LandTi Case Digest
LandTi Case Digest
LandTi Case Digest
FLORES vs. BAGAOISAN G.R. No. 173365 | April 15, 2010 FACTS: Petitioners executed a Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim in favor of Vicente T. Lazo. Petitioners agreed to sell, cede, convey, grant, and transfer by way of QUITCLAIM to Lazo. Respondent Marciano Bagaoisan, bought the subject property from Lazo. Respondent filed an action for ownership, quieting of title, partition and damages against petitioners, praying that he be declared as the true owner of the subject property and that the entire property covered by OCT No. P-11880 be partitioned among them. In the Complaint, respondent asserted that he was a tenant of Lazo and that he had been working on the subjec0t property since time immemorial. He said that, since he bought the property in 1977, he possessed the land as owner and paid real property tax thereon. He claimed that the subject property was erroneously covered by OCT No. P-11880 and that petitioners have previously recognized such fact, considering that they executed an affidavit acknowledging the erroneous inclusion of the property in their title. He averred that, lately, petitioners had denied his ownership of the land and asserted their ownership thereof by working and harvesting the crops thereon.[5] Petitioners stated that they did not relinquish ownership or possession of the land to Lazo. While admitting that they executed the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim in favor of Lazo, petitioners claimed that they were misled into signing the same, with Lazo taking advantage of their lack of education. Petitioners contended that it was too late for respondent to assert title to the disputed portion because the title covering the same had already become indefeasible one year after it was issued. RTC ruled in favor of respondent. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim is void and violates Sec. 118 of the Public Land Act (CA 141), which prohibits the alienation of lands through a homestead patent. RULING: YES Section 118 of the Public Land Act, which states: xxx Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent and grant xxx An OCT issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the promulgation of the Director of Lands order for the issuance of the patent. Respondent did not allege in his complaint or prove during the trial that fraud attended the registration of the subject property in petitioners names. In fact, there was no allegation as to how petitioners were able to secure title to the property despite the alleged ownership of respondents predecessor. More importantly, respondent failed to prove that he has title to the subject property. The Public Land Act requires that the possessor or his predecessors-in-interest must be in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years. It would be well to mention that the execution of the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim within the five-year prohibitory period also makes the homestead patent susceptible to cancellation, and the subject property being reverted to the public domain.
RAMOS-BALLALO vs. RAMOS G.R. No. 168464 | January 23, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner Zenaida and her brother Alexander (now deceased) are the children of spouses Susana Bueno and Abundio Ramos. The spouses started occupying Lot No. 204 in 1938. Abundio died in 1944. Susana met her second husband, respondent Eusebio Ramos in 1946, with whom she had five children, one of whom is respondent Rolando. In the interim, prior to 1958, Susana discovered that Felimon Domingo applied for a sales patent over the subject parcel of land which she opposed. The Bureau of Lands resolved the dispute. It was alleged that as Susana accompanied her husband Eusebio, a soldier, wherever he was assigned, Susanas father, George Bueno, and daughter, petitioner Zenaida continued the cultivation and possession of the subject land. Sometime later, Susana sold the land to petitioner who, in turn, partitioned it among herself, her brother, Alexander, and respondent Rolando and his siblings. The partition was not registered but Deeds of Sale were executed in favor of Rolando and Alexander. Petitioner thereafter mortgaged her share; however, it came to her knowledge that respondents Rolando and Eusebio had usurped her share and deprived the mortgagees of possession over the land. After settling the mortgage, petitioner filed a case for recovery of inheritance, possession and damages with a petition for preliminary mandatory injunction. RTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Zeinada Ramos. The CA founf that neither Zenaida nor Alexander complied with the homestead application requirements in order to acquire superior vested right. Hence this petition. ISSUE:
Whether or not Zeinada, as an applicant for public land, may be considered as having any right to the land occupied. RULING: The petition is partly meritorious. A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. A careful examination of the records shows that petitioner has not satisfactorily established that a valid application for homestead patent was filed by her parents. The decision of the Bureau of Lands in 1958 only addressed Zenaidas familys right of preference over the land, in view of their possession and cultivation of the land. The purported sale between petitioner and her mother cannot be given effect, nor can it be a source of right for Zenaida, because Susana did not have the authority to sell what did not belong to her. For the same reason, neither Eusebio nor Rolando can claim any right whatsoever as heirs of Susana. We find that Zenaida has proven prior possession of the portion of land she claims as her share, which possession antedates the filing of the homestead application. Moreover, Zenaida presented tax declarations both in her name and that of her predecessor-in-interest (mother Susana Bueno) covering the property. Time and again, we have held that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. ACME PLYWOOD AND VENNER CORP & IAC NATURE OF THE CASE: The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe. FACTS: The Director of Lands appealed the judgement of the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 sqm., acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lots-in-question from time immemorial, on October 29, 1962. This was accordingly only registered on July 17, 1982 long after the aegis of the 1973 Constitution. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the ruling in the case, Meralco v. CastroBartolome (114 SRC 799) should be overturned in light of jurisprudence. 2. Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized. 3. Whether or not the provision barring private companies and associations from purchasing public alienable lands in 1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively. RULING: 1. HELD. In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular Govt, to Susi v. Razon, to Herico v. Dar, the court overturned
