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Camelot's Court: Inside the Kennedy White House
Fifty years after John F. Kennedy’s assassination, presidential historian Robert Dallek, whom the New York Times calls “Kennedy’s leading biographer,” delivers a riveting portrait of this president and his inner circle of advisors—their rivalries, personality clashes, and political battles. In Camelot’s Court , Dallek analyzes the brain trust whose contributions to the successes and failures of Kennedy’s administration—including the Bay of Pigs, civil rights, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam—were indelible. Kennedy purposefully put together a dynamic team of advisors noted for their brilliance and acumen, including Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and trusted aides Ted Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger. Yet the very traits these men shared also created sharp divisions. Far from being unified, this was an uneasy band of rivals whose ambitions and clashing beliefs ignited fiery internal debates. Robert Dallek illuminates a president deeply determined to surround himself with the best and the brightest, who often found himself disappointed with their recommendations. The result, Camelot's Inside the Kennedy White House , is a striking portrait of a leader whose wise resistance to pressure and adherence to principle offers a cautionary tale for our own time.
528 pages, Paperback
First published October 8, 2013
About the author
Robert Dallek
50 books163 followersRobert Dallek is the author of 'Nixon and Kissinger', a Pulitzer Prize finalist, and 'An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963', among other books. His writing has appeared in the The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Atlantic, and Vanity Fair. He is an elected fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the Society of American Historians, for which he served as president in 2004-2005. He lives in Washington, D.C.
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December 9, 2021
A very nice concise summary of Kennedy and his team during his presidential years.
The highlight was the description of the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was Kennedy at his best, deploying a highly talented team with diverse opinions to counsel him, but ultimately understanding that it is his own responsibility to make decisions. Kennedy had the courage to resist the advice he was getting from the CIA and military, which were pushing him to take swift military action. Instead, he doggedly searched for alternate solutions. Kennedy was determined to not have a WWI like situation where a series of misunderstandings could lead to war. And while everyone was aware of the nuclear threat, Kennedy seemed uniquely sensitive that he had a responsibility to do everything in his power to remove this risk – shown not just in his response to the Cuban Missile Crisis but also in his efforts to promote peace and to de-escalate tensions with the Soviet Union.
In other areas, Kennedy was not as impressive. His passivity on Civil Rights. His inability to develop a strategic plan to get legislation passed and not just let it wallow in the Senate. The misjudgment on the Bay of Pigs. In Vietnam, he had some good instincts that things were not going well, but he didn’t follow through. He was also indecisive about key decisions in Vietnam, which had the practical effect of allowing his advisors to effectively be the decision makers, as in the case of supporting the coup in South Vietnam. And finally, his personal behavior towards some people, such as Jackie and his girlfriends, was cruel at times.
I’m not sure how to balance all of these things, but if you have “avoiding nuclear war” on one side of the ledger, that is pretty hard to offset.
The highlight was the description of the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was Kennedy at his best, deploying a highly talented team with diverse opinions to counsel him, but ultimately understanding that it is his own responsibility to make decisions. Kennedy had the courage to resist the advice he was getting from the CIA and military, which were pushing him to take swift military action. Instead, he doggedly searched for alternate solutions. Kennedy was determined to not have a WWI like situation where a series of misunderstandings could lead to war. And while everyone was aware of the nuclear threat, Kennedy seemed uniquely sensitive that he had a responsibility to do everything in his power to remove this risk – shown not just in his response to the Cuban Missile Crisis but also in his efforts to promote peace and to de-escalate tensions with the Soviet Union.
In other areas, Kennedy was not as impressive. His passivity on Civil Rights. His inability to develop a strategic plan to get legislation passed and not just let it wallow in the Senate. The misjudgment on the Bay of Pigs. In Vietnam, he had some good instincts that things were not going well, but he didn’t follow through. He was also indecisive about key decisions in Vietnam, which had the practical effect of allowing his advisors to effectively be the decision makers, as in the case of supporting the coup in South Vietnam. And finally, his personal behavior towards some people, such as Jackie and his girlfriends, was cruel at times.
I’m not sure how to balance all of these things, but if you have “avoiding nuclear war” on one side of the ledger, that is pretty hard to offset.
February 8, 2021
Almost sixty years later, it is still mind-boggling to read about how a succession of U.S. Presidents escalated the nation's involvement in what was really a civil war in Vietnam. While Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower had taken the first steps in committing the U.S. to a defense of South Vietnam, things really got going when John F. Kennedy took office in 1961. This is one of several topics that Robert Dallek skillfully covers in his book about Kennedy's advisers and their roles in helping (or, more accurately, hurting) his ability to govern.
Kennedy, elected narrowly over Richard Nixon in 1960, seemed paralyzed by the situation that was presented to him in Vietnam. To withdraw U.S. "advisers" and support of Ngo Dinh Diem's self-destructive regime would have been to invite screams of "appeasement" from Republicans, and many hawkish Democrats. He would have been called "soft" on Communism, and blamed for the "loss" of a country, much as Truman was with China in 1949. Kennedy thought that all of this would jeopardize his prospects at re-election in 1964. So, he temporized, continually putting off major decisions. Ultimately, he was assassinated before he got around to doing anything about Vietnam. One of history's big ifs is what Kennedy would have done had he lived. Would he have withdrawn any U.S. personnel once he had been re-elected, assuming that he would have been? Would he have escalated the conflict like his successor Lyndon Johnson so disastrously chose to do? The answer to the second question seems unlikely, yet it will go unanswered.
The focus of Dallek's book is on the myriad advisers that Kennedy had, and how poorly almost all of them served him. In fact, I think all of them - at least the ones that Dallek covers - did serve him poorly. Some were political creatures who always tried to straddle issues (Dean Rusk); some were hardline hawks, believing that loss of face in anywhere in the world would spell doom for the U.S. (McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, the Joint Chiefs of Staff); some were way too accepting of rosy portraits painted by sycophants (Robert McNamara); all were egotistical and unwilling to be self-critical or ask themselves tough questions. Bobby Kennedy, the Attorney General, really comes across poorly here, using his leverage as the President's brother to bully and intimidate all those around him who he did not feel were completely loyal to JFK. Dallek really summed up the Administration's entire Vietnam decision-making well on page 275: "The whole operation from McNamara down was at best an exercise in auto-intoxication and at worst a use of unmitigated deception. If the facts did not support a rosy war scenario, Harkins was determined to make it appear that way and McNamara was all too ready to embrace good news."
Dallek also, as one would expect, spends a lot of time on Cuba. The missile crisis in October 1962 is as close as the U.S. and the Soviet Union came to actual war as at any time in the 45 year period of the Cold War. After being burned badly by extremely poor advice, coupled with wishy-washy decision-making, in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961, Kennedy showed that he had learned from some of his mistakes and had matured in office. If nothing else, he had learned not to rely on his military advisers, and in fact to be skeptical each time they advocated for nuclear war or all-out attacks (which was constantly). They were war-mongers, eager to demonstrate U.S. superiority over the USSR. What they - incredibly - did not seem to care about, but Kennedy thankfully knew, was that all-out war would destroy both countries, along with a good chunk of the rest of the world. Kennedy maintained his cool throughout the process and successfully managed to get Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to back down without looking foolish in the eyes of the world.
In conjunction with that, Dallek explores Kennedy's handling of Cuban affairs, and how he was slowly but steadily moving down a path of resuming diplomatic relations at the time of his assassination. That was still a ways away at that point, but once again one must wonder how things would have been different had he lived. Relations were not even partially restored until late in Barack Obama's presidency, only to be immediately and foolishly reversed by his successor. So, over sixty years after Fidel Castro first took power, the U.S. still has an adversarial relationship with a nation ninety miles off its border. A definite potential missed opportunity.
The domestic front is definitely of minor consequence here, just like how Kennedy treated it while he was President. Dallek covers, somewhat, the exploding Civil Rights fights in the South - fights that Kennedy wanted nothing to do with. He viewed any domestic affairs as interfering with his foreign policy agenda. Kennedy had neither the inclination nor the interest to work intensely on Civil Rights or other domestic matters. I wish Dallek had covered this more, but I think I understand why he didn't: Kennedy did not prioritize them so why should he?
Dallek keeps the narrative pretty focused. This is easily readable despite the somewhat dense material. Reading over deliberations about Cuba and Vietnam could be monotonous but it never felt that way to me here. Still, I found it odd that Dallek discusses several people early in the book (Ted Sorenson, Pierre Salinger, Dave Powers, Kenny O'Donnell, Larry O'Brien) and their respective importance to Kennedy, only to completely drop them from the narrative. Why bring them up in the first place? Yet Arthur Schlesinger, whom Dallek admits was on the fringes of the Administration, appears throughout the book. Also missing was any discussion of Kennedy's domestic Cabinet secretaries, or his relations with Congressmen. Despite these omissions, this is a worthwhile read for anyone interested in JFK, his presidency, the early stages of the Vietnam War, U.S.-Soviet relations, or Cuban affairs.
