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The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order
For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United
States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it?
In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking
readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential strategies of displacement. Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on
hiding capabilities and biding time. After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of actively accomplishing something. Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US
hegemony, adopting the phrase great changes unseen in century. After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's
ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.
States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it?
In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking
readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential strategies of displacement. Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on
hiding capabilities and biding time. After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of actively accomplishing something. Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US
hegemony, adopting the phrase great changes unseen in century. After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's
ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.
432 pages, Hardcover
First published June 11, 2021
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August 2, 2021
This book is certainly an important book for readers, especially policymakers and scholars in the U.S., to obtain more understanding of China's interaction with the U.S. and perhaps conceive U.S.'s next moves regarding China. And it is written by a rising scholar of the new generation who may exert consequential policy impacts on the U.S. policy toward China and shape sentiments among scholars, public opinion, and so on. The book is certainly helpful for readers to understand many histories and aspects of China's international behavior at the regional, international, and dyadic levels. However, while the information contained in the book is helpful to understand the substantive behaviors of China in the past three decades, it is hard to agree with many of the authors' arguments and claims. This review will briefly explain some of the critiques of the book:
To begin with, as the author explains in Table 2.1 Hierarchy of Primary Sources, primary sources are heavily used throughout the entire book to support Doshi's claims. However, several major issues arise when the primary sources are heavily relied upon in the entire book such as public speech record and "Think Tank and Academic Commentary". This may be less so for the use of policy documents.
The first issue is that the leaders' intentions are hard to be accurately inferred from their public speeches. In fact, leaders in authoritarian regimes often need to satisfy a very broad spectrum of domestic audiences when making a public speech. Many of the speeches may not always work as guiding principles for leaders at lower levels and the ones that are policy-related at top levels can be undisclosed to the public. This would make it hard to accurately extrapolate the real intentions of the Chinese leadership throughout the decades from the primary sources. In essence, intentions, which Doshi's book is about, are hard to be highly accurately conjectured.
The second issue is that this book seems to be subject to a certain degree of confirmation bias toward using the sources that are consistent with the book's argument. Although China is a de facto authoritarian regime, the policy ideas and especially "think tank and academic commentaries" in China can still be highly diverse and pluralist. This abundance of pluralist policy preferences and textual materials makes it extremely easy for the author to select the ones that are consistent with the book's idea. Indeed, the book tends to quote the ones that support the author's arguments while ignoring the ones that are irrelevant or inconsistent with the argument.
Meanwhile, from the acknowledgement section of the book, it seems that most reviewers and readers of the book before publishing are unable to read the original Chinese text. It seems some translations are definitely inaccurate and misleading. This can be a severe issue as most of the arguments in the book were deduced from the original Chinese version of the primary and secondary sources such as speech and policy documents.
For instance, in Chap 7:
"[A]nd on militarized territorial disputes, Hu declared that China “must more actively promote the resolution of international and regional hot-spots related to China’s core interests . . . strengthen our strategic planning, make more offensive moves [先手棋], and actively guide the situation to develop in a favorable direction." The term of Go in Chinese [先手棋] / forcing move (or move of intiative, first-hand move etc) is mistakenly translated by Doshi as "offensive moves" in English.
This translation is misleading and largely inconsistent with China's relatively constrained behavior during Hu's era in the mid- and late-2000s.
Moreover, alongside the above possible minor drawbacks of the book, one major issue with this book is that the book's title and its arguments do not seem to correspond to a large proportion of the contents of most of the chapters. In fact, as the author tries to convey, China has been resorting to the grand strategy of "blunting", "building", and "expansion" from 1989 to 2017 and beyond to displace the American order. In doing so, the book is divided into these sections based on blunting, building, and expansion. However, the chapters within each section are heavily related to the "behaviors" of China (i.e. what China has been doing regarding building regional/international organizations and building new weapons and etc.) rather than China's "strategies" or intentions". In reality, from 1989 to 2017 and until the publishing of the book in 2021, four leaders (Deng, Jiang, Hu, Xi) ruled China, they have different personalities, visions, and ambitions during their tenure and they even had disagreements and political conflicts with other leaders during the period. It is hard to agree that, as Doshi tries to convey, China has a consistent and smooth grand strategy to replace the U.S. during the three decades.
This book is certainly helpful for readers to have more comprehensive knowledge about China's behaviors on the international stage and their consequences and implications for the U.S. given the abundant quotes Doshi uses in the book. But based on the above critiques, it is hard for me and perhaps many other readers (especially those who have some previous knowledge of and experience in China) to agree that China has been playing a "long game" since 30 years ago, as Doshi tries to argue in the book, although a large portion of China's foreign policy may have been craftily designed and although many of its behaviors certainly challenge the U.S. at dyadic, regional, and international levels as a result.
To begin with, as the author explains in Table 2.1 Hierarchy of Primary Sources, primary sources are heavily used throughout the entire book to support Doshi's claims. However, several major issues arise when the primary sources are heavily relied upon in the entire book such as public speech record and "Think Tank and Academic Commentary". This may be less so for the use of policy documents.
The first issue is that the leaders' intentions are hard to be accurately inferred from their public speeches. In fact, leaders in authoritarian regimes often need to satisfy a very broad spectrum of domestic audiences when making a public speech. Many of the speeches may not always work as guiding principles for leaders at lower levels and the ones that are policy-related at top levels can be undisclosed to the public. This would make it hard to accurately extrapolate the real intentions of the Chinese leadership throughout the decades from the primary sources. In essence, intentions, which Doshi's book is about, are hard to be highly accurately conjectured.
The second issue is that this book seems to be subject to a certain degree of confirmation bias toward using the sources that are consistent with the book's argument. Although China is a de facto authoritarian regime, the policy ideas and especially "think tank and academic commentaries" in China can still be highly diverse and pluralist. This abundance of pluralist policy preferences and textual materials makes it extremely easy for the author to select the ones that are consistent with the book's idea. Indeed, the book tends to quote the ones that support the author's arguments while ignoring the ones that are irrelevant or inconsistent with the argument.
Meanwhile, from the acknowledgement section of the book, it seems that most reviewers and readers of the book before publishing are unable to read the original Chinese text. It seems some translations are definitely inaccurate and misleading. This can be a severe issue as most of the arguments in the book were deduced from the original Chinese version of the primary and secondary sources such as speech and policy documents.
For instance, in Chap 7:
"[A]nd on militarized territorial disputes, Hu declared that China “must more actively promote the resolution of international and regional hot-spots related to China’s core interests . . . strengthen our strategic planning, make more offensive moves [先手棋], and actively guide the situation to develop in a favorable direction." The term of Go in Chinese [先手棋] / forcing move (or move of intiative, first-hand move etc) is mistakenly translated by Doshi as "offensive moves" in English.
This translation is misleading and largely inconsistent with China's relatively constrained behavior during Hu's era in the mid- and late-2000s.
Moreover, alongside the above possible minor drawbacks of the book, one major issue with this book is that the book's title and its arguments do not seem to correspond to a large proportion of the contents of most of the chapters. In fact, as the author tries to convey, China has been resorting to the grand strategy of "blunting", "building", and "expansion" from 1989 to 2017 and beyond to displace the American order. In doing so, the book is divided into these sections based on blunting, building, and expansion. However, the chapters within each section are heavily related to the "behaviors" of China (i.e. what China has been doing regarding building regional/international organizations and building new weapons and etc.) rather than China's "strategies" or intentions". In reality, from 1989 to 2017 and until the publishing of the book in 2021, four leaders (Deng, Jiang, Hu, Xi) ruled China, they have different personalities, visions, and ambitions during their tenure and they even had disagreements and political conflicts with other leaders during the period. It is hard to agree that, as Doshi tries to convey, China has a consistent and smooth grand strategy to replace the U.S. during the three decades.
This book is certainly helpful for readers to have more comprehensive knowledge about China's behaviors on the international stage and their consequences and implications for the U.S. given the abundant quotes Doshi uses in the book. But based on the above critiques, it is hard for me and perhaps many other readers (especially those who have some previous knowledge of and experience in China) to agree that China has been playing a "long game" since 30 years ago, as Doshi tries to argue in the book, although a large portion of China's foreign policy may have been craftily designed and although many of its behaviors certainly challenge the U.S. at dyadic, regional, and international levels as a result.
September 15, 2021
An important but dull contribution with a solid argument which I struggled to finish due to its very very draggy prose. If you’re looking for a coffee shop read, stay VERY far away.
Rush suggests that Chinese grand strategy (vis a vis the US) for the longest time focused on blunting and disruption. Looking at official party texts, leader statements and news sources, he finds that Chinese grand strategy shapeshifted following a number of watershed events. These are the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Gulf War, the fall of the Soviet Union and the 2008 GFC. He shows how Chinese actions in the political military and economic realms have evolved following these seminal events.
Although it would have helped with sales, his book is purely factual and shies from irresponsible or speculatory rhetoric like whether there is an existing or imminent Cold War. To deal with an assertive China which has moved on from “peripheral diplomacy” he suggests that the US should take a page from China’s playbook and adopt strategic blunting.
Rush’s book has gained increased prominence and for very good reason too. Since its publication, he now works the China desk for Biden’s NSC so it’s fair to assume this book’s contents will guide his views on the job despite the multiple disclaimers
Doshi is no high priest of American declinism. Instead he believes American values, systems and institutions are often underestimated. Many waves of declinism have passed . The American experiment survived and remains to this day intact. He believes that US values and openness attracts allies, strengthens the liberal order and sustains global dominance. In its conclusion, Doshi ends with a quote from Kennedy. “Maybe our high moon has passed, maybe our brightest days were earlier and were now going into the long slow afternoon… I don’t hold that view at all and neither do the people of this country…”
In hindsight this book could be a 4. Unfortunately,l i deal enough with official texts and all at work so I was really looking for something which would go well with cafe and background music - or at least which struck a finer balance.
