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Critique of Practical Reason
Translator's Introduction
Note on this Edition
Sketch of Kant's Life & Work
Selected Bibliography
Preface
Introduction
Doctrine of the Elements of Pure Practi-
cal Reason
Analytic of Pure Practical Reason
Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason
Methodology of Pure Practical Reason
Conclusion
Note on this Edition
Sketch of Kant's Life & Work
Selected Bibliography
Preface
Introduction
Doctrine of the Elements of Pure Practi-
cal Reason
Analytic of Pure Practical Reason
Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason
Methodology of Pure Practical Reason
Conclusion
192 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1788
About the author
Immanuel Kant
3,030 books3,855 followersImmanuel Kant was an 18th-century philosopher from Königsberg, Prussia (now Kaliningrad, Russia). He's regarded as one of the most influential thinkers of modern Europe & of the late Enlightenment. His most important work is The Critique of Pure Reason, an investigation of reason itself. It encompasses an attack on traditional metaphysics & epistemology, & highlights his own contribution to these areas. Other main works of his maturity are The Critique of Practical Reason, which is about ethics, & The Critique of Judgment, about esthetics & teleology.
Pursuing metaphysics involves asking questions about the ultimate nature of reality. Kant suggested that metaphysics can be reformed thru epistemology. He suggested that by understanding the sources & limits of human knowledge we can ask fruitful metaphysical questions. He asked if an object can be known to have certain properties prior to the experience of that object. He concluded that all objects that the mind can think about must conform to its manner of thought. Therefore if the mind can think only in terms of causality–which he concluded that it does–then we can know prior to experiencing them that all objects we experience must either be a cause or an effect. However, it follows from this that it's possible that there are objects of such a nature that the mind cannot think of them, & so the principle of causality, for instance, cannot be applied outside experience: hence we cannot know, for example, whether the world always existed or if it had a cause. So the grand questions of speculative metaphysics are off limits, but the sciences are firmly grounded in laws of the mind. Kant believed himself to be creating a compromise between the empiricists & the rationalists. The empiricists believed that knowledge is acquired thru experience alone, but the rationalists maintained that such knowledge is open to Cartesian doubt and that reason alone provides us with knowledge. Kant argues, however, that using reason without applying it to experience will only lead to illusions, while experience will be purely subjective without first being subsumed under pure reason. Kant’s thought was very influential in Germany during his lifetime, moving philosophy beyond the debate between the rationalists & empiricists. The philosophers Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer saw themselves as correcting and expanding Kant's system, thus bringing about various forms of German Idealism. Kant continues to be a major influence on philosophy to this day, influencing both Analytic and Continental philosophy.
Pursuing metaphysics involves asking questions about the ultimate nature of reality. Kant suggested that metaphysics can be reformed thru epistemology. He suggested that by understanding the sources & limits of human knowledge we can ask fruitful metaphysical questions. He asked if an object can be known to have certain properties prior to the experience of that object. He concluded that all objects that the mind can think about must conform to its manner of thought. Therefore if the mind can think only in terms of causality–which he concluded that it does–then we can know prior to experiencing them that all objects we experience must either be a cause or an effect. However, it follows from this that it's possible that there are objects of such a nature that the mind cannot think of them, & so the principle of causality, for instance, cannot be applied outside experience: hence we cannot know, for example, whether the world always existed or if it had a cause. So the grand questions of speculative metaphysics are off limits, but the sciences are firmly grounded in laws of the mind. Kant believed himself to be creating a compromise between the empiricists & the rationalists. The empiricists believed that knowledge is acquired thru experience alone, but the rationalists maintained that such knowledge is open to Cartesian doubt and that reason alone provides us with knowledge. Kant argues, however, that using reason without applying it to experience will only lead to illusions, while experience will be purely subjective without first being subsumed under pure reason. Kant’s thought was very influential in Germany during his lifetime, moving philosophy beyond the debate between the rationalists & empiricists. The philosophers Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer saw themselves as correcting and expanding Kant's system, thus bringing about various forms of German Idealism. Kant continues to be a major influence on philosophy to this day, influencing both Analytic and Continental philosophy.
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June 13, 2022
There are thirty-two quotes and no criticism. It seemed important to me to participate in filling this gap: having given up temporarily commenting on the Critique of Pure Reason, which I only read in summary, I propose to express here this which I have retained from my more complete reading of the Critique of Practical Reason, although Kant is probably one of the most difficult to synthesize philosophers that I know. Indeed, it projects us into a very abstract system of thought, each element participating in demonstrating the whole.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant addresses his philosophy's moral and ethical part. In his case, we can speak of ethics. Indeed, this morality had built within the individual; it is not the result of living together or of Stuart Mill's utilitarianism. On the contrary, it wants to be universal because pursuing the reasonings set out in the Critique of Pure Reason cannot exist, or at least be accessible to human reason, in a relative manner. It also wants to be formalist and not consequentialist: an action is good or bad in itself, about the universal conscience internalized by the individual.
However, the latter has autonomy, the freedom to follow these "natural" laws or not. In this process, had not to need God to judge good and evil but as necessary for the very conceptualization of the supreme good.
In conclusion, therefore, a complex text to read in full; the book has often fallen from my hands, but the effort is not in vain: indeed, reading extracts is not enough to "integrate" the Kantian "system": through his Critique of Pure Reason, declined in the Practical domain, he finally offers us a less ethical subjective and contingent than other thinkers of good and evil, always striving more and more to discover what man can know or not about these moral principles, rather than to define them a priori. The result is a somewhat optimistic vision simultaneously as it demands Man.
For this last reason, I influence our modern relational society and discover the "constructed cultural fact" stemming from psychology. I have little adhered to the accountability rigour of Kant's demonstration. Which nevertheless remains, by this very fact, an instrumental counterpoint to know.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant addresses his philosophy's moral and ethical part. In his case, we can speak of ethics. Indeed, this morality had built within the individual; it is not the result of living together or of Stuart Mill's utilitarianism. On the contrary, it wants to be universal because pursuing the reasonings set out in the Critique of Pure Reason cannot exist, or at least be accessible to human reason, in a relative manner. It also wants to be formalist and not consequentialist: an action is good or bad in itself, about the universal conscience internalized by the individual.
However, the latter has autonomy, the freedom to follow these "natural" laws or not. In this process, had not to need God to judge good and evil but as necessary for the very conceptualization of the supreme good.
In conclusion, therefore, a complex text to read in full; the book has often fallen from my hands, but the effort is not in vain: indeed, reading extracts is not enough to "integrate" the Kantian "system": through his Critique of Pure Reason, declined in the Practical domain, he finally offers us a less ethical subjective and contingent than other thinkers of good and evil, always striving more and more to discover what man can know or not about these moral principles, rather than to define them a priori. The result is a somewhat optimistic vision simultaneously as it demands Man.
For this last reason, I influence our modern relational society and discover the "constructed cultural fact" stemming from psychology. I have little adhered to the accountability rigour of Kant's demonstration. Which nevertheless remains, by this very fact, an instrumental counterpoint to know.
June 2, 2016
Hume, by his criticism of the concept of causality, awakened him from his dogmatic slumber—so at least he says, but the awakening was only temporary, and he soon invented a soporific that enabled him to sleep again.
—Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy
When I first read that opening salvo of Russell’s chapter on Kant, I thought it rather unfair towards the German monk. But now, after digesting Kant’s philosophy a little more, I can’t help but agree. In fact, I more than agree—I think it sums up Kant’s whole project to the letter.
Kant proceeds like this. Instead of starting off with questions like “what is morality?” or “is knowledge possible?” he assumes that he already knows what morality dictates and that knowledge is possible. Then, after this initial assumption, he tries to figure out what conditions must be present in order to justify the assumption. For example, when Hume questions the validity of causality, Kant says "well, obviously causality is real; and because it is real then there must be noumena as distinct from phenomena, so causality is an a priori assumption we make about phenomena, which makes perception possible, etc." In short, he makes more assumptions to justify his initial assumption; the end result is a neat system that rests on a bed of shaky suppositions.
Again, take Kant’s position on free will. Instead of inquiring whether we actually have free will, he says that, because we have morality, we must have free will; and therefore there must be a God and a heaven, etc. The fundamental question—can we chose our actions?—is swept under the rug by pointing to morality—which itself depends on the question of free will. And whenever he is in a bind, he invokes his famous noumena, which allow him to say "yes, perhaps we obey laws as observed phenomena; but as things-in-ourselves we have free will."
This isn’t satisfying at all. For, even in his system, causality is not a property of things-in-themselves, but a pre-condition of our perception of things-as-perceived. And because the concept of free will depends on the concept of causality, importing free will into the noumenal world makes no sense. Plus, since we can’t, by definition, know anything about ourselves as noumena, how on earth could we be obeying a moral code in the noumenal world? On the other hand, if we obey moral codes in the phenomenal world, what if it is determined through experiment that humans are subject to immutable laws and, in fact, don't have free will? You see? In either case there’s a problem.
Also consider his idea of the moral code itself. Kant insists that morality springs from reason alone. Therefore, according to Kant, whether a law is moral or not depends on the form of the law rather than the content. So long as the law can be plausibly willed as universal—regardless of the content of the law—it is moral; if it cannot, it is immoral.
But the question of whether I would will a law to be universal already takes into account my own empirical desires—so it can’t be logic alone that is at play here. For example, I see no contradiction in willing to commit suicide; because, for this to moral (according to Kant), I would only have to will that every person on the planet committed suicide—unlikely, perhaps, but not an impossible desire. Nor is there any logical barrier preventing me from willing that all humans fight to the death—provided that I myself be willing to fight to the death. In short, any action—whether or not it conduces to increasing the welfare and happiness of humankind—can be moral in Kant’s view, provided that it is willed as a universal law. That, I can't abide.
I can go on, but it’s unnecessary. In short, Kant’s philosophy is an elaborate system that merely justifies all of the things he already believed: causality is valid; morality is a duty; the self is real; free will is actual; God and heaven are real; Christianity is superior to all other moral systems; and so on. Kant’s kind of philosophy requires intelligence—and Kant was an incredible genius, to be sure—but it requires little daring or imagination, as the conclusions are known right from the start. To make an additional assumption to justify something you already believed is the easiest thing in the world; to question your belief is one of the hardest.
But, before I end this hostile review, let me temper some of these criticisms. For one, working through the philosophical system of a man as extraordinarily gifted as was Kant is valuable in itself. To merely understand him is a feat; the architecture of his mind is magnificent. Second, in dealing with these problems—however adequately or inadequately—Kant did come up with a whole set of terms that have proven to be of enormous value. And third, even if we do not accept his conclusions, we can at least give him credit for carrying on the philosophic torch after Hume’s penetrating mind almost extinguished its flame.
[Note: After some more thinking, and a lengthy talk with a friend, I think that some of my above points are invalid, or at least based on a naive reading of Kant. (Though I still think some are arguable.) Regardless of my or Kant's rightness or wrongness, I think it's a useful exercise to subject philosophical arguments to strenuous criticism, if only to better understand them. And boy is Kant pain to understand.
For a better-informed and more thorough investigation of Kant's morals, see my review of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.]
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August 12, 2024[ Setting : A dimly lit church, a confessional. ]
The air smells faintly of incense and existential dread. I'm nervous, still haven't decided whether to confess all my sins, without omitting anything... I kneel, hesitantly.. The curtain rustles, and the priest's voice emerges :
- So, my child, what sins weigh upon your soul ? Speek freely, for here, in the confessional, we're all equal - except for me, of course. I'm more equal, you know..
Me ( still nervously ) :
- Forgive me father, because....uh...because...bec...
The Priest :
- My child, don't be ashamed... Look, I'm turning my back.
Me :
Okay...Father, I ...I had an affair with a priestess....
The Priest :
- What ?!
Me :
- I had an aff...
The Priest :
- Spare me, please. God will forgive you, but I'II not. Other conquests ? I mean, other sins ?
Me :
- Ah....uh... I stole my neighbor's Wi - Fi password and binge-watched an entire season of " The Real Housewives of Transcendental Idealism ".
The Priest ( leaning closer ) :
- Hmmm....You're on my realm here.. The categorical imperative at play... You know, my dear sinner, stealing Wi-Fi is like treating humanity merely as a means to an end. But fear not ! I shall guide you toward moral enlightenment .
Me ( a bit confused ) :
- Strange... Immanuel Kant talked about the same thing, in his " Critique de la Raison Pratique "...
The Priest ( looking around ) :
- Hey, can you keep a secret ? I am Immanuel... And I tr....
Me ( interrupting ) :
- Holy shit !!!! I won't tell you anything anymore ! I'm out !
The Priest :
- Hey ! Wait ! Don't you want me to enlighten you ?
Me ( hesitantly ) :
- Okay...but use low beam, please.High beam can blind me. You're right....maybe I should... So...father Immanuel, isn't Wi-Fi a basic human right ? I mean, imagine a world where Wi-Fi is as essential as oxygen. A world where stealing Wi-Fi is not just a petty crime, but a fundamental human right. What do you say ?
Father Immanuel :
- Oh, yes.. To steal or not to steal , that is the ques..
Me ( interrupting ) :
- Quite so ! What if I'm in a cofee shop, and their Wi-Fi password is "CogitoErgoBuffer 123 " ? Is it not my moral duty to seize this low-hanging fruit ?
Father Immanuel :
- Na gut... hör mir zu, mein freund :
" Act only so that you treat Wi-Fi passwords as ends in themselves, never as mere means ".
Me :
- Mmm.. What a bulsh...And if I share my stolen Wi-Fi with others, am I a digital philanthropist ?
Father Immanuel :
- Alas, poor man, sharing stolen Wi-Fi is like sharing counterfeit coins. Benevolence with ill-gotten gains is but a fleeting virtue. Seek instead the Wi-Fi of virtue, encrypted, freely given, and buffered against moral glitches. Is my best advice.
Me ( feeling a sudden physiological need ) :
- Father Immanuel, just one more question. I have to go there.. you know..where everyone is happy.. So - Dostoevsky touched upon the theme of the " Übermensch " in Crime and Punishment . He suggested that the Übermensch possesses moral superiority not by legal right, but by inner conviction. What do you say ?
Father Immanuel ( lowering his voice ) :
- Tell me...the Priestess was happy ?
Me ( the physiological need screams ) :
- Uh...very..
Ah...but I must check this out, one more time... Father Immanuel, now I really have to go. I have to make another ...confession, at Finance . What's your advice, do I have to be honest there ?
Father Immanuel :
- Are you crazy ?! NIEMALS !!!!!
The air smells faintly of incense and existential dread. I'm nervous, still haven't decided whether to confess all my sins, without omitting anything... I kneel, hesitantly.. The curtain rustles, and the priest's voice emerges :
- So, my child, what sins weigh upon your soul ? Speek freely, for here, in the confessional, we're all equal - except for me, of course. I'm more equal, you know..
Me ( still nervously ) :
- Forgive me father, because....uh...because...bec...
The Priest :
- My child, don't be ashamed... Look, I'm turning my back.
Me :
Okay...Father, I ...I had an affair with a priestess....
The Priest :
- What ?!
Me :
- I had an aff...
The Priest :
- Spare me, please. God will forgive you, but I'II not. Other conquests ? I mean, other sins ?
Me :
- Ah....uh... I stole my neighbor's Wi - Fi password and binge-watched an entire season of " The Real Housewives of Transcendental Idealism ".
The Priest ( leaning closer ) :
- Hmmm....You're on my realm here.. The categorical imperative at play... You know, my dear sinner, stealing Wi-Fi is like treating humanity merely as a means to an end. But fear not ! I shall guide you toward moral enlightenment .
Me ( a bit confused ) :
- Strange... Immanuel Kant talked about the same thing, in his " Critique de la Raison Pratique "...
The Priest ( looking around ) :
- Hey, can you keep a secret ? I am Immanuel... And I tr....
Me ( interrupting ) :
- Holy shit !!!! I won't tell you anything anymore ! I'm out !
The Priest :
- Hey ! Wait ! Don't you want me to enlighten you ?
Me ( hesitantly ) :
- Okay...but use low beam, please.High beam can blind me. You're right....maybe I should... So...father Immanuel, isn't Wi-Fi a basic human right ? I mean, imagine a world where Wi-Fi is as essential as oxygen. A world where stealing Wi-Fi is not just a petty crime, but a fundamental human right. What do you say ?
Father Immanuel :
- Oh, yes.. To steal or not to steal , that is the ques..
Me ( interrupting ) :
- Quite so ! What if I'm in a cofee shop, and their Wi-Fi password is "CogitoErgoBuffer 123 " ? Is it not my moral duty to seize this low-hanging fruit ?
Father Immanuel :
- Na gut... hör mir zu, mein freund :
" Act only so that you treat Wi-Fi passwords as ends in themselves, never as mere means ".
Me :
- Mmm.. What a bulsh...And if I share my stolen Wi-Fi with others, am I a digital philanthropist ?
Father Immanuel :
- Alas, poor man, sharing stolen Wi-Fi is like sharing counterfeit coins. Benevolence with ill-gotten gains is but a fleeting virtue. Seek instead the Wi-Fi of virtue, encrypted, freely given, and buffered against moral glitches. Is my best advice.
Me ( feeling a sudden physiological need ) :
- Father Immanuel, just one more question. I have to go there.. you know..where everyone is happy.. So - Dostoevsky touched upon the theme of the " Übermensch " in Crime and Punishment . He suggested that the Übermensch possesses moral superiority not by legal right, but by inner conviction. What do you say ?
Father Immanuel ( lowering his voice ) :
- Tell me...the Priestess was happy ?
Me ( the physiological need screams ) :
- Uh...very..
Ah...but I must check this out, one more time... Father Immanuel, now I really have to go. I have to make another ...confession, at Finance . What's your advice, do I have to be honest there ?
Father Immanuel :
- Are you crazy ?! NIEMALS !!!!!
April 22, 2021
The question that practical reason asks us is, what ought I to do? In this book Kant offers his analysis of how pure reason, which relies on no empirical input whatsoever, can help us answer that question.
