Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

166229 June 29, 2005

MS. BAIRANSALAM LAUT LUCMAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MOSAMA M. PANDI, respondents. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Petitioner Bairansalam Laut Lucman and private respondent Mosama M. Pandi were mayoralty candidates in Poona-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, during the May 10, 2004 elections. During the canvassing of votes, private respondent objected to the inclusion of ten election returns, although only six of these are subjects of the present controversy, to wit:1

Precinct Number 1A

Election Returns Number 01201094

Objection/s 1) The election returns is obviously manufactured and/or falsified 2) It is not authentic 3) It contains alterations 1) Obviously manufactured 1) Obviously manufactured 2) Incomplete 1) Obviously manufactured and/or falsified 2) Incomplete 1) The election returns is obviously manufactured 2) It is incomplete, it lacks statistical data 1) Obviously manufactured

1B/C 3A 8A 8B/8C 14A/14B

01201091 01201095 01201093 01201106 01201096

The Municipal Board of Canvassers (Board) overruled private respondents objections on the disputed returns,2and proclaimed petitioner as the winning candidate, as shown in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Municipal Offices, signed on May 19, 2004.3 Petitioner won over private respondent by a margin of 16 votes. Private respondent filed with Commission on Elections (COMELEC) an appeal from the ruling of the Board, docketed as SPC 04-184, alleging massive fraud and irregularities in the conduct of the elections, e.g., force, threat and intimidation were employed on the voters, double voting,

substitution of voters, snatching of ballots, padding of ballots and existence of flying voters.4 Private respondent also contended that the contested election returns should have been excluded from the canvass, and that the Board was precipitate in proclaiming petitioner as the winning candidate, as private respondent has manifested on record that he is intending to appeal the Boards ruling.5 Private respondent admits that the exclusion of the contested returns is a ground for election protest, but he also argues that the COMELEC may go beyond the face of the returns to determine whether the elections in the precincts involved are a sham. Private respondent also filed a motion to annul proclamation and/or to suspend the effects of proclamationpendente lite.6 Petitioner filed his Comment and/or Answer to the appeal, arguing that the grounds relied upon by private respondent are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy but in an election protest. Petitioner also argues that her proclamation is valid; the petition is defective for failure to include indispensable parties; and that private respondent failed to inform the Board that he is appealing its ruling, as required by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7166, or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1991.7 On June 16, 2004, a hearing on the appeal was held, wherein counsel for petitioner and private respondent, and several Board of Election Inspectors of Poona-Bayabao appeared, and Ms. Monera P. Macadato, Poll Clerk of Precinct 3A was called to the witness stand.8 Presiding Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra, for the First Division, then issued an order on the same date, requiring the parties to submit their simultaneous memoranda.9 On September 30, 2004, the COMELECs First Division issued the assailed order, with the following dispositive portion: In order therefore to resolve the issues raised in this Appeal the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) hereby ORDERS the document examiners of the Commission on Elections to conduct an examination of the List of Voters with Voting Record of the precincts involved in this case as well as the VRRs pertaining to the contested precincts in the Municipality of Poonabayabao to determine whether or not actual voting by the duly registered voters of said precincts were conducted during the elections of May 10, 2004; Considering that we have annulled the proclamation of BAIRAMSALAM (sic) LAUT LUCMAN as duly elected mayor of Poonabayabao, Lanao del Sur, it is hereby ordered that the Vice-Mayor of said Municipality assumed (sic) the position pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code, until the final resolution of this petition. SO ORDERED.10 Commissioner Virgilio O. Garcillano dissented to the majority opinion on the ground that the petition involves issues proper to an election protest and not a pre-proclamation controversy.11 Petitioner moved to reconsider the assailed Order, and in an Order dated October 13, 2004, Commissioner Borra ordered and certified the motion for reconsideration to the Commission en banc.12 Thereafter, the Commission en banc, in an Order dated October 14, 2004, issued a temporary restraining order and a status quo ante order, directing the parties to maintain the status prevailing before the issuance of the September 30, 2004 Resolution. On December 14, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioners motion for lack of merit.13 The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (en banc) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The Order of the Commission (First Division) dated 30 September 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, in implementation of the directive therein, the document examiners of the Commission on Elections are hereby ordered to conduct an examination of the List of Voters with Voting Record of the precincts involved in this case as well as the VRRs pertaining to the contested precincts in the Municipality of Poonabayabao to determine whether or not actual voting by the duly registered voters of said precincts were conducted during the elections of May 10, 2004, and thereafter submit a report thereon. The Temporary Restraining Order/Status Quo Ante Order dated 14 October 2004 is hereby lifted. SO ORDERED.14 On December 17, 2004, Commissioner Mehol Sadain issued a Constancia protesting his lack of participation in the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sadain stated that although he was out on official business at the time the Resolution was routed to his office, he should have been allowed to vote thereon, or at least, informed of the urgency of its promulgation so that he may cast his vote or allow its promulgation without his signature.15 Petitioner then filed the present special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction, based on the following grounds: PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT, IN EXCESS OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ANNULLING THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PETITIONER. PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED IN EXCESS OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE DOCUMENT EXAMINERS TO EXAMINE THE LIST OF VOTERS WITH VOTING RECORDS AND THE VRRs. PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT, IN EXCESS OR WITH GRAVE OF DISCRETION (sic) IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL WITHOUT THE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IMPLEADED AND WITHOUT THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 20, RA 7166 COMPLIED. PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE CHALLENGED INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2004.16 The pivotal issue in this case is whether the appeal from the Board of Canvassers to the COMELEC (First Division) interjected by private respondent makes a case for a pre-proclamation controversy. Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code defines a pre-proclamation controversy as "any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns." Under Section 243 of the same Code, the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy, are as follows:

