Naxalism in India Emergence and Sustenance

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NAXALISM IN INDIA: EMERGENCE & SUSTENANCE

DR.S.D.MISHRA
Lecturer in history
Govt. College, AJMER

Naxalite or Naxalism or Naxalvadi (Hindi) is an extremist group active in


parts of India. Origins of this group can be attributed to communist
groups that were born out of the Sino-Soviet split in the communist
movement in India. Activities include damaging property, killing and mass
massacre of civilians. Initially the movement had its centre in West
Bengal. In recent years, they have spread into less developed areas of
rural central and eastern India, such as Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh
through the activities of underground groups like the Communist Party of
India (Maoist). They are conducting Terrorism in India, typically called the
Naxalite-Maoist insurgency. Naxals hold sway in about 180 districts across
ten states of India accounting for about 40 percent of India's geographical
area. They are especially concentrated in an area known as the "Red
corridor", where they control 92,000 square kilometers. According to
India's intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, 20,000
Naxalites were in April 2006 in operation and their growing influence
prompted Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to declare them as the most
serious threat to India's national security.

History

The term Naxalites comes from Naxalvadi, a small village in West Bengal,
where a extremist section of Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M))
led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal led a violent uprising in 1967,
trying to develop a "revolutionary opposition" in opposition to the CPI(M)
leadership. Majumdar greatly admired Mao Zedong of China and
advocated that Indian peasants and lower classes must follow in his
footsteps and overthrow the government and upper classes whom he
held responsible for their plight. He strengthened the Naxalite movement
through his writings, the most famous being the 'Historic Eight
Documents' which formed the basis of Naxalite ideology.[8] In 1967
'Naxalites' organized the All India Coordination Committee of Communist
Revolutionaries (AICCCR), and later broke away from CPI(M). Violent
'uprisings' were organized in several parts of the country. In 1969 AICCCR
gave birth to Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).

Practically all Naxalite groups trace their origin to the CPI (ML). A separate
tendency from the beginning was the Maoist Communist Centre, which
evolved out of the Dakshin Desh-group. MCC later fused with People's
War Group to form Communist Party of India (Maoist) On 21 September
2004, two major revolutionary parties guided by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
(MLM) principles – the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and the
CPI-ML People’s War (PW) – merged to form the Communist Party of
India (Maoist).The consolidation that led to an expansion of the sphere of
revolutionary activity began in 1997. Various splinter groups working
within the framework of the MLM ideology like the CPI (ML) Maoist Unity
Centre (CPI-ML-MUC) merged with the CPI-ML Naxalvadi. Later, another
splinter group, the CPI (ML) Red Flag merged with CPI-ML Naxalvadi. The
Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist), operating in Punjab
had earlier united with the then Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) to form
the MCCI. The Bihar-based Party Unity (PU) had merged with the CPI-ML
People’s War, which was active in Andhra Pradesh. There are enough
indications that another splinter group operating in Andhra Pradesh,
Janashakti, is now likely to merge with the CPI-Maoist.

The unification of the MLM ideology-driven splinter groups is a


phenomenon that has gathered momentum in the last five years. The
earlier period was marked by repeated splits among the revolutionary
parties. Consequently, their area of operation was confined to a few
pockets, not more than a few villages in a district in some cases. But
concerted efforts by the ideologues of various parties to consolidate and
spread the red influence seem to have now succeeded. To use the oil-spot
analogy, various Naxal groups operating in isolation and facing the threat
of liquidation by brute state force have joined together, just like oil spots
on a water surface join to form a large slick. In effect, the Maoist cadres
have not only increased their area of activity, but also their cadre and
sympathizer base.
Last five years witnessed rapid expansion of Maoist activities. From
merely being an irritant in isolated pockets in far-flung forest areas in
some states just a decade ago, India has suddenly woken up to the reality
of revolutionary activity engulfing more than a quarter of the country’s
geographical expanse.The architects of revolution are not only bringing
newer areas into the revolutionary fold, but determined efforts are
underway to reclaim areas where the Naxalite movement had been
crushed. A good example is West Bengal, where the movement
originated.