REPUBLIC vs. ESTONILO G.R. No. 157306 | November 25, 2005 NATURE OF THE CASE: military. FACTS: This case originated from an application for registration of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of the cadastral survey of Cagayan de Oro consisting [of] an area of 357,866 square meters, filed by the original applicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the CFI. Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previously owned and possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their attorney-in-fact and heir himself, Calistro Bacas The Provincial Fiscal filed its opposition thereto alleging that Lot 4318 is not a registrable land pursuant to PP No. 265, which declared Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army. Bombeo died and was substituted by her daughter Cipriana Actub Tiu who eventually died and was pursued anew by the latters daugters Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and Andrea Actub Tiu Po. RTC ruled in favor of respondents. While pending appeal, PP No. 330 took effect excluding Lot No. 4318 from the operation of PP No. 26. CA affirmed the RTCs decision. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have duly proven their title to the subject land and may thus register it under the Public Land Act. RULING: NO. The case is about property reserved for the
DE LA MERCED vs. CA FACTS: In a complaint filed in the CFI, Ezequiel Santos and his wife claiming ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre, sought recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named defendant, and of the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-1956. Defendants, in their answer, resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their ownership over said property as evidenced by OCT No. 3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced and their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. Mamerta, a legitimate daughter of Juan, was allowed to intervene and make common cause with the defendants. The court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs. Upon defendants' motion for reconsideration, the court amended its original decision. While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title was actually issued therefor, the said lot may be acquired by adverse possession. And, as defendants had been in possession of the property for over 20 years, they were declared to have acquired the right over the same by prescription. The complaint was consequently ordered dismissed; OCT No. 3462 cancelled and a new
ISSUE: The questions actually raised by the present appeal are: What is the effect of the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923 adjudicating the lot in favor of Santos, and the subsequent order dated December 17, 1925, directing the issuance of a certificate of title to Inocencio Santos? Did those orders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has not been issued? In the affirmative, could the property thereby affected still be lost by adverse possession? RULING: For purposes of resolving the above questions, these salient facts must be considered: By virtue of the final decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 21, dated December 26, 1923, Santos' title to Lot No. 395 was definitely confirmed as against the whole world, including the Government; That the same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19, 1925 declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de los Santos, although no such certificate was actually issued;
NAVAL vs. CA FACTS: Ildefonso A. Naval sold a parcel of land in Camarines Sur, consisting of 858 sq. m. to Gregorio B. Galarosa. The sale was recorded in the Registry of Property of the ROD Camarines Sur pursuant to Act No. 3344. Subsequently, Gregorio sold portions of the land to respondents Conrado Rodrigo Balilla, Jaime Nacion on and spouses Ireneo and Ester Moya, and Juanito Camalla. All buyers occupied the portion they bought, built improvements thereon, and paid the taxes due thereto. The controversy arose when petitioner Juanita Naval, the great granddaughter of Ildefonso, was issued by the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur an OCT, covering 733 sq. m. of the subject land. She claimed that she bought the subject land from Ildefonso in 1972. On November 10, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Bartolome Aguirre, Conrado Balila,13 Ireneo Moya, Jaime Nacion and Domingo Nacion. However, the case was dismissed. 20 years later, petitioner re-filed the complaint for recovery of possession with damages before the MCTC of Camarines Sur, against
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ISSUE: Who has a better right to the property in dispute? RULING: The 1968 Deed of Sale executed by Placida in favor of Angel should prevail over the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale made by the heirs of Placida in favor of petitioners-spouses Cuizon. Prior tempore, potior jure. It simply means, He who is first in time is preferred in right. The only essential requisite of this rule is priority in time, and the only one who can invoke this is the first vendee. Records bear the fact that when Placida sold her one-fourth portion of the property in 1968, the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale was still inexistent, and more importantly, said portion was yet to be transferred by succession to Placidas heirs. The records also show that after Placida sold her portion to Angel, the latter immediately took possession of the same. The defense of indefeasibility of the torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title. The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the free patents and titles. Petitioners knew of the existence of the 1968 Deed of Sale as the Remotos showed it to them in 1982. It cannot be said that petitioners are transferees in good faith.
