Aaron Million's Reviews > Camelot's Court: Inside the Kennedy White House

Almost sixty years later, it is still mind-boggling to read about how a succession of U.S. Presidents escalated the nation's involvement in what was really a civil war in Vietnam. While Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower had taken the first steps in committing the U.S. to a defense of South Vietnam, things really got going when John F. Kennedy took office in 1961. This is one of several topics that Robert Dallek skillfully covers in his book about Kennedy's advisers and their roles in helping (or, more accurately, hurting) his ability to govern.

Kennedy, elected narrowly over Richard Nixon in 1960, seemed paralyzed by the situation that was presented to him in Vietnam. To withdraw U.S. "advisers" and support of Ngo Dinh Diem's self-destructive regime would have been to invite screams of "appeasement" from Republicans, and many hawkish Democrats. He would have been called "soft" on Communism, and blamed for the "loss" of a country, much as Truman was with China in 1949. Kennedy thought that all of this would jeopardize his prospects at re-election in 1964. So, he temporized, continually putting off major decisions. Ultimately, he was assassinated before he got around to doing anything about Vietnam. One of history's big ifs is what Kennedy would have done had he lived. Would he have withdrawn any U.S. personnel once he had been re-elected, assuming that he would have been? Would he have escalated the conflict like his successor Lyndon Johnson so disastrously chose to do? The answer to the second question seems unlikely, yet it will go unanswered.

The focus of Dallek's book is on the myriad advisers that Kennedy had, and how poorly almost all of them served him. In fact, I think all of them - at least the ones that Dallek covers - did serve him poorly. Some were political creatures who always tried to straddle issues (Dean Rusk); some were hardline hawks, believing that loss of face in anywhere in the world would spell doom for the U.S. (McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, the Joint Chiefs of Staff); some were way too accepting of rosy portraits painted by sycophants (Robert McNamara); all were egotistical and unwilling to be self-critical or ask themselves tough questions. Bobby Kennedy, the Attorney General, really comes across poorly here, using his leverage as the President's brother to bully and intimidate all those around him who he did not feel were completely loyal to JFK. Dallek really summed up the Administration's entire Vietnam decision-making well on page 275: "The whole operation from McNamara down was at best an exercise in auto-intoxication and at worst a use of unmitigated deception. If the facts did not support a rosy war scenario, Harkins was determined to make it appear that way and McNamara was all too ready to embrace good news."

Dallek also, as one would expect, spends a lot of time on Cuba. The missile crisis in October 1962 is as close as the U.S. and the Soviet Union came to actual war as at any time in the 45 year period of the Cold War. After being burned badly by extremely poor advice, coupled with wishy-washy decision-making, in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961, Kennedy showed that he had learned from some of his mistakes and had matured in office. If nothing else, he had learned not to rely on his military advisers, and in fact to be skeptical each time they advocated for nuclear war or all-out attacks (which was constantly). They were war-mongers, eager to demonstrate U.S. superiority over the USSR. What they - incredibly - did not seem to care about, but Kennedy thankfully knew, was that all-out war would destroy both countries, along with a good chunk of the rest of the world. Kennedy maintained his cool throughout the process and successfully managed to get Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to back down without looking foolish in the eyes of the world.

In conjunction with that, Dallek explores Kennedy's handling of Cuban affairs, and how he was slowly but steadily moving down a path of resuming diplomatic relations at the time of his assassination. That was still a ways away at that point, but once again one must wonder how things would have been different had he lived. Relations were not even partially restored until late in Barack Obama's presidency, only to be immediately and foolishly reversed by his successor. So, over sixty years after Fidel Castro first took power, the U.S. still has an adversarial relationship with a nation ninety miles off its border. A definite potential missed opportunity.

The domestic front is definitely of minor consequence here, just like how Kennedy treated it while he was President. Dallek covers, somewhat, the exploding Civil Rights fights in the South - fights that Kennedy wanted nothing to do with. He viewed any domestic affairs as interfering with his foreign policy agenda. Kennedy had neither the inclination nor the interest to work intensely on Civil Rights or other domestic matters. I wish Dallek had covered this more, but I think I understand why he didn't: Kennedy did not prioritize them so why should he?

Dallek keeps the narrative pretty focused. This is easily readable despite the somewhat dense material. Reading over deliberations about Cuba and Vietnam could be monotonous but it never felt that way to me here. Still, I found it odd that Dallek discusses several people early in the book (Ted Sorenson, Pierre Salinger, Dave Powers, Kenny O'Donnell, Larry O'Brien) and their respective importance to Kennedy, only to completely drop them from the narrative. Why bring them up in the first place? Yet Arthur Schlesinger, whom Dallek admits was on the fringes of the Administration, appears throughout the book. Also missing was any discussion of Kennedy's domestic Cabinet secretaries, or his relations with Congressmen. Despite these omissions, this is a worthwhile read for anyone interested in JFK, his presidency, the early stages of the Vietnam War, U.S.-Soviet relations, or Cuban affairs.

Grade: B+