SEC. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. - The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy: (a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code; (c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. The foregoing enumeration is restrictive and exclusive.17 In the present case, the objections initially raised by private respondent before the Municipal Board of Canvassers were proper in a pre-proclamation controversy, i.e., the election returns is obviously manufactured and/or falsified, it is not authentic, it contains alterations. However, in his appeal to the COMELEC, he further alleged that the elections held in the precincts clustered in the Pooni Lomabao Central Elementary were tainted with massive election irregularities. According to private respondent, there were "massive substitution of voters, snatching of ballots from the voters by people identified with the Lucman who filled them up against the will of the voters, force or coercion, threats, intimidation, casting of votes by double registrants in the same precincts (double entry), and flying voters "18 Private respondent also alleged that the counting of votes on May 11, 2004, were not prepared simultaneously with the appreciation of the ballots/counting of votes, in violation of Section 44 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6667 (March 16, 2004). Also, private respondents watchers were threatened by petitioners watchers, forcing them to leave the counting room, and that the Board of Election Inspectors merely copied the entries on the tally boards and records of votes made by petitioners watchers. Finally, private respondent alleged that the denial to his objections to the contested election returns were not made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers in the prescribed form, and that despite his manifestation that he will appeal the Boards ruling on the returns, it proceeded with petitioners proclamation.19 Obviously, the foregoing allegations pertain not only to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns, but to the conduct of the elections as well. Pre-proclamation controversies are limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers and proceedings before said Board relating to particular election returns to which private respondent should have made specific verbal objections subsequently reduced to writing. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face. As a rule, the COMELEC is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face.20 It is beyond the COMELECs jurisdiction to go beyond the face of the returns or investigate election irregularities.21 The proceedings in a pre-proclamation controversy are summary in nature.22 Reception of evidence aliunde, such as the List of Voters with Voting Record and the VRRs, is proscribed.23 Issues such as fraud or terrorism attendant to the election process, the resolution of which would compel or necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which appear to be prima facie regular, on their face, are anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy. Such issues should be posed and resolved in a regular election protest, which is within the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).24 In a regular election protest, the parties may litigate

all the legal and factual issues raised by them inasmuch detail as they may deem necessary or appropriate.25 In Macabago vs. COMELEC,26 the Court reiterated: That the padding of the List of Voters may constitute fraud, or that the Board of Election Inspectors may have fraudulently conspired in its preparation, would not be a valid basis for a pre-proclamation controversy either. For, whenever irregularities, such as fraud, are asserted, the proper course of action is an election protest. Such irregularities as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism are proper grounds in an election contest but may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only a relative few. Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the resultant disenfranchisement of the innocent voters, for the losers will always cry fraud and terrorism (GAD vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665). Hence, as correctly argued by petitioner, private respondents cause of action before the COMELEC is proper for an election protest and not a pre-proclamation controversy, and the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondents petition/appeal. Consequently, all subsequent actions by the COMELEC in relation to private respondents appeal are null and void, and correctible by the present special civil action for certiorari. Following the disposition of the Court in Macabago vs. COMELEC,27 the dismissal of private respondents petition/appeal before the COMELEC is without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest before the proper RTC, the period for the filing of which is deemed suspended by the filing of private respondents petition/appeal. In light of the foregoing ruling, the Court need not delve on the other issues posed by petitioner as these necessarily have been rendered moot and academic28 thereby. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order dated September 30, 2004 of the First Division and Resolution En Banc dated December 14, 2004 are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Private respondents appeal to the First Division and the appeal to the COMELEC En Banc are DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest, the period for the filing of which is deemed suspended by the filing of the petition before the COMELEC until the finality of herein decision. The proclamation of petitioner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers is maintained and petitioner should be allowed to assume her office as mayor of Poona-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT EN BANC G.R. No. 165491. March 31, 2005 ROBERT E. OLANOLAN, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CELSO A. TIZON, Respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Coming to this Court via this verified petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for injunctive relief, petitioner Robert E. Olanolan urges us to nullify and set aside the en banc Order1 dated September 8, 2004 of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in EAC No. 61-2003 denying his motion for reconsideration of an earlier Resolution2 dated March 31, 2004 of the Commissions Second Division, the nullification of which, along with said Divisions other incidental issuances, are likewise sought in this recourse. The factual antecedents are, as follows: Petitioner Roberto E. Olanolan (Olanolan) and private respondent Celso A. Tizon (Tizon) were among the candidates for the position of punong barangay of Barangay 76-A, Bucana, Davao City in the July 15, 2002barangay elections. After the voting exercise and canvass, Olanolan was proclaimed the winning candidate, having garnered a total of4,278 votes as against the 4,268 votes for Tizon, the second placer, or a margin of ten (10) votes. Tizon attributed his loss to anomalies allegedly perpetrated by, among others, the chairperson, poll clerks and members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). Accordingly, on July 25, 2002, he filed before the MunicipalTrial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City an election protest,3 docketed as Election Case No. 844-G-2002, which was eventually raffled to Branch 7 of the court. In it, Tizon prayed for the revision of ballots cast in seventy (72) two precincts located at Bucana Elementary School and thereafter the nullification of Olanolans proclamation and his (Tizons) proclamation as the elected punong barangay of Barangay 76-A, Bucana, Davao City. Inasmuch as Olanolans answer with counter-protest was belatedly filed, the MTCC would, as stated in its decision, infra, enter a general denial for him. Subsequent developments saw the constitution by the MTCC of a 3-man revision committee which, after conducting a revision and recounting of ballots in the contested precincts, submitted a Revision Committee Report dated September 19, 2002.4 During the protest proceedings, it was observed that the ballots used in two (2) of the contested precincts, i.e., Precincts No. 598-A and 608-A, were without COMELEC watermarks and other security features. In fact, page 65of the revision report contained the following entries:

