NAXALISM : A CHALLENGE IN INTERNAL SECURITY OF INDIA

Author(s): Sarita Sharma and Vipin Kumar Singhal

Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science , JULY - SEPT., 2011, Vol. 72, No. 3
(JULY - SEPT., 2011), pp. 765-772
Published by: Indian Political Science Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41858850

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Indian Journal of
Political Science

This content downloaded from

13.234.89.89 on Mon, 09 Nov 2020 12:47:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Indian Journal of Political Science
Vol. LXXII, No. 3, July-Sept., 201 1, pp. 765-772

NAXALISM :
A CHALLENGE IN INTERNAL SECURITY OF INDIA

Sarita Sharma
Vipin Kumar Singhal

The present paper analyses the issue ofMaxalism with a perspective on national security
and related concerns of Indian democracy.

offshoots and it is estimated that at least 30

The Naxal movement came into shape
in 1948, but because of the lack of publicinsurgent groups are currently functioning, all
tracing their origin to the Communist Party
support it failed to gain momentum. However,
of India (Marxist-Leninist).
in 1967, it spread into a full fledged violent
movement under the leadership of Charu
Current Status of Naxal Movement in India
Majumdar. The word Naxalism finds its origin
from the small village of Naxalbari in West According to our study, we can claim
that the Naxal activism in India is not merely
Bengal where Charu started the uprising
a whimsical reaction but it gains support from
through armed means, to redistribute land
to the landless farmers from whom the the poor, tribais and other marginalized
section, of Indian society. It is a product of
landlords snatched their lands. It starts from

poverty, lack of development in equality and

Andhra Pradesh and runs through Orissa,
exploitation inherent in Indian socio-
Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, West
economic conditions. At present Naxals have
Bengal, Jharkhand, Bihar and Maharashtra. »

The stretch has been termed as the 'Red gained sympathy from urban educated class,
Corridor' where the Naxals control around certain intellectuals and human rights
92,000 square kilometers. Charu Majumdar'sactivities like Vinayak Sen of Chhattisgarh.
Attempts are being made to expand the
movement ideology was inspired by Mao
Zedong and hence more than often Naxalismsupport base of the movement, as the land

is interchanged with the word Maoism. It for the tiller is not thef only issue at present
would be significant to note that theIn fact, efforts are being made to rope in all
proponents of the movement are poor the marginalized sections of people including
peasants and tribal people, who have been the victims of globalization, privatization,
deprived of the basic necessities of life. Thisunemployment, lay offe, displacement due
has happened basically because of theto majdr projects and all those left behind in
exploitation of poor farmers by the zamindarsthe process of socio-economic development
and rich farmers in the area. Over the yearsFor enlarging their support base certain
the insurgent group has forked into severalindustrial areas and cities such as

This content downloaded from

13.234.89.89 on Mon, 09 Nov 2020 12:47:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Indian Journal of Political Science 766

highlighted
Ahmedabad, Surat Mumbai, the sophisticated
Pune, Calcutta, of the
information
Ranchi, Dhanbad, Bhilai and structural
etc., offer them networks
new of the

Maoistsof
opportunities and centres in their strongholds. On the other
attraction.
hand, as illustrated by the April 2010 attacks
As its historical evolution indicates, the
that killed 76 personnel of the Central
Naxal movement in India, in the last ten years
Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in
or so, has shown the tendency of expanding
Chhatisgarh, there are significant loopholes
its support base as well as intensification of
in the government's counter operation and
violent activities. It has assumed regional and
strategies. The Naxal incidents in current
international orientation in view of the
year 2010, which amounted to challenging
success of Maoists in the neighbouring
the authority of the State, demonstrate the
Nepal. This has emboldened Naxal groups
growing confidence of the Naxals as follows:
in India. They are at present well entrenched
in worst affected areas of West Bengal, In the month of February the Silda
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradeshcamp attack killed 24 paramilitary personnel
and Orissa. Their guerrilla tactics have
of the Eastern Frontier Rifles in an operation