Grade: B+
Kennedy, elected narrowly over Richard Nixon in 1960, seemed paralyzed by the situation that was presented to him in Vietnam. To withdraw U.S. "advisers" and support of Ngo Dinh Diem's self-destructive regime would have been to invite screams of "appeasement" from Republicans, and many hawkish Democrats. He would have been called "soft" on Communism, and blamed for the "loss" of a country, much as Truman was with China in 1949. Kennedy thought that all of this would jeopardize his prospects at re-election in 1964. So, he temporized, continually putting off major decisions. Ultimately, he was assassinated before he got around to doing anything about Vietnam. One of history's big ifs is what Kennedy would have done had he lived. Would he have withdrawn any U.S. personnel once he had been re-elected, assuming that he would have been? Would he have escalated the conflict like his successor Lyndon Johnson so disastrously chose to do? The answer to the second question seems unlikely, yet it will go unanswered.
The focus of Dallek's book is on the myriad advisers that Kennedy had, and how poorly almost all of them served him. In fact, I think all of them - at least the ones that Dallek covers - did serve him poorly. Some were political creatures who always tried to straddle issues (Dean Rusk); some were hardline hawks, believing that loss of face in anywhere in the world would spell doom for the U.S. (McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, the Joint Chiefs of Staff); some were way too accepting of rosy portraits painted by sycophants (Robert McNamara); all were egotistical and unwilling to be self-critical or ask themselves tough questions. Bobby Kennedy, the Attorney General, really comes across poorly here, using his leverage as the President's brother to bully and intimidate all those around him who he did not feel were completely loyal to JFK. Dallek really summed up the Administration's entire Vietnam decision-making well on page 275: "The whole operation from McNamara down was at best an exercise in auto-intoxication and at worst a use of unmitigated deception. If the facts did not support a rosy war scenario, Harkins was determined to make it appear that way and McNamara was all too ready to embrace good news."
Dallek also, as one would expect, spends a lot of time on Cuba. The missile crisis in October 1962 is as close as the U.S. and the Soviet Union came to actual war as at any time in the 45 year period of the Cold War. After being burned badly by extremely poor advice, coupled with wishy-washy decision-making, in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961, Kennedy showed that he had learned from some of his mistakes and had matured in office. If nothing else, he had learned not to rely on his military advisers, and in fact to be skeptical each time they advocated for nuclear war or all-out attacks (which was constantly). They were war-mongers, eager to demonstrate U.S. superiority over the USSR. What they - incredibly - did not seem to care about, but Kennedy thankfully knew, was that all-out war would destroy both countries, along with a good chunk of the rest of the world. Kennedy maintained his cool throughout the process and successfully managed to get Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to back down without looking foolish in the eyes of the world.
In conjunction with that, Dallek explores Kennedy's handling of Cuban affairs, and how he was slowly but steadily moving down a path of resuming diplomatic relations at the time of his assassination. That was still a ways away at that point, but once again one must wonder how things would have been different had he lived. Relations were not even partially restored until late in Barack Obama's presidency, only to be immediately and foolishly reversed by his successor. So, over sixty years after Fidel Castro first took power, the U.S. still has an adversarial relationship with a nation ninety miles off its border. A definite potential missed opportunity.
The domestic front is definitely of minor consequence here, just like how Kennedy treated it while he was President. Dallek covers, somewhat, the exploding Civil Rights fights in the South - fights that Kennedy wanted nothing to do with. He viewed any domestic affairs as interfering with his foreign policy agenda. Kennedy had neither the inclination nor the interest to work intensely on Civil Rights or other domestic matters. I wish Dallek had covered this more, but I think I understand why he didn't: Kennedy did not prioritize them so why should he?
Dallek keeps the narrative pretty focused. This is easily readable despite the somewhat dense material. Reading over deliberations about Cuba and Vietnam could be monotonous but it never felt that way to me here. Still, I found it odd that Dallek discusses several people early in the book (Ted Sorenson, Pierre Salinger, Dave Powers, Kenny O'Donnell, Larry O'Brien) and their respective importance to Kennedy, only to completely drop them from the narrative. Why bring them up in the first place? Yet Arthur Schlesinger, whom Dallek admits was on the fringes of the Administration, appears throughout the book. Also missing was any discussion of Kennedy's domestic Cabinet secretaries, or his relations with Congressmen. Despite these omissions, this is a worthwhile read for anyone interested in JFK, his presidency, the early stages of the Vietnam War, U.S.-Soviet relations, or Cuban affairs.
Grade: B+
June 17, 2018
The world is lucky to have had Kennedy as president of the USA for that short time from January 1961 to November 1963. He dealt with very difficult and complex events and challenges at home and abroad, and in respect of Cuba and Berlin situations that could have ended the world through nuclear destruction.
Having read about these events, visited the JFK Presidential Library and Museum in Boston, spent some of my army career in Cold-War Germany, including service in West Berlin in the British sector a couple of years before the wall came down, I have a fascination for this period, and Dallek's book, picked up at a discount bookstore on holiday in the US a few weeks' ago, looked like a good way to learn more about the men behind this young president and the decisions he took.
I could perhaps sum up this book in part by saying the military advisors, principally the joint chiefs of staff, wanted to nuke everything and everyone. They criticised Kennedy, sometimes openly and often behind the scenes, and considered him too young and inexperienced.
Another summation is that the young president whilst listening and deciding was at times a very lonely man with the weight of the world on his shoulders.
Kennedy's "Ministry of talent" drew together men from all walks of life and experience and the message from this book is they offered many views and lots analysis, but however well-meaning or experienced much (almost all from some) was wrong, misplaced and at downtimes scary and mad (yep that's the joint chiefs and CIA).
Names I assume many Americans' know well, such as: McNamara, Rusk, Rostow, Bundy, McCone and Lodge, Le May, Taylor, Harriman and of course Lyndon Johnson and Bobby Kennedy all feature. It would be hard to argue against that these advisors only wanted to what they thought right for the US, but personal situations and personalities play throughout this book (much of course like any political cabinet or corporate boardroom say), and events show the advice they gave JFK was flawed, wrong and at times possibly more than a little disingenuous.
There's little on domestic affairs, including sadly for me segregation, in this book, but Dallek positions this when he outlines that the biggest problems for the POTS were external. Although progress on the domestic agenda was made during his short presidency, and there are some mentions Dallek points to plans and priorities in the second term with a more electorally secure Kennedy second term.
Dallek provides a useful introduction on JFK and his rise to senatorship and then presidential nominee/candidate and to election. He then thrusts us into the fierce and fast days of 1961 and on.
The book has useful excerpts or sentences using Jackie Kennedy's comments or later recorded opinions alongside the use of cabinet papers, meeting notes and recordings. Schlesinger and Sorenson's information also feature. As does much on RFK - who for me comes across as determined, talented, pointed, driven, forceful and a little rude but genuinely had his brother's back and helped JFK through these tough times.
There is much in this book about Cuba and the demon Castro; Berlin and the defence of the free world, including of course the wily Khrushchev casting his shadow across these areas and challenges. But it is Vietnam that looms largest and the situation with JFK's advisors' plans, analysis, ideas (or lack of them) and disagreements amongst themselves is most interesting. It looms largest, as whilst Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis were resolved, Vietnam wasn't and slid later into full blown war and the deaths of 58,000 US service personnel (like standing at Britain's Post-1945 war memorial at the National Arborteum I have stood at the Vietnam war memorial in Washington and shed a tear for their bravery, their fear and dreadful experiences as well as the lost-potential).
It is easy to judge and to review these men from the comfort of over five decades later, especially as that intensity and atmosphere when nuclear war, sputnik and communist expansion and dominance are all a daily worry. Dallek is critical of all the players including JFK but he is to my mind even-handed in his treatment of all and the events within.
So as I finished this book I was left with some thoughts. De Gaulle was right about advisors and that ultimately it's best to make your own decision and stick with it. JFK was disappointed, sometimes angry and often despairing of the advice he was give and offered. To his credit and our benefit he took time, negotiated and acted with purpose and personal conviction.
Dallek's book is worthy of the time it takes you to read about one of the USA's most testing times.
It is of course impossible to know but this book suggests a president who would have continued to take tough decisions using a inner strength and intelligence. Sadly, the US lost chances and possibilities to change its and the word's future for the better.