As a follow up to Critique of Pure Reason, this book is a grave disappointment. Altogether abandoning the exacting critical standards he established in his earlier, better work, Kant argues on behalf of an ethical theory that I find intellectually flawed and personally repugnant. It is a morality of pious bureaucrats who distrust anything emotional (for Kant, feelings are “pathological”), contingent (i.e., “real” or "actual"), or human.
In brief, Kant argues that the proper standard for evaluating the moral merit of an action is twofold. First, the act must conform to a maxim of pure reason that is universally binding on all rational agents in all times and in all places (a "categorical imperative"). Such an imperative follows from pure reason, which can only deal with the form of argument, and not with particulars, which are by definition derived from empirical experience. Second, the act must be undertaken only and exactly because it is judged by a rational agent to follow from pure reason, not from any kind of desire or expectation about the outcome.
Kant's argument suffers from several extremely serious problems.
First, Kant never establishes why maxims derived from pure reason are eo ipso laudable. It is not obvious that any action that is good for all people to do always is necessarily better than any action that is good for some people to do sometimes.
Second, his theory demands that moral agents freely choose to comply with the directives of pure practical reason, but his theory establishing freewill is extremely weak. Readers of the Critique of Pure Reason may in fact remember that the question of determinism is one of his antimonies of pure reason, and is used in that book as an example of a pseudo-problem that philosophy can never either prove or disprove.
Third, his attempt to dodge that problem by arguing that freedom of the subject is a postulate of pure reason is completely unconvincing, and is a transparent attempt to circumvent the limits he himself persuasively established. He offers a whole series of additional postulates, offered as hypotheses that reason cannot do without, and all of them just happen to conform with the sacred cows of Pietism.
Fourth, he brazenly ignores his own dialectical analysis of virtue and happiness by positing them in this very work as an antimony, and then siding with the theory of virtue nonetheless.
Fifth, his conception of a categorical imperative is underdeveloped. In Critique of Pure Reason he famously derides philosophers who condescend to give examples, but I sure could have used a few here. I genuinely have no idea what he thinks a good example of a categorical imperative would be. “One ought to do the right thing”? “Always tell the truth”? "Never take what is not freely given"? “Be kind to your parents”?
Sixth, his theory substantially relies on the claim that the theory he describes conforms to what is usually meant by “morality.” That is far from true. Although impartiality and generality are common parts of what people generally mean by the term, they are at best necessary but not sufficient.
In addition to being philosophically problematic, I recoil from the ugly spirit of Kant’s vision, which reminds me of the worst excesses of Calvin and Luther - the hushed awe before the altar of solemnity, duty, and obedience, and the covert fear that someone somewhere might be enjoying themselves.
So in a manner that will electrify an entire generation of Germany's greatest intellects, Kant discovers a new locus of freedom rooted in the structure of human rationality. And what does he do with this new-found faculty? He immediately concludes that the highest use to which it can be put is to enthusiastically declare total obedience to the despotic dictates of a moral ought, one which possesses all the charms of a feudal lord. What kind of vision is this?
Kant is not the first great thinker to apply himself to the problem of practical reason. Thomas Aquinas, for example, also distinguished between speculative and practical reason, and elaborated his own theory of how people should act. For Aquinas, this answer is rooted in his concept of synderesis, an inner faculty of what we might today call "moral intuition," which directly perceives the rightness or wrongness of a thing.
For all of Kant’s fetishization of reason, I actually find Aquinas’ approach more rational, and more honest, for he freely admits that his determinations are based in part on intuition, sentiment, and his belief in the truth of revelation. Kant clearly relies on these factors just as much, but wrote this entire book to persuade us otherwise.
As a follow up to Critique of Pure Reason, this book is a grave disappointment. Altogether abandoning the exacting critical standards he established in his earlier, better work, Kant argues on behalf of an ethical theory that I find intellectually flawed and personally repugnant. It is a morality of pious bureaucrats who distrust anything emotional (for Kant, feelings are “pathological”), contingent (i.e., “real” or "actual"), or human.
In brief, Kant argues that the proper standard for evaluating the moral merit of an action is twofold. First, the act must conform to a maxim of pure reason that is universally binding on all rational agents in all times and in all places (a "categorical imperative"). Such an imperative follows from pure reason, which can only deal with the form of argument, and not with particulars, which are by definition derived from empirical experience. Second, the act must be undertaken only and exactly because it is judged by a rational agent to follow from pure reason, not from any kind of desire or expectation about the outcome.
Kant's argument suffers from several extremely serious problems.
First, Kant never establishes why maxims derived from pure reason are eo ipso laudable. It is not obvious that any action that is good for all people to do always is necessarily better than any action that is good for some people to do sometimes.
Second, his theory demands that moral agents freely choose to comply with the directives of pure practical reason, but his theory establishing freewill is extremely weak. Readers of the Critique of Pure Reason may in fact remember that the question of determinism is one of his antimonies of pure reason, and is used in that book as an example of a pseudo-problem that philosophy can never either prove or disprove.
Third, his attempt to dodge that problem by arguing that freedom of the subject is a postulate of pure reason is completely unconvincing, and is a transparent attempt to circumvent the limits he himself persuasively established. He offers a whole series of additional postulates, offered as hypotheses that reason cannot do without, and all of them just happen to conform with the sacred cows of Pietism.
Fourth, he brazenly ignores his own dialectical analysis of virtue and happiness by positing them in this very work as an antimony, and then siding with the theory of virtue nonetheless.
Fifth, his conception of a categorical imperative is underdeveloped. In Critique of Pure Reason he famously derides philosophers who condescend to give examples, but I sure could have used a few here. I genuinely have no idea what he thinks a good example of a categorical imperative would be. “One ought to do the right thing”? “Always tell the truth”? "Never take what is not freely given"? “Be kind to your parents”?
Sixth, his theory substantially relies on the claim that the theory he describes conforms to what is usually meant by “morality.” That is far from true. Although impartiality and generality are common parts of what people generally mean by the term, they are at best necessary but not sufficient.
In addition to being philosophically problematic, I recoil from the ugly spirit of Kant’s vision, which reminds me of the worst excesses of Calvin and Luther - the hushed awe before the altar of solemnity, duty, and obedience, and the covert fear that someone somewhere might be enjoying themselves.
So in a manner that will electrify an entire generation of Germany's greatest intellects, Kant discovers a new locus of freedom rooted in the structure of human rationality. And what does he do with this new-found faculty? He immediately concludes that the highest use to which it can be put is to enthusiastically declare total obedience to the despotic dictates of a moral ought, one which possesses all the charms of a feudal lord. What kind of vision is this?
Kant is not the first great thinker to apply himself to the problem of practical reason. Thomas Aquinas, for example, also distinguished between speculative and practical reason, and elaborated his own theory of how people should act. For Aquinas, this answer is rooted in his concept of synderesis, an inner faculty of what we might today call "moral intuition," which directly perceives the rightness or wrongness of a thing.
For all of Kant’s fetishization of reason, I actually find Aquinas’ approach more rational, and more honest, for he freely admits that his determinations are based in part on intuition, sentiment, and his belief in the truth of revelation. Kant clearly relies on these factors just as much, but wrote this entire book to persuade us otherwise.
April 8, 2014
Immanuel Kant is what I suppose one would call a 'practical philosopher' in that he is not primarily concerned with the more abstract thoughts of philosophy. Rather his philosophy, as expressed in this book, is one about how practical philosophy, or practical reason, works. He makes a distinction at the beginning of his book between the subjective and the objective, suggesting that practical reason is about making the subjective objective.
This book begins with a section about defining practical reason and its applications. In other words, this is a work which does discuss the abstract concepts of philosophy, such as good and evil or morality. But it is not a work which broadly or ambiguously leaves questions to the reader as much as it is a work which seeks to define those questions in more concrete manners.
One particular thought that Kant reaches is that morality and the existence of morality is theoretical proof for the existence of God (or at least of some higher power). I cannot explain his reasoning, though it read as sound and logical, however I do recommend that, if that vein of argument interests you, you read Kant's work here. It is an interesting way of looking at morality and something I've often questioned - without God or some kind of higher power does morality become more or less meaningless? Others may challenge that it becomes up to us then, as individuals, to be moral for the sake of being moral but that's never made a lot of sense to me. What is the purpose of morality?
Either way this is another strong philosophical text and one worth reading in order to understand more modern Western Philosophy. If philosophy interests you I would go looking for this book.
June 16, 2015
The first two critiques constitue a unit so far as their main argument goes. The Critique of Pure Reason establishes that while humans can imagine things in themselves (ideas), they can only know things as they are given to them (concepts). The gap between our conceptional understanding and our rational ideas is unbridgeable, requiring, even under the best of circumstances, an infinite induction which we, as finite beings, are incapable of. Furthermore, the First Critique establishes that while something like Russell's logical atomism represents an heuristically useful tool for the natural sciences, its extension beyond that is unwarranted.
The Critique of Practical Reason, a study of ethics, works with the heuristic assumption that human agency is absolutely free--a rational assumption given the proofs of the Critique of Pure Reason. As such, the question of ethics becomes one of acting in accord with universal principles upon which the best of all possible (viable) worlds might be imagined without in the process impinging upon the ethical agency of others. The idea of the good or of right behavior is therefore what he terms a regulative ideal. Certainty about how to act is, in principle, possible. Certainty about what to do exactly is not. We ought always do the best we can and we can formally know what "doing the best" entails.
This is satisfactory so far as it goes. A problem, however, may obtain. Kant's assumption that "agency" correlates in the case of humans to individual human organisms may be questionable. He does, however, address the matter in terms of the state and the law in his writings on jurisprudence so an answer is conceivable. Personally, I find this matter of agency to be the most pregnant in its implications. Kant's ethics basically entail that we act like god on the day before creation and continue, once the game's afoot, to act like benevolent deities thereafter. In other words, and this is probably intentional, religious issues like incarnationalism and theodicy are relevant to his ethical philosophy as becomes clear upon reading his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. The Second Critique as well as his other books on ethics would seem, therefore, to be half-way points towards a conclusion which is, at best, approached in the Third Critique (of Judgment) and the aforementioned Limits of Reason, a conclusion which is quite in keeping with what Huxley called "the perennial philosophy" of mysticism.
I wrote a little essay about Kant's ethics tendentiously along these lines which is posted elsewhere on this site.
The Critique of Practical Reason, a study of ethics, works with the heuristic assumption that human agency is absolutely free--a rational assumption given the proofs of the Critique of Pure Reason. As such, the question of ethics becomes one of acting in accord with universal principles upon which the best of all possible (viable) worlds might be imagined without in the process impinging upon the ethical agency of others. The idea of the good or of right behavior is therefore what he terms a regulative ideal. Certainty about how to act is, in principle, possible. Certainty about what to do exactly is not. We ought always do the best we can and we can formally know what "doing the best" entails.
This is satisfactory so far as it goes. A problem, however, may obtain. Kant's assumption that "agency" correlates in the case of humans to individual human organisms may be questionable. He does, however, address the matter in terms of the state and the law in his writings on jurisprudence so an answer is conceivable. Personally, I find this matter of agency to be the most pregnant in its implications. Kant's ethics basically entail that we act like god on the day before creation and continue, once the game's afoot, to act like benevolent deities thereafter. In other words, and this is probably intentional, religious issues like incarnationalism and theodicy are relevant to his ethical philosophy as becomes clear upon reading his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. The Second Critique as well as his other books on ethics would seem, therefore, to be half-way points towards a conclusion which is, at best, approached in the Third Critique (of Judgment) and the aforementioned Limits of Reason, a conclusion which is quite in keeping with what Huxley called "the perennial philosophy" of mysticism.
I wrote a little essay about Kant's ethics tendentiously along these lines which is posted elsewhere on this site.
December 10, 2022
The Sequel is even better!
August 17, 2022
...it is only with religion that the hope of happiness first arises.
Kant's trustworthy soporific. While I cannot say with a straight face that I read this with as much attention as the first Critique, I believe there is a significant reason why the latter is considered Kant's masterpiece - to the extent of stealing the acronym CPR from this, much shorter text.
Duty! Sublime and mighty name that embraces nothing charming or insinuating but requires submission, and yet does not seek to move the will by threatening anything that would arouse natural aversion or terror in the mind but only holds forth a law that of itself finds entry into the mind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly work against it; what origin is there worthy of you, and where is to be found the root of your noble descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations, descent from which is the indispensable condition of that worth which human beings alone can give themselves?
Nature then seems here to have provided for us only in a stepmotherly fashion with the faculty needed for our end.
Kant's trustworthy soporific. While I cannot say with a straight face that I read this with as much attention as the first Critique, I believe there is a significant reason why the latter is considered Kant's masterpiece - to the extent of stealing the acronym CPR from this, much shorter text.
Duty! Sublime and mighty name that embraces nothing charming or insinuating but requires submission, and yet does not seek to move the will by threatening anything that would arouse natural aversion or terror in the mind but only holds forth a law that of itself finds entry into the mind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly work against it; what origin is there worthy of you, and where is to be found the root of your noble descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations, descent from which is the indispensable condition of that worth which human beings alone can give themselves?
Nature then seems here to have provided for us only in a stepmotherly fashion with the faculty needed for our end.
February 13, 2013
Ο Immanuel Kant είναι ένας κολοσσός της διανόησης του Δυτικού Πολιτισμού. Ηθικολόγος και ορθολογιστής, έδωσε νέα κατεύθυνση στην Ευρωπαϊκή φιλοσοφία. Η «Κριτική του πρακτικού Λόγου» (1788) αποτελεί ουσιαστικά τη βάση της καντιανής ηθικής. Όλο το έργο συνοψίζεται στην προσταγή: «Πράττε έτσι, ώστε ο γνώμονας της θέλησής σου να μπορεί πάντοτε να ισχύει συγχρόνως ως αρχή μιας καθολικής νομοθεσίας», που αποτελεί το θεμελιώδη νόμο του καθαρού πρακτικού Λόγου.
Το κείμενο είναι ένα πυκνογραμμένο «τεχνικό» κείμενο, συχνά στρυφνό, με μ��γάλες προτάσεις, κύριες και δευτερεύουσες, με χαρακτηριστικό μπαρόκ στυλ. Η ανάγνωσή του είναι δύσκολη, παρά την πολύ προσεγμένη μετάφραση.
Το ομορφότερο κομμάτι του έργου του είναι ο Επίλογος:
ΔΥΟ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ γεμίζουν την ψυχή με πάντοτε καινούριο και αυξανόμενο σεβασμό και θαυμασμό, όσο συχνότερα και σταθερότερα ασχολείται μαζί τους ο στοχασμός: ο έναστρος ουρανός πάνω μου και ο ηθικός νόμος μέσα μου. Και τα δύο δεν χρειάζεται να τα αναζητώ και απλώς να τα υποθέτω έξω από το οπτικό πεδίο μου, σαν να ήταν κρυμμένα μέσα στα σκοτάδια ή στο υπερπέραν· τα βλέπω εμπρός μου και τα συνδέω αμέσως με τη συνείδηση της ύπαρξής μου. Το πρώτο αρχίζει από τη θέση που καταλαμβάνω στον εξωτερικό κόσμο και διευρύνει τη συνάφεια στην οποία βρίσκομαι προς το απείρως μεγάλο, με κόσμους πέρα από κόσμους και συστήματα συστημάτων, και επιπλέον ακόμη στους απέραντους χρόνους της περιοδικής τους κίνησης, της αρχής και της διάρκειάς τους. Το δεύτερο αρχίζει από τον αόρατο εαυτό μου, την προσωπικότητά μου, και με παρουσιάζει σε έναν κόσμο που έχει αληθινή απεραντοσύνη αλλά είναι μόνο για τον νου αισθητός, και με τον οποίο (αλλά μέσω αυτού συγχρόνως και με όλους εκείνους τους ορατούς κόσμους) αναγνωρίζω τον εαυτό μου όχι, όπως εκεί, σε μια απλώς τυχαία, αλλά σε μια καθολική και αναγκαία συνάφεια. Το πρώτο θέαμα ενός αναρίθμητου πλήθους κόσμων εκμηδενίζει κατά κάποιον τρόπο τη σπουδαιότητά μου ως ενός ζωώδους πλάσματος που πρέπει να επιστρέψει πάλι την ύλη, από την οποία έγινε, στον πλανήτη (ένα απλό σημείο στο σύμπαν), αφού έχει εφοδιασθεί για ένα σύντομο διάστημα με τη δύναμη της ζωής (δεν γνωρίζομε πώς). Αντιθέτως, το δεύτερο εξυψώνει απείρως την αξία μου ως νοήσεως μέσω της προσωπικότητάς μου, στην οποία ο ηθικός νόμος μού αποκαλύπτει μια ζωή ανεξάρτητη από τη ζωώδη φύση αλλά ακόμη και από ολόκληρο τον αισθητό κόσμο, τουλάχιστον όσο μπορεί να συναχθεί από τον σκόπιμο και μέσω του νόμου αυτού προσδιορισμό της ύπαρξής μου, ο οποίος δεν περιορίζεται σε όρους και όρια της ζωής αυτής, αλλά προχωρεί επ’ άπειρον.
