Dual Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Institutionalized Regimes in Chile and Mexico, 1970–2000

Dual Transitions from Authoritarian Rule

Dual Transitions from Authoritarian Rule

Institutionalized Regimes in Chile and Mexico, 1970–2000

FRANCISCO E. GONZÁLEZ

© 2008 The Johns Hopkins University Press

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

González González, Francisco Enrique, 1970–

Dual transitions from authoritarian rule : institutionalized regimes in

Chile and Mexico, 1970–2000 / Francisco E. González.

p. cm.

Revision of the author’s thesis (doctoral—Oxford, 2002) presented under title:

The political economy of dual transitions.

Includes bibliographical references (p.    ) and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-8018-8799-4 (hardcover : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-8018-8799-2 (hardcover : alk. paper)

ISBN-13: 978-0-8018-8800-7 (pbk. : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-8018-8800-X(pbk. alk. paper)

1. Democratization—Chile—History—20th century. 2. Chile—Economic policy.

3. Democratization—Mexico—History—20th century. 4. Mexico—Economic

policy—1970–1994. 5. Mexico—Economic policy—1994–    6. Chile—Politics

and government—1970–1973. 7. Chile—Politics and government—1973–1988.

8. Chile—Politics and government—1988–9. Mexico—Politics and government

—1970–1988. 10. Mexico—Politics and government—1998–2000. I. Title.

JL2681.G67 2008

972.08′3—dc22           2007035575

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

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A mi Amy,

porque esta historia

de desventuras

me trajo a ti.

A Francisco Thomas,

por haber llegado.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Introduction: Dual Transitions from Authoritarian Rule

PART I. THE 1970S: DIVERGENT POLITICO-ECONOMIC TRAJECTORIES

1. Chile, 1970–1982

2. Mexico, 1970–1982

PART II. THE 1980S: SURVIVING THE CRISIS YEARS AND CONVERGENCE OF TRAJECTORIES

3. Chile’s Decisive Decade, 1982–1990

4. Mexico’s Lost Decade, 1982–1988

PART III. THE 1990S: VERSIONS OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY AND FREE MARKET ECONOMIES

5. The New Chile, 1990–2000

6. Mexico in North America, 1988–2000

Conclusion: Dual Transitions in Chile, Mexico, and Beyond

Notes

Bibliography

Index

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This volume went through several stages before its current form. It benefited from the generous time and insights of Laurence Whitehead, Desmond King, and Sudhir Hazareesingh. Additionally, Alan Angell read the sections on Chile and enriched the case study with his unmatched knowledge of that country. Thanks are due to Nuffield College, Oxford, for the funded studentship (1998–2000) that made the doctoral research possible. I presented early ideas of the project at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) workshops in Bern (1997) and Grenoble (2001). I discussed the project in more detail at a conference convened by Marc Plattner and Larry Diamond of the National Endowment for Democracy in Santiago, Chile (1999), and at the Third Congress of European Latin Americanists in Amsterdam (2002).

St. John’s College, Oxford, provided a good teaching and intellectual environment (2000–2002) in which an earlier version of this work was written and discussed. The British Academy was a wonderful patron, providing the postdoctoral research fellowship that allowed me to return to Nuffield College (2002–2005) to shape the text into its current form. I owe special gratitude to Guillermo O’Donnell, who read the manuscript and helped me to clarify the volume’s central argument during his research visit to Nuffield College in the winter-spring of 2004–2005.

The last set of revisions to the manuscript was carried out during the winter of 2006–2007 at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C., where Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz helped me make the transition to full-time faculty member in the autumn of 2005. The current version of the text benefited enormously from further critical readings by Guillermo O’Donnell, Riordan Roett, Desmond King, Henry Tom, and an anonymous reader for the Johns Hopkins University Press. I owe special thanks to my superb team of research assistants, whose motivation and excellent work helped move the project toward completion: Katherine Fen-nell, Sarah Johnston-Gardner, and Alejandro Carrión Menéndez. Heartfelt thanks to Guadalupe Paz for her support and encouragement from the moment she put me in touch with publishers until the final submission of this manuscript, which was enhanced by her copyediting craftsmanship.