But JFK's legacy for me is perhaps that I was able to stand at the Vietnam war memorial to pay my tribute to fellow allied service personnel as I described above because of JFK's wise decisions, rather than never having crawled on this earth as the world had been dissolved into dust.
Having read about these events, visited the JFK Presidential Library and Museum in Boston, spent some of my army career in Cold-War Germany, including service in West Berlin in the British sector a couple of years before the wall came down, I have a fascination for this period, and Dallek's book, picked up at a discount bookstore on holiday in the US a few weeks' ago, looked like a good way to learn more about the men behind this young president and the decisions he took.
I could perhaps sum up this book in part by saying the military advisors, principally the joint chiefs of staff, wanted to nuke everything and everyone. They criticised Kennedy, sometimes openly and often behind the scenes, and considered him too young and inexperienced.
Another summation is that the young president whilst listening and deciding was at times a very lonely man with the weight of the world on his shoulders.
Kennedy's "Ministry of talent" drew together men from all walks of life and experience and the message from this book is they offered many views and lots analysis, but however well-meaning or experienced much (almost all from some) was wrong, misplaced and at downtimes scary and mad (yep that's the joint chiefs and CIA).
Names I assume many Americans' know well, such as: McNamara, Rusk, Rostow, Bundy, McCone and Lodge, Le May, Taylor, Harriman and of course Lyndon Johnson and Bobby Kennedy all feature. It would be hard to argue against that these advisors only wanted to what they thought right for the US, but personal situations and personalities play throughout this book (much of course like any political cabinet or corporate boardroom say), and events show the advice they gave JFK was flawed, wrong and at times possibly more than a little disingenuous.
There's little on domestic affairs, including sadly for me segregation, in this book, but Dallek positions this when he outlines that the biggest problems for the POTS were external. Although progress on the domestic agenda was made during his short presidency, and there are some mentions Dallek points to plans and priorities in the second term with a more electorally secure Kennedy second term.
Dallek provides a useful introduction on JFK and his rise to senatorship and then presidential nominee/candidate and to election. He then thrusts us into the fierce and fast days of 1961 and on.
The book has useful excerpts or sentences using Jackie Kennedy's comments or later recorded opinions alongside the use of cabinet papers, meeting notes and recordings. Schlesinger and Sorenson's information also feature. As does much on RFK - who for me comes across as determined, talented, pointed, driven, forceful and a little rude but genuinely had his brother's back and helped JFK through these tough times.
There is much in this book about Cuba and the demon Castro; Berlin and the defence of the free world, including of course the wily Khrushchev casting his shadow across these areas and challenges. But it is Vietnam that looms largest and the situation with JFK's advisors' plans, analysis, ideas (or lack of them) and disagreements amongst themselves is most interesting. It looms largest, as whilst Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis were resolved, Vietnam wasn't and slid later into full blown war and the deaths of 58,000 US service personnel (like standing at Britain's Post-1945 war memorial at the National Arborteum I have stood at the Vietnam war memorial in Washington and shed a tear for their bravery, their fear and dreadful experiences as well as the lost-potential).
It is easy to judge and to review these men from the comfort of over five decades later, especially as that intensity and atmosphere when nuclear war, sputnik and communist expansion and dominance are all a daily worry. Dallek is critical of all the players including JFK but he is to my mind even-handed in his treatment of all and the events within.
So as I finished this book I was left with some thoughts. De Gaulle was right about advisors and that ultimately it's best to make your own decision and stick with it. JFK was disappointed, sometimes angry and often despairing of the advice he was give and offered. To his credit and our benefit he took time, negotiated and acted with purpose and personal conviction.
Dallek's book is worthy of the time it takes you to read about one of the USA's most testing times.
It is of course impossible to know but this book suggests a president who would have continued to take tough decisions using a inner strength and intelligence. Sadly, the US lost chances and possibilities to change its and the word's future for the better.
But JFK's legacy for me is perhaps that I was able to stand at the Vietnam war memorial to pay my tribute to fellow allied service personnel as I described above because of JFK's wise decisions, rather than never having crawled on this earth as the world had been dissolved into dust.
June 22, 2016
It got bogged down for me a lot- all the different foreign policy issues that Kennedy faced got to be a bit much after a while. But what I appreciated was the insight into the life of a president, especially one as storied as JFK. For someone who has not learned much about Kennedy and has a more positive opinion on him, it was interesting to see a different side of him and his family (corrupt, power hungry, and womanizing- although the last one I already knew about). After reading this book, I can see how overwhelming and stressful it is to be a leader of a large country. Kennedy faced many challenges during his short time as president, made all the more difficult (I'm guessing from what I've read) by disagreements and differences of opinion between him and his advisers.
September 28, 2017
Inside the Kennedy White House is a fluid tale of JFK's term written by probably the most known scholar on the subject. It gives us a look at the cabinet the same way Goodwin wrote about Lincoln's White House in "Teams of Rivals".
Dallek doesn't seems to be in love with his subject and tend to focus almost exclusively on foreign policy intrigues. Mainly The Bay of Pigs fiasco, the nuclear summits with Moscow, the Berlin Wall, Laos, the Missile Crisis and Vietnam.
I read the book because I was interested in knowing better key players such as Robert MacNamara, Walter Rostow, Dean Rusk, Kenneth Albright and George McBundy. The author is great at depicting how all those men were competing for the President's attention and approval.
Dallek doesn't seems to be in love with his subject and tend to focus almost exclusively on foreign policy intrigues. Mainly The Bay of Pigs fiasco, the nuclear summits with Moscow, the Berlin Wall, Laos, the Missile Crisis and Vietnam.
I read the book because I was interested in knowing better key players such as Robert MacNamara, Walter Rostow, Dean Rusk, Kenneth Albright and George McBundy. The author is great at depicting how all those men were competing for the President's attention and approval.
February 19, 2014
After winning the extremely close election of 1960, JFK was faced with the challenge of all new presidents - transitioning from campaigning to governing - the first task, naming a cabinet and forming a team of advisors. Camelot's Court premise/goal is to provide the reader a detailed view into the workings of the Kennedy White House - the personalities, discussions, differences of opinions and ultimately the decisions made, (or not made), and thus policy. If there was any doubt in your mind, this book will confirm how difficult it is being President - even with a bunch of smart and intelligent people around to help.
The good news is that what is covered here - JFK's foreign policy - is done fairly well. And foreign policy in the early 1960's meant the Cold War - the USSR and Khrushchev, Cuba and Castro, Berlin and of course, Vietnam. On the flip-side the narrative concerning US domestic policy during JFK's 1000 days is at best cursory; topics such as Civil Rights or the US economy minimally covered. (And because of this it's unclear to this reader as to why this book simply wasn't "positioned" as a JFK foreign policy/Cold War book.)
Back on the plus side of the ledger, Dallek, as usual, does a very good job of bringing these historical figures/players to life by utilizing a combination of biographical info, quotes, analysis and context; all without impeding the narrative. (As an aside, McGeorge Bundy does not fare well here.) If you are familiar with this period of history Camelot's Court is a nice "refresher", i.e. nothing really new here. Conversely if you are new to the subject matter, this is a great place to start.
The good news is that what is covered here - JFK's foreign policy - is done fairly well. And foreign policy in the early 1960's meant the Cold War - the USSR and Khrushchev, Cuba and Castro, Berlin and of course, Vietnam. On the flip-side the narrative concerning US domestic policy during JFK's 1000 days is at best cursory; topics such as Civil Rights or the US economy minimally covered. (And because of this it's unclear to this reader as to why this book simply wasn't "positioned" as a JFK foreign policy/Cold War book.)
Back on the plus side of the ledger, Dallek, as usual, does a very good job of bringing these historical figures/players to life by utilizing a combination of biographical info, quotes, analysis and context; all without impeding the narrative. (As an aside, McGeorge Bundy does not fare well here.) If you are familiar with this period of history Camelot's Court is a nice "refresher", i.e. nothing really new here. Conversely if you are new to the subject matter, this is a great place to start.
June 3, 2020
Intéressante lecture sur le rôle des conseillers de JFK pendant ses mille jours á la Maison Blanche. JFK avait deux principes de recrutement: 1) croire aux gens (la bonne personne avec qui on s'entend bien) plus que á la structure organisationelle dans laquelle la personne doit prendre une position 2) choisir "the best and the brightest".
Lecture indispensable pour tous ceux qui ont donné des conseils aux hommes politiques, et qui ont tous compris que la concurrence, la compétition interne dans le groupe de conseillers d´être le plus proche du président est féroce et sans pitié.
