Unlawful Detainer

In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges

a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment (Ruben C.
Copuz, rep. by Atty.-in-fact Wenifreda C. Agullana Vs. Sps. Hilarion Agustin
and Justa Agustin,G.R. No. 183822. January 18, 2012).
Ejectment Case: Forcible Entry or Unlawful Detainer
An ejectment case is a summary proceeding designed to provide
expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of
the property involved (Barrientos v. Rapal, G.R. No. 169594, July 20, 2011).
It is expeditious as it is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure, a
special rule where extra pleadings and motions (other than the Complaint
and Answer), otherwise available in an ordinary civil action, are prohibited
precisely to insulate it from unnecessary delays. The main issue to be
resolved here is the issue of possession or the right to hold possession.
If youre a lessor of real property, you may, if you havent already, have to
resort to the remedy of ejectment in cases where a lessee withholds
possession of leased property after the latters right to hold the same has
already terminated, as where lessee has failed to pay rental, or has failed to
comply with the conditions of the lease contract, in which case it is called
Unlawful Detainer.
It is also available where a present possessor has held possession of a
subject property at the tolerance of the owner or the one entitled to its
possession, and thereafter refused, after demand to vacate has been made
upon him, or continues his possession thereof. In this case, an inceptively
lawful possession has become unlawful, when the tolerated possessor
refused to return the property upon demand by the rightful possessor or
owner. Anyone, whose stay in the property is merely tolerated, is bound by
an implied obligation to vacate and return the same to, upon demand of,
the rightful possessor or owner.
Note that even the owner of the property may be sued for ejectment when
he deprives another of lawful possession, as in a case of a lessor depriving
or ousting a lessee, who has been compliant with his obligations under a
lease contract, of possession thereof.
Another species of ejectment is Forcible Entry. It is the same special
proceeding as Unlawful Detainer, but the means whereby the lawful
possessor or owner of the subject property has been deprived thereof are:
Force, Intimidation, Strategy, Threat, and/or Stealth (FISTS). Anyone who
has been ousted of possession to a real property by a "strong hand" using
any of the means mentioned, may resort to this summary remedy to restore
him immediately to possession.
In both cases, ownership is not imperative in order for a plaintiff to acquire
legal personality to sue, as again, the issue is mere right to possession. In
unlawful detainer it is indispensable or jurisdictional that a demand to pay
rental or comply with the conditions of the lease and vacate is made before
an action may properly be filed. Accordingly, absence of such prior demand
could lead to the dismissal of the case. However, the same is not true in
forcible entry.
In both cases, resort to barangay conciliation is condition precedent,
meaning that the opposing party may raise as objection the fact that the
dispute has not been referred to the barangay authorities for conciliation,
and the same may be ground for the dismissal of the action. However, it is
not jurisdictional, meaning that it may be waived by such opposing party. It
is deemed waived when the opposing party failed to timely object to the
fact of its (barangay conciliation) absence.
Both actions must be brought (filed in court) within one year. The period of
one year is reckoned from, in the case of forcible entry, the date of actual
possession if the deprivation or the ground for the action is force,
intimidation, or threat; and the date of discovery and prohibition if the
deprivation or ground for the action is strategy or stealth. In unlawful
detainer, the period of one year is counted from the date of last demand.
In the case of forcible entry, the possession is unlawful/illegal from the very
beginning, while in unlawful detainer, it is inceptively lawful until
the defendant refused and failed to vacate, after demand is made upon him
by the plaintiff. Demand is made upon the termination of the defendant's
right to hold possession of the subject property, either by expiration of
contract, breach of terms of the contract, or when an owner who tolerated
the defendant's stay has manifested its intention to use the property
effectively ending the tolerance.
In both cases, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) is available under the provision of Rule
70, on forcible entry and unlawful detainer, and in relation to Rule 58, on
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER
RULE 70 - FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Grounds for judicial ejectment
First. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
ejectment case against private respondent considering that it affirmed the
trial courts finding that private respondent had failed to pay the monthly
rental of P1,800.00 for more than three months.
The contention is well taken. Under Art. 1673 of the Civil Code, the lessor
may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes:
(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for
the duration of leases under articles 1682 and 1687, has
expired;
(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;
(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the
contract;
(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or
service not stipulated which causes the deterioration
thereof; or if he does not observe the requirement in No. 2
of article 1657, as regards the use thereof.
The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is governed
by special laws.
On the other hand, the Rent Control Law provides:
Section 5. Grounds for Judicial Ejectment. - Ejectment shall
be allowed on the following grounds:
. . . .
(b) Arrears in payment of rent for a total of three (3)
months: Provided, That in case of refusal by the lessor to
accept payment of the rental agreed upon, the lessee may
either deposit, by way of consignation, the amount in court,
or with the city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be,
or in a bank in the name of and with notice to the lessor,
within one month after the refusal of the lessor to accept
payment.
The lessee shall thereafter deposit the rental within ten
days of every current month. Failure to deposit rentals for
three months shall constitute a ground for ejectment. If an
ejectment case is already pending, the court upon proper
motion may order the lessee or any person or persons
claiming under him to immediately vacate the leased
premises without prejudice to the continuation of the
ejectment proceedings. At any time, the lessor may, upon
authority of the court, withdraw the rentals deposited.
The lessor, upon authority of the court in case of
consignation and upon joint affidavit by him and the lessee
to be submitted to the city or municipal treasurer and to
the bank where deposit was made, shall be allowed to
withdraw the deposits
The trial court found that private respondent had failed to pay the monthly
rental of P1,800.00 from November 1992 to February 16, 1993, despite
demands to pay and to vacate the premises made by petitioner. Even if
private respondent deposited the rents in arrears in the bank, this fact
cannot alter the legal situation of private respondent since the account was
opened in private respondents name. Clearly, there was cause for the
ejectment of private respondent. Although the increase in monthly rentals
from P700.00 to P1,800.00 was in excess of 20% allowed by B.P. Blg. 877, as
amended by R.A. No. 6828, what private respondent could have done was
to deposit the original rent of P700.00 either with the judicial authorities or
in a bank in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner. As this Court held
in Uy v. Court of Appeals: 5 [178 SCRA 671, 676 (1989)] Misact
The records reveal that the new rentals demanded since
1979 (P150.00 per month) exceed that allowed by law so
refusal on the part of the lessor to accept was justified.
However, what the lessee should have done was to deposit
in 1979 the previous rent. This deposit in the Bank was
made only in 1984 indicating a delay of more than four
years.
From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the lessor was
correct in asking for the ejectment of the delinquent lessee.
Moreover, he should be granted not only the current
rentals but also all the rentals in arrears. This is so even if
the lessor himself did not appeal because as ruled by this
Court, there have been instances when substantial justice
demands the giving of the proper reliefs.
Justice Mendoza, Second division, T & C DEVELOPMENT CORP., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN, respondents. [G.R. No.
118381. October 26, 1999]
At the time this case was originally filed, the statute which governed the
right of a lessor to eject his lessee was B. P. Blg. 25. 8 [B.P. Blg. 25 was
replaced by B.P. Blg. 877 which took effect on January 1, 1988.] Section 5
thereof specified the grounds for judicial ejectment. The pertinent parts
thereof provide as follows:
Ejectment shall be allowed on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Need of owner/lessor to repossess his property for his own use
or for the use of any immediate member of his family as a
residential unit, such owner or immediate member not being the
owner of any other available residential unit: Provided, however,
