Seven Polaris - DP FMEA
Seven Polaris - DP FMEA
Seven Polaris - DP FMEA
XP. This is a
shell used for display purposes only. The actual control is done by the
computers (MP8200) in the Kongsberg computer cabinet.
14.3.3 Computers and all interface boards in the DPC-21/ DPC11 are located in the
upper cabinet whereas power supplies are placed in the lower cabinet. There
are analogue boards for reference system signals, and there are isolation
amplifiers on the signals for thrusters. Although the CPUs and the power
supplies are separated, the interface boards are serial linked but common and
both computers are connected to each board. The layout in the SDP-11 is the
same, except that there are only a single computer and power supply.
14.3.4 The function of the Power Supply Units (PSU) within the DP cabinet is,
amongst others, to generate a stable reference voltage for the potentiometers
used for the feedback signals.
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14.3.5 The two computers in the SDP-21 operate in parallel each receiving inputs
from sensors, reference systems, thrusters and operator and each performing
the necessary calculations. However, only the on-line computer (master)
controls the thrusters. Switchover between the computers (master/slave) may
be either automatic or manual. It is automatic if failure is detected in the on-
line computer. Continuous comparison tests are performed to check that the
two computers read the same inputs and give the same outputs.
14.3.6 If a difference occurs, warnings and alarms are reported from each computer.
The weak point in a dual redundant system is in determining which computer
is wrong. The operator therefore could choose the wrong one.
14.3.7 When operating in accordance to DP class 3, the system will also alert if the
BU DP controller is not in hot standby configuration and an alarm is issued.
This will also apply if there is a deviation between all three controllers. The
backup DP is updated by inputs from sensors, position reference systems,
thruster feedbacks and etc. to be able to take control when necessary.
Switching over from main to backup DP should not affect the position keeping
or the vessel heading.
14.4 DP Control Modes and Functions
Figure 14-2: Forces and motions, courtesy: Kongsberg Maritime
14.4.1 The standard DP control modes are implemented which are standby, manual
(joystick) and auto position. Mixed modes between manual and auto are
automatic control of yaw, surge-axis and sway-axis either separately or
combined. When all three are selected an automatic switch to AUTOPOS
mode is made. Furthermore different control modes such as ROV (follow sub),
Auto-track, are implemented.
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14.4.2 The wind, gyro or VRS sensors used by the DP Control System cannot be
directly selected from the keypad. Instead, a dialogue box on the screen is used
where the preferred sensor has to be selected. Note! If a gyro falls out it has to
be manually enabled/reselected in the dialogue box. This is not the case for the
other sensors. Operators should be aware of this.
14.4.3 A standard median test is implemented which will detect a seemingly perfect
position measurement, e.g. dragging transponder or frozen DGPS signal. A
parameter is that at least three position reference systems have to be selected
and accepted by the DP computer. Also a high variance test is used to deselect
those position reference systems which show a high variance pattern over a
prolonged time period. It is required that sufficient position reference systems
are selected and accepted by the DP Control System.
14.4.4 The DP mathematical model is using various historical input data to predict
values/position and compare with actual readings. The computer calculates the
required force and thrusters to be used in order to keep required set-points. To
achieve a good mathematical model the vessel has to be in position for some
time in order to build up the model.
14.4.5 The thruster allocations can be set in various modes being:
Variable, thrusters are operating individually and freely.
Force Bias, Azimuth thrusters are operating against each others, setting
can be made from a separate pop-up menu and also thrust tonnage can be
set. Configuration is that T2 & T4 works against each other, same for T1 &
T3.
Fixed, in this mode the azimuth thrusters can be set to a pre-defined
direction.
Environmental Fixed, DP set the thrusters to a calculated defined direction
based on environmental forces.
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14.5 DP Sensors
14.5.1 The vessel is fitted with following DP Sensors:
4 x Wind sensors
4 x Gyros
4 x VRS
Lay Tension sensors
14.5.2 Extra sensors have been installed beyond the class requirements this to
increase the operational redundancy of the vessel.
14.5.3 Wind sensor
The vessel is furnished with a total of four wind sensors; all are of make Gill
Instruments and all were installed in last quarter of 2008. The wind sensors are
located in two different Masts. Both Masts are placed very close to the
Helideck and the DPO should be aware to have the wind sensors deselected
prior to arrival/ departure of a Helicopter.
The wind data from the Wind sensors are sent to the following systems:
Wind 1: DPC-21
Wind 2: DPC-21
Wind 3: DPC-11
Wind 4: DPC-11
14.5.4 Gyro Compass
Four new gyros were installed in last quarter of 2008 during dry-docking and
all are of make SG Brown Meridian. The vessels heading signal from the gyros
are sent to the systems as follows:
Gyro 1: DPC-21, via serial splitter to HiPAP 1 + Seapath 200
Gyro 2: DPC-21
Gyro 3: DPC-11, via serial splitter to HiPAP 2
Gyro 4: DPC-11,
Gyro 1 & 2 are both placed under desk PS forward in Control room A. While
Gyro 3 is placed in rack under HiPAP APC-11 next to the BU DP OS in
Control room B and the Gyro 4 is paced in the next room.
The Latitude correction to a gyro is from manual input only.
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14.5.5 Vertical Reference System (VRS)
The VRS systems are of make MRU delivered by Kongsberg Maritime. The
MRU system uses solid state device to measure the roll, pitch and heave rate
(MRU 5 only). The MRUs have power supply from respective DPC cabinet.
The MRUs signals are sent to the following systems:
DP VRS 1 - MRU-5: DPC-21 and HiPAP 1 + Survey box via serial splitter
DP VRS 2 - MRU-2: DPC-21
DP VRS 3 - MRU-H(1355): DPC-11 & DPC 21 and via serial splitter to,
HiPAP 2
DP VRS 4 - MRU-2(0734): DPC-11
VRS5 MRU5 (3752): Seapath only
Having DP VRS 3 to be configured to DPC-21 allows the DP system to have
voting on the VRSs.
The VRSs are located at two locations, main VRSs are located in a cabinet
next to fire station #7 and DP VRS 3 and DP VRS 4 are located in Control
Room B.
14.5.6 Lay Tensioner
The DP receives pipe lay tension information directly from the new lay control
system.
The two pipe lay tensioners, each have two load cells. The load cells interface
to a single PLC, which is located in control room A. If either a load cell or its
cabling were damaged, the automatic sensing of pipe tension would be lost.
The DPO would then have to either select a fixed tension value i.e. a manual
input, or let the DP resolve the external forces through the current resolution.
The latter option would take too long and an excursion would take place so it is
not recommended.
If the PLC fails then the DP will remember the last sensed figure and use that
as if it was continuing to receive that information. There is a possible danger
where the sensing cells break down and send false signals, in that circumstance
an excursion could take place and relies on the swift intervention of the DPO.
In an emergency, where the former options (use of DP) are not available, resort
may be made to the joystick, but it is certain that manual compensation would
be highly insensitive.
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Each load cell has two strain-gauge bridges so that failure of a single bridge
can be detected and alarmed. It would then be up to the operator to decide
which one has failed. The switching off of the faulty load cell must be done at
the pipe machine and the operation could continue with the one remaining cell.
The information from the load cells is used to calculate the actual pipe tension,
which is sent to the DP in serial format. There is a signal valid section in this
data string. If the DP loses the pipe tension signal completely or if the
measurements exceed a pre-set maximum limit set by the DPO, the value will
revert to the last valid measurement used by the DP that was within the clip
limit, or the DPO does one of the following:
Uses the last measurement
Enters a manual value
Deselects pipe tension altogether and then the external forces would be
resolved as current.
It would be the best option to use a manual setting similar to the last automatic
reading.
The DPO may also enter a minimum limit also, below which the pipe tension
input will not be allowed to fall. During a recovery from a tension input
failure the function Filter Constant may be used, in general terms this assists
the transition between the absence of a tension value or a value of less than the
real value to the operational tension value.
Any jump in the compensation value will result in a disturbance of the position
so the values, be they manual or automatic have to be as close as possible to
the real tension.
In the DP system the pipe tension is low pass filtered before being used for
compensation which means that the peaks in tension are ironed out to make the
signal more usable The DPO has to set up this filter to adapt it to the stiffness
of the pipe, and may enter a correction factor called bias, which is a figure that
will be added to the automatic reading, thereby in fact setting the amount of
compensation. It should be noted that these values are crucial to the systems
behaviour. Of all settings allowed by the DP system none should result in
instability. Careful testing is required to prove this
The DPO at all times has the option to change from automatic compensation
using the measured values, to a fixed value which is entered manually. The
DPO should take care when making changes to this value since a transient
disturbance of the position keeping will follow each change, the extent of
which is related to the size of the change in the compensation.
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A further problem with the use of fixed values for compensation is that the real
tension varies with the vessels position. The effect of this could be oscillating
motions with possibly increasing amplitude. A procedure should be developed
to prevent this problem.