Finally, special recognition and gratitude go to my wife, Amy Berrington, whose love and support have kept me going, and to my parents, Laura I. González Martínez and Francisco González Méndez, whose lifelong work helping street children, the poor, and the elderly in need of medical treatment remains a deep source of inspiration.

Dual Transitions from Authoritarian Rule

INTRODUCTION

Dual Transitions from Authoritarian Rule

Faith in democracy received a boost during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Between the early 1970s and the dawn of the twenty-first century, more than eighty countries throughout the world underwent transitions from authoritarian or totalitarian to democratic political regimes. According to Freedom House, in the year 2000 there were 120 competitive electoral democracies in the world, which represented the highest number in the history of humankind. Moreover, the proportion of countries in the world that were democratic was higher than ever before (63 percent).¹ This global political phenomenon started in the early 1970s in southern Europe with the demise of military dictatorships and the transitions to democracy in Portugal, Spain, and Greece, and then extended to Latin American, Eastern European, East and Southeast Asian, and sub-Saharan countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Baptized as the third wave of democratization, this global political phenomenon has prompted a rich academic literature.²

The third wave of democratization is distinctive. As Diamond and Plattner put it, a single distinguishing feature of contemporary democratic transitions that most sets them apart from previous efforts … might well be the linkage between political and economic reform, the ‘dual’ nature of the transition.³ Of particular relevance is Haggard and Kaufman’s observation that most of the new democratic governments have been induced to pursue a relatively ‘orthodox’ direction of economic reform, one that has decisively favored liberalization, reducing the role of the state in the economy, and expanding the role of market forces in society. By contrast, the shocks of the 1930s gave rise to ‘heterodox’ policy experiments [with the adoption of inward-looking economic models], which dramatically expanded the role of the state in the economy.⁴ Therefore, in order to properly understand the third wave of democratization, it is crucial to recognize that many of these countries faced dual transitions: from authoritarian or totalitarian political regimes to democratic ones and from state-led or command economies to market ones.

Dual Transitions as the Breakup of Political and Economic Monopolies

Dual transitions are best characterized as processes whereby political and economic monopolies are broken. A political monopoly of this type is the exclusive exercise of political power that the outgoing totalitarian or authoritarian regime enjoyed before the transition to democracy. An economic monopoly involves an extent of control of economic activity and resource allocation enjoyed by the same regime and its allies before the market reforms typical of economic liberalization are implemented.

The breakup of monopolies has been shown to redistribute benefits and costs among groups; indeed, this is inherent in the very idea of dismantling monopolies. These changes in the allocation of power (in the political sphere) and rents (in the economic sphere) redirect the behavior of political and economic leaders by modifying their calculations about how to maximize their relative benefits.⁵

Specifically, the breakup of political and economic monopolies brought about by these dual transitions entails immediate costs for the losers of monopoly power, whether political or economic or both, while promising future gains for those who had been excluded from enjoying those benefits. Game theorists argue that those who benefit from monopoly power have a vested interest to defend the status quo, while the excluded will organize to fight and force change. The aim of incumbents becomes making credible promises about redistribution to dissuade the opposition from fighting to break up their political and economic monopolies by revolution, if need be. For promises to be credible, the opposition can demand the restructuring of political and economic institutions to force a reallocation of not only current but also future power. In the useful distinction introduced by Acemoglu and Robinson, the opposition needs to translate its current de facto power (social mobilization, public opinion support, armed struggle, and so on) into future de jure power (restructuring political and economic institutions) to ensure their participation in the future decision-making process regarding the allocation of costs and benefits.⁶

Historically, this has been done in a variety of ways. Some opposition movements have just replaced and excluded the previous winners (outgoing regime incumbents) by preserving monopoly power for themselves. This was the case in the 1917 social revolution that led to the establishment of totalitarian communist rule in Russia.⁷ If instead of the preservation of monopoly (with only a change in leadership), its breakup moves in the direction of pluralism in the political arena and free market price competition in the economic sphere, then the allocation of power and rents will become less centralized. Rather than the single decision of the monopolist allocating political and economic resources to individuals or groups as the occasions demand, individuals make independent decisions about the allocation of those resources.⁸ As a consequence, more actors become empowered, competition over costs and benefits increases, and outcomes about future allocation of power and resources become more uncertain.