That the period of lease has expired: Provided, further, That the
lessor has given the lessee notice three months in advance of the
lessor's intention to repossess the property: and Provided, finally,
That the owner/lessor or immediate member stays in the residential
unit for at least one year, except for justifiable cause.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Expiration of the period of a written lease contract.
In no case shall the lessor or his successor-in-interest be entitled to
eject the lessee upon the ground that the leased premises has been
sold or mortgaged to a third person.
A perusal of the above provisions reveals that certain requirements have to
be met before a lessee can be validly ejected by the lessor under Section
5[c]. Private respondent herein, however, questions only whether there was
compliance with the notice requirement. Consequently, it would be futile to
discuss further the other three requirements as private respondent does
not dispute compliance with the same.
Under paragraph (f) of the above-quoted provision, expiration of the period
of a written contract is a ground for ejectment separate from and
independent of paragraph [c], which requires the three-month notice. There
is an apparent inconsistency between the two paragraphs because
paragraph [f] makes expiration of the period, without any other condition, a
ground for ejectment. Thus, regardless of the lessor's reason for wanting to
repossess the leased premises, as long as the lease has expired, there is a
legal ground for ejectment. Not so with paragraph [c]. Under the latter
paragraph, where the reason for ejectment is because the lessor needs it for
his own use, the lease period must not only have expired. There should be a
three-month notice to vacate as well. For reasons which will be shown
hereunder, there is no need for Us to dwell on this apparent conflict in
order to decide the case before Us.
The lease contract in this case was written and, although no definite period
is specified, there was just the same a term for the lease only until such
time when the lessor should need the premises for his own use. This Court
has previously held that where the agreement is that the lessee would
vacate the premises when the lessor should need the same for his own use,
the period of the lease is fixed, as the parties are fully aware that when that
time comes, the lease is terminated. 9 [Lim v. Vda. de Prieto, 101 Phil. 15
[1957].] When the lessor [the former owner] informed private respondent
herein on November 19, 1978 to vacate the lot leased because he needed it,
private respondent signed a written promise to vacate the premises within
three months from said date, i.e., on or before February 19, 1979. On this
date, however, private respondent failed to leave despite the demands of
the lessor. In Our opinion, even assuming that the lease fixed no term, the
aforesaid written promise had the effect of amending the original lease
contract by stipulating for a definite period when the lease would
terminate, i.e., three months from November 19, 1978. Thus, upon the
expiration of said period, the written contract of lease would expire, giving
rise to the lessor's right to file an action for ejectment against private
respondent. From another angle, said written promise can also be
considered as an admission that a three-month notice to vacate had been
given by the lessor to the lessee. In either case, a legal ground for ejectment
would exist, the first under paragraph [f] of Section 5, and the second under
paragraph [c] of the same section.
Although private respondent claims that the written promise was secured
through misrepresentation, this allegation was not given credence by the
trial court, which based its decision mainly on said written promise.
Obviously also, the trial court did not find it necessary to discuss the other
requirements of paragraph [c] because private respondent merely
questioned the lack of due notice. Nevertheless, We note that the evidence
shows that petitioner was merely renting an apartment at that time, which
means that he owns no property on which a residential house can be built
other than the lot occupied by private respondent and which he has
adamantly refused to vacate despite the fact that his lease had already
expired. In any case, petitioner's case need not rest on paragraph [c], and is
meritorious under paragraph [f] alone. Whatever rights the former owner-
lessor had under Section 5 devolved upon petitioner herein when he bought
the property. Therefore, the right of the former owner to eject private
respondent due to expiration of the lease passed on to petitioner. And the
last paragraph of said Section 5 to the effect that in no case can the lessor
or his successor-in-interest be entitled to eject the lessee on the ground
that the leased premises has been sold, cannot help private respondent
because the lease had already expired before the sale. This last provision
applies only when the attempted ejectment is made while the lease period
has not yet expired. In other words, the owner's successor-in-interest must
respect an existing contract of lease. Where the lease period is still running
any attempt to eject the lessee would constitute a breach of contract. But
where the lease has expired, there is no more contract to breach.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' decision that a three-month
notice should have been sent by petitioner on his own behalf because he
was not a party to the lease contract. As We stated earlier, petitioner was
subrogated to all the rights of his predecessor-in-interest. The latter gave
the three-month notice which was accepted by private respondent, and
who in fact signed a written promise to vacate within three months. When
the latter period expired and the lessee failed to move out, the lessor's right
to judicial ejectment arose. This right was transferred to petitioner when he
bought the property and therefore there was no need for him to give
another notice. The mere fact that private respondent continued in the
premises despite repeated demands on him to vacate, does not change the
fact that the lease had ended. Private respondent's continued possession
was merely tolerated by petitioner and his predecessor-in-interest.
However, even assuming arguendo that the appellate court's premise is
correct, petitioner did give notice on his own behalf. The trial court found
that soon after the sale of the property to petitioner, or on October 10,
1979, the latter wrote to private respondent that he vacate the premises.
After this and other subsequent demands were ignored, he again made a
demand on August 7, 1982 informing private respondent that he wished to
build his house on the property. After this last demand was again ignored,
he brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman who, on September
19, 1982, sent a summons to private respondent, who, not only ignored it
but in addition, refused to accept it when served upon him.10 [Rollo, p.
26.] Petitioner finally filed an ejectment suit before the MTC on December
7, 1982, or four months after his verbal demand on August 7, 1982. Thus,
even disregarding the previous demands soon after the sale, petitioner had
complied with the requirement of three-month notice.
It is clear, therefore, that whichever basis We use in this case, whether
Section 5[c] or Section 5[f] of B. P. Blg. 25, petitioner has a legal right to
eject private respondent.
A final point to consider is the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the MTC
had no "jurisdiction nor competence to pass upon the controversy at bar"
and that the RTC is "more competent to resolve questions concerning the
effects of the sale on the leased premises." We agree with petitioner that
this is an erroneous opinion. The complaint filed with the MTC clearly shows
that this is a simple ejectment case, where no issue nor allegation is made
involving any other question but the right of petitioner to oust private
respondent from the premises based on the expiration of the contract and
on the repeated demands made on the latter to vacate the property. This
Court has held that what determine the nature of an action and the Court
which has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations made in the
complaint.11[Ching v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 [1987].] Petitioner bought the
property because he needed a lot on which to build his house. Private
respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to vacate the premises. In
the meantime, petitioner was renting an apartment while private
respondent was making use of his property.
There is no doubt that B. P. Blg. 25, better known as the Rent Control Law,
was enacted primarily to protect tenants, especially those belonging to the
low income group. However, this same law, as is clearly manifested by
Section 5[c], did not ignore the interests of small landowners or lessors. The
policy of the law is not to be interpreted or implemented in such a way as to
oppress the lessor when he needs the leased premises for his own use
because he has no other property, or when the tenant fails to pay the
rentals for an unreasonable length of time. In such cases, fairness and
justice demand that the lessor be given the right to resort to the courts to
aid him in asserting his constitutional right to abode. 12 [Tan Tok Lee v. CFI
of Kalookan City, 121 SCRA 438 [1983].]
Justice Campos Jr., Second Division, TEODULO GARCIA, Petitioner
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and SANTOS
GUTIERREZ, Respondents, G. R. No. 88632, March 22, 1993