the guerillas stated was the beginning of

surprised the security forces. Besides their
"Operation Peace Hunt", the Maoist answer
wide support in the rural and tribal areas of
these States, they have generated certain
to the government "Operation Green Hunt-
amount of sympathy among certain urbanthat was recently launched against them.
educated and intellectual section.
• On 28th May the derailment of a
The nature of Naxal violence has Kolkata-Mumbai night train killed at
undergone a subtle change in the recent least 150 persons. Officials claim that
years. Small scale isolated attacks have been Maoists are responsible for the
replaced by large scale, well organized sabotage which caused the disaster.
attacks on the government apparatus. In May
• On 29th June, at least 26 policemen
2010, Maoists triggered an improvised are killed in a Maoist attack in the
explosive device (I ED) blast which targeted
central Indian State of Chhattisgarh.
a private bus travelling from Sukma to
• On 29th August, a joint team of BSF
Dantewada in the State of Chhattisgarh. The
blast occurred at an area that had been and district police was attacked by the

demined four days beforè the attack and rebels in Bhuski village (Chhattisgarh)
claimed the lives of 31 people, including 15 under Drug Kondal police station in the
civilians and 15 Special Police Officers district while they were conducting

(SPOs). This attack was significant not only routine search operations in the wee
because it targeted civilians, but because it hours. Following the attack, the forces

This content downloaded from

13.234.89.89 on Mon, 09 Nov 2020 12:47:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Naxalism : A Challenge in Internal Security of India 767

retaliated and in the action they lost

institutions and affecting businesses. Maoist
strongholds,
five security personnel, including three namely the States of
BSF jawans. Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, West
Bengal and Andhra Pradesh are home at 85
• On 12th September, Naxalites killed
per cent of India's coal resources as well a
3 policemen and took 4 more hostages
significant amount of India's forest resources.
in an ambush in Chhattisgarh. The 4
The Maoist insurgency is also placing India's
policemen were later released without
natural resources, energy sources and
conditions after Naxal leaders listened
foreign economic investments at serious
to the appeals of family members. The
political and economic risk.
freed policemen also promised the
Naxals to never take up arms against The Ministry of Home Affairs concedes in its
the insurgency again. latest Annual security report 2009-2010 that
left-wing extremists operate in the vacuum
• On 5th October, rebels killed 4 Special
created by weak governance structures and
Force officers as they were on their
take advantage of prevalent dissatisfaction.
way to a market in Maharashtra.
They also exploit feelings of perceived
• On 8th October, Naxalites triggered a neglect and injustice among the
landmine in the border area between underprivileged and remote segments of the
Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra. Thepopulation. As such, it is necessary for the
attack killed 3 Special Forces officers,government to develop a multi-prolonged
wounded 2 more and completely strategy that counters both the violence and
wrecked their military jeep. its root causes. These incidents are much

beyond the threshold of tolerance and leave

From the year 2005 to 2009, the Maoist
no further scope to continue with a soft
insurgency has claimed the lives of 2,41 1
approach towards Naxalites. The situation
civilians and personnel of the security forces.
has become grave enough and calls for an
As of 10th October 2010, 526 civilians, and
immediate and serious State response. If the
248 personnel of the security forces have
been killed in Maoist attacks. In addition to government does not take concrete and stem
steps even now, it should be prepared to
the large number of casualties the Naxalites
accept more such incidents of even greater
are destroying valuable State and private
intensity.
infrastructure including railways, schools,
hospitals, policing and government

This content downloaded from

13.234.89.89 on Mon, 09 Nov 2020 12:47:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Indian Journal of Political Science 768

STATEWISE NAXAL VIOLENCE IN 2008-2009

State 2008 2009

In Casualties In Casualties
Incidents Incidents

Andhra Pradesh 92 46 66 18

Bihar 164 73 232 72

Chhattisgarh 620 242 529 290

Jharkhand 484 207 742 208

Madhya Pradesh 7 - 1 -

Maharashtra 68 22 154 93

Orissa 103 101 266 67

Uttar Pradesh 4 - 8 2

VNfest Bengal 35 26 255 158

Others 14 4 5

Total 1591 721 2258 908

Consequences and
still alive. It is high Implicati
time that the Government
realized that war is not peace; otherwise
The consequences of Naxali
battalions over battalions will be induced into
already in front of us. But what ou
this fire only to fuel it more rather than
is not able to see is the implicat
extinguishing it
being used to
curb the problem ra
Conclusion -
way of dialogue. Poverty breeds f
mindless and After a close examination
reckless of the Naxal
killing of
would breed menace,
nothing else
it is clear that the movement tha
thrives
contempt andonthereby
the dissatisfaction of themore
marginalized andblo
government should take
alienate the population. lessons
The main premise
history. As a parallel example,
of the Naxals was the upliftment of the poor ab
was first invested peasants and to create
they wanted Talib
the land tiller to
another decade has been invested to be the land owners. But with time, the list of
demolish Taliban but the menace of Taliban is demands kept growing. Now, following
their