Rush suggests that Chinese grand strategy (vis a vis the US) for the longest time focused on blunting and disruption. Looking at official party texts, leader statements and news sources, he finds that Chinese grand strategy shapeshifted following a number of watershed events. These are the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Gulf War, the fall of the Soviet Union and the 2008 GFC. He shows how Chinese actions in the political military and economic realms have evolved following these seminal events.
Although it would have helped with sales, his book is purely factual and shies from irresponsible or speculatory rhetoric like whether there is an existing or imminent Cold War. To deal with an assertive China which has moved on from “peripheral diplomacy” he suggests that the US should take a page from China’s playbook and adopt strategic blunting.
Rush’s book has gained increased prominence and for very good reason too. Since its publication, he now works the China desk for Biden’s NSC so it’s fair to assume this book’s contents will guide his views on the job despite the multiple disclaimers
Doshi is no high priest of American declinism. Instead he believes American values, systems and institutions are often underestimated. Many waves of declinism have passed . The American experiment survived and remains to this day intact. He believes that US values and openness attracts allies, strengthens the liberal order and sustains global dominance. In its conclusion, Doshi ends with a quote from Kennedy. “Maybe our high moon has passed, maybe our brightest days were earlier and were now going into the long slow afternoon… I don’t hold that view at all and neither do the people of this country…”
In hindsight this book could be a 4. Unfortunately,l i deal enough with official texts and all at work so I was really looking for something which would go well with cafe and background music - or at least which struck a finer balance.
Read
March 23, 2022Dry yet compelling case that China sees the United States as its main strategic rival, has seen things that way for a long time, and has undertaken strategies aimed at blunting U.S. power in Asia and beyond. I think that such a reality has been obvious for some time but this book gives a lot of substantiation based on primary source Chinese Communist Party documents. Interesting its own recommendations rely on blunting and asymmetric strategies to indirectly curtail Chinese ascendancy, but to do so at minimal cost and while avoiding direct confrontation. This book is a bit of a data dump but it makes its point.
June 26, 2023
Spoiler alert: China wants to displace the US.
This is an incredibly dry analysis of China’s geopolitical strategy based largely on the CCP’s own internal documents since the 1990s. The conclusion is pretty obvious and undeniable: China wants to overtake the US’s world hegemonic control. I know, I’m as shocked as you are. I think the author here does a good job of laying out the strategy although with a serious amount of repetition.
The crux of the story is this: starting in the 1990s, China has had a grand strategy of blunting and displacing. The author argues that three events in the 1990s catalyzed this strategy for China: Tiananmen square, the US Gulf War and the Soviet collapse. Since those events, China has had a strategy of hiding its ability and keeping a low profile while shoring up regional control in Asia. The whole idea in the 1990s was to not appear as a threat to the US so the US doesn’t do what it always does: manufacture the collapse of socialist regimes. Clearly, China was successful in keeping this low profile while ramping up its manufacturing and becoming an export behemoth. During this time, China has a weird naval strategy: overinvesting in submarine and mine technology and doing nothing about trying to get aircraft carriers. The plan was to thwart US advanced aircraft carrier capabilities rather than to directly challenge its own aircraft carriers. It was all a defensive strategy. China developed the world’s largest submarine fleet to blunt regional US naval control.
Another strategy is that China was worried about neighbors colluding with the US, so China has made many attempts at diplomatic multilateral efforts by joining organizations like APEC, all with the attempt at blunting the US in the pacific rim. China basically sabotaged the APEC so it wouldn’t become an Asian NATO where the US could exert influence. China has also been obsessed with maintaining MFN (Most Favored Nation) status which has greatly helped globalize its markets and catapult its GDP to rival that of the US’s, primed to change their strategy into being more aggressive after the 2008 financial collapse.
Cue the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China just took a page from the US and how it's used the IMF and WTO to slap down BRI projects all over the place even if they make zero economic sense to maintain debt leverage and control over smaller countries with budding economies. The entire point of BRI is for China to gain regional dominance and put China at the center of other country’s economies. China has successfully executed monterey diversification even offering up its own China back payment systems, CIPS, to compete with SWIFT.
Now with the rise of Trumpism and fracturing of social and cultural cohesion, China likely sees the time is ripe to become more aggressive with US hegemonic blunting. China basically now overtly states its aims are to subvert the US’s position in the world. Does this mean more military aggression? Probably not. As the author argues, you can take over hegemonic control peacefully which it seems China has become adept at doing.
Here’s what’s missing from this book: China’s incredible weaknesses like its burdensome dependence on supply chains for its exporting and manufacturing. China’s success for the last 20-30 years is because of its hyper financed model based on cheap credit. The unraveling of the American lead order may completely upend China’s model of success. China's navy is large but only has 3 aircraft carriers opposite of US’s 11. Yes, China can bomb the hell out of its own waterways if any southeast asian country tries to take control but it will cut off mainland China from essential trading that it needs to even support its own population. Combine a plummeting fertility rate that will destroy its work force with mass starvation and single party rule and you have the perfect cocktail for social upheaval. China could be right around the corner at any moment of its own society unraveling.
Also missing from this book is how much US treasury China holds: it’s a lot. It does this to keep its export prices low to keep its labor force robust. China depends on the US to maintain a trade surplus which is one of the entire reasons China has been so successful. China is dependent on US consumption. The point is, the US and China are locked into interdependence. How can you blunt your rival when your literal success depends on theirs? Anything China does to disrupt this arrangement will be much much worse for China than the US.
Anyway, I found this book worthwhile.
This is an incredibly dry analysis of China’s geopolitical strategy based largely on the CCP’s own internal documents since the 1990s. The conclusion is pretty obvious and undeniable: China wants to overtake the US’s world hegemonic control. I know, I’m as shocked as you are. I think the author here does a good job of laying out the strategy although with a serious amount of repetition.
The crux of the story is this: starting in the 1990s, China has had a grand strategy of blunting and displacing. The author argues that three events in the 1990s catalyzed this strategy for China: Tiananmen square, the US Gulf War and the Soviet collapse. Since those events, China has had a strategy of hiding its ability and keeping a low profile while shoring up regional control in Asia. The whole idea in the 1990s was to not appear as a threat to the US so the US doesn’t do what it always does: manufacture the collapse of socialist regimes. Clearly, China was successful in keeping this low profile while ramping up its manufacturing and becoming an export behemoth. During this time, China has a weird naval strategy: overinvesting in submarine and mine technology and doing nothing about trying to get aircraft carriers. The plan was to thwart US advanced aircraft carrier capabilities rather than to directly challenge its own aircraft carriers. It was all a defensive strategy. China developed the world’s largest submarine fleet to blunt regional US naval control.
Another strategy is that China was worried about neighbors colluding with the US, so China has made many attempts at diplomatic multilateral efforts by joining organizations like APEC, all with the attempt at blunting the US in the pacific rim. China basically sabotaged the APEC so it wouldn’t become an Asian NATO where the US could exert influence. China has also been obsessed with maintaining MFN (Most Favored Nation) status which has greatly helped globalize its markets and catapult its GDP to rival that of the US’s, primed to change their strategy into being more aggressive after the 2008 financial collapse.
Cue the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China just took a page from the US and how it's used the IMF and WTO to slap down BRI projects all over the place even if they make zero economic sense to maintain debt leverage and control over smaller countries with budding economies. The entire point of BRI is for China to gain regional dominance and put China at the center of other country’s economies. China has successfully executed monterey diversification even offering up its own China back payment systems, CIPS, to compete with SWIFT.
Now with the rise of Trumpism and fracturing of social and cultural cohesion, China likely sees the time is ripe to become more aggressive with US hegemonic blunting. China basically now overtly states its aims are to subvert the US’s position in the world. Does this mean more military aggression? Probably not. As the author argues, you can take over hegemonic control peacefully which it seems China has become adept at doing.
Here’s what’s missing from this book: China’s incredible weaknesses like its burdensome dependence on supply chains for its exporting and manufacturing. China’s success for the last 20-30 years is because of its hyper financed model based on cheap credit. The unraveling of the American lead order may completely upend China’s model of success. China's navy is large but only has 3 aircraft carriers opposite of US’s 11. Yes, China can bomb the hell out of its own waterways if any southeast asian country tries to take control but it will cut off mainland China from essential trading that it needs to even support its own population. Combine a plummeting fertility rate that will destroy its work force with mass starvation and single party rule and you have the perfect cocktail for social upheaval. China could be right around the corner at any moment of its own society unraveling.
Also missing from this book is how much US treasury China holds: it’s a lot. It does this to keep its export prices low to keep its labor force robust. China depends on the US to maintain a trade surplus which is one of the entire reasons China has been so successful. China is dependent on US consumption. The point is, the US and China are locked into interdependence. How can you blunt your rival when your literal success depends on theirs? Anything China does to disrupt this arrangement will be much much worse for China than the US.
Anyway, I found this book worthwhile.
June 27, 2024
This is a significant text for future US foreign policy towards China. The author is sponsored by the important Brookings Institute think tank.
Takeaways:
The US elite has finally concluded that there will be no rapprochement with China.
The Chinese elite are confident that the US is in terminal decline for a variety of reasons which include ethnic diversity causing domestic strife (true) and populism of the left and right which may lead to the US withdrawing from the world.
The Chinese changed strategies from a "hiding their power" strategy to a "build global relationships" strategy after the 2008 financial crisis and again in 2016 after Trump's election to an "actively displace American power" strategy.
The Chinese elite are too entrenched to be overthrown through a gradual opening or violent revolution. And furthermore, any attempt to overthrow the CCP would lead to war since the CCP suspect America is behind any revolt against their power (possibly true).