Souvent JFK était moins qu'impressioné par le conseil des experts, peut-être parce que á la fin du jour, c´était lui et que lui responsable des décisions: "The principal lesson of any presidential term, he would surely have acknowledged, is the anguish of choosing between imperfect options and having to take the responsability for lives lost and money wasted when fallible advisers and chiefs take wrong turns."
Lecture indispensable pour tous ceux qui ont donné des conseils aux hommes politiques, et qui ont tous compris que la concurrence, la compétition interne dans le groupe de conseillers d´être le plus proche du président est féroce et sans pitié.
Souvent JFK était moins qu'impressioné par le conseil des experts, peut-être parce que á la fin du jour, c´était lui et que lui responsable des décisions: "The principal lesson of any presidential term, he would surely have acknowledged, is the anguish of choosing between imperfect options and having to take the responsability for lives lost and money wasted when fallible advisers and chiefs take wrong turns."
July 12, 2017
An excellent account of the most important political moments of the Kennedy White House, seen through the interactions of JFK's closest advisers with the President himself. The focus is overwhelmingly on foreign policy, mainly Vietnam, Cuba (both Bay of Pigs invasion and missile crisis), Berlin, and Nuclear Tests Ban negotiations. Not much is covered on domestic issues, except for brief accounts on civil rights.
On Vietnam, the account strenghtens the view that Kennedy would most probably haven't dragged the U.S. into the open-ended commitment Vietnam got under LBJ. Kennedy was quite skeptic about the necessity of supporting Saigon and preventing the fall of South Vietnam. Dallek makes a good case that the main reason why Kennedy didn't pull out from Vietnam was for... domestic political considerations: Kennedy was very anxious about not being branded as "soft" on communism and being accused of having lost Vietnam as Truman "lost" China at the end of the 40s.
On Cuba, Kennedy had clearly indicated he wouldn't commit US soldiers along the Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs, but the Joint Chiefs thought that, like most presidents, Kennedy wouldn't allow the venture to fail and would commit itself to a full-fledged U.S. invasion of Cuba if things were to go wrong. To their surprise, Kennedy refused to commit U.S. soldiers even when told that the landing of the Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs was failing. Kennedy felt deceived and manipulated by the Joint Chiefs into something that they knew had a high probability of failure without active support of the U.S. military. The drama happened only a few months into his presidency, and he never trusted the military after.
On the October 1962 missile crisis and also on negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear tests ban, Kennedy was often aghast by the lack of restraint from the Joint Chiefs about using nuclear weapons, like those weapons were just bigger conventional bombs. He clearly perceived and was always preoccupied about the risk posed to mankind by nuclear bombs. On the October 62 missile crisis, although he did not want to have Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba, it remains to be seen how far he would have gone if Khrushchev wouldn't have blinked first and ordered his vessels back. Any outcome was better that nuclear conflict, and even if in the end he traded a pledge of non-invasion of Cuba against the removal of the missiles, he was also ready to give up on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey if needed.
In conclusion, you see a sensitive and thoughtful man, often tortured by his doubts and his concerns about balancing all sides of a problem, in the midst of an inner circle made of highly intelligent men who did not however always provide him with the best advice and support.
On Vietnam, the account strenghtens the view that Kennedy would most probably haven't dragged the U.S. into the open-ended commitment Vietnam got under LBJ. Kennedy was quite skeptic about the necessity of supporting Saigon and preventing the fall of South Vietnam. Dallek makes a good case that the main reason why Kennedy didn't pull out from Vietnam was for... domestic political considerations: Kennedy was very anxious about not being branded as "soft" on communism and being accused of having lost Vietnam as Truman "lost" China at the end of the 40s.
On Cuba, Kennedy had clearly indicated he wouldn't commit US soldiers along the Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs, but the Joint Chiefs thought that, like most presidents, Kennedy wouldn't allow the venture to fail and would commit itself to a full-fledged U.S. invasion of Cuba if things were to go wrong. To their surprise, Kennedy refused to commit U.S. soldiers even when told that the landing of the Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs was failing. Kennedy felt deceived and manipulated by the Joint Chiefs into something that they knew had a high probability of failure without active support of the U.S. military. The drama happened only a few months into his presidency, and he never trusted the military after.
On the October 1962 missile crisis and also on negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear tests ban, Kennedy was often aghast by the lack of restraint from the Joint Chiefs about using nuclear weapons, like those weapons were just bigger conventional bombs. He clearly perceived and was always preoccupied about the risk posed to mankind by nuclear bombs. On the October 62 missile crisis, although he did not want to have Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba, it remains to be seen how far he would have gone if Khrushchev wouldn't have blinked first and ordered his vessels back. Any outcome was better that nuclear conflict, and even if in the end he traded a pledge of non-invasion of Cuba against the removal of the missiles, he was also ready to give up on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey if needed.
In conclusion, you see a sensitive and thoughtful man, often tortured by his doubts and his concerns about balancing all sides of a problem, in the midst of an inner circle made of highly intelligent men who did not however always provide him with the best advice and support.
February 10, 2017
3.5
This is less “inside the Kennedy White House” and more “inside dealings with Cuba, Russia, and Vietnam with brief mentions of other goings on.” So, the expectations I had going into this book were not exactly met. The book was very much focused on foreign policy, with slight mentions of domestic events. So, maybe we should all agree that while people shouldn’t judge a book by its cover, we do judge books by their titles.
Kennedy came into the White House and tried to install a “ministry of talent” to provide the advice necessary to avoid nuclear Armageddon and navigate the new world order. Unfortunately, as this book (and others) points out, while these men (and they were all men) may have been “the best and the brightest,” they oftentimes served Kennedy very poorly. The egos were very strong, with infighting on most issues. A quote about Schlesinger sums up why so many of Kennedy’s advisers seemed to fail him, as they were all “a brilliant critic who sacrificed his independent judgment to the attractions of continuing access to power.”
In addition to the civilian advisers, the military commanders tried to push Kennedy hard into deploying force and dropping nuclear bombs on the slightest of threats. One particularly chilling quote comes from the head of Strategic Air Command: “The whole idea is to kill the bastards. At the end of the war if there are two Americans and one Russian left alive, we win.”
Overall, Kennedy was very much focused on foreign affairs (or so this book has as its central theme) and had no patience for domestic concerns. From his vantage, the threat of a nuclear war was so great that he saw its avoidance as his primary goal – assuming the domestic areas would be better addressed in a world that moved back from the brink (in his second term). Unfortunately, as Kennedy discovered, domestic unrest does not wait.
While this book outlines a log of the mistakes made and reasons for them, the overall picture is of a president who was learning from each mistake made and becoming more confident in his decision making ability- questioning the assumptions of aides and military leaders more forcefully. This of course only leads into the unresolved questions and what ifs that have plagued many since the JFK assassination. These unresolved questions and the unrealized hopes of what JFK expected to accomplish in his second terms are what makes this book and his legacy so frustrating.
Given the lessons JFK learned, and his reluctance to move forward with a more full scale involvement in Vietnam, it is possible that he would have found a way out, rather than further in. It is also possible he would have come to realize a more morally sound view on civil rights. But it is also possible he may have been lead astray by his administration's main failure in Vietnam decision making, an unwillingness to hear dissenting opinions about progress from the press, or on the ground officials that appears to have grown out of internal reactions to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Overall, the level of debate within the West Wing was beneficial in providing differing viewpoints... if Twitter was around during the Cuban Missile Crisis I do not think it would have ended well.
This is less “inside the Kennedy White House” and more “inside dealings with Cuba, Russia, and Vietnam with brief mentions of other goings on.” So, the expectations I had going into this book were not exactly met. The book was very much focused on foreign policy, with slight mentions of domestic events. So, maybe we should all agree that while people shouldn’t judge a book by its cover, we do judge books by their titles.
Kennedy came into the White House and tried to install a “ministry of talent” to provide the advice necessary to avoid nuclear Armageddon and navigate the new world order. Unfortunately, as this book (and others) points out, while these men (and they were all men) may have been “the best and the brightest,” they oftentimes served Kennedy very poorly. The egos were very strong, with infighting on most issues. A quote about Schlesinger sums up why so many of Kennedy’s advisers seemed to fail him, as they were all “a brilliant critic who sacrificed his independent judgment to the attractions of continuing access to power.”
In addition to the civilian advisers, the military commanders tried to push Kennedy hard into deploying force and dropping nuclear bombs on the slightest of threats. One particularly chilling quote comes from the head of Strategic Air Command: “The whole idea is to kill the bastards. At the end of the war if there are two Americans and one Russian left alive, we win.”
