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==History==
==History==

=== Early history ===
[[File:Saukele, Kasakh nomades, 19th century.jpg|thumb|Kazakh nomads in the 19th century]]
[[File:Saukele, Kasakh nomades, 19th century.jpg|thumb|Kazakh nomads in the 19th century]]


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In 1936, after [[Sheng Shicai]] expelled 30,000 Kazakhs from Xinjiang to Qinghai, [[Hui people|Hui Chinese]] led by General [[Ma Bufang]] massacred Kazakhs, until there were only 135 of them left.<ref>{{Cite journal |last= |first= |year=1951 |title=Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2t5VAAAAYAAJ |journal=American Academy of Political and Social Science |language=en |publisher=A.L. Hummel |volume=277 |pages=152 |access-date=28 June 2010 |quote=A group of Kazakhs, originally numbering over 20000 people when expelled from Sinkiang by Sheng Shih-ts'ai in 1936, was reduced, after repeated massacres by their Chinese coreligionists under Ma Pu-fang, to a scattered 135 people.}}</ref>
In 1936, after [[Sheng Shicai]] expelled 30,000 Kazakhs from Xinjiang to Qinghai, [[Hui people|Hui Chinese]] led by General [[Ma Bufang]] massacred Kazakhs, until there were only 135 of them left.<ref>{{Cite journal |last= |first= |year=1951 |title=Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2t5VAAAAYAAJ |journal=American Academy of Political and Social Science |language=en |publisher=A.L. Hummel |volume=277 |pages=152 |access-date=28 June 2010 |quote=A group of Kazakhs, originally numbering over 20000 people when expelled from Sinkiang by Sheng Shih-ts'ai in 1936, was reduced, after repeated massacres by their Chinese coreligionists under Ma Pu-fang, to a scattered 135 people.}}</ref>


=== Modern history ===
The arrival of the People’s Republic of China at the end of The Civil War led to significant changes in Xinjiang. The Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in the region were granted autonomy around governance, language, and religion at first, but the end goal was for the Kazakhs to integrate into the new Chinese State.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
The arrival of the People’s Republic of China at the end of The Civil War led to significant changes in Xinjiang. The Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in the region were granted autonomy around governance, language, and religion at first, but the end goal was for the Kazakhs to integrate into the new Chinese State.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
</ref>
</ref>
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In more outward ways, Xinjiang began to change as well. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps began a series of projects aimed at urbanising the region.<ref>Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99
In more outward ways, Xinjiang began to change as well. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps began a series of projects aimed at urbanising the region.<ref>Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99
</ref>This, combined with the arrival of Han settlers led to a demographic shift as Kazakh areas were no longer majority Kazakh.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
</ref> This, combined with the arrival of Han settlers led to a demographic shift as Kazakh areas were no longer majority Kazakh.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
</ref> This period also saw concerns over separatism, as worsening Sino-Soviet relations saw the USSR stirring up nationalist sentiments.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
</ref> This period also saw concerns over separatism, as worsening Sino-Soviet relations saw the USSR stirring up nationalist sentiments.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
</ref>
</ref>
The end of the Cultural Revolution and rise of Deng Xiaoping led to a loosening of restrictions. The representation of Kazakhs rebounded, especially with the return of purged political leaders and Kazakhs who fled the country.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.</ref> The collectivisation policies were also rolled back, but ethnic tensions between Kazakh and Han persist.<ref>Zhang, Z; Tsakhirmaa, S, (2022) 'Ethnonationalism and the Changing Pattern of Ethnic Kazakhs’ Emigration from China to Kazakhstan', China Information, 36(3), pp. 318-343. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0920203X221092686</ref>