Εντούτοις, ο θαυμασμός και ο σεβασμός μπορούν βεβαίως να μας παρωθούν στην έρευνα, αλλά δεν μπορούν να υποκαθιστούν την έλλειψή της. Αλλά τι πρέπει να γίνει, για να επιχειρήσομε την έρευνα τούτη με τρόπο επωφελή και αρμόζοντα στο ύψος του αντικειμένου; Μερικά παραδείγματα μπορούν να λειτουργήσουν εδώ ως προειδοποίηση αλλά επίσης και ως πρότυπα για μίμηση. Η παρατήρηση του κόσμου ξεκίνησε από το λαμπρότερο θέαμα που μπορούν ποτέ να μάς παρουσιάσουν οι ανθρώπινες αισθήσεις και που μπορεί ποτέ ο νους μας να παρακολουθήσει και να επεξεργασθεί στην ευρεία τους έκταση, και κατέληξε – στην αστρολογία. Η ηθική ξεκίνησε από την ευγενέστερη ιδιότητα στην ανθρώπινη φύση, η ανάπτυξη και καλλιέργεια της οποίας αποβλέπει σε άπειρη ωφέλεια, και κατέληξε – στην φαντασιοπληξία και στη δεισιδαιμονία. Έτσι συμβαίνει με όλες τις ακόμη πρώιμες προσπάθειες, στις οποίες το κυριώτερο μέρος του έργου εξαρτάται από τη χρήση του Λόγου, η οποία δεν αποκτάται, όπως η χρήση των ποδιών, αφ’ εαυτής, διαμέσου της συχνής εξάσκησης, ιδίως όταν αφορά σε ιδιότητες, οι οποίες δεν μπορούν να παρουσιασθούν με τόσο άμεσο τρόπο στην κοινή εμπειρία. Αλλά αφότου διαδόθηκε ο γνώμονας, οσοδήποτε αργά και αν συνέβη αυτό, να αναλογίζεται κανείς προηγουμένως καλά τα βήματα που προτίθεται να κάμει ο Λόγος, και να μην τον αφήνομε να ακολουθεί την πορεία του διαφορετικά παρά μόνον στην τροχιά μιας μεθόδου την οποία έχουμε συλλογισθεί καλά προηγουμένως, από τότε έλαβε η κρίση περί του σύμπαντος μιαν εντελώς διαφορετική κατεύθυνση και συγχρόνως, μαζί με αυτήν, μιαν ασυγκρίτως ευτυχέστερη έκβαση. �� πτώση μιας πέτρας, η κίνηση μιας σφενδόνης, αναλυμένες στα στοιχεία τους και στις δυνάμεις που εκδηλώνονται εκεί, και επεξεργασμένες μαθηματικώς, επέφεραν τελικώς τη σαφή εκείνη και για ολόκληρο το μέλλον αμετάβλητη κατανόηση του σύμπαντος, η οποία, με συνεχιζόμενη παρατήρηση, μπορεί να ελπίζει ότι πάντοτε θα διευρύνεται μόνο, χωρίς να χρειάζεται να φοβάται ότι θα υποχρεωθεί ποτέ να υποχωρήσει.
Αλλά το παράδειγμα εκείνο μπορεί να μάς συμβουλεύσει να ακολουθήσομε επίσης την οδό τούτη κατά τη μεταχείριση των ηθικών καταβολών της φύσης μας και να μάς δώσει ελπίδα για παρόμοια καλή επιτυχία. Πράγματι, έχομε πρόχειρα τα παραδείγματα του ηθικώς κρίνοντος Λόγου. Με το να τα αναλύομε στις στοιχειώδεις τους έννοιες, αλλά, λόγω ελλείψεως των Μαθηματικών, με το να επιχειρού��ε, μέσα από επαναλαμβανόμενες δοκιμές επί του κοινού ανθρώπινου νου, μια μέθοδο όμοια με τη Χημεία, δηλαδή του διαχωρισμού του εμπειρικού από το ορθολογικό στοιχείο που τυχόν απαντάται στα παραδείγματα εκείνα, μπορούμε να καταστήσομε γνωστά με βεβαιότητα και τα δύο αυτά στοιχεία στην καθαρότητά τους καθώς και το τι μπορεί να επιτύχει το καθένα μόνο του και αφ’ εαυτού του· με τον τρόπο αυτόν μπορούμε να προλάβομε, αφ’ ενός, τη σύγχυση μιας ακόμη ανώριμης, μη εξασκημένης κρίσης και αφ’ ετέρου (πράγμα που είναι πολύ πιο αναγκαίο), τις εξάρσεις της ιδιοφυΐας, με τις οποίες, όπως γίνεται συνήθως από οπαδούς της φιλοσοφικής λίθου, υπόσχονται, χωρίς οποιαδήποτε μεθοδική έρευνα και γνώση της φύσης, ονειρεμένους θησαυρούς, ενώ εξανεμίζονται οι αληθινοί. Με μια λέξη: Η επιστήμη (που την έχομε αναζητήσει με τρόπο κριτικό και επιχειρήσει με τρόπο μεθοδικό) είναι η στενή πύλη που οδηγεί στη διδασκαλία της σοφίας, εάν με τούτη εννοείται όχι απλώς τι οφείλομε να κάνομε, αλλά και τι πρέπει να χρησιμεύει στους δασκάλους ως κανόνας, για να διανοίξουν καλά και εμφανώς την οδό της σοφίας, που πρέπει να ακολουθήσει ο καθένας, και να διαφυλάξουν άλλους από σφαλερούς δρόμους: μια επιστήμη της οποίας θεματοφύλακας θα πρέπει να παραμείνει πάντοτε η φιλοσοφία, στη λεπτή έρευνα της οποίας το κοινό δεν πρέπει να έχει κάποια ανάμειξη, ασφαλώς όμως να έχει στις διδασκαλίες της που, έπειτα από μία τέτοια επεξεργασία, μπορούν για πρώτη φορά να τού φανούν αληθινά διαφωτιστικές.
Το κείμενο είναι ένα πυκνογραμμένο «τεχνικό» κείμενο, συχνά στρυφνό, με μ��γάλες προτάσεις, κύριες και δευτερεύουσες, με χαρακτηριστικό μπαρόκ στυλ. Η ανάγνωσή του είναι δύσκολη, παρά την πολύ προσεγμένη μετάφραση.
Το ομορφότερο κομμάτι του έργου του είναι ο Επίλογος:
ΔΥΟ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ γεμίζουν την ψυχή με πάντοτε καινούριο και αυξανόμενο σεβασμό και θαυμασμό, όσο συχνότερα και σταθερότερα ασχολείται μαζί τους ο στοχασμός: ο έναστρος ουρανός πάνω μου και ο ηθικός νόμος μέσα μου. Και τα δύο δεν χρειάζεται να τα αναζητώ και απλώς να τα υποθέτω έξω από το οπτικό πεδίο μου, σαν να ήταν κρυμμένα μέσα στα σκοτάδια ή στο υπερπέραν· τα βλέπω εμπρός μου και τα συνδέω αμέσως με τη συνείδηση της ύπαρξής μου. Το πρώτο αρχίζει από τη θέση που καταλαμβάνω στον εξωτερικό κόσμο και διευρύνει τη συνάφεια στην οποία βρίσκομαι προς το απείρως μεγάλο, με κόσμους πέρα από κόσμους και συστήματα συστημάτων, και επιπλέον ακόμη στους απέραντους χρόνους της περιοδικής τους κίνησης, της αρχής και της διάρκειάς τους. Το δεύτερο αρχίζει από τον αόρατο εαυτό μου, την προσωπικότητά μου, και με παρουσιάζει σε έναν κόσμο που έχει αληθινή απεραντοσύνη αλλά είναι μόνο για τον νου αισθητός, και με τον οποίο (αλλά μέσω αυτού συγχρόνως και με όλους εκείνους τους ορατούς κόσμους) αναγνωρίζω τον εαυτό μου όχι, όπως εκεί, σε μια απλώς τυχαία, αλλά σε μια καθολική και αναγκαία συνάφεια. Το πρώτο θέαμα ενός αναρίθμητου πλήθους κόσμων εκμηδενίζει κατά κάποιον τρόπο τη σπουδαιότητά μου ως ενός ζωώδους πλάσματος που πρέπει να επιστρέψει πάλι την ύλη, από την οποία έγινε, στον πλανήτη (ένα απλό σημείο στο σύμπαν), αφού έχει εφοδιασθεί για ένα σύντομο διάστημα με τη δύναμη της ζωής (δεν γνωρίζομε πώς). Αντιθέτως, το δεύτερο εξυψώνει απείρως την αξία μου ως νοήσεως μέσω της προσωπικότητάς μου, στην οποία ο ηθικός νόμος μού αποκαλύπτει μια ζωή ανεξάρτητη από τη ζωώδη φύση αλλά ακόμη και από ολόκληρο τον αισθητό κόσμο, τουλάχιστον όσο μπορεί να συναχθεί από τον σκόπιμο και μέσω του νόμου αυτού προσδιορισμό της ύπαρξής μου, ο οποίος δεν περιορίζεται σε όρους και όρια της ζωής αυτής, αλλά προχωρεί επ’ άπειρον.
Εντούτοις, ο θαυμασμός και ο σεβασμός μπορούν βεβαίως να μας παρωθούν στην έρευνα, αλλά δεν μπορούν να υποκαθιστούν την έλλειψή της. Αλλά τι πρέπει να γίνει, για να επιχειρήσομε την έρευνα τούτη με τρόπο επωφελή και αρμόζοντα στο ύψος του αντικειμένου; Μερικά παραδείγματα μπορούν να λειτουργήσουν εδώ ως προειδοποίηση αλλά επίσης και ως πρότυπα για μίμηση. Η παρατήρηση του κόσμου ξεκίνησε από το λαμπρότερο θέαμα που μπορούν ποτέ να μάς παρουσιάσουν οι ανθρώπινες αισθήσεις και που μπορεί ποτέ ο νους μας να παρακολουθήσει και να επεξεργασθεί στην ευρεία τους έκταση, και κατέληξε – στην αστρολογία. Η ηθική ξεκίνησε από την ευγενέστερη ιδιότητα στην ανθρώπινη φύση, η ανάπτυξη και καλλιέργεια της οποίας αποβλέπει σε άπειρη ωφέλεια, και κατέληξε – στην φαντασιοπληξία και στη δεισιδαιμονία. Έτσι συμβαίνει με όλες τις ακόμη πρώιμες προσπάθειες, στις οποίες το κυριώτερο μέρος του έργου εξαρτάται από τη χρήση του Λόγου, η οποία δεν αποκτάται, όπως η χρήση των ποδιών, αφ’ εαυτής, διαμέσου της συχνής εξάσκησης, ιδίως όταν αφορά σε ιδιότητες, οι οποίες δεν μπορούν να παρουσιασθούν με τόσο άμεσο τρόπο στην κοινή εμπειρία. Αλλά αφότου διαδόθηκε ο γνώμονας, οσοδήποτε αργά και αν συνέβη αυτό, να αναλογίζεται κανείς προηγουμένως καλά τα βήματα που προτίθεται να κάμει ο Λόγος, και να μην τον αφήνομε να ακολουθεί την πορεία του διαφορετικά παρά μόνον στην τροχιά μιας μεθόδου την οποία έχουμε συλλογισθεί καλά προηγουμένως, από τότε έλαβε η κρίση περί του σύμπαντος μιαν εντελώς διαφορετική κατεύθυνση και συγχρόνως, μαζί με αυτήν, μιαν ασυγκρίτως ευτυχέστερη έκβαση. �� πτώση μιας πέτρας, η κίνηση μιας σφενδόνης, αναλυμένες στα στοιχεία τους και στις δυνάμεις που εκδηλώνονται εκεί, και επεξεργασμένες μαθηματικώς, επέφεραν τελικώς τη σαφή εκείνη και για ολόκληρο το μέλλον αμετάβλητη κατανόηση του σύμπαντος, η οποία, με συνεχιζόμενη παρατήρηση, μπορεί να ελπίζει ότι πάντοτε θα διευρύνεται μόνο, χωρίς να χρειάζεται να φοβάται ότι θα υποχρεωθεί ποτέ να υποχωρήσει.
Αλλά το παράδειγμα εκείνο μπορεί να μάς συμβουλεύσει να ακολουθήσομε επίσης την οδό τούτη κατά τη μεταχείριση των ηθικών καταβολών της φύσης μας και να μάς δώσει ελπίδα για παρόμοια καλή επιτυχία. Πράγματι, έχομε πρόχειρα τα παραδείγματα του ηθικώς κρίνοντος Λόγου. Με το να τα αναλύομε στις στοιχειώδεις τους έννοιες, αλλά, λόγω ελλείψεως των Μαθηματικών, με το να επιχειρού��ε, μέσα από επαναλαμβανόμενες δοκιμές επί του κοινού ανθρώπινου νου, μια μέθοδο όμοια με τη Χημεία, δηλαδή του διαχωρισμού του εμπειρικού από το ορθολογικό στοιχείο που τυχόν απαντάται στα παραδείγματα εκείνα, μπορούμε να καταστήσομε γνωστά με βεβαιότητα και τα δύο αυτά στοιχεία στην καθαρότητά τους καθώς και το τι μπορεί να επιτύχει το καθένα μόνο του και αφ’ εαυτού του· με τον τρόπο αυτόν μπορούμε να προλάβομε, αφ’ ενός, τη σύγχυση μιας ακόμη ανώριμης, μη εξασκημένης κρίσης και αφ’ ετέρου (πράγμα που είναι πολύ πιο αναγκαίο), τις εξάρσεις της ιδιοφυΐας, με τις οποίες, όπως γίνεται συνήθως από οπαδούς της φιλοσοφικής λίθου, υπόσχονται, χωρίς οποιαδήποτε μεθοδική έρευνα και γνώση της φύσης, ονειρεμένους θησαυρούς, ενώ εξανεμίζονται οι αληθινοί. Με μια λέξη: Η επιστήμη (που την έχομε αναζητήσει με τρόπο κριτικό και επιχειρήσει με τρόπο μεθοδικό) είναι η στενή πύλη που οδηγεί στη διδασκαλία της σοφίας, εάν με τούτη εννοείται όχι απλώς τι οφείλομε να κάνομε, αλλά και τι πρέπει να χρησιμεύει στους δασκάλους ως κανόνας, για να διανοίξουν καλά και εμφανώς την οδό της σοφίας, που πρέπει να ακολουθήσει ο καθένας, και να διαφυλάξουν άλλους από σφαλερούς δρόμους: μια επιστήμη της οποίας θεματοφύλακας θα πρέπει να παραμείνει πάντοτε η φιλοσοφία, στη λεπτή έρευνα της οποίας το κοινό δεν πρέπει να έχει κάποια ανάμειξη, ασφαλώς όμως να έχει στις διδασκαλίες της που, έπειτα από μία τέτοια επεξεργασία, μπορούν για πρώτη φορά να τού φανούν αληθινά διαφωτιστικές.
April 10, 2017
Το βιβλίο αυτό με δυσκόλεψε περισσότερο από άλλα που έχω διαβάσει όχι λόγω νοημάτων, όσο λόγω της ξύλινης γλώσσας που θυμίζει νομικούς κώδικες. Επέμεινα όμως σ' αυτό, περισσότερο απ' ότι έχω κάνει με άλλα στο παρελθόν, κυρίως επειδή θεωρώ φίλο το Σοπενάουερ και ως τώρα οι ''συμβουλές'' του με βοήθησαν στην προσωπική μου εξέλιξη, με κυριότερες βέβαια ''γνωριμίες'', τον Αριστοτέλη, το Σενέκα, τον Πλούταρχο, τον Κικέρων και το Χιούμ. Ωστόσο, υπάρχει μια ιδιαιτερότητα στην οποία δεν έδωσα ποτέ τη δέουσα προσοχή: πως δε γίνεται να διαβαστεί ο Καντ και να κατανοηθεί πλήρως, χωρίς να έχει προηγηθεί ο Λοκ. Και εμπιστεύομαι αυτή την κρίση, διότι αν είχα διαβάσει το Περί της τετραπλής ρίζας του αποχρώντος λόγου προτού διαβάσω το Περί Ψυχής, δε θα είχα καταλαβει τίποτα.
Οπότε για τη βαθμολογία, βάζω έναν αστερίσκο και μια άνω τελεία για μια δεύτερη ανάγνωση αφού διαβάσω Λοκ. Επιπλέον, ο Σοπενάουερ έχει την τάση να παραθέτει αυτολεξεί φράσεις και παραγράφους από άλλους φιλοσόφους, με αποτέλεσμα να έχω ήδη πάρει μια γεύση από Καντ πολύ πιο προσιτή σε σχέση με τη μετάφραση Ανδρουλιδάκη της Εστίας. Μπορεί να είναι αρτιότατη και πιστή, ωστόσο ίσως θα έπρεπε να είναι όχι απλοποιημένη, κάθε άλλο, αλλά περισσότερο κοντά στη γλώσσα και την εποχή μας. Επειδή απ' όσο γνωρίζω δεν υπάρχει άλλη έκδοση και χωρίς να θέλω να κατηγορήσω τις εκδόσεις Εστία που θεωρώ απ' τις καλύτερες στη χώρα μας, σταματάω εδώ αυτή την αναφορά, θα κάνω όμως ωστόσο κάποια στιγμή μια προσπάθεια να διαβάσω την αντίστοιχη μετάφραση στα γαλλικά.
Τι είναι η Κριτική του Πρακτικού Λόγου του Καντ;
Ο λόγος είναι η λογική, η ανεξάρτητη του νου. Το νοητικό διαφέρει απ' το λογικό. Το λογικό δε χρησιμοποιεί δικές του πρώτες ύλες, ό,τι έρχεται σε αυτό είναι όλα εισαγωγές γι' αυτό και όλες οι έννοιες περιλαμβάνουν το σχήμα, τη μορφή και οδηγούν στο συνδυασμό των μορφών, στο συμπέρασμα ( προσοχή! όχι στην κρίση θα σας έλεγε σε αυτό το σημείο ο Σοπενάουερ, αυτή ανήκει αλλού ). Το λογικό διαφέρει επίσης απ' το αισθησιακό, όσο και απ' το αληθινό. Για αυτά δε χρειάζεστε τον Καντ να σας τα πει γιατί στο συγκεκριμένο έργο δε σας τα λέει, χρειάζεται όμως να τα γνωρίζετε προκαταβολικά. Ατυχώς, αν τις γνώσεις αυτές τις έχετε πάρει απ' την Τετραπλή Ρίζα θα έχετε συμπεράνει στην πορεία της ανάγνωσης πως υπάρχουν ορισμένα ''κακώς κείμενα'', ορισμένα σημεία όπου μπορούν να παρερμηνευτούν ή που δίδονται συγκεχυμένα στην Κριτική του Πρακτικού Λόγου.
