The Poverty of Progress: Latin America in the Nineteenth Century

The Latin American States in 1826.

(SOURCE: Mary Wilhelmine Williams, The People and Politics of Latin America. New York: Ginn and Company, 1930.)

THE POVERTY OF PROGRESS

THE POVERTY OF PROGRESS

Latin America in the Nineteenth Century

E. Bradford Burns

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Berkeley Los Angeles London

University of California Press

Berkeley and Los Angeles, California

University of California Press, Ltd.

London, England

Copyright © 1980 by The Regents of the University of California

First Paperback Printing 1983

ISBN 0-520-05078-9

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Bums, E Bradford.

The poverty of progress.

Includes index.

1. Latin America —History—1830-1898.

2. Latin America — Social conditions. 3. Latin

America — Economic conditions. I. Title.

F1413.B87 980’.03 80-51236

Printed in the United States of America

Peoples of Europe, if only the sea and wind had never brought you to us! Ah, it was not for nothing that nature extended between us that flat expanse of waters.

— Words of the Indian Cacambo, Basilio de Gama, O Uraguai The incorporation of America into ‘Western Civilization’ was marked by violence first against the Indian population and later against the black slaves and the mestizo population.

— Alvaro Tirado Mejia,

Aspectos Sociales de las Guerras Civiles en Colombia And at last the philosophy of progress shows its true face: a featureless blank. We know now that the kingdom of progress is not of this world: the paradise it promises us is in the future, a future that is impalpable, unreachable, perpetual. Progress has peopled history with the marvels and monsters of technology but it has depopulated the life of man. It has given us more things but not more being. … How can we not turn away and seek another mode of development? It is an urgent task that requires both science and imagination, both honesty and sensitivity; a task without precedence, because all of the modes of development that we know, whether they come from the West or the East, lead to disaster. Under the present circumstances the race toward development is mere haste to reach ruin.

— Octavio Paz, The Other Mexico: Critique of the Pyramid One of the reasons I had wanted to go back to a traditional peasant society was to see if, as Fromm and Maccoby had suggested, there was a higher level of productiveness and a greater enjoyment of life than in the mestizo village which they had studied and with which I was also quite familiar. Again, as I have repeatedly observed, there does in fact appear to be a greater enjoyment of life among the Chan Kom women than there had been observed in Las Cuevas, or in most mestizo villages, or for that matter, in most communities in the U.S.A. The women constantly display their sense of pride and pleasure in most aspects of their lives, conveying a feeling of dignity as well as pride. And, more importantly, there is a sense of harmony with each other, with nature, within their total world." —Mary Lindsay Elendorf,

Nine Mayan Women: A Village Faces Change The quality of human existence is the ultimate measure of development.

— Alan Berg,

The Nutrition Factor: Its Role in National Development

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

PREFACE

CHAPTER ONE The Nineteenth Century: Progress and Cultural Conflict

CHAPTER TWO The Elite Preference for Progress

CHAPTER THREE The Preservation and Glorification of the Elite Preference

CHAPTER FOUR An Intellectual Counterpoint

CHAPTER FIVE The Patriarchal Preference

CHAPTER SIX The Folk Speak

CHAPTER SEVEN The Poverty of Progress

CHAPTER NOTES

STATISTICAL TABLES

GLOSSARY

INDEX

PREFACE

If this essay succeeds, it will open an interpretive window providing a different perspective of Latin America’s recent past. At first glance, the view might seem to be of the conventional landscape of modernization, but I hope a steady gaze will reveal it to be far vaster and more complex. For one thing, rather than enumerating the benefits accruing to Latin America as modernization became a dominant feature of the social, economic, and political life of the region, this essay regards the imposition of modernization as the catalyst of a devastating cultural struggle and as a barrier to Latin America’s development. Clearly if a window to the past is opened by this essay, then so too is a new door to controversy.

