An Anthology of World War One, 1914–1918: Extracts from Selected Titles

Introduction

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Slaughter on the Somme: 1 July 1916

The Complete War Diaries of the British Army’s Worst Day

Martin Mace & John Grehan

Hardback

9781848847705

£25.00

At 07.30 hours on 1 July 1916, the devastating cacophony of the Allied artillery fell silent along the front on the Somme. The ear-splitting explosions were replaced by the shrill sound of hundreds of whistles being blown. At that moment, tens of thousands of British soldiers climbed out from the trenches on their part of the Western Front, and began to make their way steadily towards the German lines opposite. It was the first day of the Battle of the Somme.

By the end of the day, a number of the regiments involved had met with some degree of success; others had suffered heavy losses for no gain, whilst a few quite literally ceased to exist. That day, the old infantry tactics of the British Army clashed head-on with the reality of modern warfare. On what is generally accepted as the worst day in the British Army’s history, there were more than 60,000 casualties — a third of them fatal.

In this publication, the authors have drawn together, for the first time ever, all the War Diary entries for 171 British Regiments that went ‘over the top’ that day — a day which even now still touches so many families both in the United Kingdom and around the world.

Martin Mace has been involved in writing and publishing military history for more than twenty years. In 2006 he began working on the idea for Britain at War magazine, This publication has grown rapidly to become the best-selling military history periodical.

John Grehan has written more than 150 books and articles on military subjects, covering most periods of history. John is currently employed as the Assistant Editor of Britain at War magazine.

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Extracted from Slaughter on the Somme. In this sample chapter we join III Corps as they begin their advance, following the 34th Division in their assault on La Boisselle Salient and the 8th Divisions assault on Ovillers Spur, and we look at what was happening with the Germans opposite III Corps.

III Corps

1 July 1916

The position of III Corps between Bécourt and Authuille, lay on the forward slopes of a long low ridge between Albert and La Boisselle, marked by Tara and Usna Hills, a continuation of the spur of the main Ginchy - Pozières ridge on which the village of Ovillers stands. Behind this ridge the divisional artillery was deployed in rows, one brigade behind the other, dug in on bare and open ground. The observers were on the crest, with a perfect view of the whole German position spread out before them like a map, each trench shown up by its chalk parapet. The enemy first position, with its front line higher than the British, lay across the upper slopes of the three spurs which reach out south-westwards from the main ridge towards Albert.

The distance between the opposing lines varied from 800 to 50 yards, the trench nearest to the enemy, opposite La Boisselle being known as Glory Hole.

The right of the corps faced the western slope of the long Fricourt spur; its centre, the La Boisselle spur, with the village of that name almost in the German front line; whilst in front of its left was the upper part of Ovillers spur, with the village within the German front defences. The depressions running into the enemy position between the three spurs were known as Sausage Valley and Mash Valley. Neither was more than 1,000 yards wide, so that, being bare and open, any advance up them could be effectively met by crossfire from both sides, whilst the spurs themselves were covered with a network of trenches and machine-gun nests. The great Thiepval spur - actually opposite X Corps, next on the left - overlooked practically all the first belt of ground over which the divisions of III Corps had necessarily to advance.

The German defences consisted of a front system with four main strongpoints in its southern half: Sausage Redoubt (or Heligoland), with Scots Redoubt behind it, Schwaben Höhe and La Boisselle village. A fifth, Ovillers, was situated centrally in its northern half. Behind the front defences were two intermediate lines: the first from Fricourt Farm to Ovillers, and the second, incomplete, in front of Contalmaison and of Pozieres. Behind these again was the second position from Bazentin le Petit to Mouquet Farm, consisting of two lines. The third position was three miles in rear of the second. Owing to the enemy’s front position being on the forward slopes, it was completely exposed to fire, except the front trenches near La Boisselle and these were not only very near our own front line but difficult to reach with shell fire owing to the configuration of the ground. It will be observed, however, how singularly well the front line was adapted to defence, being sited, as the ground demanded, as a series of salients and re-entrants, the La Boisselle and Thiepval salients being particularly strong.

