Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China

Capitalism without Democracy

THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA

Kellee S. Tsai

Cornell University Press ITHACA AND LONDON

For Felix and Kirby

Each new generation of scientists or social researchers furthers its predecessors’ understanding of the world of reality. If one day we look back at our present findings . . . and find that this understanding was superficial and naïve, this will only be evidence of progress in our understanding.

Fei Xiaotong, "Small Towns, Great Significance:

A Study of Small Towns in Wujiang County" (1984)

Contents

Preface

List of Abbreviations

Note on Conversion of Key Measures and Romanization

Map of China

1. The Myth of China’s Democratic Capitalists

2. Bypassing Democracy

3. The Unofficial and Official Revival of China’s Private Sector

4. Private Entrepreneurs’ Identities, Interests, and Values

5. Diversity in Private Entrepreneurs’ Coping Strategies

6. Local Variation in Private Sector Conditions

7. Changing China

Appendix A

Appendix B

Glossary of Chinese Terms

References

Preface

When I first visited China in 1992, I remember marveling that for an authoritarian country dominated by a Communist party, people seemed to get away with a lot at the ground level. To be sure, there were—and still are—serious restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly when it comes to practices that could threaten the party-state’s legitimacy. But ordinary people were finding ways around midlevel rules and regulations that were anachronistic or impractical. A few years later when I was conducting research on informal finance, the evasive capacity of China’s private entrepreneurs impressed me further. Despite numerous obstacles, China’s business owners raise capital through innovative and often illegal means, and in the process the private sector has boomed.

Is this transformative potential of private entrepreneurs limited to economic issues? What are the political implications of private sector development in China? This book’s title, Capitalism without Democracy, summarizes the broad contours of the conclusion. To date, the spread of markets has not brought democracy to China, and my research shows that private entrepreneurs are not likely to demand regime change. A venture capitalist in Beijing predicted, Things would quickly become chaotic if China became a democracy. What I worry about the most is maintaining social stability so the economy will continue to do well. But that is only part of the story. Regardless of whether China ultimately makes a transition to democracy, dramatic changes in the country’s paramount political institutions have already occurred. Moreover, those changes have favored private entrepreneurs—the Chinese Communist Party now welcomes capitalist members, and at least on paper the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China protects private property rights. How did these institutional changes occur in the absence of regime transition or political mobilization by private entrepreneurs?

My explanation is similar in logic to what I found in the veiled, yet expansive, world of informal finance: in discrete collaboration with local officials, private entrepreneurs have devised a host of what I call adaptive informal institutions, which are routinized adaptations to the constraints and opportunities of various formal institutions. In turn, these adaptive informal institutions have undermined and contributed to the transformation of the formal institutions that once endeavored to constrain the activities of business owners. Private entrepreneurs have indeed had an impact on Chinese politics, but this influence has occurred through indirect means. That this is possible in an authoritarian party-state helps us understand endogenous institutional change. As a middle-aged hotel owner put it, I have already experienced two revolutions in my lifetime—the Cultural Revolution and a market revolution—and somehow, the Chinese Communist Party has managed to survive both.

Because this book explores both the origins and the consequences of adaptive informal institutions, it is fitting that many of the contributions to this project occurred through informal means—impulsive late night e-mails, pontifications during happy hour, cab driver chats, interminable banquets, dank massage parlors, delays at public transportation hubs, and, yes, even interactions by the water fountain outside my office in Mergenthaler Hall. Recounting those encounters would make a colorful narrative about the anthropology of fieldwork and life in the ivory tower.

Less colorful, but more central to resolving the practical challenges facing academics in social science, is another book-length tribute that I could write about the kindness of friends, colleagues, institutions, interviewees, and students who took the time to support various dimensions of this project over the years.

First, this book would not have been possible without the multiple sources of institutional support that I received. A two-year grant from the International Research Fellowship Program of the National Science Foundation (NSF INT-0107326), administered by Program Manager Susan Parris, enabled me to design and implement a national survey based on multistage area probability sampling, as well as to conduct field interviews with hundreds of entrepreneurs and officials in various parts of China. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF.

The Private Economy Research Center and the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences proved to be professional hosts. In this regard, I thank Zhang Houyi and Chen Guang jin for their diligence and patience as research collaborators; I also thank Dai Jianzhong, Huang Ping, and Wang Xiaoyi for their friendship and assistance along the way.