"B) In precinct 598A with a total number of 56 votes for OLANOLAN and 29 for TIZON was excluded from the recounting on the following grounds: 1) That the color of the ballots is different from the ballots which were already recounted taken from the previous boxes; 2) That upon examination, the ballots in this precinct do not have security code shadow while in the other ballots which were already recounted from the previous ballot boxes have their security code shadow". In the same proceedings, the BEI chairman of Precinct No. 598-A, Benigno Silvosa, admitted to receiving from the Davao City Treasurers Office the election paraphernalia for that precinct the day before actual voting and thenbringing home the same to his residence.6 On December 18, 2002, the MTCC rendered judgment7 dismissing Tizons election protest mainly on the strength of the following premises: In the case of Marcelino Libanan vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jose Ramirez, G.R. No. 129783, December 22, 1997, the court affirmed the ruling of the Tribunal in . . . HRET Case No. 95-020 to the effect that a ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears any of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark (b) in cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of blue and red fibers in the ballot. In the instant action, petitioner [i.e.,Tizon] failed to show convincing proof that the absence of the COMELEC watermarks particularly on ballots belonging to Precinct 578-A [should have been Precinct 598-A] rendered the same invalid. Nonetheless, even if the COMELEC watermarks are not visible to the naked eye, the ballots under this precinct bore the initial of the BEI chairman at the back of the same. As held, it is only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection. xxx xxx xxx The allegation in the Petition . . . which refers to anomalous conduct of the Chairman of the BEI of Precinct 598-A . . . in the person of Ben Silvosa was unsubstantiated. The court is convinced the alleged anomaly did not exist. (Words in bracket added). In time, Tizon appealed to the COMELEC whereat his recourse was docketed as EAC No. 61-2003. On March 31, 2004, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution,8 setting aside the appealed decision of the MTCC and declaring Tizon, as protestant-appellant thereat, "the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay 76-A, Bucana, Davao City in the July 15, 2002 barangay elections having obtained a total of 4,221 votes as against the protestee-appellees 4,196 or a margin of 25 votes". The Second Division ratiocinated: On the other hand, a cursory reading of the questioned decision of the court a quo reveals flaws and/or shortcomings that militate against the validity of the findings and conclusions contained in said decision. Predicated therefrom, we find it necessary to disabuse the minds of the parties anent their contentious allegations by examining and appreciating the ballots and all election documents the results hereunder discussed.

Petitioner Olanolan received a copy of the resolution on April 14, 2004. Two days thereafter, April 16, he filed, via registered mail, a Motion for Reconsideration.9 For his part, private respondent Tizon sought, in an earlier motion,10 the execution of the aforementioned March 31, 2004 Resolution of the COMELECs Second Division. Pursuant to an Order of April 26, 2004,11 the Second Division elevated Olanolans Motion for Reconsideration (MR), together with the case records, to the COMELEC en banc, noting that "only seven (7) sets of the said MR were filed and that no payment of the required motion fee was made by movant." In the same Order, the Second Division likewise elevated to the en banc Tizons motion for execution pending appeal. Barely a week after, or on May 4, 2004, petitioner Olanolan submitted a manifestation12 enclosing therewith a postal money order in the amount of P500.00 to cover the required legal fees for his Motion for Reconsideration. In the herein assailed Order dated September 8, 2004,13 the COMELEC en banc denied the desired reconsideration on account of Olanolans, as movant therein, failure to pay the motion fee and to submit the required number of copies of his motion for reconsideration. In the same Order, the COMELEC en banc directed the Second Divisions commission clerk to immediately issue an Entry of Judgment and the Chief of the Judicial Records Division to remand to the MTCC the records of the case, stating in this regard the following: Considering that there is no valid motion [for reconsideration] to speak of, the provision of Section 13 (c), Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure applies, to wit: Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolution. xxx (c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special actions and Special cases andafter fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation. hence, the Resolution promulgated by this Commission (Second Division) on March 31, 2004, copy of which was received by protestee-appellees counsel on April 14, 2004, had become final and executory on April 15, 2004. (Italics and underlining in the original). After the decreed issuance of Entry of Judgment, the COMELECs Special Second Division, acting on Tizons earlier motion to execute the questioned March 31, 2004 Resolution of the Division, directed, in its Order of September 16, 2004,14 the issuance of the corresponding writ, which the division clerk did issue on even date.15 Hence, petitioner Olanolans present recourse, claiming in gist, that the COMELEC en banc acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in 1. denying his motion for reconsideration of the March 31, 2004 Resolution of the Second Division on grounds of non-payment of legal fees and non-submission of the required copies of the motion; and 2. declaring the same Resolution as final and executory on April 15, 2004, or fifteen (15) from its promulgation on March 31, 2004, on the theory that his motion for reconsideration of such resolution is, for all intents and purposes, not filed.

Petitioner Olanolan also imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Second Division in reversing the MTCC decision and in ordering the issuance of a writ of execution that eventually led to the implementation of its (Second Divisions) March 31, 2004 Resolution. In the Courts en banc Resolution of November 9, 2004, we directed the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed resolution and order of the COMELEC.16 In compliance with this injunction, the Department of the Interior and Local Government took the necessary measures which eventually enabled petitioner Olanolan to actually assume the office of punong barangay on December 6, 2004. It is petitioners posture in this recourse that the twin requirements on payment of fee for motion for reconsideration and the submission of the necessary number of copies of such motion are not jurisdictional caveat, but partake of the nature of mere technical rules which should not be made to prevail over the collective will of the voters of Barangay 76-A, Bucana, Davao City. It is, he adds, thus gravely abusive of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc to predicate its assailed denial action on non-compliance with such technical requirements. We are not persuaded. The term "grave abuse of discretion", in its juridical sense, connotes, as Litton Mills Inc. Inc. vs. Galleon Trader, Inc.,17 and a host of other cases teach, capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of passion and hostility.18 The word "capricious", usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary", conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand ofcertiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative. As it were, the COMELEC en banc, in issuing its assailed Order dated September 8, 2004,19 did no more than follow its own rules issued pursuant to no less than to its constitutional mandate to promulgate "its rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases"20 as well as to issue "its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices . . . ."21 The rules on payment of legal fees and submission of pleadings are embodied in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 7(f) of Rule 40 and Section 1, Rule 7, thereof, pertinently providing, respectively, as follows: Rule 40, Section 7(f): "Sec. 7. Legal Fees. The following legal fees shall be charged and collected. xxx xxx xxx (f) For filing of a motion for reconsideration on a decision, order or resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P500.00 (as amended) Rule 7, Section 1: "Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10) legible copies. xxx,".