The high road Amiens - Albert - Pozières - Bapaume cut through the centre of III Corps’ front. In its straight course from Albert up to the Pozières ridge it ascends aslant the northern slope of the La Boisselle spur, and thence rises steadily to Pozières. This highway was roughly the line of demarcation between the two divisions which were to make the assault, the actual dividing line being at first about five hundred yards to the left of it, but near Ovillers passing to the right. The 34th Division, on the right, was to attack and capture the German defences on the Fricourt spur and astride SausageValley as far as La Boisselle (inclusive). It was then to advance to the line Contalmaison - Pozières (exclusive), halting some eight hundred yards in front of the German second position. The 8th Division, on the left, was to capture the German front defences north of the Bapaume road, including the whole western slope of Ovillers spur and the village. It was then to push forward to a line facing the German second position between Pozières (inclusive) and Mouquet Farm.

The two assaulting divisions had thus to capture two fortified villages and six lines of trenches, and to advance into the German position to a depth of roughly two miles on a frontage of 4,000 yards - a formidable task.

The 19th Division, in corps reserve, but with its guns in action under the other divisions, was to be in a position of readiness in an intermediate position north of Albert, and as the 34th and 8th Divisions moved forward to the assault, the two leading brigades of the 19th Division were to take their places in the Tara-Usna line, ready to move forward to relieve them when they had secured their objectives.

The corps artillery - mostly concentrated on both sides of the Amiens road, just west of Albert - comprised 98 heavy guns and howitzers, in addition to the divisional batteries, and a groupe of French 75-mm of the 18th Field Artillery Regiment to fire gas shell. It was organized in five groups, two working with each of the assaulting divisions and the other, composed of the heavier natures, covering the whole front.² This gave a heavy gun to every forty yards, and a field gun to every twenty-three yards.

As the infantry commanders were by no means satisfied with the results of the bombardment of La Boisselle and Ovillers, a battery of eight Stokes mortars was told to shell the former at zero. It was speedily knocked out by shell fire, but before this happened considerable effect appeared to have been produced on La Boisselle.

The programme of fire for 1 July provided for eight lifts of the heavy artillery, and laid down that after the assault the subsequent movement of the infantry will be assisted and regulated by a system of barrages which will move back slowly in accordance with a timetable.³ In this programme the sixth lift, to fall behind Contalmaison and Pozières, took place 1 hour and 25 minutes after zero, and the final lift, roughly 1,000 yards further back, 22 minutes later. The slowly referred to the general pace of the advance of the barrage, which was about two miles in 1 hour and 47 minutes. It was made in jumps by the heavy artillery as in XIII and XV Corps: the divisional artillery barrage, on the other hand, was to go back very slowly, and the instructions issued in the 34th Division artillery (Brigadier-General A.D. Kirby) made clear what was intended. They state:

"Lifts are timed to commence at the same time as the Heavy Artillery. But instead of lifting straight back on to the next line, divisional artillery will rake back gradually to the next line. The rake, however, the speed of which was given in an appendix, was not continuous, but a series of short lifts of 50, 100, or 150 yards. It was further said that the speed at which the rake goes back to the next line will be calculated so that the shrapnel barrage moves back faster than the infantry can advance". There was not therefore a creeping barrage, but only an attempt to deal with every small intermediate trench.

There were frequent complaints of bad gun ammunition during the preliminary bombardment and on 1 July, for, as in XV Corps, the field-gun ammunition proved to be very faulty, causing numerous premature bursts with consequent casualties as the guns were ranged in several lines. Many of the heavy howitzer shells fell short, and many failed to burst: an officer with the successful right wing of the corps reported a dud shell every two or three yards over several acres of ground. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the twelve-inch railway gun, firing at zero from behind Albert at thirteen miles’ range, drove the headquarters of the German XIV Corps out of Bapaume.⁴

