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    USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers: The Pacific 1942
    USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers: The Pacific 1942
    USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers: The Pacific 1942
    Ebook158 pages1 hour

    USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers: The Pacific 1942

    By Mark Stille, Ian Palmer and Howard Gerrard

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    About this ebook

    This book dramatically reveals the experiences of the airmen and guncrews of the rival vessels as they battled for victory in a duel of skill, tenacity and guts.

    The IJN was a pioneer in naval aviation, having commissioned the world's first carrier, which was used against the US fleet at Pearl Harbor. The Americans followed suit, initiating a huge aircraft carrier development program. As the War in the Pacific escalated into the largest naval conflict in history, the role of the carrier became the linchpin of American and Japanese naval strategy as these rival vessels found themselves locked in a struggle for dominance of this critical theater.

    This book provides an analysis of the variety of weaponry available to the rival carriers, in particular the embarked aircraft as well as the powerful ship-borne guns. Study the design and development of these revolutionary ships and 'live' the experiences of the rival airmen and gun crews as they battled for victory in a duel of skill, tenacity and guts.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherBloomsbury Publishing
    Release dateMay 20, 2012
    ISBN9781780967882
    USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers: The Pacific 1942
    Author

    Mark Stille

    Mark Stille is the author of numerous Osprey titles focusing on naval history in the Pacific. He recently concluded a nearly 40-year career in the intelligence community, including tours on the faculty of the Naval War College, on the Joint Staff and on US Navy ships. He received his BA in History from the University of Maryland and also holds an MA from the Naval War College.

    Read more from Mark Stille

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      Book preview

      USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers - Mark Stille

      DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

      US NAVY CARRIER DOCTRINE

      Following World War I, during which the British Royal Navy had demonstrated the utility of embarking aircraft on ships, including aircraft carriers, the US Navy realized that naval aviation was an instrumental part of modern naval operations. Fearful of falling farther behind the British, the US Navy received funding for the conversion of a collier into an aircraft carrier in July 1919. This experimental carrier was followed by the first fleet carriers in 1927. Upon first entering service, US Navy carriers’ primary task was to support the battle fleet. Carrier aircraft would provide reconnaissance and spotting for the battle fleet while denying those advantages to the enemy. Spotting was viewed as especially important as aircraft could observe the fall of fire and radio corrections. Carriers were also expected to protect the airspace over their own fleet, thus denying the enemy the advantages of long-range spotting and scouting.

      Gradually, the US Navy developed the carrier’s role into an independent offensive platform. Early carrier aircraft were unable to carry torpedoes large enough to cripple or sink a capital ship, and although bombs could be carried, they posed no real threat to ships maneuvering at speed to avoid attack. However, in the 1920s, the offensive capability of carrier aircraft was greatly increased by the development of dive-bombing, which for the first time, allowed maneuvering ships to be struck with some degree of accuracy. Capital ships with heavy deck armor were still immune from attack, but carriers, with their unarmored flight decks, had now become very vulnerable to aerial attack.

      Reflecting the premise that carriers could not withstand significant damage, US Navy doctrine increasingly separated the carriers from the battle fleet to prevent their early detection and destruction by the enemy. The primary task of the carrier was now to destroy opposing carriers as soon as possible, thus preventing their own destruction and setting the stage for intensive attack on the enemy battle fleet. To maximize the carrier’s striking power, standard US Navy doctrine called for the launch of an entire air group at one time. In order that an entire deck load strike be launched quickly, it was necessary to have the entire strike spotted on the flight deck.

      Early in the war, US Navy carriers each had a permanently assigned air group. Each of the assigned squadrons carried the hull number of the ship it was assigned to. For example, Lexington’s fighter squadron was numbered VF-2, her dive-bombers VB-2, her scout bombers VS-2, and her torpedo squadron VT-2. After July 1938, air groups were known by the name of the ship. Thus, the squadrons listed above comprised the Lexington Air Group. By mid-1942, the entire air group was numbered to match its parent ship’s hull number. With few exceptions, the permanence of the squadrons within an air group lasted through the battle of Midway. After that, due to carrier losses or squadron exhaustion, carriers could have a mix of squadrons from two or three air groups. As such, when Enterprise engaged in the battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942, her air group had its original fighter and dive-bomber squadrons as well as the scouting squadron from the sunken Yorktown and the torpedo squadron from the damaged Saratoga.