Since there are several single failures that would fail tension measurement, the
automatic pipe tension compensation system is not consistent with the
philosophy of class 2 or 3 requirements. Thus, for class 2 or 3 operations the
vessel must always have the manual backup ready for use.
14.6 Position Reference Systems
14.6.1 The vessel is fitted with following positioning reference systems:
Main DP (SDP-21):
2 x DGPS (Veripos LHD2-GG)
1 x Seapath 200 (only for heading and VRS to HiPAPs no DP interface)
1 x HiPAP 500
1 x Fanbeam
1 x LWTW (also interface to Backup DP)
Backup DP (SDP-11):
1 x DGPS (Veripos LHD2-GG)
1 x HiPAP 500
14.6.2 DGPS
There are three DGPS systems fitted all of make Veripos, two DGPSs for the
SDP-21 located in control room A and one for the SDP-11 in control room B.
Each DGPS system is set up with Inmarsat corrections.
The GPS antennas are mounted on the fwd edge of the Helideck with a proved
distance between the two (DGPS 1 & DGPS 2 is 2 meters).
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14.6.3 Seapath 200
Figure 14-3: Example of DGPS configuration Courtesy Kongsberg Maritime
The Seapath is not used as a DGPS system to DP, but is used by the HiPAPs
as vessel sensor and gyro and therefore included in this report. As seen from
the illustration this system comprises of two GPS antennas mounted on a
bracket with a known distance between the two. One of the advantages with
the Seapath compare to traditional DGPSs is that it can also be used as a
heading reference and motion reference.
The Seapath 200 system has its own MRU-5 sensor placed together with the
main DP MRUs. The MRU signal can be used in main DP as a backup for the
other two. The gyro (gyro1) signal to the Seapath is needed for calibration
only.
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14.6.4 HiPAP
Figure 14-4: HiPAP Courtesy: Kongsberg Maritime
The vessel is equipped with two HiPAP 500 hydro acoustic systems. Both
HiPAPs are setup for USBL and LBL. The HiPAP Hull units are located in
respective HiPAP trunk fore and aft amidships centre walkway Quarter deck
and down.
The system is named from High Precision Acoustic Positioning system and
is designed for all water depths from very shallow looking horizontally at a
transponder to deep water (2000m) looking straight down with a standard unit.
The transducer extends below the hull and uses a semi spherical transducer
with over 230 elements and electronic controls that enables narrow beam
transmission and focused reception in the direction of the transponder, thus
reducing the noise that would otherwise be received from other areas of the
sphere.
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The system calculates a three dimensional subsea position of a transponder
relative to the vessel mounted transducer unit. The directional stability of the
unit is obtained firstly fixing the transponder location by a wide beam and
subsequently by aiming a narrow reception beam towards the transponder. The
system uses a digital beam form, which takes its input from all the transducer
elements.
The system controls the beam dynamically so it is always pointing towards the
target, roll, pitch and yaw is input to the tracking algorithm to direct the beam
in the correct direction thus enabling the correction for these motions to be
effectively applied continuously.
The system calculates a variance for its measurements; determine the known
system accuracy and standard deviation. The HiPAP has a built-in Kalman
filter, which improves the stability and accuracy of the initial narrow beam
guidance but does not interfere with raw fixed data being sent to the DP
control computers.
The HiPAP needs a heading signal and a VRS signal to operate, the following
shows the different combinations that can be configured for each HiPAP.
HiPAP 1 HiPAP 2 (backup DP)
Seapath Seapath (HiPAP# Gyro 1 & VRS1)
Gyro 1 Gyro 3 (HiPAP# Gyro 2)
DP VRS1 DP VRS3 (HiPAP# VRS 2)
The HiPAP signals are sent via fibre optic link to the APC 11 computer and
from there to the DP system via the dual network.
The configuration of the Seapath, gyro and VRS into the HiPAP is to be in
according to DP operational manual. When calibrating the HiPAPs the
Seapath will be used, and for operating according to DP class 3 HiPAP 2 can
only use Gyro 2 and VRS3.
The HiPAP operator station can operate in a master/slave setup. Further
configurations reference is made to vessels DP operational manual.
Note! The configuration of the HiPAPs is that the Survey have their own
HiPAP OS (3) that is connected by the network and by that can communicate
with both HiPAP units. Survey can only control mobile units. The HiPAP 1
will solely be used for the main DP for positioning on the Fixed Transponder
at seabed. Survey will only be allowed to operate mobile transponders by use
of HiPAP 2. When operating in accordance to DP class 3, the Survey team
cannot operate the HiPAP 2. Reference is made to the DP Operations Manual
for configurations and procedures.
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14.6.5 Fanbeam
Figure 14-5: Fanbeam Courtesy: MDL
The Fanbeam system, of make MDL is an auto tracking laser radar system.
Its measuring range and bearing to a target by using a reflected laser beam.
This is a short range reference system targeting either a reflector or a prism.
The Fanbeam system comprises a laser unit, a monitor and a control unit, in
addition to the reflector or prism. The Fanbeam position signals are fed into the
DP computers.
The maximum range with a single prism is 1 km. With a stack of prisms this
can be increased to over 2 km under ideal circumstances. The system can also
be used with a simple reflector. The maximum range is then limited to 200-250
metres.
The main limitation on use for DP is the resolution of the bearing measurement
which will limit the useable range for DP to about 100m.
The most serious failure of Fanbeam is it could track an erroneous target,
although the system does have features to reject false targets. The use of the
Fanbeam system can be limited by weather conditions, especially fog, which
limits the maximum range of the system because it uses an infrared laser beam
(905 nm) and infrared light is easily absorbed by moist air.
The position of the unit is corrected for roll and pitch in the DP system by VRS
input.
The vessel should be supplied with reflectors or prisms.
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14.6.6 Tautwire
A LWTW of type Bandak Mk 8-15 are installed as a DP reference system. The
LWTW is located in the bow of the vessel and is controlled locally at the unit
or remotely from control room A. The LWTW is supplied from the 460V 4FSB
distribution. The power supply is to the systems HPU, which is used to deploy
the weights and to maintain constant tension when the clump weight is at the
seabed. The 230V power supply is for the LWTW cabinet and the separate
Tautwire remote unit placed in control room A.
The LWTW uses instrument air to compensate higher frequency motions (roll,
pitch and heave). Small motions are corrected by air held in the twin
accumulator bottles fitted on the boom of the LWTW unit while the winch
corrects excess motions.
The LWTW has a gimbal head, measuring the athwart-ships angles and along-
ship angles. The pitch and roll signals from VRS is considered in reading the
angles in the gimbal head.
The illustration below shows the operational area and angle of the wire,
typically limits for warning is set in DP to 19
o
and alarm rejection from DP is
22
o
.
Figure 14-6: LWTW working area Courtesy: Kongsberg Maritime
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14.7 DP Control System Power Supply
14.7.1 The vessel is equipped with three independent UPSs for the DP system and its
reference systems. The power supply to the UPSs are configured as follows:
DP UPS 1 CB Q7 in panel 4P208 (Radio Room)
DP UPS 2 CB Q2 in panel 2CRASB (control room A)
DP UPS BU: CB Q1 in panel 2CRBSB (control room B)
14.7.2 Each UPS provides 230V AC to the DPC, references and peripherals. The UPS
-distribution is as shown in below:
DP UPS 1 DP UPS 2 DP UPS 3 (BU)
- F1: Spare - F1: Spare DGPS 2 - F1: Spare
- F2: DPC 21A - F2: DPC 21B - F2: SDP 11
- F3: SDP OS1 - F3: SDP OS2 - F3: Backup OS
- F4: Spare - F4: DP printer - F4: Repeater Gyro 1
- F5: WIND n 3
Wind 2
- F5: Wind n 2 wind 1 - F5: Wind n 1 3
- F6: GPS n 2 & 3
unknown
- F6: Spare gyro 2 - F6: GPS 1 unknown
- F7: NDU 1
network distribution
unit
- F7: Fanbeam - F7: NDU 2
- F8: Spare Fan
beam fwd
- F8: HIPAP OS fed
from pdu3
- F8: Spare wind 4
- F9: Spare DGPS 1 - F9: HIPAP
transceiver Fwd
- F9: HIPAP
transceiver Aft
- F10: Repeater Gyro
3
- F10: LTW (Taut wire) - F10: Spare wind 4
- F11: Spare Seapath - F11: DPAL Alarm
light
- F11: Spare DP printer
- F12: Spare pilot
radar
- F12: Artemis Mat DP
survey
- F12: HIPAP OS
printer
14.7.3 In addition, some DP important consumers have power supplies as follows:
VRS 1: DPC-21
VRS 2: DPC-21
VRS 3: DPC-11
VRS 4: DPC-11
Gyro 1 UPS 6
Gyro 4 UPS 7
HiPAP 1 Hoist Control: 4FSB
HiPAP 2 Hoist Control: 4 ES
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15 FAILURE ANALYSIS SEVEN POLARIS
15.1 Configuration and assumptions
15.1.1 All four main engines are running and driving respective azimuth thruster. These systems are independent of each other, and the
power supply for auxiliary systems is generated from the PTO generators.