My institutional home, the Department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, generously allowed me to spread the NSF grant over five years, which meant that I was able to conduct the fieldwork, analyze the data, have two babies, and write this book, while students and colleagues dealt with my staggered absences from campus.

Sage Publications permitted me to use some of the material that originally appeared in my article, Capitalists without a Class: Political Diversity among Private Entrepreneurs in China, Comparative Political Studies 39 (November 2005): 1130–1158.

I am also grateful for access to data from the East Asia Barometer Project (2000–2004), which was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received major funding support from Taiwan’s Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica, and National Taiwan University.

For superb research assistance, I thank Mary Akchurin, Shirley Chen, Daniel Slater, and Jack Yeung. Li Jianjun, Wang Juan, and Zeng Jin helped to clarify many queries in a timely manner. Graduate students in my seminar on comparative democratization—Renny Babiarz, Michael Becher, Kersten Hoenig, Michael McCarthy, Mariam Mufti, and Jeff Pugh—also deserve credit for critically reading key portions of the manuscript, and Mariam Mufti assisted diligently with indexing.

In the course of shaping and completing this book, I have benefited greatly from sound advice, thoughtful comments, tough questions, and fruitful exchanges with Howard Aldrich, Joel Andreas, Giovanni Arrighi, Richard Baum, Eva Bellin, Thomas Berger, Thomas Bernstein, Kathy Chen, Chen Yongjun, Erin Chung, William Connolly, Sarah Cook, Richard Doner, Mary Gallagher, Merle Goldman, Stephan Haggard, Lingxin Hao, Jonathan Hartlyn, He Daming, Yasheng Huang, Richard Katz, Margaret Keck, Scott Kennedy, Melvin Kohn, Cheng Li, Davin Mackenzie, Gerald McDermott, Tobie Meyer-Fong, Ethan Michelson, Kin Moy, Andrew Nathan, Jean Oi, William Parish, Albert Park, Margaret Pearson, Minxin Pei, Elizabeth Perry, Benjamin Read, Elizabeth Remick, William Rowe, Ben Ross Schneider, Adam Sheingate, Tianjian Shi, Matthew Shum, Beverly Silver, Aseema Sinha, Daniel Slater, Sidney Tarrow, Lily Tsai, Andrew Walder, Andrew Watson, Martin Whyte, Ezra Vogel, Dali Yang, Madeleine Zelin, and Elke Zuern.

I also enjoyed input from audiences at annual meetings of the American Political Science Association and the Association for Asian Studies, as well as seminars or conferences held at the following institutions (in several cases, more than once): Columbia University, Cornell University, Georgetown University, Harvard University, Indiana University–Bloomington, the International Food Policy Research Institute, Jiang Han University, Johns Hopkins University, Luce Foundation, Stanford University, University of Chicago, University of Havana, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, University of Michigan–Ann Arbor, and University of Pennsylvania.

I owe an intellectual debt and special thanks to the three readers who offered constructive feedback on the entire manuscript—Bruce Dickson, Kevin O’Brien, and Dorothy Solinger; indeed, their scholarship influenced my own thinking on the topic before I even started this project. Mark Blyth and Davis Bookhart read multiple versions of certain sections with characteristic care and without complaint. At Cornell University Press, Candace Akins expertly guided the book through production, and Roger Haydon deserves a medal for his editorial magic, ongoing attention, and friendship.

None of the people mentioned above bears any responsibility for remaining errors, unsubstantiated claims, or other embarrassing shortcomings in the final product.

Above all, I acknowledge the unreciprocated generosity of all the entrepreneurs and other interviewees, who should remain anonymous and who are identified by pseudonyms in the text. I wouldn’t have much to write about without them. At the same time, most of the interviews are not even mentioned in this book—like a photographer who shoots countless rolls of film to capture a particular image, I have presented only a sliver of the material gathered from very busy people in the course of my conducting a national survey and extensive fieldwork.

Finally, I am fortunate to have a family that offers absolute confidence and support in me and my research. My parents, especially my mother Katherine, my sister, Linda, my in-laws Betty and Sam, and my husband, Davis, have all helped out in a multitude of thankless but very much needed ways—thank you. The contribution of my two young sons was more oblique: their impending births, at the beginning and the end of the writing process, respectively, helped to keep things on schedule. I dedicate this book to them with love. Without them, I might still be rewriting the introduction or wandering around dusty markets in China, transcribing the details of other people’s lives rather than living my own.