On the issue of jurisdiction, the firmly settled principle is that a
municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful detainer
cases even if the question of the ownership of the property is raised by
the defendant.The exception is where the question of title is so involved
in the ejectment case that it cannot be decided unless the title to the
property is first ascertained.
On the issue of jurisdiction, the firmly settled principle is that a municipal
court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases even if
the question of the ownership of the property is raised by the
defendant. 6 [Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 795 citing Lopez v.
Santiago, 107 Phil. 668; De Gaerlan v. Martinez, 85 Phil 375; De la Cruz v.
Burgos, 28 SCRA 977.]
The exception is where the question of title is so involved in the ejectment
case that it cannot be decided unless the title to the property is first
ascertained. 7 [Luna v. Nable, 67 Phil. 340.]
That situation does not obtain in the present case. In fact, the defendants
do not even claim the leased property and invoke only a right of pre-
emption thereto under P. D. 1508. That is only an inchoate right that has yet
to be perfected. Moreover, they have acknowledged their status as mere
lessees and their obligation to pay their accrued rentals to the private
respondents. They have done this not only expressly in their
pleadings 8 [Annex B, Rollo, pp. 31, 32.] but also by their act of consigning
the said rentals before and after the period from 1984 to 1988. 9 [Rollo, p.
14.]
The question of default is factual and was decided by all the three courts
below against the defendants. Their findings are conclusive on this Court,
there being no satisfactory showing that they were reached arbitrarily or
without basis.
Regarding the extension of the period of the lease, the view that this could
not be granted because the defendants were in default in their rentals is not
supported by law or doctrine. There is no such prohibition in Article 1687,
which reads in full as follows:
Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is
annual, from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if
the rent as weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid
daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period
for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the
lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year.
If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer
period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months.
In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the
lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.
We sustained such an extension in the case of Divino v. Marcos 10 [4 SCRA
186.] although non-payment of rentals was the ground invoked for the
ejectment of the lessees. Through Mr. Justice Jose Ma. Paredes, this Court
observed:
The lot in question has been rented to the petitioner for about 20
years and his predecessor- in-interest for more. Even though rentals
had been paid monthly, still no period for the duration of the lease
had been set. The lease had been consistently and tacitly renewed
["tacita reconduccion"] until the ejectment case was filed [Co Tiam
v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672; Villanueva v. Canlas, 77 Phil. 381; Art. 1670,
N.C.C.; Art. 1566, Old Civil Code]. Having made substantial or
additional improvements on the lot, and considering the difficulty of
looking for another place to which petitioner could transfer such
improvements, and the length of his occupancy of the lot [since
1936], and the impression acquired by him that he could stay on the
premises, as long as he could pay the rentals, it would seem that
there exists just grounds for granting the extension of lease and that
the extension of two years granted by the trial court, is both fair and
equitable.
The petitioners herein are in a similar situation as they have been leasing
the property since 1979 and, as observed by the lower courts , have
introduced valuable improvements thereon. The Court also notes that the
validity of the extension was not appealed by the private respondents, who
thereby accepted the same. The issue was not even raised by the
petitioners in their appeal. We now come to the increase of the monthly
rental by the Metropolitan Trial Court from P100.00 a month to P3,000.00.
Since the stipulated rental was P100.00 per month, any increase thereof
should be in accordance with B. P. 25, the original law regulating the rentals
of dwelling units and lots, and all the succeeding amendatory laws. B. P. 25,
which was applicable to all residential units with monthly rentals not
exceeding P300.00, provided that such rentals could not be increased by
more than 10% every year. It had an initial duration of five years from 1979
but its effectivity was extended to June 1985 by B. P. 267, and again
extended to December 1987 by B. P. 877, with the following authorized
rates of increase:
Period Max. Increase
July 1, 1985 to Dec. 31, 1985 10%
Jan. 1, 1986 to Dec. 31, 1986 20%
Jan. 1, 1987 to Dec. 31, 1987 20%
On January 1, 1988, the effectivity of B. P. 877 was extended to December
31, 1989, by R. A. 6643, which provided a maximum increase also of 20%.
Another extension on the same terms was made for 3 more years or until
December 31, 1991, by R. A. 6828. On January 1, 1993, R. A. 7644 gave still
another extension from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, but the
maximum increase was retained at 20% per year.
Applying these laws, We find the following monthly rentals to be
demandable from the petitioners for the years indicated:
The Metropolitan Trial Court held, after resolving the factual question of
default, that the petitioners should start paying the new rentals from
November 1990, when the complaint for ejectment was filed. Accordingly,
they should pay the increased monthly rent of P483.00 for November 1990
to December 31, 1990; P580.00 for January 1,1991 to December 31, 1991;
P696.00 for January 1, 1992 to December 13, 1992 and P835.50 for January
1, 1993 to 1993, with legal interest. The two-year extension of the lease is
commuted from the date the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
became final as to the private respondents, who did not appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed except as to the
amount of the rentals to be paid by the petitioners, which should be
computed in accordance with the discussion in the body of this opinion.
HEIRS OF JACOBO BOLUS, Namely JAKE B. BOLUS, ELIZABETH BOLUS-NERI,
RICARDO B. BOLUS, EMMANUEL B. BOLUS, CORAZON BOLUS, CARLITO
BOLUS and ROMEO BOLUS,Petitioners vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES RICARDO and GLICERIA JIMENEZ,Respondents, G. R. No. 107036,
February 9, 1993

