In the

United States Court of Appeals

____________________ ARGUEDJANUARY25,2013DECIDEDAUGUST12,2013 ____________________ Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and KANNE, CircuitJudges. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. Quincy Neri designed a glass sculpture that Architectural Building Arts installed in the ceilingoftheentrancehallwayatLindaHughesscondomin ium in Madison, Wisconsin. As part of its renovation of Hughess whole residence, Architectural Building Arts re moved the foyers dome (which had been decorated with a

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mural) and installed a vaulted ceiling to which the sculpture was attached. Leslie Sager designed the lighting for the re vised entryway. With Hughess consent, Eric Ferguson took before, during, and after photographs of the project; two of these include the sculpture. Architectural Building Arts put copies of the photos on its web site and included them in a newsletter and an application for an architectural award. Sager posted them on her own web site, while Ferguson posted them to his Flickr page. Architectural Building Arts, Sager, and Ferguson all sought to exemplify the skills they hadcontributed. This lawsuit has been their reward. Neri contends that ArchitecturalBuildingArts(plusMelindaMonroeand Steve Larson, its owners), Sager, and Ferguson violated her copy right in the sculpture, which she calls Mendota Reflection. A magistrate judge, presiding by consent under 28 U.S.C. 636(c), dismissed the suit on the ground that Neri lacks a registrationofhercopyright.Althoughacopyrightexistsau tomatically as soon as a work is fixed in a tangible medium, 17 U.S.C. 102(a), litigation to enforce a copyright is permis sible only after it has been registered. 17 U.S.C. 411(a). Neri submitted for registration a collection of photographs of her unpublished works, including Mendota Reflection, and the Register of Copyrights issued a certificate of registration (No. VAu 1066185). But the court concluded that the appli cationwasdefectiveandthecertificateinvalid. The magistrate judge discussed several ways of charac terizing the registrationas a standalone registration of Mendota Reflection, as a compilation or group work, and as a collection, which can be registered as a single work that covers all of its constituents. The judge found each of these

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approaches wanting. We do not need to get beyond 408(a) and 37 C.F.R. 202.3(b)(4), which deal with the requirements for collections of unpublished works. Heres the important partoftheregulation:
Inthecaseofunpublishedworks:allcopyrightableelementsthat are otherwise recognizable as selfcontained works, and are combined in a single unpublished collection. For these pur poses,acombinationofsuchelementsshallbeconsideredacol lectionif: (1)Theelementsareassembledinanorderlyform; (2) The combined elements bear a single title identifying the collectionasawhole; (3) The copyright claimant in all of the elements, and in the collectionasawhole,isthesame;and (4)All of the elements are by the same author, or, if they are by different authors, at least one of the authors has contrib utedcopyrightableauthorshiptoeachelement. Registration of an unpublished collection extends to each cop yrightableelement in the collection andto the authorship,if any, involvedinselectingandassemblingthecollection.

37 C.F.R. 202.3(b)(4)(i)(B). Theres no dispute about three of these four requirements. The submission has a single title (Artwork of Q), and Neri claims copyright in each of the sculptures and in the collection as a whole. But the magis trate judge found that Neris submission was not in an or derlyformandthereforecouldnotberegistered. The magistrate judge described Neris submission as a booklet containing photographs of several sculptures, plus some loose photographs. The sculpture installed at the Hughes residence is included among the loose photographs but not the booklet. The magistrate judge thought this disor derly and thus ineligible for registration. We tried to verify

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this by looking for ourselves but encountered an obstacle: the material Neri submitted for registration is not in the rec ord. Apparently the magistrate judge drew his understand ing from questions and answers during depositions.At least once, Neri described her submission as the magistrate judge did; but at oral argument in this court Neri (who argued her ownappeal)insistedthataphotoofMendotaReflectionisin the booklet. The problem may be terminological; Neri may have used the title Mendota Reflection for more than one sculpture. But it is hard to understand how a court could concludethatagivensubmissionisnotinanorderlyform whenthesubmissioncannotbeexamined. Neriistheplaintiff,andaplaintiffwhofailstoputessen tialinformationintotherecordusuallyloses,butshehasthe benefit of the Registers certificate, which gives her claim at least prima facie support. 17 U.S.C. 410(c). This means that the defense needed to show why the court should disregard theregistration,andabsenceofevidenceredoundstothede fensesdetriment. The magistrate judge thought that only a single bound book or booklet is an orderly way to present photographs ofsculptures.If,asNericontends,theHughessculptureisin the booklet, then this understanding implies that the regis tration is valid. What is more, we do not see why only a sin gle document can be orderly. The Register did not say so, ei ther in issuing the regulation or in evaluating Neris submis sion. The Register found the submission adequate; a district court should not set aside an agencys application of its own regulationswithoutastrongreason. Although the district court thought Neris form disorder ly, it did not rely on any legal authority that establishes how