Complementing the aforequoted Section 7(f) of Rule 40 is the succeeding Section 18 of the same Rule, prescribing the COMELECs option in case of non-payment of prescribed fees, thus: "Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. If the fees above prescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action until they are paid and may dismiss the action or proceeding." Petitioners lament that what the COMELEC en banc did was improvidential as it could have merely refused to act on his motion for reconsideration until the required fees were paid, while understandable, is untenable. Rodillas vs. Commission on Elections22 succinctly explains why: Petitioner cannot invoke to his aid the provision of Section 18, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure for the simple reason that under said Rule, the COMELEC is precisely given the discretion, in a case where the prescribed fees are not paid, to either refuse to take action on the case until the fees are paid, or to dismiss the action or proceeding. The COMELEC, unfortunately for petitioner, chose to exercise the second option. The COMELEC, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal. Consequent to the COMELECs en banc Order declaring its Second Divisions Resolution of March 31, 2004 final and executory, the assailed issuance by the latter of the corresponding writ of execution to implement said resolution can be sustained as correct and doubtless within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a writ of certiorari, certiorari being limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction; it is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment,23 if such be the case. In all, this Court finds that the COMELEC en banc committed no error in denying, for reasons stated in its assailedOrder dated September 8, 2004, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Second Divisions Resolution of March 31, 2004. Given the foregoing premises, there is hardly any need to delve into the question of whether grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance by the COMELEC of an Entry of Judgment on the assailed Second Divisions March 31, 2004 Resolution that led to the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution. Such issue has been rendered moot and academic by this disposition. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.24 In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which a petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.25 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the status quo ante order issued by this Court on November 9, 2004 is hereby RECALLED. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006

FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. x---------------------x G.R. No. 163354 January 23, 2006

ROMMEL G. ONG, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Before the Court are these two separate petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc. The first, docketed as G.R. No. 163295, is a petition for certiorari with petitioner Francis G. Ong impugning the COMELEC en banc resolution1 dated May 7, 2004 in SPA Case No. 04-048, granting private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated March 31, 20042 of the COMELECs First Division. The second, G.R. No. 163354, is for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for injunctive relief, filed by petitioner Rommel Ong, brother of Francis, seeking, among other things, to stop the COMELEC from enforcing and implementing its aforesaid May 7, 2004 en banc resolution in SPA Case No. 04-048 pending the outcome of the petition in G.R. No. 163295. Per its en banc Resolution of June 1, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of these petitions. The recourse stemmed from the following essential and undisputed factual backdrop: Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor. On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy3 of Francis. Docketed as SPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have

assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850 before the RegionalTrial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest,4 albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis certificate of candidacy for the May 10, 2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution5 dismissing the said petition of Alegre, rationalizing as follows: We see the circumstances in the case now before us analogous to those obtaining in the sample situations addressed by the Highest Court in the Borja case. Herein, one of the requisites for the application of the three term rule is not present. Francis Ong might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004. The mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The [RTC] of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 41 has voided his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that Stanley Alegre was the "legally elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte." This disposition had become final after the [COMELEC] dismissed the appeal filed by Ong, the case having become moot and academic. xxx xxx xxx On the basis of the words of the Highest Court pronounced in the Lonzanida case and applicable in the case at bench, Ong could not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998 to 2001 because "he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as a presumptive winner; which presumption was later overturned when [the RTC] decided with finality that [he] lost in the May 1998 elections." (Words in bracket and emphasis in the original). Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely motion for reconsideration, contending, in the main, that there was a misapplication of the three-term rule, as applied in the cited cases of Borja vs. Comelec and Lonzanida vs. Comelec, infra. On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued, in SPA No. 04-048, a resolution6 reversing the March 31, 2004 resolution of the COMELECs First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis "as disqualified to run for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004"; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis name from the official list of candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his favor. The following day, May 8, Francis received a fax machine copy of the aforecited May 7, 2004 resolution, sending him posthaste to seek the assistance of his political party, the Nationalist Peoples Coalition, which immediately nominated his older brother, Rommel Ong (Rommel), as substitute candidate. At about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, Rommel filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his brother Francis. The following undisputed events then transpired:

1. On May 9, 2004, or a day before the May 10 elections, Alegre filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Rommel Ong. 2. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento, counsel for the Ong brothers, addressed a letter7 to Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Camarines Norte Liza Z. Cario and Acting Election Officer Emily G. Basilonia in which he appealed that, owing to the COMELECs inaction on Alegre's petition to cancel Rommels certificate of candidacy, the name "Rommel Ong" be included in the official certified list of candidates for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte. The desired listing was granted by the PES Carino. 3. On May 10, 2004, Alegre wrote8 to then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, Commissioner-in-Charge for Regions IV and V, seeking clarification on the legality of the action thus taken by the PES Cario. Responding, Commissioner Garcillano issued a Memorandum under date May 10, 20049 addressed to PES Liza D. Zabala-Cario, ordering her to implement the resolution of the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004.10 Said Memorandum partly stated: The undersigned ADOPTS the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig [Director IV, Law Department], which he quote your stand, "that substitution is not proper if the certificate of the substituted candidacy is denied due course. In the Resolution of the Commission En banc, the Certificate of candidacy of Francis Ong was denied due course," and elaborated further that: "x x x there is an existing policy of the Commission not to include the name of a substitute candidate in the certified list of candidates unless the substitution is approved by the Commission. In view, thereof, it is recommended that 1) the substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong Gan Ong, should be denied due course; and 2) the election officer be directed to delete his name from the list of candidates." The above position of the Commission was in line with the pronouncement of Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Abaya (311 SCRA 617) which states: "There can no valid substitution where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy." In view thereof, you are hereby directed to faithfully implement the said Resolution of the Commission En Banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added]. 4. Owing to the aforementioned Garcillano Memorandum, it would seem that the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvasser of San Vicente issued an order enjoining all concerned not to canvass the votes cast for Rommel, prompting the latter to file a protest with that Board.11 5. On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alegre as the winning candidate for the mayoralty post in San Vicente, Camarines Norte.12 On May 12, 2004, Francis filed before the Court a petition for certiorari, presently docketed as G.R. No. 163295. His brother Rommels petition in G.R. No. 163354 followed barely a week after.