CUIZON vs. REMOTO FACTS: The parties in this case are vying for ownership of a 4,300 square meter-land located Agusan del Norte. Petitioners-spouses Encarnacion and Salvador Cuizon rely on TCT issued by the Registry of Deeds of Agusan del Norte pursuant to a notarized 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale executed by the heirs of Placida wherein they adjudicated unto themselves the one-fourth share of Placida, and, at the same time, sold said portion to their co-heir, Encarnacion L. Cuizon. On the other hand, respondents have in their favor a 1968 Deed of Sale involving a portion of the same property executed by Placida in favor of Angel husband of respondent Mercedes C. Remoto, and father of the other respondents. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered that the property be reconveyed to them. On appeal by petitioners, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusion of the trial court. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it.
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PORTES, SR. vs. ARCALA FACTS: Respondents claimed that as early as 1908, their parents, Vicente and Felisa, had already occupied and developed the disputed parcels of land, Lots 2 and 3, in Negros Occidental. The Director of Lands approved Vicentes homestead application for Lots 2 and 3. Vicente and Felisa were in open, exclusive and continuous possession of Lots 2 and 3 until their deaths. Respondents succeeded them in their rights and took possession. Respondents filed the complaint against their cousins, who are the nephew and nieces of Vicente. They were impleaded together with their respective spouses and the predecessor-in-interest of petitioners. The trial court ruled that respondents own Lots 2 and 3. Only the heirs of Napoleon appealed from the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. RULING:
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At the time that Felomina and Luis fraudulently titled Lot 2 in their names, Vicente and Felisa, respondents parents, were still in possession of Lot 2. Vicente and Felisas right to file an action for reconveyance was thus not subject to prescription. Respondents remained in possession of Lot 2 until 1967 when they were ousted from Lot 2-A. Since respondents were no longer in possession of Lot 2-A, the ten-year prescriptive period must be reckoned from the time that TCT No. T-65157 covering Lot 2-A was issued to Napoleon, which was on 16 December 1971. Prescription had not yet set in as the action for reconveyance was filed on 21 April 1977, or only six years after title to Lot 2-A was issued to Napoleon. Respondents are not estopped by laches. Laches or stale demands is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. Laches gives rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert a right either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[23] Respondents vigilance in asserting and protecting their rights over Lot 2-A is on record. They initiated the investigation with the Bureau of Lands and registered their adverse claims on the certificate of title of Lot 2-A even before title was transferred to Napoleon. Respondents are far from guilty of sleeping on their rights.
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SANTOS vs. CRUZ FACTS: Respondent Iluminada Cruz is the owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-19968 and TCT No. 19973 of the Registry of Deeds of the City of Malabon, portions of which were occupied by petitioners Ricardo Santos and Paula Wong, respectively. Respondent Cruz filed two actions for ejectment against petitioners alleging that the latter entered her lot without her consent and built thereon structures without her permission; that petitioners, being her relatives, were allowed to stay free of charge on condition that they will vacate the premises upon demand; despite repeated demands, petitioners refused to vacate the said lots, and in view of the failure of the contending parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent was constrained to file the instant suit.
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Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners. In her omnibus motion, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator. The intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate. Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard. However, no claims were filed against the estate. Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory. The intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.
PACIOLES JR. vs. CHING FACTS: Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties, stock investments, bank deposits, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children. Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelitas estate. Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix. Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir.
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys fees. Respondent opposed petitioners motion. The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Forthwith, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate courts order which denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondents claim of ownership.