Overall, Kennedy was very much focused on foreign affairs (or so this book has as its central theme) and had no patience for domestic concerns. From his vantage, the threat of a nuclear war was so great that he saw its avoidance as his primary goal – assuming the domestic areas would be better addressed in a world that moved back from the brink (in his second term). Unfortunately, as Kennedy discovered, domestic unrest does not wait.
While this book outlines a log of the mistakes made and reasons for them, the overall picture is of a president who was learning from each mistake made and becoming more confident in his decision making ability- questioning the assumptions of aides and military leaders more forcefully. This of course only leads into the unresolved questions and what ifs that have plagued many since the JFK assassination. These unresolved questions and the unrealized hopes of what JFK expected to accomplish in his second terms are what makes this book and his legacy so frustrating.
Given the lessons JFK learned, and his reluctance to move forward with a more full scale involvement in Vietnam, it is possible that he would have found a way out, rather than further in. It is also possible he would have come to realize a more morally sound view on civil rights. But it is also possible he may have been lead astray by his administration's main failure in Vietnam decision making, an unwillingness to hear dissenting opinions about progress from the press, or on the ground officials that appears to have grown out of internal reactions to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Overall, the level of debate within the West Wing was beneficial in providing differing viewpoints... if Twitter was around during the Cuban Missile Crisis I do not think it would have ended well.
December 15, 2013
The basic premise of this book - looking at the Kennedy presidency through his interactions with his chief policy advisers - is certainly an interesting one, but having finished it I'm not convinced that it really contributed anything new to the already overwhelming number of books on Kennedy's thousand days in the White House. Dallek is author of one of, in my opinion, the best biographies of Kennedy available - John F Kennedy: An Unfinished Life - and with such a title already in his portfolio I'm not sure this one was necessary.
Another criticism (and really, it seems as though I didn't enjoy this book with all this carping, and I did!) is that it focuses almost exclusively on foreign policy issues. This is understandable, as foreign policy has always been one of the few areas where Presidents can flex their muscle, so to speak, where, short of war, they are relatively independent of Congress. And Kennedy faced some particularly pressing foreign policy issues in his short presidency - Cuba, Vietnam, the Soviet Union. But a book ostensibly looking at Kennedy's White House whilst devoting just a few throw-away lines to the Civil Rights Movement is really doing history a disservice.
That said, this is a good book. Dallek is a very good writer, clearly thoroughly familiar with the era and the personalities, and he draws heavily on much recently-released material on the Kennedy years - tape recordings, interviews, memoirs - to give a real in-depth insight into the psychology of many of the decisions made. It is fascinating that Kennedy, whilst surrounded by so many brilliant minds, decisively and determinedly charted his own path; and it is entirely to his credit that he knew when to listen to their opinions and when to disregard them. It is frightening to think what may have happened to the United States and the world at large had Kennedy listened to some of his military advisers over Cuba or Vietnam.
Another criticism (and really, it seems as though I didn't enjoy this book with all this carping, and I did!) is that it focuses almost exclusively on foreign policy issues. This is understandable, as foreign policy has always been one of the few areas where Presidents can flex their muscle, so to speak, where, short of war, they are relatively independent of Congress. And Kennedy faced some particularly pressing foreign policy issues in his short presidency - Cuba, Vietnam, the Soviet Union. But a book ostensibly looking at Kennedy's White House whilst devoting just a few throw-away lines to the Civil Rights Movement is really doing history a disservice.
That said, this is a good book. Dallek is a very good writer, clearly thoroughly familiar with the era and the personalities, and he draws heavily on much recently-released material on the Kennedy years - tape recordings, interviews, memoirs - to give a real in-depth insight into the psychology of many of the decisions made. It is fascinating that Kennedy, whilst surrounded by so many brilliant minds, decisively and determinedly charted his own path; and it is entirely to his credit that he knew when to listen to their opinions and when to disregard them. It is frightening to think what may have happened to the United States and the world at large had Kennedy listened to some of his military advisers over Cuba or Vietnam.
October 28, 2013
It is tempting to say of Robert Dallek’s latest book that there’s nothing really new here. The basic story line in “Camelot’s Court” will seem familiar to even casual readers of the vast Kennedy oeuvre, and the major themes struck by Dallek, chiefly that JFK was served badly by his advisers, were sounded by David Halberstam’s “The Best and the Brightest” more than 40 years ago.
Nonetheless, Dallek, whose “An Unfinished Life” (2003) first exposed the severity of JFK’s medical condition, is an assiduous digger into archives, and he writes with a kind of granular authority. He doesn’t labor to spell out lessons of leadership, but he doesn’t need to. The story of how a glamorous but green young president struggled with conflicting and often bad advice while trying to avoid nuclear Armageddon remains a gripping and cautionary tale of the loneliness of command.
Dallek’s account does not finally redeem or exalt JFK, but it does make you want to elect presidents who are not easily fooled by the so-called experts.
See also:
The Best and the Brightest
Read our review here:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinion...
Nonetheless, Dallek, whose “An Unfinished Life” (2003) first exposed the severity of JFK’s medical condition, is an assiduous digger into archives, and he writes with a kind of granular authority. He doesn’t labor to spell out lessons of leadership, but he doesn’t need to. The story of how a glamorous but green young president struggled with conflicting and often bad advice while trying to avoid nuclear Armageddon remains a gripping and cautionary tale of the loneliness of command.
Dallek’s account does not finally redeem or exalt JFK, but it does make you want to elect presidents who are not easily fooled by the so-called experts.
See also:
The Best and the Brightest
Read our review here:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinion...
April 21, 2020
This is an important resource for anybody considering a government career when it comes to better understanding how U.S. foreign policy issues were handled during the Kennedy administration.
Dallek is not one to perpetuate the Camelot myth, but neither is it his aim to diminish the significance of Kennedy's time in the White House. Albeit dry at times due to the nature of the subject matter, this gave me a more well-rounded view of Kennedy and his cabinet by removing some of the glamour I naively attached to him and those working alongside him. But it also reinforced my gratitude that to the president almost anything was better than a nuclear war.
3.5
Dallek is not one to perpetuate the Camelot myth, but neither is it his aim to diminish the significance of Kennedy's time in the White House. Albeit dry at times due to the nature of the subject matter, this gave me a more well-rounded view of Kennedy and his cabinet by removing some of the glamour I naively attached to him and those working alongside him. But it also reinforced my gratitude that to the president almost anything was better than a nuclear war.
3.5
September 11, 2017
The politics of the 1960s were superheated by the constant possibility of nuclear war. The Russian premier, Nikita Khrushchev, seemed to be a bomb throwing barbarian who was capable of anything but reason and goodwill, and on the American side, a shocking number of generals and policymakers wanted to use nukes in all kinds of inappropriate situations. It was a dangerous world.
Kennedy was tested with a series of crises from almost his first day in office. From Cuba, to Berlin, to Vietnam he had to deal with constant flash points in addition to the overall pressure of Soviet power. And he did a pretty good job, standing firm in Berlin, forcing the Russians down in Cuba and keeping us out of a nuclear war. In this book Dallek tells the story of this brinkmanship (largely skipping domestic and personal issues), focusing on Kennedy's relationships with his various advisers.
As I read the barrage of different opinions, many of them terrible, delivered by highly educated experts on every single issue, I was amazed that this cacophony didn't render him inert. How did Kennedy make sense if anything? I would probably be frozen by a such a blizzard of conflicting ideas. Many of the men advising Kennedy were not helpful. Their advice was muddled and the effect of reading one bad piece of advice after another makes Dallek's book feel a little muddled as well. It continually circles back to the same problems and regurgitates the old advice in slightly different forms again and again.
Still, they were big and complicated issues and Dallek knows what he's talking about. This book is worth reading if you have any interest in Kennedy or the history of American foreign policy.
(Finally, the title of this book is irritating. Calling the Kennedy administration "Camelot" always makes me cringe.)
Kennedy was tested with a series of crises from almost his first day in office. From Cuba, to Berlin, to Vietnam he had to deal with constant flash points in addition to the overall pressure of Soviet power. And he did a pretty good job, standing firm in Berlin, forcing the Russians down in Cuba and keeping us out of a nuclear war. In this book Dallek tells the story of this brinkmanship (largely skipping domestic and personal issues), focusing on Kennedy's relationships with his various advisers.
As I read the barrage of different opinions, many of them terrible, delivered by highly educated experts on every single issue, I was amazed that this cacophony didn't render him inert. How did Kennedy make sense if anything? I would probably be frozen by a such a blizzard of conflicting ideas. Many of the men advising Kennedy were not helpful. Their advice was muddled and the effect of reading one bad piece of advice after another makes Dallek's book feel a little muddled as well. It continually circles back to the same problems and regurgitates the old advice in slightly different forms again and again.