In our en banc resolution dated June 1, 2004, G.R. No. 163295 and G.R. No. 163354 were consolidated.13 Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC issued an order dismissing private respondent Alegres Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for being moot and academic.14 The issues for resolution of the Court are: In G.R. No. 163295, whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its en banc resolution dated May 7, 2004 declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to run for Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections and consequently ordering the deletion of his name from the official list of candidates so that any vote cast in his favor shall be considered stray. In G.R. No. 163354, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to Rommels certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis. A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question of whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. Petitioner Francis, on the other hand, disagrees. He argues that, while he indeed assumed office and discharged the duties as Mayor of San Vicente for three consecutive terms, his proclamation as mayor-elect in the May 1998 election was contested and eventually nullified per the decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte dated July 4, 2001. Pressing the point, petitioner argues, citing Lonzanida vs. Comelec15, that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and one assuming office on the strength of a protested proclamation does so as a presumptive winner and subject to the final outcome of the election protest. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as follows: Sec. 43. Term of Office. xxx xxx xxx (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.16 With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule. We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full term", and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position. It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850,17 that it was Francis opponent (Alegre) who "won" in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from the Courts ruling in, Lonzanida vs. Comelec,18 citingBorja vs. Comelec19. In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision dated January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the office and performed his duties up to March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed and was eventually granted. There, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. As the Court pointedly observed, Lonzanida "cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact vacated] his post before the expiration of the term."

The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service. On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. But more importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term. The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post of San Vicente and denying due course to his certificate of candidacy by force of the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the three-term limit rule for any local elective official cannot be sustained. What the COMELEC en banc said in its May 7, 2004 assailed Resolution commends itself for concurrence: As correctly pointed out by Petitioner-Movant [Alegre]in applying the ruling in the Borja and Lonzanida cases in the instant petition will be erroneous because the factual milieu in those cases is different from the one obtaining here. Explicitly, the three-term limit was not made applicable in the cases of Borja and Lonzanida because there was an interruption in the continuity of service of the three consecutive terms. Here, Respondent Ong would have served continuously for three consecutive terms, from 1995 to 2004. His full term from 1998 to 2001 could not be simply discounted on the basis that he was not duly elected thereto on account of void proclamation because it would have iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality as it rewards a legally disqualified and repudiated loser with a crown of victory. (Word in bracket added; emphasis in the original) Given the foregoing consideration, the question of whether or not then Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano overstepped his discretion when he issued the May 10, 2004 Memorandum, ordering the implementation of aforesaid May 7, 2004 COMELEC en banc resolution even before its finality20 is now of little moment and need not detain us any longer. Just as unmeritorious as Francis petition in G.R. No. 163295 is Rommels petition in G.R. No. 163354 in which he (Rommel) challenges the COMELEC's act of not including his name as a substitute candidate in the official list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. As it were, existing COMELEC policy21 provides for the non-inclusion of the name of substitute candidates in the certified list of candidates pending approval of the substitution. Not to be overlooked is the Courts holding in Miranda vs. Abaya,22 that a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party as that of the former, thus: While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code. xxx xxx xxx A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all. xxx xxx xxx After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why in Bautista [Bautista vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998] we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004 elections were already pass, Rommel Ongs petition in G.R. No. 163354 is already moot and academic. WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Asscociate Justice ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Asscociate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Asscociate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Asscociate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Asscociate Justice

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. RESOLUTION TINGA, J.: Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy. On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired. In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari , petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for theCertificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and his program of government. First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.

Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting,2 and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.4 An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise: I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied) Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel aCertificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the

limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has to be accorded due weight. Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is misplaced. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held: [T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].11 The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the COMELECs Comment: There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00). xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.12 The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in every polling place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral contributions.15Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given election. Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would

actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings." The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.18 The determination of bona fidecandidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code. Now, the needed factual premises. However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions. Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to their respective Comments. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process. As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to show that the candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the Constitution and other election laws. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug*, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*

On Official Leave.

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
2

See Basco v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52, 68; Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, 246 SCRA 540, 564. "A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not selfexecuting." Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997, 267 SCRA 408, 431. "Accordingly, [the Court has] held that the provisions in Article II of our Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be construed as mere statements of principles of the State." Justice Puno, dissenting, Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, Id. at 474.
3

See Kilosbayan Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, 16 November 1995, 250 SCRA 130, 138. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, supra note 2 at 436.
4

Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 2.

"A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and enforcement. The inquiry demands a micro-analysis and the context of the provision in question." J. Puno, dissenting, Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, supra note 2.
6

J. Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers (1995), p. 148. IV Records of Proceedings and Debates, 1986 Constitutional Commission 945.

See J. Feliciano, concurring, Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 815. Section 69. Nuisance Candidates. The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
9

SEC. 6. Motu Proprio Cases. The Commission may, at any time before the election, motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy of any candidate for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senator and Party-list:
10

I. The grounds: a. Candidates who, on the face of their certificate of candidacy, do not possess the constitutional and legal qualifications of the office to which they aspire to be elected; b. Candidate who, on the face of said certificate, filed their certificate of candidacy to put the election process in mockery or disrepute; c. Candidates whose certificate of candidacy could cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of names and surnames with other candidates; and d. Candidates who have no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy had been filed or acts that clearly demonstrate the lack of such bona fide intention, such as: d.1 Candidates who do not belong to or are not nominated by any registered political party of national constituency; d.2 Presidential, Vice-Presidential [candi-dates] who do not present running mates for vice-president, respectively, nor senatorial candidates; d.3 Candidates who do not have a platform of government and are not capable of waging a nationwide campaign.
11

Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). Rollo, pp. 469. See Section 178, Omnibus Election Code, as amended. See Section 239, Omnibus Election Code, as amended. See Article XI, Omnibus Election Code, as amended. See Section 2(1), Article IX, Constitution.

12

13

14

15

16

17

Sanchez v. COMELEC, 199 Phil. 617 (1987), citing Cauton v. COMELEC, L-25467, 27 April 1967, 19 SCRA 911.
18