Αλλά τί είναι η Κριτική του Πρακτικού Λόγου του Κάντ;
Πρόκειται για το Ηθικό Σύστημα του Καντ. Η ηθική, το καθήκον, δε μπορούν παρά να είναι αποτέλεσμα της ελέυθερης βούλησης και δίνει τα κριτήρια για να μπορεί ο άνθρωπος αυτοβούλως να είναι ηθικός, να ζει σε ένα κόσμ�� με ανθρώπους των οποίων χαρακτηρίζει τις πράξεις ηθικές αν είναι τόσο στο αντικειμενικό πλαίσιο, όσο και στο καθαρά υποκειμενικό, εφ' όσον έχει δώσει τέτοιες αξίες στη ζωή του, με τον ίδιο τρόπο που η ευχαρίστηση, η ηδονή, η λύπηση διαφέρουν απ' την ευδαιμονία. Ευδαιμονία για τον Καντ ( και για 'μενα ) δεν είναι μόνο το ευχάριστο, το ευχάριστο είναι ένα τσάφ και πέρασε, αλλά εκείνο που δίνει κάτι παραπάνω, που σε βοηθάει στην προσωπική σου πορεία, είτε αυτό λέγεται γνώση, είτε σκέψη, μα και τελικά η σκέψη δεν απαιτεί και γνώση; Με βάση όλα τα παραπάνω η Ηθική δεν είναι νόμοι που μας έρχονται ως ιδέες απ' το υπερπέραν, είναι ... εσωτερικές. Είναι το αποτέλεσμα των παραστάσεων που παρατηρούμε, αισθανόμαστε και εισάγουμε μέσα μας.
Οπότε για τη βαθμολογία, βάζω έναν αστερίσκο και μια άνω τελεία για μια δεύτερη ανάγνωση αφού διαβάσω Λοκ. Επιπλέον, ο Σοπενάουερ έχει την τάση να παραθέτει αυτολεξεί φράσεις και παραγράφους από άλλους φιλοσόφους, με αποτέλεσμα να έχω ήδη πάρει μια γεύση από Καντ πολύ πιο προσιτή σε σχέση με τη μετάφραση Ανδρουλιδάκη της Εστίας. Μπορεί να είναι αρτιότατη και πιστή, ωστόσο ίσως θα έπρεπε να είναι όχι απλοποιημένη, κάθε άλλο, αλλά περισσότερο κοντά στη γλώσσα και την εποχή μας. Επειδή απ' όσο γνωρίζω δεν υπάρχει άλλη έκδοση και χωρίς να θέλω να κατηγορήσω τις εκδόσεις Εστία που θεωρώ απ' τις καλύτερες στη χώρα μας, σταματάω εδώ αυτή την αναφορά, θα κάνω όμως ωστόσο κάποια στιγμή μια προσπάθεια να διαβάσω την αντίστοιχη μετάφραση στα γαλλικά.
Τι είναι η Κριτική του Πρακτικού Λόγου του Καντ;
Ο λόγος είναι η λογική, η ανεξάρτητη του νου. Το νοητικό διαφέρει απ' το λογικό. Το λογικό δε χρησιμοποιεί δικές του πρώτες ύλες, ό,τι έρχεται σε αυτό είναι όλα εισαγωγές γι' αυτό και όλες οι έννοιες περιλαμβάνουν το σχήμα, τη μορφή και οδηγούν στο συνδυασμό των μορφών, στο συμπέρασμα ( προσοχή! όχι στην κρίση θα σας έλεγε σε αυτό το σημείο ο Σοπενάουερ, αυτή ανήκει αλλού ). Το λογικό διαφέρει επίσης απ' το αισθησιακό, όσο και απ' το αληθινό. Για αυτά δε χρειάζεστε τον Καντ να σας τα πει γιατί στο συγκεκριμένο έργο δε σας τα λέει, χρειάζεται όμως να τα γνωρίζετε προκαταβολικά. Ατυχώς, αν τις γνώσεις αυτές τις έχετε πάρει απ' την Τετραπλή Ρίζα θα έχετε συμπεράνει στην πορεία της ανάγνωσης πως υπάρχουν ορισμένα ''κακώς κείμενα'', ορισμένα σημεία όπου μπορούν να παρερμηνευτούν ή που δίδονται συγκεχυμένα στην Κριτική του Πρακτικού Λόγου.
Αλλά τί είναι η Κριτική του Πρακτικού Λόγου του Κάντ;
Πρόκειται για το Ηθικό Σύστημα του Καντ. Η ηθική, το καθήκον, δε μπορούν παρά να είναι αποτέλεσμα της ελέυθερης βούλησης και δίνει τα κριτήρια για να μπορεί ο άνθρωπος αυτοβούλως να είναι ηθικός, να ζει σε ένα κόσμ�� με ανθρώπους των οποίων χαρακτηρίζει τις πράξεις ηθικές αν είναι τόσο στο αντικειμενικό πλαίσιο, όσο και στο καθαρά υποκειμενικό, εφ' όσον έχει δώσει τέτοιες αξίες στη ζωή του, με τον ίδιο τρόπο που η ευχαρίστηση, η ηδονή, η λύπηση διαφέρουν απ' την ευδαιμονία. Ευδαιμονία για τον Καντ ( και για 'μενα ) δεν είναι μόνο το ευχάριστο, το ευχάριστο είναι ένα τσάφ και πέρασε, αλλά εκείνο που δίνει κάτι παραπάνω, που σε βοηθάει στην προσωπική σου πορεία, είτε αυτό λέγεται γνώση, είτε σκέψη, μα και τελικά η σκέψη δεν απαιτεί και γνώση; Με βάση όλα τα παραπάνω η Ηθική δεν είναι νόμοι που μας έρχονται ως ιδέες απ' το υπερπέραν, είναι ... εσωτερικές. Είναι το αποτέλεσμα των παραστάσεων που παρατηρούμε, αισθανόμαστε και εισάγουμε μέσα μας.
June 3, 2010
It is difficult to overestimate Kant's influence in philosophy. Even those who reject his explicit theories often use his terms, whether by wondering how it could be possible for something to be "synthetic" (not a matter of meaning) and yet "a priori" (knowable independent of experience), or by asking what is the source of an ethical "imperative." Kant has sometimes been credited for almost single-handedly creating the German philosophical tradition, and it certainly is hard to imagine what Hegel's or Marx's wrings would have looked like without the influence of Kant.
Many current day writers on philosophical ethics have been influenced by Kant. Some accept the categorical imperative as a valid test of moral rightness, but more commonly one will see Kant's linking of morality and autonomy, or his analysis of moral worth as an inner acceptance of the motive of duty, or his insistence that the good is what the moral aims at as opposed to morality being defined by its aim at the good.
The impact of Kant's writing style has arguably also been extensive, on which topic the twentieth century philosophy Walter Kaufmann tartly reports, "Few philosophers since Kant have approximated his genius, but many of his shortcomings are widely shared even today, and to some extant at least this is due to his phenomenal influence." Kant's insights are often masked by his convoluted sentences and unclear technical terms. Fortunately, the second Critique is significantly more accessible than the first, but still the second Critique elicits many conflicting interpretations.
The Critique of Practical Reason can be regarded as the sequel to theCritique of Pure Reason, picking up where that earlier book left off. In the first Critique, Kant divides our judgments in two ways—the a priori (knowable before experience) versus the a posteriori (knowable through experience) and the analytic (true by virtue of meaning) versus the synthetic (true by virtue of the facts). He ultimately concludes, first, that a posteriori judgments are about how things look to us, not about how things intrinsically are, since they are filtered through our experiences, and, second, all synthetic judgments are a posteriori, since we have no access to the world other than through experience.
This second conclusion rules out the possibility of metaphysically proving the existence of God, freedom, and immortality. It does leave open, though, the right to have faith that such things exist in the way the world is in itself, the noumenal realm, since we can never know what is true in that realm. The second Critique will take this further, arguing that the correct understanding of morality requires us to believe in God, freedom, and immortality. As well as continuing from the Critique of Pure Reason, theCritique of Practical Reason lays the grounds for the Metaphysics of Morals,written nine years later in 1797, and which applies the general moral principles of the second Critique to a variety of cases.
The second Critique in some senses can be seen as the opposite of the first Critique. While the main theme of the first Critique is how little we can know about its topic, metaphysics, the second Critique is about how we can know about its topic, morality. Not only that, but some of the first Critique is arguably taken back. We are directly aware of the application of the moral law to us, and through this, we are aware of our freedom, which, it turns out, is awareness of causation from the noumenal world. More than that, not only can we believe in God and immortality, as the first Critique agreed, but it turns out that reason commands belief in them.
In a different sense, though, the second Critique furthers the work of the first. Kant describes himself in the Critique of Pure Reason as having created a revolution to counter Copernicus'. Copernicus humbles man by removing him form the center of the physical universe, but Kant elevates him by presenting the whole phenomenal world of the senses as being created by us and by our senses. In the conclusion of the second Critique, Kant picks up this metaphor again, explaining how he has now shown how the human being lies at the center of the moral universe, and through that universe man connects with the noumenal world.
Kant's comparison of the first and the second Critique in the preface and his subsequent discussion in the introduction bring out one of the oddities of Kant's writing: a tendency to model his works after one another. Here it is questionable whether the structure of the first Critique was really so suitable for this book, and whether the parallels he discusses are more illuminating or more distracting. The first Critique utilizes theoretical reasoning—roughly, philosophical thinking—to examine the limits of the potential achievements of such thinking. The second Critique, however, as Kant points out, does not use pure practical reason—decision-making based on reason and not on desire—to point out the limitations of such decision- making. For one thing, it is unclear how one could "apply" a faculty of decision-making in a book, which is better seen as a recording of theoretical reason's activity.
Mainly though, Kant is not critiquing pure practical reason but lauding it, saying that it is possible and that it is the ground of morality. True, we can say that he is thereby attacking impure practical reason. Kant believes that although his beliefs about pure practical reason are commonsensical, insofar as common sense can grasp them, philosophers are liable to go astray and enshrine the self-serving calculations of impure practical reason in the place of pure practical reason. But it remains to be seen whether anything is really gained by setting up the analogy in the first place.
A point about the comparison which is important to remember is that the Critique of Practical Reason does not simply contrast with the Critique of Pure Reason, in that it critiques the impure reason which the first Critique still left unexamined. Rather, the title of the first Critique is meant to be understood as elliptical for "The Critique of Pure Theoretical Reason," while the title of the second Critique can be understood as elliptical for "The Critique of Impure Practical Reason". The pure / impure distinction, which has to do with whether contingent, sensory factors are involved, is not the same as the theoretical / practical distinction, which has to do with the faculty of knowing versus the faculty of acting.
This book contains three sections: the Analytic, the Dialectic, and the Doctrine of Method. The Analytic presents, in both critiques, the operations of the faculty in question. In the case of the second Critique, this will turn out to be a derivation of the one principle of pure practical reason, the categorical imperative, and an argument that obeying it is equivalent to freedom. The Dialectic presents, in both Critiques, arguments that the faculty in question can go astray. In the case of the second Critique, this will be an argument that pure practical reason goes wrong when it seeks perfection in this world, as well as an argument that what we should instead do is seek perfection in the next world with God's help, making the assumption that immortality and God exist. The Doctrine of Method in the first Critique plans out the future sciences of pure theoretical reason; the Doctrine of Method in the second Critique plans out the future of educating people in the use of pure practical reason.
The Critique of Practical Reason contains the one true ultimate moral principle, the categorical imperative. However, there is no full discussion of its application. That is because Kant intends everything in the Critique of Pure Reason to proceed a priori, without any reference to what, as a matter of contingent fact, human nature happens to be like. Without such a theory, we cannot say what, concretely, our duties are. The role of the Metaphysics of Morals is to give such a theory.
Many current day writers on philosophical ethics have been influenced by Kant. Some accept the categorical imperative as a valid test of moral rightness, but more commonly one will see Kant's linking of morality and autonomy, or his analysis of moral worth as an inner acceptance of the motive of duty, or his insistence that the good is what the moral aims at as opposed to morality being defined by its aim at the good.
The impact of Kant's writing style has arguably also been extensive, on which topic the twentieth century philosophy Walter Kaufmann tartly reports, "Few philosophers since Kant have approximated his genius, but many of his shortcomings are widely shared even today, and to some extant at least this is due to his phenomenal influence." Kant's insights are often masked by his convoluted sentences and unclear technical terms. Fortunately, the second Critique is significantly more accessible than the first, but still the second Critique elicits many conflicting interpretations.
The Critique of Practical Reason can be regarded as the sequel to theCritique of Pure Reason, picking up where that earlier book left off. In the first Critique, Kant divides our judgments in two ways—the a priori (knowable before experience) versus the a posteriori (knowable through experience) and the analytic (true by virtue of meaning) versus the synthetic (true by virtue of the facts). He ultimately concludes, first, that a posteriori judgments are about how things look to us, not about how things intrinsically are, since they are filtered through our experiences, and, second, all synthetic judgments are a posteriori, since we have no access to the world other than through experience.
This second conclusion rules out the possibility of metaphysically proving the existence of God, freedom, and immortality. It does leave open, though, the right to have faith that such things exist in the way the world is in itself, the noumenal realm, since we can never know what is true in that realm. The second Critique will take this further, arguing that the correct understanding of morality requires us to believe in God, freedom, and immortality. As well as continuing from the Critique of Pure Reason, theCritique of Practical Reason lays the grounds for the Metaphysics of Morals,written nine years later in 1797, and which applies the general moral principles of the second Critique to a variety of cases.
The second Critique in some senses can be seen as the opposite of the first Critique. While the main theme of the first Critique is how little we can know about its topic, metaphysics, the second Critique is about how we can know about its topic, morality. Not only that, but some of the first Critique is arguably taken back. We are directly aware of the application of the moral law to us, and through this, we are aware of our freedom, which, it turns out, is awareness of causation from the noumenal world. More than that, not only can we believe in God and immortality, as the first Critique agreed, but it turns out that reason commands belief in them.
In a different sense, though, the second Critique furthers the work of the first. Kant describes himself in the Critique of Pure Reason as having created a revolution to counter Copernicus'. Copernicus humbles man by removing him form the center of the physical universe, but Kant elevates him by presenting the whole phenomenal world of the senses as being created by us and by our senses. In the conclusion of the second Critique, Kant picks up this metaphor again, explaining how he has now shown how the human being lies at the center of the moral universe, and through that universe man connects with the noumenal world.
Kant's comparison of the first and the second Critique in the preface and his subsequent discussion in the introduction bring out one of the oddities of Kant's writing: a tendency to model his works after one another. Here it is questionable whether the structure of the first Critique was really so suitable for this book, and whether the parallels he discusses are more illuminating or more distracting. The first Critique utilizes theoretical reasoning—roughly, philosophical thinking—to examine the limits of the potential achievements of such thinking. The second Critique, however, as Kant points out, does not use pure practical reason—decision-making based on reason and not on desire—to point out the limitations of such decision- making. For one thing, it is unclear how one could "apply" a faculty of decision-making in a book, which is better seen as a recording of theoretical reason's activity.
Mainly though, Kant is not critiquing pure practical reason but lauding it, saying that it is possible and that it is the ground of morality. True, we can say that he is thereby attacking impure practical reason. Kant believes that although his beliefs about pure practical reason are commonsensical, insofar as common sense can grasp them, philosophers are liable to go astray and enshrine the self-serving calculations of impure practical reason in the place of pure practical reason. But it remains to be seen whether anything is really gained by setting up the analogy in the first place.
A point about the comparison which is important to remember is that the Critique of Practical Reason does not simply contrast with the Critique of Pure Reason, in that it critiques the impure reason which the first Critique still left unexamined. Rather, the title of the first Critique is meant to be understood as elliptical for "The Critique of Pure Theoretical Reason," while the title of the second Critique can be understood as elliptical for "The Critique of Impure Practical Reason". The pure / impure distinction, which has to do with whether contingent, sensory factors are involved, is not the same as the theoretical / practical distinction, which has to do with the faculty of knowing versus the faculty of acting.
This book contains three sections: the Analytic, the Dialectic, and the Doctrine of Method. The Analytic presents, in both critiques, the operations of the faculty in question. In the case of the second Critique, this will turn out to be a derivation of the one principle of pure practical reason, the categorical imperative, and an argument that obeying it is equivalent to freedom. The Dialectic presents, in both Critiques, arguments that the faculty in question can go astray. In the case of the second Critique, this will be an argument that pure practical reason goes wrong when it seeks perfection in this world, as well as an argument that what we should instead do is seek perfection in the next world with God's help, making the assumption that immortality and God exist. The Doctrine of Method in the first Critique plans out the future sciences of pure theoretical reason; the Doctrine of Method in the second Critique plans out the future of educating people in the use of pure practical reason.
The Critique of Practical Reason contains the one true ultimate moral principle, the categorical imperative. However, there is no full discussion of its application. That is because Kant intends everything in the Critique of Pure Reason to proceed a priori, without any reference to what, as a matter of contingent fact, human nature happens to be like. Without such a theory, we cannot say what, concretely, our duties are. The role of the Metaphysics of Morals is to give such a theory.
November 7, 2019
While re-reading Kant's major works (his frist two Critiques) I was amazed by how dull and long-winding this German philosopher really is. That is, I forgot about my reservations of two years ago, when I read him for the first time.
His second critique deals with the transcendental foundations of morality and, ultimately, religion. What can be summarized rather concise, takes him more than 200 pages of abstruse German prose.
Kant claims that we exist both as phenomenon - that is, as appearance in the natural world - and as noumenon - that is, as a transcendental thing in itself. And this separation allows us to both account for a causally determined natural world and a free will, that is a will that is determined by transcendental freedom. In short: human beings, as reasonal entities, are both causally determined as well as causes themselves.
For Kant, freedom rests in the moral law, which is nothing but a formal principle of how we ought to behave. It doesn't prescribe particular things, it just prescribes that our actions should be able to be universalized. In other words: everything we do, we should do only if we can wish all other people do this.
Since we are imperfect beings, we can never attain this ultimate aim (to literally act according to the perfect moral law), but we can try to approach it. And since this approach takes an infinite time, we exist as immortal souls - that is, according to Kant. Also, there has to be a cause of this perfect law and this perfect world, a being who not only caused but literally willed this and nothing else. Hence, God exists - again, according to Kant. These three postulates, freedom, immortal soul and God are the transcendental ideas that we can know, although we cannot know anything about them. And this verifies his earlier doctrine transcendental idealism.