Higher uncertainty leads to more social conflict over the future allocation of political and economic resources, but it need not necessarily lead to high political instability or recurrent regime change. The empirical evidence shows that democratic and authoritarian regimes can cope with different degrees of competition in the political and economic spheres without suffering acute political instability or breakdown. Democracies as different as the United States, Canada, Western European countries, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and India have experienced long periods of democratic regime continuity in the face of different degrees of political and economic competition. In a similar vein, authoritarian regimes in Mexico under the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Brazil and Chile under bureaucratic authoritarian military rule, Turkey under Atatürk, Egypt under Nasser, Algeria under Ben Bella, and Yugoslavia under Tito experienced long periods of continuity under different degrees of political and economic competition.⁹

It is helpful to categorize the universe of authoritarian and democratic regimes included in the monopoly/decentralized political and economic spheres across two dimensions. The first dimension is the spectrum between authoritarian and democratic political regimes. The second dimension is the spectrum between state-led and open economies. Figure 1 illustrates the four resultant politico-economic models.

A country situated in the first quadrant is based on the neoliberal model of democracy. The rationale behind this model is that economic freedom (property rights and free markets) provides the basis and the best guarantee for the establishment and the development of political freedom (liberal democracy). This model regards the market as a more efficient disciplinary tool of individual and social behavior than the state; it is inherently suspicious about extensive state intervention in the economy. Cases in this quadrant include the third-wave democracies that implemented the Washington Consensus in the 1990s.¹⁰

A country situated in the second quadrant is based on free market authoritarianism. This model assumes that political democracy and extensive state involvement in the economy are pernicious for a country in the long term. It conceives democracy as a system that encourages the rise and deepening of conflicts between pressure groups and their competing claims. The state becomes overburdened trying to meet these ever rising demands and becomes fiscally weakened. A weak state is increasingly unable to enforce basic functions such as law and order. Because democracy allows freedom of organization and expression, radical groups will advance projects whose aim is to undermine or even to overthrow the regime. A weak state will find itself unable to respond both to the socioeconomic challenge of development and to the political challenge of anti-systemic forces.¹¹ The corollary of free market authoritarianism is the enhancement of economic freedom at the expense of political freedom. It was the trajectory pursued in Mexico between 1985 and 1996, in Chile under General Augusto Pinochet, and in Peru under Alberto Fujimori.

Figure 1. Politico-Economic Models in a Two-Dimensional Space

A country situated in the third quadrant is based on state-led authoritarianism. This model was popular in Latin America between the 1930s and the 1970s and in Asia and Africa after de-colonization. It advocates wide state intervention in the economy and state guidance of the political process to build nations. Such states become strong dispensers of patronage and clientelism. The more economic space and activity the state takes over, the less is left for independent private activity. Likewise, the more it controls political activity, the harder it is for autonomous political organization and activity to flourish.

A country situated in the fourth quadrant is based on state-led democracy. Whereas the neoliberal model emphasizes economic freedom and political equality (one person one vote), this politico-economic model, found in countries with strong traditions of social democratic government in continental Europe and Scandinavia, underscores relative equality, socioeconomic as well as political.¹² It criticizes neoliberalism for stressing economic freedom while at the same time overlooking the inequality of initial distribution of resources inherent in any society. Given this initial inequality, economic freedoms and the chances of individuals and groups to develop will be unequal and unfair from the start. Hence, social democracy has always advocated a strong role for the state in economic development and social provision.