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much order is required. We have found several discussions of registration under 202.3(b)(4)(i)(B), but none of these tackles the orderly form question. See Fonar Corp. v. Dome nick, 105 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a set of comput er programs was inan orderly form but without providing a definitionofthatterm);Szabov.Errisson,68F.3d940(5thCir. 1995); L.A. Printex Industries, Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2012); United Fabrics International, Inc. v. C&J Wear,Inc.,630F.3d1255(9thCir.2011).Weareonourown. Registration is required for litigation but not for the ex istence of copyright. This implies that registration serves a recordkeeping function. It pins down details about what intellectualproperty rights have been claimed. Cf. Reed Else vier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (registration is a procedural but not a jurisdictional requirement). The most important detail is authorshipnot simply who owns the copyright, but also the dates of the authors birth and death (since a copyright lasts for the authors life plus 70 years). The statute specifies nine pieces of information that a regis trationmustinclude.17U.S.C.409.Defendantsdonotdeny that Neris submission included all of those nine that apply to her claim. The regulation exercises a power conferred by 409(10): an applicant must supply any other information regarded by the Register of Copyrights as bearing upon the preparation or identification of the work or the existence, ownership,ordurationofthecopyright. Since the orderly form requirement implements a stat ute allowing the Register to require other information, the key question must be whether the submission is organized well enough to permit users and courts to pin down the in formation on which copyright enforcement depends. The

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CopyrightOfficesaidexactlythisinalettertoNeri,conclud ing that her registration is valid because the works have beenpresentedtousinaformatfromwhichtheycanreadily be identified. This implies that loose photographs could suffice if numbered or labeled (for example, if each were named,as theOffices letter said that Neris submissions had been). Anyorganizationthat enablesacourttoassociateawork underlying the suit with a work covered by a registration ought to do the trick. If a booklet (or PDF file) with page numbers is orderly enoughas the magistrate judge thoughta sequence of loose but numbered or named pho tographs should be enough too. Many a folder of photo graphs is better organized than a slapdash assortment run off by a corner print shop. If the Hughes sculpture is identi fiable in the registration, that should do. But if, as defend ants suggest, it is not depicted at allif the materials that Neri submitted to the Copyright Office contain only photos of sculptures similar to the one she made for Hughesthen registrationVAu1066185doesnotsupportthissuit. Anticipating that we might not accept the district courts conclusion, defendants ask us to affirm the judgment on an alternative ground: that Fritz Schomburg rather than Neri is the author of Mendota Reflection. Schomburg is a glass blower(agaffer)whomadethe60orsoglasselementsofthe sculpture. Neri assisted by making molten glass available as Schomburg needed it. Defendants say that Schomburgs sta tus as the gaffer makes him the true author of the sculp ture. This assumes that only a change of formhere, from drawings to glasscreates intellectualproperty rights. De fendants might as well say that the typesetter owns a books

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copyright or that the members of an orchestra who play a newcompositionusingtheirowninterpretationsofthescore becomethemusicsauthors. Most intellectual property is created in stages. Neris claimdependsnotonherroleasaidewhileSchomburgblew the glass, but on her design work: she decided what kind of glass would be created, in what shapes and colors, attached to what armatures, and where the glass elements would go relative to the ceiling and each other. The resulting whole is the sculpture in which Neri claims copyright. To the extent that Schomburg added features in the course of blowing the glass,hehasaseparateclaimofintellectualpropertyinade rivativework,butthisdoesnotdetractfromNerisrights. On remand, the district court may wish to take up other issues ahead of the orderly form question. One possible defense is consent from a joint author. Hughes approved the photography and its display, as did Architectural Building Arts. Both Hughes andArchitectural BuildingArts have po tentialclaimstoauthorshipand,whenaworkhasmultiple authors, any of them can authorize reproduction.According to some evidence in discovery, both Hughes and Architec tural Building Arts exercised discretion over the colors and arrangement of the 60 individual glass pieces. Neri denies thattheyplayedanysuchrole,andwecantresolvethatdis puteonappeal. Anotherpotential defenseisfair use.ArchitecturalBuild ing Arts and Sager were entitled to document their own roles in renovating Hughess home. It was not possible to show what they had accomplished without displaying the sculpture along with the furniture and other aspects of the foyer. None of the defendants offered the photographs for

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sale. It is hard to imagine that any viewer would have deemedaphotographoftheHughesvestibuletobeasubsti tuteforanoriginalNeriartwork.(Neridoesnotcontendthat she sells photos of her works or that the defendants activi ties have reduced herability to start offering photos or other derivativeworks.Tothecontrary,Nerihasplacedpicturesof Mendota Reflection on her own web site, http://www.quincyneri.com/#!glass, which anyone can ac cess for free.) It is also hard to imagine that these photo graphs reduced the demand for Neris art. They seem more like free advertising. But again the parties have not come to gripsonthefairuseissue,sowecannotresolveitonappeal. Onefinalcomment.Nericontendsthatshehasregistered the Hughes sculpture by itself, avoiding all issues about the collection regulation. She did not alert the district court to this until after the summaryjudgment briefs had been filed, and the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion by concluding that Nerihad waited too long. Now that the case must be reconsidered in the district court, however, the judge may think it prudent to revisit this subject, which could avoid any need to go back over whether the Artwork of Q submission allows litigation about defendants photo graphsthatincludetheHughessculpture. VACATEDANDREMANDED