As human beings, we should discover the moral law inside of us, and this immediately leads to the realization of our limitations. This, consequently, leads us both into awe for this exalted moral law and into humility regarding ourselves. When we let the moral law determine our will, we are free in the only meaningful sense. And this immediately eradicates all self-love, arrogance and hubris.
According to Kant, there were only two things that fascinated and intrigued him, the universe as a whole and the moral law within himself. And I think it is fair to regard his whole second Critique as an attempt to refute all morality that is based on principles of moral sense, utility, happiness, pleasure, or stoïc virtue, and to plant his own flag on the moral mountain. Whether he succeeded in this, is an interesting question.
Kant claims that his ethics does not equal a happy life (at least a happy life per se). Our aim should be to treat both ourselves and all others as both means to our ends and objects in themselves. This will limit our actions severely, in a way that is not pleasurable per se. But Kant realizes we cannot follow any morals that exclude human happiness - since this would be literally meaningless to most of us - so he tries to save his project by claiming that since we have immortal souls and there is a rewarding and punishing God in the afterlife, we have very clear hopes for eternal happiness, and this should be enough in itself to overcome any tendency to divert from the moral law wihtin us.
Kant's message is one of duty, self-knowledge and enlightenment, which makes his work fit the Zeitgeist of his days. But, there are simply too many flaws in his system. There's the problem of causality being a concept in the mind and at the same time (and contradictorily) a transcendental idea. Also, there are the manifold holes in his universal moral principle - for example, why should I be honest to someone who is looking for my friend to murder him? Or to a friend who gave me his weapon to keep safe and now, being in a phase of insanity, asks it back? There are simply too many cases in everyday life where a principle of ethical non-contradiction doesn't make sense or doesn't answer our question. Last, there is of course the rigidity of Kant's emphasis on duty and his utter neglect of our biological, as opposed to our reasonable, side. He fulminates against the Scottish moral sentiment-philosophers, like Hutcheson and Hume, who claimed ethics is founded on our feelings of approval and disapproval of moral actions. But I think, in hindsight, science has rather vindicated the moral sentiment-approach to ethics, while Kant's system is the principle of Christianity in disguise.
It is this last conclusion that makes me reject Kant's approach. Both his first and his second Critique start from assumptions that have to be proven correct. Why? Because Kant demands it. He wants to both accept Newtonian mechanical science as true and certain knowledge and Hume's scepticism regarding the possibility of true and certain knowledge - so he invents a whole new, intelligible world and a transcendental idealistic epistemology in order that both claims can be accomodated. He wants to both prescribe a Christian moral doctrine and keep religion from the sphere of science - so he invents a principle and three postulates that are grounded in this unknowable intelligible world.
I find Kant's philosophy both fascinating as well as a perfect illustration of 'fitting the facts'. Historically, Kant has been of huge influence on the developments in both science and philosophy, and it is only because of the respect I have for his aims, his intelligence and his wit, that I give this book three stars. His style of writing, the way he develops arguments and his devlopment of a unique peculiar vocabular apparatus all prohibit me from offering any higher rating. Kant definitelty is a fascinating thinker, but I don't know if I can recommend his works...
His second critique deals with the transcendental foundations of morality and, ultimately, religion. What can be summarized rather concise, takes him more than 200 pages of abstruse German prose.
Kant claims that we exist both as phenomenon - that is, as appearance in the natural world - and as noumenon - that is, as a transcendental thing in itself. And this separation allows us to both account for a causally determined natural world and a free will, that is a will that is determined by transcendental freedom. In short: human beings, as reasonal entities, are both causally determined as well as causes themselves.
For Kant, freedom rests in the moral law, which is nothing but a formal principle of how we ought to behave. It doesn't prescribe particular things, it just prescribes that our actions should be able to be universalized. In other words: everything we do, we should do only if we can wish all other people do this.
Since we are imperfect beings, we can never attain this ultimate aim (to literally act according to the perfect moral law), but we can try to approach it. And since this approach takes an infinite time, we exist as immortal souls - that is, according to Kant. Also, there has to be a cause of this perfect law and this perfect world, a being who not only caused but literally willed this and nothing else. Hence, God exists - again, according to Kant. These three postulates, freedom, immortal soul and God are the transcendental ideas that we can know, although we cannot know anything about them. And this verifies his earlier doctrine transcendental idealism.
As human beings, we should discover the moral law inside of us, and this immediately leads to the realization of our limitations. This, consequently, leads us both into awe for this exalted moral law and into humility regarding ourselves. When we let the moral law determine our will, we are free in the only meaningful sense. And this immediately eradicates all self-love, arrogance and hubris.
According to Kant, there were only two things that fascinated and intrigued him, the universe as a whole and the moral law within himself. And I think it is fair to regard his whole second Critique as an attempt to refute all morality that is based on principles of moral sense, utility, happiness, pleasure, or stoïc virtue, and to plant his own flag on the moral mountain. Whether he succeeded in this, is an interesting question.
Kant claims that his ethics does not equal a happy life (at least a happy life per se). Our aim should be to treat both ourselves and all others as both means to our ends and objects in themselves. This will limit our actions severely, in a way that is not pleasurable per se. But Kant realizes we cannot follow any morals that exclude human happiness - since this would be literally meaningless to most of us - so he tries to save his project by claiming that since we have immortal souls and there is a rewarding and punishing God in the afterlife, we have very clear hopes for eternal happiness, and this should be enough in itself to overcome any tendency to divert from the moral law wihtin us.
Kant's message is one of duty, self-knowledge and enlightenment, which makes his work fit the Zeitgeist of his days. But, there are simply too many flaws in his system. There's the problem of causality being a concept in the mind and at the same time (and contradictorily) a transcendental idea. Also, there are the manifold holes in his universal moral principle - for example, why should I be honest to someone who is looking for my friend to murder him? Or to a friend who gave me his weapon to keep safe and now, being in a phase of insanity, asks it back? There are simply too many cases in everyday life where a principle of ethical non-contradiction doesn't make sense or doesn't answer our question. Last, there is of course the rigidity of Kant's emphasis on duty and his utter neglect of our biological, as opposed to our reasonable, side. He fulminates against the Scottish moral sentiment-philosophers, like Hutcheson and Hume, who claimed ethics is founded on our feelings of approval and disapproval of moral actions. But I think, in hindsight, science has rather vindicated the moral sentiment-approach to ethics, while Kant's system is the principle of Christianity in disguise.
It is this last conclusion that makes me reject Kant's approach. Both his first and his second Critique start from assumptions that have to be proven correct. Why? Because Kant demands it. He wants to both accept Newtonian mechanical science as true and certain knowledge and Hume's scepticism regarding the possibility of true and certain knowledge - so he invents a whole new, intelligible world and a transcendental idealistic epistemology in order that both claims can be accomodated. He wants to both prescribe a Christian moral doctrine and keep religion from the sphere of science - so he invents a principle and three postulates that are grounded in this unknowable intelligible world.
I find Kant's philosophy both fascinating as well as a perfect illustration of 'fitting the facts'. Historically, Kant has been of huge influence on the developments in both science and philosophy, and it is only because of the respect I have for his aims, his intelligence and his wit, that I give this book three stars. His style of writing, the way he develops arguments and his devlopment of a unique peculiar vocabular apparatus all prohibit me from offering any higher rating. Kant definitelty is a fascinating thinker, but I don't know if I can recommend his works...
May 24, 2021
Introductory thoughts: Freedom is the only idea of speculative reason that we can know a priori (291). Freedom is the condition of the moral law. Ideas like God are conditions of the practical use of our pure reason (i.e., God is a limiting concept. You need God to make other ideas work).
To say it another way: God is an application of our will to a determined object.
Problems Kant must solve:
1) He had previously denied that we could know supersensible reality, yet he specifically posits this for morality (the freedom of our will).
The thinking subject internally intuits itself as a phenomenon (292).
The imperative: these are rules that I do not make up for myself. They transcend me. It is closer to the realm of causality. A Law is much stronger. It actually determines the will. As such they are categorical.
Theorem I: a principle which presupposes an empirical object of desire can furnish no practical laws (298).
Theorem 2: all material practical principles fall under the category of self-love or private happiness.
A refined pleasure is one that does not wear out and increases our capacity for enjoyment.
Kant proceeds to speak on what is “a good or an evil in itself” (317). That language is surprising, given his agnosticism on knowing anything “in itself.” Kant is cheating. He (rightly) says the moral good “is something whose object is supersensible” (319). He correctly wants to avoid the is-ought fallacy. On the other hand, one wonders how he can possibly know this, given that the supersensible are noumena and off-limits to our knowing. He says by way of conclusion that “It is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as a type of a supersensible system of things” (320). I had always suspected Kant was a secularized Plato. Now I am sure.
Motive: subjective ground of determination (321).
Kant defines personality as “freedom and independence on the mechanism of nature.”
Kant’s most notorious move is his positing God, the soul, and the moral law as postulates of pure reason. He knows he needs these categories in order for his system to work. Unfortunately, they are empty concepts. Kant doesn’t seriously think that God will act in history and bring judgment. Yet that is precisely what Kant’s God would need to do in order for a moral universe to work. At the end of the day, as Nietzsche would later point out, Kant doesn’t really need God at all.
Kant’s take on human freedom and determinism bears our consideration. How can we be free if we live in a Newtonian universe of cause and effect? Kant’s analysis here is quite similar to Jonathan Edwards’. As long as we remain in a time-bound universe, we cannot be free. Kant believes in freedom, though. He maintains that the time-bound universe is the world of appearances, akin to the phenomenal world. You aren’t free in that world. However, you do have a transcendental freedom. Determinism only applies to the sensible world of appearances.
I think he is wrong, but his take isn’t that strange. As Reformed Christians, we hold free will in suspicion, yet we also believe we are active moral agents who make meaningful choices. And if we hold to Edwards’ analysis of determinism, it’s not clear how different we are from Kant, practically speaking.
Kant’s writing is elegant and austere and could have only been written during the Enlightenment. This text is fascinating in some regards because Kant begins to walk back some of his stronger claims in the First Critique.
To say it another way: God is an application of our will to a determined object.
Problems Kant must solve:
1) He had previously denied that we could know supersensible reality, yet he specifically posits this for morality (the freedom of our will).
The thinking subject internally intuits itself as a phenomenon (292).
The imperative: these are rules that I do not make up for myself. They transcend me. It is closer to the realm of causality. A Law is much stronger. It actually determines the will. As such they are categorical.
Theorem I: a principle which presupposes an empirical object of desire can furnish no practical laws (298).
Theorem 2: all material practical principles fall under the category of self-love or private happiness.
A refined pleasure is one that does not wear out and increases our capacity for enjoyment.
Kant proceeds to speak on what is “a good or an evil in itself” (317). That language is surprising, given his agnosticism on knowing anything “in itself.” Kant is cheating. He (rightly) says the moral good “is something whose object is supersensible” (319). He correctly wants to avoid the is-ought fallacy. On the other hand, one wonders how he can possibly know this, given that the supersensible are noumena and off-limits to our knowing. He says by way of conclusion that “It is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as a type of a supersensible system of things” (320). I had always suspected Kant was a secularized Plato. Now I am sure.
Motive: subjective ground of determination (321).
Kant defines personality as “freedom and independence on the mechanism of nature.”
Kant’s most notorious move is his positing God, the soul, and the moral law as postulates of pure reason. He knows he needs these categories in order for his system to work. Unfortunately, they are empty concepts. Kant doesn’t seriously think that God will act in history and bring judgment. Yet that is precisely what Kant’s God would need to do in order for a moral universe to work. At the end of the day, as Nietzsche would later point out, Kant doesn’t really need God at all.
Kant’s take on human freedom and determinism bears our consideration. How can we be free if we live in a Newtonian universe of cause and effect? Kant’s analysis here is quite similar to Jonathan Edwards’. As long as we remain in a time-bound universe, we cannot be free. Kant believes in freedom, though. He maintains that the time-bound universe is the world of appearances, akin to the phenomenal world. You aren’t free in that world. However, you do have a transcendental freedom. Determinism only applies to the sensible world of appearances.
I think he is wrong, but his take isn’t that strange. As Reformed Christians, we hold free will in suspicion, yet we also believe we are active moral agents who make meaningful choices. And if we hold to Edwards’ analysis of determinism, it’s not clear how different we are from Kant, practically speaking.
Kant’s writing is elegant and austere and could have only been written during the Enlightenment. This text is fascinating in some regards because Kant begins to walk back some of his stronger claims in the First Critique.
January 2, 2022
"Een vaak gedane waarneming heeft me van het volgende overtuigd: wanneer ik zo'n onderneming voltooide, stemde datgene wat me halverwege het werk met het oog op het andere, externe doctrines soms zeer bedenkelijk leek, uiteindelijk onverwachts volkomen overeen met wat geheel onafhankelijk van die doctrines, zonder partijdigheid en voorliefde ervoor, vanzelf was ontdekt - als ik mijn bedenkingen zolang maar terzijde schoof en me alleen op mijn werk richtte, totdat het af was. Schrijvers zouden zich heel wat fouten en heel wat verloren moeite (omdat die aan begoochelingen verspild werd) besparen, als ze maar konden besluiten wat vrijmoediger te werk te gaan."
April 28, 2024
Leitura mais difícil da minha vida. Termos técnicos DEMAIS, mesmo pesquisando você ainda fica confuso.
Assisti um vídeo do YouTube que esclareceu 2 termos do Kant, mas o restante do livro é extremamente penoso de ler.
Se Kant escrevesse um pouquinho melhor, linguagem levemente popular eu continuaria estudando! Assim realmente fica impossível.
Assisti um vídeo do YouTube que esclareceu 2 termos do Kant, mas o restante do livro é extremamente penoso de ler.
Se Kant escrevesse um pouquinho melhor, linguagem levemente popular eu continuaria estudando! Assim realmente fica impossível.
January 3, 2021
Sta je meni bilo u glavi da sam krenuo u ovo, Boze pomozi
June 19, 2023
I’m more of a Groundworker myself
June 1, 2022
მდაჰ...
წმინდა გონების კრიტიკასთან რო ვერ მოვა, ეგ გასაგებია, მაგრამ ბევრი რამ, რაც დღეს ცნობიერების ფილოსოფიაში გვხვდება, ანდა წმინდა გონების მესამე ანტინომიიდან გამომდინარე ნებისმიერ მეცნიერების დარგს ეხება, რომელიც მიზეზ-შედეგობრიო��აზე საურობს, აქ უკვე განხილულია და ხშირად დღეს უბრალოდ განმეორება ხდება ამ ანტინომიის თეზის-ანტითეზისისა (ახლებურ ჭრილში) და წინ ვეღარ მივდივართ. აქაც ერთ-ერთი მცდელობაა ამ პრობლემის გადალახვის, მაგრამ ბევრისთვის დარწმუნებული ვარ ბევრი დეტალი მიუღებელია ფილოსოფიურად.
მგონია ძაან დიდი გავლენა ჰქონდა ამას და ზნეთა მეტაფიზიკის დაფუძნებას ქემპბელის (ლიბერტარიანიზმის, როგორც ცნობიერების ფილოსოფიის ერთ-ერთი თეორიის, მიმდევარის) ნაშრომზე - "აქვს თუ არა პიროვნებას თავისუფალი ნება?", რაც მგონია საინტერესო განვითარებაა მორალის კანტიანური კვლევა-ძიებისა თავისუფალი ნების არსებობის დამტკიცებისათვის. ორივე თეორიას თავისი პრობლემები აქვს, მაგრამ არჩევანის პრობლემაზე - შეეძლო თუ არა აგენტს სხვაგვარად მოქცეულიყო - ორივე ამახვილებს ყურადღებას. უბრალოდ, კანტი ამას მარტო გაკვრით ახსენებს და უფრო მეტად უღრმავდება იმას, შემეცნებადია თუ არა ეს თავისუფალი ნების პოსტულატები და თვითონ თავისუფლად, უპირობოდ გამოწვეული მიზეზ-შედეგობრიობა (თეორიულად არაა შემეცნებადი, მაგრამ არც შეუძლებელია - ანუ პრობლემატურია და ამიტომ მხოლოდ პრაქტიკულადაა დასაშვებიო - ამბობს აქა).
უბრალოდ, აი, რაღაც მომენტებში პრაქტიკული გამოყენებისთვის არსებული აუცილებლობიდან რო გადადის შეუმეცნებადის (ღმერთის, უკვდავების, თავისუფლების) დაშვებაზე და ობიექტურ რეალურობაზე, მაგრამ თან არა, მაგრამ თან ცოტათი მაინც აფართოებს თეორიულ ცოდნას, მაგრამ არა სპეკულაციურად, არამედ პრაქტიკულ გამოყენებაშიო მარტოო... მანდ ცოტა... 😂
მოკლედ, წმინდა გონების კრიტიკის ბოლოს უფრო ჯანსაღი შეფასება ჰქონდა მორალურობაზე, ჩემი აზრით, ვიდრე მთლიან ამ ნაშრომში.
ალბათ, ამ ტექსტის გამო უფრო ჩავარდა უამრავი მომავალი ფილოსოფოსის ღრანჭებში, ვიდრე ნებისმიერი სხვა ნაშრომის გამო.
წმინდა გონების კრიტიკასთან რო ვერ მოვა, ეგ გასაგებია, მაგრამ ბევრი რამ, რაც დღეს ცნობიერების ფილოსოფიაში გვხვდება, ანდა წმინდა გონების მესამე ანტინომიიდან გამომდინარე ნებისმიერ მეცნიერების დარგს ეხება, რომელიც მიზეზ-შედეგობრიო��აზე საურობს, აქ უკვე განხილულია და ხშირად დღეს უბრალოდ განმეორება ხდება ამ ანტინომიის თეზის-ანტითეზისისა (ახლებურ ჭრილში) და წინ ვეღარ მივდივართ. აქაც ერთ-ერთი მცდელობაა ამ პრობლემის გადალახვის, მაგრამ ბევრისთვის დარწმუნებული ვარ ბევრი დეტალი მიუღებელია ფილოსოფიურად.