But, there were limitations to the loosening of restrictions. The 1990s saw a wave of popular unrest and terrorist attacks that led to the Chinese Government instituting the Strike Hard campaign aimed at suppressing separatism and restoring security.<ref>Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf - </ref> This and the political climate after 9/11 led to a change in policy away from cultural assimilation to securitization, as the Chinese state increasingly cracked down on separatists and Islamist terrorists.<ref>Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf - </ref>
The end of the Cultural Revolution and rise of Deng Xiaoping led to a loosening of restrictions. The representation of Kazakhs rebounded, especially with the return of purged political leaders and Kazakhs who fled the country.<ref>Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.</ref>The collectivisation policies were also rolled back, but ethnic tensions between Kazakh and Han persist.<ref>Zhang, Z; Tsakhirmaa, S, (2022) 'Ethnonationalism and the Changing Pattern of Ethnic Kazakhs’ Emigration from China to Kazakhstan', China Information, 36(3), pp. 318-343. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0920203X221092686</ref>

But, there were limitations to the loosening of restrictions. The 1990s saw a wave of popular unrest and terrorist attacks that led to the Chinese Government instituting the Strike Hard campaign aimed at suppressing separatism and restoring security.<ref>Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf - </ref> This and the political climate after 9/11 led to a change in policy away from cultural assimilation to securitization, as the Chinese state increasingly cracked down on separatists and Islamist terrorists.<ref>Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf - </ref>


=== Kazakh claims against other ethnic groups ===
From 1934 to 1938, Qumil Elisqan led about 18,000 Kerey Kazakhs to migrate to Gansu and Qinghai.<ref name="Benson1988">{{cite book|first=Linda|last=Benson|title=The Kazaks of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ntpwAAAAMAAJ&q=%2818%29+If+one+goes+by+the+authors+or+the+documents+of+this+period,+the+number+of+Kazaks+who+went+to+Gansu+was+18+000.+...+%2821%29+While+we+were+living+there+during+these+2+years+the+people+who+were+resident+in+Qinghai+and+Gansu+were+Tibetans+.|year=1988|publisher=Ubsaliensis S. Academiae|isbn=978-91-554-2255-4|page=195}}</ref> Over the span of 2 years of battles, 5,000 Kazakhs were killed by Hui Muslim Chinese and Tibetans in Gansu. Led by Eliskhan Batur Elifuglu (1919–1943), the 13,000 survivors fled towards India in September 1940.<ref name=":0" />

Tibetan troops robbed and killed Kazakhs 400 miles east of Lhasa at Chamdo when the Kazakhs were entering Tibet.<ref>{{cite book|title=Blackwood's Magazine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=p-LQAAAAMAAJ&q=%28I+subsequently+obtained+interesting+confirmation+of+the+Kazaks%27+sojourn+in+Kansu+;+for+one+day+the+Khan+Bahadur+brought+...+when+they+were+held+up+by+a+detachment+of+Tibetan+soldiers+and+officials,+who+killed+some+of+them+and+looted+much+of+...|year=1948|publisher=William Blackwood|page=407}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> To stop the migrants, a Tibetan cavalry numbering 1,000 attacked and fought the Kazakhs for three days in north Tibet, but ultimately lost.<ref name=":0" /> Afterwards, the Tibetan government sent the Kazakhs to the [[Ladakh]] region of [[Kashmir]] in British India.<ref name="Lin2011p231">{{cite book|author=Hsaio-ting Lin|title=Tibet and Nationalist China's Frontier: Intrigues and Ethnopolitics, 1928–49|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=osn1WrRCelcC&q=kazakhs+kansu+tibetans&pg=PA231|date=1 January 2011|publisher=UBC Press|isbn=978-0-7748-5988-2|pages=231–}}</ref> When they arrived at the Kashmir border, many Kazakhs died when the British ordered Indian guards to shoot. Once it was realized that they were civilians, the 3,039 surviving Kazakhs were let into India via Chuchul checkpoint in September 1941. Over these 3 years, 15,000 Kazakhs were killed.<ref name=":0" />