KELLEE S. TSAI

Baltimore, Maryland

Abbreviations

Note on Conversion of Key Measures and Romanization

The conversion of key measures is as follows:

1 mu of land = 0.0667 hectare or 1/6 acre

1 jin = 0.5 kilograms or 1.123 pounds

1 wan = ten thousand

1 yi = 100 million

$1.00 = 8.28 renminbi (RMB) or yuan during the 1998 to 2004 period

Selected historical exchange rates are as follows:

Sources: Rates for 1975 to 1980 are from China Financial Statistics 1952–1991; rates for 1981 to 1984 are from the China Financial Yearbook 1986; and rates for 1985 to 2005 come from the China Statistical Yearbook 2006.

Note on Romanization

The pinyin system of romanization is used throughout the text, except in cases where the Wade-Giles term is more familiar.

Map of China

1

The Myth of China’s Democratic Capitalists

The biggest problems in China are corruption and absence of the rule of law. But democracy wouldn’t solve these problems because the Chinese masses are too ignorant to participate in politics.

Private entrepreneur in Shanghai, 2005

The Myth

In the summer of 1989, when college students were squatting in Tiananmen Square, demanding democracy, Beijing’s street vendors donated food and water to the students. Private copy shops operated their fax machines around the clock to spread the word. A brigade of private entrepreneurs on motorcycles dubbed the Flying Tigers spontaneously formed to deliver messages and patrol the perimeters of Beijing for signs of troop movement toward the square (Li et al. 1989, 189–193).¹ The privately owned Stone Corporation provided computer equipment and cash donations to the students. To domestic and international audiences, these accounts were quite moving. The idea that China’s new capitalists were altruistic and supportive of the spontaneous student-led democracy movement, the idea that China’s bourgeoisie were also becoming democrats like their historical counterparts in Europe and North America, was encouraging.²

Even a decade after the Tiananmen crisis, Jonathan Adelman boldly asserted, It is hard for the great majority of Americans who have not visited China or followed it closely to realize that China is in the middle of a historic transition to capitalism and ultimately democracy (Adelman 2001, 41A).³ The global business community soon added its euphoric prognostications that encouraging private sector development would ensure a democratic transition in China. The American Society for Competitiveness instructed its corporate readers that global entrepreneurs must continue to invest in corporate infrastructure to help insure stability, success and the inevitable attainment of full democracy there (Global Competitiveness, January 2002, S183). A number of political scientists have gone as far as pronouncing that democratization is inevitable in China and will be brought about by its growing economy. Larry Diamond (1999) asserted that sooner or later, economic development will generate growing pressures (and possibilities) for China to make a definitive regime change to democracy.⁴ Hu Shaohua elaborates on this general logic in Explaining Chinese Democratization (2000):

China is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, and its economy probably will continue to expand in the foreseeable future. The growing economy will bring higher living standards, a higher level of education, and a more complicated socioeconomic structure in its wake. Under these circumstances, more people will demand more freedom and democracy. (155)⁵

Other scholars have devoted their energies to identifying the economic benchmarks for regime transition. Stanford economist Henry Rowen predicted that if China maintained a 5 percent per capita growth in gross domestic product, then by 2015 it will reach a critical threshold of $7,000–8,000 per capita GDP and become democratic (Rowen 1996, 61, 68–69).⁶ Xia Li Lollar (1997) not only finds evidence for a positive correlation between a market economy and democracy (4) but contends that China has already commenced a dual-step transition to democracy such that China has gone through its first stage of transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism and is on the verge of starting the longer-term, second transition toward democracy (83–84). Using a resource distribution index, Tatu Vanhanen (2003) finds that China has already reached the transition level for democracy.

Such predictions are inspired in part by the stunning expansion of China’s private sector since the late 1970s. In 1977, China did not even keep official statistics on private enterprises because they were illegal and negligible in number. By 2005, there were 29.3 million private businesses, employing over 200 million people and accounting for 49.7 percent of the GDP (China Daily, December 14, 2005).⁷ Yet private property rights are not protected consistently by rule of law, private entrepreneurs lack access to most conventional sources of credit, and business owners are denied the opportunity to vote for political leaders who will defend their material interests. Hence, based on the evolution of democracy in a handful of Western countries, many observers expect that China’s growing population of capitalists will naturally agitate for democracy in the spirit of no taxation without representation. They will strategically leverage their economic resources to acquire political ones. As Zheng Yongnian puts it, Chinese business classes are likely to play a role that their European counterparts did in the past. Capitalism is generating a Chinese bourgeoisie. It is a class with teeth (Zheng 2004, 311).