This content downloaded from

13.234.89.89 on Mon, 09 Nov 2020 12:47:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Naxalism : A Challenge in Internal Security of India 769
are the main demands: (a) A democratic
cases from inaccessible terrain. This has
atmosphere should be created in theostensibly
State. posed a major hurdle in dealing
The government should respect people's
with the problem since security forces do not
right to fight for their democratic demands;
reach to the affected and afflicted spots duly
(b) Implement reforms in the agricultural
and easily.
sector like Land Ceiling Act; (c) Implement
Now the question arises what should
policies of industrialization and other
be done? The breeding ground for this Naxal
schemes based on local resources in place
movement is soaked in socio-economic
of the liberalisation, privatization and
inequality. The destitute and needy people
globalisation policies being followed now; (d)
are the core of this movement. The
Recognise the tribal people's rights on forest;
callousness of poverty, rural indebtedness,
(e) Form a separate Telangana State; (f)
unemployment, growth of inequality and
Cessation of atrocities on Dalits; and (g)
exploitation has formed the generating
Recover money from the affluent who evade
taxes. ground for Naxalists. These problems have
to be addressed.
Naxals never had a peaceful approachSince Dr. Manmohan Singh came to
to attain their demands. They often resorted
power as the Prime Minister in 2004, he and
to violence. It is an irony that they soon started
his government have been projecting the
following what they had set out to crush -
Maoists as the greatest internal security
atrocities. The above given statistics reveal
threat faced by India and calling for and
the horrific picture. Land is the vital issue for
promising a special strategy to counter them
these Maoists since the movement launched
through coordinated action involving the
in Naxalbari village was for land. And the
Centre and State in whose territory the
Centre and State governments have to are active. The Congress had
Maoists
realise the Land reforms and its judicious
appointed, in 2004, a special task force of
distribution has not been implemented in
the party for the Congress-ruled Andhra
many of the affected States, particularly
Pradesh to come out with suitable
Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Chhattisgarh.
recommendations for dealing with the Maoist
activities.
Another problem in tackling this
menace is that these Naxal groups are notBefore evolving a strategy, however,
one has to understand the basic difference
coming to the table for talks and their ideology
is steeped in armed revolution. They want to Maoist insurgency/terrorism and
between
transmute the social structure through the
jihadi terrorism. Firstly, the Maoist terrorism
is an almost totally rural phenomenon,
barrel of the gun. Further they are getting
moral and material support from far-flung
whereas jihadi terrorism is a largely urban
centers. They have links with LTTE, a terrorist
phenomenon. Secondly, Maoist terrorism is
organization operating in Sri Lanka. aRight
totally indigenous phenomenon motivated
since the inception of this movementby China
domestic grievances and a domestic
is furnishing tacit support to it. Addedpolitical
to this agenda. Jihadi terrorism is externally
they operate from forest areas and insponsored
many or aided by the intelligence

This content downloaded from

13.234.89.89 on Mon, 09 Nov 2020 12:47:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Indian Journal of Political Science 770

agencies of Pakistan the

and rural areas has facilitated
Bangladesh and the spread
Maoist terrorism.
is motivated by their strategic agenda. Jihadi
terrorism is a cross border threat to national
Maoists mainly attack police stations,
security. Maoist terrorism is an internal threat.
police lines, camps and arms storage depo
While the Maoist leaders are
of para-military forces in order to demorali
motivated largely by their desirethe to seek forces and capture their arm
security
political power through a Maoist andstyle of
ammunition. The repeated success
People's War, similar to the war the
waged by
Maoists in mounting large-scale surpr
their counterparts in Nepal, theirattacks
cadres on
andsuch hard targets speaks of th
foot soldiers fighting for them poor
are largely
state of rural policing and intelligen
motivated by genuine grievances arising
set-upfrom
and the equally poor state of physi
the political, economic and socialsecurity.
hardships.