The author proposes a "blunting" strategy to contain China, similar to China's policy before 2008 against the US. Blunting includes:
Being conservative with financial resources (since China's resources are greater than the US)
Not competing with China everywhere but focusing on key American allies (Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, etc)
Focus on cheap asymmetric denial weapons (anti-carrier missiles, ocean mines, etc) rather than expensive power projection/prestige weapons (carriers) to deny any actors control of a region (like the South China Sea)
Given weapons technology to the countries listed above
Prevent China from establishing new military bases outside of China (not building new expensive US bases) using international or regional organizations (ASEAN, etc.) and financial aid (both government aid and cheap financing from US-dominated finacial institutions)
Finance "democratic dissidence" in Chinese-dominated states (I think we know what that means)
Prevent any further technology transfers to China, which include limiting Chinese attendance at US Universities, moving production of important technologies out of China (decoupling), and doing all of this through more state intervention in business.**
Censor and outlaw Chinese companies in the US (TikTok, etc.)
Maintain the US dollar's status as the global reserve currency by avoiding using financial sanctions against foreign countries (unlikely after the grave mistake of starting a war with Russia and seizing their foreign exchange reserve).
Increase foreign h1b visas by a lot. (Likely to exacerbate internal elite conflict in the US, especially between Indian, Jewish, and Chinese elite. This also increases the risk of Chinese elites betraying America for China as conflict grows between the two countries. In the long run, I suspect the US will make life uncomfortable for Chinese Americans.)
Increase US spending on technology.
In conclusion, the author recommends America become more like China to compete with China.
Self-directed businesses cannot compete with competent corporatist systems like China so America's system must become more corporatist. It has already been moving in this direction for a while, but the balance might finally be shifting from the business to the political elite in the West. Since the 80s the business plutocracy has been in the driving seat in the West. They used their power to lower taxes, move jobs overseas, etc. now the state will force companies to reshore production (to the US and friendly countries like Mexico) and cooperate with a larger economic plan. The government will also need to extract more wealth from businesses and the population at large to finance increased military and technology spending which almost necessitates capital controls on money moving between the US and overseas. It has been shown, although not mentioned in this book, that countries with strong capital controls (such as China) extract higher effective tax rates from their companies than countries with free movement of capital, such as the US. How this jives with maintaining the US dollar's global reserve currency status I must give some more thought.
The author mentions populism as a threat to US power globally so it will likely be suppressed and/or given concession to placate the masses. If you've been paying attention to current events from about 2020 onward including the... 2020 election you would have been able to deduce this strategy already. That being said the current recruiting shortfall in the US military will likely be the catalyst for the concessions to the masses. Concessions include allowing Trump to be reelected president.
The diversity problem was not addressed. I suspect the US government will make concessions to businesses and continue allowing mass immigration of both skilled (especially from India and East Asia) and unskilled migration (from Latin America, the middle east, and Africa) but increase policing of blacks and remove explicit anti-white propaganda from the media and schools to keep the population quiescent. The Chinese are definitely correct when they highlight diversity as one of America's greatest "contradictions."
Takeaways:
The US elite has finally concluded that there will be no rapprochement with China.
The Chinese elite are confident that the US is in terminal decline for a variety of reasons which include ethnic diversity causing domestic strife (true) and populism of the left and right which may lead to the US withdrawing from the world.
The Chinese changed strategies from a "hiding their power" strategy to a "build global relationships" strategy after the 2008 financial crisis and again in 2016 after Trump's election to an "actively displace American power" strategy.
The Chinese elite are too entrenched to be overthrown through a gradual opening or violent revolution. And furthermore, any attempt to overthrow the CCP would lead to war since the CCP suspect America is behind any revolt against their power (possibly true).
The author proposes a "blunting" strategy to contain China, similar to China's policy before 2008 against the US. Blunting includes:
Being conservative with financial resources (since China's resources are greater than the US)
Not competing with China everywhere but focusing on key American allies (Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, etc)
Focus on cheap asymmetric denial weapons (anti-carrier missiles, ocean mines, etc) rather than expensive power projection/prestige weapons (carriers) to deny any actors control of a region (like the South China Sea)
Given weapons technology to the countries listed above
Prevent China from establishing new military bases outside of China (not building new expensive US bases) using international or regional organizations (ASEAN, etc.) and financial aid (both government aid and cheap financing from US-dominated finacial institutions)
Finance "democratic dissidence" in Chinese-dominated states (I think we know what that means)
Prevent any further technology transfers to China, which include limiting Chinese attendance at US Universities, moving production of important technologies out of China (decoupling), and doing all of this through more state intervention in business.**
Censor and outlaw Chinese companies in the US (TikTok, etc.)
Maintain the US dollar's status as the global reserve currency by avoiding using financial sanctions against foreign countries (unlikely after the grave mistake of starting a war with Russia and seizing their foreign exchange reserve).
Increase foreign h1b visas by a lot. (Likely to exacerbate internal elite conflict in the US, especially between Indian, Jewish, and Chinese elite. This also increases the risk of Chinese elites betraying America for China as conflict grows between the two countries. In the long run, I suspect the US will make life uncomfortable for Chinese Americans.)
Increase US spending on technology.
In conclusion, the author recommends America become more like China to compete with China.
Self-directed businesses cannot compete with competent corporatist systems like China so America's system must become more corporatist. It has already been moving in this direction for a while, but the balance might finally be shifting from the business to the political elite in the West. Since the 80s the business plutocracy has been in the driving seat in the West. They used their power to lower taxes, move jobs overseas, etc. now the state will force companies to reshore production (to the US and friendly countries like Mexico) and cooperate with a larger economic plan. The government will also need to extract more wealth from businesses and the population at large to finance increased military and technology spending which almost necessitates capital controls on money moving between the US and overseas. It has been shown, although not mentioned in this book, that countries with strong capital controls (such as China) extract higher effective tax rates from their companies than countries with free movement of capital, such as the US. How this jives with maintaining the US dollar's global reserve currency status I must give some more thought.
The author mentions populism as a threat to US power globally so it will likely be suppressed and/or given concession to placate the masses. If you've been paying attention to current events from about 2020 onward including the... 2020 election you would have been able to deduce this strategy already. That being said the current recruiting shortfall in the US military will likely be the catalyst for the concessions to the masses. Concessions include allowing Trump to be reelected president.
The diversity problem was not addressed. I suspect the US government will make concessions to businesses and continue allowing mass immigration of both skilled (especially from India and East Asia) and unskilled migration (from Latin America, the middle east, and Africa) but increase policing of blacks and remove explicit anti-white propaganda from the media and schools to keep the population quiescent. The Chinese are definitely correct when they highlight diversity as one of America's greatest "contradictions."
May 31, 2024
There is a fundamental framework on which this book has been built. It claims the blunt and build strategies of great powers and maps to what China did against US along with different phases by China to become what it has. It then proposes what US should do.
It also details the parameters- military economic and political on which the strategies should be played. The guidance is that US should counter Chinese attempts for their type of coercion based world order in a asymmetric manner. This is in contrast to coercion consent and legitimacy based world world US has built.
I find the book highly repetitive although the framework is interesting.
It is definitely an important book however the framework underlying seems to be the overriding feature of the book.
A 20 pages description and a tabular description or couple of diagrams could have explained the framework clearly.
Author could have included the framework as an appendix for people who will not be having time to read the book.
Atleast the length could have been half of what it is currently.
Irrespective I do think and recommend this book for everyone who has some interest in world power dynamics of great powers.
It also details the parameters- military economic and political on which the strategies should be played. The guidance is that US should counter Chinese attempts for their type of coercion based world order in a asymmetric manner. This is in contrast to coercion consent and legitimacy based world world US has built.
I find the book highly repetitive although the framework is interesting.
It is definitely an important book however the framework underlying seems to be the overriding feature of the book.
A 20 pages description and a tabular description or couple of diagrams could have explained the framework clearly.
Author could have included the framework as an appendix for people who will not be having time to read the book.
Atleast the length could have been half of what it is currently.
Irrespective I do think and recommend this book for everyone who has some interest in world power dynamics of great powers.
November 19, 2022
China's Long Game, In Flames
This was a very good book on foreign policy - a topic I have double-downed on over the last 12 months or so.
This book detailed the true plans behind the CCP and it holds up with recent news and details about what is going on inside China.
Important political read.
Rush out and get this one!
4.7/5
This was a very good book on foreign policy - a topic I have double-downed on over the last 12 months or so.
This book detailed the true plans behind the CCP and it holds up with recent news and details about what is going on inside China.
Important political read.
Rush out and get this one!
4.7/5
Want to read
May 28, 2022
January 7, 2022
To date, best book I've read on China's rise, why it's so consequential for the world, and what the U.S. ought to do in response.
Drawing on hundreds of primary texts translated from into English, Doshi does a superb job offering thoughtful, supported analysis. Balanced in his approach, Doshi persuasively articulates why this moment is significant & addresses various perspectives on the consequences of the current geopolitical situation. While he's realistic, he also (rightly) doesn't paint our epoch as hopeless.
Highly recommend!
Drawing on hundreds of primary texts translated from into English, Doshi does a superb job offering thoughtful, supported analysis. Balanced in his approach, Doshi persuasively articulates why this moment is significant & addresses various perspectives on the consequences of the current geopolitical situation. While he's realistic, he also (rightly) doesn't paint our epoch as hopeless.
Highly recommend!
July 7, 2021
One of the best books I’ve read on the US-China strategic competition. Uses a host of CCP primary sources to explain China’s grand strategy to become the worlds hegemony.
January 9, 2022
While at times the author is unnecessarily repetitive, this is the most systematic, comprehensive, longitudinal review of Chinese grand strategy I have read. The author’s approach is balanced in that he addresses counter arguments fairly. The book is researched and cited deeply.
Most of the text is dedicated to explaining the development and application of Chinese strategy. However, the end of the book does address limited recommendations for a US strategy to compete with China.
As an aside, there is also one of the most useful descriptions of grand strategy at the beginning of the book that I found to be uncommonly clear. Within the US, we tend to call everything a strategy and poorly distinguish between types of strategies. The author’s explanation was helpful.