Two very large mines, to be fired two minutes before zero, were laid by the 179th Tunnelling Company Royal Engineers under the shoulders of the salient formed by the trenches round La Boisselle in order to destroy any flanking arrangements, and by the height of their lips to prevent enfilade fire along No Man’s Land on either side. The southern one, known as Lochnagar, under Schwaben Redoubt, contained 60,000lbs of ammonal;⁵ the other, Y Sap, 40,600lbs of ammonal.⁶ As mine warfare had been going on in the La Boisselle area, infinite precautions were necessary to prevent the discovery of this new enterprise, especially as there was no continuous front trench along the mine-field, which was only held by a series of posts covering the mine shafts.⁷

34th Division: The assault on La Boisselle Salient

The full weight of the twelve infantry battalions of the 34th Division was to be thrown in the first assault, by successive waves, against the German position.⁸ It was to attack in four columns, each column three battalions deep on a frontage of four hundred yards. Between the third and fourth columns opposite La Boisselle there was to be a gap.

Unlike Ovillers in the 8th Division area, La Boisselle, the key of the front system owing to its salient position, was not to be attacked directly; the two left columns, passing on either side of it, were, as they advanced, to send into it special bombing parties (amounting in all to one platoon), supported by Lewis guns and Stokes mortars, to clear it from both flanks. Brigade and battalion commanders who expressed doubts as to the feasibility of this course were reminded that the commander of the Fourth Army had said the village would have been rendered untenable and the Germans in it wiped out by the preliminary bombardment, while the flanking shoulders on either side of it would be destroyed by the great mines.

On 30 June, however, the front line troops had found the garrison very much on the alert, for parties put over the parapet to clear passages through the wire in front of it were fired upon. It was arranged, therefore, that at zero when the barrage lifted, the bombardment of the village should be continued by trench mortars until the flanking parties could enter. To deal with Sausage Redoubt, a dangerous flanking work, during the night an emplacement for a trench-mortar battery was dug in No Man’s Land - there 500 yards wide - and its fire proved very effective until all its personnel were killed or wounded. It was subsequently discovered that the damage done by the bombardment was superficial, and that none of the deep dug-outs had been injured. In one of them an overhearing station had remained in action to the last. At 02.45 hours it had picked up part of a telephoned British order which pointed to an assault in the morning.⁹

The two right columns which assembled in the Tara-Usna trenches were formed of the 101st Brigade (Brigadier-General R.C. Gore),¹⁰ each having one battalion in front and one in support with a battalion of the 103rd Brigade (Tyneside Irish, Brigadier-General N.J.G. Cameron¹¹) in rear. The two left columns were similarly composed of the 102nd Brigade (Tyneside Scottish, Brigadier-General T.P.B. Ternan), with the two remaining battalions of the 103rd Brigade in rear. As the 103rd Brigade contained, as did the division as a whole, a large number of miners, extensive galleries had been dug in Tara hill for the first assembly of its battalions.

At the hour of assault all four columns were to advance in extended order in lines of companies, each in column of platoons at 150 paces’ distance. BrigadierGeneral Gore ordered the headquarters (Lieutenant Colonel, second-in- command, adjutant, etc.) of his battalions to stand fast when the troops advanced, and not to go forward until ordered by the brigade. They therefore remained intact and available to reorganize their commands at night, whilst practically all the other battalion staffs became casualties.

The first objective of the two leading lines of battalions was the German front system, consisting of four trenches. The fourth trench, requiring an advance of about 2,000 yards, was to be reached forty-eight minutes after zero hour, i.e., 08.18 hours. The second objective was the German second intermediate line, the Kaisergraben, in front of Contalmaison and Pozieres villages. This line was to be reached by 08.58 hours, when the 101st and 102nd Brigades were to halt and consolidate. The 103rd Brigade, forming the third line of battalions and following close in rear, would then pass through the 101st and 102nd Brigades, capture Contalmaison village, and advance to the third, and final, objective of the division, a line close to the outer or eastern edge of that village and Pozieres. This line, to be reached by the 103rd Brigade at 10.10 hours, was to be put into a state of defence preparatory to a subsequent assault on the German second position, which lay eight hundred yards beyond.¹²