After most of the nations of Latin America gained political independence, their leaders rapidly accelerated trends more leisurely under way since the closing decades of the eighteenth century: the importation of technology and ideas with their accompanying values from Western Europe north of the Pyrenees and the full entrance into the world’s capitalistic marketplace. Such trends shaped those new nations more profoundly than their advocates probably had realized possible. Their promoters moved forward steadfastly within the legacy of some basic institutions bequeathed by centuries of Iberian rule. That combination of hoary institutions with newer, non-Iberian technology, values, and ideas forged contemporary Latin America with its enigma of overwhelming poverty amid potential plenty.

This essay emphasizes that the victory of the European- oriented ruling elites over the Latin American folk with their community values resulted only after a long and violent struggle, which characterized most of the nineteenth century. Whatever advantages might have resulted from the success of the elites, the victory also fastened two dominant and interrelated characteristics on contemporary Latin America: a deepening dependency and the declining quality of life for the majority.

We know little of the struggles of the folk and weakly appreciate their motivations. Apparently the less European- oriented peoples were determined to safeguard their own cultural past with which they were not only familiar but from which they felt they derived greater benefits. Obviously we should know more of their attitudes, rationale, ways of life, and alternatives to rapid modernization and to capitalism in order to better understand Latin America’s historical process. The folk were wary of modernization, at least in the forms it took in the nineteenth century. Apparently they had good reasons to be. Their quality of life declined as modernization accelerated. The contrasting and conflicting goals of the elites and the folk provide a dramatic dialectic. I suggest it might constitute the essence of nineteenth-century Latin American history.

This speculative essay asks the reader to consider revising some standard views of nineteenth-century Latin America and to consider the possibility that folk societies and cultures derived from Ibero-Afro-Indian experiences might have provided life-style alternatives more advantageous to the masses than the Europeanized modernization imposed on them. In doing so, it is intentionally polemical. It consciously questions some widely accepted concepts, theses, and interpretations, partly to urge they be reconsidered, partly to broaden them. Some perhaps should be replaced. My hope is that this essay will stimulate further discussion in an effort to reassess the nineteenth century, a key period in Latin American history, an understanding of which is requisite for any meaningful analysis of contemporary Latin America.

Admittedly the essay sweeps broadly across vast geographical and temporal spaces. It is at best suggestive. More research and evidence will be necessary to sustain these theses. Let us regard the essay, then, as the possible beginning of a reinterpretation. However, the essay claims originality only on the basis of its broad sweep. Otherwise, it has brought together some ideas suggested and evidence documented by an historical revisionism already under way in Latin America, Europe, and the United States. I owe much to those scholars whose monographic studies have provided novel glimpses into the last century as well as valuable data. In the notes following the text, I pay tribute to many of those pioneering works and to their authors. Naturally I assume responsibility for the theses in this essay and, indeed, for the interpretations I place on statistics and data drawn from others.

E. Bradford Burns

Hollywood Hills February 1980

Popular Governments of Latin America

The period between 1849 and 1852 marked the high point of popular governments in nineteenth-century Latin America. Folk leaders or caudillos dominated Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Yucatan.

CHAPTER ONE

The Nineteenth Century: Progress and Cultural Conflict

Cultural conflict characterized nineteenth-century Latin America. On the one hand, the elites, increasingly enamored with the modernization first of an industrializing Europe and then of the United States, insisted on importing and imposing those foreign patterns on their fledgling nations. They became increasingly convinced that Europe and the United States offered solutions to the problems they perceived in their societies as well as a life-style to their liking. On the other hand, the vast majority of Latin Americans, other elites but most particularly the popular classes, recognized the threat inherent in the wholesale importation of modernization and the capitalism accompanying it. They resisted, preferring their long-established living patterns to the more recent foreign novelties and fearful of their impact on their lives. The conflict between the two groups intensified as the century matured. In the struggle the Europeanized elites did not hesitate to repress their more numerous opposition who clung to their preferences and when necessary used physical means in an effort to preserve them.