მგონია ძაან დიდი გავლენა ჰქონდა ამას და ზნეთა მეტაფიზიკის დაფუძნებას ქემპბელის (ლიბერტარიანიზმის, როგორც ცნობიერების ფილოსოფიის ერთ-ერთი თეორიის, მიმდევარის) ნაშრომზე - "აქვს თუ არა პიროვნებას თავისუფალი ნება?", რაც მგონია საინტერესო განვითარებაა მორალის კანტიანური კვლევა-ძიებისა თავისუფალი ნების არსებობის დამტკიცებისათვის. ორივე თეორიას თავისი პრობლემები აქვს, მაგრამ არჩევანის პრობლემაზე - შეეძლო თუ არა აგენტს სხვაგვარად მოქცეულიყო - ორივე ამახვილებს ყურადღებას. უბრალოდ, კანტი ამას მარტო გაკვრით ახსენებს და უფრო მეტად უღრმავდება იმას, შემეცნებადია თუ არა ეს თავისუფალი ნების პოსტულატები და თვითონ თავისუფლად, უპირობოდ გამოწვეული მიზეზ-შედეგობრიობა (თეორიულად არაა შემეცნებადი, მაგრამ არც შეუძლებელია - ანუ პრობლემატურია და ამიტომ მხოლოდ პრაქტიკულადაა დასაშვებიო - ამბობს აქა).
უბრალოდ, აი, რაღაც მომენტებში პრაქტიკული გამოყენებისთვის არსებული აუცილებლობიდან რო გადადის შეუმეცნებადის (ღმერთის, უკვდავების, თავისუფლების) დაშვებაზე და ობიექტურ რეალურობაზე, მაგრამ თან არა, მაგრამ თან ცოტათი მაინც აფართოებს თეორიულ ცოდნას, მაგრამ არა სპეკულაციურად, არამედ პრაქტიკულ გამოყენებაშიო მარტოო... მანდ ცოტა... 😂
მოკლედ, წმინდა გონების კრიტიკის ბოლოს უფრო ჯანსაღი შეფასება ჰქონდა მორალურობაზე, ჩემი აზრით, ვიდრე მთლიან ამ ნაშრომში.
ალბათ, ამ ტექსტის გამო უფრო ჩავარდა უამრავი მომავალი ფილოსოფოსის ღრანჭებში, ვიდრე ნებისმიერი სხვა ნაშრომის გამო.
August 22, 2023
(3.5)
October 29, 2007
i still can't reconcile myself with his philosophy of moral deontology. the supposed "universal maxim" makes no sense to me. i think morality depends on situations. doing something consistently is not always the right thing to do. his concepts are too far into the realm of abstraction, and although he calls it practical reason, there's nothing practical about it. it refuses to enter into the realm of every day life.
October 11, 2017
In Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (1781), Immanuel Kant ended with the conclusion that there exists (1) a phenomenal world that we perceive and constitute via our mental categories and the notions of space and time, and (2) a noumenal world of which we cannot know anything positively - we can only try to use Pure Reason to discover slithers of a priori synthetical knowledge of this. Kant 'discovered' three things that exists in this noumenal world: (1) us, as immortal souls, (2) God, as a necessary cause and Supreme Being, and (3) freedom. Towards the end of the first Kritik, Kant mentions that we cannot know these three things for sure, but we need them for Morality.
It is in Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft (1788) that Kant further works out his earlier thoughts on Morality. Like the first Kritik, the second one is easy to summarize. It is also much shorter (you need to have read the first Kritik as a foundation, though).
From the start, Kant makes us grand promises: while Pure (Speculative) Reason can hint at the existence of immortal souls, God and freedom, the Pure Practical Reason can positively prove this. Sounds interesting. Let's see if he succeeds in convincing us.
In the first part of the Kritik, Kant analyzes the concepts of moral law and freedom. He does this in order to discover, by applying Pure Reason to Practice (praxis), the nature of Morality. In other words, he wants to find the form of the moral law (as synthetic knowledge a priori), independent of any experience a posteriori.
For Kant, Practical Reason is a mental faculty that we possess as 'thinking things'. It determines our will by applying universal principles of action (praxis) to particular cases. These principles come in two forms, which are fundamental in understand Kant's Kritik: hypothetical and categorial imperatives.
In order to find a genuine moral law, we have to apply Pure Reason. This means to leave the concepts themselves alone and focus on the logical relations between concepts. Kant doesn't want to find the content of Morality, but the form in which the laws come. This is not really accurate, though; Kant wants to find the content of the law in its form - independent from us as objects.
So, to begin with, we can base our actions on personal desires (these Kant calls maxims) but these have their foundation in us, as objects. These maxims are called hypothetical imperatives: they are conditionally (IF we want to achieve/possess/etc. something, THEN we have to do this or that) and they presuppose personal interests in us, as objects. Therefore, these hypothetical imperatives are not good enough.
In the end, Kant finds the only possible law in which the form determines the content, and is thereby independent of our experience or interests: the (infamous) categorical imperative. It is categorical, since - just like the 12 categories that we use to perceive and constitute the world around us - we use this imperative to constitute our behaviour. Kant's categorical imperative says that we should act in such a way that we could wish that our act would become a universal law, without creating internal contradictions. Is it just to lie? No, because we could not wish for lying to be universal - the meaning of our language would disappear. Is it just to commit suicide? No, because we could not wish for everyone committing suicide universally. Well, actually, both examples are problematic and they expose the flaws in his system (of which later more).
For Kant,the moral law (i.e. the categorical imperative) has its origin in the noumenal world. The law itself consists only of form and is therefore a piece of synthetic knowledge a priori that we can only discover by applying our Pure Reason. Since our desires and interests are part of the phenomenal world, they cannot restrain the moral law in any way. It is here that Kant sees our freedom (which is also part of the noumenal world): we are free in as far as we dictate our will by the moral law.
Morality is independent of any restraint and therefore autonomous (a thing in itself); respect for the moral law is equivalent to freedom. So we see that Kant has defined freedom, not only negatively (as in the first Kritik) as 'independent of phenomenal restraints', but now also positively as 'acting according to the moral law'.
To summarize: Kant has found that freedom is doing what the moral law (i.e. the categorial imperative) prescribes. Since this moral law is a noumenon, it is indepedent of any phenomenal restraint, hence personal interests such as happiness and satisfaction form no part of the moral law. In the last part of the Analytic, Kant uses this last discovery to do away with all of the preceding moral philosophies: epicureanism, aristotelean ethics, anything that is concerned with human interests cannot be (morally) Good. He praises the doctrine of stoics for seeking Virtue in denying worldly interests their influence on our constitution, but he only praises and subscribes to the christian morality - since this is the only morality that prescribes autonomous (therefore categorical and noumenal) laws; all the other systems of ethics are, ultimately, heterenomous (therefore hypothetical and phenomenal).
In the second part of the Kritik, Kant uses the dialectical method to do away with antinomies. Since Pure Reason cannot penetrate the noumenal world, we fall prey to either dogmatic rationalism or sceptical empiricism, leading to contradicting, unsolvable philosophical stand offs. Just like in the first Kritik, in the second one Kant tries to resolve the problems and in the process finds (this time, positive) truths about the noumenal world.
What's the problem in the second Kritik? Well, there is a problem in the conception of the highest good (or Summum Bonum, as Kant calls it). In one sense (thesis), the highest good is that which is necessarily required for all the other goods; in another sense (antithesis) it is the best good of all the goods, even though these goods might not be necessary (but contingent). In essence it is a conflict between duty and virtue - should we do our moral duty with the possibiliy of not being rewarded by the world around us, or should we strive for virtue and thereby happiness?
Kant's solution (synthesis) is very much like his solutions in the first Kritik. He uses the existence of two worlds to do away with the entire problem. We should always do our duty! When this doesn't lead to rewards, in the form of happiness, this is only a phenomenal issue. And this is not a problem anymore, since we exists as noumenal AND phenomenal things.
So even though we might not by happy in the phenomenal world when doing our duty, we are happy in the noumenal world. By doing our duty continuously, we progress, as immortal souls, on an infinite road to perfection, which we will never reach, according to Kant, but this doesn't make it less important to strive for this.
As a lucky corollary, for Kant at least, when striving for this highest good (ultimate happiness in doing our duty) - which, once again, we will never reach, as fallible beings - we need a perfect Supreme Being as a rewarding mechanism and lawmaker. This Being should be omniscient, since it has to know everything about us at any time; this Being should be omnipotent, since it has to be able to make any law that is has to make and to reward us in any way that is demanded; the Being should be be perfectly good, since it has to love justice.
In other words: by trying to find the universal moral law, Kant has ingenuously postively proved the existence of (1) our freedom, (2) the existence of us as immortal souls and (3) the existence of a Supreme Being, God; all three as noumena in the Transcendental World. Three noumena that were only hinted at as possible existing things in the first Kritik!
To summarize the whole of Kant's Practical Reason: when we apply Pure Reason to Morality, we find a universal moral law, a categorical imperative, that says that we should act only in such a way that we could want every human being acting thus, without this leading to contradictions. Our freedom lies in our respect for and our duty towards this moral law, as an autonomous object. When we do our duty, we set out on an infinite road to the highest good (i.e. summum bonum), and this requires us to exist as infinite intelligences (i.e. immortal souls). God, as Supreme Being, necessarily exists as lawmaker and mechanism of reward. These three things, freedom, immortal souls and God, positively exist as noumena - they are needed for a universal moral law.
Now, what should we make of all this? In the first Kritik, I found it very convenient that Kant posits another, unknowable world in which he could deposit all the problems in philosophy. In the second Kritik, this becomes problematical. In the first Kritik, he could get away with saying that immortal souls, human freedom and God might exists - we could not prove or disprove this, but in the second Kritik this is not an option anymore. Kant needs these three things as existing noumena, since they are the building blocks of his Moral Law. This shows the weakness of the whole system.
In my view, he overstretches his method of Pure Reason to acquire synthetic knowledge a priori by wanting say too much. He wants to prove there is a universal moral law (the categorical imperative) and therefore has to cross his own admitted epistemological boundaries. He basically contradicts his first Kritik with the publication of the second Kritik. This is problematic.
There are, basically, two important problems for Kant (as far as I can see).
1. When dealing with the impossibility of positively proving the existence of God, Kant claimed that the existence of God (as object) could not be proved by predicates. "Existence" is a subjective thing which is logically unrelated to the object (God). In other words: trying to prove the existence of noumenal things by using phenomenal things is impossible, by definition. Now, in the second Kritik, Kant seems to prove the existence of immortal souls, freedom and God as noumena by using a very similar argument as the one he criticized earlier. He says we need these three things for the Moral Law, but just because we need them, doesn't prove that they positively exist. Utility is not an argument for existence; I can think of thousands of very useful things, but this doesn't make them exist. It is in broad outlines the same as the ontological argument: existence is part of perfection, but this doesn't prove anything.
2. But let's grant Kant, for the sake of argument, the existence of the three pillars under his Moral Law. When the moral law, or the categorical imperative, becomes problematic, then the three pillars become superfluous anyway. So what about the categorical imperative? Well, it seems very problematic, to say the least. We should do only the things that we could wish were universal without leading to contradictions. Kant mentions suicide as an example; but if everyone wants to commit suicide, does it lead to a contradiction when we apply it to the categorical test? Of course not. If everyone wants to commit suicide, then it doesn't lead to a contradiction when I commit suicide. And it's the same with killing off the whole entire human race. Does it lead to a contradiction when the entire human race wants to kill the whole human race and I do it? Ofcourse not, I would only put in practice what everyone wants anyway. And a thrid and last example: if I should never lie, because it would lead to a contradiction if I should want that everyone lies, should I lie to a murderer who wants to kill my friend and asks for his location (which I know)? Kant would say: tell the truth, you will be rewarded as a noumenon. Right... Benjamin Constant offered the last example to show the problems of Kant's categorical imperative, and I think it is convincing.
So to conclude: we can think of examples that we would class as immoral acts but that would nonetheless be moral according to the categorical imperative; we can also think of examples that would class as moral acts (protecting a friend from a murderer) but which are immoral according to the categorical imperative. So we are back to square one: Kant wanted to find a universal law, but the failure of his categorical imperative leads us to consider every situation as a particular moral instance, which is the one thing Kant wanted to do away with. This makes his three building blocks - which are problematic on their own merits - superfluous oddities in a failing moral theory.
Should we then just ridicule Immanuel Kant for concocting such an arcane idea? Of course we should not. Kant showed us that we should view human beings not only as means to ends (hypothetical), but also ALWAYS AND AT THE SAME TIME as goals in and of themselves (categorical). Respect for this moral law (which Kant preached) is an Enlightenment ideal we should never lose out of out sight. Besides respect for our fellow human beings, Kant learned us that intentions do matter. We should not only focus on consequences of actions - like utilitarians or religious believers who, out of prudence (i.e. self-love), follow God's laws as if following a dictator - we should always weigh the intentions of ourselves and others when thinking about morality. These are two important lessons, never mind the confused philosophy that is attached to it.
It is in Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft (1788) that Kant further works out his earlier thoughts on Morality. Like the first Kritik, the second one is easy to summarize. It is also much shorter (you need to have read the first Kritik as a foundation, though).
From the start, Kant makes us grand promises: while Pure (Speculative) Reason can hint at the existence of immortal souls, God and freedom, the Pure Practical Reason can positively prove this. Sounds interesting. Let's see if he succeeds in convincing us.
In the first part of the Kritik, Kant analyzes the concepts of moral law and freedom. He does this in order to discover, by applying Pure Reason to Practice (praxis), the nature of Morality. In other words, he wants to find the form of the moral law (as synthetic knowledge a priori), independent of any experience a posteriori.
For Kant, Practical Reason is a mental faculty that we possess as 'thinking things'. It determines our will by applying universal principles of action (praxis) to particular cases. These principles come in two forms, which are fundamental in understand Kant's Kritik: hypothetical and categorial imperatives.
In order to find a genuine moral law, we have to apply Pure Reason. This means to leave the concepts themselves alone and focus on the logical relations between concepts. Kant doesn't want to find the content of Morality, but the form in which the laws come. This is not really accurate, though; Kant wants to find the content of the law in its form - independent from us as objects.
So, to begin with, we can base our actions on personal desires (these Kant calls maxims) but these have their foundation in us, as objects. These maxims are called hypothetical imperatives: they are conditionally (IF we want to achieve/possess/etc. something, THEN we have to do this or that) and they presuppose personal interests in us, as objects. Therefore, these hypothetical imperatives are not good enough.
In the end, Kant finds the only possible law in which the form determines the content, and is thereby independent of our experience or interests: the (infamous) categorical imperative. It is categorical, since - just like the 12 categories that we use to perceive and constitute the world around us - we use this imperative to constitute our behaviour. Kant's categorical imperative says that we should act in such a way that we could wish that our act would become a universal law, without creating internal contradictions. Is it just to lie? No, because we could not wish for lying to be universal - the meaning of our language would disappear. Is it just to commit suicide? No, because we could not wish for everyone committing suicide universally. Well, actually, both examples are problematic and they expose the flaws in his system (of which later more).
For Kant,the moral law (i.e. the categorical imperative) has its origin in the noumenal world. The law itself consists only of form and is therefore a piece of synthetic knowledge a priori that we can only discover by applying our Pure Reason. Since our desires and interests are part of the phenomenal world, they cannot restrain the moral law in any way. It is here that Kant sees our freedom (which is also part of the noumenal world): we are free in as far as we dictate our will by the moral law.
Morality is independent of any restraint and therefore autonomous (a thing in itself); respect for the moral law is equivalent to freedom. So we see that Kant has defined freedom, not only negatively (as in the first Kritik) as 'independent of phenomenal restraints', but now also positively as 'acting according to the moral law'.
To summarize: Kant has found that freedom is doing what the moral law (i.e. the categorial imperative) prescribes. Since this moral law is a noumenon, it is indepedent of any phenomenal restraint, hence personal interests such as happiness and satisfaction form no part of the moral law. In the last part of the Analytic, Kant uses this last discovery to do away with all of the preceding moral philosophies: epicureanism, aristotelean ethics, anything that is concerned with human interests cannot be (morally) Good. He praises the doctrine of stoics for seeking Virtue in denying worldly interests their influence on our constitution, but he only praises and subscribes to the christian morality - since this is the only morality that prescribes autonomous (therefore categorical and noumenal) laws; all the other systems of ethics are, ultimately, heterenomous (therefore hypothetical and phenomenal).
In the second part of the Kritik, Kant uses the dialectical method to do away with antinomies. Since Pure Reason cannot penetrate the noumenal world, we fall prey to either dogmatic rationalism or sceptical empiricism, leading to contradicting, unsolvable philosophical stand offs. Just like in the first Kritik, in the second one Kant tries to resolve the problems and in the process finds (this time, positive) truths about the noumenal world.
What's the problem in the second Kritik? Well, there is a problem in the conception of the highest good (or Summum Bonum, as Kant calls it). In one sense (thesis), the highest good is that which is necessarily required for all the other goods; in another sense (antithesis) it is the best good of all the goods, even though these goods might not be necessary (but contingent). In essence it is a conflict between duty and virtue - should we do our moral duty with the possibiliy of not being rewarded by the world around us, or should we strive for virtue and thereby happiness?
Kant's solution (synthesis) is very much like his solutions in the first Kritik. He uses the existence of two worlds to do away with the entire problem. We should always do our duty! When this doesn't lead to rewards, in the form of happiness, this is only a phenomenal issue. And this is not a problem anymore, since we exists as noumenal AND phenomenal things.
So even though we might not by happy in the phenomenal world when doing our duty, we are happy in the noumenal world. By doing our duty continuously, we progress, as immortal souls, on an infinite road to perfection, which we will never reach, according to Kant, but this doesn't make it less important to strive for this.