This book is a must read for anyone interested in understand China’s historical, present, and future aims and grand strategy.
Most of the text is dedicated to explaining the development and application of Chinese strategy. However, the end of the book does address limited recommendations for a US strategy to compete with China.
As an aside, there is also one of the most useful descriptions of grand strategy at the beginning of the book that I found to be uncommonly clear. Within the US, we tend to call everything a strategy and poorly distinguish between types of strategies. The author’s explanation was helpful.
This book is a must read for anyone interested in understand China’s historical, present, and future aims and grand strategy.
November 5, 2022
這一本一樣其實是給米國人看的，而且這麼大一本本質上還是說帖，目的就是要確立米國的對中政策。
由於是說帖，所以本書雖然厚，但是條理分明綱舉目張，讀起來反而很輕鬆。作者的立論很明白：共匪對美策略是在天安門事件、波灣戰爭、蘇聯解體三連發事件後規劃成形，而且有層次地削弱（米國）→建立（地區霸權）→全球爭霸。兩個分界點分別是金融危機和英國脫歐/川普當選。
作者提出立論後，這麼多篇幅主要都是從共匪端蒐集資料，做為各階段大戰略中，政治經濟軍事外交等方面策略規劃與執行的佐證。這部分臺灣讀者反而拜國內就有共匪同路人/傳聲筒之賜，平時就看得到，而且看得很多，所以可以「複習」地很快速，甚至可以驗證作者推論是否到位。
像我就覺得共匪這個 long game 在動機面上其實是民族主義累積百年以上的天朝情懷，只要是中國人都會做出類似的迷夢，而且在規劃執行的過程會同時確保當權者的利益，只不過剛好現在是共匪而已。
於是說帖看完，最後 50 頁對於不同意見者的辯駁，以及條列式的米國政策建議（同樣反過來以削弱中國、建立印太乃至國際秩序為基本要旨）就顯得更據說服力；而且搞不好有些就是現在進行式。
由於是說帖，所以本書雖然厚，但是條理分明綱舉目張，讀起來反而很輕鬆。作者的立論很明白：共匪對美策略是在天安門事件、波灣戰爭、蘇聯解體三連發事件後規劃成形，而且有層次地削弱（米國）→建立（地區霸權）→全球爭霸。兩個分界點分別是金融危機和英國脫歐/川普當選。
作者提出立論後，這麼多篇幅主要都是從共匪端蒐集資料，做為各階段大戰略中，政治經濟軍事外交等方面策略規劃與執行的佐證。這部分臺灣讀者反而拜國內就有共匪同路人/傳聲筒之賜，平時就看得到，而且看得很多，所以可以「複習」地很快速，甚至可以驗證作者推論是否到位。
像我就覺得共匪這個 long game 在動機面上其實是民族主義累積百年以上的天朝情懷，只要是中國人都會做出類似的迷夢，而且在規劃執行的過程會同時確保當權者的利益，只不過剛好現在是共匪而已。
於是說帖看完，最後 50 頁對於不同意見者的辯駁，以及條列式的米國政策建議（同樣反過來以削弱中國、建立印太乃至國際秩序為基本要旨）就顯得更據說服力；而且搞不好有些就是現在進行式。
November 14, 2021
This book is very useful to understand China's foreign policy during the last 40 years. The author argues that China's strategy and evolution as a global power can be broken down into three phases:
Blunting Phase (1989-2008): During this period, China sees itself as clearly inferior to the US, economically, politically and militarily. It fears US intervention in its own internal affairs (especially after Tiananmen Square) and adopts a blunting strategy that consists of maximising its very limited resources to counter US influence. It silently develops defensive military capabilities and enters political and economic organisations (for example the World Trade Organisation) to reduce US power over China.
Building Phase (2009-2016): Having built a massive economy and accumulated vast foreign reserves, China feels it has the power to exert regional influence. The Belt & Road Initiative and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are good examples of these efforts. Their goal is not immediate economic profit, but to grow China's influence in the region and create productive infrastructure that would make neighbour countries China-dependant in the future.
Global Expansion (2017 - Present): Events such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in the US lead Chinese leaders to believe that the West is in decline. China believes that democracies are increasingly unable to cope with the social inequality that they create through their neoliberal economic policies. It sees its authoritarian socialist system as better prepared for coming decades. At the forefront of China's plan is developing its own technology capabilities; it sees the "Fourth Industrial Revolution” as the opportunity to overtake the West. During the last part of the book, the author outlines how the US can counter China's rise during the coming decade.
Although the ideas in the book are very interesting, some sections can get boring and repetitive. Each chapter and section begins with a short introduction to an idea. The author then tries to justify it at length with numerous facts and quotes by Chinese politicians. It is not a smooth read, but a book worth reading, especially the content in the last few chapters.
Blunting Phase (1989-2008): During this period, China sees itself as clearly inferior to the US, economically, politically and militarily. It fears US intervention in its own internal affairs (especially after Tiananmen Square) and adopts a blunting strategy that consists of maximising its very limited resources to counter US influence. It silently develops defensive military capabilities and enters political and economic organisations (for example the World Trade Organisation) to reduce US power over China.
Building Phase (2009-2016): Having built a massive economy and accumulated vast foreign reserves, China feels it has the power to exert regional influence. The Belt & Road Initiative and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are good examples of these efforts. Their goal is not immediate economic profit, but to grow China's influence in the region and create productive infrastructure that would make neighbour countries China-dependant in the future.
Global Expansion (2017 - Present): Events such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in the US lead Chinese leaders to believe that the West is in decline. China believes that democracies are increasingly unable to cope with the social inequality that they create through their neoliberal economic policies. It sees its authoritarian socialist system as better prepared for coming decades. At the forefront of China's plan is developing its own technology capabilities; it sees the "Fourth Industrial Revolution” as the opportunity to overtake the West. During the last part of the book, the author outlines how the US can counter China's rise during the coming decade.
Although the ideas in the book are very interesting, some sections can get boring and repetitive. Each chapter and section begins with a short introduction to an idea. The author then tries to justify it at length with numerous facts and quotes by Chinese politicians. It is not a smooth read, but a book worth reading, especially the content in the last few chapters.
September 14, 2021
Rush Dushi is an American officer linked to the Brookings Institution, himself a brilliant example of how immigrants shape up American visions of the world an policy. Despite his particular background, the vision he has doesn't differ much from what would be "The Blob" main vision of China.
His book try to disentangle the concept of Chinese Grand Strategy in the long term. He says is influenced by the way Gaddis saw the Cold War, and it's not entirely off. The book is almost completely based on written documents, memoires and other Chinese-language texts. I guess because of how difficult it may be to get people talking on these issues there are some missing voices and on-the-ground experience.
Nevertheless, he makes his point pretty well and the book touches on very important topics to understand the logic of great power competition in the XXI century with a lot of anecdotal conferences but good grasp of a realist theory.
Basically his thesis is that Chinese post-cold-war grand strategy had three moments marked by several critical events that triggered a change in the perception of the Chinese elites about American power and their own role in the world.
1. "The Trifecta" - Tinanmen, the Fall of the Soviet Union and something else I forgot. It was a moment where China perceived itself as weak, and had to "Hide its capabilities" and restrain from major conflicts with the west. The main strategy would be blunt American efforts to consolidate its hegemony in Asia. Here the most interesting part mentions the choice for assymetrical weapons even when conventional militar doctrines would suggest otherwise. Even when restraining, China kept building theory and ideas with a grand strategic goal in the horizon: the US was perceived as the major rival even when there were moments of cooperation. The main challenge was to avoid being isolated from the newly-created American hegemony world even when Chinese system was illiberal. The basic idea was to avoid direct conflict (diplomatic, economic, military), build assymetrical capacities and blunt American efforts to build their own)
2. The 2008 crisis. There is a perception of decline in the American order, and China perceives this moment as an opportunity to start building their own proactive capabilities. The main focus is in the Asian region through the "community of shared destiny" or something like that. The basic idea is that China slowly would abandon a restrained and deffensive position to start building their own partnerships and initiatives with the confidence that America would keep declining.
3. Trump election, Brexit, COVID-19. Acceleration of the historical time. Period of uncertainty and ultimately, crisis. China has a one-in-a-century possibility to take advantage of America's poor response to these events including not only their domestic problems but also the coordination with key allies and partners. China built capacities not only to balance American power in Asia, but globally. The country would be now devoted to exploit economic and technological advantages while improving and readying the military. Chinese projects flow to the world despite their economic convenience to set targets of geopolitical relevance, and the "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy" aims to challenge America in direct and aggressive terms.
Lastly, the book suggests that America should learn from the lessons of the past and use some of the same tools China used to protect its position in the world. Some of them are using assymetrical means to blunt the Chinese power wherever possible, make use of deals and partnerships to jointly balance difficult positions, and continue building an American orden based in liberal values and transparency. It's a "full engagement" kind of approach, where it is recognized that there are elements where China and US will necesarily cooperate (climate change for example), while others where they have to compete (technological development).
In the end, the author suggests that America has the capabilities, resources and resilience to stand up against this challenge, but China's rise won't go away any soon, and it's a new reality the world has to live with.
His book try to disentangle the concept of Chinese Grand Strategy in the long term. He says is influenced by the way Gaddis saw the Cold War, and it's not entirely off. The book is almost completely based on written documents, memoires and other Chinese-language texts. I guess because of how difficult it may be to get people talking on these issues there are some missing voices and on-the-ground experience.
Nevertheless, he makes his point pretty well and the book touches on very important topics to understand the logic of great power competition in the XXI century with a lot of anecdotal conferences but good grasp of a realist theory.
Basically his thesis is that Chinese post-cold-war grand strategy had three moments marked by several critical events that triggered a change in the perception of the Chinese elites about American power and their own role in the world.