Still, they were big and complicated issues and Dallek knows what he's talking about. This book is worth reading if you have any interest in Kennedy or the history of American foreign policy.
(Finally, the title of this book is irritating. Calling the Kennedy administration "Camelot" always makes me cringe.)
January 12, 2018
It's about time I finished reading this book! I will try to write this as concise as I possibly can.
To begin I feel that, at times, it's a little long-winded. I'm sure the author only left the most relevant information, but I think a slight bit more editing could still be done.
I also recommend a list. Yes, a list. There are plenty of names, organisations, and such, and I got lost. I wish I had wrote down who was who, and their "roles". Perhaps you are better (or read the book all at once), but at page 300 I no longer recalled who, say, Rusk was or his function.
And I finish the review with the authenticity aspect. I tend to forget that, sometimes, people write "fiction", even in biographies. This book seems very true-to-fact to me. There are a lot of quotations, sources, and all of the documents/information used for the book are listed at end notes. I know some authors have "coloured" President Kennedy a little in other biographies, but this one seems well and thoroughly researched. Above all it doesn't fictionalise or "tint" history.
To begin I feel that, at times, it's a little long-winded. I'm sure the author only left the most relevant information, but I think a slight bit more editing could still be done.
I also recommend a list. Yes, a list. There are plenty of names, organisations, and such, and I got lost. I wish I had wrote down who was who, and their "roles". Perhaps you are better (or read the book all at once), but at page 300 I no longer recalled who, say, Rusk was or his function.
And I finish the review with the authenticity aspect. I tend to forget that, sometimes, people write "fiction", even in biographies. This book seems very true-to-fact to me. There are a lot of quotations, sources, and all of the documents/information used for the book are listed at end notes. I know some authors have "coloured" President Kennedy a little in other biographies, but this one seems well and thoroughly researched. Above all it doesn't fictionalise or "tint" history.
June 2, 2023
Not one of my more enjoyable non-fiction history book reads but it did the job.
I saw some people here complaining the book talked about Cuba, the Soviets and Vietnam, and not much else, but I guess they're not quite understanding just how little interest Kennedy had in matters that were not foreign policy. And those three areas of the foreign policy were the hottest at that point, hence the focus for him and for the book.
I actually think this book conveyed quite well just how much Kennedy increasingly found himself bogged down in Vietnam. And that it was far from a secret thing already in the early 60s. Lots of opinions, in Kennedy's circle and in the press.
The most valuable part of the book for me were all the introductions of the various staffers, and all the various quotes, from various first sources, sometimes transcribed from JFK's internal taping mechanisms. The book did a good job synthesising everything...But at times it got a bit dry and a bit quote-follows-quote.
Giving this a 3, as the rating here at the time of my finishing is 3.68 and I think this is a solid 3.5 book. And because 3.68 is higher than 3.5...we're left with three. (And thus endeth my unnerving eight book long streak of 4/5s. Hurray!)
I saw some people here complaining the book talked about Cuba, the Soviets and Vietnam, and not much else, but I guess they're not quite understanding just how little interest Kennedy had in matters that were not foreign policy. And those three areas of the foreign policy were the hottest at that point, hence the focus for him and for the book.
I actually think this book conveyed quite well just how much Kennedy increasingly found himself bogged down in Vietnam. And that it was far from a secret thing already in the early 60s. Lots of opinions, in Kennedy's circle and in the press.
The most valuable part of the book for me were all the introductions of the various staffers, and all the various quotes, from various first sources, sometimes transcribed from JFK's internal taping mechanisms. The book did a good job synthesising everything...But at times it got a bit dry and a bit quote-follows-quote.
Giving this a 3, as the rating here at the time of my finishing is 3.68 and I think this is a solid 3.5 book. And because 3.68 is higher than 3.5...we're left with three. (And thus endeth my unnerving eight book long streak of 4/5s. Hurray!)
February 26, 2014
I was sitting in 9th grade civics class one day in 1964 when one of the English teachers came running into our classroom crying and shouting “the president has been shot, the president has been shot.” About a half hour later, the entire school was called into the auditorium and told that John F Kennedy was dead- assassinated. In addition, since this was during the height of the cold war, we were told not to panic because there was no evidence of the Russians being involved. We were not under attack!
The assassination of JFK, like the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the destruction of the Twin Towers were epic events that changed the world as we knew it. As you can see from the above paragraph, almost everyone alive at the time of those events could tell you 50 years later where they were and what they were doing when it happened. It was seared into your mind.
After 50 years, Kennedy still ranks in the top 10 in most presidential rankings. Since becoming an adult and reading much about him over the years, I have never really considered him to be in that stratosphere but I couldn’t put my finger on exactly why. This book really help guide me in that direction. Summarized, my current view is that Kennedy, by his actions was somewhere in the lower top third of our presidents. I think why many people rate him higher is because of three aspects: his personality and intelligence; the toughness of the times he governed in and the impressive list of things that JFK wanted to accomplish
Kennedy’s youthful good looks and his impressive quick wit made him stand out sharply against almost any president that we can compare him to. The world in which he governed was never more dangerous: the constant threat of ending civilization by nuclear war, the Bay of Pigs and later the Cuban missile crisis, Viet Nam, Berlin, crazy Khrushchev, civil rights and the nuclear arms race and testing are just some of the things that kept him occupied. His presidency was certainly not Camelot.
The most interesting aspect of this book is the way Kennedy is approached. It is a study of his cabinet, his assistants and appointees, and how he interacted with them that shows Kennedy at his best, and worst. He chose the “best and brightest” but then often got overwhelmed by their conflicting advice. This diversity of thought helped him greatly in some areas and utterly failed him in others because of the wide spectrum of ‘educated’ advice that he got from them. For example, during the Cuban missile crisis, his advisors suggested, or more often demanded, actions ranging from nuking the Russians to doing nothing. He alone had to make the final decision.
One Kennedy greatness is obvious in this book, he had an amazing learning curve. His first year in office was mostly bumbling from one crisis to another. He knew what he wanted to do but was hobbled by trying to please all of the political giants. By his last year he showed so much improvement that you have to ask what would the world be like if he lived through his first term and a possible second?
The assassination of JFK, like the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the destruction of the Twin Towers were epic events that changed the world as we knew it. As you can see from the above paragraph, almost everyone alive at the time of those events could tell you 50 years later where they were and what they were doing when it happened. It was seared into your mind.
After 50 years, Kennedy still ranks in the top 10 in most presidential rankings. Since becoming an adult and reading much about him over the years, I have never really considered him to be in that stratosphere but I couldn’t put my finger on exactly why. This book really help guide me in that direction. Summarized, my current view is that Kennedy, by his actions was somewhere in the lower top third of our presidents. I think why many people rate him higher is because of three aspects: his personality and intelligence; the toughness of the times he governed in and the impressive list of things that JFK wanted to accomplish
Kennedy’s youthful good looks and his impressive quick wit made him stand out sharply against almost any president that we can compare him to. The world in which he governed was never more dangerous: the constant threat of ending civilization by nuclear war, the Bay of Pigs and later the Cuban missile crisis, Viet Nam, Berlin, crazy Khrushchev, civil rights and the nuclear arms race and testing are just some of the things that kept him occupied. His presidency was certainly not Camelot.
The most interesting aspect of this book is the way Kennedy is approached. It is a study of his cabinet, his assistants and appointees, and how he interacted with them that shows Kennedy at his best, and worst. He chose the “best and brightest” but then often got overwhelmed by their conflicting advice. This diversity of thought helped him greatly in some areas and utterly failed him in others because of the wide spectrum of ‘educated’ advice that he got from them. For example, during the Cuban missile crisis, his advisors suggested, or more often demanded, actions ranging from nuking the Russians to doing nothing. He alone had to make the final decision.
One Kennedy greatness is obvious in this book, he had an amazing learning curve. His first year in office was mostly bumbling from one crisis to another. He knew what he wanted to do but was hobbled by trying to please all of the political giants. By his last year he showed so much improvement that you have to ask what would the world be like if he lived through his first term and a possible second?
March 8, 2014
This book is an examination of the Kennedy administration from a political and interpersonal perspective.
It is written like a really big research paper, all the dialogue and facts have a source, and I can't imagine the amount of effort it took to do that kind of research.
It's impressive. However unless you are really into history and appreciate academic-style writing, you might not like this book.
(I do enjoy the style, so I didn't mind this.)