West Bengal, where Naxalism was crushed in the ’70s has seen a
spectacular rebirth of the movement. Presently, 15 districts of West
Bengal are affected with the Maoist problem. While Purulia, Bunkura and
West Midnapore are badly affected, the Maoists have made steady
progress in Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, Coochbihar, Malda, Murshidabad and
Burdwan. In a state like Uttar Pradesh, so far unaffected by any
revolutionary activity, Chandauli, Mirzapur and Sonebhadra are now
classified as Naxal-affected. Uttaranchal faces problems in Nainital,
Almora, Champawat, Pittorgarh and Uddhamsingh Nagar districts.
Karnataka, untouched till recently, now faces acute problems in
Chikmagalur, Udipi, Shimoga, Gulbarga, Tumkur and Gulbarga districts.
Tamil Nadu, which turned out to be the main rocket launcher making
centre for the Maoists, has witnessed revolutionary activity in
Dharmapuri, Salem, Coimbatore and Madurai.

The Government of India recently disclosed that 162 districts in 14


states out of a total of 602 districts in the country have been affected by
extremism of varying intensities. Of the affected districts, the
revolutionary movement is intense in 90 districts, while the remaining
districts have seen mass organization activity/underground squad
movements, but not revolutionary violence.The spatial spread of the
Maoist movement has surpassed all other insurgent activity in the
country. The terrorist activity in Jammu and Kashmir is confined to 12
districts, while insurgency in the North East is confined to 51 districts.
The Maoist movement in India can presently be classified into three
phases – organization phase, guerrilla warfare phase and mobile warfare
phase. The situation is complicated as the revolutionary movement is
extremely resilient and capable of sliding back to a lower phase or moving
ahead into a higher phase, depending on the state’s response on military
and civil development planks.

Andhra Pradesh is the best example that can be cited for scaling down
revolutionary activity. It was in the mobile warfare stage with the
People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army almost running a parallel government
in some areas, when the party leadership took a conscious decision to
scale down to the organization stage and cadres were asked to give top
priority to their security and start mobilizing people on various issues. The
concept of area-wise seizure of power stems from this guerrilla strategy.

In the Organization stage, Maoist cadres concentrate on building up


agitations on people’s issues and violence is extremely selective (strategic
defensive). In the guerrilla phase, the revolutionaries see themselves to
be on an equal footing with the state and fight for area domination. This
is the stage where violence reaches a crescendo, as the rebels use shoot-
and-scoot attacks on security forces (strategic stalemate). The mobile
warfare phase is one where the rebels control the area and the security
forces are forced to be on permanent guard (strategic offensive).

It is difficult to demarcate the areas state-wise, as there is bound to be a


large overlap among the three phases. However, the LWE movement in
the Bastar forest areas of Chhattisgarsh is undoubtedly in the mobile
warfare stage, where revolutionaries and people’s militia clearly have an
upper hand over the security forces.

The spurt in revolutionary activity in the country can be attributed to two


chief causes: the inability of a democratic polity to put an end to the
exploitative structures in society, official inefficiency in expediting
processes intended to help the downtrodden.

While the Maoists have always presented convincing political arguments


on a range of social and economic issues, be it the inability of the
government to rehabilitate people being evacuated for constructing
irrigation projects, or suicides of farmers and weavers, the politicians do
not have any effective counter-argument to convince the masses that
their way of tackling the emerging problem provides the correct solution.
In other words, on a political plane, there is no answer to the disturbing
questions raised by the Maoists. The policy-makers primarily focus on
tackling the Maoist problem on a military plane and blindly ask the
affected states to follow examples like the Andhra Pradesh model without
correcting the mistakes committed by the state. The social and economic
changes that are being ushered in for a variety of reasons, the
liberalization, privatization and globalization programmes, are not being
factored in when similar strategies are proposed elsewhere. Moreover,
the apparent unanimity among policy-makers in employing military tactics
to counter the spread of a revolutionary movement, is conspicuously
absent when it comes to the political strategy to be adopted in response
to the issues being raised by the Maoists on a ‘political plane’.

The political leadership is neither ready nor willing to answer the


questions raised by the Maoists in respect of people’s issues at large – be
it what they see as ‘gross injustice’ meted out to the tribal population in
respect of setting up heavy industries in forest areas, or displacement of
people owing to industrial activity. Even in social conflict zones like the
Khairlanji in Maharashtra, there is little effort by the political leadership to
reassure society that a democratic polity can indeed provide effective
solutions to the people’s problems. Consequently, if even a minuscule
section of society finds relevance in revolutionary politics, the blame
squarely lies with the politician and administrator. And that’s where
Naxalism finds its growing support base.

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