The question now becomes: How do the Latin American countries that underwent dual transitions in the 1980s and 1990s fit into this scheme?

Dual Transitions in Latin America and the Distinctiveness of the Chilean and Mexican Cases

In this volume, I examine the cases of Chile and Mexico, where authoritarian regimes controlled dual transitions in the 1980s and 1990s. The other Latin American countries that underwent dual transitions during these decades were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Of these, the impetus behind political democratization and economic liberalization was weakest in Paraguay, while in Uruguay and to a lesser extent in Brazil democratization was coupled with a consensus to retain the tradition of state-led economy, even in the face of external pressures in favor of liberalization. Countries that did not undergo dual transitions in the region were Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, all of which remained democracies in the 1970s and 1980s, and Cuba, which remained a totalitarian regime. Central American countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua underwent triple transitions: from civil war to peace; from authoritarian to democratic rule; and from state-led to relatively open economies.

The comparative historical analysis in this volume covers the years 1970 to the year 2000.¹³ This choice is not arbitrary. The three decades frame a peak and a deep trough in the recent political and economic history of Latin America. The peak was reached in the early 1970s. It represented the zenith of state intervention in the economy and of governments from the left, which tried to bring about popular democracy in some cases and socialism in others. However, as figure 2 illustrates, by 1976 all of the Latin American countries that would undergo dual transitions in the 1980s and 1990s had succumbed to different varieties of state-led or free market authoritarianism.

Figure 2. Politico-Economic Models in Latin America in 1976

The deep trough was produced by the 1982 economic crisis, which triggered the so-called lost decade of economic and social development in most Latin American countries, including Chile and Mexico. Painful years of stabilization, adjustment, and economic restructuring along free market lines followed in most countries. Nonetheless, as figure 3 shows, by 2000 all the dual transition countries had embraced electoral democracy.

Two factors made dual transitions in Chile and Mexico distinctive. First, they were the only two countries in which authoritarian regimes by and large controlled the two transitions. In contrast, left-wing authoritarian regimes in Peru and in Ecuador, and right-wing ones in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay underwent transitions to democracy between 1978 and 1989. The demise of these regimes meant that they were unable to influence further their respective dual transitions. We should remain aware about wide variations among these cases, as exemplified by the total collapse of the military regime in Argentina in 1982–83, on the one hand, and the orderly retreat to the barracks and continuing influence of the military in Brazil after 1985, on the other. Likewise, the fall of these authoritarian regimes before the wave of market reforms spread throughout the region also meant that they did not control the economic transition to free markets. This task was the responsibility of their young democratic regimes.¹⁴

Second, the process of dual transitions in Chile and Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s was more successful than in the other seven dual-transition countries in Latin America. The question of success or failure is always open to value judgment and is therefore subjective. In this volume, successful dual transition processes mean, on the economic side, that neither Chile nor Mexico experienced the escalation of social conflict into episodes of hyperinflation and, politically, that the heads of state in both countries finished their constitutionally prescribed terms in office. In contrast, the other seven countries faced episodes of hyperinflation or interrupted presidencies or both.¹⁵

Figure 3. Politico-Economic Models in Latin America in 2000

Explaining the Relative Success of Dual-Transition Management in Chile and Mexico

Thus far dual transitions have been analyzed through sequence analysis. The basic assumption behind this type of analysis is that which came first is relevant to understanding the extent of control that different political regimes can exert over large-scale politico-economic transformations.¹⁶ The two basic sequences are democratic transition first and neoliberal transformation later or neoliberal transformation first and democratic transition later. Scholars who argue that the latter sequence is more likely to lead to successful dual transition processes point out that authoritarian regimes tend to have stronger capacity than democratic ones in controlling the timing, pace, and extent of economic and political change.¹⁷ Applied to Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, this argument might help to identify a reason why the processes of dual transitions in Chile and Mexico were comparatively more successful than in countries where transitions to democracy happened first and the new, usually fragile, democratic regimes had less control over the timing, pace, and extent of political and economic change (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay).