The Reality behind the Myth

The 1989 images of private business owners helping democracy activists are outdated and misleading.⁸ Today most private entrepreneurs are not donating resources toward building a democratic People’s Republic of China (PRC) in their spare time. Instead, most are working eighteen-hour days and struggling to stay in business. Others are saving their profits to educate their one child, pay for medicine, buy a house, or retire. Some are planning to leave the country. Quite a few entertain local officials as necessary business expenses, and many are members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Remarkably, most entrepreneurs think that the system generally works for them. One told me in 1996, Even though I spend about 70 percent of my profits on fees and bribes, running this restaurant still gives me a better life than what I had as a state factory worker.⁹ This entrepreneur’s loyalty to the regime was especially apparent when he voluntarily expressed strong approval for the way that the central government dealt with student protestors in 1989. He believed that the crackdown maintained the social stability necessary for continued economic growth.

Rather than assuming that Chinese entrepreneurs are going to demand democratic reforms, I suggest that it is more instructive to assess whether members of the current generation of capitalists share a common identity and definition of interests—which would be necessary for constituting a politically assertive class or even part of a class (Thompson 1966; cf. Katznelson 1986). China’s business owners are diverse. Most do not fall into the income and lifestyle strata that we regard as constituting the middle class.¹⁰ Because of their diversity, entrepreneurs deal with the government in different ways and have different political views—if they have any. And to the extent that China’s capitalists are politically assertive, they are not inclusive in their demands. Existing studies and my own research demonstrate that class formation, to the extent that it results in a common identity, has not occurred among private entrepreneurs and is unlikely to in the near future.¹¹ This is not to say that private sector development is politically irrelevant or that China will never develop some form of democracy but, rather, that the sequence of events leading to capitalist demands for democracy in a handful of other countries is distinctive and unlikely to be replicated. China’s private entrepreneurs should be analyzed on their own terms to understand how and to what extent they are politically consequential. Based on hundreds of in-depth interviews and an original national survey of business owners, in this book I demonstrate that China’s capitalists are pragmatic and creative but they are not budding democrats.

Why, then, do general observers continue to have high democratic expectations of China’s toiling entrepreneurs? Whether voluntarist or structuralist in orientation, few scholars propound a simple linear model of political development based on an overgeneralization of Barrington Moore’s famous quotation no bourgeois, no democracy (Moore 1966, 418).¹² Yet a number of vocal observers remain influenced by a handful of classic works in political science that can be summarized by Joseph Schum-peter’s declaration that modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process (Schumpeter 1976 [1942], 296–297).¹³ Post–cold war notions of convergence toward capitalist democracy as a global norm have also revived the logic of modernization theory, which associates economic prosperity with political liberalization (Fukuyama 1992; Lipset 1959; Pye 1990). As Bruce Gilley asserts in China’s Democratic Future (2004), The laws of social science grind away in China as they do elsewhere, whether people like it or not (xiii). But in reality, the path to democratization is not nearly so simple.¹⁴ The belief that capitalists must demand democracy is a myth, not a law of social science. Historically, the processes that lead to democratization are highly contingent and involve a multiplicity of actors and institutions. China is no different in this regard, so debunking this popular myth is not difficult. In this book I do not predict whether China will someday become a liberal democracy. I do, however, assert with a high level of certainty that should democratization occur in China, it will not be led by a disgruntled horde of private entrepreneurs.

Private entrepreneurs may not be clamoring for democracy, but they are influencing Chinese politics. In the course of their day-to-day interactions—with one another and with local officials—entrepreneurs are changing the country’s formal political institutions in ways that reflect their needs and interests. Although liberal democracies permit many direct forms of political expression, what China’s entrepreneurs are doing is more subtle and possibly more effective in conveying their policy concerns than voting, lobbying, and protesting. In this book I thus engage the more complex issues of what it really means to be a private entrepreneur in China, how entrepreneurs actually perceive themselves, and, most fundamentally, how they get things done. We will see that business owners must navigate a myriad of political and regulatory restrictions—and in doing so, how they have fundamentally altered the formal political landscape. We will also see that the private sector’s political influence has unfolded in an indirect and incremental manner. In examining these issues, I explain why China’s private entrepreneurs are not out on the streets demanding democracy and why significant institutional transformations have occurred in China’s political economy in the absence of regime change. The answers to these apparent paradoxes are grounded in the daily practices of business owners and their official regulators. Local economic and state actors have evaded, exploited, and appropriated formal institutions through a variety of informal adaptive strategies. Ultimately, the adaptive informal institutions of private entrepreneurs have had a structural impact on the formal institutions governing China’s political economy.