1. "The Trifecta" - Tinanmen, the Fall of the Soviet Union and something else I forgot. It was a moment where China perceived itself as weak, and had to "Hide its capabilities" and restrain from major conflicts with the west. The main strategy would be blunt American efforts to consolidate its hegemony in Asia. Here the most interesting part mentions the choice for assymetrical weapons even when conventional militar doctrines would suggest otherwise. Even when restraining, China kept building theory and ideas with a grand strategic goal in the horizon: the US was perceived as the major rival even when there were moments of cooperation. The main challenge was to avoid being isolated from the newly-created American hegemony world even when Chinese system was illiberal. The basic idea was to avoid direct conflict (diplomatic, economic, military), build assymetrical capacities and blunt American efforts to build their own)
2. The 2008 crisis. There is a perception of decline in the American order, and China perceives this moment as an opportunity to start building their own proactive capabilities. The main focus is in the Asian region through the "community of shared destiny" or something like that. The basic idea is that China slowly would abandon a restrained and deffensive position to start building their own partnerships and initiatives with the confidence that America would keep declining.
3. Trump election, Brexit, COVID-19. Acceleration of the historical time. Period of uncertainty and ultimately, crisis. China has a one-in-a-century possibility to take advantage of America's poor response to these events including not only their domestic problems but also the coordination with key allies and partners. China built capacities not only to balance American power in Asia, but globally. The country would be now devoted to exploit economic and technological advantages while improving and readying the military. Chinese projects flow to the world despite their economic convenience to set targets of geopolitical relevance, and the "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy" aims to challenge America in direct and aggressive terms.
Lastly, the book suggests that America should learn from the lessons of the past and use some of the same tools China used to protect its position in the world. Some of them are using assymetrical means to blunt the Chinese power wherever possible, make use of deals and partnerships to jointly balance difficult positions, and continue building an American orden based in liberal values and transparency. It's a "full engagement" kind of approach, where it is recognized that there are elements where China and US will necesarily cooperate (climate change for example), while others where they have to compete (technological development).
In the end, the author suggests that America has the capabilities, resources and resilience to stand up against this challenge, but China's rise won't go away any soon, and it's a new reality the world has to live with.
October 18, 2023
This was one of the most impressive books I have ever read. The sheer amount of notes and citations throughout the text are mind-blowing; no wonder it took the author so long to write it. It should be said this is an academic text and not geared for popular reading (so it may seem dry to those who approach it as such). That being said, it is extremely well organized and easy to navigate.
I came into the book a bit skeptical and not in agreement with the author, that changed. The argument is clearly presented and has very convincing evidence to back it up. It is likely to be one of the most influential books I read about the PRC in my life.
I highly recommend it to everyone (especially any American politicians).
I came into the book a bit skeptical and not in agreement with the author, that changed. The argument is clearly presented and has very convincing evidence to back it up. It is likely to be one of the most influential books I read about the PRC in my life.
I highly recommend it to everyone (especially any American politicians).
January 5, 2022
A very interesting analysis of the evolution of China's policy towards the USA and the West more in general. A must read for anybody who is interested in the current China-USA disputes.
The book is written from a biased point of view (from the USA side) but is therefore all the more interesting as it explains to a large extent the current [policy of the USA and the Biden administration towards China.
The text is sometimes a bit repetitive and a next edition could benefit from a bit of editing.
The book is written from a biased point of view (from the USA side) but is therefore all the more interesting as it explains to a large extent the current [policy of the USA and the Biden administration towards China.
The text is sometimes a bit repetitive and a next edition could benefit from a bit of editing.
February 15, 2024
If you enjoy geopolitical books describing great power competition, this is a solid book. Easily digestible academic-style format that covers China’s blunting, building, and dominating periods as it strives to be a great world power. If you don’t want to read the whole book, jump to Part 3 that offers a whole government approach for how to compete across all instruments of power.
April 2, 2024
Comprehensive and convincing, it proves that China is trying to displace the U.S.-led world order and details how the CCP is trying to do it. It’s written a bit like an academic essay, which is good for building a holistic argument but can make it a little repetitive. Im very happy the author ended up on the NSC and was able to commit some of these ideas into practice.
August 16, 2022
Best review and data driven analysis of great power competition I’ve read. Incredible level of detail while still keeping it relatable to all audiences. It’s a must read.
March 15, 2023
A book that examines Chinese grand strategy by looking at Chinese foreign policy documents. Read it if you care about such things.
August 15, 2024
Although dry as a math textbook, this book was full of unique insights and perspectives. Not an easy read, but certainly a book worth reading.
January 16, 2024
An educative crash-course into the “how we got here” for U.S.-PRC competition today. While dull at points, Doshi is very detailed and thorough in his argument. I would suggest this to those interested in geopolitics/national security whose focus is not traditionally the PRC.
December 8, 2023
I'm considering just calling this book "The Long Book" because it's, well, long and often repetitive. How many ways can you prove the same point?
Still, I think it's an important read, and I can see why it's a foundational work for a lot of thinking on the subject of CCP's evolving aims. I also appreciate its thoroughness. It is a good example of PMESII-PT analysis. It flips the cube and looks at the problem from many perspectives, and I appreciate that.
Still, I think it's an important read, and I can see why it's a foundational work for a lot of thinking on the subject of CCP's evolving aims. I also appreciate its thoroughness. It is a good example of PMESII-PT analysis. It flips the cube and looks at the problem from many perspectives, and I appreciate that.
October 25, 2021
Very interesting view about China and it grand strategy. For those that hope the conflict or trade war will end, don't be fool, this will be last and not even end with possible third WW.
September 17, 2021
Drawing on an expansive landscape of often-seclusive authoritative Chinese-language Communist Party documents, leader-level speeches, media, and other commentary, Rush Doshi’s “The Long Game” traces the geostrategic playbook of China’s political leaders over the last several decades. Doshi discerns three discrete thought-regimes China has leveraged to become a formidable adversary to the US, beginning with a long period in the 1970s and 1980s of lying in the wait (“hiding capabilities and biding time”) by tepidly “blunting” an assertive American regional presence in the Asia Pacific, followed by a more self-confident “building” strategy of effectuating a modest regional presence after the fall of the Soviet Union, and lastly a more aggressive “expansion” strategy of sparring with the US for global superpower status after the 2008 financial crisis.
Doshi masterfully dissects the Chinese Communist Party’s evolving foreign policy weltanschauung by meticulously parsing trends in dense reams of party doctrine, making clear how China’s reactive foreign policy lens fuels its debut to the foreground of the world’s stage. While the author’s writing is often circular and distended (it’s easy to imagine this book could have been one-third its length without sacrificing the incisiveness of its thesis), his painstaking hairsplitting of the minutiae in these materials is impressive, and he succeeds at laying bare the stunning arc of China’s shape shifting foreign policy doctrine during a series of key junctures in recent global history.
Doshi masterfully dissects the Chinese Communist Party’s evolving foreign policy weltanschauung by meticulously parsing trends in dense reams of party doctrine, making clear how China’s reactive foreign policy lens fuels its debut to the foreground of the world’s stage. While the author’s writing is often circular and distended (it’s easy to imagine this book could have been one-third its length without sacrificing the incisiveness of its thesis), his painstaking hairsplitting of the minutiae in these materials is impressive, and he succeeds at laying bare the stunning arc of China’s shape shifting foreign policy doctrine during a series of key junctures in recent global history.
April 12, 2022
Brilliant analysis.
Ch 1: what is grand strategy? A coherent body of thought that guides the state’s action.
-what is hegemonic order? A form of control by a hegemonic state to regulate and control subordinates. Done by coercive capacity, consensual inducements, and legitimacy.
- strategies to displace a hegemon:
1 blunt the hegemony’s power
2 build alternative forms of control
Do it in sequence
Ch 2: the party leads everything
-Leninism has no checks and balances, all power is concentrated at the top. They claim this makes it efficient.
-The core theme animating the CCP is nationalist, not communist. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese ppl is not a communist slogan.
-Leninism is the tool to achieve this great rejuvenation.
-all key foreign policy decisions are made by the party, not the state
-Grand strategy is set at the very top of the party, paramount leader level
-The party communicates to itself via speeches and texts
-Doshi’s method is the use of a hierarchy of primary sources listed on page 42
Part 1: 1989 to 2008
Hiding Capabilities and Biding Time
Ch 3: New Cold Wars have Begun - The trifecta and the new American threat
-China’s traumatic trifecta:
1.) Tianaman Square
2.) The gulf war
3.) Soviet Collapse
-These events lead China to focus on the US as the number one security threat. Deng and other Chinese leaders understood that the US was trying to bring about peaceful evolution.
-Phase 1 of China’s Grand Strategy: bide and hide
While the relative power differentials between the US and China were high in US’a favor, China should hide its growing strength so as not to alarm the US who could build a balancing coalition. When balance of power changes, can move to phase 2.
-Phase 1: Blunting
1.) Focus on sea denial to stop US dominating waters near China
2.) Join regional institutions and sew dysfunction in them, constrain US within them, use to them to re-assure neighbors of China’s benign intentions.
3.) secure most favored nation trading status with the US - reduces discretionary use of American economic power. Also join WTO.
Ch 4: Implementing Military Blunting: Grasping the assassins mace
-Grand strategy principle: whatever the enemy is afraid of, we develop that. To blunt US military develop sea denial strategy, anti access/area denial
- Develop asymmetric weapons that are cheap and blunt American power.
-PRC developed 3 denial platforms:
1.) subs - built to operate in China’s coastal waters
2.) mines - cheap way to deny US access to coastal waters
3.) missiles - developed asbm carrier killers
-China could have developed aircraft carriers but held off since it didn’t fit with blunting phase strategy.
Ch 5: Implementing Political Blunting: Demonstrate Benign Intentions
-China undermined all US attempts at order building in Asia by joining organizations then working against them—APEC and others
-China supported east Asia institutions that lacked US presence, ex. Shanghai Cooperation Organization & APEC +3
-Also used regional orgs to project China’s benign intentions. Good neighbor policy existed to blunt encirclement while China was weak.