As a lucky corollary, for Kant at least, when striving for this highest good (ultimate happiness in doing our duty) - which, once again, we will never reach, as fallible beings - we need a perfect Supreme Being as a rewarding mechanism and lawmaker. This Being should be omniscient, since it has to know everything about us at any time; this Being should be omnipotent, since it has to be able to make any law that is has to make and to reward us in any way that is demanded; the Being should be be perfectly good, since it has to love justice.
In other words: by trying to find the universal moral law, Kant has ingenuously postively proved the existence of (1) our freedom, (2) the existence of us as immortal souls and (3) the existence of a Supreme Being, God; all three as noumena in the Transcendental World. Three noumena that were only hinted at as possible existing things in the first Kritik!
To summarize the whole of Kant's Practical Reason: when we apply Pure Reason to Morality, we find a universal moral law, a categorical imperative, that says that we should act only in such a way that we could want every human being acting thus, without this leading to contradictions. Our freedom lies in our respect for and our duty towards this moral law, as an autonomous object. When we do our duty, we set out on an infinite road to the highest good (i.e. summum bonum), and this requires us to exist as infinite intelligences (i.e. immortal souls). God, as Supreme Being, necessarily exists as lawmaker and mechanism of reward. These three things, freedom, immortal souls and God, positively exist as noumena - they are needed for a universal moral law.
Now, what should we make of all this? In the first Kritik, I found it very convenient that Kant posits another, unknowable world in which he could deposit all the problems in philosophy. In the second Kritik, this becomes problematical. In the first Kritik, he could get away with saying that immortal souls, human freedom and God might exists - we could not prove or disprove this, but in the second Kritik this is not an option anymore. Kant needs these three things as existing noumena, since they are the building blocks of his Moral Law. This shows the weakness of the whole system.
In my view, he overstretches his method of Pure Reason to acquire synthetic knowledge a priori by wanting say too much. He wants to prove there is a universal moral law (the categorical imperative) and therefore has to cross his own admitted epistemological boundaries. He basically contradicts his first Kritik with the publication of the second Kritik. This is problematic.
There are, basically, two important problems for Kant (as far as I can see).
1. When dealing with the impossibility of positively proving the existence of God, Kant claimed that the existence of God (as object) could not be proved by predicates. "Existence" is a subjective thing which is logically unrelated to the object (God). In other words: trying to prove the existence of noumenal things by using phenomenal things is impossible, by definition. Now, in the second Kritik, Kant seems to prove the existence of immortal souls, freedom and God as noumena by using a very similar argument as the one he criticized earlier. He says we need these three things for the Moral Law, but just because we need them, doesn't prove that they positively exist. Utility is not an argument for existence; I can think of thousands of very useful things, but this doesn't make them exist. It is in broad outlines the same as the ontological argument: existence is part of perfection, but this doesn't prove anything.
2. But let's grant Kant, for the sake of argument, the existence of the three pillars under his Moral Law. When the moral law, or the categorical imperative, becomes problematic, then the three pillars become superfluous anyway. So what about the categorical imperative? Well, it seems very problematic, to say the least. We should do only the things that we could wish were universal without leading to contradictions. Kant mentions suicide as an example; but if everyone wants to commit suicide, does it lead to a contradiction when we apply it to the categorical test? Of course not. If everyone wants to commit suicide, then it doesn't lead to a contradiction when I commit suicide. And it's the same with killing off the whole entire human race. Does it lead to a contradiction when the entire human race wants to kill the whole human race and I do it? Ofcourse not, I would only put in practice what everyone wants anyway. And a thrid and last example: if I should never lie, because it would lead to a contradiction if I should want that everyone lies, should I lie to a murderer who wants to kill my friend and asks for his location (which I know)? Kant would say: tell the truth, you will be rewarded as a noumenon. Right... Benjamin Constant offered the last example to show the problems of Kant's categorical imperative, and I think it is convincing.
So to conclude: we can think of examples that we would class as immoral acts but that would nonetheless be moral according to the categorical imperative; we can also think of examples that would class as moral acts (protecting a friend from a murderer) but which are immoral according to the categorical imperative. So we are back to square one: Kant wanted to find a universal law, but the failure of his categorical imperative leads us to consider every situation as a particular moral instance, which is the one thing Kant wanted to do away with. This makes his three building blocks - which are problematic on their own merits - superfluous oddities in a failing moral theory.
Should we then just ridicule Immanuel Kant for concocting such an arcane idea? Of course we should not. Kant showed us that we should view human beings not only as means to ends (hypothetical), but also ALWAYS AND AT THE SAME TIME as goals in and of themselves (categorical). Respect for this moral law (which Kant preached) is an Enlightenment ideal we should never lose out of out sight. Besides respect for our fellow human beings, Kant learned us that intentions do matter. We should not only focus on consequences of actions - like utilitarians or religious believers who, out of prudence (i.e. self-love), follow God's laws as if following a dictator - we should always weigh the intentions of ourselves and others when thinking about morality. These are two important lessons, never mind the confused philosophy that is attached to it.
September 30, 2020
Bugüne kadar materyalist felsefe dair düşünürleri çoğunlukla takip ettim ve onlarla birlikte idealist felsefenin hızlı bir şekilde çöpe atılışını. Bunlara sadece "idealist felsefe" diyip geçiştirdim. Karşı çıkışın nedenlerine yoğunlaşmadım.
İdealizm ile yaygın kurumsal dinin uygulamasını bir tuttum ancak bu böyle değilmiş. Bu amaçla 17. yüzyıl göreceli hazmı kolay geçse de konu Kant olunca malum Klasik Alman İdealizminin kurucusu olarak görülmekte diyip okuduk da ne mümkün. Aşırı yoğunlaşma ve ilave okuma ve açıklamalar gerekiyor. Kant ve başka idealistlerin ne dediğini anlamadan bunun Hegel ve diğerlerindeki eleştirisini ve Klasik Alman Felsefesinin sonunu nasıl anlarım düşüncesiyle Kant abimize el attık, atmasaydık belki daha iyiydi.
Çok katı, sert bir filozof karmaşık kelimeler var. Ben kavramı bulanık ve karmaşık, işler biraz yürümediğinde yeni kavramlar icat ediyor. Yine ritmi bozmadan sabırla ve ek okumalar ile desteklenmeden benim için altından kalkılabilecek bir kitap değildi. Ne kadar kalktık o da meçhul. Transandental Mantık, Tanrı idesinin kökeni ve uzay zaman konuları havada uçuyor.
Zaten bu Teorik akıl ve Pratik akıl yedi beni bitirdi. Kant'ın sanıyorum şöyle vurucu bir lafı var bu da çok feci; "İmana yer bulmak için bilgiyi inkar etmek zorunda kaldım" Abimi feci eleştiriyor nerde bir antinomi - çatışkı görse şakadanak patlatıyor peki cevap nedire baktığımda karışık kavramlara bir girince çıkmak mümkün olmuyor. Ama Kant'ın Ahlak yasaları ve Maksimleri daha anlaşılırdı benim için
İdealizm ile yaygın kurumsal dinin uygulamasını bir tuttum ancak bu böyle değilmiş. Bu amaçla 17. yüzyıl göreceli hazmı kolay geçse de konu Kant olunca malum Klasik Alman İdealizminin kurucusu olarak görülmekte diyip okuduk da ne mümkün. Aşırı yoğunlaşma ve ilave okuma ve açıklamalar gerekiyor. Kant ve başka idealistlerin ne dediğini anlamadan bunun Hegel ve diğerlerindeki eleştirisini ve Klasik Alman Felsefesinin sonunu nasıl anlarım düşüncesiyle Kant abimize el attık, atmasaydık belki daha iyiydi.
Çok katı, sert bir filozof karmaşık kelimeler var. Ben kavramı bulanık ve karmaşık, işler biraz yürümediğinde yeni kavramlar icat ediyor. Yine ritmi bozmadan sabırla ve ek okumalar ile desteklenmeden benim için altından kalkılabilecek bir kitap değildi. Ne kadar kalktık o da meçhul. Transandental Mantık, Tanrı idesinin kökeni ve uzay zaman konuları havada uçuyor.
Zaten bu Teorik akıl ve Pratik akıl yedi beni bitirdi. Kant'ın sanıyorum şöyle vurucu bir lafı var bu da çok feci; "İmana yer bulmak için bilgiyi inkar etmek zorunda kaldım" Abimi feci eleştiriyor nerde bir antinomi - çatışkı görse şakadanak patlatıyor peki cevap nedire baktığımda karışık kavramlara bir girince çıkmak mümkün olmuyor. Ama Kant'ın Ahlak yasaları ve Maksimleri daha anlaşılırdı benim için
March 8, 2022
Jag vet inte riktigt vad jag tycker om denna. Trivial, är det ord som kommer närmast, med en väldigt märklig (och i princip onödig) form av kompatibilism som grund, och ett förkastande av glädje som grund för moral mitt i. Kants beskrivning är onödigt komplex, och verkar tidvis postulera sina egna slutsatser.
November 26, 2022
Pues claro que sí viva el deber y viva la ley
August 21, 2019
Respectable in the effort put into the system outlined, but ultimately it amounts to an empty and subjectivist formalism.
August 27, 2020
Kant took the concepts he developed in his “Critique of Pure Reason” and applied them deductively and in reverse order in the “Critique of Practical Reason”. Reason is used to develop the categorical imperative from the freedom of the will; however three things-in-themselves are needed to be postulated in order to fully develop his moral theory: liberty, immortality of the soul, and God. No sentiments, interests, or experiences should play any part in developing or following the categorical imperative (i.e. its development should be synthetic a priori). The only feeling we should experience towards the categorical imperative is respect. Good and bad considerations should not play any role in the development of the categorical imperative, but should only follow from it.
In his “Critique of Pure Reason” Kant argued that we should stay away from elaborating on any thing-in-itself like God, causality, liberty, and so on since an antinomy will ensue – that is we cannot think of something that is a thing-in-itself as if it is a phenomenon. Accordingly, these concepts should stay empty. In the “Critique of Practical Reason”, these three things-in-themselves are reintroduced and even given some positive contents. Moreover, the Practical Reason is considered more fundamental and important when compared with the Pure Reason.
Crucial to Kant's argument is that a rational being belongs to the experienced natural causality (i.e. is a phenomenon), but also is a free will (i.e. is a thing-in-itself). In this way, a rational being is placed in nature and thus under its deterministic laws, but also capable to initiate free will and thus under the moral law.
I enjoyed this book more than I expected; however Kant is quite boring, didactic, and conservative. Moreover, his excessively rational, systematic, axiomatic, deductive, lengthy, and repetitive approach seems to rather conceal the topic instead of illuminating it.
In his “Critique of Pure Reason” Kant argued that we should stay away from elaborating on any thing-in-itself like God, causality, liberty, and so on since an antinomy will ensue – that is we cannot think of something that is a thing-in-itself as if it is a phenomenon. Accordingly, these concepts should stay empty. In the “Critique of Practical Reason”, these three things-in-themselves are reintroduced and even given some positive contents. Moreover, the Practical Reason is considered more fundamental and important when compared with the Pure Reason.
Crucial to Kant's argument is that a rational being belongs to the experienced natural causality (i.e. is a phenomenon), but also is a free will (i.e. is a thing-in-itself). In this way, a rational being is placed in nature and thus under its deterministic laws, but also capable to initiate free will and thus under the moral law.
I enjoyed this book more than I expected; however Kant is quite boring, didactic, and conservative. Moreover, his excessively rational, systematic, axiomatic, deductive, lengthy, and repetitive approach seems to rather conceal the topic instead of illuminating it.
September 24, 2021
This book is a masterpiece! Throughout I have this feeling that I'm in the presence of a grand vision, the kind you get when you're reading Dante's Inferno, the Harry Potter novels, Dostoyevsky's Brothers Karamazov, or Spinoza's Ethics. It's normally a kind of admiration from seeing a grand structure of thought built from little edifices. Furthermore, it is also a grand work for the mammoth problem it's trying to solve, namely the grounding of morality. Kant's solution is such that this book becomes a seminal text in moral philosophy. The insights from this book builds up from the first book, Critique of Pure Reason, which unfortunately is indispensable to get through this.
The problem Kant is trying to solve is this: where does morality come from and under what foundation should we build our ethical life with? Many people nowadays think they come from science/reason, as famously Sam Harris argued. However, an is cannot be derived from an ought. Many also believes in religious values. However, without sufficient grounding they often end up being empty rules which people follow just to avoid hell. Also, you can't avoid interpreting the religious laws. How do people know their interpretation is the most correct? Moreover, many become pleasure seekers, a more vulgar version of the ancient Epicureans, who preaches moderation and prudence of living style to achieve long lasting pleasure. Hence, what is moral is what is pleasant to us. Many also become skeptics, especially the cultural relativists. Back in Kant's days, this position is held by David Hume, a Scottish philosopher who plays such a large influence to Kant in that he points out the big questions. Hume argues that morality comes from custom, sentiment, and experience, which is then synthesized into moral theories, which is probably in line with how many sociobiologists today think of it.
Another big problem is the origin of freedom. How do freedom exist when we live in a universe where everything is determined by scientific laws? Is free will an illusion? Do we have to pretend that we have free will because no one has figured out scientific laws completely and that they're too complicated to understand anyway?
Kant came up with a solution based on reason, one which I'm surprised was not so often quoted nowadays.
What Kant did was to retreat morality to the noumenal realm. He makes the distinction between speculative reason and practical reason. The first contains mathematical, logical, and causal laws, whereas the second contains things that cannot be subsumed under the first but they are necessary to our daily life, such as freedom, God, and immortality of the soul. Hence, morality is not subject to scientific laws. Another which is subject to the noumenal realm is free will, since it seems like you can make a decision at whim regardless of laws of science. While Kant has destroyed the rational arguments for the existence of these three things in the Critique of Pure Reason, arguing that reason is incapable of asserting with certainty things that are not based on experience; here Kant asserts we can be sure of their existence through practical reason.
Kant's argument is basically:
1. We have moral laws. We don't know how we came to have it, but we have conscience, which will judge us if we do not commit ourselves to its high standards.
2. It follows that we have freedom. We cannot have moral laws without freedom since if people are forced to do something, then the act is no longer moral no matter how good the consequences are.
3. Hence we know that God, freedom, and immortality exists, because moral laws can't exist without those aforementioned.
It's a funny argument. He starts from the middle, namely that we have moral laws, before then building the foundation of it.
Kant is a deontologist. He believes that the grounding of morality should not be pleasure or self-love, but the form of the law itself. His maxim "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will it become a universal law" is a reflection of this. Another is "act as if people are an end to itself, not as means" (my paraphrase). The grounding of morality is virtue, not consequences.
Out of these concepts came the idea of duty, in which Kant believes to be the embodiment of the form of the moral law. One commits an act because one is compelled by the highest good according to his reason, regardless of consequences. This is what is called the categorical imperative.
It follows that by following the categorical imperative you become free. What kind of freedom? Kant argues that freedom is not about being able to do all that you want to do, but instead, being able to do what you don't want to do because it's right, or even, able to not do what you don't want to do. It's interesting that Kant reaches the conclusion that many religious founders have reached before (Jesus, Pharisees, Confucius), although with the benefit of hindsight. What is crucial about Kant's contribution is his deep analysis on the form of the moral law derived from reason. Funnily, Kant's follower Schopenhauer will echo Buddhist conclusions several decades later.
Furthermore, through our reason we can conceive the highest good, which Kant calls the transcendental ideal, which forms the basis for our ideal. Since an ideal cannot be achieved throughout our life (the same way one cannot fully fulfill the moral precepts that Jesus teaches in the Sermon of the Mounts), therefore immortality exists so that we can fulfill it. Kant also uses a similar argument is arguing for God's Existence in that one cannot enjoy and commit moral acts without a supremely good being.
It's a grand vision which builds an edifice of moral philosophy based on reason. I find it compelling. I feel like the traditional 'leap of faith' of the Christian belief is replaced with a leap from the phenomenal to the noumenal in Kant's philosophy. One feels such a jump in some of his final conclusions. I buy his arguments until he start asserting that immortality and God exists because we need to fulfill the morality inside of us. There's a leap there which cannot be justified. However, his argument about the existence of freedom is compelling, although he leaves the details untouched.
The problem Kant is trying to solve is this: where does morality come from and under what foundation should we build our ethical life with? Many people nowadays think they come from science/reason, as famously Sam Harris argued. However, an is cannot be derived from an ought. Many also believes in religious values. However, without sufficient grounding they often end up being empty rules which people follow just to avoid hell. Also, you can't avoid interpreting the religious laws. How do people know their interpretation is the most correct? Moreover, many become pleasure seekers, a more vulgar version of the ancient Epicureans, who preaches moderation and prudence of living style to achieve long lasting pleasure. Hence, what is moral is what is pleasant to us. Many also become skeptics, especially the cultural relativists. Back in Kant's days, this position is held by David Hume, a Scottish philosopher who plays such a large influence to Kant in that he points out the big questions. Hume argues that morality comes from custom, sentiment, and experience, which is then synthesized into moral theories, which is probably in line with how many sociobiologists today think of it.
Another big problem is the origin of freedom. How do freedom exist when we live in a universe where everything is determined by scientific laws? Is free will an illusion? Do we have to pretend that we have free will because no one has figured out scientific laws completely and that they're too complicated to understand anyway?
Kant came up with a solution based on reason, one which I'm surprised was not so often quoted nowadays.
What Kant did was to retreat morality to the noumenal realm. He makes the distinction between speculative reason and practical reason. The first contains mathematical, logical, and causal laws, whereas the second contains things that cannot be subsumed under the first but they are necessary to our daily life, such as freedom, God, and immortality of the soul. Hence, morality is not subject to scientific laws. Another which is subject to the noumenal realm is free will, since it seems like you can make a decision at whim regardless of laws of science. While Kant has destroyed the rational arguments for the existence of these three things in the Critique of Pure Reason, arguing that reason is incapable of asserting with certainty things that are not based on experience; here Kant asserts we can be sure of their existence through practical reason.
Kant's argument is basically:
1. We have moral laws. We don't know how we came to have it, but we have conscience, which will judge us if we do not commit ourselves to its high standards.
2. It follows that we have freedom. We cannot have moral laws without freedom since if people are forced to do something, then the act is no longer moral no matter how good the consequences are.