      Into the early stages of the Pacific War, the standard US carrier air group had four squadrons. This included four squadrons of some 18 aircraft each with several reserves. The dive-bomber and scout squadrons were equipped with identical aircraft, the modern SBD Dauntless dive-bomber. In practice, most scouting missions were conducted by the scouting squadron, but both squadrons were capable of conducting strike missions. The fighter squadron grew in size as the war unfolded from the original 18 to 27 at Midway and then to 36 during the Guadalcanal campaign. The fourth squadron was equipped with torpedo bombers that could also operate as level bombers.

      The US Navy’s carriers were not present at Pearl Harbor, and they immediately began a series of raids on Japanese-held islands. The most audacious of these was the April 18, 1942, raid on the Japanese Home Islands using B-25 medium bombers launched from Hornet and known as the Doolittle Raid. (US Naval Historical Center)

      Radar was just coming into widespread use in 1942 and promised to greatly increase the effectiveness of fleet air defense by extending the distance of fighter interception and by maximizing the use of available fighters. However, despite some success, the overall effectiveness of radar for fighter direction remained uneven and was not as effective as it later became in the war.

      The US Navy’s radar program resulted in the delivery of 20 CXAM radar sets in 1940. All six carriers then in service were fitted with these sets with Yorktown being the first, receiving her CXAM in July 1940. CXAM was an air search radar that used a very large mattress-like antenna. Increases in power, and therefore detection ranges, led to the CXAM-1 radar. With an accuracy of 200yd, it was capable of detecting a large aircraft flying at 10,000ft at 70nm or a small aircraft at 50nm. The second-generation SC radar had essentially the same electronics as the CXAM-1 with the addition of an integral Identification Friend or Foe system and limited altitude detection capabilities but with a smaller antenna. With an accuracy of 100yd, it was capable of detecting a large aircraft flying at 10,000ft at 80nm or a small aircraft at 40nm. Radar would prove to be a critical factor in the carrier war.

      US NAVY CARRIER DESIGN

      US Navy carrier design was shaped by the continuing requirement to quickly generate maximum offensive power against enemy carriers. Therefore, the developments and techniques necessary to quickly launch a full deck of aircraft were paramount. Open, unarmored hangars facilitated the quick launch of large numbers of aircraft. Standing practice called for most of the carrier’s aircraft to be parked on the flight deck with the hangar deck used for aircraft maintenance and storage. This practice and the design of US carriers meant that the Americans operated larger air groups than their Japanese counterparts.

      In the autumn of 1921, the Americans invited the major naval powers of the day to Washington, D.C., to participate in an arms limitations conference intended to forestall another naval arms race. The resultant Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 set the numbers and tonnage of capital ships allowed by the United States, Britain, Japan, Italy, and France. In addition to limiting battleship tonnage, the treaty also dictated the maximum size of carriers and the total carrier tonnage allowed to each signatory nation. The United States and Britain were each permitted 135,000 tons of carriers, and the Imperial Navy 81,000 tons of carrier construction. To keep within the constraints of the treaty, the US Navy attempted to design carriers with sufficient speed for fleet operations and enough space to operate a large four-squadron air group. Adequate speed was considered to be in excess of 30kts, permitting carriers to escape attack by enemy cruisers and to conduct flight operations in all kinds of wind conditions. Providing adequate protection to a carrier deliberately kept small was a challenge, and US designers worked to provide adequate underwater protection against torpedo attack and sufficient strength on the main deck (which was the hangar deck, not the flight deck) to withstand aerial bombs. Overall, these goals were achieved in the Lexington class and the superb Yorktown class. On all US carriers, damage control was a top priority, and the crews were well trained in this regard. Another important design consideration was the provision of a heavy antiaircraft armament. After construction of

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