Upon crossing the border, however, the Kazakhs were unwelcome in Kashmir, and were confined to an open mountainous camp on the outskirts of [[Muzaffarabad]]. Due to poor living conditions and the monsoon rains, more Kazakhs and their livestock died daily. In April 1942, with the help of local Muslims, the Kazakhs were allowed to move to Gari Habibullah, and then Ternova village, where Indian Muslims hosted them. Nevertheless, additional Kazakhs died from illness, poor diet, and the warm climate. The remaining Kazakhs were granted residence permits, and with the help of regional [[nawab]]s, resettled elsewhere, with most eventually ending up in Pakistan after the [[Partition of India]] in 1947.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Devlet |first=Nadir |date=2004 |title=Studies in the Politics, History and Culture of Turkic Peoples |url=https://www.academia.edu/4534001 |publisher=Yeditepe University |pages=191, 192 |format=PDF |publication-place=Istanbul |via=academia.edu}}</ref>

==Distribution==
==Distribution==
[[File:Kazakh autonomous prefectures and counties in China.png|right|thumb|350px|Kazakh autonomous prefectures and counties in China]]
[[File:Kazakh autonomous prefectures and counties in China.png|right|thumb|350px|Kazakh autonomous prefectures and counties in China]]
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==Language and Culture==
==Language and Culture==
[[File:Kazakh Yurts.jpg|thumb|Kazakh [[yurt]]s]]
[[File:Kazakh Yurts.jpg|thumb|Kazakh [[yurt]]s]]
The Kazakh population in China has a distinct culture, mostly based on a series of genealogical records that in addition to stipulating lineage, keep the traditional ways of life alive.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Salimjan |first=Guldana |date=2020-11-15 |title=Mapping loss, remembering ancestors: genealogical narratives of Kazakhs in China |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2020.1819772 |journal=Asian Ethnicity |volume=22 |issue=1 |pages=105–120 |doi=10.1080/14631369.2020.1819772 |issn=1463-1369}}</ref> Some Kazakhs are nomadic herders and raise sheep, goats, cattle, and horses. These nomadic Kazakhs migrate seasonally in search of pasture for their animals. During the summer the Kazakhs live in [[yurt]]s, while in winter they settle and live in modest houses made of adobe or cement blocks. Others live in urban areas and tend to be highly educated and hold much influence in integrated communities. The Islam practiced by the Kazakhs in China contains many elements of shamanism, ancestor worship, and other traditional beliefs and practices.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Elliot |first=Sheila Hollihan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BEwUAAAACAAJ |title=Muslims in China |publisher=Mason Crest Publishers |year=2006 |isbn=1-59084-880-2 |location=Philadelphia |pages=62–63}}</ref>
The Kazakh population in China has a distinct culture, mostly based on a series of genealogical records that in addition to stipulating lineage, keep the traditional ways of life alive.<ref>Salimjan, G. (2021) 'Mapping Loss, Remembering Ancestors: Genealogical Narratives of Kazakhs in China', Asian Ethnicity, 22(1), pp. 105-120. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1080/14631369.2020.1819772</ref>Kazakh is still spoken in the community, although unlike Kazakh varieties in Kazakhstan, it takes influences from Mandarin and is written in the Arabic script.<ref>Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99</ref> Chinese Kazakhs almost always speak Uygur or Mandarin in addition, both of which are used for interethnic communication.<ref>Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99</ref> Thus, Kazakh remains important but is seldom spoken outside the home, with the exception of Kazakh-majority areas.<ref>Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99</ref> Many Kazakhs feel ethnically distinct from other groups in Xinjiang and connected to Kazakhs across the border in Kazakhstan.<ref>Zhang, Z; Tsakhirmaa, S, (2022) 'Ethnonationalism and the Changing Pattern of Ethnic Kazakhs’ Emigration from China to Kazakhstan', China Information, 36(3), pp. 318-343. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0920203X221092686</ref> However, the rollback of Kazakh-medium education and the Russification of post-Soviet Kazakhs across the border means this feeling is not quite universal..<ref>Zhang, Z; Tsakhirmaa, S, (2022) 'Ethnonationalism and the Changing Pattern of Ethnic Kazakhs’ Emigration from China to Kazakhstan', China Information, 36(3), pp. 318-343. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0920203X221092686</ref>