In addition, a lot of the book is concerned with what certian Kennedy and/or his councilors thought of each other:
"Rusk thought McCone was a big poo-poo face, but he did't want to hurt his feelings so he said, "you can plan a raid on Cuba if you think they're worthwhile."" (*Note: The preceding text has been paraphrased)
Actually, its what the whole book is focused 'round. If you're not intrigued by that kind of thing I'd recommend finding a book that approaches the story from a different perspective.
(I thought it was hilarious!)
I was hoping to learn a lot from this book, (and I did) but mostly it made me curious. Cuz now I want to know more about Diem, Castro, and that one USSR leader who's name I can't spell. It was a really neat introduction into how these people (Not just the communists, but political leaders/advisors in general) think and behave.
One thing I didn't like about the book is that it introduces a lot of people who fulfill different roles and argue with each other, and I have a hard time remembering who is who. It would have been nice to have a graph with basic information on each Kennedy-councilor.
I notice a lot of people think this book is redundant because the author wrote another book on the Kennedy administration. I haven't read that other book, so I can't compare them a whole lot.
It is written like a really big research paper, all the dialogue and facts have a source, and I can't imagine the amount of effort it took to do that kind of research.
It's impressive. However unless you are really into history and appreciate academic-style writing, you might not like this book.
(I do enjoy the style, so I didn't mind this.)
In addition, a lot of the book is concerned with what certian Kennedy and/or his councilors thought of each other:
"Rusk thought McCone was a big poo-poo face, but he did't want to hurt his feelings so he said, "you can plan a raid on Cuba if you think they're worthwhile."" (*Note: The preceding text has been paraphrased)
Actually, its what the whole book is focused 'round. If you're not intrigued by that kind of thing I'd recommend finding a book that approaches the story from a different perspective.
(I thought it was hilarious!)
I was hoping to learn a lot from this book, (and I did) but mostly it made me curious. Cuz now I want to know more about Diem, Castro, and that one USSR leader who's name I can't spell. It was a really neat introduction into how these people (Not just the communists, but political leaders/advisors in general) think and behave.
One thing I didn't like about the book is that it introduces a lot of people who fulfill different roles and argue with each other, and I have a hard time remembering who is who. It would have been nice to have a graph with basic information on each Kennedy-councilor.
I notice a lot of people think this book is redundant because the author wrote another book on the Kennedy administration. I haven't read that other book, so I can't compare them a whole lot.
December 2, 2013
An excellent supplement to Dallek's earlier JFK biography An Unfinished Life, this new title details the interactions of JFK with his carefully chosen group of advisors, led by his brother Robert and including luminaries such as Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy. Detailed analyses of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the ongoing reaction of JFK's administration to Vietnam feature, but possibly the most interesting revelation is how JFK came, fairly quickly, to distrust the vast majority of the advice he was given. He still listened - and Dallek emphasizes that JFK was a good listener - but made decisions on his own. The role JFK played in the preservation of world peace is also emphasized; the readiness of the US military to use nuclear weapons everywhere and at any time is shocking and one wonders if there are still such enthusiasts in the current ranks. As often, we are left wondering what might have been if, as Dallek points out, JFK's back brace had not kept him upright in the car after the first shot hit him in the shoulder....
March 6, 2014
As if the reader is in the room with the advisers...
Dallek prioritizes diplomacy over domestic affairs, perhaps because that is his specialty and because the latter is so dramatic. The takeaway is that a leader must listen to advisors and then make up his or her mind independently, and that even the best and the brightest are usually going to argue with one another, leaving the president no more certain than before. Kennedy's native instincts saved the world from nuclear holocaust but led to an ambivalence on Vietnam that was only relatively less disastrous. if you believe that personalities make history, this book is for you.
Dallek prioritizes diplomacy over domestic affairs, perhaps because that is his specialty and because the latter is so dramatic. The takeaway is that a leader must listen to advisors and then make up his or her mind independently, and that even the best and the brightest are usually going to argue with one another, leaving the president no more certain than before. Kennedy's native instincts saved the world from nuclear holocaust but led to an ambivalence on Vietnam that was only relatively less disastrous. if you believe that personalities make history, this book is for you.
January 11, 2014
I'm not sure why this book was written other than to pad the author's wallet. Robert Dallek mentions in this book that he wrote a Kennedy bio 10 years ago which I read and found very complete. Also, if one is looking for a comprehensive look at Kennedy's staff, David Halberstam's "The Best and Brightest" is the most complete look at the background's of Kennedy's cabinet. I would recommend those two books for a complete look at Kennedy and the Vietnam War. This book really does not fill any needs.
3 stars for a good review of the Kennedy years but other options are better.
3 stars for a good review of the Kennedy years but other options are better.
May 16, 2014
Now fifty years since JFK's tragic passing, Dallek may be the first of the "fair and objective" historians to turn back the clock to those seemingly more innocent days. While clearly an admirer of the late president, Dallek wields his pen fairly, noting both the flaws and strengths of this enigmatic man. Most of all, Dallek illuminates the men around Kennedy and their roles in the New Frontier. A very useful piece of scholarship which one and all will enjoy!
December 6, 2013
An enjoyable and relatively quick read, burdened by some occasionally caustic and self-assured analysis that perhaps excessively faults Kennedy's advisors relative to the man himself. It offers good context on our entry in Vietnam, struggle with Communism, Soviet Union, Cuba, civil rights...with emphasis on the advice Kennedy received and how he responded.
August 20, 2022
Several parts of this book were very interesting and provided little-discussed information about the negative effect of JFK’s presidency. Several other parts, however, were so heavy. It’s clear Dallek did a lot of research for this book and it seems he was determined to include every single piece of information he found, even if it slowed the flow of the book significantly.
September 3, 2019
I enjoyed the book and learning some of the inner workings behind the President. However, I felt like the book ended rather abruptly. It did not disclose the reactions of the staff when learning of the assassination nor the interactions during the transfer of power to Johnson.
December 7, 2018
Starts strong and focused, but then sputters out.
June 26, 2019
Started out really good but then it basically became a rehashing of Dallek’s Unfinished Life. Too much Vietnam talk.
May 27, 2021
“In short there’s simply not..
A more congenial spot..
For happy , ever-aftering than Camelot..
As sung by Richard Harris, Lerner and Loew envisioned Camelot as a fanciful place, perfect for happy ever aftering. Camelot’s Court, the 3 year residence for John Kennedy and staff, was anything but. Plagued by a constant onslaught of foreign crises with an underlying domestic racial crisis bubbling, there was no happy nothing in this Camelot.
Post Eisenhower, Kennedy was elected into a world dominated by Cold War and the Russian threat. McCarthy was railing in Congress. Castro was beating the Russian drum in Cuba. An inexperienced politician like Kennedy was catapulted into the White House. He had Lyndon Johnson for VP, but never liked him and disregarded him. Around himself though he hired “ the best and the brightest”, from left and right, liberal and conservative. Dalleks very intense book focuses on these densely packed, 3 years highlighting the roles of numerous Kennedy advisors.
There was no scarcity of reasons to seek advice during this 1000 days. The ongoing Vietnam war, the status of Cuba-US relations leading to the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis and the longstanding racial divide in the country all left Kennedy seeking counsel. The book details the counsel in impressive detail. Maybe too impressive as it’s hard to maintain control over who said what.
Kennedy is described as taking all these opinions in and attempting to plan a course, usually with brother Robert. The problem was that the opinions were frequently on the opposite side of Kennedy’s thinking. War hawks dominated and a case is made for Kennedy holding down the fort of peace despite numerous aides ( esp military) pushing for heightened combat.,
Things change but maybe they stay the same too. People on the left see Kennedy with a nice glow. We didn’t know about the extensive womanizing ( only alluded to here as it is not the focus) or the significant health issues (Addisons on chronic steroids, chronic pain, spastic colon, urinary infections). We don’t really think of him being at odds with the press but there was a constant battle to stop the negative press the Vietnam war was getting.
Kennedy even discussed a reporters work with the NYTimes editor.
It’s work to read this book. I was 11-14 during these years, so I wasn’t fully aware of things but living next to the US in those days I heard and saw the news and it was a tense time. Detailing who said what during this period is a huge job, but Dallek gamely tries to do just that. There is only so much you can take in however until Sorensen becomes Schlesinger or Rusk and Rostov become the same person, and don’t even ask about the generals.
What jumps out mostly is how charged these 3 short years are. There is so much going on, and Kennedy ( and Bobby) hover in the middle continually bouncing off these “court” members. Remarkably they generally seem to have developed the best course , resisting the hawks.
Obviously neither John or Bobby got their happy ever after, but this well documented book shows they fought for us while they were here.
Docked a point because it’s a real slog to get thru.,
A more congenial spot..
For happy , ever-aftering than Camelot..