The Broader Implications of China’s Experience

These claims have broader implications for theoretical debates concerning political and institutional development as well as implications for the study of democracy. China does not fit preexisting models of political economy, and indeed it defies the expectations of many familiar explanations in the study of comparative politics. Analyzing the process of private sector development in reform-era China does, however, yield insights into the dynamics of endogenous institutional change. Despite ongoing regime durability, a number of the country’s political, economic, and even social institutions have undergone momentous transformations since the late 1970s. Rather than confirming prevailing theories of political development, the causal mechanism underlying many of these transformations lies in the informal interactions among local state and nonstate actors. Conventional explanations of democratic development and regime change generally overlook the causal potential of informal practices and institutions to change or sustain formal institutions.¹⁵ Meanwhile, studies of transitions from socialism have been more attentive to the relevance of informal institutions and socialist-era legacies, but they have focused more on how deep-rooted informal institutions undermine formal ones rather than how they may contribute to the resilience of formal institutions.

The best-known comparative historical theories of democratic development predict capitalist class formation and democratic mobilization on the basis of structural transformations in the economy and society.¹⁶ Instead of focusing on classes and social structure, voluntarist approaches to regime transition expect that disgruntled business elites will join forces with other elites to promote fundamental political changes.¹⁷ Yet thus far evidence for both the structural and the voluntarist explanations of democratization and regime change is absent in China. In the macrolevel sweep of traditional structural approaches, social groups or classes are defined in overly broad terms, which obscures the possibility that various members of those groups may have widely varying identities and interests—and, of particular interest to this study, varying formal and informal resources for interacting with state agents. Even in areas as geographically small as Hong Kong and Taiwan, private capital is segmented along socioeconomic, territorial, and ethnic lines (e.g., Wu 2005). By the same token, China’s business owners have different backgrounds and different ways of dealing with their concerns, including the strategic decision to maintain a low profile. Because of this, coherent class formation and collective action have not occurred.¹⁸ Meanwhile, voluntarist explanations overemphasize bargaining among elites and the role of formal associations. In China the wealthiest businesspeople generally have little trouble gaining access to local officials, some of whom are unofficially on their payrolls. And most business associations are either organized or co-opted by the state in a noncontentious manner (Chan and Unger 1995; Dickson 2003; Kennedy 2005; Nevitt 1996; Unger 1996).

The socialist transition literature points out that historical legacies and informal institutions continue to shape political and economic dynamics even after the collapse of Communism and deliberative democratic institutional design on the part of elites. As a result, studies concerning the rapid economic and political transitions of former socialist countries have reached indeterminate conclusions about the post-transition sustainability of liberal democracy, as well as their economic performance under newly installed market institutions.¹⁹ In contrast to the post-Communist countries of the former Soviet Union and East Europe, China has experienced piecemeal, gradualist economic transition over the last two decades, while political reforms have been even more limited. Most of the existing comparative literature therefore focuses on explaining either the institutional endurance of the Chinese Communist Party (Solnick 1996; Walder 1994) or the reasons for China’s impressive economic growth (McMillan and Naughton 1992; Woo 1999). Unfortunately, these efforts do not explain the coexistence of political continuity and rapid industrialization in China.