See Section 9, Article IX, Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT EN BANC G.R. NO. 167499 September 15, 2005 MILES ANDREW MARI ROCES, Petitioners, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARIA ZENAIDA B. ANG PING, Respondent. DECISION PUNO, J.: If there is a right, there must be a remedy is an old legal adage. The case at bar provides the perfect setting for the application of this adage which is a demand for simple justice. The facts will show how the respondents right to run for a public office has been frustrated by unscrupulous officials in charge of the sanctity of our electoral process. Petitioner Miles Roces (Roces) and former Congressman Harry Ang Ping (Mr. Ang Ping) filed their respective certificates of candidacy (COCs) for the position of Representative for the 3rd Congressional District of Manila in the May 2004 elections. On January 5, 2004, a registered voter of Manila named Alejandro Gomez questioned Mr. Ang Pings candidacy before the COMELEC through a petition to deny due course or cancel his COC.1 The petition alleged that Mr. Ang Ping misrepresented himself to be a natural-born citizen, hence was disqualified for the position. Acting for the COMELEC First Division, Commissioner Virgilio O. Garcilliano issued an order on April 30, 2004scheduling the promulgation of its resolution on May 5, 2004.2 Two days before the scheduled promulgation or on May 3, 2004, Mr. Ang Ping filed with the COMELEC a Sworn Declaration of Withdrawal of his COC.3 The next day, May 4, 2004, the General Counsel for the Nationalist Peoples Coalition, the political party of Mr. Ang Ping, sought that Mr. Ang Pings wife, Ma. Zenaida Ang Ping (Mrs. Ang Ping), substitute for him.4 Mr. Ang Ping also filed a motion to cancel the scheduled promulgation and dismiss the petition to deny due course or cancel his COC on the same date.5 On May 5, 2004, Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra deferred the promulgation for lack of quorum as he was the sole Commissioner in attendance.6 Despite all these developments, the COMELEC First Division, through Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier, Resurreccion Z. Borra, and Virgilio O. Garcilliano, issued a resolution granting the petition to deny due course to Mr. Ang Pings COC and ordering the Board of Election Inspectors of Manila not to count any vote cast in his favor.7 It ruled that the resolution which was originally scheduled for promulgation by Commissioner Garcilliano on May 5, 2004 was instead promulgated on April 30, 2004, the same date that the notice of promulgation was issued.8 The resolution was served on Mr. Ang Pings counsel on May 8, 2004.9 Compounding the woes of Mr. Ang Ping, and despite the deferment of the promulgation by Commissioner Borra at a hearing on May 5, 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued on the same date an order denyingMr. Ang Pings motion to dismiss. It held that the motion to

dismiss was filed after the "promulgation" of theApril 30, 2004 resolution granting the petition to deny due course to Mr. Ang Pings COC.10 On May 9, 2004,and before the expiration of the fiveday reglementary period,11 Mr. Ang Ping moved for reconsideration of the April 30, 2004 resolution and the case was elevated to the COMELEC en banc.12 While the case was still with the COMELEC First Division, or on May 8, 2004, the COMELEC en bancissued Resolution No. 6823, declaring moot Mr. Ang Pings Affidavit of Withdrawal, denying due course to the substitute COC of Mrs. Ang Ping and ordering the Regional Election Director to delete Mr. Ang Pings name from the certified list of candidates.13 Among the signatories to the Resolution wereCommissioners Javier, Borra, and Garcilliano of the COMELEC First Division before which the petition to deny due course was still pending.14 Mr. Ang Ping had no knowledge of the resolution. Racing against time or on May 11, 2004, the spouses Ang Ping repaired to this Court and filed a petition forcertiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order, status quo order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as G.R. No. 163259, assailing COMELEC Resolution No. 6823.15 The next day or on May 12, 2004, this Court issued a resolution requiring Roces to comment and denied the issuance of an order suspending the proclamation.16 On the election day itself, the Manila City Board of Canvassers resolved not to canvass the votes for Mr. or Mrs. Ang Ping citing COMELEC Resolution No. 6823.17 On May 15, 2004, after counting only 6,347 votes out of the 150,387 registered voters in the district, it proclaimed Roces winner.18 The spouses Ang Ping appealed the Board resolution to the COMELEC en banc19 and filed a petition to annul the proclamation20 but these were dismissed by COMELECs Resolution No. 7257 and Omnibus Order of July 6, 2004.21 On May 19, 2004, Roces filed his Comment to the petition of spouses Ang Ping with this Court.22 On May 25, 2004, this Court required the spouses Ang Ping to file their consolidated reply to the Comment.23 On May 24, 2004, Mrs. Ang Ping filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the House of RepresentativesElectoral Tribunal (HRET), which was docketed as HRET Case No. 04-004.24 In her election protest, Mrs. Ang Ping alleged, among others, that COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 was a "glaring case of deprivation" of Mr. and Mrs. Ang Pings right to "elevate SPC 04-224 to the Commission en banc" and that the COMELECs April 30, 2004 resolution was irregularly promulgated. Roces filed his answer alleging, among others, that the HRET has no jurisdiction over the case.25 On July 16, 2004, the spouses Ang Ping filed their consolidated reply with this Court.26 On July 27, 2004, we required Mrs. Ang Ping to show cause why the petition in G.R. No. 163259 should not be dismissed in view of the filing and pendency of HRET Case No. 04-004.27 In her Compliance filed on July 30, 2004, Mrs. Ang Ping explained that the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 may be ventilated as one of the issues to be settled in the HRET Election Protest since the non-canvassing of the "Ang Ping votes" and the proclamation of petitioner Roces were founded on COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 and were raised as the principal issues in the HRET Election Protest. This notwithstanding, the spouses Ang Ping manifested that they will "submit to any disposal which this Honorable Court may find appropriate under the above circumstances" and "would defer and will accept any order/resolution of the Honorable Court that would resolve to dismiss the instant petition/controversy, but allowing them to pursue and concentrate their time and effort in the above-mentioned Ad Cautela HRET Election Protest Case, which they intend to convert to a REGULAR PROTEST case, in such an event."28

On August 10, 2004, this Court dismissed G.R. No. 163259 in view of the pending HRET protest filed by Mrs. Ang Ping.29 The resolution eventually became final and executory.30 Thereafter, Mrs. Ang Ping filed in the HRET a motion to convert the ad cautelam protest to a regular protest. The HRET granted the motion on September 9, 2004.31 In the HRET, Roces filed a motion to dismiss the protest, assailing in the main the personality of Mrs. Ang Ping to file the protest. It also raised the following issues: (1) whether the HRET has jurisdiction to review COMELEC Resolution No. 6823; (2) whether Mrs. Ang Ping can validly substitute for Mr. Ang Ping; (3) whether the protest may be resolved by mere canvass of election returns; (4) whether the proceeding is a "protest" considering that it questions proceedings held before the Manila City Board of Canvassers; (5) whether Mrs. Ang Ping could claim any right to the ballots cast considering she was not listed in the certified list of COMELEC candidates; (6) whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance despite failing to state the specific precincts protested; and (7) whether forum shopping was committed. After extensive oral arguments, the HRET denied Rocess motion to dismiss on March 3, 2005. It ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to file the protest against Roces since: (1) there was no final COMELEC resolution disqualifying or denying due course to the COC of Mr. Ang Ping, thus her substitution for the latter was legally permissible under the Omnibus Election Code;32 (2) she was one of the candidates voted for during election day in the 3rd District of Manila;33 and (3) the COMELEC Order of May 5, 2004 was of questionable validity for the reason that: (a) it was issued in violation of its April 30, 2004 resolution setting the promulgation for May 5, 2004 and despite the fact that the records had not yet reached the COMELEC en banc;34 and (b) there was no prior notice and hearing in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.35 Rocess motion for reconsideration of the HRET order was denied on March 21, 2005. Roces then filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the two preceding resolutions of the HRET.36 Theissues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to file the election protest despite the denial in due course and cancellation of her COC under COMELEC Resolution No. 6823; and (2) whether or not HRET has jurisdiction to review a resolution or order of the COMELEC and/or declare the same as void and disregard or set it aside. After several months or on April 28, 2005, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution denying Mr. Ang Pings motion for reconsideration of the COMELECs April 30, 2004 resolution for being moot and academic due to the petitioners proclamation, Mr. Ang Pings withdrawal of his candidacy and Mrs. Ang Pings attempt to substitute for her husband.37 We hold that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the petitioners motion to dismiss for the following reasons: First. The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives38 and has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it.39 This exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether that state of facts exists which confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters which arise in the case legitimately before it.40Accordingly, it has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction.41 One of the three essential elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must be present.42 Consequently, the HRET merely exercised its exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to contest the election of Roces.

Second. There is no dispute that to support his motion to dismiss, Roces offered as evidence the COMELEC resolutions denying due course to Mrs. Ang Pings COC. In doing so, Roces submitted to the HRET the admissibility and validity of these resolutions and the HRET cannot be faulted in reviewing the said resolutions especially for the purpose of determining whether Roces was able to discharge his burden of proving that Mrs. Ang Ping is not the proper party to assail his election. In passing upon the COMELEC resolutions especially for that purpose, it cannot be said that the HRET usurped the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. On the merits of the HRET ruling, we hold that the HRET did not abuse its discretion in holding that Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to contest the election of Roces. Under COMELEC rules, the procedure of promulgation of a decision or resolution is as follows: SECTION 5. Promulgation. The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram.43 Promulgation is important because it determines when the reglementary period begins to toll. In the case at bar, Commissioner Garcilliano fixed the promulgation of its resolution whether to give due course to the candidacy of Mr. Ang Ping on May 5, 2004. For mysterious reasons, the COMELEC First Division of Commissioner Garcillano did not promulgate the resolution on May 5, 2004 in accordance with its notice of promulgation. In violation of the abovecited rule, and despite the deferment of the promulgation by Commissioner Borra to a date to be set by the COMELEC First Division, the resolution was deemed "promulgated" by the COMELEC on April 30, 2004 when it was filed with the clerk of court. The April 30, 2004 COMELEC resolution was received by Mr. Ang Pings counsel only on May 8, 2004.44 The mysterious April 30, 2004 resolution was thereafter used to run roughshod over the rights of the Ang Pings. Thus, on May 5, 2004, the COMELEC First Division of Commissioner Garcilliano denied Mr. Ang Pings motion to dismiss. Allegedly, Mr. Ang Pings motion was filed after the April 30, 2004 resolution. To make matters worse, the COMELEC en banc usurped the jurisdiction of the COMELEC First Division when it issued Resolution No. 6823 on May 8, 2004 which ordered the deletion of Mr. Ang Pings name from the Certified List of Candidates and denied the spouses Ang Pings motions to withdraw and substitute despite the fact that: (1) the reglementary period of Mr. Ang Ping to appeal had not yet expired; and (2) Mr. Ang Ping hadfiled a motion for reconsideration of the preceding order on May 10, 2004 within the five-day reglementary period. Nowhere is it provided in the law that the COMELEC en banc has the power to assume jurisdiction motu proprio over a petition to deny due course pending before a division of the Commission. Diametrically opposed thereto are the provisions of the Constitution and COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provide that motions for reconsideration of the COMELEC divisions decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings must first be filed in the Divisions before the Commission en banc may take cognizance thereof, viz.: SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.45

SECTION 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission.46 SECTION 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of. Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc. SECTION 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for Resolution. The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en bancwithin ten (10) days from the certification thereof. (Emphases supplied)47 This premature COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 was then used on May 12, 2004, or on the election day itself, by the Manila City Board of Canvassers as the basis of its resolution not to canvass the votes for Mr. or Mrs. Ang Ping. It then proclaimed Roces the winner despite having counted only 6,347 votes out of the 150,387 registered voters of the district.48 Following these highly suspect resolutions, Roces was proclaimed winner on May 15, 2004. All told, it cannot be denied that the effect of COMELEC en banc Resolution No. 6823 was to execute the April 30, 2004 resolution of its First Division which, at that time, had not yet become final and executory. These irregularities cannot be swept away by the belated COMELEC en bancs April 28, 2005 resolution denying Mr. Ang Pings motion for reconsideration dated May 10, 2004.49 It is argued that Mrs. Ang Pings motions for reconsideration and appeals "cured" whatever defects occurred at the COMELEC. Citing T.H. Valderama & Sons, Inc. v. Drilon,50 Roces points to the petition for certiorari filed with this Court on May 11, 2004 by Mrs. Ang Ping assailing COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 and her acquiescence to any "appropriate action taken (by the Court) including the dismissal of the above petition." Contrary to Rocess posture, Valderama and its kin required that the aggrieved party be given an opportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, it ought to be emphasized that the private respondent was systematically denied the opportunity to be heard. The resolution of the COMELECs First Division was made before its priorily set date of promulgation, deemed final and executory by the COMELEC en banc in Resolution No. 6823 before expiry of the reglementary period, and executed by the Manila City Board of Canvassers. The petition for certiorari filed by Mrs. Ang Ping challenged these resolutions and could not have cured these blatant violations of her right to due process. In truth, this Court referred the case of Mrs. Ang Ping to the HRET where she has filed a protest ad cautelam. There is no iota of doubt that the COMELECs resolutions are void ab initio for violating Mrs. Ang Pings constitutional right to due process. Judgments entered in a proceeding failing to comply with procedural due process are void, as is one entered by a court acting in a manner inconsistent with due process.51 A void judgment is defined as one that, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect. A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to, and is attended by none of the consequences of, a valid adjudication. Indeed, a void judgment need not be recognized by anyone, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair, or create rights, nor can any rights be based on it. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for any purpose.52 Needless to stress, the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest as the COMELEC Resolution dated April 30, 2004, Order of May 5, 2004, and Resolution No. 6823 were void ab initio.

Third. Petitioner contends that the HRET cannot review decisions of the COMELEC and that COMELEC decisions, orders, or rulings may be solely reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.53 It is true that generally, the method of assailing a judgment or order of the COMELEC is via petition for certiorari.54 As aforestated, however, it was petitioner who submitted these resolutions to the HRET as proofs that Mrs. Ang Ping was not a proper party. These same resolutions were collaterally attacked by Mrs. Ang Ping before the HRET when she alleged that these violated her right to due process.55 A void judgment or resolution may be impeached through collateral attack.56 A direct attack on a judgment or resolution is defined as an attempt to avoid or correct it in some manner provided by law, in a proceeding instituted for that very purpose, in the same action and in the same tribunal. Conversely, acollateral attack is an attempt to impeach the judgment or resolution by matters dehors the record, before a tribunal other than the one in which it was rendered, in an action other than that in which it was rendered; an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it; any proceeding which is not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or modifying such decree; an objection, incidentally raised in the course of the proceeding, which presents an issue collateral to the issues made by the pleadings.57 The rule that a void judgment or decree is subject to collateral attack at any time is based upon a court's inherent authority to expunge void acts from its records.58 The void resolutions of the COMELEC, especially the April 30, 2004 resolution issued by its First Division, cannot oust the HRET of its jurisdiction over the case at bar. Fourth. We hasten to add that judgments, orders and resolutions should only be declared void in the most exceptional circumstances due to detrimental effects on the doctrine of finality of judgments. The circumstances of this case, however, are unique in that the private respondent was denied due process and was forced to seek justice in the HRET. In fact, it was this Court that referred the private respondent to the HRET when it dismissed the latters petition in G.R. No. 163259 on the ground of the pendency of HRET Case No. 04-004. To grant the petition now would effectively foreclose the private respondents access to any remedy despite violation of her right to due process. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order previously issued by the Court is lifted. SO ORDERED. REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice (no part) ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Associate Justice

(no part) CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice Associate Justice (No part) ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Associate Justice ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice Associate Justice CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 105-111; Docketed as SPC No. 04-224 and raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
2

Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 36. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 112-113; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 37-39.

Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 121-123; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 47-48. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 42-46. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 49-54. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 63-74. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 36. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 63, 75. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 119-120; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 61-62. COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 18, Section 13(b) (1993). "Attachment 1" to Respondents "Comment." Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 124-126; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 32-34. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 34. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 3-31. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 131, 156. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 127-128; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 93-94.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 129-130; Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 129; Respondents "Comment," p. 8.
18 19

Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 95-110; Docketed as SPC No. 04-016. Docketed as SPC No. 04-084. Respondents "Comment," p. 9. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 132-142, 161. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 161. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 132-153. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 154-160. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 162-178. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 180-181.

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 182-187. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 188. Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 190. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 161-163. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 41, 49-50. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, p. 50. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 42-44. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, p. 46. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 3-30. "Attachment 1" to Respondents "Comment." Const., Article VI, Section 17 (1987).

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

II Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, pp. 87-88; Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, p. 731 (2003).
40

21 C.J.S. Courts 9 (2005) citing In re National Labor Relations Board, 58 S.Ct. 1001, 304 U.S. 486, 82 L.Ed. 1482; People ex rel. Carlstrom v. Shurtleff, 189 N.E. 291, 355 Ill. 210; Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Jones, Com.App., 24 S.W.2d 366.
41

21 C.J.S. Courts 88 (2005) citing State v. S & R Sanitation Services, Inc., 521 A.2d 1017, 202 Conn. 300; Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 484 So.2d 1221; Stoll v. Gottlieb, Ill., 59 S.Ct. 134, 305 U.S. 165, 83 L.Ed. 104 and other cases.
42

21 C.J.S. Courts 16 citing Noxon Chemical Products Co. v. Leckie, C.C.A.N.J., 39 F.2d 318; Telesco v. Telesco, 447 A.2d 752, 187 Conn. 715; Harder v. Johnson, 76 P.2d 763, 147 Kan. 440 and other cases.
43

COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 18, Section 5 (1993). Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, pp. 63, 75. Const., Article IX-C, Section 3 (1987). COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 3, Section 3 (1993). COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 19, Sections 5-6 (1993). Rollo, G.R. No. 163259, p. 129; Respondents "Comment," p. 8. "Attachment 1" to Respondents "Comment."

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

181 SCRA 308 (1990).

51

49 C.J.S. Judgments 17 (2005); 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.2d 2862, citing Simer v. Rios, C.A.7th, 1981, 661 F.2d 655, 663,
52

46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 31 (2005), citing Ripley v Bank of Skidmore, 355 Mo 897, 198 SW2d 861; Apple v Edwards, 123 Mont 135, 211 P2d 138 and other cases; 50 C.J.S. Judgments 499 (2005); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 110 (1999); Paredes v. Moya, 61 SCRA 525 (1974).
53

Const., Article IX, Section 7 (1987). 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 64. Rollo, G.R. No. 167499, pp. 132-152.

54

55

56

Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717 (1925); Dahl v. Grenier, 1 Dist., 467 N.E.2d 992, 81 Ill.Dec. 870, 126 Ill.App.3d 891; In re Petition of Stern (1954), 2 Ill.App.2d 311, 120 N.E.2d 62; Sherman & Ellis, Inc., v. Journal of Commerce, 259 Ill.App. 453.
57

50 C.J.S. Judgments 505 (2005).

58

Dahl v. Grenier, 1 Dist., 467 N.E.2d 992, 81 Ill.Dec. 870, 126 Ill.App.3d 891; In re Petition of Stern (1954), 2 Ill.App.2d 311, 120 N.E.2d 62; Sherman & Ellis, Inc., v. Journal of Commerce, 259 Ill.App. 453.