Some Kazakhs are nomadic herders and raise sheep, goats, cattle, and horses. These nomadic Kazakhs migrate seasonally in search of pasture for their animals. During the summer the Kazakhs live in [[yurt]]s, while in winter they settle and live in modest houses made of adobe or cement blocks. Others live in urban areas and tend to be highly educated and hold much influence in integrated communities. The Islam practiced by the Kazakhs in China contains many elements of shamanism, ancestor worship, and other traditional beliefs and practices.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BEwUAAAACAAJ|title=Muslims in China|last=Elliot|first=Sheila Hollihan|publisher=Mason Crest Publishers|year=2006|isbn=1-59084-880-2|location=Philadelphia|pages=62–63}}</ref>

='''Surveillance'''=

==='''Types of Surveillance'''===

The Chinese surveillance apparatus employs extensive data collection and advanced artificial intelligence to create a more agile version of authoritarian governance, enabling it to exert unparalleled social control Chinese leaders are confident that by collecting large amounts of data, they can foresee potential threats and issues before they manifest The Chinese Communist Party has been integrating traditional surveillance techniques with cutting-edge technological innovations and biometric information to create a substantial surveillance system in Xinjiang. This surveillance system pertains to a range of measures from biometric data collection (facial and iris recognition) to vehicle and drone surveillance and smartphone applications These surveillance measures extend to every aspect of life in Xinjiang, such as technology use and social interactions, which puts pressure on ethnic minorities to conform to government standards
Impact of Surveillance

==='''Social and Cultural Impact of Surveillance on Kazakhs'''===

For many years, the cultural landscape permitted traditional Kazakh shrines, festivals, and religious observances, such as the annual pilgrimage to the Imam Asim shrine. However, anti-terrorism and social stability policies have limited Kazakhs' freedom to express their religious beliefs and participate in communal cultural practices. This infrastructure has further facilitated extensive surveillance of community gatherings, festivals, and religious practices, affecting the ability to openly practise Islam . Since 2017, the CCP has adopted a more preventative approach to its policy in Xinjiang, allegedly detaining over one million people in re-education facilities. Hundreds of testimonies from minority Kazakhs who have been detained and released from these facilities have emerged online in the years since. One prominent account, given by Gulbahar Haitiwaji, details the physical and emotional abuse endured by detainees at the camp, where silence was enforced and military-style exercises were carried out every day, sometimes for multiple hours.

==='''Psychological and Behavioural Impacts of Surveillance'''===
As there are no strict guidelines for assessing and determining potential 'transgressions,' local authorities are given prerogative in interpreting and administering these guidelines, further entrenching Beijing's 'preventative approach' to dealing with separatist activism within Xinjiang. In addition, when the ‘Grid Management System’ was implemented in Xinjiang, dividing communities into administrative zones, each given a group of party members with great discretion in implementing local tactics and strategies. Their job is to conduct surveillance on any activities that are thought to pose a threat to ‘social stability.’. This pervasive surveillance system has disrupted trust among the Kazakh community. Residents are incentivized to report any ‘suspicious’ activity amongst their neighbors, fostering a widespread sense of mistrust . This has significantly eroded the social fabric of Xinjiang, diminishing solidarity within the Kazakh community as individuals grow increasingly wary of one another.

==='''Surveillance and ‘Re-education’ Camps'''===

Impact of Re-Education Camps: 2017 saw the launch of a contentious, forceful new approach to address what was labelled the ‘three threats’—terrorism, separatism, and religious radicalism. Many Kazakhs were sent to ‘re-education’ centres as part of the surveillance regime, removing them from the workforce temporarily. As aforementioned, this strategy led to multiple cultural communities, including Kazakhs, undergoing 'ideological and professional development' in re-education facilities. Such actions have resulted in considerable limitations on individual liberties and an intensified monitoring system, compelling people to self-censor, both online and in person. This forced absence creates financial strain on families, who must then survive without a primary wage earner.