In contrast, authors who favor the democracy first sequence argue that the authoritarian advantage thesis neglects the negative legacies of authoritarian rule, both as an impediment to economic rationality and as a potential obstacle to full democratization.¹⁸ This volume agrees with these criticisms, but I subject the authoritarian advantage thesis to a different critique. There is ample evidence from Latin America in the 1970s that the presence of authoritarian rule per se was not a necessary and sufficient condition for political regimes to control and shape the pace and extent of political and economic change. Thus, right-wing military regimes attempted and failed to transform their countries’ economies along free market lines at the same time that they tried to postpone the return of democracy in Argentina (1976–83) and Uruguay (1973–85). In the opposite direction, nationalist left-wing military regimes in Peru (1968–75) and, more briefly, in Ecuador (1972–76) and Bolivia (1969–71) tried to socialize their economies under populist, nondemocratic political regimes, but their reforms were later reversed. Even the strong military regime that ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985 had little or no leverage over the move to economic liberalization during President Fernando H. Cardoso’s tenure (1995–2003).

From the perspective of the authoritarian regimes’ many failures to control dual-transition processes in Latin America, Chile and Mexico represent exceptions to the rule of equating an authoritarian advantage with successful management of dual transitions. In the face of so many other authoritarian regime failures to control dual transitions in Latin America since the 1970s, there have to be some factors other than the sequencing of the two transitions that help to explain why the authoritarian advantage operated in Chile and Mexico. The question is, Can we find common factors at work that allowed such different authoritarian regimes—the former a bureaucratic authoritarian military regime, the latter a civilian, hegemonic party regime—to control their dual transition processes?

To answer this question, I start by positing that the failure of sequence analysis to predict the outcome of dual transitions in Latin America since the 1970s is due to two problems. On the one hand, its conception of political and economic transitions is too rigid (that is, one occurs after the other in a clear-cut way). On the other hand, it does not specify a priori mechanisms through which the timing, pace, and extent of dual transitions may be controlled by incumbents in authoritarian or newly democratic regimes.

With respect to the problem of a rigid conception of how political and economic change takes place in dual transitions, I introduce a more empirically based relationship between political and economic transitions. Historically, the dual transitions in Chile and in Mexico were not strictly sequential. Rather, different aspects of the economic and political transitions were coterminous and interactive. Any convincing explanation of how the authoritarian advantage operated in these two countries therefore needs to take into account the effects of politico-economic interactions on these two relatively successful dual transitions.

The scholarly literature has highlighted the importance of analyzing politico-economic interactions to understand dual transitions. For example, Haggard and Kaufman have shown how the presence or absence of economic crisis influenced the type of authoritarian withdrawal and the type of challenges facing new democratic regimes, and conversely, how the political institutions of both authoritarian and democratic regimes influenced their countries’ economic conditions and prospects during the years of political or economic transition in twelve Latin American and Asian countries.¹⁹ Bates and Krueger’s multinational analysis of market reforms in both democratic and authoritarian countries concluded that it became evident that both economic and political factors had a profound influence on the situation resulting in the need for reform, the nature of the reform effort, and its outcome, and that interaction of these factors was little understood.²⁰ Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens developed a comparative historical model that accounted for the rise of democracy in capitalist societies. They highlighted the importance of the complex interactions between economic and political processes that have to be taken into account to avoid formalistic analyses of political democratization and economic development.²¹ In their study about the sustainability of democracy, Przeworski and his colleagues also concluded that the interdependence [of] political and economic reforms is essential to understand whether democracy is likely to generate desirable and politically desired objectives, as well as whether it is likely to last.²²

To identify and analyze politico-economic interactions, I introduce two categories that represent opposite ideal types. From the ideal-type perspective, dual transitions can interact by either strengthening or weakening each other. In the language of this volume, mutual strengthening of the economic and the political transitions is the result of politico-economic synergies. In the opposite direction, mutual weakening of the dual transitions is the result of politico-economic antagonisms. Examples of the former include sustained economic growth under macroeconomic stability leading to the moderation of social and political conflict or political institutions capable of aggregating and channeling the conflicts over the distribution of costs and benefits of dual transitions in a positive-sum direction. Examples of the latter include the escalation of distributional conflicts that spill over into hyperinflation or economic crises that put pressure on governments and can lead to either their fall (as in some interrupted presidencies) or to the fall of the political regime.