15.1.2 This failure analyses show effects while operating according to DP Class 2/3 criteria with closed 460V bustie breaker if no other is
listed and the following switchboard configuration:
Generators G1 to G3 ready for start if not running
Generators G4 and G5 ready for start if not running
At least one generator connected to MS4 and MS1
460V 4ES is powered from MS1
GS is ready for start
All monitoring, automation and K-Chief working as designed
15.1.3 For power distribution configuration, reference is made to section 6 in this report.
15.1.4 The failure analysis shows effects with the auxiliary system set-up as follows:
FO system all systems available
SW system no alarms, all pumps available
FW system no alarms, all circulation pumps available (duty/ standby)
LO system all systems available
Compressed air system all systems available
HVAC/ Chilled Water systems, all systems available and no alarms
15.1.5 All position reference systems and all vessel sensors are to be available and in operations and DP system are set for DP class 3
with consequence analysis and median test functions running.
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15.1.6 In this failure analysis, the comment Loss of redundancy reflects that the vessel does not fulfil requirements in accordance with
IMO DP Class 2/3, after a single failure has occurred. This does not mean that there has to be an effect on the station keeping
performance, a failure can occur without affecting the performance.
15.1.7 The failure analysis is based on the available documentation listed in section 16 References in this report.
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15.2 Failure Analysis Fire & Flooding
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Vessel
Layout
Control
room A
Fire in
control room
A
Electric failure
Technical failure
Personnel
Alarm
DPO to immediately take control
on BU DP and switch over the
Fire Switch. Abandon control
room A and take control from
control room B
No effect on station
keeping but loss of
redundancy
A fire in control room A or in
the safety control room could
damage remote safety stop
cabling to all thruster room fire
dampers. As a result from this
all four main thrusters could be
lost.
Control
room B
Fire in
control room
B
Electric failure
Technical failure
Personnel
Alarm
Fire here will damage equipment
and system in that room, else no
effect as all systems are run from
control room A
No effect on station
keeping but loss of DP
class 3 or redundancy
Quarter
Deck
Fire in a
compartment
Electric failure
Technical failure
Personnel
Alarm
Fire doors will shut to prevent
spreading of fire.
Depending on where the fire has
broken out and spread to it can
result in loss of a HiPAP, loss of a
network (Main Net is in corridor
centre)
Cables for respective DP zone is
A-60 insulated + there are shall be
distance between the cable
routing
No effect on station
keeping but loss of
redundancy
Both HiPAPs are located in
centre walkway, distance and
fire doors/ bulkheads between
them
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Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Hold
Deck
Fire /
flooding in a
compartment
Electric failure
Technical failure
Pipe burst
Hull damage
Personnel
Alarm
Loss / damage of systems in that
compartment.
This deck houses among others
the generator room/ thruster
rooms etc.
At this level all doors are to be
water tight
No effect on station
keeping but loss of
redundancy. Reduced
thruster/ power capacity
Each thruster room is self-
contained.
Generator room includes G1 to
G3 + MS2.
Generators G4 G5 + MS are
located in crane pedestal
Fire/
Flooding of
a thruster
room
Electric failure
Technical failure
Pipe/ hull damage
Personnel
Alarm
Loss of that particular thruster
Each thruster room is segregated.
No effect on station
keeping but loss of
redundancy. Loss of one
thruster only
Generator
room
Electric failure
Technical failure
Pipe/ hull damage
Personnel
Alarm
Loss of generators G1 to G3 +
MS2
None Both generators G4 and G5 can
run supply MS4, feeding MS3
and MS1. As MS1 and MS3 are
placed in a different
compartment as MS2.
Fire in
Sewage
room
Electric failure
Technical failure
Personnel
Alarm
Have to close outlet valve from
settling tank, and stop transferring
of FO to all day tanks.
None Enough FO in day tanks to
abandon operation. Each
thruster engine day tank has a
capacity of 5m
3
estimated 5
hours running time.
Fire in pump
room
Electric failure
Technical failure
Pipe/ hull damage
Personnel
Alarm
Generators run out of day tank.
None
Crane
Pedestal
Fire in Crane
pedestal
Electric failure
Technical failure
Pipe/ hull damage
Personnel
Alarm
Loss of generators G4 & G5 +
MS4
No effect on station
keeping but loss of both
tunnel thrusters (MS4)
One tunnel has a secondary
supply from MS3 that can be
used.
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Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
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15.3 Failure Analysis - Power Generation
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Thruster
Engines
Thruster
Engine
Shut down of
engine
Mechanical
failure: piston,
valve,
camshaft,
bearings,
turbocharger
Aux. systems
Alarm Stop of affected engine, de-clutch
from main gear. Loss of that
thruster.
No effect on station
keeping
Reduced thruster capacity
Pre-warning of
engine
Aux. systems
i.e. LO pressure
FW cooling
Alarm Request stop of engine,
Governor
failure
Input failure
Output failure
Power failure
Alarm Trip of affected engine
Gear Gear failure Mech. failure
Alarm Loss of drive to thruster and PTO
generator
PTO
generator
PTO generator
failure
Internal short
circuit.
Excitation
failure, AVR
failure.
Overload
Belt drive
failure
Alarm. Trip of generator breaker, hence
loss of supply to thruster
switchboard.
Automatic changeover to power
supply from MS3.
None if quick enough,
otherwise loss of thruster
Reduced thruster capacity
Thruster switchboards have a
supply from MS3 when in
standstill. A relay contactor will
change over the supply.
If thruster stops it can be started
to be run with power from MS3.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 80 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Diesel
Generators (G1-G5)
Diesel
Generator
Shut down of a
DG
Mechanical
failure: piston,
valve,
camshaft,
bearings,
turbocharger
Aux. systems
Alarm Stop of affected DG, the other DG
in parallel will pick up the load
DP system will perform load
reduction of tunnel thrusters if
required.
No effect on station
keeping
Reduced power capacity
If G1 to G3 is set in Auto then
PMS will automatically start the
one in 1
st
standby. Otherwise
engineer has to manually start
generator Semi-automatic
Pre-warning of
ME
Aux. systems
i.e. LO pressure
FW cooling
Alarm No automatic function for start of
next standby generator
None Engineer has to start next
generator manually and take the
faulty one off the board.
Governor
failure
Input failure
Output failure
Power failure
Alarm Trip of affected generator No effect on station
keeping
Reduced power capacity
Alternator Alternator
failure
Internal short
circuit.
Excitation
failure, AVR
failure.
Overload
Alarm. Trip of generator breaker, hence
reduced power capacity
An AVR failure/ overspeed can
result in also tripping of the other
DG on reverse power, hence
blackout
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
and power capacity, or
blackout
A full blackout will not directly
affect the vessel as it has four
independent running main
thrusters. The vessel will run on
UPS supply. FO to their day
tank will eventually be the
limiting factor. Day tanks are
each on 5 m
3
which will give
ample time to take corrective
actions.
Emergency.
Generator
(GS)
Engine failure
Alternator
failure
Mech. or
electrical
Alarm Stop of engine None Normally GS is not running.
The GS will start up when loss
of power to 4ES.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 81 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.4 Failure Analysis - Power Distribution
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Ships 460V SWBDs
Main
switchboards
Powerless MS1 Internal short
circuit.
Alarm. Loss of MS1 and generators G1 to
G3 as these can only connect to
MS1.
None
Trip of bus tie to segregate fault.
Powerless MS2 Internal short
circuit.
Alarm. Loss of MS2 and related
consumers such as FO transfer
pump, LO sep 1&2 and starting
air compressor 2.
None
Trip of bus tie to segregate fault.
Powerless MS3 Internal short
circuit.
Alarm. Loss of MS3 and related
consumers such as ventilation T5,
distribution 4FSB and 4FSC, and
backup power to T1 to T4.
4FSB loss of Tautwire, HiPAP +
SW pumps to G4& G5
Loss of both tunnel thrusters as
loss of their HPU
4FSC loss of thruster cooling fan
+ 2
nd
pumps to tunnel thruster
HPUs
None or
Reduced thruster capacity
The efficiency of the two tunnel
thrusters is normally very low.
Used to assist with heading
control.
Powerless MS4 Internal short
circuit.
Alarm. Loss of MS4 and related
consumers such both tunnel
thrusters, T5 can be connected to
MS3. Loss of generators G4 &
G5 as these are connected to
MS4.
None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 82 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Bustie
Breakers
Fails to open Internal failure Alarm A fault on these breakers such
that it does not open in case of a
major failure (i.e. a hidden
failure) can cause a blackout. If it
opens too late the transients on
the distribution can trip many
auxiliaries on under voltage due
to transients.
