 | 2,150 | 50,732 |
Karamay district | 3.49 | 5,079 | 145,452 |
Baijiantan district | 3.35 | 2,151 | 64,297 |
Urko district | 5.53 | 539 | 9,751 |
Hami city | 8.76 | 43,104 | 492,096 |
Yizhou district | 2.71 | 10,546 | 388,714 |
Barkol Kazakh autonomous county | 34.01 | 29,236 | 85,964 |
Yiwu county | 19.07 | 3,322 | 17,418 |
Changji Hui autonomous prefecture | 7.98 | 119,942 | 1,503,097 |
Changji city | 4.37 | 16,919 | 387,169 |
Fukang city | 7.83 | 11,984 | 152,965 |
Midong district | 1.94 | 3,515 | 180,952 |
Hutubi county | 10.03 | 21,118 | 210,643 |
Manas county | 9.62 | 16,410 | 170,533 |
Qitai county | 10.07 | 20,629 | 204,796 |
Jimsar county | 8.06 | 9,501 | 117,867 |
Mori Kazakh autonomous county | 25.41 | 19,866 | 78,172 |
Bortala Mongol autonomous prefecture | 9.14 | 38,744 | 424,040 |
Bole city | 7.10 | 15,955 | 224,869 |
Jinghe county | 8.27 | 11,048 | 133,530 |
Wenquan county | 17.89 | 11,741 | 65,641 |
Ili Kazakh autonomous prefecture | 1.78 | 5,077 | 285,299 |
Kuytun city | 1.78 | 5,077 | 285,299 |
Ili prefecture direct-controlled territories | 22.55 | 469,634 | 2,082,577 |
Ghulja city | 4.81 | 17,205 | 357,519 |
Ghulja county | 10.30 | 39,745 | 385,829 |
Qapqal Xibe autonomous county | 20.00 | 32,363 | 161,834 |
Huocheng county | 7.96 | 26,519 | 333,013 |
Gongliu county | 29.69 | 45,450 | 153,100 |
Xinyuan county | 43.43 | 117,195 | 269,842 |
Zhaosu county | 48.43 | 70,242 | 145,027 |
Tekes county | 42.25 | 56,571 | 133,900 |
Nilka county | 45.15 | 64,344 | 142,513 |
Tacheng prefecture | 24.21 | 216,020 | 892,397 |
Tacheng city | 15.51 | 23,144 | 149,210 |
Usu city | 9.93 | 18,907 | 190,359 |
Emin county | 33.42 | 59,586 | 178,309 |
Shawan county | 16.23 | 30,621 | 188,715 |
Toli county | 68.98 | 55,102 | 79,882 |
Yumin county | 32.42 | 15,609 | 48,147 |
Hoboksar Mongol autonomous county | 22.59 | 13,051 | 57,775 |
Altay prefecture | 51.38 | 288,612 | 561,667 |
Altay city | 36.80 | 65,693 | 178,510 |
Burqin county | 57.31 | 35,324 | 61,633 |
Koktokay county | 69.68 | 56,433 | 80,986 |
Burultokay county | 31.86 | 24,793 | 77,830 |
Kaba county | 59.79 | 43,889 | 73,403 |
Qinggil county | 75.61 | 40,709 | 53,843 |
Jiminay county | 61.39 | 21,771 | 35,462 |
Language and Culture
The Kazakh population in China has a distinct culture, mostly based on a series of genealogical records that in addition to stipulating lineage, keep the traditional ways of life alive.[18] Some Kazakhs are nomadic herders and raise sheep, goats, cattle, and horses. These nomadic Kazakhs migrate seasonally in search of pasture for their animals. During the summer the Kazakhs live in yurts, while in winter they settle and live in modest houses made of adobe or cement blocks. Others live in urban areas and tend to be highly educated and hold much influence in integrated communities. The Islam practiced by the Kazakhs in China contains many elements of shamanism, ancestor worship, and other traditional beliefs and practices.[19]
Kazakh is still spoken in the community, although unlike Kazakh varieties in Kazakhstan, it takes influences from Mandarin and is written in the Arabic script. Chinese Kazakhs almost always speak Uyghur or Mandarin in addition, both of which are used for interethnic communication.[20] Thus, Kazakh remains important but is seldom spoken outside the home, with the exception of Kazakh-majority areas.[20] Many Kazakhs feel ethnically distinct from other groups in Xinjiang and connected to Kazakhs across the border in Kazakhstan.[21] However, the rollback of Kazakh-medium education and the Russification of post-Soviet Kazakhs across the border means this feeling is not quite universal.[21]
Notable people
- Osman Batur (1899–1951) – Kazakh chieftain who fought both for and against the Nationalist Chinese government in the 1940s and early 1950s
- Dalelkhan Sugirbayev (1906–1949) – Kazakh chieftain who fought against the Nationalist Chinese government and sought to join the Chinese Communists in 1949
- Qazhyghumar Shabdanuly (Template:Lang-kk; 1925–2011) – Kazakh Chinese political activist and author writing in Kazakh language. For more than forty years, Shabdanuly was imprisoned by the People's Republic of China for his political views.