It is India's long neglect to develop Unfortunately,

the instead of working out
tribal areas which has created large pockets
an appropriate strategy which will address
of alienation against the government and deficiencies and at the
these operational
these pockets have become thesamespawning
time pay equal attention to the political
ground of Maoist terrorism. The governments
handling of the problem, there is an unwise
concerned have to taken note of tendency
the genuine
to militarise the counter-Maoist
grievances of the tribais and dealinsurgency
with themmanagement.
'
in a sympathetic manner. There has to be a
In May
system for a prompt enquiry into ail 2006, the Planning
allegations of excess. Commission appointed an expert committee
headed by D. Bandopadhyay, a retired IAS
Also, Maoist terrorism cannot be
officer instrumental in dealing with the
effectively countered without modernising
Naxalites and
in West Bengal in the 1970s. The
strengthening our rural policing and the rural
expert committee has underscored the
presence and strengthening our rural policing
social, political, economic and cultural
and the rural presence of the intelligence
discrimination faced by the SCs/STs across
agencies. The tribal areas, which have
the not yet as a key factor in drawing large
country
been affected by the Maoist virus, number
have toof
bediscontented people towards the
developed on a crash basis in order Naxalites.
to prevent The committee established the
the spread of the virus to them. lack of empowerment of local communities
as the main reason for the spread of the
The capabilities of the security
NaxalMaoist
agencies deployed for countering movement. Choosing its words
activities also have to be different carefully,
from those the report states that "We have two
worlds of education, two worlds of health, two
of the urban counter-terrorism agencies. The
emphasis has to be on greater mobility in the
worlds of transport and two worlds of
housing...".
rural areas and greater protection from land-
mine used extensively by the Maoists. For The
the first time in the history of the
failure to develop the road infrastructure in a government appointed
Naxal movement,

This content downloaded from

13.234.89.89 on Mon, 09 Nov 2020 12:47:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Naxalism : A Challenge in Internal Security of India 771
roads
committee has put the blame on the in inaccessible areas; (b) to build
State
camping grounds and helipads at strategic
for the growth of the movement. Providing
statistics of 125 districts from the Naxal- locations in remote areas; (c) to strengthen
affected States, the committee finds out that police stations that have been identified as
the State bureaucracy has pitiably failed in
being at risk; (d) to upgrade and strengthen
delivering good governance in these areas. approach roads to police stations and
The report recommends rigorous training for outposts where there is risk of lEDs and
the police force, not only on humane tacticslandmines; and (e) to provide for critical
of controlling rural violence but also on the
needs, specific to the areas where holistic
anti-Na!xal measures are being taken in a
constitutional obligation of the State for the
protection of fundamental rights. focused manner.

Making a departure from the usual The States have been asked to
government position, the expert committeeprepare integrated action plans in the most
concludes that development paradigmaffected districts to achieve the objectives.
pursued since independence has aggravatedFor this, the ministry has identified 15 action
the prevailing discontent among the points that include preparation of a
marginalized sections of society. Citingcomprehensive connectivity plan for the 33
democratic principles, the report also arguesdistricts seriously affected by Left-wing
for the right to protest and discovers thatextremism.
unrest is often the only thing that actually puts
Alarmed by the apparent failure of the
pressure on the government to make things
State machinery to tackle Naxalites, Union
work and for the government to live up to its
Home Minister P. Chidambaram admitted on
own promises.
July 1 5, 2009 that the government had failed
Dealing with Naxalism needs a holisticin curbing Naxal menace in the country.
approach with development initiatives as anSpeaking in Rajya Sabha, Mr. Chidambaram
integral part of the security approach. said that the government had failed in
Security here must be understood in itsassessing the threat posed by the Maoists,
broader perspective, which includes humanadding further that it also failed to tackle them
development in its scope, because humanwith the seriousness they deserve. 'Today
security is an inseparable component of anythey (Naxalites) pose a grave challenge ...
human development formula, and vice versa.We are preparing to take on the challenge.
Details cannot be disclosed now," he said.
The Union Home Ministry has unveiled
"Regrettably for many years we did not
a new Rs. 500 crore fully Centre-sponsored
properly assess the threat posed by Left-wing
scheme which will be implemented by State
extremism. We under-estimated the
governments - for Naxalism-hit States.
challenge and in the meanwhile they
Centre will give Rs. 135 crore a year to the
(Naxalites) extended their influence" he
States under the scheme. The scheme has
added. Chidambar am further informed that
five important objectives: (a) to provide
a military advisor has been appointed to
mobility to the police by upgrading existing
prepare an action plan for dealing with

