Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39592 January 28, 1975

The Spouses ANTONIO JAYME and ANA
SOLIDARIOS, petitioners,
vs.
Hon. Judge NESTOR ALAMPAY and BENITO ONG, respondents.
Edmundo G. Manlapao for petitioners.
Osmundo R. Victoriano and Eduardo P. Arboleda for private
respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

In this review on pure questions of law of respondent court's

granting of the motion to dismiss petitioners' action for reformation
of instrument, the Court reverses and remands the case for trial
and adjudication on the merits. The Civil Code provides that where,
as alleged in the complaint, two parties agree upon the mortgage of
real property but the instrument states that the property is sold
absolutely or with a right of repurchase, an action for reformation of
the instrument is proper. The prescriptive period must be
determined on the basis of the allegations of the complaint for
reformation of instrument and not on the counter-allegations of the
motion to dismiss (which must hypothetically admit the factual
allegations of the complaint) that the transaction was actually a true
sale (which is a matter of defense), of an action for annulment of
which would prescribe in the lesser period of four years. The
existence of a bona fide mortgage in favor of a third party clearly
constitutes no impediment to petitioners' action for reformation and
recovery of title.

On November 29, 1972, petitioners-spouses filed a complaint

against private respondent in the court of first instance of Negros
Occidental presided by respondent judge for reformation of
instrument and praying that the deed of absolute sale of the parcel
of land in Bacolod City executed by them on December 24, 1964 in
favor of private respondent which did not embody their true
agreement be reformed and declared a contract of mortgage and
that their property be returned to them upon their payment of the
loan consideration of P16,500.00 and that they be awarded
damages, attorneys' fees and costs.
In their complaint, petitioners allege that "on December 24, 1964
the plaintiffs and the defendant Ong entered into an agreement
whereby they agreed that the plaintiffs will borrow from the
defendant the sum of P16,500.00 on the security of the parcel of
land above mentioned;" "that the deed of sale does not embody the
true agreement of the parties which was to constitute a mortgage
over Lot No. 270-A, Bacolod Cadastre above mentioned to secure

payment of the loan of P16,500.00;" "that plaintiffs acceded to the

condition required by the defendant Ong (to execute in his favor a
deed of sale) for the reason that they reposed great confidence in
said defendant, being a good family friend and because they were
in dire need of money "that simultaneous to the execution of the
deed of sale, Annex A, the defendant Ong executed in favor of the
plaintiff an option (for six months) to purchase the ... parcel of land
for the same sum of P16,500.00;" that since the purported sale up
to now, petitioners "continue to occupy part of the premises without
paying rentals to the defendant; moreover, plaintiffs collect up to the
present time all the rentals due from the other occupants of the
premises;" that the "sum of P16,500.00 ... is grossly inadequate for
purpose of definite sale ...;" that the "plaintiffs had on several
occasions offered to the defendant Ong to pay the sum of
P16,500.00 representing the loan ...;" that the plaintiffs are "willing
and ready to pay defendant the loan of P16,500.00 plus lawful
interest if due;" that "due to the defendant Ong's unjust refusal to

execute the proper document of mortgage and to accept plaintiff's

payment of their loan to him they suffered damages." 1
Respondent filed his answer with counterclaim and raised the
defense of prescription in his answer. Respondent court after pretrial directed respondent to raise the issue of prescription squarely
in a motion to dismiss. Petitioners filed their opposition to the
dismissal motion and after hearing, respondent court issued its
order of June 10, 1974 granting the motion to dismiss and
dismissing petitioners' case.
No evidence on the sole issue of prescription was received by
respondent court at the hearing of the dismissal motion. It merely
relied on the allegations of the complaint and the pleadings and
granted dismissal on two grounds, to wit,
1. The proper remedy of petitioners on the basis of the complaint is
annulment of the sale on the ground of "vitiated consent" which

action has prescribed within the statutory four-year period citing

Article 1391, Civil Code; 2and
2. The existence of a mortgage for P100,000.00 over the lot
executed by respondent in favor of Jose del Castillo 3who is a
mortgagee in good faith presents a legal impediment to petitioners'
action for reformation of instrument and recovery of the property
free from all liens and encumbrances.
Reconsideration was peremptorily denied in respondent court's
order of August 5, 1974. Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari on pure questions of law. The Court per its resolution of
January 13, 1975 in view of the simple issues involved resolved to
consider the case as a special civil action and respondent's motion
to dismiss as his answer to the petition in order to expeditiously
dispose of the legal questions presented without the need and
expense of parties' briefs.

The petition has merit and calls for the setting aside of the
dismissal order.
1. Respondent court manifestly erred in holding that petitioners'
action prescribed four years after the execution of the questioned
deed of sale on the premise of its unsupported prejudgment in its
dismissal order (without trial and evidence) that "the ultimate
agreement of the parties (was) for the definite sale and conveyance
(of the property)", 4 and that petitioners' action "would involve, not
the reformation of said document of sale into a mortgage as they so
contend, but inherently the annulment itself of the deed of sale and
only because of an alleged vitiated consent of the plaintiffs in
acceding to the conditions required by the defendant." 5
Respondent court instead of disregarding, should have adhered to
the established rule that in motions to dismiss, the allegations of the
complaint are deemed to be hypothetically admitted. Here, the
complaint for reformation of instrument clearly alleged that the deed
of sale did not express the true agreement of the parties and should

be reformed into the mortgage that it actually was and prayed that
petitioners be allowed to redeem the property by repaying the loan
of P16,500.00 (the true value of the property being much more, as
evidenced by the mortgage loan for P100,000.00 which respondent
in turn secured on it). Such allegations are binding for purposes of
the dismissal motion and therefore the applicable prescription
period for such actions based upon a written contract and for
reformation thereof as provided by law is ten (10 years as provided
in Article 1144, Civil Code. 6
Such right to reformation is expressly recognized in Article 1365 of
the Civil Code which provides that "If two parties agree upon the
mortgage or pledge of real or personal property but the instrument
states that the property is sold absolutely or with a right to
repurchase, reformation of the instrument is proper."
Petitioners' action for reformation and recovery of title was brought
on November 29, 1972 less than eight years after execution of the

questioned deed on December 24, 1964 and had therefore not

prescribed.
Respondent's counter-theory that the questioned contract was in
truth and reality a bona fide sale is clearly a matter of defense,
which was yet to be established at the trial and could not be availed
of at the pre-trial stage to dismiss the case as if it were already a
proven fact, contrary to the very allegations of fact of the complaint
which petitioners must be given an opportunity and their day in
court to establish.
2. Respondent court's other ground for dismissal, to wit, that the
existing P100.00-mortgage of the property in favor of Jose del
Castillo (whom the parties have conceded to be a mortgagee in
good faith) constitutes an impediment to petitioners' action as an
innocent party's "undisputed rights ... would be impaired and
prejudiced" is clear error.

It is obvious that the mortgagee's rights over the property are

recognized but that would in no way defeat petitioners' action for
reformation and recovery of title to the property. If petitioners
prevail, they simply would recover the title to the property, subject to
the mortgage thereon in favor of del Castillo or as prayed for by
them, respondent may be duly sentenced "to deliver title to the
plaintiffs free from any encumbrances including the mortgage to
defendant del Castillo" 7 which merely means that respondent would
in such case be obliged and sentenced to discharge del Castillo's
mortgage credit (which mortgage loan he obtained after all for his
own exclusive benefit).
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the
dismissal order of June 10, 1974 and remanding the case to
respondent court for trial and adjudication on the merits. Without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Castro (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
1 Pars 4 to 14 of petitioners' complaint, Annex A, petition;
notes in parentheses supplied.
2 Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought
within four years.
This period shall begin:
In cases of intimidation, violence, undue influence from the
time the defect of the consent ceases. In case of mistake
or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same. ..."
(Civil Code).
3 Del Castillo as mortgagee was originally impleaded as
defendant in petitioners' complaint, but as per the pre-trial
order of Jan. 16, 1974, Annex C, petition, petitioners
agreed to withdraw their complaint against him in the

absence of evidence to impeach his character as a

mortgagee in good faith and the court dismissed the case
as against him.
4 Rollo, p. 7.
5 Idem, p. 8.
6 Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
1) Upon a written contract;
2) Upon an obligation created by law;
3) Upon a judgment (n)" in (Civil Code).
7 Rollo, pages 17-18.