Ch 6: implementing Economic blunting: permanent normal trade relations
-China’s economic blunting strategy was to blunt American efforts to manipulate chinas economic dependence on the US in ways that could harm China.
-The blunting tools were: get most favored nation MFN status for China, and to accede to the WTO
-MFN + WTO accession would tie American hands in regard to use of trade as an economic coercion tool. Limit US use of: trade sanctions, tariffs, USTR section 301 investigations, and tech restrictions
-Chinese leaders were aware of the risks of this type of economic liberalization, and that US’s strategic idea was that it would lead to political liberalization and peaceful evolution. CCP took note and stood up counter measures.
-China used APEC to get developing nation status which would transfer to WTO and make it less onerous to join.
-All in all, Econ blunting strategy reduced US Econ leverage over China.
Part II: 2009-2016 “Actively Accomplish Something”: Building as China’s Second Displacement Strategy
Ch 7: The Financial Crisis & The Dawn of Building: A Change in the Balance of Power
-Long history of China longing for a multipolar world in official party speeches and docs. Read: diminishment of US power
-Global Financial Crisis causes China to reevaluate the relative power differentials. It then moves from blunting strategy to order building strategy in Asia.
-Building strategy begins under Hu, not Xi. Hu announced end of bide and hide and need to ‘actively accomplish something.’
-PRC order building in Asia: BRI, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Community of Common Destiny
-All these things lead to the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.
Ch. 8: Implementing Military Building: Make More Offensive Moves
-After GFC China turns from military blunting to military building the foundations for regional hegemony.
-Focus ways to build to protect China’s maritime interests and secure resource flows from overseas.
-2012 China builds blue water navy — aircraft carriers, more surface vessels, mine counter measures, amphibious warfare capability, marine transport crafts and builds out overseas facilities, including Djibouti and other supply bases
Ch. 9: Implementing Political Building: Establish Regional Architecture
-During blunting phase China played spoiler in Asian institutions and kept them weak and thin. Post GFC by contrast China went on an institution building spree and sought to thicken those it led.
-PRC shifts focus to “peripheral diplomacy” ie. building multilateral orgs in Asia that would reflect China’s interests. Called this Community of Common Destiny = China’s Asian Order
-China built two major regional orgs 1 AIIB 2 CICA
-AIIB offers China 3 things:
1 coercive capacity to constrain neighbors by withholding funding 2 allows China to set development and Econ governance rules 3 Provides Chinese leadership with legitimacy. States will align their foreign policy more closely with China’s to gain access to capital.
-CICA used to develop a China led Asian Security Framework that is used to oppose US security alliances. CICA reflects Chinese and Russian security goals. CICA can limit members ability to cooperate with the US and it can help secure BRI projects that China sees as a global public good.
Ch 10: Implementing Economic Building: Aboard our development train
-China wants to use its economic power over infrastructure and finance for the purpose of geo-strategic ends ie. it seeks to create economic leverage for political ends
-China’s economic order in Asia makes other regional states asymmetrically dependent on China due to its size while giving China more freedom to maneuver and constrain others.
-Two main economic order building bodies: bri and credit rating agencies + SWIFT alternative
-BRI- Most BRI projects are loss making, which is okay for CCP because the goal is to create asymmetric economic leverage, not profit. -
-BRI creates ports, choke points to exclude western countries and many have dual use military purposes in mind. Can help China defend its sea lanes.
-China makes 3 main attempts to fight US financial hegemony
1 Promote trade in RMB to weaken dollar
2 Build alternatives to SWIFT system
3 Build alternative to big 3 credit rating agencies
-Goal is global economic multipolarity
Part III: 2017-Present - Global Expansion as China’s Third Displacement Strategy. “Great Changes Unseen in a Century”
Ch 11: American Decline and China’s Global Ambition. “Toward the World’s Center Stage”
-Trump + Brexit + COVID-19 Mark and then solidify shift in China’s grand strategy. These events confirm the west is in terminal decline.
-2017 @ 19th party Congress Xi gives 3 hour speech outlining the new phase - beyond blunting and building - the concept is “great changes unseen in a century” meaning the global balance of power is now shifted enough that China can directly contest the US for superpower status.
-The plan to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation = replace the US as the world’s most powerful state by 2049 - the CCP’s centenary
-Current situation provide risks and opportunities, Xi believes the opportunities outweigh the risks and time is on China’s side
-US remains biggest impediment, China still fears containment and encirclement
Ch 12: The ways and means of China’s global expansion: Standing Tall and Seeing Far
-Sweden story—wine for our friends, shotguns for our enemies.
-China’s list of demands on Australia are blueprint for the Chinese order. Reduce foreign investment screening, tolerate Huawei, rollback foreign interference legislation, end human rights criticisms, change South China Sea stance, join the belt and Road initiative, muzzle the media, think tanks and officials that China dislikes. Or else face the economic consequences.
-3 ways and means of China’s global strategy
1.) Beijing puts forward a liberal norms in global institutions this is at the political level
2) economic level: seize the fourth industrial revolution and limit United States financial power
3) military level: acquire global capabilities/force posture and build new global support infrastructure
-Community of shared future for mankind is the grand strategic concept that defines China’s actions since 2017. This envisions China providing public goods to create a loose political block that supports China globally.
1.) China views moment since trumps election as “period of strategic opportunity“ to replace a retreating America as leader in many international organizations and to insert its own illiberal norms. China has also exported illiberalism and its development model to the Third World.
2.) China sees winning the fourth industrial revolution as key to leapfrogging the US and laying the base for its future superpower status. Already out invests the US 10 times on quantum computing. China also wants to set global tech standards.
3.) expanding military expeditionary capabilities to safeguard natural resource flows, ceilings, energy resources.
Ch. 13: an asymmetric strategy for US China competition
-Great power contest is back, the United States must now use some of the tools that China used against us. We need to engage in asymmetric blunting and order building.
-asymmetric blunting is blunting Chinese power at a cost that is less than it took the Chinese to establish/build the order. Some examples:
-provide regional allies with A2D area denial capabilities
-Undermined China’s efforts to build overseas bases
Report on belt and Road initiative corruption, build belt and -Road initiative funding alternatives
Close tech loopholes and brain drain out of China
Washington and its allies should join Chinese multilateral organizations and play spoiler
-The United States should then build/rebuild the American order:
-Harden critical facilities and get more dispersed for example the Pacific deterrence initiative
– build resilient information infrastructure
– maintain dollar hegemony
– audit supply chains and do more research and development
– there is no chance of a grand bargain with China. China will agree well week and then discard the agreement wind strong enough
– no attempts at peaceful evolution or manipulating Chinese domestic politics will work. These efforts will backfire and it is impossible to do given the amount of control the CCP has.
Ch 1: what is grand strategy? A coherent body of thought that guides the state’s action.
-what is hegemonic order? A form of control by a hegemonic state to regulate and control subordinates. Done by coercive capacity, consensual inducements, and legitimacy.
- strategies to displace a hegemon:
1 blunt the hegemony’s power
2 build alternative forms of control
Do it in sequence
Ch 2: the party leads everything
-Leninism has no checks and balances, all power is concentrated at the top. They claim this makes it efficient.
-The core theme animating the CCP is nationalist, not communist. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese ppl is not a communist slogan.
-Leninism is the tool to achieve this great rejuvenation.
-all key foreign policy decisions are made by the party, not the state
-Grand strategy is set at the very top of the party, paramount leader level
-The party communicates to itself via speeches and texts
-Doshi’s method is the use of a hierarchy of primary sources listed on page 42
Part 1: 1989 to 2008
Hiding Capabilities and Biding Time
Ch 3: New Cold Wars have Begun - The trifecta and the new American threat
-China’s traumatic trifecta:
1.) Tianaman Square
2.) The gulf war
3.) Soviet Collapse
-These events lead China to focus on the US as the number one security threat. Deng and other Chinese leaders understood that the US was trying to bring about peaceful evolution.
-Phase 1 of China’s Grand Strategy: bide and hide
While the relative power differentials between the US and China were high in US’a favor, China should hide its growing strength so as not to alarm the US who could build a balancing coalition. When balance of power changes, can move to phase 2.
-Phase 1: Blunting
1.) Focus on sea denial to stop US dominating waters near China
2.) Join regional institutions and sew dysfunction in them, constrain US within them, use to them to re-assure neighbors of China’s benign intentions.
3.) secure most favored nation trading status with the US - reduces discretionary use of American economic power. Also join WTO.
Ch 4: Implementing Military Blunting: Grasping the assassins mace
-Grand strategy principle: whatever the enemy is afraid of, we develop that. To blunt US military develop sea denial strategy, anti access/area denial
- Develop asymmetric weapons that are cheap and blunt American power.
-PRC developed 3 denial platforms:
1.) subs - built to operate in China’s coastal waters
2.) mines - cheap way to deny US access to coastal waters
3.) missiles - developed asbm carrier killers
-China could have developed aircraft carriers but held off since it didn’t fit with blunting phase strategy.
Ch 5: Implementing Political Blunting: Demonstrate Benign Intentions
-China undermined all US attempts at order building in Asia by joining organizations then working against them—APEC and others
-China supported east Asia institutions that lacked US presence, ex. Shanghai Cooperation Organization & APEC +3
-Also used regional orgs to project China’s benign intentions. Good neighbor policy existed to blunt encirclement while China was weak.
Ch 6: implementing Economic blunting: permanent normal trade relations
-China’s economic blunting strategy was to blunt American efforts to manipulate chinas economic dependence on the US in ways that could harm China.