The developmental state model has attracted much attention in Beijing due to its ability to explain the rapid postwar economic growth of China’s East Asian neighbors under conditions of political stability.²⁰ In Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the state played a leading role in promoting export-oriented industrialization, while ensuring the political quiescence of its citizens. But efforts to extend the developmental state model to China have not been convincing, largely because they tend to ascribe developmental state qualities to a party-state that has not been nearly as coherent, bureaucratically disciplined, or supportive of the private sector as the original developmental state model requires (Tsai and Cook 2005).²¹

Despite these deviations from existing political and economic models, it is important to recognize that major institutional changes relating to the private sector have occurred since the late 1970s. State-owned enterprises are undergoing privatization, the financial sector is undergoing commercializing reforms, and, perhaps most significantly, the Chinese Communist Party has done something that would have been unthinkable just a few decades ago—broadened its membership base to include private entrepreneurs. Neither political elites nor private entrepreneurs are bursting with liberal democratic sentiments, but the latter are now encouraged to join the CCP as well as corporatist-style consultative and associational bodies. By the same token, even though the PRC does not possess many of the attributes of a developmental state, the policy environment for private capital accumulation has improved significantly over time. As the founder and chief executive officer of a leading telecommunications software company put it in 2005, Ten years ago the status of the private sector was still vague and uncertain, but now private businesses enjoy many favorable policies. Today if you are educated and have technical skills, you can not only be successful but extraordinarily successful [like me] (Interview 301). How can these changes be explained?

Most theories of institutional change rely either on the presence of external shocks or on highly motivated political leaders to explain the causal mechanism underlying major institutional reforms and institutional design.²² As of this writing, China has weathered serious exogenous shocks on most sides of its borders, including the fall of European communism in 1989–91 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98. In the interim, Beijing has promulgated a number of significant economic and political reforms, including a fundamental ideological reorientation of the most powerful political institution in China, the CCP. Taken together, these reforms could be interpreted as indicating elite-level responsiveness to mitigate potentially catastrophic exogenous shocks.

I argue, however, that most of China’s formal institutional reforms have been in reaction to endogenous pressures—that is, to dynamics in the private sector that were already occurring on the ground level within China. This does not dispute the relevance and symbolic importance of major international events or official national policies. Instead, I am suggesting that the actual causal dynamics leading to elite-level decisions arise from grass-roots interactions among entrepreneurs and between entrepreneurs and officials. These exchanges have facilitated business practices that are usually informal, if not explicitly illegal. More important, in the aggregate they have had a structural impact on the political economy. They facilitated private sector development before central state policies sanctioned these practices. In the course of their everyday interactions, China’s local officials and business owners devised novel ways for local enterprises to operate, which in turn attracted elite-level attention in sanctioning, post hoc, changes in the country’s economic and political institutions. To put it in comparative terms, even in an authoritarian regime with a unitary political system, the process of formal institutional change has been an adaptive and reactive one on the part of state and economic actors, at both the local and national levels.

Some China scholars focus on elite-level dynamics—and, as a result, tend to have a more top-down view of the country’s reform process.²³ However, a growing number of studies have documented instances of institutional innovations originating at the local level and then later being sanctioned or adopted by the center. For example, in a manner evocative of James Scott’s (1995) notion of weapons of the weak, Daniel Kelliher (1993), Andrew Watson (1983), Dali Yang (1996), and Kate Xiao Zhou (1996) have argued that farmers spontaneously reverted to household farming well before the state permitted decollectivization.²⁴ Barry Naughton (1994), Jean Oi (1999), Kristin Parris (1993), Jonathan Unger (2002), and others have studied how collective enterprises that were supposed to be run by township and village governments effectively served as an organizational disguise for private enterprises with more than eight employees before they were legally permitted. And Lynn White (1998) offers numerous examples from Shanghai of local economic and political practices that preceded their formal approval by higher levels of government.

In chapters 3 and 6 I present additional cases of similar dynamics within the private sector from the perspective of local officials and business owners. Although private entrepreneurs do not vote for leaders in Beijing, the latter have nonetheless proven to be quite receptive to formalizing many of the informal practices that entrepreneurs have relied on to run their businesses and local officials have tolerated to develop their economies. As will be seen, when these informal coping strategies become routinized as adaptive informal institutions, they transcend Scottian forms of passive resistance. For example, the systematic violation of national licensing and financing regulations in the form of fake foreign-invested enterprises and disguised private banks, respectively, involves local economic and political elites, not just hapless peddlers and peasants. Adaptive informal institutions are not merely weapons of the weak.

At the same time, adaptive informal institutions do not always lead to officially sanctioned changes in formal institutions. The scholarship on reform-era China offers manifold instances of local innovation that have not resulted in formal institutional reform but have involved the appropriation of formal institutions to serve the particular interests of various state and nonstate actors. X. L. Ding (1994) refers to this phenomenon as institutional amphibiousness, because formal institutions are used in ways