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The Appellate Court dismissed the petition ISSUE: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate? RULING: NO. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The CAs reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court. First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition, respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties. And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the settlement of Miguelitas estate, did not submit his own inven tory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
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While the rest did, the spouses Ramon and Estrella Ragudo who were occupying the lot, consisting of about 105 square meters of the Fabella Estate, refused to join the Association. The portion occupied by them was awarded to Mrs. Miriam De Guzman, a FETA member. FETA became the registered owner of the entire Fabella Estate, as evidenced by a TCT. FETA filed against the spouses Ragudo a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC. The MeTC dismissed the unlawful detainer case. The RTC affirmed the same. FETA then filed with the RTC-Pasig a complaint for recovery of possession. The trial court rendered judgment in FETAs favor. On appeal by the spouses Ragudo, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
RAGUDO vs. FABELLA ESTATE TENANTS ASSOCIATION INC. FACTS: Earlier, the tenants of a parcel of land at Mandaluyong City with an area of 6,825 square meters (hereinafter referred to as the Fabella Estate), which formed part of the estate of the late Don Dionisio M. Fabella, organized themselves and formed the Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc. (FETA), for the purpose of acquiring said property and distributing it to its members. Unable to raise the amount sufficient to buy the property from the heirs of Don Fabella, FETA applied for a loan from the NHMFC under the latters Community Mortgage Program. As a pre-condition for the loan, NHMFC required all tenants to become members of FETA.
ISSSUE: Whether or not acquisitive prescription and equitable laches had set in to warrant the continued possession of the subject lot by Ragudo and whether the same principle had created a vested right in favor of Ragudo to continue and possess and own the subject lot. RULING: NO We have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. In Natalia Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et al.,: Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to
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Upon learning of the existence of the above TCTs, Salvador Serra Serra, for and in behalf of his co-heirs, registered their adverse claim and moved for the cancellation of the reconstituted titles. They averred that they are holders of valid and existing certificates of title over the subject properties and have been in continuous and actual possession thereof. The trial court denied petitioners motion to cancel the reconstituted titles and granted instead Hernaez prayer that they be placed in possession of the subject properties, which petitioners challenged before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-00139. On June 7, 1971, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction which was ordered lifted in a resolution dated August 3, 1971. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence they filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. L-34080 and consolidated with G.R. No. L-34693, seeking to annul the resolution lifting the writ of preliminary injunction.
ESTATE OF SALVADOR SERRA vs. HEIRS OF PRIMITIVO HERNANDEZ FACTS: A petition for reconstitution of alleged lost OCT and owners duplicate copies in the name of Eleuterio Hernaez covering Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre, in the Province of Negros Occidental, was filed by his successors-in-interest Primitivo, Rogaciana and Luisa, all surnamed Hernaez with then CFI of Bacolod City. The CFI granted the petition and ordered the reconstitution of the subject OCTs and its duplicate copies. These reconstituted OCTs were cancelled on May 29, 1969 upon presentation by Hernaez of a declaration of heirship and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-51546, T-51547, and T-51548 were issued in their names.
RULING: Petitioners alleged possession of TCTs and actual possession of the subject lands, although strong proof of ownership, are not necessarily conclusive where the assertion of proprietary rights is founded on dubious claim of ownership. Since petitioners impugn the proprietary claim of Hernaez over the properties, the burden rests on them to establish their superior right over the latter. It is also undisputed that petitioners are all Spanish citizens. Under Philippine law, foreigners can acquire private lands only by hereditary succession or when they were formerly natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship. In this case, petitioners did not present proof that they acquired the properties by inheritance. Neither
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TAN vs. DE LA VEGA SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. x x x. Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending partys answer to raise an issue. The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings by
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WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED and the February 3, 2005 Decision and the July 6, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79957 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264 for further proceedings.
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Petitioners started the construction of a seven (7)-door bungalow-type building that allegedly intruded into the lot of Respondents. Petitioners were summoned by barangay officials to a meeting and was then agreed upon that petitioners would defer the construction work pending the result of a relocation survey to be conducted by a government surveyor. A survey was conducted by a geodetic engineer and in her report, Candelarias lot and petitioners lot were not correctly positioned geographically on the ground. Thus, as per survey, sub-lot B with an area of 10.43 square meters serves as right of way of Lot 6-B (petitioners lot) while sub-lot C with an area of 10.18 square meters was the portion of Lot 6-A (respondents lot) presently occupied by petitioners. Despite the delineation of said boundaries, petitioners proceeded with the forestalled construction. Respondents filed an ejectment case against petitioners before the MeTC. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the judgment of the MeTC. Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration but it was denied. The appellate court rendered a Decision13 dismissing the petition. RULING: CAJAYON vs. BATUYONG FACTS: Flaviana Lim Cajayon and Carmelita Lim Constantino (petitioners) and Isagani P. Candelaria were co-owners of a 260-square meter lot. A partition agreement was entered into by petitioners and Candelaria, wherein Lot 6-A, Psd 00-034294, containing an area of 100 square meters was adjudicated to Candelaria, while Lot 6-B, Psd 00034294, containing an area of 160 square meters was given to Petitioners now come to us via the present petition, submitting as issues the question of jurisdiction and the weight to be accorded to the verification survey results. It is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. From the above-quoted allegations taken in tandem with the textbook distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, it is clear that the complaint makes out a case for forcible entry, as opposed to unlawful detainer.