With respect to the problem of the failure of sequence analysis to specify a priori mechanisms for the capacity or incapacity of authoritarian regimes to control the timing, pace, and extent of dual transitions, I emphasize political institutions as such mechanisms. I argue that institutionalized authoritarian regimes in Chile and Mexico permitted incumbents and the opposition to manage and negotiate inter-temporally the costs and benefits of the breakup of political and economic monopolies. Institutionalized regimes induced inter-temporal bargaining and accommodation by helping to overcome coordination problems; to lengthen political and economic actors’ time horizons; and to structure the possibility of negotiating political opponents’ choices through rationalized, predictable procedures that helped to produce positive-sum outcomes.

Successful management of the dual transitions was not preordained in either Chile or Mexico. Even though authoritarian regime incumbents by and large controlled the pace, timing, and extent of dual transitions, economic and political liberalization made future outcomes more uncertain, and this strengthened the role that contingency could have at any given point. Regime institutionalization constrained the likelihood that contingent events spiraled into what I identify as strengthening politico-economic antagonisms and raised the probability of politico-economic synergies.

Huntington long ago established the importance of regime institutionalization as an independent variable of managed political change. According to him, institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability, which in turn helps to establish that the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government.²³ Linz raised a similar point when discussing authoritarianism in pre-1974 Brazil by distinguishing authoritarian situations from regimes, going on to identify the main characteristics of the former type: constant creation and disregard of institutions, including the making and breaking of constitutions; constant changes to the rules of elections (if there are any); profound struggles at the top of the regime’s leadership that translate into succession crises; and a negative raison d’être with little capacity to serve as the foundation for legitimate and stable authoritarian political institutions.²⁴

In contrast, applied to contemporary Latin America, Mainwaring and Scully identified the main positive characteristic of institutionalization by arguing that when a practice or organization becomes well-established and widely known, if not universally accepted, … actors develop expectations, orientations, and behavior based on the premise that this practice or organization will prevail in the foreseeable future.²⁵ Institutionalization lowers the uncertainty of future political (and economic) outcomes.

The micro-foundations of how such lowering of uncertainty occurs can be summed up as follows: given specific threats about political and economic change to a given status quo, rational individuals will try to protect their stakes by promoting self-interested politics and policies.²⁶ In countries without an institutionalized political regime (democratic or authoritarian), stability of organizations and procedures is given relatively low value, so the pursuit of self-interest leads to weak coordination and therefore to low cooperation among contending groups. Also, without the predictability of formal and informal rules and practices created by an institutionalized regime, rational individuals face short time horizons because contending groups try to change the status quo to suit their interests at any time. Lastly, without predictable rules and practices enshrined in an institutionalized regime, individual actors develop a winner-take-all mentality, which raises the potential for increased social conflict.

The key effect of an institutionalized political regime is spelling out how and when change to the status quo can be enacted. This basic coordination mechanism structures and lengthens time horizons and may promote cooperation between contenders. In this system, individual actors know that they will not be permanent winners or losers, because the institutionalized rules and practices spell out how change can be brought about, which helps them to organize to maximize their chances of enjoying benefits. Such a priori knowledge helps moderate conflict between contending groups, each of which tries to impose its political values and economic interests on the others. In such a system, uncertainty about the future status quo is lower than in one that does not have an institutionalized regime. Lower uncertainty means a lower premium on the risk of unexpected or unilateral losses of power and resources in the future status quo and more room for bargaining that yields positive-sum outcomes.