Financial and Labour Market Surveillance: The financial effect on ethnic Kazakhs is significant, particularly for those who once participated in both cross-border commerce with Kazakhstan and the local labour market, as being flagged by the state puts employees at high unemployment risk. Those who have been tracked or scrutinised face discrimination in hiring, limiting their job opportunities. Surveillance regulations—as well as hindering commercial dealings—subject Kazakhs to perpetual observation. Business transactions in Xinjiang are highly monitored, and strict regulations hinder their capacity to engage in commerce openly, affecting the financial stability of Kazakhs more generally.


Kazakh is still spoken in the community, although unlike Kazakh varieties in Kazakhstan, it takes influences from Mandarin and is written in the Arabic script. Chinese Kazakhs almost always speak Uyghur or Mandarin in addition, both of which are used for interethnic communication.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=S.Zh. Tazhibayeva |first=S.Zh. Tazhibayeva |last2=I.A. Nevskaya |first2=I.A. Nevskaya |last3=A.K. Mutali |first3=A.K. Mutali |last4=A. Kadyskyzy |first4=A. Kadyskyzy |last5=A.A. Absady |first5=A.A. Absady |date=2023 |title=Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.32523/2664-5157-2023-4-130-145 |journal=Turkic Studies Journal |volume=5 |issue=4 |pages=130–145 |doi=10.32523/2664-5157-2023-4-130-145 |issn=2664-5157}}</ref> Thus, Kazakh remains important but is seldom spoken outside the home, with the exception of Kazakh-majority areas.<ref name=":0" /> Many Kazakhs feel ethnically distinct from other groups in Xinjiang and connected to Kazakhs across the border in Kazakhstan.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Zhang |first=Zhe |last2=Tsakhirmaa |first2=Sansar |date=2022-05-11 |title=Ethnonationalism and the changing pattern of ethnic Kazakhs’ emigration from China to Kazakhstan |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0920203x221092686 |journal=China Information |volume=36 |issue=3 |pages=318–343 |doi=10.1177/0920203x221092686 |issn=0920-203X}}</ref> However, the rollback of Kazakh-medium education and the Russification of post-Soviet Kazakhs across the border means this feeling is not quite universal.<ref name=":1" />
Mobility Surveillance:
As a result of intensified monitoring measures introduced in recent years, especially following 2016, ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang have encountered greater limitations on travel, particularly regarding passport acquisition. This restriction has hindered numerous individuals eager to relocate to Kazakhstan from departing China, as their requests for passports and other travel documents face denial or postponement due to heightened examination by local officials. Surveillance limits Kazakhs’ freedom of movement, as they are frequently stopped at checkpoints requiring ID verification, facial scans, or biometric data entry. These checkpoints inhibit their ability to travel freely for work, education, or family visits.


==Notable people==
==Notable people==

Revision as of 03:55, 5 November 2024

Kazakhs in China
中国哈萨克族 (Chinese)
جۇڭگو قازاقتارى (Kazakh)
Total population
1,462,588
Regions with significant populations
Xinjiang (Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Aksai Kazakh Autonomous County, Barkol Kazakh Autonomous County, Mori Kazakh Autonomous County)
Languages
Kazakh, Mandarin
Religion
Majority Sunni Islam, minority Tibetan Buddhism or unaffiliated
Related ethnic groups
Uyghurs, Salar people, Kyrgyz in China, Uzbeks in China
Kazakhs in China
Chinese name
Simplified Chinese中国哈萨克族
Traditional Chinese中國哈薩克族
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinZhōngguó Hāsàkèzú
Dunganese name
DunganҖунгуй хазахзў
Kazakh name
Kazakhجۇڭگو قازاقتارى
Қытайда қазақтар
Qytaida qazaqtar
[qɤ̆tʰaɪtá qasaχtʰáɚ]

Kazakhs in China form the largest community of Kazakhs outside Kazakhstan. They are one of the 56 ethnic groups officially recognized by the People's Republic of China. There is one Kazakh autonomous prefecture – Ili in Xinjiang – and three Kazakh autonomous counties – Aksay in Gansu, and Barkol and Mori in Xinjiang.

History

Early history

Kazakh nomads in the 19th century

During the fall of the Dzungar Khanate in the mid-18th century, the Manchus of the Qing Dynasty massacred the native Dzungars of Dzungaria in the Dzungar genocide, and afterwards colonized the depopulated area with immigrants from many parts of their empire. Among the peoples that moved into the depopulated Dzungaria were the Kazakhs from the Kazakh Khanates.[1]

In the 19th century, the advance of the Russian Empire troops pushed the Kazakhs to neighboring countries. Russian settlers on traditional Kazakh land drove many over the border to China, causing their population to increase in China.[2]

During the Russian Revolution, when Muslims faced conscription, Xinjiang again became a sanctuary for Kazakhs fleeing Russia.[3] During the 1920s, hundreds of thousands of Kazakh nomads moved from Soviet Kazakhstan to Xinjiang to escape Soviet persecution, famine,[note 1] violence, and forced sedentarization.[4] Kazakhs that moved to China fought for the Soviet Communist-backed Uyghur Second East Turkestan Republic in the Ili Rebellion (1944–1949).

Toops[who?] estimated that 326,000 Kazakhs, 65,000 Kirghiz, 92,000 Hui, 187,000 Han, and 2,984,000 Uyghur (totaling 3,730,000) lived in Xinjiang in 1941. Hoppe[who?] estimated that 4,334,000 people lived in Xinjiang in 1949.[5]

In 1936, after Sheng Shicai expelled 30,000 Kazakhs from Xinjiang to Qinghai, Hui Chinese led by General Ma Bufang massacred Kazakhs, until there were only 135 of them left.[6]

Modern history

The arrival of the People’s Republic of China at the end of The Civil War led to significant changes in Xinjiang. The Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in the region were granted autonomy around governance, language, and religion at first, but the end goal was for the Kazakhs to integrate into the new Chinese State.[7]

In the early stages, this meant high spending on infrastructure and education, aiming to boost agricultural output and literacy respectively.[8] The arrival of the Cultural Revolution saw the end of permissiveness and the beginning of a more hardline policy, as Kazakh party cadres were purged, Islamic practice restricted, and pastoralist herds collectivized.[9] The end of pastoralism was especially harmful, as the connection to the land and nomadic lifestyle remains an important part of the Kazakh identity.[10]

In more outward ways, Xinjiang began to change as well. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps began a series of projects aimed at urbanising the region.[11] This, combined with the arrival of Han settlers led to a demographic shift as Kazakh areas were no longer majority Kazakh.[12] This period also saw concerns over separatism, as worsening Sino-Soviet relations saw the USSR stirring up nationalist sentiments.[13]

The end of the Cultural Revolution and rise of Deng Xiaoping led to a loosening of restrictions. The representation of Kazakhs rebounded, especially with the return of purged political leaders and Kazakhs who fled the country.[14] The collectivisation policies were also rolled back, but ethnic tensions between Kazakh and Han persist.[15]

But, there were limitations to the loosening of restrictions. The 1990s saw a wave of popular unrest and terrorist attacks that led to the Chinese Government instituting the Strike Hard campaign aimed at suppressing separatism and restoring security.[16] This and the political climate after 9/11 led to a change in policy away from cultural assimilation to securitization, as the Chinese state increasingly cracked down on separatists and Islamist terrorists.[17]

Distribution

Kazakh autonomous prefectures and counties in China

By province

By county

(Only includes counties or county-equivalents containing >1% of county population.)

County-level distribution of Kazakhs (2000)
Сounty/City % Kazakh Kazakh pop Total pop
Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region 6.74 1,245,023 18,459,511
Aksay Kazakh autonomous county 30.5 2,712 8,891
Ürümqi city 2.34 48,772 2,081,834
Tianshan district 1.77 8,354 471,432
Saybag district 1.27 6,135 482,235
Xinshi district 1.06 4,005 379,220
Dongshan district 1.96 1,979 100,796
Ürümqi county 8.00 26,278 328,536
Karamay city 3.67 9,919 270,232
Dushanzi district 4.24 2,150 50,732
Karamay district 3.49 5,079 145,452
Baijiantan district 3.35 2,151 64,297
Urko district 5.53 539 9,751
Hami city 8.76 43,104 492,096
Yizhou district 2.71 10,546 388,714
Barkol Kazakh autonomous county 34.01 29,236 85,964
Yiwu county 19.07 3,322 17,418
Changji Hui autonomous prefecture 7.98 119,942 1,503,097
Changji city 4.37 16,919 387,169
Fukang city 7.83 11,984 152,965
Midong district 1.94 3,515 180,952
Hutubi county 10.03 21,118 210,643
Manas county 9.62 16,410 170,533
Qitai county 10.07 20,629 204,796
Jimsar county 8.06 9,501 117,867
Mori Kazakh autonomous county 25.41 19,866 78,172
Bortala Mongol autonomous prefecture 9.14 38,744 424,040
Bole city 7.10 15,955 224,869
Jinghe county 8.27 11,048 133,530
Wenquan county 17.89 11,741 65,641
Ili Kazakh autonomous prefecture 1.78 5,077 285,299
Kuytun city 1.78 5,077 285,299
Ili prefecture direct-controlled territories 22.55 469,634 2,082,577
Ghulja city 4.81 17,205 357,519
Ghulja county 10.30 39,745 385,829
Qapqal Xibe autonomous county 20.00 32,363 161,834
Huocheng county 7.96 26,519 333,013
Gongliu county 29.69 45,450 153,100
Xinyuan county 43.43 117,195 269,842
Zhaosu county 48.43 70,242 145,027
Tekes county 42.25 56,571 133,900
Nilka county 45.15 64,344 142,513
Tacheng prefecture 24.21 216,020 892,397
Tacheng city 15.51 23,144 149,210
Usu city 9.93 18,907 190,359
Emin county 33.42 59,586 178,309
Shawan county 16.23 30,621 188,715
Toli county 68.98 55,102 79,882
Yumin county 32.42 15,609 48,147
Hoboksar Mongol autonomous county 22.59 13,051 57,775
Altay prefecture 51.38 288,612 561,667
Altay city 36.80 65,693 178,510
Burqin county 57.31 35,324 61,633
Koktokay county 69.68 56,433 80,986
Burultokay county 31.86 24,793 77,830
Kaba county 59.79 43,889 73,403
Qinggil county 75.61 40,709 53,843
Jiminay county 61.39 21,771 35,462

Language and Culture

Kazakh yurts

The Kazakh population in China has a distinct culture, mostly based on a series of genealogical records that in addition to stipulating lineage, keep the traditional ways of life alive.[18] Some Kazakhs are nomadic herders and raise sheep, goats, cattle, and horses. These nomadic Kazakhs migrate seasonally in search of pasture for their animals. During the summer the Kazakhs live in yurts, while in winter they settle and live in modest houses made of adobe or cement blocks. Others live in urban areas and tend to be highly educated and hold much influence in integrated communities. The Islam practiced by the Kazakhs in China contains many elements of shamanism, ancestor worship, and other traditional beliefs and practices.[19]

Kazakh is still spoken in the community, although unlike Kazakh varieties in Kazakhstan, it takes influences from Mandarin and is written in the Arabic script. Chinese Kazakhs almost always speak Uyghur or Mandarin in addition, both of which are used for interethnic communication.[20] Thus, Kazakh remains important but is seldom spoken outside the home, with the exception of Kazakh-majority areas.[20] Many Kazakhs feel ethnically distinct from other groups in Xinjiang and connected to Kazakhs across the border in Kazakhstan.[21] However, the rollback of Kazakh-medium education and the Russification of post-Soviet Kazakhs across the border means this feeling is not quite universal.[21]

Notable people

See also

Notes

References

  1. ^ Smagulova, Anar. "XVIII – XIX Centuries. In the Manuscripts of the Kazakhs of China". academia.edu. East Kazakhstan State University.
  2. ^ Alexander Douglas Mitchell Carruthers; Jack Humphrey Miller (1914). Unknown Mongolia: A Record of Travel and Exploration in North-west Mongolia and Dzungaria. Hutchinson & Company. p. 345.
  3. ^ Andrew D. W. Forbes (9 October 1986). Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949. CUP Archive. pp. 17–. ISBN 978-0-521-25514-1.
  4. ^ Genina, Anna (2015). Claiming Ancestral Homelandsː Mongolian Kazakh migration in Inner Asia (PDF) (A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Anthropology) in The University of Michigan). p. 113.
  5. ^ Bellér-Hann, Ildikó (2008). Community Matters in Xinjiang, 1880–1949: Towards a Historical Anthropology of the Uyghur. BRILL. pp. 64–. ISBN 978-90-04-16675-2.
  6. ^ "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science". American Academy of Political and Social Science. 277. A.L. Hummel: 152. 1951. Retrieved 28 June 2010. A group of Kazakhs, originally numbering over 20000 people when expelled from Sinkiang by Sheng Shih-ts'ai in 1936, was reduced, after repeated massacres by their Chinese coreligionists under Ma Pu-fang, to a scattered 135 people.
  7. ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
  8. ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
  9. ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
  10. ^ Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99
  11. ^ Tazhibayeva, S.Zh; Nevskaya, I.A; Mutali, A.K; Kadyskyzy, A; Absady, A.A; (2023) 'Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China', Turkic Studies Journal, 5(4), pp. 130-145. Available at: https://ed.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/44UOE_INST/1viuo5v/cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_59a49840baaf4ff4a183156f11d25b99
  12. ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
  13. ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
  14. ^ Benson, L; Svanberg, I. (1988) 'The Kazakhs in Xinjiang', in L. Benson; I. Svanberg (eds.) The Kazakhs of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, pp. 1-107.
  15. ^ Zhang, Z; Tsakhirmaa, S, (2022) 'Ethnonationalism and the Changing Pattern of Ethnic Kazakhs’ Emigration from China to Kazakhstan', China Information, 36(3), pp. 318-343. Available at: https://doi-org.eux.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0920203X221092686
  16. ^ Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf -
  17. ^ Lee, M., & Yazici, E. (2023) China’s Surveillance and Repression in Xinjiang. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Myunghee-no Lee-4/publication/368724121_China's_Surveillance_and_Repression_in_Xinjiang/links/64ea09400453074fbdb448cc/Chinas-Surveillance-and-Repression-in-Xinjiang.pdf -
  18. ^ Salimjan, Guldana (15 November 2020). "Mapping loss, remembering ancestors: genealogical narratives of Kazakhs in China". Asian Ethnicity. 22 (1): 105–120. doi:10.1080/14631369.2020.1819772. ISSN 1463-1369.
  19. ^ Elliot, Sheila Hollihan (2006). Muslims in China. Philadelphia: Mason Crest Publishers. pp. 62–63. ISBN 1-59084-880-2.
  20. ^ a b S.Zh. Tazhibayeva, S.Zh. Tazhibayeva; I.A. Nevskaya, I.A. Nevskaya; A.K. Mutali, A.K. Mutali; A. Kadyskyzy, A. Kadyskyzy; A.A. Absady, A.A. Absady (2023). "Lexical Peculiarities of Kazakh Spoken in China". Turkic Studies Journal. 5 (4): 130–145. doi:10.32523/2664-5157-2023-4-130-145. ISSN 2664-5157.
  21. ^ a b Zhang, Zhe; Tsakhirmaa, Sansar (11 May 2022). "Ethnonationalism and the changing pattern of ethnic Kazakhs' emigration from China to Kazakhstan". China Information. 36 (3): 318–343. doi:10.1177/0920203x221092686. ISSN 0920-203X.
  22. ^ "Jumabieke Tuerxun: From The Rural Edges of China to the UFC". Fightland. Retrieved 24 October 2014.