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Respondents had been in prior physical possession of the property in the concept of owner prior to petitioners intrusion on 21 May 1996. When petitioners encroached upon respondents lot and started construction works thereon the latter was dispossessed of the area involved. Despite various demands by respondents to vacate, petitioners obstinately refused to do so. Clearly, petitioners entry into the said property was illegal from the beginning, precluding an action for unlawful detainer. On the other hand, to establish a case of forcible entry, the complaint must allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Petitioners contend that while they concede they might have intruded on respondents property, the action is barred by prescription because it was filed more than one (1) year after the occurrence of the alleged intrusion. The contention is baseless. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff to bring an action in the proper inferior court for forcible entry or unlawful detainer within one (1) year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. In forcible entry, the one-year period is counted from the date of actual entry on the land. Records show that the ejectment suit was instituted on 11 April 1997. Petitioners actual entry into the property, according t o the complaint, took place on 21 May 1996. Thus, the suit was filed well within the one (1)-year period mandated by law.
PHILIPPINE ESTATE MANAGEMENT vs. TRONO FACTS: The petition alleges that on November 9, 1994, George, Ma. Teresa, Edgardo, Ma. Virginia, Jesse, Ma. Cristina, Inocencio, Jr., Carmen, and Zenaida, all surnamed Trono, herein respondents, filed with
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Respondents application for registration of a parcel of land already covered by a Torrens title is actually a collateral attack against petitioners title not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is well settled that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked; the issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose.[9] Hence, whether or not respondents have the right to claim title over the property in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding. That should be threshed out in a proper action. It has been invariably stated that the real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Corollarily, Section 32 of the same law states: Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
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Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person responsible for the fraud. (underscoring ours) A decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined, but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings.[12] As per records of the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City, TCT No. T-9182[13] was registered in petitioners name as early as April 28, 1989, or five (5) years before the filing of respondents application for registration. Thus, it is too late for them (respondents) to question petitioners titles considering that the Certificates of Title issued to the latter have become incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the decree of registration. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
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The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.22 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED
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GOVERNEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABALLE FACTS: Respondent Salvador Wee (Wee) filed a Cadastral Case, seeking the judicial reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-10046. The OSG appeared as Oppositor in behalf of the Government of the Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of Zamboanga City to likewise appear in its behalf. A Notice of Hearing was posted in Zamboanga City. The notice was also published in the Official Gazette. The RTC issued its order allowing reconstitution of OCT. Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the RTC. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for non-compliance with the jurisdictional requirements set in Section 13 of R.A. No. 26. RULING: YES. The reconstitution proceedings before the RTC falls under Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 26, or reconstitution from an authenticated copy of the decree of registration, pursuant to which the original title was issued. The applicable provisions, therefore, are Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26
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INDUSTRIES
CORPORATION
vs.
SKUNAC
Miguel Lim, then presenting himself as president of respondent corporation filed with the RTC Manila, a petition for the issuance of a new TCT in lieu of the lost TCT. The trial court issued an order directing the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new owners duplicate of TCT. The appellate court further ruled that petitioner was not a purchaser in good faith and for value. Hence, this Petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring as null and void the reconstituted title more than one (1) year after the same was issued. RULING: YES Main Issue: Validity of the Reconstituted Title Being intertwined, the second and the third issues raised by petitioner will initially be addressed by the Court. Also, a discussion of these issues will lead to a resolution of the first one. At the outset, the Court observes that the applicable law in applying for a replacement of an owners duplicate certificate of title is PD 1529. Respondent Miguel Lim procured the reconstituted title on the basis of RA No. 26. At any rate, the procedure employed for the issuance of the reconstituted certificate of title has not been raised as an issue in the present case.
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