As sung by Richard Harris, Lerner and Loew envisioned Camelot as a fanciful place, perfect for happy ever aftering. Camelot’s Court, the 3 year residence for John Kennedy and staff, was anything but. Plagued by a constant onslaught of foreign crises with an underlying domestic racial crisis bubbling, there was no happy nothing in this Camelot.
Post Eisenhower, Kennedy was elected into a world dominated by Cold War and the Russian threat. McCarthy was railing in Congress. Castro was beating the Russian drum in Cuba. An inexperienced politician like Kennedy was catapulted into the White House. He had Lyndon Johnson for VP, but never liked him and disregarded him. Around himself though he hired “ the best and the brightest”, from left and right, liberal and conservative. Dalleks very intense book focuses on these densely packed, 3 years highlighting the roles of numerous Kennedy advisors.
There was no scarcity of reasons to seek advice during this 1000 days. The ongoing Vietnam war, the status of Cuba-US relations leading to the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis and the longstanding racial divide in the country all left Kennedy seeking counsel. The book details the counsel in impressive detail. Maybe too impressive as it’s hard to maintain control over who said what.
Kennedy is described as taking all these opinions in and attempting to plan a course, usually with brother Robert. The problem was that the opinions were frequently on the opposite side of Kennedy’s thinking. War hawks dominated and a case is made for Kennedy holding down the fort of peace despite numerous aides ( esp military) pushing for heightened combat.,
Things change but maybe they stay the same too. People on the left see Kennedy with a nice glow. We didn’t know about the extensive womanizing ( only alluded to here as it is not the focus) or the significant health issues (Addisons on chronic steroids, chronic pain, spastic colon, urinary infections). We don’t really think of him being at odds with the press but there was a constant battle to stop the negative press the Vietnam war was getting.
Kennedy even discussed a reporters work with the NYTimes editor.
It’s work to read this book. I was 11-14 during these years, so I wasn’t fully aware of things but living next to the US in those days I heard and saw the news and it was a tense time. Detailing who said what during this period is a huge job, but Dallek gamely tries to do just that. There is only so much you can take in however until Sorensen becomes Schlesinger or Rusk and Rostov become the same person, and don’t even ask about the generals.
What jumps out mostly is how charged these 3 short years are. There is so much going on, and Kennedy ( and Bobby) hover in the middle continually bouncing off these “court” members. Remarkably they generally seem to have developed the best course , resisting the hawks.
Obviously neither John or Bobby got their happy ever after, but this well documented book shows they fought for us while they were here.
Docked a point because it’s a real slog to get thru.,
February 26, 2020
"His time in the White House underscored for him that there are no experts in public policy--only men and women, with the best of intentions, guessing at what would work."
Brilliant, charismatic, and backed by the wealth of a prestigious New England family, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was nevertheless a flawed human being. Kennedy's meteoric political career depended in part on his ability to conceal his many health problems and his philanderous propensities. A mixed record during his tragically short time in the White House was glamorized by the Camelot metaphor put forth by his widow Jackie, his brother Bobby, and the historian and friend Arthur Schlesinger.
Although JFK made an effort to surround himself with the best and the brightest--minds of the first order from both government and academia--his administration had to function within the context of the Cold War and a segregated America. Russia, Berlin, Cuba, Viet Nam, desegregation, and nuclear test ban talks were defining moments during his tenure. There were some mistakes, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, some triumphs, notably the Cuban Missile Crisis, and a sizable number of problems, such as our growing involvement in Viet Nam, which were left unresolved for future administrations to deal with. Presented with drastically conflicting points of view and advice from hawks and doves, Kennedy was often frustrated by the limited relevance of all those fine intellects. Once, receiving polar opposite reports from two trusted sources on Viet Nam, he asked them in frustration if they had visited the same country. Sadly, Kennedy was still learning at the time of his assassination, and it is impossible to say how a second term might have played out.
Dallek does a fine job of discussing the issues of the times and the personalities who had influence during the Kennedy administration. My one small criticism is that the book has no index, so I was not always able to look back and review a character's background.
Brilliant, charismatic, and backed by the wealth of a prestigious New England family, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was nevertheless a flawed human being. Kennedy's meteoric political career depended in part on his ability to conceal his many health problems and his philanderous propensities. A mixed record during his tragically short time in the White House was glamorized by the Camelot metaphor put forth by his widow Jackie, his brother Bobby, and the historian and friend Arthur Schlesinger.
Although JFK made an effort to surround himself with the best and the brightest--minds of the first order from both government and academia--his administration had to function within the context of the Cold War and a segregated America. Russia, Berlin, Cuba, Viet Nam, desegregation, and nuclear test ban talks were defining moments during his tenure. There were some mistakes, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, some triumphs, notably the Cuban Missile Crisis, and a sizable number of problems, such as our growing involvement in Viet Nam, which were left unresolved for future administrations to deal with. Presented with drastically conflicting points of view and advice from hawks and doves, Kennedy was often frustrated by the limited relevance of all those fine intellects. Once, receiving polar opposite reports from two trusted sources on Viet Nam, he asked them in frustration if they had visited the same country. Sadly, Kennedy was still learning at the time of his assassination, and it is impossible to say how a second term might have played out.
Dallek does a fine job of discussing the issues of the times and the personalities who had influence during the Kennedy administration. My one small criticism is that the book has no index, so I was not always able to look back and review a character's background.
May 8, 2020
I've read several biographies of John F. Kennedy and his short presidency. Most center on the man with all his weaknesses and strengths. This book, however, by Robert Dallek concentrates more on the advisers around Kennedy and how poorly they served the president. One expects in any presidential administration advisers will take opposing views leaving the president to choose a course for the nation. However, in this case most of Kennedy's advisers appear to be more interested in their own egos which prohibited them from seeing what was really happening especially in foreign affairs.
What I see as unbelievable is the role Lyndon Johnson played in the Kennedy administration. Dallek makes it clear Kennedy had little use for Johnson and sidelined him on many issues. However, when it came to the Vietnam War, Johnson offered a clear and unequivacal opinion - don't get involved. Johnson is quoted as saying "Before we take any such plunge we had better be sure we are prepared to become bogged down chasing irregulars and guerrillas over the rice fields and jungles of Southeast Asia while our principal enemies China and the Soviet Union stand outside the fray and husband their strength."
Kennedy disregard that advice and set the stage for one of the most ruinious and divisive wars in U.S. history. Incredibly, Johnson himself disregard his own advice when he assumed the office of president, however, by that time the U.S. had already invested too many lives and too much money to turn back in the failed effort.
Yes the Kennedy assassination was tragic but the bigger tragedy as Dallek points out was the failure of so many bright, talented individuals to make the right decision for 58,000 Americans who died in Vietnam.
What I see as unbelievable is the role Lyndon Johnson played in the Kennedy administration. Dallek makes it clear Kennedy had little use for Johnson and sidelined him on many issues. However, when it came to the Vietnam War, Johnson offered a clear and unequivacal opinion - don't get involved. Johnson is quoted as saying "Before we take any such plunge we had better be sure we are prepared to become bogged down chasing irregulars and guerrillas over the rice fields and jungles of Southeast Asia while our principal enemies China and the Soviet Union stand outside the fray and husband their strength."
Kennedy disregard that advice and set the stage for one of the most ruinious and divisive wars in U.S. history. Incredibly, Johnson himself disregard his own advice when he assumed the office of president, however, by that time the U.S. had already invested too many lives and too much money to turn back in the failed effort.
Yes the Kennedy assassination was tragic but the bigger tragedy as Dallek points out was the failure of so many bright, talented individuals to make the right decision for 58,000 Americans who died in Vietnam.
December 9, 2023
Amidst the welter of studies of the Kennedy Presidency, this covers one of the most intriguing aspects. Namely how did the Administration operate? In particular, how did a potentially very capable set of individuals - many from an academic and business background, who were confident in their abilities - get on in the business of government? The answer from this book is that they struggled to comprehend the issues with which they were confronted. In large measure, these were foreign policy issues, notably Cuba, Vietnam and the relations generally with the USSR.
This is a fair and balanced book from the author of a stunning one-volume biography of JFK. "Camelot's Court" complements that achievement and reads very clearly and convincingly. Dallek is good at placing the key advisers and administration officials in their context. The story of the Kennedy Administration is a salutary lesson in how brilliant people struggle to work out what is going on and how to make decisions in modern government.
This is a fair and balanced book from the author of a stunning one-volume biography of JFK. "Camelot's Court" complements that achievement and reads very clearly and convincingly. Dallek is good at placing the key advisers and administration officials in their context. The story of the Kennedy Administration is a salutary lesson in how brilliant people struggle to work out what is going on and how to make decisions in modern government.
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