At zero hour the whole infantry of the division, except the head of the second column, rose as one man, the front line going over the top and the rear lines moving down the slopes of Tara-Usna ridge, even the reserve battalions of the 103rd Brigade leaving their trenches. In a matter of ten minutes some 80 per cent of the men in the leading battalions were casualties; for directly the artillery barrage lifted off the German front line, an ever-increasing number of machine- guns - mostly in rear of the front line, well sited and hidden, and untouched by the bombardment - came into action, sweeping No Man’s Land, which was 200800 yards wide, and the front slopes of the Tara-Usna ridge.

There was no surprise: the Germans were ready. Warned by the order which had been overheard, and well drilled at manning the parapet, they came up out of their deep dug-outs as if by magic directly the barrage moved, and established a rough firing line before the British had got across No Man’s Land.

The four assaulting columns met with misfortunes of varying nature, accentuated by the fact that all the battalions of the 103rd Brigade left the Tara- Usna line at zero when the leading troops went over the top. Thus, in most cases, as soon as the latter were held up, the tail of each column telescoped on its head, with the result that composite parties formed of men of all battalions were to be found nearly everywhere, thus presenting splendid targets to the enemy. The right column was faced by the steep convex slope of the long western side of the Fricourt spur. The front companies of the 15/Royal Scots moved forward to within two hundred yards of the German front trench before zero hour, covered by the final bombardment and trench mortar fire.

On the barrage lifting, they overran with great steadiness and with little loss the German front trench which lay along the upper part of the slope, the pipe- major in the first wave playing the pipes, which, however, were soon punctured. At this early stage flanking machine-gun fire from SausageValley and La Boisselle forced the leading companies of the 15/Royal Scots, which were ahead of those of the second column, from their proper direction, and practically destroyed the left wings of the rear companies and of the lines of the 16/Royal Scots, which were following. The intended line of advance lay north of east, but owing to the hail of fire from the left the lines instinctively veered due eastward, moving straight up instead of aslant the rising slope, leaving parties of the 15/Royal Scots to clear up the German trenches in their sector, which included Sausage Redoubt. This divergence was maintained and accentuated as the advance progressed, carrying the right column into the zone of XV Corps. Thus by 07.48 hours the 15/ and 16/Royal Scots were well on the top of the Fricourt spur, but had left uncaptured both Sausage Redoubt and Scots Redoubt.

The error of direction was not discovered until half-an-hour later, when, after advancing nearly a mile and crossing the German first intermediate line, the Royal Scots reached Birch Tree Wood beyond the Sunken Road, in the depression leading down to Fricourt village and ran into units of the 21st Division (XV Corps). The remains of the two Scottish battalions, now considerably intermingled, edged away therefore to their left, northwards, to rectify the mistake.

Those of the 15/Royal Scots moved along Birch Tree Trench, in the German second intermediate line, towards Peake Woods, and those of the 16/Royal Scots took up a position in support along the Fricourt - Pozières road (the Sunken Road of XV Corps’ sector), two hundred yards in rear.

Before this northward movement along Birch Tree Trench was completed, the enemy¹³ attacked from the direction of Peake Woods, chiefly with bombing parties along the trench. Simultaneously heavy machine-gun fire was opened from the left flank and rear by German parties in the third and fourth trenches, and by a party in Scots Redoubt. This counter-attack caused heavy loss, and forced the Royal Scots to withdraw southwards, the 15/Royal Scots along Birch Tree Trench to a position just inside XV Corps’ sector, about Birch Tree Wood - Shelter Wood, and the 16/Royal Scots, with men of the 27/Northumberland Fusiliers, and 11/Suffolk from the next column, to the vicinity of Round Wood. They then initiated a movement towards Wood Alley and Scots Redoubt, being joined by men of various battalions, amongst them a captain of the 11/Suffolk, who had been wounded. Finding only a second lieutenant with the Royal Scots, he took command, and both objectives were secured - Scots Redoubt in an almost undamaged condition and most valuable as a flank support.