-The blunting tools were: get most favored nation MFN status for China, and to accede to the WTO
-MFN + WTO accession would tie American hands in regard to use of trade as an economic coercion tool. Limit US use of: trade sanctions, tariffs, USTR section 301 investigations, and tech restrictions
-Chinese leaders were aware of the risks of this type of economic liberalization, and that US’s strategic idea was that it would lead to political liberalization and peaceful evolution. CCP took note and stood up counter measures.
-China used APEC to get developing nation status which would transfer to WTO and make it less onerous to join.
-All in all, Econ blunting strategy reduced US Econ leverage over China.
Part II: 2009-2016 “Actively Accomplish Something”: Building as China’s Second Displacement Strategy
Ch 7: The Financial Crisis & The Dawn of Building: A Change in the Balance of Power
-Long history of China longing for a multipolar world in official party speeches and docs. Read: diminishment of US power
-Global Financial Crisis causes China to reevaluate the relative power differentials. It then moves from blunting strategy to order building strategy in Asia.
-Building strategy begins under Hu, not Xi. Hu announced end of bide and hide and need to ‘actively accomplish something.’
-PRC order building in Asia: BRI, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Community of Common Destiny
-All these things lead to the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.
Ch. 8: Implementing Military Building: Make More Offensive Moves
-After GFC China turns from military blunting to military building the foundations for regional hegemony.
-Focus ways to build to protect China’s maritime interests and secure resource flows from overseas.
-2012 China builds blue water navy — aircraft carriers, more surface vessels, mine counter measures, amphibious warfare capability, marine transport crafts and builds out overseas facilities, including Djibouti and other supply bases
Ch. 9: Implementing Political Building: Establish Regional Architecture
-During blunting phase China played spoiler in Asian institutions and kept them weak and thin. Post GFC by contrast China went on an institution building spree and sought to thicken those it led.
-PRC shifts focus to “peripheral diplomacy” ie. building multilateral orgs in Asia that would reflect China’s interests. Called this Community of Common Destiny = China’s Asian Order
-China built two major regional orgs 1 AIIB 2 CICA
-AIIB offers China 3 things:
1 coercive capacity to constrain neighbors by withholding funding 2 allows China to set development and Econ governance rules 3 Provides Chinese leadership with legitimacy. States will align their foreign policy more closely with China’s to gain access to capital.
-CICA used to develop a China led Asian Security Framework that is used to oppose US security alliances. CICA reflects Chinese and Russian security goals. CICA can limit members ability to cooperate with the US and it can help secure BRI projects that China sees as a global public good.
Ch 10: Implementing Economic Building: Aboard our development train
-China wants to use its economic power over infrastructure and finance for the purpose of geo-strategic ends ie. it seeks to create economic leverage for political ends
-China’s economic order in Asia makes other regional states asymmetrically dependent on China due to its size while giving China more freedom to maneuver and constrain others.
-Two main economic order building bodies: bri and credit rating agencies + SWIFT alternative
-BRI- Most BRI projects are loss making, which is okay for CCP because the goal is to create asymmetric economic leverage, not profit. -
-BRI creates ports, choke points to exclude western countries and many have dual use military purposes in mind. Can help China defend its sea lanes.
-China makes 3 main attempts to fight US financial hegemony
1 Promote trade in RMB to weaken dollar
2 Build alternatives to SWIFT system
3 Build alternative to big 3 credit rating agencies
-Goal is global economic multipolarity
Part III: 2017-Present - Global Expansion as China’s Third Displacement Strategy. “Great Changes Unseen in a Century”
Ch 11: American Decline and China’s Global Ambition. “Toward the World’s Center Stage”
-Trump + Brexit + COVID-19 Mark and then solidify shift in China’s grand strategy. These events confirm the west is in terminal decline.
-2017 @ 19th party Congress Xi gives 3 hour speech outlining the new phase - beyond blunting and building - the concept is “great changes unseen in a century” meaning the global balance of power is now shifted enough that China can directly contest the US for superpower status.
-The plan to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation = replace the US as the world’s most powerful state by 2049 - the CCP’s centenary
-Current situation provide risks and opportunities, Xi believes the opportunities outweigh the risks and time is on China’s side
-US remains biggest impediment, China still fears containment and encirclement
Ch 12: The ways and means of China’s global expansion: Standing Tall and Seeing Far
-Sweden story—wine for our friends, shotguns for our enemies.
-China’s list of demands on Australia are blueprint for the Chinese order. Reduce foreign investment screening, tolerate Huawei, rollback foreign interference legislation, end human rights criticisms, change South China Sea stance, join the belt and Road initiative, muzzle the media, think tanks and officials that China dislikes. Or else face the economic consequences.
-3 ways and means of China’s global strategy
1.) Beijing puts forward a liberal norms in global institutions this is at the political level
2) economic level: seize the fourth industrial revolution and limit United States financial power
3) military level: acquire global capabilities/force posture and build new global support infrastructure
-Community of shared future for mankind is the grand strategic concept that defines China’s actions since 2017. This envisions China providing public goods to create a loose political block that supports China globally.
1.) China views moment since trumps election as “period of strategic opportunity“ to replace a retreating America as leader in many international organizations and to insert its own illiberal norms. China has also exported illiberalism and its development model to the Third World.
2.) China sees winning the fourth industrial revolution as key to leapfrogging the US and laying the base for its future superpower status. Already out invests the US 10 times on quantum computing. China also wants to set global tech standards.
3.) expanding military expeditionary capabilities to safeguard natural resource flows, ceilings, energy resources.
Ch. 13: an asymmetric strategy for US China competition
-Great power contest is back, the United States must now use some of the tools that China used against us. We need to engage in asymmetric blunting and order building.
-asymmetric blunting is blunting Chinese power at a cost that is less than it took the Chinese to establish/build the order. Some examples:
-provide regional allies with A2D area denial capabilities
-Undermined China’s efforts to build overseas bases
Report on belt and Road initiative corruption, build belt and -Road initiative funding alternatives
Close tech loopholes and brain drain out of China
Washington and its allies should join Chinese multilateral organizations and play spoiler
-The United States should then build/rebuild the American order:
-Harden critical facilities and get more dispersed for example the Pacific deterrence initiative
– build resilient information infrastructure
– maintain dollar hegemony
– audit supply chains and do more research and development
– there is no chance of a grand bargain with China. China will agree well week and then discard the agreement wind strong enough
– no attempts at peaceful evolution or manipulating Chinese domestic politics will work. These efforts will backfire and it is impossible to do given the amount of control the CCP has.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 4, 2021
A well-researched book on contemporary US-China relations. Doshi's use of primary sources (e.g. leader-level speeches, Party documents, doctrinal texts, etc.) demonstrates the painstaking care of bringing the readers to the minds and inner workings of the notoriously opaque CCP as close as possible.
While I appreciate the amount of effort taken in the methodology, the book's recommendations remain highly idealistic and would require more flexibility and pragmatism to be more "palatable". This part also seems to be a bit rushed.
While I appreciate the amount of effort taken in the methodology, the book's recommendations remain highly idealistic and would require more flexibility and pragmatism to be more "palatable". This part also seems to be a bit rushed.
February 11, 2024
The book contends that the basis of US-China rivalry since the Cold War has been over regional and now global order. The narrative emphases on the approaches that growing powers like China use to relocate anrecognized hegemon like the United States short of war.
Interestingly, a hegemon’s locus in regional and global order arises from three broad “forms of control” that are used to regulate the conduct of other states: a) intimidating competence, b) consensual stimuli, and rightfulness.
For rising states, the act of quietly dislocating the hegemon consists of two comprehensive approaches usually followed in order:--
**The first strategy is to dull the hegemon’s exercise of those forms of control, particularly those extended over the rising state; after all, no rising state can relocate the hegemon if it remains at the hegemon’s compassion.
**The second is to build forms of control over others; indeed, no rising state can become a hegemon if it cannot secure the deference of other states through forced terrorizations, consensual inducements, or just validity.
Into the following 13 chapters, the author divides his book:
1.“A Coherent Body of Thought and Action”: Grand Strategy and Hegemonic Order
2.“The Party Leads Everything”: Nationalism, Leninism, and the Chinese Communist Party
3.“New Cold Wars Have Begun”: The Trifecta and the New American Threat
4.“Grasping the Assassin’s Mace”: Implementing Military Blunting
5.“Demonstrate Benign Intentions”: Implementing Political Blunting
6.“Permanent Normal Trading Relations”: Implementing Economic Blunting
7.“A Change in the Balance of Power”: The Financial Crisis and the Dawn of Building
8.“Make More Offensive Moves”: Implementing Military Building
9.“Establish Regional Architecture”: Implementing Political Building
10.“Aboard Our Development Train”: Implementing Economic Building
11. “Toward the World’s Center Stage”: American Decline and China’s Global Ambition
12. “Standing Tall and Seeing Far”: The Ways and Means of China’s Global Expansion
13. An Asymmetric Strategy for US-China Competition
This book contends that, since the end of the Cold War, China has pursued a grand strategy to displace American order first at the regional and now at the global level.
Chapter 1 defines grand strategy and international order, and then explores how rising powers displace hegemonic order through strategies of blunting, building, and expansion.
Chapter 2 focuses on the Chinese Communist Party as the connective institutional tissue for China’s grand strategy. As a nationalist institution that emerged from the patriotic ferment of the late Qing period, the Party now seeks to restore China to its rightful place in the global hierarchy by 2049.
Chapter 3, explores the blunting phase of China’s post–Cold War grand strategy using Chinese Communist Party texts.
Chapter 4 considers blunting at the military level. It shows that the trifecta prompted China to depart from a “sea control” strategy increasingly focused on holding distant maritime territory to a “sea denial” strategy focused on preventing the US military from traversing, controlling, or intervening in the waters near China.
Chapter 5 considers blunting at the political level. It demonstrates that the trifecta led China to reverse its previous opposition to joining regional institutions.