Worst case full blackout
Important systems on backup
supplies and azimuth thrusters
still running
None
There are two bustie breakers
for each SWBD; simultaneously
failure of them both is seen as
highly unlikely.
Thruster
room
switchboard
Loss of power
to thruster
switchboard
4CSB1-4
Internal short
circuit.
Alarm. Loss of power to that
switchboard, hence that thruster
will stop.
Reduced thruster capacity
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 83 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Distribution
boards
4 FSB Loss of power Breaker trip
Short circuit
Alarm. Loss of consumers from that
board HiPAP deployment motor
LWTW, HPU pumps 1 to tunnel
thrusters auto changeover to 2
nd
pumps
No effect on station
keeping performance
Loss of LWTW
4FSC Loss of power Breaker trip
Short circuit
Alarm. Loss of consumers from that
board
Loss of pump no. 2 to tunnel
thrusters + cooling fans
No effect on station
keeping performance
4ES Loss of power Breaker trip
Short circuit
Alarm. Loss of consumers from that
board
Loss of power to 2 ES and to
control room A & B
No effect on station
keeping performance
If not restored power to control
room distribution eventually DP
UPSs fails
Loss of redundancy
30 min battery endurance on
UPS
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 84 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
230V Distribution
Transformer
(460V/
230V
Transformer
failure
Mech. failure
El. Failure
Breaker fault
Alarm Loss of power to affected 230V
distribution. Important consumers
runs on redundant supply
No effect on station
keeping performance
If not restored power to control
room distribution eventually DP
UPSs fails
Loss of redundancy
If the transformer to 2ES fails
then the alternate supply from
2FSB to control rooms should
be connected
230V
Distribution
board
Loss of power
to 2 ES
Breaker trip
Transformer
failure
Short circuit
Alarm. Loss of related consumer,
alternate supply to control room
to be instated.
No effect on station
keeping performance
If not restored power to control
room distribution eventually DP
UPSs fails
Loss of redundancy
Loss of power
to 2 FSB
Breaker trip
Transformer
failure
Short circuit
Alarm. Loss of related consumer, such as
UPS 5
VMS ST2U
2FC
None
Loss of power
to 2 FC
Breaker trip
Short circuit
Alarm. Loss of related consumer, such as
VMS LC22
VMS LC23
Alarm panels
None
Loss of power
to 2 CRASB or
2CRBSB
Breaker trip
Short circuit
Alarm. Loss of related consumer such as
DP UPS(s)
NAV equipment
None
Eventually DP UPS(s) will
run out
Loss of redundancy
DP UPS 1&2 are powered from
same distribution 2CRASB.
Failure of this both systems on
30 min battery endurance
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 85 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
24V Distribution
24V
Distribution
Battery failure Internal failure
due to lack of
maintenance
None None None Battery failure should be found
on maintenance routines.
Battery change interval 3- 5
years, check with Vendor
UPS
Failure
Internal failure Alarm Loss of charging, system
continues to run on battery
None,
eventually loss of system
powered from that UPS
Loss of
UPS 1-4
Internal failure
Alarm Loss of corresponding thruster to
affected UPS
Reduced thruster capacity,
loss of redundancy
Loss of UPS 5 Internal failure
Alarm Loss of control power to pumps
start cabinet G4 & G5 etc.
None
Loss of UPS 6 Internal failure
Alarm Loss of thruster T5 alarming
power to SDP 21 OS 1 & OS2
None
Loss of UPS 7 Internal failure
Alarm Loss of Thruster T6, alarming
power to SDP 11 OS
None
Loss of UPS 8 Internal failure
Alarm Loss of control voltage to MS4 None
Loss of UPS
17
Internal failure
Alarm Loss of control voltage to G4 and
G5
None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 86 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.5 Failure Analysis Power Automation and Propulsion Control
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
K-Chief 500
OS and
computers
Power failure Short circuit,
fuse failure,
loose wire.
Alarm Loss of affected ROS, other ROS
available
None
Tank sounding Not
functioning
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm No data of level status No effect on station
keeping performance
Valve control Not
functioning
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm No operation of valves or status
monitoring
No effect on station
keeping performance
Watch Call
System
Not
functioning
Any failure
mode
Alarm No alarming on duty station No effect on station
keeping performance
Thruster Engines
Control System
Engine
Control
Cabinet/ panel
Loss of a 24V
power
Fuse failure
Wire break
Alarm None, engine runs on redundant
supply
None
Loss of 230V
power supply
Fuse failure
Wire break
230V/24V
inverter failure
Alarm None, engine runs on redundant
supply
None
Loss of both
supplies
Short circuit,
Distr. failure
Alarm Trip of engine, hence loss of
thruster
Reduced thruster capacity
Loss of power
to safety PLC
Fuse failure
Wire break
PLC failure
Alarm Loss of electronic safety, engine
safety still intact
None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 87 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Governor Instability of
regulator
Hydraulic leak Alarm A hydraulic leak of oil from the
governor/ regulator can result in
engine hunting and oscillating
Engine to be stopped, hence loss
of a thruster
Reduced thruster capacity
Shutdown
initiated
Engine
shutdown
Overspeed
LO pressure ME
Cooling water
temp.
LO pres. MG
Alarm Affected engine shuts down,
hence loss of a thruster
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Diesel Generator
Control System
DG Control
Cabinet/ panel
Loss of a 24V
power
Fuse failure
Wire break
Alarm None, engine runs on redundant
supply
None
Loss of 230V
power supply
Fuse failure
Wire break
230V/24V
inverter failure
Alarm None, engine runs on redundant
supply
None
Loss of both
supplies
Short circuit,
Distr. failure
Alarm Trip of engine
Engineer to start standby
generator
None
Loss of power
to safety PLC
Fuse failure
Wire break
PLC failure
Alarm Loss of electronic safety, engine
safety still intact
None Load sharing com lines are
between DSLCs and from
DSLC to 723
Woodward
723+
load & Speed
control unit
Not working Power failure Alarm Trip of affected DG
None
Load sharing
line
Wire break Alarm Not Applicable None Load sharing is by governor
DROOP No load sharing lines
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 88 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Governor Instability of
regulator
Hydraulic leak Alarm A hydraulic leak of oil from the
governor/ regulator can result in
engine hunting and oscillating of
the frequency.
None Engine to be stopped
AVR Over / under
excitation
Internal failure Alarm Trip of Generator breaker
None
Shut down
function of a
Generator
Engine shut
down
Overspeed
LO pressure ME
Cooling water
temp.
LO pres. MG
Alarm Stop of affected G#
If the Overspeed is not quick
enough this can result in
unsymmetrical load and the other
generator(s) can trip on reverse
power before the affected
generator trips.
None
Reduced power capacity
In case of blackout all
important systems on
backup supply
This can cause a blackout if
faulty DG takes all load and
then trip.
Note this will cause loss of
LWTW if used
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 89 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
IAS / PMS system
Field Station Power failure UPS failure
Fuse failure
Alarm Loss of Field station with
belonging components
None Field stations (PS41 &PS42)
with important equipment
connected have redundant
power supply from both UPSs.
Internal failure Alarm Loss of components/ controller
powered from that RCU
None PS 41 & 42 have redundant
controllers and power supply
Controller
failure
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm Automatic changeover to backup
controller if master fails, else no
affect
None Loss of Field station with
equipment if no redundancy
Network HUB
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm None, works on redundant
network
None
Software error Wrong
programming,
None Cause wrong configuration wrong
commands.
None This is eliminated trough use
and testing
Data Virus Data virus in all
computer
system on net
None A virus can result in crash of
computer systems
None To prevent this Vessel operator
should make sure to have
procedures available to restrict
the use of computers connected
to the network
Network
RBus
Serial line
NMEA
Comm. failure
Wire break
Alarm Loss of communication from
affected equipment
None
Ethernet
Comm. failure
Wire break
Alarm None
None
Runs on redundant network
ModBus
Comm. failure
Wire break
Alarm Loss of communication from
affected Equipment
None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 90 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
IAS OS
Stopped, not
working
PCU stop
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm Loss of control/ monitoring from
that operator station
None
Operator to use other operator
station
Thruster Drive Not
communicatin
g to IAS/PMS
Power failure
Unit failure
Alarm Loss of remote ctrl and
monitoring of propulsion drives
No effect on propulsion drives.
None
Generator
Breaker
measurement
Loss of circuit
breaker signal
from SWBD
Wire break
Sensor failure
Alarm Affected DG runs in droop mode Could lead to reduced
thrust capacity
SWBD Hz
measurement
Loss of Hz
signal from
SWBD
Wire break
Sensor failure
Alarm No effect only alarm given None
SWBD Voltage
measurement
Loss of V
signal from
SWBD
Wire break
Sensor failure
Alarm No effect only alarm given None
DG kW
measurement
Over / under
range or lost
Wire break
Alarm No effect only alarm given None
Valve control Not
functioning
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm No operation of valves or status
monitoring
None
Tank sounding Not
functioning
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm No data of level status None
Watch Call
System
Not
functioning
Any failure
mode
Alarm No alarming on duty station None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 91 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
PMS
Network Loss of comm.
line
Wire break Alarm Dual ring line network all systems
comm. on remaining line.