The Royal Scots were now astride the Fricourt spur, even a little beyond their first objective along the eastern side of it, and faced the Contalmaison spur 1,000 yards away across the valley. One party of the 16/Royal Scots, according to German accounts, actually penetrated the village and was there annihilated. The 27/Northumberland Fusiliers, which was to follow close behind the 16/Royal Scots, was stopped by the intense and accurate machine-gun fire which dominated No Man’s Land. Parties got through to the Fricourt - Pozieres road, and some men, with others of the 24/Northumberland Fusiliers of the next column on the left, reached Acid Drop Copse and the outskirts of Contalmaison. But such isolated advances could not change the fortune of the day.

On learning what the situation was, Brigadier-General Gore selected the battalion quarters of the 16/Royal Scots (Lieutenant Colonel Sir G. McCrae) to go forward and take command. The position reached by the Royal Scots was consolidated, and as it flanked the eastern side of the Fricourt spur towards Contalmaison, it formed a strong defensive flank on the left of XV Corps.¹⁴

On the left of the second column, opposite the gap of two hundred yards which divided it from the third, the Lochnagar mine (the double mine) was successfully exploded at 07.28 hours, blowing up the German garrison and causing a great crater ninety yards across and seventy feet deep, with lips fifteen feet high. Immediately south of the mine, however, the German front trench, following the contour of SausageValley, formed a pronounced re-entrant and the infantry of the second column, delayed five minutes by order in view of the mine explosion,¹⁵ was not only behind the columns on either side in crossing No Man’s Land, but had further to go than that on its left.

The barrage had of course lifted and the Germans thus had plenty of time to man the position deliberately, including Sausage Redoubt, the northern face of which flanked the advance. Their fire, combined with that of the flanking machine guns in Sausage Valley and La Boisselle, turned first on to the right column and then on to the second, was fatal to the success of the 34th Division. Within two minutes of zero hour, before the lines of the 10/Lincolnshire had cleared the front trench, machine-gun fire raked them and those of the 11/Suffolk following. The latter unit, in addition, suffered from a weak artillery barrage placed on the British trenches by the German batteries soon after the assault had been launched. Men fell fast, and the lines were gradually reduced to isolated small parties.

On the extreme right, a party which tried to storm Sausage Redoubt was burnt to death by flame throwers as it reached the parapet but some of the Suffolks got through and joined, as we have seen, the Royal Scots of the first column on top of the Fricourt spur. Still the courageous efforts of the mass of the Lincolnshire and Suffolks to cross the five hundred yards of No Man’s Land were unavailing, and the 24/Northumberland Fusiliers following them was ordered to halt in the front trenches.¹⁶

The survivors took any cover available in the open fire-swept zone; some men, from all three battalions, reached and consolidated a position in the Lochnagar crater. The party of the 15/Royal Scots left by the right column to deal with Sausage Redoubt attempted to bomb northwards into it, but was not strong enough to do so. Two attempts made by the 27th Field Company Royal Engineers and a company of the 18/Northumberland Fusiliers (Pioneers) to reinforce this party across No Man’s Land also failed owing to machine-gun fire; it was obvious that until the Germans could be cleared out of the redoubt, the troops of the second column lying out in No Man’s Land could neither be reinforced nor relieved during daylight.

The third column of the 102nd Brigade formed of the 21st, 22nd and 26th Northumberland Fusiliers, the last battalion belonging to the 103rd Brigade, tried to pass immediately south of La Boisselle, but north of the Lochnagar crater. Starting immediately the mine was fired, and having less than two hundred yards of No Man’s Land to cross, it succeeded in overrunning the trenches of Schwaben Höhe. The leading lines then moved along the western side of Sausage Valley, immediately below La Boisselle village, and crossed the next two lines of trenches (Kaufmanngraben and Alte Jägerstrasse). Their right flank was, however, exposed owing to the failure of the second column to advance at zero.

Detachments of bombers were sent out towards La Boisselle, but were unable to make progress. Up to this time, that is twelve minutes after zero hour, the bombardment of