3. Hence we know that God, freedom, and immortality exists, because moral laws can't exist without those aforementioned.
It's a funny argument. He starts from the middle, namely that we have moral laws, before then building the foundation of it.
Kant is a deontologist. He believes that the grounding of morality should not be pleasure or self-love, but the form of the law itself. His maxim "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will it become a universal law" is a reflection of this. Another is "act as if people are an end to itself, not as means" (my paraphrase). The grounding of morality is virtue, not consequences.
Out of these concepts came the idea of duty, in which Kant believes to be the embodiment of the form of the moral law. One commits an act because one is compelled by the highest good according to his reason, regardless of consequences. This is what is called the categorical imperative.
It follows that by following the categorical imperative you become free. What kind of freedom? Kant argues that freedom is not about being able to do all that you want to do, but instead, being able to do what you don't want to do because it's right, or even, able to not do what you don't want to do. It's interesting that Kant reaches the conclusion that many religious founders have reached before (Jesus, Pharisees, Confucius), although with the benefit of hindsight. What is crucial about Kant's contribution is his deep analysis on the form of the moral law derived from reason. Funnily, Kant's follower Schopenhauer will echo Buddhist conclusions several decades later.
Furthermore, through our reason we can conceive the highest good, which Kant calls the transcendental ideal, which forms the basis for our ideal. Since an ideal cannot be achieved throughout our life (the same way one cannot fully fulfill the moral precepts that Jesus teaches in the Sermon of the Mounts), therefore immortality exists so that we can fulfill it. Kant also uses a similar argument is arguing for God's Existence in that one cannot enjoy and commit moral acts without a supremely good being.
It's a grand vision which builds an edifice of moral philosophy based on reason. I find it compelling. I feel like the traditional 'leap of faith' of the Christian belief is replaced with a leap from the phenomenal to the noumenal in Kant's philosophy. One feels such a jump in some of his final conclusions. I buy his arguments until he start asserting that immortality and God exists because we need to fulfill the morality inside of us. There's a leap there which cannot be justified. However, his argument about the existence of freedom is compelling, although he leaves the details untouched.
June 13, 2022
Some parts incomprehensible, others outrageous (Kant is the priest of reason, basically despising feelings and emotions), some juicy (his rationalism does not exclude psychological insight and there are moments when his judgements are pre-psychoanalytical), others -- rigid and harsh.
I don't understand why many rationalists (re-reading Aristotle gave me the same impression) are inherently anti-hedonistic. Why do they seem to feel that a philosophy of pleasure is a sort of betrayal of human nature, that it is somewhat base? Is that resentment, masochism or something else?
Furthermore, from a mathematical-philosophical perspective, Kant is a supercomputer. From a stylistic-philological one, he is careless and makes you suffer.
After finishing the book, I thought: thank God we have Nietzsche!
I don't understand why many rationalists (re-reading Aristotle gave me the same impression) are inherently anti-hedonistic. Why do they seem to feel that a philosophy of pleasure is a sort of betrayal of human nature, that it is somewhat base? Is that resentment, masochism or something else?
Furthermore, from a mathematical-philosophical perspective, Kant is a supercomputer. From a stylistic-philological one, he is careless and makes you suffer.
After finishing the book, I thought: thank God we have Nietzsche!
February 2, 2022
Kant, bằng lý tính thuần túy thực hành, trở về với những ý niệm về Thượng Đế, Tự Do, Sự Bất Tử như là điều kiện tất yếu khi suy tưởng về khả thể của quy luật luân lý. Không ngoài dự đoán, nhưng cũng không giống dự đoán, Kant không trở thành một nhà thần học luân lý, mà trở thành một con gà con của tinh thần Phổ và hào quang của truyền thống Tin Lành Luther.
Kant, không hề đưa ra một thứ giáo điều nào về quy luật luân lý, vì rõ ràng, những ý niệm về quy luật luân lý, như là chỉ duy nhất được chứng minh bằng Sự kiện của lý tính, là một khái niệm rỗng, vì Kant luôn phủ nhận động cơ luân lý phải xa rời cái xu hướng đầy cảm tính, nên không một trực quan nào có thể tương ứng với quy luật luân lý, những đối tượng của lý tính thuần túy thực hành, là cái Thiện, cũng là một khái niệm rỗng, toàn bộ đều là cái hình thức, và chỉ hình thức mới đáp ứng được yêu sách phổ biến và tất yếu tiên nghiệm. Như vậy Kant đề ra một cái "Phải là" về mặt hình thức như là các châm ngôn [đích thực] về mặt luân lý có tính bắt buộc, nhất quyết, nhưng lại nâng ý niệm Tự do lên như là ý niệm nền tảng cho quy luật luân lý, trong một chú thích [cho A5] Kant viết: "Tự do là “ratio essendi” của quy luật luân lý, trong khi quy luật luân lý là “ratio cognoscendi” của Tự do. Bởi nếu quy luật luân lý không được suy tưởng một cách minh bạch từ trước thì ắt ta không bao giờ xem bản thân ta là có lý do chính đáng để giả định một sự vật như thế như là Tự do (dù nó không tự mâu thuẫn). Nhưng, nếu giả sử không có Tự do thì cũng tuyệt nhiên không thể bắt gặp quy luật luân lý ở trong ta." như vậy, Kant nhẹ nhàng loại bỏ mâu thuẫn [đơn thuần về mặt ngôn ngữ] và nâng vai trò Tự Do - vốn là một ý niệm của lý tính thuần túy tư biện, được chứng minh trong Phê phán I là không thể nhận thức - trở thành cốt yếu đối với quy luật luân lý. Tự Do còn là một ý niệm giúp giải quyết được những Nghịch lý của lý tính thuần túy [xem Biện chứng pháp của Phê phán I] về quy luật nhân quả, đây là một vấn đề khá phức tạp và khó hiểu, liên quan đến ý niệm về vật tự thân/hiện tượng, rồi đến sự tư biện, rồi tổng hợp/phân tích, tiên nghiệm,... không đủ cho khuôn khổ một bài giới thiệu.
Quy luật luân lý, về mặt hình thức đã được chứng minh một cách sâu sắc, hoàn toàn là một thứ khả niệm, không có quan năng cảm tính nào tương ứng, ở đây, trong một chi tiết rất nhỏ, được đề cập đến qua "sự hình dung" về Thượng Đế, như là một điều kiện đảm bảo cho sự hoà hợp giữa giác tính và cảm năng, giữa công việc đề ra các Châm ngôn khi đối diện với Sự Thiện-Tối cao - như là đối tượng duy nhất của quy luật luân lý -, như vậy cuối cùng Kant vẫn vô cùng lúng túng khi xử lý ý niệm của mình về sự tự trị của luân lý. Con người của Kant là con người tự thức, "thoát khỏi tình trạng vị thành niên" như mong muốn trong "Khai minh là gì?", nhưng lại là một quốc đảo tự trị đầy cô độc, con người kiêu hãnh đứng trên tháp ngà của mình, cao hết thảy, bao quát hết thảy, cô độc hết thảy. Cần chú ý Kant luôn nhấn mạnh vào các ý niệm Tự Do, Thượng Đế, Sự Bất Tử là không thể nhận thức, nhưng nó tất yếu phải được suy tưởng, đó là nỗ lực để hợp thức hoá vai trò của các ý niệm này đối với lý tính.
Một điều nữa, Kant không thích thú gì trong việc phân tách nhị nguyên, như Kant luôn than thở về một sinh vật mang đầy hữu hạn tính, chẳng qua ông chỉ muốn giới hạn những khả thể nhận thức của mình để khỏi vượt qua ranh giới tư biện đầy nguy hiểm, nhưng Kant luôn là con người của tính hiện đại, của tinh thần hiện đại, Kant ý thức về sự phân tách trong chính bản thân lý tính, ham muốn hoà hợp kết hợp nó dưới một đề án luân lý, dưới một đại tự sự mang tính nhân loại học lớn lao, điều này đã từng thấy trong ước mơ về một hoà bình vĩnh cửu, hay một thế giới toàn-hoàn vũ.
Một cảm nhận cá nhân. Cuốn sách có nhiều đoạn hùng tráng, vĩ đại:
"Hai điều tràn ngập tâm tư với sự ngưỡng mộ và kính sợ luôn luôn mới mẻ và gia tăng mỗi khi nghĩ đến, đó là: bầu trời đầy sao trên đầu tôi và quy luật luân lý ở trong tôi. Tôi không phải đi tìm chúng hay phỏng đoán về chúng như thể chúng giấu mình trong bóng tối hay ở một nơi cao vời bên ngoài chân trời của tôi, trái lại, tôi nhìn thấy chúng trước mắt mình và nối kết chúng một cách trực tiếp với ý thức về sự hiện hữu của tôi. Cái trước, “bầu trời đầy sao”, bắt đầu từ vị trí tôi đang chiếm chỗ ở trong thế giới bên ngoài của giác quan và nới rộng sự nối kết của tôi ở trong đó với sự Lớn Rộng vô bờ bến của những thế giới chất chồng lên những thế giới và những hệ thống chất chồng lên những hệ thống, và lại ở trong những thời gian vô lượng vô biên của sự vận hành theo chu kỳ của chúng với sự khởi đầu và tiếp diễn. Cái sau, “quy luật luân lý”, bắt đầu từ bản ngã vô hình vô ảnh của tôi, từ Nhân cách của tôi và thể hiện tôi trong một thế giới có sự vô tận đích thực, nhưng chỉ có thể dò tìm bằng giác tính, và, cùng với tính vô tận ấy, tôi nhận ra rằng tôi không hiện hữu trong một sự nối kết đơn thuần bất tất mà là phổ quát và tất yếu (cũng như tôi đồng thời hiện hữu với tất cả những thế giới hữu hình nói trên). Cái nhìn trước về một sự đa tạp của hằng hà sa số thế giới hầu như thủ tiêu tầm quan trọng của riêng tôi, xét như một sinh vật thụ tạo, mà sau khi được ban cho một sức sống ngắn ngủi (không ai biết tại sao), lại phải quay về lại với cát bụi đã hình thành nên nó nơi một hành tinh vốn chỉ là một chấm nhỏ trong vũ trụ. Trong khi đó, ngược lại, cái nhìn sau lại nâng giá trị của tôi lên cao đến vô tận với tư cách là một Trí tuệ nhờ vào Nhân cách tôi, trong đó quy luật luân lý khai mở cho tôi một cuộc sống độc lập với thú tính và cả với toàn bộ thế giới cảm giác, chí ít là trong chừng mực có thể suy ra từ vận mệnh được định liệu cho tôi bởi quy luật này, một vận mệnh không bị giới ước theo những điều kiện và ranh giới của cuộc sống hiện tại mà kéo dài đến vô tận." [Phê phán lý tính thuần túy, A289]
Kant, không hề đưa ra một thứ giáo điều nào về quy luật luân lý, vì rõ ràng, những ý niệm về quy luật luân lý, như là chỉ duy nhất được chứng minh bằng Sự kiện của lý tính, là một khái niệm rỗng, vì Kant luôn phủ nhận động cơ luân lý phải xa rời cái xu hướng đầy cảm tính, nên không một trực quan nào có thể tương ứng với quy luật luân lý, những đối tượng của lý tính thuần túy thực hành, là cái Thiện, cũng là một khái niệm rỗng, toàn bộ đều là cái hình thức, và chỉ hình thức mới đáp ứng được yêu sách phổ biến và tất yếu tiên nghiệm. Như vậy Kant đề ra một cái "Phải là" về mặt hình thức như là các châm ngôn [đích thực] về mặt luân lý có tính bắt buộc, nhất quyết, nhưng lại nâng ý niệm Tự do lên như là ý niệm nền tảng cho quy luật luân lý, trong một chú thích [cho A5] Kant viết: "Tự do là “ratio essendi” của quy luật luân lý, trong khi quy luật luân lý là “ratio cognoscendi” của Tự do. Bởi nếu quy luật luân lý không được suy tưởng một cách minh bạch từ trước thì ắt ta không bao giờ xem bản thân ta là có lý do chính đáng để giả định một sự vật như thế như là Tự do (dù nó không tự mâu thuẫn). Nhưng, nếu giả sử không có Tự do thì cũng tuyệt nhiên không thể bắt gặp quy luật luân lý ở trong ta." như vậy, Kant nhẹ nhàng loại bỏ mâu thuẫn [đơn thuần về mặt ngôn ngữ] và nâng vai trò Tự Do - vốn là một ý niệm của lý tính thuần túy tư biện, được chứng minh trong Phê phán I là không thể nhận thức - trở thành cốt yếu đối với quy luật luân lý. Tự Do còn là một ý niệm giúp giải quyết được những Nghịch lý của lý tính thuần túy [xem Biện chứng pháp của Phê phán I] về quy luật nhân quả, đây là một vấn đề khá phức tạp và khó hiểu, liên quan đến ý niệm về vật tự thân/hiện tượng, rồi đến sự tư biện, rồi tổng hợp/phân tích, tiên nghiệm,... không đủ cho khuôn khổ một bài giới thiệu.
Quy luật luân lý, về mặt hình thức đã được chứng minh một cách sâu sắc, hoàn toàn là một thứ khả niệm, không có quan năng cảm tính nào tương ứng, ở đây, trong một chi tiết rất nhỏ, được đề cập đến qua "sự hình dung" về Thượng Đế, như là một điều kiện đảm bảo cho sự hoà hợp giữa giác tính và cảm năng, giữa công việc đề ra các Châm ngôn khi đối diện với Sự Thiện-Tối cao - như là đối tượng duy nhất của quy luật luân lý -, như vậy cuối cùng Kant vẫn vô cùng lúng túng khi xử lý ý niệm của mình về sự tự trị của luân lý. Con người của Kant là con người tự thức, "thoát khỏi tình trạng vị thành niên" như mong muốn trong "Khai minh là gì?", nhưng lại là một quốc đảo tự trị đầy cô độc, con người kiêu hãnh đứng trên tháp ngà của mình, cao hết thảy, bao quát hết thảy, cô độc hết thảy. Cần chú ý Kant luôn nhấn mạnh vào các ý niệm Tự Do, Thượng Đế, Sự Bất Tử là không thể nhận thức, nhưng nó tất yếu phải được suy tưởng, đó là nỗ lực để hợp thức hoá vai trò của các ý niệm này đối với lý tính.
Một điều nữa, Kant không thích thú gì trong việc phân tách nhị nguyên, như Kant luôn than thở về một sinh vật mang đầy hữu hạn tính, chẳng qua ông chỉ muốn giới hạn những khả thể nhận thức của mình để khỏi vượt qua ranh giới tư biện đầy nguy hiểm, nhưng Kant luôn là con người của tính hiện đại, của tinh thần hiện đại, Kant ý thức về sự phân tách trong chính bản thân lý tính, ham muốn hoà hợp kết hợp nó dưới một đề án luân lý, dưới một đại tự sự mang tính nhân loại học lớn lao, điều này đã từng thấy trong ước mơ về một hoà bình vĩnh cửu, hay một thế giới toàn-hoàn vũ.
Một cảm nhận cá nhân. Cuốn sách có nhiều đoạn hùng tráng, vĩ đại:
"Hai điều tràn ngập tâm tư với sự ngưỡng mộ và kính sợ luôn luôn mới mẻ và gia tăng mỗi khi nghĩ đến, đó là: bầu trời đầy sao trên đầu tôi và quy luật luân lý ở trong tôi. Tôi không phải đi tìm chúng hay phỏng đoán về chúng như thể chúng giấu mình trong bóng tối hay ở một nơi cao vời bên ngoài chân trời của tôi, trái lại, tôi nhìn thấy chúng trước mắt mình và nối kết chúng một cách trực tiếp với ý thức về sự hiện hữu của tôi. Cái trước, “bầu trời đầy sao”, bắt đầu từ vị trí tôi đang chiếm chỗ ở trong thế giới bên ngoài của giác quan và nới rộng sự nối kết của tôi ở trong đó với sự Lớn Rộng vô bờ bến của những thế giới chất chồng lên những thế giới và những hệ thống chất chồng lên những hệ thống, và lại ở trong những thời gian vô lượng vô biên của sự vận hành theo chu kỳ của chúng với sự khởi đầu và tiếp diễn. Cái sau, “quy luật luân lý”, bắt đầu từ bản ngã vô hình vô ảnh của tôi, từ Nhân cách của tôi và thể hiện tôi trong một thế giới có sự vô tận đích thực, nhưng chỉ có thể dò tìm bằng giác tính, và, cùng với tính vô tận ấy, tôi nhận ra rằng tôi không hiện hữu trong một sự nối kết đơn thuần bất tất mà là phổ quát và tất yếu (cũng như tôi đồng thời hiện hữu với tất cả những thế giới hữu hình nói trên). Cái nhìn trước về một sự đa tạp của hằng hà sa số thế giới hầu như thủ tiêu tầm quan trọng của riêng tôi, xét như một sinh vật thụ tạo, mà sau khi được ban cho một sức sống ngắn ngủi (không ai biết tại sao), lại phải quay về lại với cát bụi đã hình thành nên nó nơi một hành tinh vốn chỉ là một chấm nhỏ trong vũ trụ. Trong khi đó, ngược lại, cái nhìn sau lại nâng giá trị của tôi lên cao đến vô tận với tư cách là một Trí tuệ nhờ vào Nhân cách tôi, trong đó quy luật luân lý khai mở cho tôi một cuộc sống độc lập với thú tính và cả với toàn bộ thế giới cảm giác, chí ít là trong chừng mực có thể suy ra từ vận mệnh được định liệu cho tôi bởi quy luật này, một vận mệnh không bị giới ước theo những điều kiện và ranh giới của cuộc sống hiện tại mà kéo dài đến vô tận." [Phê phán lý tính thuần túy, A289]
December 21, 2022
“la morale non è propriamente la dottrina che ci insegna come dobbiamo farci felici, ma come dobbiamo diventar degni della felicità. Solo quando la religione sopraggiunge, viene anche la speranza di partecipare un giorno alla felicità nella misura che avremo procurato di non essere indegni”
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