No single elite espousing a uniform doctrine ever existed. Despite their variety, however, they shared a general outlook and they took actions that increasingly in the nineteenth century harmed the folk. That plurality of elites, because of their skills, contacts, powers, adaptability, intelligence, birth, and/or wealth, exercised an unusual degree of authority. They controlled the governmental institutions, as well as the commerce, banking, agriculture, and arts. They tended to make or to influence the making of significant economic and political decisions in their regions or nations. Likewise, the folk manifested a heterogeneity that challenges generalization in so vast an area as Latin America. And yet, as in the case of the elites, the folk, when all was said and done, manifested certain broad tendencies of behavior that gave them generally recognizable and somewhat similar characteristics as we shall later see.

While cultural clash was not unique to nineteenth-century Latin America, the intensity seldom had been equalled before and has not been approached since. To some degree it had characterized this hemisphere for thousands of years as Indian empires expanded, encroached on other Indian groups, and imposed new cultures. In the sixteenth century, the clash assumed different and more complex forms, first with the Iberian invasion and conquest and then with the importation of slaves from Africa. The cultural clash that we know most about pitted Indian civilizations against Iberian. Indian rebellions against European rule and cultural imposition frequently erupted during the long colonial period. As mestizo and mulatto cultures took shape, borrowing as they did from the Indo-Afro-European experiences, as the number of slaves and manumitted blacks rose as well as the number of settlements of runaway slaves, as the immigration of Iberian peasants into Latin America expanded, the variation and complexity of cultural expressions and the possibility of symbiosis or of conflict also increased. In at least one aspect, the nineteenth century was unique: it was the last opportunity for those most identified with the New World, the folk societies and their cultures, to exert influence over local, regional, or even national life. However, by the final decades of the century and certainly by the first of the twentieth century, those once vigorous folk societies had lost the struggle. They no longer were viable alternatives to the Europeanization that was taking place on an unprecedented scale.

The period in this essay denoted the nineteenth century defies precise definition. At best its boundaries blur. This temporal term encompasses those years after the new nations declared and won their political independence. (Symbolically we could use the date 1821, realizing that Haiti was independent by 1804 and that Brazil did not exert its independence until 1822, while the Spanish-speaking nations broke their relationship with Madrid at a variety of times from 1810 to 1822.) For purposes of this essay, then, the nineteenth century began when the new nations of Latin America assumed responsibility for their political destinies. This period ended sometime during the second decade of the twentieth century, terminated by the outbreak of a major revolution in Mexico whose potential for the creation of an autochthonous society seemed to mark a significant break with the past, by World War I, which disturbed established export and dependency patterns forcing a new relationship between Latin America and its nineteenthcentury mentors England and France, and by the rise to power of the United States with the further spread of its influence throughout all of Latin America. It was all too evident by that time that the drive toward increasing urbanization, industrialization, and modernization had accelerated; while at the same time, and contradictory to that drive only on the most superficial level, the latifundio, export economies, and dependency characterized life in these new countries of the Western Hemisphere. The governments of the elites had selected the North Atlantic model for their countries to follow and forced the opposition to bend to that decision.

The nations of the North Atlantic during the nineteenth century spawned a remarkable technology, which in turn facilitated their development. Infrastructures of roads, canals, and railroads solidified national unity while encouraging commerce and industry. Steamships and/or railroads circulated commerce, ideas, and peoples among those nations more readily and swiftly. Industrialization and urbanization, reshaping the economies as well as the demographies, required increasing amounts of agrarian products and raw materials. The population surge unleashed by medical advances further added to those requirements. Rapid accumulation of capital prompted investors to look abroad for lucrative investments, and Latin America with its natural resources and vast potential beckoned. There, the North Atlantic capitalists invested, sold their manufactured surpluses, and purchased mineral or agrarian products. By 1914, they had invested $8.5 billion in Latin America. The British put fully twenty percent of their overseas investment there. Generally most of the Latin American elites welcomed those investments and accepted their attendant consequences. They respected the cultures that made possible such capital accumulation, awesome technology, and pleasant lifestyles.