This content downloaded from

13.234.89.89 on Mon, 09 Nov 2020 12:47:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Indian Journal of Political Science 772
9. Sumanta Banerjee,
Maoists. The Home Minister said India's
he Simmering
was in Revolution:
The Naxalite Uprising, Zed Books Pub., 1984 .
close touch with Chief Ministers of the Naxal-
10. Edward Duyker, Tribal Guerrillas: The Santals of
affected States and would hold a meeting
West Bengal and the Naxalite Movement, Oxford
with them to discuss ways toPress,
University counter
1937. Left-
wing extremism. 11. Prakash Singh, The Naxalite Movement in India,
Rupa Pub., 1995.
One could take a cue from the
12. Prakash Louis, People Power : The Naxalite
successful land reforms in Kerala, and Movement
to in Central Bihar, New Delhi:
Wordsmiths, 2002.
some extent West Bengal, that have not only
assuaged agrarian tension, but have13.also
Bela Bhatia, " Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar",
Economic and Political Weekly, April 9, 2005.
undermined the clutch of ultras, while exactly
to the contrary, failure of the same in Andhra
14. Rajat Kujur, "Naxal Movement in India: A Profile ",
IPCS Research Papers, Sept. 2008.
Pradesh, Bihar and Chhattisgarh has
changed what was essentially peasant
15. P.K^Datta, Land Reforms Administration in West
Bengal. New Delhi, Daya Publishing Company,
struggle into Naxalite movements. A lasting
1980.
solution to Left extremist politics cannot be
16. S. Banerjee, " Naxalbari : Between Past and
achieved without addressing the socio-
Future", Vol 37, No. 22, Economic and Political
economic factors that contribute to its rise
Weekly, June 2002.

and growth. 17. Raman Dixit, "Naxalite Movement in India: The

State's Response", journal of Defence Studies,
Références : Vol.4, No. 2, April 2010.

18. V. Ramakrishnan, " Flawed Operation", Frontline,

1. Akansha Mehta, Surge in the Red Tide: India's
Vol. 27. Issue 09, Apr. 24-May. 07, 2010 .
Maoist Insurgency, Counter Terrorist Trend and
Analysis, Vol. 2, Issue 6, June 2010, P. 2. 19. B.K. Roy Burman, "What has Driven the Tribais
of Central India to Political Extremism",
2. http://www. satp. org/satporgtp/countries/india/
Mainstream, October 17 ; 2009.
maoist/datasheetsfatalitiesnaxal.asp
20. B.K. Roy Burman , "Militant Left Radicalism, State
3. Akansha Mehta, ibid, P.2.
and Civil Society with Special Focu on Land
4. Akansha Mehta, Countering India's Maoist Rights", Mainstream , December 25, ~J10 (Annual
Insurgency : The Need for Strategy not Operations, 2010).
R.S.I.S. Commentaries, 74/2010, 5 July 2010, P.2.
21. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naxalite, retrieved 03-01'
5. J. C. Johan, Naxalite Politics in India, Institute of 2011.

Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New

22. cpim.org/marxist/198501_ marxisty naxaiism _
Delhi, Research Publications, 1972.
Prakash.htm, retrieved 05-01-2011.
6. Sankar Ghosh, The Naxalite Movement: A Maoist
23. naxalwar.wordpress.com/, retrieved 05.01.2011.
Experiment, Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay Pub.,
1975.
24. timesofindia.mdiatimes.comtretrieved 03. 01.201 1.
7. Sohail Jawaid, The Naxalite Movement in India: 25. "Naxal Menace" http://ndtv.com/news/
Origin and Failure of the Maoist Revolutionary specialsnaxal-menace.php, retrieved 12.02.2010.
Strategy in West Bengal, 1967-1971, Associated
Pub. House, 1979.

8. Sumanta Banerjee , In the Wake of Naxalbari: A

History of the Naxalite Movement in India,
Subamarakha Pub., 1980.

This content downloaded from

13.234.89.89 on Mon, 09 Nov 2020 12:47:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms