Civil Procedure Case Digests (Rule 37 and Rule 38)
Civil Procedure Case Digests (Rule 37 and Rule 38)
Civil Procedure Case Digests (Rule 37 and Rule 38)
Having gone through the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), an appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and a petition
for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA), this ejectment case is now before
this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The case stemmed from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by respondent
spouses Francisco and Rosario Castro against Danilo Cansino, Linda de Jesus
and Elena Mesa1 before the Metropolitan Trial Court. The subject matter of the
controversy is a parcel of land located at Maligaya Park Subdivision, Kalookan
City. In their complaint, respondents alleged that petitioners, "by strategy and
stealth unlawfully constructed their respective houses inside plaintiffs(’)
(herein respondents) aforementioned parcel of land." 2 In their answer with
counterclaim, petitioners Cansino and de Jesus averred that their possession
was "premised upon the honest belief that the lot they were and are still
occupying was a public land;" that they "had been in possession of the subject
premises ever since 1977;" and that "the failure (of herein respondents) to
allege when possession of defendants (herein petitioners) started and taken
cognizance of by plaintiffs (herein respondents) created (sic) doubts" as to the
jurisdiction of the MeTC.3
The MeTC took cognizance of the case and treated the complaint as one for
ejectment under the Rules on Summary Procedure. It ordered the parties to
submit their respective affidavits and those of their witnesses along with their
other evidence. Thereafter, the MeTC in its decision dated August 12, 1994,
dismissed the complaint holding that in an ejectment case, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving prior physical possession of the property. Respondents failed
to discharge the burden.4
On appeal with the RTC of Kalookan City, Br. 120, the court, on January 11,
1995, affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC. It held that respondents were
not able to present evidence of their actual possession of the property prior to
that of petitioners, while the latter were able to prove their possession of the
property since 1977.5
Thus, petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. They
assailed the right of the RTC to decide the issue of ownership without any fair
trial and the propriety of the action of the RTC in considering the documentary
evidence attached by respondents in their motion for reconsideration which
were not made part of the position paper they (respondents) previously
submitted.7
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioners
were unable to substantiate their possession of the property. Their "occupancy
is at best due to the tolerance of the registered owners, private respondent
spouses." Moreover, "since respondents had prior legal possession of the
property, they had in their favor priority of time that legally entitles them to
stay in the said property." 8 With regard to the action taken by the RTC in
considering the documentary evidence attached only in the motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court ruled that under Section 5, Rule 135 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the RTC has the inherent power to amend and
control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice.9
Petitioners brought the case at bar to this Court on a petition for review on
certiorari. They raise the following issues:
II
Anent the first issue, Section 5, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 5. Inherent powers of courts. – Every court shall have the power:
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice;
The Court of Appeals upheld the RTC in reconsidering its prior decision on the
basis of new evidence attached to the motion for reconsideration on the ground
that it is the inherent right of the court to amend and control its processes. It
further ruled that procedural technicalities should not override substantial
justice.11
We disagree. It is true that the rules provide that courts have the inherent
power to amend their decisions to make them conformable to law and justice.
This prerogative, however, is not absolute. The rules do not contemplate
amendments that are substantial in nature. 12 They merely cover formal
changes or such that will not affect the crux of the decision, like the correction
of typographical or clerical errors. Courts will violate due process if they make
substantial amendments in their decisions without affording the other party
the right to contest the new evidence presented in a motion for
reconsideration.
Under Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party may file a motion for
reconsideration on the ground, among others, that "x x x, the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or the decision or final order is
contrary to law."13 It requires the motion to point out specifically the findings or
conclusions of the judgment or final order which are not supported by the
evidence or which are contrary to law, making specific reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence presented or to the provisions of law
alleged to be violated.14
In the case at bar, respondents attached for the first time in their motion for
reconsideration, evidence to prove their ownership over the parcel of land
subject matter of this controversy. This cannot be countenanced. For one,
possession is the only issue in a case for unlawful detainer. 16 More importantly,
there is no justification for the delay in presenting said evidence. We note that
although it was respondents who filed an appeal to the RTC, they failed to
submit their memorandum as required by the said court. 17 It was only after the
RTC rendered an unfavorable decision that respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration and appended their new evidence. Piecemeal presentation of
evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.
In light of our resolution of the first issue which clears the question of prior
possession, it is unnecessary to discuss the second issue since petitioners’
argument touches on the ownership of the lot subject matter of this
controversy. As discussed, the case at bar is an ejectment case where the only
issue is prior possession of the lot. Any controversy with regard to ownership
should be ventilated in a separate action.
SO ORDERED.
ELPIDIO S. UY, petitioner,
vs.
FIRST METRO INTEGRATED STEEL CORP. and HON. ANTONIO I. DE
CASTRO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 3, Manila, respondents.
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81046 dated August 27,
2004 dismissing petitioner Elpidio S. Uy's petition for certiorari and its
Resolution2 dated February 22, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts show that on July 5, 1999, private respondent First Metro Integrated
Steel Corporation (FMISC) filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for
writ of preliminary attachment against Robert Juan Uy (Robert), Midland
Integrated Construction Company (MICC) and herein petitioner Elpidio Uy,
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
99-94408 and raffled to Branch 3.3
In their Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim, Robert and MICC alleged
that they are strangers to the contract between FMISC and petitioner; that
Robert merely referred petitioner to FMISC; that petitioner left his check in
Robert's office which was picked up by FMISC's collector; and that the
deformed steel bars were delivered to and received by petitioner's
representatives as certified to by Paul Eldrich V. Uy, petitioner's son. 4
During the October 25, 2001 hearing, petitioner was represented by Atty.
Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. who appeared as Atty. Molina's collaborating
counsel.8 The hearing was cancelled and rescheduled to December 13, 2001.
However, on December 10, 2001, Atty. Molina withdrew his appearance as
petitioner's counsel with the latter's consent. 9 On December 13, 2001, Atty.
Danilo Bañares entered his appearance and requested for a resetting on
February 14 and 28, 200210 which was granted by the trial court. On February
14, 2002, Atty. Bañares appeared but instead of presenting evidence for the
petitioner, he requested for a postponement and resetting of the hearing. 11
During the scheduled hearing on February 28, 2002, Atty. Bañares arrived
late. Upon motion of FMISC, the trial court ordered that petitioner's right to
present evidence is deemed waived and the parties were directed to file their
respective memorandum.12 The case was deemed submitted for decision on
November 18, 2002.13
On March 7, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment, 15 the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
a) the sum of P690,000 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from July
1998 until fully paid;
SO ORDERED.16
On April 4, 2003, petitioner received a copy of the Decision.
On April 21, 2003, petitioner through Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. filed a Motion
for New Trial17 on the ground of gross negligence of petitioner's counsel in
failing to attend the hearing for the reception of evidence, thus impairing his
rights to due process.
The trial court denied the motion for new trial in an Order 18 dated October 1,
2003.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
which dismissed the petition in its assailed Decision dated August 27, 2004. It
held that the trial court correctly denied the motion for new trial because it
was filed out of time and that a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy
for the denial of a motion for new trial.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this recourse on the
grounds that –
2. The former Seventeenth (17th) Division of the Court of Appeals gravely erred
in not finding that the Public Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he issued the
assailed Order dated October 1, 2003 denying Petitioner's Motion for New
Trial.20
A scrutiny of the records discloses that while the Motion for New Trial was
received by the trial court on April 28, 2003, the date on the Registry Receipt
attached to the Affidavit of Service 21 as well as that stamped on the
envelope22 which contained the copy of the motion, reveals that it was filed and
served by registered mail on April 21, 2003, a Monday, because April 19, 2003,
the last day for filing the same was a Saturday. Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules
of Court states in no uncertain terms that if the last day of the period thus
computed falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where
the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. Thus, the
motion was actually filed on time it having been filed on April 21, 2003, the
next working day, following the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday.
Section 9, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court which provides that the remedy to an
order denying a motion for new trial is to appeal the judgment or final order,
must be read in conjunction with Section 1, Rule 41 which provides that:
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appeasable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the filing by the petitioner of a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals from the denial of the motion for new trial by the trial court is proper.
Notwthstanding the foregoing, we find that the trial court correctly denied
petitioner's motion for new trial.
Section 1, Rule 37 provides that a motion for new trial may be filed within the
period for taking an appeal based on the following grounds:
xxxx
Scrutiny of the records disclose that the hearings were postponed or cancelled
without any justification. However, the trial court accommodated the requests
for postponement or resetting in order to accord petitioner due process. Under
the circumstances, we find petitioner's counsel's failure to attend the seven
scheduled hearings without justifiable reason tantamount to inexcusable
neglect. As such, it cannot be a ground for new trial.
In addition, the Rule requires that motions for new trial founded on fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence must be accompanied by affidavits
of merits, i.e., affidavits showing the facts (not mere conclusions or opinions)
constituting the valid cause of action or defense which the movant may prove
in case a new trial is granted, because a new trial would serve no purpose and
would just waste the time of the court as well as the parties if the complaint is
after all groundless or the defense is nil or ineffective. 24
Under the Rules, the moving party must show that he has a meritorious
defense. The facts constituting the movant's good and substantial defense,
which he may prove if the petition were granted, must be shown in the affidavit
which should accompany the motion for a new trial. 25 We examined petitioner's
Affidavit of Merit and find that it did not contain clear statements of the facts
constituting a good and valid defense which he might prove if given the chance
to introduce evidence. The allegations that he has a "meritorious
defense"26 and a "good cause"27 are mere conclusions which did not provide the
court with any basis for determining the nature and merit of the case. An
affidavit of merit should state facts, and not mere opinion or conclusions of
law.28 Petitioner's motion for new trial and affidavit of merit did not mention
the evidence which he was prevented from introducing, nor did it allege that
such evidence would change the outcome of the case.
Petitioner's argument that his counsel's negligence was so gross that he was
deprived of due process fails to impress. Gross negligence is not one of the
grounds for a motion for a new trial. We cannot declare his counsel's
negligence as gross as to liberate him from the effects of his failure to present
countervailing evidence.29 In Air Philippines Corporation v. International
Business Aviation Services, Phils., Inc.,30 we did not consider as gross
negligence the counsel's resort to dilatory schemes, such as (1) the filing of at
least three motions to extend the filing of petitioner's Answer; (2) his
nonappearance during the scheduled pretrials; and (3) the failure to file
petitioner's pretrial Brief, even after the filing of several Motions to extend the
date for filing.
Besides, we find that petitioner's and his counsel's negligence are concurrent.
During the initial hearing for the reception of his evidence, petitioner was
absent allegedly due to influenza. During the succeeding scheduled hearings,
petitioner was absent but his lawyer, Atty. Molina, was present but did not
present any evidence. Instead, motions for postponement or resetting were
made. In one occasion, Atty. Molina was absent but Atty. Carpio, Jr. appeared
as collaborating counsel. Still, no evidence was presented but a resetting was
again requested.
On December 13, 2001, petitioner hired Atty. Bañares as his new counsel, and
the hearings were set on February 14 and 28, 2002. For petitioner, thus, to
feign and insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress of the case is to
unmask a penchant for the ludicrous. 31 When he hired the services of Atty.
Bañares, it is highly improbable that he was unaware of the stage of the
proceedings. In keeping with the normal cause of events, he should have made
the proper inquiries from his former counsel as to the status of the case.
Incidentally, we find it interesting that Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. who assisted
petitioner in the preparation of the motion for new trial, wherein he claimed
that his former counsel was grossly negligent in defending his case, was
petitioner's collaborating counsel and who appeared in his behalf during the
October 25, 2001 hearing but likewise presented no evidence for the petitioner.
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a
result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify
as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-
opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new
counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on
the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to
securing new trials in the event of conviction, 33 or an adverse decision, as in
the instant case.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182718 September 26, 2008
A PETITION for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases
when there is no other available or adequate remedy. It may be availed of only
after a judgment, final order, or other proceeding was taken against petitioner
in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. 1
The Antecedents
In his verified position paper, petitioner alleged that on January 28, 2002,
respondent MRM Philippines, Inc. hired him as a seaman on board the vessel
M/T SARABELLE 2. He signed a contract for three (3) months with a monthly
salary of $584.00. According to petitioner, his work involved a day-to-day
activity that required exertion of strenuous effort, and that he often worked
overtime due to the pressure of his work. His contract was extended for
another three (3) months. On the second week of June 2002, he felt an
excruciating pain in his left testicle. After being examined by a doctor at the
port of France, he was diagnosed with hernia. On June 26, 2002, he was
repatriated due to his ailment.
Upon petitioner’s return to the Philippines, he was examined by Dr. Alegre, the
company physician, who prescribed certain medication. On July 24, 2002, Dr.
Alegre declared that he was fit to resume work. When he reported to MRM
Philippines, Inc. hoping to be re-hired for another contract, he was told that
there was no vacancy for him.
On March 31, 2005, Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered its
decision5 dismissing the complaint for utter lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter
explained that petitioner was fit to resume work as a seafarer as of July 23,
2002 as his "hernia" was already cured or non-existent. In fact, petitioner was
ready to resume work. Unfortunately, he was not accommodated due to lack of
vacancy. The fact that he was not re-hired by respondent did not mean that he
was suffering from disability.
On September 30, 2005, the NLRC Third Division issued a resolution 6 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision dated March 31, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7
On December 20, 2005, the motion for reconsideration was dismissed for lack
of merit. On January 27, 2006, the NLRC resolution became final and
executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
On March 2, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). However, on June 7,
2006, the CA dismissed the case due to formal infirmities. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied. On September 29, 2006, the CA resolution
became final and executory.
On May 9, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
June 7, 2006 and September 5, 2006 Resolutions of the CA, which dismissed
his petition for certiorari.
In Our Resolution8 dated July 16, 2007, We denied the petition for the
following reasons: (1) the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days fixed in Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; (2) failure to pay on time docket
and other fees and deposit for costs in violation of Section 3, Rule 45, in
relation to Section 5(c) of Rule 56; and (3) insufficient or defective verification
under Section 4, Rule 7.
On May 6, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment
interposing the following grounds:
II. The Honorable Labor Arbiter further committed a GROSS MISTAKE when he
adopted the irrelevant jurisprudence cited by the respondents and by adopting
it in his decision;
III. The Honorable NLRC Third Division also committed a GROSS MISTAKE
when it affirms the ERRONEOUS decision of the Honorable Labor Arbiter;
IV. The factual findings of the Honorable Labor Arbiter, and the Honorable
NLRC Third Division, are not based on substantial evidence and that their
decisions are contrary to the applicable law and jurisprudence; and
The threshold issue before Us is – Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief
from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our
resolution denying his petition for review?
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order
is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in
any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be
interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases
cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:
A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases
originally cognizable by this Court.
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to
Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.
As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the
order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, a petition for relief from
the judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, viz.:
Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment of inferior
court. – When a judgment is rendered by an inferior court on a case, and a
party thereto by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been
unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been prevented from taking an
appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province in
which the original judgment was rendered, praying that such judgment be set
aside and the case tried upon its merits.
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the judgment or
other proceeding thereof. – When a judgment order is entered, or any other
proceeding is taken against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.
Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by
separate provisions of the Rules of Court.15 It may, from time to time, be
supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through
resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the
Revised Internal Rules of the CA16 allows the remedy of petition for relief in the
CA.
There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief
applicable in the CA or this Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to
55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court,
identifies the remedies available before said Court such as annulment of
judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration
(Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38
mentioned.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the
CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme
Court. This Court entertains only questions of law. A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which
are beyond the concerns of this Court.ALF-itc
Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the same must
still be dismissed. The late filing of the petition for review does not amount to
excusable negligence. Petitioner’s lack of devotion in discharging his duty,
without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to
prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be
shown.
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law
was due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of
appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence
or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel.
Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to
be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise,
the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which
has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to
mistaken mode of procedure by counsel.17
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 140630 : August 12, 2004
The records show that on January 26, 1999, the trial court rendered
judgment3 in Civil Case No. 97-0237 in favor of the plaintiffs Sanritsu Great
International Corporation, Tetsuji Maruyama, Akira Kubota and Yukio
Matsuzaka, ordering defendant Yusuke Fukuzumi to pay to the plaintiffs sums
of money. The fallo of the decision reads:
SO ORDERED.4
In his petition for relief, the petitioner averred that his counsel suffered a high
blood pressure on May 6, 1999 which impelled said counsel to rest for three
days, upon the advice of his doctor, thus, hindered him from filing the notice of
appeal on May 6, 1999. The petitioner appended to his petition a verified
Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Lakambini Cruz-Crespo dated June 18,
1999, viz:
medical certificate
The patient was advised to rest for at least 3 days (May 6-8, 1999).
He was given Nifedipine (Calcibloc).
On August 5, 1999, the trial court issued an Order denying the defendant's
petition on the ground that Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was not
applicable. The defendant's motion for reconsideration of the order was denied
by the court per its Order dated October 22, 1999.
The defendant, now the petitioner, filed his Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court alleging that:
In his comment on the petition, the respondents averred that (a) the petitioner
cannot invoke Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which applies only to
negligence of a party and not of his counsel; (b) by his negligence, the
petitioner failed to avail of other remedies other than filing his petition for relief
from the June 22, 1999 Order of the trial court; and (c) the alleged high blood
pressure of the petitioner's counsel is merely an afterthought.
The remedy of a party whose notice of appeal is denied by the trial court,
although such notice is filed within the period therefor, is to file a motion for
reconsideration of such order and, if the court denies such motion, to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. If the party is
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing his
notice of appeal within the reglementary period therefor, his remedy is to file a
petition for relief, in the same case, from the order of the trial court denying
his notice of appeal. This is provided in Section 2, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which reads:
Such party is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court if he was not prevented from filing his notice of appeal by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Such relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss
of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of
procedure for that matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount
to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of
inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel. 7
If the petition for relief is denied by the trial court, the remedy of the petitioner
is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads:
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate civil action
under Rule 65. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The petitioner's failure to file his notice of appeal within the period therefor is
far from excusable. It, rather, shows negligence no less. The medical certificate
issued to his counsel shows that he was examined by Dr. Lakambini Cruz-
Crespo on May 6, 1999 and was advised to rest for three days from May 6,
1999 or until May 8, 1999. The petitioner would like the trial court and this
Court to believe that his counsel was unable to file the notice of appeal on or
before May 6, 1999 because he was even advised to take a rest for three days.
But his counsel was able, well enough, to prepare and file the notice of appeal
on May 7, 1999 when he was supposed to be resting. The petitioner even failed
to allege in his notice of appeal that the same was filed one day late because
his counsel was suffering from high blood pressure on May 6, 1999. It was
only after the petitioner received the order of the trial court denying his notice
of appeal and filed his petition for relief on June 22, 1999 did he allege that his
counsel was suffering from high blood pressure on May 6, 1999. It was only on
June 18, 1999 that the petitioner secured a medical certificate from Dr.
Crespo.
Thus, we are not convinced by the petitioner's claim that his counsel was
suffering from high blood pressure on May 6, 1999, which prevented him from
filing said notice of appeal on said date. Said allegation is a mere afterthought
to cover up his and his own counsel's collective negligence. It is settled that
clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. 8
It bears stressing that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well and
failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment or
resolution final and executory.9 After all, the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 10
While we have ruled that delay in the filing of a notice of appeal does not
justify the dismissal of the appeal, however, the petitioner has not shown any
exceptional circumstances justifying a reversal of the assailed order of the trial
court and the reinstatement of his appeal.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
In sum, the CA held that because Soriano seasonably filed her own Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010, the said
Decision of the RTC is not an appealable judgment despite the denial of
Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration. The CA believed that Bernardo's Notice
of Appeal was premature owing to the pendency of Soriano's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration:cralawred
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
The RTC's Decision cannot yet be considered a judgment that may be appealed
due to the filing of Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration because, as
explained by the CA:cralawred
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
In other words, the CA held that despite the RTC's Decision being a judgment
on the merits of the case and despite the RTC having already disposed
Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration of such Decision, the pendency of
Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration warranted the treatment of the
RTC's Decision as an interlocutory order and not a final judgment that can be
appealed, as there was still something left for the RTC to do, which was to
decide the Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Issue
Stripped to its core, the sole issue to be decided by the Court in the instant
case is whether the CA erred in denying Bernardo's Certiorari Petition, holding
that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when the latter denied
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal due course due to the pendency of Soriano's
Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
In connection with the foregoing, Section 5 of the same Rule states that the
notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, specify the judgment
or final order or part thereof appealed from, specify the court to which the
appeal is being taken, and state the material dates showing the timeliness of
the appeal.
With respect to the period for filing the notice of appeal, the appeal shall be
taken within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.22 When a motion for new trial or
reconsideration was filed by the party, which was subsequently denied by the
court, there is a fresh period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the notice
of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
or motion for reconsideration.23
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it is not disputed that the RTC
rendered its Decision dated August 5, 2010, which resolved the merits of the
Custody case, upholding Soriano's right to parental custody and parental
authority, albeit ruling that it will be for the best interest of the child to stay
with Bernardo first for the school year 2009-2010 while studying at Notre
Dame of Greater Manila.
The subject RTC Decision, having delved into the merits of the Custody case
and having fully disposed of the respective issues and causes of action raised
by the parties, was undoubtedly a judgment on the merits and not a mere
interlocutory order. The RTC's Decision did not merely rule on incidental
matters; it decided on the subject matter of the case, i.e., the custody of
Stephanie.
Being an appealable judgment on the merits, Bernardo had the right to appeal
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court the RTC's Decision by filing a notice of
appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC's Order dated August 31, 2010
denying Bernardo's timely-filed Motion for Reconsideration. This was exactly
what Bernardo did. She timely filed a Notice of Appeal, containing all the
required contents of a notice of appeal under Section 5, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court and paid the corresponding appeal fees on September 8, 2010.
Assuming of course that the notice of appeal satisfies the content requirements
set under Section 5, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the approval of a notice of
appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the lower court, provided the appeal is
filed on time.27 Hence, the RTC's Order dated September 9, 2010 denying due
course to Bernardo's seasonably-filed Notice of Appeal was a departure from
the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. In accordance with the Rules,
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal should have been deemed perfected as to her.
In other words, following the line of thinking of the RTC and CA, in so far as
Bernardo was concerned, the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010,
notwithstanding the fact that it is a judgment on the merits, was to be treated
as a mere interlocutory order not subject to appeal owing to the pendency of
Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Hence, despite already having her
own Motion for Reconsideration denied by the RTC, Bernardo's right to appeal
was made contingent and dependent on Soriano's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.
The RTC and CA seem to have confused the right of a party to appeal and the
right of another party to file a motion for reconsideration. There is nothing in
the Rules which makes a party's right to appeal dependent or contingent on
the opposing party's motion for reconsideration. Similarly, a party's
undertaking to file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment is not hindered
by the other party's filing of a notice of appeal. Jurisprudence holds that "each
party has a different period within which to appeal" 29 and that "[s]ince each
party has a different period within which to appeal, the timely filing of a
motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other or another
party's period of appeal."30
Hence, a party's ability to file his/her own appeal upon receipt of the assailed
judgment or the denial of a motion for reconsideration challenging the said
judgment within the reglementary period of 15 days is not affected by the other
parties' exercise of discretion to file their respective motions for
reconsideration.
Contrary to the holding of the CA, if the RTC granted due course to Bernardo's
Notice of Appeal, the RTC would not have been divested of jurisdiction to
decide Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and that Soriano's right to
file her own Motion for Reconsideration would not have been defeated
whatsoever. This is the case because under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the
case only upon the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties .
Further, the CA's concern that allowing due course Bernardo's Notice of Appeal
would have led to a multiplicity of appeals is unfounded, considering that the
respective appeals of Bernardo and Soriano could have been consolidated by
the appellate court.
Nevertheless, despite the foregoing, even with the RTC having committed an
error in procedure when it denied due course Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, the
CA was not in error to deny Bernardo's Certiorari Petition.
The RTC's act of denying due course Bernardo's Notice of Appeal was not
borne out of a capricious, whimsical, and arbitrary exercise of judgment. The
records reveal that the RTC was motivated, albeit erroneously, by practicality,
wanting to first decide Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and avoid a
multiplicity of appeals before the CA.
As seen in the RTC's Order dated September 9, 2010 denying due course
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, the RTC did not completely preclude Bernardo
from appealing the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010. What the RTC merely
did was to deny due course the Notice of Appeal in the meantime and order
Bernardo to file her comment on Soriano's Comment (With Motion for Partial
Reconsideration), so that upon the RTC's eventual disposition of the said
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, Bernardo and/or Soriano could henceforth
file their respective notices of appeal.
Subsequently, the RTC issued its Order dated October 22, 2010 granting
Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration, modifying the RTC's Decision
dated August 5, 2010. Hence, Bernardo could have, at that time, appealed yet
again by filing another notice of appeal assailing the RTC's Decision. In fact, as
a clear indication that Bernardo had an adequate and available remedy,
Bernardo was able to question the modification of the RTC's Decision and file a
Motion for Reconsideration on November 22, 2010, which was prior to the
filing of the Certiorari Petition on March 15, 2011. When such Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its Order dated January 31, 2011,
Bernardo had 15 days from the receipt of the said Order to appeal the RTC's
Decision dated August 5, 2010 before the CA.
Simply stated, despite the earlier denial of due course by the RTC of
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, Bernardo still had the available remedy of filing
another Notice of Appeal after the RTC eventually modified its Decision dated
August 5, 2010 when it granted Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 11,
2011 and Resolution dated January 6, 2012 rendered by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 118506 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
Issues
In sum, the instant Petition presents three main issues tor the
Court's consideration:
(2) whether the CA erred in holding that Notice of Appeal filed by the
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje was wrongfully denied by the RTC,
considering that the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration was not
a pro forma motion; and
I. The Certiorari Petition assailed
the RTC 's Resolution dated April
4, 2011 and not the Decision
dated December 3, 2010.
Well-settled is the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts. When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
Court.17
The Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the factual finding of the
CA that the Certiorari Petition filed by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje,
as a fact, assailed the RTC's Resolution dated April 4, 2011. To be
sure, a simple perusal of the Certiorari Petition reveals that
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje allege in their Petition that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its Resolution dated April 4, 2011:
In its Resolution dated April 4, 2011, the RTC found the respondents
Heirs of Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration a pro forma motion
because it did not raise any new arguments. However, the Court has
decided in a catena of cases that the mere reiteration in a motion for
reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon
by the court does not make a motion pro forma. The Court,
in Coquilla v. Commission on Elections,20 held that:
Hence, the Court upholds the CA's finding that respondents Heirs of
Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration on the RTC's Decision dated
December 3, 2010 is not a pro forma motion that prevented the
tolling of the reglementary period to file an appeal. Hence, the Court
sustains the CA's order upon the RTC to give due course to the
Notice of Appeal filed by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje.
Rule 39, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states that where the
executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on
appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such
orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice
may warrant under the circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
DANA S. SANTOS, Petitioner
vs.
LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS, Respondent
The Facts
Dana and Leodegario first met each other in 1982, in a wake, through a
common friend. Their relationship developed into a romance. Soon, the couple
began living together. Their cohabitation produced two children. As their
business ventures prospered, Dana and Leodegario married each other on
December 3, 1987, before a Catholic priest. Two more children were born to
the couple after the marriage. However, their relationship started to deteriorate
as time passed by. Heated arguments and suspicions of infidelity marred their
marriage so much, so that in 2001, Dana and Leodegario filed a joint petition
for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, which was granted. 5
The final straw came on September 11, 2003, when Leodegario filed a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-6954, alleging psychological incapacity on the part of Dana. The
case was assigned to Branch 72 of the aforesaid court. On April 2, 2004, Dana
filed her Answer, alleging that Leodegario filed the petition in order to marry
his paramour, with whom he had a son.6
The case proceeded to trial on the merits. The Public Prosecutor found no
evidence of collusion between Dana and Leodegario. Both parties appeared in
the pre-trial conference and marked their documentary exhibits. Leodegario
presented as witnesses a clinical psychologist, a former employee of the
couple's joint business, and himself. However, when it was Dana's turn to
present evidence, her counsel failed to appear despite notice. On February 26,
2009, the trial court issued an Order declaring Dana to have waived her right
to present evidence and ordering Leodegario to submit his memorandum, after
which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. 7
On June 24, 2009, the trial court rendered its Decision. 8 It declared the
marriage between Dana and Leodegario null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The court held that Dana was afflicted with grave,
incurable, and juridically antecedent Histrionic Personality Disorder. Dana
received a copy of the decision on August 26, 2009.
Dana filed a Notice of Appeal on September 4, 2009; but she withdrew her
appeal and instead filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC,
dated October 19, 2009, alleging that extrinsic fraud and mistake prevented
her from presenting her case at the trial. Leodegario filed a comment on the
petition.
In an Order9 dated February 17, 2010, the trial court denied Dana's petition,
ruling that there was no sufficient allegation of fraud or mistake in the
petition.
Dana filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an
Order10 dated April 22, 2010. Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA,11 ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when
it denied her petition for relief and allowed the Decision dated June 24, 2009
to stand despite her inability to present her evidence. After a further exchange
of pleadings, the appellate court, in a Resolution 12 dated February 7, 2011,
referred Dana's petition to the Philippine Mediation Center.
On June 6, 2011, under the auspices of the appellate court mediator, Dana
and Leodegario entered into a compromise agreement, 13 where they agreed to
transfer the titles to their conjugal real properties in the name of their four
common children. On June 16, 2011, Dana moved for the archival of the case.
On July 19, 2011, the CA issued a Resolution 14 declaring the case closed and
terminated by virtue of the compromise agreement and ordering the issuance
of entry of judgment.
On July 3, 2012, Dana filed a Manifestation 15 alleging that Leodegario was not
complying with the compromise agreement. She reiterated this allegation in
her Motion to Reopen and/or Reinstate the Petition16 which she filed on August
14, 2012. Ordered by the appellate court to comment on the Motion to Reopen,
Leodegario countered that he has complied with the essential obligations
under the compromise agreement. He, subsequently, filed a Manifestation
showing such compliance, attaching the copies of the transfer certificates of
title with the required annotations thereon, deeds of sale in favor of their
common children, and the new transfer certificates of title in the names of
their common children.17
On April 15, 2014, the Former 15th Division of the CA rendered the first
assailed Resolution18 denying Dana's Motion to Reopen, thusly:
SO ORDERED.19
On September 26, 2014, the Former 15th Division of the CA rendered the
second assailed Resolution21 denying Dana's Motion for Reconsideration
and/or to Submit Petition for Decision, disposing, thus:
SO ORDERED.22
The appellate court found the Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit
Petition for Decision unmeritorious. It held that the marital ties between Dana
and Leodegario had been severed by the trial court's decision of June 24,
2009; hence, the compromise agreement did not involve the validity of their
marriage but only their property relations. Furthermore, the appellate court
found that Dana, in her Motion to Archive Case, had conceded her intention to
have the case dismissed upon compliance with the stipulations of the
Compromise Agreement.23
Aggrieved, Dana filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this
Court on November 24, 2014. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
Leodegario filed their respective Comments on the petition.
The Issues
1) Whether or not the assailed resolutions of the CA, which terminated her
case by reason of the compromise agreement, were erroneous for being
contrary to the State's legal mandate to defend the sanctity of marriage;
2) Whether or not the assailed resolutions of the CA, which in effect upheld the
order of the trial court dismissing her petition for relief, violated her right to
due process; and
3) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court's decision
declaring the marriage void had attained finality despite the filing of the
petition for relief from judgment.24
Dana argues that she never intended to compromise the issue of the validity of
her marriage, as this cannot be the subject of compromise under Article 2035
of the New Civil Code. She further asserts that under Article 2041 of the New
Civil Code, as applied in Miguel v. Montanez,25 she is entitled to simply
consider the compromise agreement as rescinded, since Leodegario committed
a breach of the agreement. Dana also claims that the termination of the case
on the basis of the compromise agreement violated her right to due process,
since she was unable to present her side of the controversy. Lastly, she
contends that the appellate court erred in ruling that the trial court decision
declaring the marriage void had become final, claiming that her petition for
relief amounted to a motion for new trial, the filing of which is one of the
requirements for filing an appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. 26
The core issue in this petition is the propriety of setting aside the judgment
upon compromise rendered by the court a quo. Dana maintains that the
judgment should be vacated because of Leodegario's alleged breach of their
compromise; and because she did not intend to compromise the issue of the
validity of her marriage. To bolster her stand, she invokes Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution and urges the State to uphold, or at least try to
uphold, her marriage. Leodegario, on the other hand, asserts the binding force
of the trial court's decision and the judgment on compromise, claiming that the
courts a quo acted according to law and jurisprudence in rendering the
assailed judgments.
It must be borne in mind that Civil Case No. 03-6954 is a proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between Dana and Leodegario on the
ground of psychological incapacity. The applicable substantive laws are,
therefore, the Family Code and the New Civil Code, while the governing
procedural law is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, with the Rules of Court applying
suppletorily.27
In the case at bar, the CA 28 and the OSG29 both concluded that the trial court
decision had attained finality after Dana's inability to file an appeal therefrom.
The two resolutions of the appellate court presuppose that the judgment on
the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage had attained finality. Dana, on
the other hand, asserts that it had not.
There is indeed no showing in the record that Dana moved for reconsideration
or new trial from the RTC decision. She, nevertheless, filed an appeal.
However, probably cognizant of the proscription in Section 20 30 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, which makes the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a motion
for new trial a precondition for filing an appeal, she withdrew her appeal and
filed a petition for relief from judgment.
Nevertheless, considering the nature and office of a petition for relief, which is
to set aside a final judgment,32 the Court cannot agree with Dana's assertion
that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 03-6954 had not attained
finality. In fact, the decision has already been annotated in their marriage
contract.33 This finding, however, does not detract from the fact that the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-6954 continued even after the trial court had
rendered judgment, precisely because Dana filed a petition for relief from that
judgment. From the denial of her petition, she sought recourse to the appellate
court. The appellate court, in dismissing the case upon the parties'
compromise on their conjugal properties, invoked the finality of the RTC
decision as a bar to the litigation of the other issues raised by Dana's petition.
This conclusion is untenable.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure changed the nature of an order of denial of a
petition for relief from judgment, making it unappealable 38 and, hence,
assailable only via a petition for certiorari.39 Nevertheless, the appellate court,
in deciding such petitions against denials of petitions for relief, remains tasked
with making a factual determination, i.e., whether or not the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition. To do so, it is still
obliged, as Service Specialists instructs, to "determine not only the existence of
any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of
action or defense, as the case may be."40 Stated otherwise, the finality of the
RTC decision cannot bar the appellate court from determining the issues
raised in the petition for relief, if only to determine the existence of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying such petition. While a
Rule 38 Petition does not stay the execution of the judgment, 41 the grant
thereof reopens the case for a new trial; 42 and thus, if merit be found in
Dana's certiorari petition assailing the trial court's denial of her petition for
relief, the case will be reopened for new trial.