Chapter 6 considers blunting at the economic level. It argues that the trifecta laid bare China’s dependence on the US market, capital, and technology—notably through Washington’s post-Tiananmen sanctions and its threats to revoke most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status, which could have seriously damaged China’s economy.
Chapter 7 explores this building strategy in Party texts, demonstrating that the shock of the Global Financial Crisis led China to see the United States as weakening and emboldened it to shift to a building strategy. It begins with a thorough review of China’s discourse on “multipolarity” and the “international balance of forces.”
Chapter 8 focuses on building at the military level, recounting how the Global Financial Crisis accelerated a shift in Chinese military strategy away from a singular focus on blunting American power through sea denial to a new focus on building order through sea control.
Chapter 9 focuses on building at the political level. It shows how the Global Financial Crisis caused China to depart from a blunting strategy focused on joining and stalling regional organizations to a building strategy that involved launching its own institutions.
Chapter 10 focuses on building at the economic level. It argues that the Global Financial Crisis helped Beijing depart from a defensive blunting strategy that targeted American economic leverage to an offensive building strategy designed to build China’s own coercive and consensual economic capacities.
Chapter 11 discusses the dawn of China’s expansion strategy. It argues that the strategy emerged following another trifecta, this time consisting of Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the West’s poor initial response to the coronavirus pandemic.
Chapter 12 discusses the “ways and means” of China’s strategy of expansion. It shows that politically, Beijing would seek to project leadership over global governance and international institutions and to advance autocratic norms.
Chapter 13, the book’s concluding chapter, summaries a US response to China’s ambitions for displacing the United States from regional and global order.
What are the major narratives preached by this book? The following:
1) The book exemplifies what Chinese order might look like if China is able to achieve its goal of “national rejuvenation” by the centennial of the founding of the PRC in 2049.
2) At the regional level, China already accounts for more than half of Asian GDP and half of all Asian military spending, which is pushing the region out of balance and toward a Chinese sphere of influence.
3) A fully realized Chinese order might eventually involve the withdrawal of US forces from Japan and Korea, the end of American regional alliances, the effective removal of the US Navy from the Western Pacific, deference from China’s regional neighbors, unification with Taiwan, and the resolution of territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.
4) Chinese order would likely be more coercive than the present order, consensual in ways that primarily benefit connected elites even at the expense of voting publics, and considered legitimate mostly to those few who it directly rewards.
5) China would organize this order in ways that damage liberal values, with authoritarian winds blowing stronger across the region.
6) Order abroad is often a reflection of order at home, and China’s order-building would be distinctly illiberal relative to US order-building.
To conclude, this book enters a mainly unsettled debate over Chinese strategy divided between “skeptics” and “believers.” The skeptics have not yet been convinced that China has a grand strategy to dislocate the United States regionally or globally; by contrast, the believers have not actually attempted coaxing.
Interestingly, a hegemon’s locus in regional and global order arises from three broad “forms of control” that are used to regulate the conduct of other states: a) intimidating competence, b) consensual stimuli, and rightfulness.
For rising states, the act of quietly dislocating the hegemon consists of two comprehensive approaches usually followed in order:--
**The first strategy is to dull the hegemon’s exercise of those forms of control, particularly those extended over the rising state; after all, no rising state can relocate the hegemon if it remains at the hegemon’s compassion.
**The second is to build forms of control over others; indeed, no rising state can become a hegemon if it cannot secure the deference of other states through forced terrorizations, consensual inducements, or just validity.
Into the following 13 chapters, the author divides his book:
1.“A Coherent Body of Thought and Action”: Grand Strategy and Hegemonic Order
2.“The Party Leads Everything”: Nationalism, Leninism, and the Chinese Communist Party
3.“New Cold Wars Have Begun”: The Trifecta and the New American Threat
4.“Grasping the Assassin’s Mace”: Implementing Military Blunting
5.“Demonstrate Benign Intentions”: Implementing Political Blunting
6.“Permanent Normal Trading Relations”: Implementing Economic Blunting
7.“A Change in the Balance of Power”: The Financial Crisis and the Dawn of Building
8.“Make More Offensive Moves”: Implementing Military Building
9.“Establish Regional Architecture”: Implementing Political Building
10.“Aboard Our Development Train”: Implementing Economic Building
11. “Toward the World’s Center Stage”: American Decline and China’s Global Ambition
12. “Standing Tall and Seeing Far”: The Ways and Means of China’s Global Expansion
13. An Asymmetric Strategy for US-China Competition
This book contends that, since the end of the Cold War, China has pursued a grand strategy to displace American order first at the regional and now at the global level.
Chapter 1 defines grand strategy and international order, and then explores how rising powers displace hegemonic order through strategies of blunting, building, and expansion.
Chapter 2 focuses on the Chinese Communist Party as the connective institutional tissue for China’s grand strategy. As a nationalist institution that emerged from the patriotic ferment of the late Qing period, the Party now seeks to restore China to its rightful place in the global hierarchy by 2049.
Chapter 3, explores the blunting phase of China’s post–Cold War grand strategy using Chinese Communist Party texts.
Chapter 4 considers blunting at the military level. It shows that the trifecta prompted China to depart from a “sea control” strategy increasingly focused on holding distant maritime territory to a “sea denial” strategy focused on preventing the US military from traversing, controlling, or intervening in the waters near China.
Chapter 5 considers blunting at the political level. It demonstrates that the trifecta led China to reverse its previous opposition to joining regional institutions.
Chapter 6 considers blunting at the economic level. It argues that the trifecta laid bare China’s dependence on the US market, capital, and technology—notably through Washington’s post-Tiananmen sanctions and its threats to revoke most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status, which could have seriously damaged China’s economy.
Chapter 7 explores this building strategy in Party texts, demonstrating that the shock of the Global Financial Crisis led China to see the United States as weakening and emboldened it to shift to a building strategy. It begins with a thorough review of China’s discourse on “multipolarity” and the “international balance of forces.”
Chapter 8 focuses on building at the military level, recounting how the Global Financial Crisis accelerated a shift in Chinese military strategy away from a singular focus on blunting American power through sea denial to a new focus on building order through sea control.
Chapter 9 focuses on building at the political level. It shows how the Global Financial Crisis caused China to depart from a blunting strategy focused on joining and stalling regional organizations to a building strategy that involved launching its own institutions.
Chapter 10 focuses on building at the economic level. It argues that the Global Financial Crisis helped Beijing depart from a defensive blunting strategy that targeted American economic leverage to an offensive building strategy designed to build China’s own coercive and consensual economic capacities.
Chapter 11 discusses the dawn of China’s expansion strategy. It argues that the strategy emerged following another trifecta, this time consisting of Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the West’s poor initial response to the coronavirus pandemic.
Chapter 12 discusses the “ways and means” of China’s strategy of expansion. It shows that politically, Beijing would seek to project leadership over global governance and international institutions and to advance autocratic norms.
Chapter 13, the book’s concluding chapter, summaries a US response to China’s ambitions for displacing the United States from regional and global order.
What are the major narratives preached by this book? The following:
1) The book exemplifies what Chinese order might look like if China is able to achieve its goal of “national rejuvenation” by the centennial of the founding of the PRC in 2049.
2) At the regional level, China already accounts for more than half of Asian GDP and half of all Asian military spending, which is pushing the region out of balance and toward a Chinese sphere of influence.
3) A fully realized Chinese order might eventually involve the withdrawal of US forces from Japan and Korea, the end of American regional alliances, the effective removal of the US Navy from the Western Pacific, deference from China’s regional neighbors, unification with Taiwan, and the resolution of territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.
4) Chinese order would likely be more coercive than the present order, consensual in ways that primarily benefit connected elites even at the expense of voting publics, and considered legitimate mostly to those few who it directly rewards.
5) China would organize this order in ways that damage liberal values, with authoritarian winds blowing stronger across the region.
6) Order abroad is often a reflection of order at home, and China’s order-building would be distinctly illiberal relative to US order-building.
To conclude, this book enters a mainly unsettled debate over Chinese strategy divided between “skeptics” and “believers.” The skeptics have not yet been convinced that China has a grand strategy to dislocate the United States regionally or globally; by contrast, the believers have not actually attempted coaxing.
September 1, 2021
One of the most important and heavily researched book out there on the past three decades of China foreign policy. With an author who is going to be one of the movers and shakers for Sino-US in the next decades.
However, note the selective bias in his policy reading, which relies on think tank sources quite a bit. Also worth pointing out the book has a falsifying undertone that Chinese strategies change *because of* its power dynamics with the US - when clearly China's surge of domestic economy and solidifying politics are the main contributors to its grand shifts. Instead of being the fundamental drivers, American foreign policy success or faliures should only be read as "promots" for China to decidedly move on with gaining more global influence.
However, note the selective bias in his policy reading, which relies on think tank sources quite a bit. Also worth pointing out the book has a falsifying undertone that Chinese strategies change *because of* its power dynamics with the US - when clearly China's surge of domestic economy and solidifying politics are the main contributors to its grand shifts. Instead of being the fundamental drivers, American foreign policy success or faliures should only be read as "promots" for China to decidedly move on with gaining more global influence.
March 6, 2022
Having read a few books on China's Grand Strategy, this may be the most objective, but perhaps not the most broad ranging.
Doshi bases much of his book on the strategic realignment stemming from the Trifecta of events, Tiananmen in 1989, Gulf War 1 and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Changes unseen in a century, as is frequently reiterated.
A central problem with this book is the repetitive nature, and the repeat of the phrase "changes unseen in a century" sometimes had me literally screaming.
However, a decent book overall and an objective way to understand China's financial and military strategy.
Doshi bases much of his book on the strategic realignment stemming from the Trifecta of events, Tiananmen in 1989, Gulf War 1 and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Changes unseen in a century, as is frequently reiterated.
A central problem with this book is the repetitive nature, and the repeat of the phrase "changes unseen in a century" sometimes had me literally screaming.
However, a decent book overall and an objective way to understand China's financial and military strategy.
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