None G1 to G5 can be fully controlled
by PMS.
PLC Loss of comm.
/ control
server
PLC failure
Power failure
Alarm Systems controlled by secondary
server
None
Generator
Protection Unit
Sepam Loss of Sepam Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm Loss of Sepam will trip the
generator breaker
None
Reduced power capacity
The Sepam is powered from
respective generator cubicle.
Thruster &
Propulsion Control Systems
There is no loop monitoring for signal failure for any of the azimuth, pitch or RPM signals: Only a
prediction error warning is given when sufficient difference has occurred between demand and
feedback. Failure of the feedback signals from the thrusters should raise an alarm and de-selection
of the thruster either automatically or by the operator.
Tunnel
Thrusters
Control
cabinet
Loss of power
supply to
control cabinet
Fuse failure
Short circuit
Alarm
Loss of one tunnel thruster
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Loss of
control unit
Short circuit
Internal failure.
Alarm
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 92 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Comm.
between DP
and E-shaft
Rpm
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # prediction
Rpm to idle
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Rpm
feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # input error, works as
normal
None DP uses calculated feedback
Comm.
between
E-shaft &
Converter
rpm
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # prediction error
Rpm to idle
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
rpm
feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # not ready, rpm to idle
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Converter Converter
signal failure
Wire break
Pulse Encoder
Interface
Module
Alarm Thruster # not ready, rpm to idle
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Azimuth
Thrusters
Control
cabinet
Loss of either
power supply
to control
cabinet
Fuse failure
Short circuit
Alarm Automatic changeover to other
supply
None Power supply connected by
diode bridge
Loss of
control unit
Short circuit
Internal failure.
Alarm Loss of one azimuth thruster in
DP and from Bridge control
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 93 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Comm.
between DP
and TCC
Azimuth
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # Not ready deselected
from DP
Pitch and Azi to zero,
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Azimuth
feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # Prediction / input error
Depending on wire broken, the
Azi will either freeze, rotate to
zero position
Pitch
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # Not ready deselected
from DP
Pitch and Azi to zero,
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Pitch feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # prediction/ input error
Thruster works as normal
None DP uses calculated feedback
Comm.
between TCC
and thruster
Azimuth
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # prediction error
Pitch works
Azi freezes or rotates depending
on wire taken
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Azimuth
feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # error azimuth, freezes,
pitch works
Local alarm on thruster panel
for emergency ctrl is sounded
way before any affect noted in
DP. This will alert DPO too.
Pitch
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # prediction error
Pitch freezes, then slow down to 0
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Pitch feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster #not ready
Thruster deselects out of DP
Emergency ctrl from thruster
panel possible
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 94 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Thruster Engine
Control Helicon
Control
cabinet
Speed signal
Rpm feedback
Lost comm. Wire break Alarm Loss of engine rpm to UN
Thruster # not ready
Engine runs at fixed speed
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Speed order will give alarm in
IAS Woodward minor alarm
None
Load signal Lost comm. Wire break Alarm Alarm in IAS None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 95 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.6 Failure Analysis - Fuel Oil System
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
FO System General
Remote
operated
QCVs
Closing of
valve
Manual act Alarm Stop of engine(s) due to FO
starvation.
QCV layout one lever for all and
one lever per engine / tanks
None This is highly unlikely the QCV
cabinets are protected against
inadvertent operation and valves
need oil pressure close.
Some are also by pulling a wire,
Loss of oil/
wire break
Leakage
Wire snaps /
stuck
No affect, The QCVs needs oil
pressure to close
Same with wire type needs to pull
wire to close valve
None
FO day tank High level
alarm failure.
Sensor failure,
broken wire
None Can result in overfilling from
separator. Normally overflow to
FO overflow tank
None Valves are adjusted manually to
allow continues filling of all day
tanks.
Low level
alarm failure
Sensor failure,
broken wire
None No affect, Normally continuous
purification from settling to
service tank
None Periodic maintenance should
prevent this.
During trials testing for level
alarms were done by open
circuit, this is not testing of the
sensor itself. This is not testing
of sensor, rather the alarm
system only.
FO day tanks to the thruster
engines has a capacity of 5m3
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 96 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
FO settling
tank
High level
alarm failure.
Sensor failure,
broken wire
None Can result in overfilling
Manual operation by use of FO
transfer pump
None Periodic maintenance should
prevent this.
Low level
alarm failure
Sensor failure,
broken wire
None No affect, None Operator to manually fill
settling tank
Periodic maintenance should
prevent this.
FO transfer
pump
Mech. Failure,
electrical
failure
Fatigue,
bearing,
coupling,
damage of
motor, short
circuit
Alarm Loss of affected pump.
FO separator can also have
suction from cargo manifold
None
FO
Separator
feed pump
Mech. Failure,
electric power
supply
Fatigue,
bearing,
coupling,
damage of
motor, short
circuit
Alarm FO feeding to the separator does
not work hence loss of
purification.
None Tank capacity is sufficient to
give enough time for operator to
repair/ fix separator feed pump
or use the other separator
FO separator Internal failure Mech.
Electrical
or dirt/ water
Alarm Worst case can cause engine
damage. Separator failure can in
worst case result in dirt/ water
into the affected FO tanks.
None; however in worst
case loss of engines caused
by water/ dirt.
As the separator delivers to all
tanks simultaneously this can
affect all engines/ generators.
This can cause engine damage,
correct maintenance and
regularly samples reduces the
risk of this.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 97 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
FO system FO
Contamination
Microbiological
growth,
water
Fuel oil
samples
Clogged filters, stop of engines. None; however in worst
case loss of engines caused
by water or other
contamination.
Procedures for periodic samples
to give a pre warning and
regular draining of any water
from tanks. FO storage tanks are
common
FO System
Thruster Engines
Generators
FO Filter
(Coarse type
Racor)
(Generator
only)
Reduced flow
through filter
Clogged filter Alarm Operator can change over to
bypass.
None Assume enough time from
alarm given allowing the
operator to change over filter.
Periodic maintenance should
prevent this.
Flow meter
Reduced flow
over flow
meter
Internal failure Alarm If for some reason an internal
failure will cause flow restriction
there is a bypass line that can be
used
None Assume enough time from
alarm given allowing the
operator to open for bypass.
One flow meter per engine
FO Booster
pump
(engine
driven)
Mech. Failure
Fatigue,
bearing,
coupling,
Internal pump
failure
Alarm Reduced FO pressure, start of
standby booster pump
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Once this pump fails it is highly
doubtful that the operation of
engine will continue. Engineer
will stop the engine to reduce
escalation of failure
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 98 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
FO standby
booster
pump
(electrical
driven)
Mech. Failure
Fatigue,
bearing,
coupling,
Internal pump
failure
Alarm
FO standby booster pump is not
working.
Loss of affected thruster engine
As this pump is only used if
engine driven id not working.
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
One electrical standby booster
pump per thruster engine.
Generators 1 -3 has a pneumatic
backup pump.
Electrical
failure
Breaker failure
Internal failure
Motor failure
FO Filter
(fine, engine
mounted)
Clogged filter Clogged filter Alarm Clogged filter causing reduced
FO flow to injectors.
Assume enough time to take
corrective actions. This will affect
one engine only.
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Injectors Not
functioning
Mechanical
failure
Alarm Damage on affected engine and it
will be stopped
FO System GS
FO System
GS
Failure of GS
FO system
Any failure Alarm FO failure will only affect this
engine.
Normally not in use, but is fitted
as class of SOLAS.
None Service tank has LAL that
allows ample time (15 hours
continuous run from alarm is
activated)
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 99 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.7 Failure Analysis - Cooling Water Systems
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection
of failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
SW Cooling System
Generators
Sea chest Clogged
Not filled with
SW
Debris (weeds etc.)
Clogged vent pipe
Alarm Reduced cooling of FW
system
None Can affect a generator pair
SW Strainer
(filter)
Filter failure Clogged, dirt Alarm Can use other sea chest
and filter on the other
side.
None
SW manifold Aeration
Not filled with
water
Air taken in from sea
chest(s)
Clogged vent pipe
Ice/ weed blowing
Alarm Loss of suction and
cooling to generators, if
not restored in time,
engines will stop on
HTFW
None Generator G4 & G5 have a
separate system as of G1-G3
SW
overboard
valve
Flow restrictions Closed,
remote ctrl valve
If closed this will cause
no circulation of SW
through generators
None Generator G4 & G5 have a
separate system as of G1-G3
SW Pump
Engine
driven
(G1-G3)
Mechanical
failure of pump
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, damage of
motor, overload
Alarm Loss of cooling to that
particular generator
None Loss of a generator, Engineer
starts another generator and
take it online
SW Pump
Electric
(G4& G5)
Mechanical
failure of pump
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, damage of
motor, overload
Alarm Loss of running pump,
start of standby pump.
None SWBD failure hence loss of
both pumps and eventually
loss of G4 & G5 due to lack of
cooling
Electrical failure
of pump
Fuse failure
Short circuit
SWBD failure
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 100 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection
of failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
SW/ FW
Central
cooler
Reduced
capacity/Failure
of cooler
Leakage
Clogging
Damage/ rupture
Corrosion
Alarm Loss of cooling for
effected generator(s),
slow increase of FW
temperature for affected
system.
None
Loss of a generator, Engineer
starts another generator and
take it online
SW Cooling System
Thruster Engines
Sea chest Clogged
Not filled with
SW
Debris (weeds etc.)
Clogged vent pipe
Alarm Reduced cooling of FW
system
SW Strainer
(filter)
Filter failure Clogged, dirt Alarm Reduced cooling of FW
system
SW manifold Aeration
Not filled with
water
Air taken in from sea
chest(s)
Clogged vent pipe
Ice/ weed blowing
Alarm Loss of suction and
cooling to engine, if not
restored in time, engine
will stop on HTFW
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
SW cooling system to thruster
engines are independent of
each other this will affect only
one thruster engine/ thruster
SW
overboard
valve
Flow restrictions Closed,
remote ctrl valve
If closed this will cause
no circulation of SW
through generators
SW cooling
Pump
Mechanical
failure of pump
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, damage of
motor, overload
Alarm Running pump stops,
start of standby pump
None
Electrical failure
of pump
Breaker failure
Short circuit
Central
cooler
Mech. failure Damage
Corrosion
Clogged
Alarm No circulation through
cooler, reduced cooling
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
SW cooling system to thruster
engines are independent of
each other this will affect only
one thruster engine/ thruster
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 101 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection
of failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Clutch cooler Mech. failure Damage
Corrosion
Clogged
Alarm No circulation through
cooler, increased clutch
oil temperature
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
SW cooling system to thruster
engines are independent of
each other this will affect only
one thruster engine/ thruster
Thruster Oil
cooler
Mech. failure Damage
Corrosion
Clogged
Alarm No circulation through
cooler, increased thruster
oil temperature.
Thruster to be stopped
FW Cooling System
Generators
LTFW pump
Mechanical
failure of pump
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling,
Alarm Stop of affected
generator due to lack of
cooling.
None Loss of a generator, Engineer
starts another generator and
take it online
HTFW pump Mechanical
failure of pump
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling,
Alarm
TCV TCV valves not
working properly
Mech. Failure
Electrical failure
Pneumatic failure
Out of calibration
Alarm TCV fails as set or to full
open
None
Manual operation of TCV
If TCV fails to full open it can
cause under cooling of engine
FW header
tank
Drain of water Leakage in system Alarm Loss of a generator None Regular maintenance should
reduce this risk.
Each generator has its own
FW cooling system.
Heat
Exchanger
Mech. failure Damage
Corrosion
Clogged
Alarm No circulation through
that heat exchanger
Temperature increase on
that system, hence
generator has to be shut
down
FW Pre-
heater
Not working Pump failure
Heater failure
Alarm Affected engine not
ready for start
None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 102 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection
of failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
FW Cooling System
Thruster Engines
FW cooling
system
Any See generators above Alarm Stop of affected engine,
hence loss of that
thruster
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Any failure of an engine will
only affect one thruster.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 103 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.8 Failure Analysis - Lube Oil Systems
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
LO system
Generators
The LO system for each
engine is independent
LO direct
driven pump
Failure of
pump
Fatigue, pinion/gear
failure
Alarm Stop of affected
generator and auto start
of priming pump.
None
Engineer starts another
generator
Priming pump Mech. failure
El. failure
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, damage of
motor, short circuit,
power supply
Alarm None if engine is
running
No start of G# if
standby, G# will be start
blocked
None Good practice is to have the
pump available at all time
LO cooler Leakage Rupture Alarm Due to higher pressure
in LO system, LO will
get in the FW system.
Loss of pressure
depending on size of
leak. Stop of affected
generator
None
Engineer starts another
generator
TCV TCV valves
not working
properly
Mech. failure, out of
calibration
Alarm TCV fails as set None Manual operation possible
LO filters Failure of filter Clogging, dirt Alarm Should not affect
running of generator
If not corrected stop of
affected engine.
None
Regular maintenance should
avoid this
LO sump Leakage Rupture or leak in
system.
Alarm Low level alarm before
low-low pressure and
stop of affected engine
None Regular maintenance should
avoid this
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 104 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
LO system Micro bacterial
growth
Stop of an engine LO sample This can cause engine
damage and clogging of
filters
None
This should be detected by
regular oil analysis.
LO separator Failure Power supply, internal
error
Alarm No effect on a running
engine. Worst case can
cause engine damage.
Separator failure can
result in dirt/ water into
the LO system.
None
This can cause engine
damage, correct maintenance
and regularly samples will
reduce the risk
Only generators G1, G2 and
G3 can have its LO purified
All other engines have oil
change.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 105 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
LO system
Thruster Engine
The LO system for each
engine is independent
Engine LO
system
Any See generators Alarm A LO system failure
will only cause stop of
one engine, hence loss
of an azimuth thruster.
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
These engines do also have a
standby LO pump in addition
to priming pump. That will
automatically start up upon
low LO pressure.
It is highly unlikely that the
engine will be running for a
long time if the standby pump
starts up. Engineer will mostly
stop the engine to reduce risk
of escalating the failure.
LO system
Gear/ Clutch
LO direct
driven pump
Failure of
pump
Fatigue, pinion/gear
failure
Alarm, noise Loss of that pump
Start of standby pump
None
Standby LO
pump MG
Mech.
failure/power
failure
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, damage of
motor, short circuit,
power supply loss
Alarm Not in use when engine
is running.
No effect on running
machinery.
None Good practice is to have the
pump available for service at
all time.
LO filters MG Failure of filter Clogging, dirt Alarm Filters are fitted with
pressure differential
alarm to warn the
operator.
None, if proper actions
taken.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 106 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
LO cooler MG Reduced
capacity /
Failure of
cooler
Leakage, clogging,
dirt
Alarm Due to higher LO
pressure the LO will
leak into the coolant
system and result in low
pressure, hence declutch
of MEs.
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
MG clutch Loss of oil
pressure to
clutch
Leakage Alarm A low pressure of gear
oil will initiate shut
down of engine
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Loss of control
power (24V)
Fuse failure Alarm Clutch stays as set None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 107 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.9 Failure Analysis - Compressed Air System
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/ comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Starting Air System
Generators
Start air to generators G1 to
G3 is from one system, and to
G4 & G5 is from another
system.
Starting air
compressor
Mech. or
electrical
failure
Valve failure, fatigue,
bearing failure, loss
of power supply,
protection trip
Alarm Loss of one compressor
Air remains in two
receivers
None All engines running
Starting air
receivers/ valves
Leakage Rupture or leaking
valves
Alarm Isolate that receiver and
use the other one
None Each engine room has two
receivers
Starting air to
generator
No air
pressure or to
low
Start disk failure
Distributor failure
Alarm No start of generator None Assumed engines are running.
If not, no start and reduced
power capacity
Control air to
generators
No air
pressure or to
low
Pressure reduced
clogged, not working
Alarm No air to engine shut
down safety functions
None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 108 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/ comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Staring Air System
Thruster Engines
Starting air to the thruster
engines is from a common
system ring line this is
normally split as thruster room
1 and 3 shares the compressor
in thruster room 1. The second
compressor in thruster room 4
is shared amongst thruster
room 2 and 4. Each engine
room has a control air receiver
fitted with none return valve.
Starting air
compressor
Mech. or
electrical
failure
Valve failure, fatigue,
bearing failure, loss
of power supply,
protection trip
Alarm Loss of one compressor
Air remains in receivers
None All engines running
Starting air
receivers/ valves
Leakage Rupture or leaking
valves
Alarm Isolate that receiver, still
have control air in its
receiver.
None When totally drained this will
affect control air to two
engines rooms only. Engineer
shall have ample time to
isolate faulty receiver and
open isolation valves for air
supply from the PS/SB
system.
Starting air to
Engines
No air
pressure or to
low
Start disk failure
Distributor failure
No start of engine None Assumed engines are running.
If not, no start
Pressure
reducing panel
Not working Mech. Failure
Clogged
Alarm Loss of instr. Control air
feed. Eventually low
pressure alarm
None
If no action taken loss of an
engine
Reduced thruster capacity
Assume ample time for
engineer to open for air from
service air system.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 109 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/ comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Control air No air
pressure or too
low to engines
Loss of air
Reduction panel
failure
Alarm Loss of control air
TCV to full open
Loss of air to engine shut
down safety
Fire dampers will
eventually close as they
are pneumatic controlled
None
Assume ample time for
engineer to open for air from
service air system, this will
prevent fire dampers to close
Worst case will be closing of
fire dampers and then loss of
an engine, hence a thruster
No immediate effect, reduced
head pressure in thruster
gravity tanks, can risk SW
ingress into thruster housing,
reduced oil sealing pressure
Control air
compressor
(Thruster room
2/3 only)
Mech. or
electrical
failure
Valve failure, fatigue,
bearing failure, loss
of power supply,
protection trip
Alarm Loss of one compressor
Air remains in receivers
+ air can be taken from
starting air line too.
None
Service
Air system
Service air
system
Loss of air Leakage
Loss of air on the line
Compressor failure
Alarm Loss of air to:
Separators
SW inlet valves control
Tautwire
Start air to G4 & G5
None Engineer to take necessary
actions to correct failure.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 110 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.10 Failure Analysis - Ventilation
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Function/ comp. Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detecti
on of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Ventilation
Engine room fan Fan not
working
Mech. failure
Electrical failure
Alarm Loss of one of the two supply
fans
Reduction in combustion air and
ventilation to engine room.
None As the ECR is manned the
loss of ventilation will be
noticed and appropriate
action to be taken.
Thruster room
fans
Fan not
working
Mech. failure
Electrical failure
Alarm Loss of supply fan
Thruster rooms do also have AC
system
Thrusters and its aux. systems
are water cooled too
None Important rooms have stand-
alone AC systems fitted in
addition to traditional fan
supply
SWBD room fan Fan not
working
Mech. failure
Electrical failure
Alarm Loss of supply fan
SWBD rooms do also have AC
system
None
AC Units AC unit not
working
Mech. failure
Electrical failure
Each room location has its own
independent standalone unit
None There is no alarm fitted.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 111 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.11 Failure Analysis Propulsion System
15.11.1 Note that the failure analysis for the control and monitoring system for the propulsion system is found in section 15.5 in this
report.
Function/
comp.
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Tunnel
Thrusters
Thruster Mech. failure Bearings, blades,
couplings
Vibration,
noise
Stop of thruster
depending of extent of
failure
El. Motor Not running Motor failure
Power failure
Alarm Loss of affected thruster No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Frequency
converter
Mech. failure
El. failure
Hardware
Breaker failure
Short circuit
Protection trip
Alarm Loss of affected thruster
Pre-charger
Transformer
No power Breaker fault Alarm None None No affect as long as thruster is
running, else not possible to
start
Cooling circuit Lack of
cooling
Loss of cooling fan Alarm Two fans one will run
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
There are two cooling fans per
thruster, all are powered from
4FSB.
Power failure Alarm Loss of cooling fan(s)
Failure of 4FSB loss of
cooling fans to both
tunnel thrusters.
This failure will cause loss of
both tunnel thrusters
LO/ servo
system
Loss of oil
pressure/
circulation
Pump failure
Leakage
Alarm Trip of thrusters No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Thruster is interlocked, loss of
LO pressure thruster stops
also start interlocked for same.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 112 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
comp.
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Seal system incl.
Tank
Loss of head
pressure or oil
Leakage Alarm Risk of seawater ingress
into the thruster housing
None, however SW in
system will increase risk of
wear and tear
Azimuth
Thrusters
Thruster engine Not running Mech. failure
Electrical failure
Shutdown
Alarm Stop of thruster
depending of extent of
failure
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Thruster or gear Mech. failure Bearings, blades,
couplings
Vibration,
noise
Loss of affected thruster
Cooling circuit
to HPU
Lack of
cooling
No circulation of
coolant in cooling
circuit
Alarm Temperature increases
no auto trip of thruster.
Thruster will run Hot
before a high temp and
shutdown of engine.
Engineer should stop thruster
engine to protect the thruster
itself from running to hot.
LO system Loss of oil
pressure/
circulation
Pump failure
Leakage
Alarm Trip of thrusters No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
LO/ servo pump Mech. or
electrical
failure
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, motor
failure, loss of power,
short circuit,
protection trip
Alarm Stop of pump.
Thruster trips, internal
safety.
The thruster is interlocked
meaning if pump fails,
automatically stop of thruster
and no start of thruster is
possible.
Oil filters Failure of
filter
Clogged, dirt Alarm No affect as long as
action taken.
Monitored for pressure
difference
None Watch keeper to take
necessary actions to correct
failure.
Filter set for each system,
pitch, steering and lift
lowering.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 113 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
comp.
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Oil cooler Failure of
cooler
Leakage, rupture. Oil
in FW system.
Alarm Temp. increase
Can cause trip of thruster
Pitch Control
valves
Failure of
pitch valve
Leakage, seizure, dirt Alarm Can cause variance in
pitch or freeze.
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Operator should be aware of
this and disable thruster if this
occurs. The outcome of this
type of failure can varies from
pitch to zero or to full 100%
depending on failure.
Steering control
valve
Valve failure Leakage, seizure, dirt Alarm Can cause uncontrolled
steering of thruster
Operator should be aware of
this and disable thruster if this
occurs.
Steering motor Mech. failure Piston, fatigue Alarm Thruster will not rotate
or rotates slower
Gravity /
Header tank
Loss of head
pressure
Lack of compressed
air to tank
Alarm Reduced head pressure No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Regular maintenance should
avoid this
Reduced
amount of oil
Leakage Alarm No affect as long as
action taken.
Can cause stop of
affected thruster.
Watch keeper to take
necessary actions to correct
failure.
Increased amount of oil in
tank will also give an alarm,
notifying that something is
wrong.
Seal tank Loss of head
pressure
Lack of compressed
air to tank
Alarm Reduced head pressure,
risk of SW ingress to
thruster housing through
the seals
None No immediate effect Increase
of SW in LO system,
Regular maintenance/ oil
samples should give a warning
to avoid this
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 114 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
comp.
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Feedback
transmitter
Slewing ring
gear failure
Mech. Failure This can cause the
thruster to rotate un-
controllably.
There will be a steady
signal to DP and thruster
cabinet, of which will
send out order signal for
the thruster to rotate to
the direction given.
Reduced thruster capacity
This can cause unstable
station keeping.
This type of failure will not
necessary give alarm for the
faulty thruster
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 115 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.12 Failure Analysis - DP Control System
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
DP
System
DPC-11
Computer
Any failure
causing loss of
this station
Electrical failure
Computer failure
Controller failure
Etc.
Alarm Loss of backup DP
station
No effect on station keeping
performance
Loss of DP Class 3
All systems running on main
DPC-21.
Vessel still within DP class 2
DPC-21
Computers
Power failure Short circuit in
cabinet, fuse failure,
PSU failure
Alarm Blackout of affected
computer.
Auto switchover to other
computer.
No effect on station keeping
performance
Loss of DP Class 2/3
In DP class 2 the BU DP
system does not count.
Note! That both DP UPS 1
and UPS 2 are both powered
through the same distribution
2CRASB.
Software error Wrong programming,
model
None Cause wrong
configuration wrong
commands.
DP system does not act
correct on commands/
functions selected.
Loss of position may occur.
Self-check routines between
computers.
Data Virus Data virus in all
computer system on
net
None A virus can result in
crash of computer
systems
Loss of Station keeping To prevent this Vessel
operator should make sure to
have procedures available to
restrict the use of computers
connected to the network
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 116 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Loss of I/O
card
Fuse failure, card
failure, short circuit
Alarm Loss of communication
to components on that
I/O card
Loss of redundancy Loss of class depends on I/O
lost.
The trials revealed that
there are I/O cards that
controls up to three
thrusters, failure of this,
three thrusters are lost. U31
thruster 2, 4 and 5. U32
thruster 1, 3 and 6 are lost.
Abnormal
behaviour
thruster
control
Internal failure in I/O
card
Alarm This scenario can be
critical for those I/O
cards that control
variable pitch thrusters.
Loss of redundancy
If a thruster goes to full pitch
this can affect station
keeping capability
Thruster to be deselected from
DP. Thruster can be used in
emergency mode to assist DP
if needed.
DP Network Net failure Net overload, cable
breakage, fuse/
breaker failure
HUB/ node failure
Alarm Loss of affected
communication network.
Signal transfer on
redundant network.
None and
loss of redundancy
Galvanic
Isolation unit
Not working Loss of power
Internal failure
Alarm Loss of control to
affected thruster(s)
No effect on station keeping
performance
Loss of redundancy
Reduced thruster capacity
Galvanic units are powered
in pairs. A fuse/power
failure will cause loss of two
units. Hence two thrusters
are lost.
Internal failure will cause loss
of one thruster.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 117 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Operator
Console
Operator
Console
Loss of OS Power failure
Fuse failure
Short circuit
Computer failure
Alarm Loss of affected OS.
Other OS still available.
None and
loss redundancy
DP change over
switch
Any failure Power failure, short
circuit, cable
breakage
Alarm Power failure, breakage
of one input cable will
not have any affect due
to each thruster unit got
separate cables.
None One switch per thruster
DP
Sensors
VRS Power or
mech. failure
Fuse failure
Short circuit
Damage
Alarm Loss of affected VRS.
Vessel to be set up with
3 VRSs to main DP
(include voting) and 2 to
the BU DP station
None
Sufficient number of VRSs
available after failure of one.
Note! Loss of VRS to Seapath
or HiPAP will cause loss of
those systems.
Gyro Not working Short circuit
Fuse failure
Mech. failure
Alarm Loss of affected gyro.
DP auto select other
gyro(s).
None and
loss of redundancy
Gyro signal to Seapath are for
calibration only
Number of gyros to main DP
is 3; loss of one will cause loss
redundancy.
There are 2 gyros (3&4) to
backup DP loss of gyro 4, still
within class 2/3.
Difference Wrong calibration,
damage
Alarm Affected gyro will be de-
selected by DP system
due to gyro difference
check.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 118 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Wind Power failure Fuse failure
Supply failure
Short circuit
Alarm Loss of affected wind
sensor
None and
loss of redundancy
Vessel has 4 sensors, 2 for
main and 2 for BU DP
Mech./internal
failure
Damage, shielding
effect
Excess wind speed
due to Helicopter
operations
Warning Can cause wrong signals
to DP system.
DP system compensates
for wrong input.
Can result in excursion
DPO to be aware of this.
Position
Reference
Systems
Vessel is fitted with 3
DGPSs, 1 Fanbeam, 1
LWTW and 2 HiPAPs
DGPS
Power failure Fuse failure
Supply failure
Short circuit
Alarm Loss of affected DGPS
as DP ref. system.
None
GPS Antenna Wire break
Shielding
GPS antenna damage
Alarm Shielding can affect more than
one DGPS
DGPS signal Loss of
differential
correction signal
Spotbeam
Shielding,
Out of range, power
failure
Warning
indication on
DGPS
monitor
Loss of diff. signal to
DGPS
None
Affected DGPS rejected
from DP as ref. system
There is one demodulator per
GPS, all diff. corr. of type
Spotbeam. However one of
AFSAT and the other two are
AOREH
Loss of pre-set
numbers of
satellite signals
Too few satellite
signals
Alarm Can cause loss of all
DGPSs and Seapath
None
Or loss of redundancy
Vessel remains with only on
Fanbeam, LWTW and one
HiPAP if configured right.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 119 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Degraded
performance
Shielding, noise/
disturbance in
hardware signal
network, poor
satellite constellation,
invalid satellites,
poor atmospheric
conditions
Alarm,
Warning
Can cause invalid
position on DGPS.
DP will vote away poor
DGPS.
Loss of redundancy.
Seapath Power Failure Fuse failure
UPS failure
Alarm The DP system does not use
the Seapath, but its used as
heading and motion reference
for HiPAP(s).
GPS antenna Shielding of a GPS
antenna
Communication
Alarm Loss of Seapath, hence
loss of HiPAP as a DP
reference source
No effect on station keeping
performance
Loss of a HiPAP as DP ref.
system
Loss of VRS
signals
Power failure
Mech. failure
Signal failure
Alarm
Loss of Gyro
signals
Power failure
Mech. failure
Signal failure
Alarm No affect None Gyro signal is used for visual
check / calibration only
HiPAP Computer
APC-11
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm Motion + gyro signals from
Seapath or from a gyro &
MRU. Setup configuration
according to DP Ops
Manual
Transceiver MRU signal
Gyro signal
Power failure
Alarm Loss of affected HiPAP No effect on station keeping
performance
Transducer Mech. damage
Sensor failure
Alarm
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 120 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Transponder Not working
Battery failure
Noise in water
(propeller wash/
water layers)
Alarm
Hoist control Power failure Alarm None as long as
transducer is deployed
None Not possible to lift / lower
transducer
Fanbeam Power Failure Fuse failure
Supply failure
Short circuit
Alarm Loss of Fanbeam No effect on station keeping
performance
Track failure Select new target,
Weather conditions
(e.g. fog), rotation of
vessel
Alarm Unstable reference.
LWTW HPU failure Electrical
Mech. failure
Alarm LWTW rejected from
DP, lost.
No effect on station keeping
performance
Failing HPU failure can lead
to not paying out wire or
pulling in = loss of mooring
Cable failure Cable break Alarm
Clump weight Stuck at seabed None Not possible to retrieve No affect as the system will be
in mooring
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 121 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Function/
component
Description of failure
Effect of failure
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Dragging clump
weight along Seabed
Alarm LWTW should be
rejected as the angle and
wire length will be
frozen
Internal DP verification
should reject the LWTW
based on same data sent
several times, though small
changes will not be detected
and the DPO has to determent
if LWTW data are OK or not.
DP UPS
DP UPSs Power failure
230V/ rectifier
failure
Short circuit
Fuse/ breaker failure
Alarm Loss of 230V main
supply cause UPS to
auto-change to battery
power.
No effect on station keeping
performance
Eventually loss of main DP
if failure of 2CRASB.
Loss of redundancy
Battery endurance should be
min. 30 minutes.
Note both DP UPS 1 & UPS 2
from same distribution
Battery failure Battery failure Alarm None, remains on main
supply.
None Regular maintenance should
reveal this
Loss of UPS Internal UPS failure,
short circuit
Alarm Loss of consumers on
affected UPS.
Loss of redundancy Reference is made to section
14.7 for list of UPS consumers
that will be lost.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 122 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
16 REFERENCES
/1/ FMEA report GM-694-170-R01-rev2
/2/ 1203351A_1 OSes.
/3/ 1203352A_1 FS 31-36
/4/ 1203353A_1 FS 37-38-41
/5/ 1203355A_1 FS 39
/6/ 1203356A_1 FS 42
/7/ 1203357A_1 UPS
/8 1208197B_1 KFDD Common system
/9/ 1208200B_1 KFDD IAS
/10/ 1208201B_1 KFDD PMS
/11/ 1208202A_1 KFDD Serial Lines
/12/ K-Chief Topology - 1203364A_1
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: A1
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
APPENDIX A
Kongsberg Maritime DP I/O specifications
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: A2
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
I/O Specification SDP 21
Equipment U11 U12 U13 U14 U31 U32 U33 U41
Tension NMEA X
Gyro 1 X
DGPS 1 X
Wind 1 X
Gyro 2 X
DGPS 2 X
Wind 2 X
Gyro 3 X
Artemis interface (not used) X
DGPS 3 X
Waypoint X
Fanbeam X
Thr. 5 ready X
Thr. 2 ready X
Thr. 4 ready X
VRS 1 OK X
VRS 2 OK X
UPS 1 alarm X
Thr. 1 ready X
Thr. 3 ready X
Thr. 6 ready X
LWTW warn., select, alarm X
VRS 3 OK X
UPS 2 alarm X
VRS 1 roll X
VRS 1 pitch X
VRS 1 heave X
LWTW length , beam, along X
VRS 2 roll X
VRS 2 pitch X
Thr. 2 pitch feedback X
Thr. 2 azimuth feedback sin X
Thr. 2 azimuth feedback cos X
Thr. 4 pitch feedback X
Thr. 4 azimuth feedback sin X
Thr. 4 azimuth feedback cos X
Thr. 2 pitch command X
Thr. 2 azimuth command X
Thr. 4 pitch command X
Thr. 4 azimuth command X
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: A3
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Equipment U51 U61
Thr. 1 pitch feedback X
Thr. 1 azimuth feedback sin X
Thr. 1 azimuth feedback cos X
Thr. 6 rpm feedback X
Thr. 1 pitch command X
Thr. 1 azimuth command X
Thr. 6 rpm command X
Thr. 6 direction command X
Thr. 3 pitch feedback X
Thr. 3 azimuth feedback sin X
Thr. 3 azimuth feedback cos X
Thr. 5 rpm feedback X
Thr. 3 pitch command X
Thr. 3 azimuth command X
Thr. 5 rpm command X
Thr. 5 direction command X
Note!
A single card failure can result in loss of three thrusters, ref. U31 & U32.
Two thrusters will be lost if following cards fails U41, U51 and U61.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: A4
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
I/O Specification SDP 11
Equipment U11 U12 U13 U31 U32 U33 U41 U51
Tension NMEA X
Gyro 4 X
Wind 3 X
VRS 4 X
DGPS 3 X
Wind 4 X
Gyro 3 X
Thr. 5 ready X
Thr. 4 ready X
VRS 3 OK X
UPS 3 X
Thr. 1 ready X
Thr. 6 ready X
Tautwire X
VRS 4 X
Backup selected X
VRS 3 (pitch/roll/heave) X
Tautwire X
Thr. 5 order/feedback X
Thr. 2 order/feedback X
Thr. 4 order/feedback X
Thr. 1 order/feedback X
Thr. 3 order/feedback X
Thr. 6 order/feedback X
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: B1
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ
Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
APPENDIX B
Annual DP Trials with recommendations
See last Annual DP Trials report