- Ashat Kerimbay (Template:Lang-kk) – Chinese politician
- Mukhtar Kul-Mukhammed (Template:Lang-kk) – politician and public figure of Kazakhstan; First Deputy Chairman of "Nur Otan" party
- Janabil Jänäbil Smağululı (Template:Lang-kk) – Chinese politician
- Mayra Muhammad-kyzy (Template:Lang-kk; Maira Kerey) – opera singer. She was the first Kazakh at the Parisian Grand Opera, and is an Honored Artist of the Republic.
- Mamer – folk singer
- Rayzha Alimjan (Template:Lang-kk; رايزا ٴالىمجان) – Kazakh Chinese actress and model
- Xiakaini Aerchenghazi (Template:Lang-kk) – speed skater who competed in the 2018 Winter Olympics
- Rehanbai Talabuhan – speed skater who competed in the 2018 Winter Olympics
- Adake Ahenaer (Template:Lang-kk) – speed skater
- Yeljan Shinar (Template:Lang-kk) – footballer currently playing as a defender for Shenzhen
- Yerjet Yerzat – Chinese footballer for Chongqing Dangdai Lifan FC
- Yeerlanbieke Katai (Template:Lang-kk) – freestyle wrestler; bronze medals winner at the 2014 Asian Games, and competed in the 2016 Summer Olympics
- Jumabieke Tuerxun – mixed martial arts fighter; he previously fought as a Bantamweight in the Ultimate Fighting Championship[22]
- Kanat Islam – boxer who won bronze medals at the 2008 Summer Olympics, 2007 World Championships, and the 2006 Asian Games
- Yushan Nijiati – amateur boxer; bronze medal winner at the 2007 World Amateur Boxing Championships in the 91 kg division
- Tuohetaerbieke Tanglatihan (Template:Lang-kk) – amateur boxer; competed in the men's middleweight event at the 2020 Summer Olympics
- Walihan Sailike (Template:Lang-kk) – Greco-Roman wrestler; bronze medal winner in the 60 kg event at the 2018 World Wrestling Championships, and bronze medal winner in the 2020 Summer Olympics
- Ahenaer Adake (Template:Lang-kk) – speed skater; competed in the women’s 1,500 meters, 3,000 meters, and team pursuit events at the 2022 Winter Olympics
See also
- Kazakh exodus from Xinjiang
- Kyrgyz in China
- Dungans
- 2020 Dungan–Kazakh ethnic clashes
- Uzbeks in China
Notes
- ^ This included the Kazakh famine of 1919–1922 and Kazakh famine of 1930–1933.
References
- ^ Smagulova, Anar. "XVIII – XIX Centuries. In the Manuscripts of the Kazakhs of China". academia.edu. East Kazakhstan State University.
- ^ Alexander Douglas Mitchell Carruthers; Jack Humphrey Miller (1914). Unknown Mongolia: A Record of Travel and Exploration in North-west Mongolia and Dzungaria. Hutchinson & Company. p. 345.
- ^ Andrew D. W. Forbes (9 October 1986). Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949. CUP Archive. pp. 17–. ISBN 978-0-521-25514-1.
- ^ Genina, Anna (2015). Claiming Ancestral Homelandsː Mongolian Kazakh migration in Inner Asia (PDF) (A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Anthropology) in The University of Michigan). p. 113.
- ^ Bellér-Hann, Ildikó (2008). Community Matters in Xinjiang, 1880–1949: Towards a Historical Anthropology of the Uyghur. BRILL. pp. 64–. ISBN 978-90-04-16675-2.
- ^ "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science". American Academy of Political and Social Science. 277. A.L. Hummel: 152. 1951. Retrieved 28 June 2010.
A group of Kazakhs, originally numbering over 20000 people when expelled from Sinkiang by Sheng Shih-ts'ai in 1936, was reduced, after repeated massacres by their Chinese coreligionists under Ma Pu-fang, to a scattered 135 people.
- ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
- ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
- ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
- ^ Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99
- ^ Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99
- ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
- ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
- ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
- ^ Zhang, Z; Tsakhirmaa, S, (2022) 'Ethnonationalism and the Changing Pattern of Ethnic Kazakhs’ Emigration from China to Kazakhstan', China Information, 36(3), pp. 318-343. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0920203X221092686
- ^ Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf -
- ^ Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf -
- ^ Salimjan, Guldana (15 November 2020). "Mapping loss, remembering ancestors: genealogical narratives of Kazakhs in China". Asian Ethnicity. 22 (1): 105–120. doi:10.1080/14631369.2020.1819772. ISSN 1463-1369.
- ^ Elliot, Sheila Hollihan (2006). Muslims in China. Philadelphia: Mason Crest Publishers. pp. 62–63. ISBN 1-59084-880-2.
- ^ a b S.Zh. Tazhibayeva, S.Zh. Tazhibayeva; I.A. Nevskaya, I.A. Nevskaya; A.K. Mutali, A.K. Mutali; A. Kadyskyzy, A. Kadyskyzy; A.A. Absady, A.A. Absady (2023). "Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China". Turkic Studies Journal. 5 (4): 130–145. doi:10.32523/2664-5157-2023-4-130-145. ISSN 2664-5157.
- ^ a b Zhang, Zhe; Tsakhirmaa, Sansar (11 May 2022). "Ethnonationalism and the changing pattern of ethnic Kazakhs' emigration from China to Kazakhstan". China Information. 36 (3): 318–343. doi:10.1177/0920203x221092686. ISSN 0920-203X.
- ^ "Jumabieke Tuerxun: From The Rural Edges of China to the UFC". Fightland. Retrieved 24 October 2014.