Influenced by the political and economic ideas of the Enlightenment at the time of their political independence, the ruling elites imposed upon Latin America theories that reflected little or none of the local socioeconomic environment. The precise political labels adopted by the elites varied, although they tended to group themselves under the headings of Liberals and Conservatives. Those labels confused rather than clarified because the elites had much more in common than in opposition. They tended to gravitate toward what was considered in the broadest terms of the Enlightenment to be liberal for the early nineteenth century: a written constitution that circumscribed the chief executive who shared power at least nominally with a legislature and judiciary; a limitation, if not outright abolition, of restrictions on trade; public education; and formal equality before the law. Liberty and democracy as the dominant elites perceived and pursued them throughout most of the nineteenth century in a majority of the Latin American nations sanctioned individualism, competition, and the unfettered pursuit of profit. They tended to be abstract, exclusive, and dependent on authority. In the classical sense, liberalism meant placing individual freedom and material gain over public interest. The elites felt they shaped their institutions in the latest European molds. They ignored the obvious fact that those models did not reflect American experience. As one immediate consequence the European models sired weak and compliant economic structures in the New World. They also favored the strong, wealthy, and resourceful minority over the huge, but weakened majority.

The elites spoke constantly of progress, perhaps the most sacred word in the political vocabulary but also one with an awesome array of meanings. Later generations of scholars substituted the word modernization, but that replacement did little to clarify the concept. Both words, used interchangeably hereafter, implied an admiration for the latest ideas, modes, values, inventions, and styles of Europe and the United States and a desire to adopt —rarely to adapt —them. The elites believed that to progress meant to recreate their nations as closely as possible to their European and North American models. They felt they would benefit from such a recreation, and by extension they assumed that their nations would benefit as well. They always identified (and confused) class well-being with national welfare.

The economic system that the elites obviously associated with progress was capitalism. It could not be otherwise when their primary models were England, France, and the United States. True, in large parts of Latin America long before independence, a type of neocapitalism already had penetrated and under Iberian institutions had influenced Latin American societies. It shaped at least a part of local customs as they evolved over the centuries. A high degree of mediation of values existed in those distant realms of the multicultural Iberian empires. European ideas and techniques filtered slowly, selectively through local customs, a process more notable outside the major cities and ports of course. But symbiosis characterized the cultures even in those urban areas. To a greater or lesser degree, depending on the area, the Iberian authorities had worked out with the inhabitants of their New World empires a modus operandi that respected or tolerated many local customs. If the local populations converted nominally to Roman Catholicism, acknowledged the supremacy of Iberian monarchs, and supplied labor when needed by the Europeans, they were left largely alone. Also, they received a kind of protection from crown and church as well as a certain minimal security from the local neofeudalistic landowners. In short, a type of compromise had been reached between Iberian demands and local customs. Like most compromises it suited neither side perfectly, but both accepted it as preferable to other alternatives. At any rate, the penetration of that Iberian neocapitalism was incomplete and by no means as challenging to the local populations and their cultures after the initial conquest period as was North Atlantic capitalism after 1821, particularly after midcentury.

As it turned out, old Iberian policies facilitated the adoption by the new Latin American governments of the neoclassical economic model imposed by the Northern Europeans.

Latin America was to trade those items it produced cheaply (agrarian and mineral products) for those items it did not produce or could not do so cheaply (manufactured goods). Such a trade patern derived from the complementary division of labor was supposed to benefit all. Only the passage of time revealed to the Latin Americans the mischief masked by facile theory.

The constitution, laws, and political practices the ruling elites put into effect complemented the penetration and growth of capitalism in Latin America. In nineteenth-century practice, the landlords produced their sugarcane, wool, beef, wheat, coffee, indigo, cacao, or other crops on as large a scale as possible for sale in an external market from which they expected a satisfactory profit. The politicians approved foreign exploitation of the natural resources with the hope that some residue of the wealth created would enrich them and facilitate the transformation of at least the capital cities into citadels of European culture. The wealth created from the countryside and mines, shared