The effects of regime institutionalization are probabilistic rather than deterministic. This means that the likelihood of overcoming coordination problems, lengthening time horizons, and structuring bargaining to produce positive-sum outcomes increases under an institutionalized regime—but these outcomes cannot be guaranteed. To understand how the processes of dual transitions in Chile and Mexico adhered to these general conditions, we have to specify the origins, the characteristics, and the mode of operation of their institutionalized authoritarian regimes.

The origin of both regimes was different. The institutionalized authoritarian regime based on the hegemonic rule of the PRI in Mexico was the result of a successful elite pact between victorious generals and caciques (local or regional strongmen) in 1929 to negotiate power succession through bargaining inside the party rather than bullets and violence. The Chilean military regime that came to power in 1973 was the result of a coup against the democratically elected government headed by Salvador Allende, which was attempting the socialist transformation of the country. The former regime was therefore civilian, while the latter was military. In terms of their approach to mobilization, the two regimes were also different. The Mexican regime conformed to what Linz identified as controlled mobilization of a population previously not organized and mobilized, while the Chilean regime was a case of deliberate demobilization of a population previously mobilized within a more competitive political situation.²⁷

Both countries shared four similar characteristics of institutionalized authoritarian rule: the presence of a stable constitutional framework, an agreed calendar for political contestation, highly institutionalized political parties and party systems, and strong executive branch authority. Stable constitutional rule—rather than de facto rule—based on the 1917 Mexican and the 1980 Chilean constitutions helped actors to achieve basic inter-temporal coordination to negotiate the future status quo. Agreed electoral calendars and strong parties and party systems channeled participation in a way that contained violence and moderated social and political conflict, while at the same time lengthening actors’ time horizons by establishing the bases for predictable political contestation and the inter-temporal allocation of costs and benefits that would result from transitions. Crucially, the party systems in both countries ensured votes and representation for outgoing regime actors and their allies—members and supporters of the PRI in Mexico and of the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) in Chile—while in countries like Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru they did not.²⁸ Thus, while guarantees about broad political representation in the democratic future raised the likelihood of positive-sum politico-economic outcomes in Chile and Mexico, the lack of guaranteed representation for the outgoing authoritarian regimes and their allies in Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru bred winner-take-all, confrontational dual transitions. Lastly, the traditional centrality of the national executive branch of government in both countries helped to minimize collective action problems by focusing the negotiations about the economic and political transitions in a single office with strong top-down command.

The four shared characteristics of Chile’s and Mexico’s authoritarian regimes helped to strengthen the weight of political institutions in the recurrent allocation of costs and benefits during the dual transitions. At this point a paradox becomes apparent, as these two strongly institutionalized authoritarian regimes ended up undergoing transitions to democracy. Did their strength lead to their destruction? Linz has argued that no matter how strong and entrenched, authoritarian regimes live in a permanent uneasy equilibrium because they all face this legitimacy pull toward the polyarchical model with political freedom for relatively full participation, or toward the committed, ideological single-party model.²⁹ From this perspective, the pull of both the Chilean military and the Mexican hegemonic party regime was toward the former model, because they had institutionalized channels that structured political contestation including, crucially, the possibility that a future status quo might mean democratic rule. Thus, the 1980 constitution in Chile contained a calendar for an eventual transition to democracy, while the 1917 constitution and the federal electoral laws in Mexico, while ensuring systematic advantages for the PRI, did not bar other parties from eventually reaching power through elections.

The institutionalization of authoritarian rule, but of a type that structured political contestation in a relatively open-ended manner (allowing plebiscites or elections to determine the allocation of future power and resources), permitted the opposition in both Chile and Mexico to engage the regime institutionally, that is, in rationalized, rule-bound, relatively predictable ways; to gain increasing political and economic space, which strengthened their commitment to keep playing by the rules of the game; and, in the end, to force the authoritarian regimes from power through democratic elections.

Finally, with respect to mode of operation, the Chilean and Mexican authoritarian regimes used force—the Chilean military regime ruthlessly, whereas the Mexican regime