As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by
the mere filing before the regional trial court (RTC) of another action
raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an exception, however,
unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on
considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners'
house would result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial
court (MCTC) judgment.
In the main, the issue is whether the peculiar circumstances of this case
justify the suspension of the ejectment proceedings on appeal before the
RTC, pending the resolution of the action for quieting of title.

The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue: Suspension of the Ejectment Suit
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 are designed to
summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one
who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings. It has been held that these actions "are intended
to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their
hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession."7[Vda [de
Legaspi v. Avendao, 79 SCRA 135, September 27, 1977, per Barredo, J.] In
these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and
pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature.
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of
the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment
proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the
actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto
possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial
Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding,
or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved."8 [Wilmon Auto
Supply Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 108, April 10, 1992, per Narvasa,
CJ. In this case, the Court also held:
"1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions
in the municipal trial courts or other courts of the first level (Nacorda v.
Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 (1966)) do not abate the latter; and neither do
proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 (1956),
citing Pue et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81, (1950)).
2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit against the
plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 (1981)).
3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the principal
issue before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the
execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue
involved is the material possession or possession de facto of the premises
(Heirs of F. Guballa Sr. v. CA et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 (1988)).
4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit
involving the same property (Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 (1972)).
5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment
actions (e.g., to compel renewal of a lease contract) (Desamito v.
Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 (1966); Pardo de Tavera v. Encarnacion, 22 SCRA
632 (1968); Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 (1987); Commander Realty, Inc. v.
CA, 161 SCRA 264 (1988)).
6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute sale
to one of sale with pacto de retro) does not suspend an ejectment suit
between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 (1975)).
7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria" also
has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property (Del Rosario v.
Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 (1963); Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v.
CA, 133 SCRA 520 (1984); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 (1987); Ching v.
Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 (1987); Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. CA, 174
SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 (1989); Guzman v. CA (annulment
of sale and reconveyance), 177 SCRA 604 (1989); Demamay v. CA, 186 SCRA
608 (1990); Leopoldo Sy v. CA et al., (annulment of sale and reconveyance),
GR No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting
property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property
(Salinas v. Navarro (annulment of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage
and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage), 126 SCRA 167 (1983);
Ang Ping v. RTC (annulment of sale and title), 154 SCRA 153 (1987);
Caparros v. CA (annulment of title), 170 SCRA 758 (1989); Dante v. Sison
(annulment of sale with damages), 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. (annulment of document), 177 SCRA 288 (1989)"]
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the
pending civil action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao,
wherein the Court declared:
"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer,
as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of
the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in
issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable
and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of
physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience
and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal
possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought
to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be
filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the
unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment
in the more substantive case involving legal possession or
ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry
that as a matter of public policy the right to physical
possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the
prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party
might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the
premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to
recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and
without resorting to the courts."9 [Supra, p. 145.]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the mere existence of a judicial
proceeding putting at issue the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises
is not enough reason to justify an exception to the general rule. In Salinas v.
Navarro,10 [126 SCRA 167, November 29, 1983, per Gutierrez Jr., J.] the
Court explained that "the exception to the rule in x x x Vda. de Legaspi is
based on strong reasons of equity not found in the present petition. The
right of the petitioners is not so seriously placed in issue in the annulment
case as to warrant a deviation, on equitable grounds, from the imperative
nature of the rule. In the Vda. de Legaspi case, execution of the decision in
the ejectment case would also have meant demolition of the premises, a
factor not present in this petition."
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the
demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of
reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent's suit is one
of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the
ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter
that is likely to create the "confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and
expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision12 [In fact, according to
private respondent (Memorandum, p. 19; rollo, p. 477), the "RTC had
already rendered its decision dated 7 April 1999 affirming in toto, the earlier
judgment rendered by the (MCTC)in herein respondent's favor."] would
cause the respondent to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by
physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have
been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the
land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be
wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the
outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent,
unjust and probably irreparable.
We should stress that respondent's claim to physical possession is based not
on an expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere
tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting
of title, we deem it judicious under the present exceptional circumstances
to suspend the ejectment case.
The Suspension of Proceedings Even During Appeal
One final point. In Vda. de Legaspi, the Court held that "if circumstances
should so require, the proceedings in the ejectment case may be suspended
in whatever stage it may be found." This statement is unequivocally clear; it
includes even the appellate stage.
Justice Panganiban, Third Division, CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN, JOSEFINA V.
AMAGAN and DINA V. AMAGAN, petitioners, vs. TEODORICO T.
MARAYAG, respondent [G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000]