The CA, therefore, erred in refusing to reopen Dana's petition on the basis of
the finality of the trial court decision.
The Court now resolves the question regarding the propriety of setting aside
the judgment on compromise.
On one hand, the immutability and immediate effect of judgments upon
compromise is well-settled. In Magbanua v. Uy,43 it was held that:
On the other hand, Article 2035(2) and Article 5 of the New Civil Code provide:
Again, the Court reiterates, at the risk of being repetitive, that the petition
which gave rise to these proceedings is for the declaration of nullity of Dana
and Leodegario's marriage. Dana's petition for certiorari with the CA, which is
nothing but a consequence of the proceedings before the RTC, alleges the
fraudulent deprivation of her chance to refute and controvert Leodegario's
allegations and to present her side of the issue, which she also lays down in
her petition. The core issue of Dana's petition is, therefore, the validity of her
marriage to Leodegario. The termination of the case by virtue of the
compromise agreement, therefore, necessarily implies the settlement by
compromise of the issue of the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage.
In a long line of cases,48 the Court has censured and punished lawyers, and
even judges, who have drafted agreements to dissolve marriages or to sanction
adulterous relations. The rule applies a fortiori to the CA. It was, therefore,
erroneous for the appellate court to terminate Dana's suit - which puts in
issue the validity of her marriage - by virtue of the execution of the Decision 11
Q.R. No. 214593 compromise agreement which only covers the property
relations of the spouses. While these issues are intertwined, a compromise of
the latter issue should not and cannot operate as a compromise of the former,
per Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
The Court cannot give its imprimatur to the dismissal of the case at bar even
if, as the appellate court held, it was Dana's intention 49 to have the case
terminated upon the execution of the compromise agreement. Nevertheless, the
Court agrees with the appellate court when it ruled that the scope of the
compromise agreement is limited to Dana and Leodegario's property
relations vis-à-vis their children, as Article 2036 of the Civil Code provides that
"[a] compromise comprises only those objects which are definitely stated
therein, or which by necessary implication from its terms should be deemed to
have been included in the same." As held by the appellate court:
However, despite the error committed by the appellate court, absent vices of
consent or other defects, the compromise agreement remains valid and binding
upon Dana and Leodegario, as they have freely and willingly agreed to, and
have already complied with, the covenants therein. The agreement operates as
a partial compromise on the issue of the disposition of the properties of the
marriage.
Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to uphold the appellate court's decision,
because the trial court's denial of Dana's petition for relief from judgment does
not amount to grave abuse of discretion.
While the remaining issues in the petition partake of a factual nature, the
Court deems it necessary to write finis to this case at this level in order to
avoid remanding the case to the appellate court. It has been held that "remand
is not necessary if the Court is in a position to resolve a dispute on the basis of
the records before it; and if such remand would not serve the ends of
justice."51 A careful perusal of the petitions filed by Dana before the trial court,
the appellate court, and this Court betrays the lack of allegations sufficient to
support a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38.
Jurisprudence provides that fraud, as a ground for a petition for relief, refers
to extrinsic or collateral fraud52 which, in turn, has been defined as fraud that
prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or
defense and from having an adversarial trial of the issue, as when the lawyer
connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest. Extrinsic fraud
can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented
from presenting his case to the court.53 In Lasala v. National Food
Authority,54 the Court defined extrinsic fraud in relation to parties represented
by counsel, viz.:
Atty. Mendoza never bothered to provide any valid excuse for this
crucial omission on his part.1aшphi1 Parenthetically, this was not
the first time Atty. Mendoza prejudiced the NFA; he did the same
when he failed to file a motion for reconsideration and an appeal in
a prior 1993 case where Lasala secured a judgment of
P34,500,229.67 against the NFA.
For these failures, Atty. Mendoza merely explained that the NFA's
copy of the adverse decision was lost and was only found after the
lapse of the period for appeal. Under these circumstances, the NFA
was forced to file an administrative complaint against Atty.
Mendoza for his string of negligent acts.
As in Lasala, the Court found sufficient factual justification for the grant of
CEZA's petition for relief, viz.:
Turning now to the case at bar, it is clear that Dana's allegations in her
petition for relief fall way short of the jurisprudential threshold for extrinsic
fraud. The Court quotes the allegations Dana made in her petition for relief
with the trial court:
Dana's petition is anchored on two main allegations: first, that her counsel
failed to notify her of the hearings dated February 26 and March 26, 2009; and
second, that her counsel nonchalantly told her that it was their mutual
decision to not present any evidence. However, she categorically admits that
she "does not accuse her previous counsel [of] any wrongdoing or neglect, or
any other parties probably in cahoots with her said counsel." 61 Furthermore,
the petition makes no specific citation of other acts or circumstances
attributable to her counsel that fraudulently deprived Dana of her opportunity
to fully ventilate her claims and defenses with the trial court. The acts
complained of in the petition constitute neither "gross and palpable negligence"
nor corruption or collusion amounting to extrinsic fraud. The general rule,
which binds the client to the negligence of her counsel, remains applicable to
this case. All told, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed her petition for
relief.