Ejectment cases are summary in character and . . . the judgment in an
action for unlawful detainer is immediately executory, and may be
stayed only if the defendant-appellants (1) [perfect] their appeal, (2) file
a supersedeas bond, and (3) periodically deposit rentals falling due
during the pendency of the appeal. . . . The defendants failure to comply
with these requisites entitled the complainant to the immediate
execution of the judgment
The civil case assigned to respondent Judge is one for Unlawful Detainer and
is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Section 6 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure is explicit. Thus:
SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on
motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein;
Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion reduce the amount
of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.
As clearly stated in the Section above-quoted, when the defendant fails to
answer the complaint within the period provided, the court, motu proprio,
or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint. Defendant has ten (10) days from service
of summons to file an answer to the complaint 1 [SEC. 5. Answer. Within
ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer
to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and
negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-
claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall
be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims
shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer
in which they are pleaded.] and it is not disputed that defendant in the
aforesaid civil case failed to answer the complaint.
Respondent Judge contends that the Urgent Manifestation and Motion to
Render Judgment by Reason of Failure to Answer dated December 23, 1997
has not been set for hearing and is fatally defective as the notice of hearing
is not addressed to the parties but to the clerk of court and hence, the same
is a mere scrap of paper.
The contention is untenable. Section 6 expressly provides that the
court, motu proprio, on its own motion or initiative 2 [p. 400, Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1982.] shall render judgment on the case. Thus,
even without a motion filed by plaintiff, the court has to render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what
is prayed for therein. Clearly, respondent Judge has failed in this respect.
Admittedly, he has not rendered a decision from the time herein
complainant filed the Urgent Manifestation on December 23, 1997, and the
Motion for Early Resolution on January 21, 1998 until the filing of this
administrative complaint on June 11, 1998, or for about six (6) months. The
fact that respondent Judge has rendered a decision in the ejectment case on
December 14, 1998 will not absolve him from any administrative liability.
The rules require courts to decide cases submitted for decision generally
within three (3) months from the date of such submission. With respect to
cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first level courts are
only allowed thirty (30) days following the receipt of the last affidavit and
position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within
which to render judgment. 3 [Raboca vs. Pantanosas, Jr., 245 SCRA 293.] We
stated in Cruz vs. Pascual 4 [244 SCRA 111.] that the Rule on Summary
Procedure was precisely enacted to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases and failure to observe the 30-day period within
which to render a judgment subjects the defaulting judge to administrative
sanction.
Justice Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division, ALBERT R. SORDAN, complainant,
vs. JUDGE ROLANDO B. DE GUZMAN of the MeTC-Br. 2,
Manila, respondent [A.M. No. MTJ-00-1296. October 5, 2000]

Respondent Judges Responsibility and Liability

With respect to the Order denying the Motion to Quash Alias Writ of
Execution, respondent judge incurred no liability. The denial of the
defendants motion to quash and execution of the judgment against the
defendant was clearly proper, considering that a supersedeas bond had not
been filed, and periodic deposits of a reasonable value for the use of the
property had not been made in accordance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. As stated by the Court in Fernandez v.
Espanol: 1 [289 SCRA 1, 5-6, April 15, 1998.]
. . . *E+jectment cases are summary in character and . . . the judgment in an
action for unlawful detainer is immediately executory, and may be stayed
only if the defendant-appellants (1) [perfect] their appeal, (2) file a
supersedeas bond, and (3) periodically deposit rentals falling due during the
pendency of the appeal. . . . The defendants failure to comply with these
requisites entitled the complainant to the immediate execution of the
judgment.
Furthermore, considering that the Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution
was the second one, which merely reiterated grounds already previously
ruled upon and disposed of, respondent judge was right in immediately
denying the same. Under the circumstances, waiting for defendants reply
was clearly unnecessary and would have served no other purpose than to
unjustly delay the necessary subsequent court processes
WINNIE BAJET, petitioner, vs. Judge PEDRO M. AREOLA Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (Branch 85), respondent, [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1615. June 19,
2001]per Justice Panganiban, Third Division
In its first assigned error, petitioner argues that the decision of the MTCC of
Lapu-Lapu City had become final and immediately executory in view of the
undisputed failure of the private respondents to post asupersedeas bond as
required by Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We do not agree. Since the private respondents had seasonably filed an
appeal with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, the judgment of the MTCC of Lapu-
Lapu City did not become final. And for reasons hereunder stated, the
perfection of the appeal was enough to stay the execution of the MTCC
decision.
Under the former Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,8 [Now Section
19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.] if the judgment of the
municipal trial court in an ejectment case is adverse to the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately. To stay the immediate execution of the
judgment, the defendant must (1) perfect his appeal; (2) file
a supersedeas bond to answer for the rents, damages, and costs accruing
down to the time of the judgment appealed from; and (3) periodically
deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the
appeal.9 [Chua v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 437, 444 [1998];
Fernandez v. Espaol, 289 SCRA 1, 5-6 [1998].]
As a rule, the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory and if not filed, the
plaintiff is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the
judgment. An exception is where the trial court did not make any findings
with respect to any amount in arrears, damages or costs against the
defendant,10 [1 FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM
797 (1997).] in which case no bond is necessary to stay the execution of the
judgment. Thus, in Once v. Gonzales,11 [76 SCRA 258, 261 [1977].] this
Court ruled that the order of execution premised on the failure to file
a supersedeas bond was groundless and void because no such bond was
necessary there being no back rentals adjudged in the appealed judgment.
Similarly, in the instant case, there was no need for the private respondents
to file a supersedeas bond because the judgment of the MTCC did not award
rentals in arrears or damages. The attorneys fees ofP8,000 and the
litigation expenses of P2,000 awarded in favor of the petitioner need not be
covered by a bond, as these are not the damages contemplated in Section 8
of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The damages referred to therein are the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property which
are generally measured by its fair rental value and cannot refer to other
damages which are foreign to the enjoyment or material possession of the
property.12 [See De Laureano v. Adil, 72 SCRA 148, 155 [1976].] Neither
were the private respondents obliged to deposit the rentals falling due
during the pendency of the appeal in order to secure a stay of execution
because the appealed judgment did not fix the reasonable rental or
compensation for the use of the premises.13 [Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664,
674 [1921].] Hence, it was error for the RTC to order the execution of the
judgment of the MTCC.
Chief Justice Davide, Jr. Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Court of Appeals,
G.R., No. 128102, March 7, 2000

The Court also held that the word vacate is not a talismanic word that
must be employed in all notices. The alternatives are clear cut. The
tenants must pay rentals which were fixed and which became payable in
the past, failing which they must move out. There can be no other
interpretation of the notice given to them. Hence when the owner
demanded that either they pay or a case for ejectment would be filed
against them, the tenants were placed on notice to move out if they do
not pay. There was, in effect, a notice or demand to vacate.
Petitioner belabors the fact that the letter is not categorical and precise in
seeking his eviction from the property. He misses the point. It must be
stressed that courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of their
functions and in making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict
themselves to literal interpretation of words, phrases and sentences. A
complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to render a just and
equitable judgment.11 [Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC, 267 SCRA 202, 215
(1997).]A case in point is Golden Gate Realty Corp. vs. IAC.12 [152 SCRA 684,
691 (1987).] The tenants therein defaulted in the payment of rents.
Accordingly, the owner notified them to pay and failing to do so a case of
ejectment would be filed against them. The tenants argue that the notice
does not make a demand upon them to vacate the premises. In resolving
such issue, this Court ruled that when the lessor demanded payment of the
due and unpaid rentals or a case for ejectment would be filed against them,
the owner was giving strong notice that you either pay your unpaid rentals
or I will file a court case to have you thrown out of my property. The Court
also held that the word vacate is not a talismanic word that must be
employed in all notices. The alternatives are clear cut. The tenants must pay
rentals which were fixed and which became payable in the past, failing
which they must move out. There can be no other interpretation of the
notice given to them. Hence when the owner demanded that either they
pay or a case for ejectment would be filed against them, the tenants were
placed on notice to move out if they do not pay. There was, in effect, a
notice or demand to vacate.
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be
said to have erred in finding that the written demand is sufficient to eject
petitioner from the property subject of controversy.
Now, insofar as the second assigned error is concerned, we hold that the
doctrine of res judicata does not apply in this case. There are four essential
conditions which must concur in order that res judicata may effectively
apply, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first
and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and
identity of causes of action.13 [Bachrach Corporation vs. Court Appeals &
Philippine Ports Authority, 296 SCRA 487 (1998).]
The first ejectment case had for a cause of action based on the need for the
premises. The second ejectment case involved a different cause of action,
that is, for non-payment of rentals up to February 1982. In the third case,
the cause of action was the need for the premises and non-payment of
rentals from November 1987 up to May 1988. In this latest ejectment suit,
the cause of action is the non-payment of rentals from December 1987
accumulating to P17,064.65. Clearly, the cause of action and the
circumstances present in the instant case are not the same but differ
markedly from those in previous suits cited. Reliance on the doctrine of res
judicata by petitioner is sadly misplaced.
Justice Quisumbing, Second Division, Siapan v. CA and Hon. Sayo, Jr., [G.R.
No. 111928. March 1, 2000]

Nothing is more settled than the rule that ejectment is solely concerned
with the issue of physical or material possession of the subject land or
building. However, if the issue of possession depends on the resolution
of the issue of ownership which is sufficiently alleged in the complaint,
the municipal trial court may resolve the latter although the resulting
judgment would be conclusive only with respect to the possession but
not the ownership of the property.
First. Petitioner Tala Realty contends that the municipal trial court has no
jurisdiction to decide the issue of ownership in an ejectment case.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that ejectment is solely concerned
with the issue of physical or material possession of the subject land or
building. However, if the issue of possession depends on the resolution of
the issue of ownership which is sufficiently alleged in the complaint, the
municipal trial court may resolve the latter 10 [Refugia v. Court of Appeals,
258 SCRA 347,366 (1996).] although the resulting judgment would be
conclusive only with respect to the possession but not the ownership of the
property 11 [Sec. 18, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.].
In the instant case, the issue of ownership was not even addressed, there
being no need to do so as the ejectment case hinged on the question
concerning the two (2) lease contracts of the contending parties.
Justice De Leon, Jr. , Second Division Tala Realty Services Corporation v.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank [G.R. No. 129887. February 17,
2000]

A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
Petitioners now assail the jurisdiction of the MeTC contending that the
failure of the complaint to allege the character of the sublease or entry of
the Jimenez spouses into the property, whether legal or illegal,
automatically classified it into an accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria
cognizable by the RTC and not by the MeTC;
8
[Petitioners cited Munoz v. CA
where the Court held that when the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the
action should be accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria in the Court of First
Instance (now, Regional Trial Court), as basis for their contention. (G.R. No.
102693, 23 September 1992, 214 SCRA 216).] thus, the action should have
been dismissed.
The rule is settled that a question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time,
even on appeal, provided that its application does not result in a mockery of
the tenets of fair play. In the instant case, the jurisdictional issue was
raised by petitioners for the first time only in the instant Petition for
Review. However, it should be noted that they did so only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals. Despite several
opportunities in the RTC, which ruled in their favor, and in the Court of
Appeals, petitioners never advanced the question of jurisdiction of the
MeTC. Additionally, petitioners participated actively in the proceedings
before the MeTC
9
[Refugia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118284, 5 July
1996, 258 SCRA 347, citing Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29264, 29
August 1969, 29 SCRA 419; Navoa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59255, 29
December 1995, 251 SCRA 545.]and invoked its jurisdiction with the filing of
their answer, in seeking affirmative relief from it, in
subsequently filing a notice of appeal before the RTC, and later, a Petition
for Review with the Court of Appeals. Upon these premises, petitioners
cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by
attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted
themselves voluntarily. Laches now bars them from doing so.
Be that as it may, we find no error in the MeTC assuming jurisdiction over
the subject matter. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it
alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is
unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the
law.
10
[Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108817, 10 May 1994, 232
SCRA 372; Pangilinan v. Aguilar, No. L-29275, 31 January 1972, 43 SCRA
136.] As correctly found by the appellate court, to which we agree, the
allegations in the complaint sufficiently established a cause of action for
unlawful detainer. The complaint clearly stated how entry was effected
and how and when dispossession started - petitioners were able to enter
the subject premises as sublessees of Purisima Salazar who, despite the
termination of her lease with respondent, continued to occupy the subject
premises without any contract with it; thus, their stay was by tolerance of
respondent.
The fact that the complaint failed to state that respondent was in prior
possession of the property before it was unlawfully withheld by petitioner
spouses is of no moment. Prior physical possession is indispensable only in
actions for forcible entry but not in unlawful detainer.
11
[Javelosa v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 124292, 10 December 1996, 265 SCRA 493.]
Petitioner spouses, as mere sublessees of Purisima Salazar, derive their right
from the sublessor whose termination of contract with the lessor
necessarily also ends the sublease contract. Thus, when the contract of
lease of Purisima Salazar with respondent was terminated the contract of
sublease of petitioners with the former also necessarily ended and
petitioners cannot insist on staying on the premises. Petitioners can invoke
no right superior to that of their sublessor.
12
[Duellome v. Gotico, No. L-
17846, 29 April 1963, 7 SCRA 841.]
It is not correct to say that petitioners could not have occupied the property
by tolerance of respondent as their entry into the premises was inceptively
illegal, the sublease being entered into without the consent of the
owner.
13
[Sec. 4. Assignment of Lease or Subleasing. Assignment of lease
or subleasing of the whole or any portion of the residential unit, including
the acceptance of boarders or bedspacers, without the written consent of
the owner/lessor is prohibited (Batas Pambansa Blg. 887).]Petitioners argue
that tolerance is only available in cases where entry was lawful from the
start and cannot be asserted where entry was illegal from the start. It
appears however that respondent did not expressly and equivocally prohibit
the subleasing of the property. Although the attached contracts of lease
state that the lessee cannot sublease the property, none of those contracts
pertain to the contract of lease between Purisima Salazar and respondent
PATRICIA.
14
[Attached Contracts of Lease pertain to those between Patricia,
Inc., and Renato Establecida, Patricia, Inc., and Augusto Tortosa, and not
Patricia, Inc., and herein petitioners; Rollo, pp. 109-114. ] In any event, the
fact that PATRICIA sent a letter to the Jimenez spouses informing them of
the termination of the lease of Purisima Salazar shows that they recognize
and acknowledge their stay in the premises as sublessees of
Salazar. However, after the termination of the
contract of lease of Purisima Salazar with PATRICIA, any right of the
Jimenez spouses to stay in the premises, although previously recognized,
then and there ended. After the termination of the contract of lease of
Salazar the continued stay of the Jimenez spouses thereat was merely by
tolerance of PATRICIA and it became unlawful after they ignored the lessor's
demand to leave.
The status of petitioner spouses is akin to that of a lessee or a tenant whose
term of lease has expired but whose occupancy has continued by tolerance
of the owner. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
forbearance or permission without any contract between them is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him.

15 [Vda. De Catchuela v. Francisco, No. L-31985, 25 June 1980, 98
SCRA 172, citing Calubayan v. Pascual, No. L-22645, 18 September 1967, 21
SCRA 146; Yu v. de Lara, No. L-16084, 30 November 1962, 6 SCRA 785.] The
present action being for unlawful detainer, it is well within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts.
Justice Belosillo, Second Division, Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc., [G.R. No.
134651. September 18, 2000]

The present action, although termed as one for "reconveyance of real
property" is actually one for recovery of the right to possess or accion
publiciana. This is an action for recovery of the right to possess and is a
plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of the
title. Accion publiciana orplenaria de posesion is also used to refer to an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty. In such case, the regional trial court has jurisdiction.
The "jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court can not be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
the defendant." 9 [Serdoncillo vs. Benolirao, G.R. No. 118328, October 8,
1998; San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 255 SCRA 133 [1996]; Boleyley vs.
Villanueva, G. R. No. 128734, September 14, 1999.]
The present action, although termed as one for "reconveyance of real
property" is actually one for recovery of the right to possess or accion
publiciana. This is an action for recovery of the right to possess and is a
plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of the
title.10 [Aguilon vs. Bohol, 79 SCRA 482 [1977]; Desbarats vs. de Laureano,
18 SCRA 116 [1966].] Accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion is also used
to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.11 [Bernabe vs. Dayrit, 125 SCRA 423, 425
[1983].] In such case, the regional trial court has jurisdiction.12 [Bernabe vs.
Dayrit, supra.]Here, the parties admit that the subject real property is
registered in the name of respondent Alfredo Torres. In the regional trial
court what respondent sought was to recover possession of the subject real
property alleging that he owned the lot on which he had allowed his father
(now deceased) and sisters, petitioners herein, to erect their houses. Since
the complaint alleged that respondent Alfredo Torres was the owner of the
subject lot and that he merely allowed his father Simplicio Torres and his
sisters Amelia and Primitiva to construct their houses thereon, and that
since 1972 respondent pleaded to petitioners to remove their houses and
such additional constructions thereon as respondent needed the lot for his
own use, the action is plainly one for recovery of possession of real
property, or accion publiciana, filed on October 7, 1987, more than one year
after dispossession or when possession became unlawful, which is within
the jurisdiction of a regional trial court.13 [Javier vs. Veridiano, 237 SCRA
565, 573 [1994]; Medina vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 837 [1990];
Bernabe vs. Dayrit, supra; del Castillo vs. Aquino, 212 SCRA 553 [1992].] As
heretofore stated, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, not by the answer nor by the evidence
adduced at the trial. Thus, the jurisdiction of the lower court is not affected
by the fact that petitioners asserted in their answer to the complaint that
the subject lot was truly owned by the estate of their father, also the father
of respondent, or that the last written demand to vacate was given on
September 2, 1987, just more than a month prior to the filing of the action.
Since initial demand to vacate was made in 1972, petitioners occupancy
became unlawful. Subsequent demands were merely in the nature of
reminders or reiterations of the original demand, the one-year period to
commence suit is counted from the first demand.14 [Pacis vs. Court of
Appeals, G. R. No. 102676, February 3, 1992, min. res., cited in Summary of
1992 Supreme Court Rulings, Part III, by Atty. Daniel T. Martinez, p. 1847;
Desbarats vs. de Laureano, supra.] When the dispossession lasted beyond
one year, the proper action is accion publiciana for recovery of possession
of the subject property filed in the regional trial court.15[Desbarats vs. de
Laureano, supra.]
Justice Pardo, First Division, SPOUSES ROMAN & AMELITA T. CRUZ and
SPOUSES SEVERINO& PRIMITIAVA T. BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
ALFREDO & MELBA TORRES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents [G.R. No. 121939. October 4, 1999]

Anent the ejectment case, the one-year reglementary period under
Section 1, Rule 70 for filing an unlawful detainer case is counted from
the time of the "unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession". Such
unlawful deprivation occurs upon expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession. And such right legally expires or terminates upon
receipt of the last demand to vacate.
Anent the ejectment case, the one-year reglementary period under Section
1, Rule 70 22 [The 1964 Revised Rules of Court] for filing an unlawful
detainer case is counted from the time of the "unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession". Such unlawful deprivation occurs upon
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession. And such right
legally expires or terminates upon receipt of the last demand to
vacate 23 [ See Sy Oh v. Hon. Garcia and Lim Chi v. Hon Garcia, 138 Phil.
777]
In this case, although possession by petitioners (other than Villaluz) lasted
beyond March 31, 1988 (the date they were supposed to vacate the
premises in accordance with the agreement between petitioner Villaluz and
private respondents),24 [ Rollo, p. 232] nevertheless their continued
possession from April 1, 1988 up to the time they received the demand to
vacate on February 23, 1989, 25 [ Rollo, p. 234] is considered as possession
by tolerance. Said petitioners are not lessees but their status is analogous to
that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose
occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. Their right of possession of
the said property stems from their being employees of petitioner Villaluz
who only allowed them to occupy the premises for a certain period. As such,
their possession depends upon the possession of petitioner Villaluz. Having
merely stepped into the shoes of the latter, said petitioners cannot acquire
superior rights than that of petitioner Villaluz. It has been ruled, that "the
person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand," otherwise the
remedy of ejectment may be availed of to oust him from the
premises. 26 [Refugia v. CA, 258 SCRA 347 (1996); Yu v. De Lara, 6 SCRA 785
(1962)] In such case, the one year prescriptive period for filing the
appropriate action to remedy the unlawful withholding of possession is to
be counted from the date of receipt of the last demand to
vacate 27 [Calubayan v. Pascual, 215 SCRA 146] because it is only from that
time that possession becomes illegal. 28 [ See Vda. de Prieto v. Reyes, 14
SCRA 430; Canaynay v. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36] Accordingly, since the
complaint for ejectment was instituted on July 12, 1989, 29 [Petition, p. 26;
Rollo, p. 33] or a mere four (4) months from the time of the last demand to
vacate, the same was timely filed within the prescriptive period.
Finally, petitioners (other than Villaluz) argue that the civil aspect in the B.P.
22 case constitutes a prejudicial question to the ejectment suit because the
ownership of the premises subject of the latter suit is allegedly being
disputed in the former case. The argument is not meritorious. The
ejectment suit can stand on its own regardless of the outcome of the civil
case in B P. 22. The resolution of either is not determinative of the other.
This is so because private respondents were already the owners of the
properties subject of the ejectment suit by virtue of the Deeds of Sale
executed between the former and petitioner Villaluz. 30 Rollo, pp. 71-72;
228-229. The certificates of title issued in private respondents' name further
confirm their ownership. 31 [TCT 127633 and 127630, (Rollo, pp. 73-74)] As
owners, they may initiate legal action to recover possession thereof from an
occupant who can show no right to occupy the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
the assailed consolidated case is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Justice Francisco, THIRD DIVISION, TERESITA VILLALUZ, CHIT ILAGAN,
Spouses ADOR and TESS TABERNA and MARIO LLAMAS, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and SPOUSES REYNALDO AND ZENAIDA
ANZURES, respondents, [G.R. No. 106214. September 5, 1997.]

A co-lessee or sub-lessee of the property. Thus, it is still bound by the
ejectment suit even if it was not named a party thereto.
Moreover, petitioner admits that it has been the actual occupant of the
leased premises since 1980 and it has authorized Constancio Manzano to
pay the rents for and in its behalf. In fact, it claims to have been paying the
rent religiously, effectively implying that it is a co-lessee or sub-lessee of the
property. Thus, it is still bound by the ejectment suit even if it was not
named a party thereto.6 [Bataclan v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 764
(1989)] It is well-settled that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not
only upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties
thereto, if they are:
a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant
fraudulently
occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;
b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the
permission of the defendant;
c) transferees pendente lite;
d) sublessee;
e) co-lessee; or
f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the
defendant. 7 [1 Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium 793 (1997)]
Consequently, the appellate court did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in annulling the trial courts order granting the writ of preliminary
injunction.
The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order;
as such, it cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review
on certiorari. 8 [Saulog v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 590 (1996); Arabesque
Industrial Philippines, Inc. v. court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 602 (1992)] The
proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary
appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned
may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently
erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief. 9 [Salcedo-Ortaez v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)] In the
instant case, the trial court issued as writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 13040, in spite of the fact
that the right of petitioner to occupy the leased premises has been declared
by final judgment to be inexistent. Having no clear legal right, petitioners
plea should not have merited the favorable action of the trial court. The
order granting the writ of preliminary injunction was thus clearly erroneous
and must be set aside. As the appellate court succintly explained:
We are mindful of the ruling of the Supreme Court that
where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the orders or decisions pertaining to the cause are orders or
decisions within its jurisdiction and however erroneous they
may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. However,
while certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court, the Supreme Court
allows certiorari as a mode of redress where the assailed
order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief. Petitioner would be made
to suffer unnecessary waste of time before it could proceed
with the ejectment of its lessees and all persons, including
private respondent Oro Cam claiming under them if we opt
to dismiss the petition and ignore the patently erroneous
granting of the writ of preliminary injunciton and unduly
impose upon petitioner the burden of going through the
proceedings with respondent court which had evidently
taken a patently erroneous view against herein petitioners
valid stand.10 [CA Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 29.]
Justice Mendoza, Second Division, ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former Fourth Division and ANGEL CHAVES,
INC., respondents [G.R. No. 128743. November 29, 1999]