Various cases relating to Age relaxation/ Concession Back to Index Page S.L.P. (C) No.7999/94 D.D. 9.5.

1994 The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kuldip Singh The Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.L.Hansaria Rajendra Kumar Bhati and Ors.- Petitioners Vs. Union P.S.C. & Anr.- Respondents The applicants who were OBCs demanded relaxation/concession in age and attempts similar to SC/STs. Held as under: Upon hearing counsel the Court made the following ORDER Whether any concession in any form are to be extended to the backward classes is a matter of policy for the Government to consider. This Court cannot go into this question. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed. ***

PRINCIPAL BENCH : NEW DELHI OA NO.747/92 D.D. 24.4.1992 The Hon'ble Mr. P.K. Kartha, Vice-Chairman (J) The Hon'ble Mr. I.K.Rasgotra, Member (A) Shri N.K.Sharma Applicant Vs. Union of India - Respondents Over aged candidate demanded for entertainment of his application for Civil Services Examination. Held - The Rule for the Civil Services (P) Examn, are statutory in nature and not open to challenge unless they are irrational or arbitrary. The framing, re-framing, changing and re-changing the rules to meet the needs of the situation lies exclusively in the domain of the executive and is not open to challenge unless there is a proven case of malafide. Hon'ble Mr. I.K.Rasgotra, Member (A) JUDGEMENT Shri N.K. Sharma has filed this Original Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, aggrieved by the decision of the respondents conveyed in F1/5/91-E-I(B) issued by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC for short) and notified in Employment News of 28.12.1991-3.1.1992, according to which the Respondent No. 2, viz. U.P.S.C. has allowed the candidates within the age group of 21-23 years to appear in the Civil Services Examination 1992 and increased the number of chance from four to five. The date of birth of the applicant is 10-6-1957 and he had appeared in the Civil Services Examination 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1990. The applicant, therefore, on the crucial date viz. 1-8-1992 would be over 35 years of age. He apprehends that in the circumstances in which he is placed, the Respondent No. 2 would reject his Application for want of eligibility in respect of age, thereby preventing him from taking the Civil Services Examination, 1992. The main ground of attack of the applicant is that in the year 1990 also the respondents had made changes in respect of age limit and in respect of number of chances to be availed of by the candidates for that particular year only. This was successfully challenged in the various Benches of the Tribunal and the applicants therein although had crossed the age 31 years, were allowed by the Tribunal to appear in the Civil Services Examination, 1990. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant drew our attention to an interim order passed by the Lucknow Bench of the Tribunal in OA 56/92 and OA

58/92, allowing the applicants therein to appear in the examination by directing the respondents to entertain their applications even if they crossed the age of 33 years as on 1-8-1992. 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the applicant and perused the record

placed on the judicial file. In our opinion, the issues of law and fact of matter brought up before us are distinguishable and, therefore, we are not persuaded to accept that our interference is warranted with the proposed C.S.E., 1992 on the ground. We are also not aware of the full facts and circumstances in which the Lucknow Bench of the Tribunal had given an interim order in O.A., referred to in the preceding paragraph. The Rules for Civil Service Examination are statutory in nature and not open to challenge unless they are irrational or arbitrary. The framing, reframing, changing and rechanging the Rules to meet the needs of the situation lies exclusively in the domain of the executive and is not open to challenge unless there is a proven case of malafide. The administrative action is subject to control by judicial review under (1) illegality, where the decision-making authority has been guilty of an error of law, eg by purporting to exercise a power it does not possess; (2) irrationality, where the decision-making authority has acted so unreasonable authority would have made the decision; (3) procedural impropriety where the decision-making authority has failed in its duty to act fairly. The procedural changes made in regard to the number of chances and the age limit from time to time have been made by the respondents, keeping in view all relevant factors and they have been made equally applicable to all equally placed persons. Such a classification has been held to be permissible within the framework of the Constitutional provisions, as it is meant to advance larger social objective. The applicant has not been able to demonstrate to our satisfaction that the classification made by raising the age and by increasing the number of chances is bad in law, irrational and therefore illegal. interference in this matter. In the facts and circumstances of the case the application is bereft of merit and is dismissed at the admission stage itself. *** We are, therefore, not inclined to favour judicial three heads:-

No.F.25/4/97-R(C&P) UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION RECRUITMENT (C & P) SECTION Dated: 11th February 2000. CIRCULAR No. 3/2000 Subject: Judgment delivered by the CAT, Bangalore on OA No, 20/2000, filed by Dr. J.C. Sharma Vs Union of India & Ors. *********** The grievance of the applicant was that though he had the requisite qualification for the post of Director at Central Institute of Indian Languages, Deptt. of Education, he was not called for interview. The applicant contented that the age limit for direct recruitment should have been increased by two years on the basis of Central Civil Services and Civil posts (Upper age limit for direct recruitment) Rules, 1998. The operative part of the Judgment delivered by the CAT, Bangalore is reproduced below:"2. The applicant has sought to rely upon the Central Civil Service and Civil Posts (Upper age limit for direct recruitment) Rules, 1998 to contend that the age limit for direct recruitment should be increased by 2 years. Annexure A-1 is the rule relied upon by the applicant. Those rules are applicable for direct rectt. by competitive examination. In the instant case, the recruitment is not by competitive examination and those rules do not apply. As the applicant was not within the age limit as on the last date prescribed in the advertisement, he was ineligible and we do not find any good ground to entertain this application. The same is rejected". Circulated for information and guidance among all Officers/Sections in the Recruitment Wing. ***

F.25/3/2001-R(C&P) UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION RECRUITMENT (C&P) SECTION New Delhi, 13th February 2002. Subject: Judgment delivered by the CAT, New Delhi on OA No. 1285/2001, filed by Sh. Sanjiv Kumar Vs. UPSC & Others. (Court Case file No. F.25/27/2001R(C&P)R.IV Rectt. File No. 566/96-R.IV) ********** Brief facts relating to the case are mentioned below:The appellant Sh. Sanjiv Kumar was an applicant for a post of Deputy Director, in Deptt. of Education, for which applications were invited by the Commission. The applicant claimed age relaxation as a Govt. Servant and furnished a certificate from his employer to the said effect. However it was found out that the applicant was not a Govt. Servant. Thereafter, he sought age relaxation as a meritorious sportsperson by producing certificate from the Delhi State Amateur Athletic Association indicating that he had represented the state in Marathon. The same also did not find favour with the UPSC, who did not consider the case of the applicant. This OA was filed by the applicant challenging this stand taken by the Commission. However, the Hon'ble CAT, New Delhi vide their judgment dated 17.10.2001, upheld the decision of the Commission. The operative part of the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble CAT, New Delhi is reproduced below: "We have carefully considered the matter specifically in the light of the instructions of the DOP & AR earlier and DOPT later with regard to the eligibility of persons for being recruited against Group 'C' & 'D' Posts from the category of meritorious an outstanding sportsmen. The scheme itself has been formulated to ensure that in the matter of appointment through direct recruitment, Govt. should have special consideration to person who have represented the country or the state or the University or the school in representative tournaments or persons who have obtained national awards in physical efficiency or those persons who have represented the state/UT/University state, school through could not obtain a medal or position. The relevant and specific expression used is the 'representation of the country at international level, of the state at the national level, of the university at Inter University level and of the school at inter school level and winning medal or positions". Thereafter, persons who were awarded National award in physical efficiency and lastly those who have participated at the various level even if they had not obtained and produced a certificate from DSAAA showing that he has participated in Half Marathon (21 Km) conducted by the makers of Rath vanaspati in

conjunction with the Amateur Athletic Federation of India and the National Institute of Sports. "........................This does not bring him in any of the five categories indicated in the letters of DOP & AR & DOPT outlining the basic qualification and requirements for being considered for appointment in any post against the quota meant for meritorious or outstanding sportsmen. Once he is not eligible to be considered for appointment against the quota for meritorious or outstanding sportsmen, the question of any age relaxation does not even arise. The respondents have acted correctly and legally and there is no justification at all for assailing the decision. Circulated among all Officers/Sections in the Recruitment Wing for information and guidance. ***

F.No.25/3/2001-R(C&P) UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION RECRUITMNT (C&P) SECTION New Delhi, 5th April 2002 Subject: Judgment delivered by the Karnataka High Court, Bangalore on W.P.No. 35839/2000[SCAT] filed by Sh. Dr.J.C. Sharma Vs. UOI & others. Court case file No. : F.25/72002-R(C&P)R.IV Rectt. File No. : F.1/414/97-R.IV

The Petitioner, Dr. J.C. Sharma, was an applicant for the post of Director, Central Institute of Indian Languages, Mysore advertised by the UPSC. The prescribed age limit for the post was 50 years, relaxable upto 5 years for Govt. Servants. The petitioner had already completed 55 years of age and accordingly was not called for interview. Feeling aggrieved, he approached the Tribunal by filing OA No. 20/2000 and contended that there should be a further relaxation of age by another two years having regard to the provisions of Central Civil Services and Civil posts [Upper age limit for Direct Recruitment] Rules, 1998. The said contention was not accepted and the application was rejected by the Tribunal. The applicant filed this WP in the High Court of Bangalore against the above decision of the Tribunal. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court, Bangalore rejected the contentions of the applicant vide their judgment dated 29.10.2001, the operative part of which is re-produced below:"The Rules relied on by the petitioner provides for relaxation of age limit by two years, by increasing the upper age limit, only for recruitment by direct open competitive examination method to the Central Civil Services and Civil posts specified in the relevant services recruitment rules. The Rules also clarify that 'Direct Open Competitive Examination' means direct recruitment by open competitive examination conducted by UPSC or Staff Selection Commission or any other authority under the Central Government and shall not include recruitment through limited departmental examination or by short listing or by interview.

As rightly held by the Tribunal, relaxation of upper age limit by two year is therefore not applicable to the post of Director of CIIL Mysore, which is not by way of direct open competitive examination. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to claim increase of upper age limit by two years. We do not find any merit in this petition. Accordingly it is rejected". Circulated in the Recruitment Wing for information and guidance of all concerned. ***

GAUHATI HIGH COURT W.P. No.3945/1999 & connected cases D.D.10.1.2001 The Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.Biswas Dr.Dilip Kumar Sarkar & Ors. - Petitioners Vs. State of Assam & Ors. - Respondents Selection to the post of Principals of 3 Medical Colleges of Assam Advertisement No.6/99 dated 5.6.99 prescribed the eligibility criteria including age limit There is no Clause in the advertisement for relaxation of age or experience prescribed P.S.C. recommended the names of 6 candidates in the order of merit by relaxing the eligibility criteria with regard to age and experience in respect of 2 candidates Sl.Nos.2 and 3 in the select list for 3 posts the High Court has quashed the select list with a direction to initiate the selection process afresh. Cases referred: 1.(1998)7 SCC 469 Laxmibai Kshetriya, Gramin Bank Vs. Chand Behari Kapoor 2. AIR 2000 SC 1097 State of U.P. Vs. Ram Swarup Saroj JUDGMENT 1. By this judgment writ petition (C) Nos. 3945/99,5095/99,2294/2000 and 2-

3/2000 are being disposed of as they relate to the same subject matter. 2. Writ petition (C) No. 3945/99 has been filed by Dr. Dilip Kumar Sarkar praying

for issue of appropriate directions for recalling the advertisement No. 6/99 dtd 05.06.99 issued for selection of the principals of three Medical Colleges of Assam and for further direction for holding interview on the basis of advertisement No. 7/97 making provisions for reservation for Scheduled Caste candidates. His grievance is that the ad-hoc appointment should no longer continue and regular appointment be made complying with the reservation policy of the Government. The State in their affidavit-in-opposition justified the impugned advertisement on the ground that it had to be issued to comply with the provisions of the Assam Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of vacancies for services and posts) Act, 1978. Respondent No.4 Dr. K.N. Barua, submitted in affidavit controverting the contentions raised in the petition and further submitted that reservation for appointment in excess of 50% of the total posts or vacancies is impermissible under the provisions of the Act. 3. Writ petition (c) No. 5095/99 has been filed by Dr. Munindra Mohan Deka for

issue of a writ of Mandamus restraining the respondents from appointing any person

from the recommendation dtd 23.09.99 (Annexure-XIII) made by the commission and also for setting aside the name. The propriety and the validity of the select list has been challenged on the ground that the candidates recommended by the Commission suffers from various deficiencies in respect of eligibility criteria namely, experience, age etc. According to Dr. Deka, the candidates without fulfilling the requisite criteria were considered and selected in deviation from the stipulations incorporated in the advertisement. 4. Writ petition (C) No. 2294/2000 has been filed by Dr. S.N.R. Patgiri praying for

cancellation of the ad-hoc appointment made to the post of Principal-cum-Chief Superintendent both at Guwahati Medial College and Assam Medical College, Dibrugarh. Further, direction has also been sought extending the validity of the select list dtd 23.09.99 (Annexure-6). 5. Dr. K.N. Barva, preferred Writ petition (C) No. 2323/2000 for issue of a writ of

Mandamus for discontinuing the ad-hoc appointment of Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 as Incharge Principal and for appointing him as the Principal of Gauhati Medical College in pursuance of his selection and position in the select list. 6. It would appear from the pleadings above that the State Authority has been

making ad-hoc arrangement to run the three Medical Colleges in the state without appointment of any regular Principal although the Commission forwarded its recommendation to the State long before. The State for reasons best known to them did not go for any appointment from the said list even though interim order has been passed directing the State to appoint regular Principal. 7. Mr. G. Uzir, learned counsel arguing for the writ petitioner (W.P(C) No. According to Mr. Uzir,

5095/99) submitted that the select list dtd 23.09.99 is tainted because of selection of ineligible candidates by condonation of age dehor the rules. consideration of ineligible candidates and incorporation of their names in the select list has vitiated the entire selection process and therefore, it is a case fit for a direction to the State to go for selection afresh. Shri Uzir further pointed out that age of over-aged candidate has been condoned without any authority of law in deviation from the terms and conditions of the advertisement. According to Shri Uzir the list has expired with effect from 23.09.2000 and the court having no power to extend the validity cannot direct the State to appoint any candidate from the said list. Mr. Bhattacharjees, Learned Senior Counsel argued that the selection as a whole cannot

be assailed and there cannot be any bar in giving a direction to the state to appoint the eligible candidates recommended by the Commission. Shri Bhattacharjee further submitted that the validity of the select list has been extended during the pendency of the writ petitions and therefore, there is obviously no bar in complying with the recommendation of the Commission. Shri. N.M. Lahiri, Learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioner of WP(C)No. 2294/2000 argued in tune with Shri. Bhattacharjee and urged that the Government be directed to go ahead with the appointment. 8. A careful scrutiny of the respective submissions would show that the following

questions need to be answered in the writ petitions, namely :(a) Where the select list prepared more than a year ago could be given effect to in view of the pendency of the writ petition and the direction given by this court extending its validity? (b) Whether eligibility criteria i.e. age could be condoned by the Government in respect of some candidates and whether inclusion of their names in the select list would vitiate the entire select list; or alternately whether the select list could be acted upon to the exclusion of ineligible candidates made eligible dehors the Rules? (c) Whether the candidature of Dr. M.M. Deka, writ petitioner in WP (C) No. 5095/99, was duly considered along with other candidates by the Commission. 9. Before we examine the above questions in the context of the argument

advanced, it would be of convenience to quote herein below the advertisement No. 6/99 and the select list prepared by the Commission :"ADVERTISEMENT" "............. (1) 3 (three) posts of Principal-cum-Chief Superintendent in the Medical Colleges of the State under Health and Family Welfare (B) Dept., Govt. of Assam (Re-Advertisement). 1(one) post reserved for ST(P). Scale of pay: Rs.10,050/P.M. to Rs. 15,575/- P.M. Qualification and Experience: Recognised and Registered MBBS under relevant Act with recognised post graduate Degree. Persons holding the post of Professor preferably Head of Dept. and 10(ten) years teaching experience as Professor/Associate Professor out of which 5(five) years should be as Professor in a Dept. of a Medical College of the State. Age: Minimum 40 years and maximum 54 years of age as on 01.01.1999.

(N.B:- This is in cancellation of the earlier advertisement de Advt. No. 7/97 Item No.2. However candidates who had applied earlier need not apply again)". "SELECT LIST" EXTRACT OF COMMISSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS. No. 71 PSC/DR-3/1/97-98 dtd 23.09.99. Position Sl. No. Name 1. 6 Dr. Khagendra Narayan Barua 2. 16 Dr. Sujit Nandi Purkayastha 3. 20 Dr. Ratneswar Swargiary 4. 18 Dr. Dilip Kr. Sarkar 5. 3 Prof (Dr.) Surendra Rana Pargiri 6. 2 Dr. (Mrs.) Nandita Choudhury The candidates are recommended by the Commission for the post of Principal-cum-Chief Superintendent in the Medical Colleges of the State under the Health and Family Welfare (B) Department in order of preference". 10. The advertisement quoted above does not mention of any validity period of

Category ST(P) SC

the list to be prepared. Shri. G. Uzir vehemently argued that the court has no power to extend the validity of the list. According to him, the order dtd 19.09.2000 passed by this court in WP(C) No. 3945/1999 extending the validity period of the impugned list till disposal of the writ petition is beyond the power of the court. In support of this contention, Shri Uzir also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Laxmibai Kshetriya, Gramin Bank Vs. Chand Behari Kapoor and others (1998) 7 SCC 496. In para 11 of the said Judgment, the Supreme Court observed that decision of the High Court that the panel remains alive until all the persons in the panel are appointed is wholly erroneous. This observation was made in a different legal context in No provision connection with a panel prepared under the Regional Rural Banks Act. 1976. This decision cannot determine the course of action in the instant case. could be cited at the bar to show that a list prepared by the commission is valid for one year only. Even, there is no mention of any validity period in the advertisement. If we go by the prevailing norm that a list normally remains valid for a period of one year only, the writ petitions having been filed before expiry of one year would have kept the list valid. This view is drawn from a decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P Vs. Ram Swarup Saroj AIR 2000 SC 1097. The Supreme Court observed as follows:"10. Similarly the plea that a list of selected candidates for appointment to the state services remains valid for a period of one year only is primarily a question depending on facts and yet the plea was not raised before the High Court. Secondly, we find that the select list was finalised in the month of

November 1996 and the writ petition was filed by the respondent in the month of October, 1997 i.e before the expiry of one year from the date of the list. Merely because a period of one year has elapsed during the pendency of litigation, we cannot decline to grant the relief to which the respondent has been found entitled to by the High Court............ 11. It we go by the above ratio, the writ petition WP(C) No.2323/2000 filed by

Dr. K.N. Barua on 12.05.2000 being well within the period of one year from the date when the select list was prepared cannot be thrown away if the list is otherwise found to be valid. This answers the question raised by Sri. Uzir about the enforceability of the impugned select list. 12. Next comes the question relating to relaxation of eligibility criteria dehors the

Rules. It has already been indicated hereinbefore that the selection process has been assailed primarily on the ground that a few over-aged candidates were permitted to take part in the interview and some of them have been recommended. Shri Uzir. Learned counsel referred to Annexure-XIV and XV (in writ petition (c) No. 5095/1999) in order to show that Dr. R. Swargiary, the third recommended is over-aged by nine months and lacked teaching experience by two months and that the said deficiencies were removed by the State dehors the Rules. The advertisement quoted above do not include any clause for relaxation of age or any other eligibility criteria. There is also no recruitment Rules for selection of the Principals of the Medical Colleges. No application was placed to show that such relaxation was permissible under any Executive Instruction. It would therefore, appear that the condonation and relaxation of the eligibility criteria were made without any authority of law. Relaxation of eligibility criteria in a selection process in a given case may not be always wholly irrelevant as the selection means a search for the best available candidate. Here no special reasons or circumstances are available to inspire this court to approve the impugned action. It was obviously not proper on the part of the State to relax qualification in respect of certain candidates in the absence of any provision that the state may in appropriate case relax eligibility criteria specified in the advertisement. The advertisement quoted hereinbefore in para-9 clearly prescribes teaching experience of 10 years as professor/Associate Professor between the age group of 40 years and 54 years as on 01.01.1999. That being so condonation/relaxation of eligibility criteria with regard to age and teaching experience in respect of Dr. Swargiary and a few others cannot be approved as an attempt to selection the best available candidates. The powers relaxation should have been reflected in the

advertisement itself creating an avenue for many others to apply for consideration of their candidature. 13. To bring home the above conclusion, Shri Uzir, Learned Counsel assisted the In Shalnda

court are in attention to a number of decision of the Supreme Court.

Hasan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (1990) 3 SCC 48, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of statutory Rules providing of salvations, the advertisement must indicate that the selection committee/appointing authority has the hope to relax the qualification. In District Collector and Chairman, Vizianagaram S.W.R.S. Society Vs. S. Tripura Sundari Devi the Supreme Court held as follows:"6. It must further be realised by all concerned that when an advertisement mentions a particular qualification and an appointment is made in disregard of the same, it is not a matter only between the appointment authority and the appointee concerned. The leveled are all those who had similar or even than the appointee or appointees but who had not applied for the post because they did not possess the qualifications mentioned in the advertisement. It amounts to a fraud on public to appoint persons with inferior qualifications in such circumstances unless it is clearly stated that the qualifications are reliable. No court should be a party a perpetuation of the fraudulent practice. We are afraid that the Tribunal lost sight of this fact". 14. It may be mentioned herein that in Virendra Nath Gupta and another Vs.

Delhi, Administration and others (1990) 2 SCC 30 decided a low days prior to Shainka Hasan (supra), the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the appointment of a teacher since the eligibility criteria was relaxed in accordance with the provisions of the Rules. Even prior to that in P. Mahendran & others Vs. State of Karnataka and others (1990) 1 SCC 411, the Supreme Court held that if a candidate applies for a post in response to an advertisement issued by the Commission in accordance with recruitment rules, he acquires a right to be considered for selection in accordance with the existing Rules. This right cannot be affected by amendment of any Rules unless the amending Rules is retrospective in nature. This observation of the Supreme Court indicates that the selection process once set in motion has to be within the terms and conditions of the advertisement. This alternately suggests that any change of the qualification once prescribed is not permissible unless notice thereof is given to all the intending candidates. 15. The decision of the Supreme Court referred to above clearly supports the

contention raised by Shri Uzir, Learned Senior Counsel that once the advertisement is made, the qualification prescribed therein cannot be altered as the matter is not

confined between the appointing authority and the appointee concerned. It emerges that the relaxation of qualification of Dr. Swargiary and a few others and incorporation of their names in the merit list has been contrary to the law in force. This would be clear from the comparative table showing merit-cum-experience an age of selected candidates available as Annexure-XVI in writ petition (c) No. 5095 of 1999 which is quoted below:"COMPARATIVE TABLE SHOWING MERIT CUM EXPERIENCE AND AGE OF SELECTED CANDIDATES AND THE PETITIONER. Position as per Sl Select No List 1 6 Date of Date of Appointment appointment and Joining as Associate as professor Professor and head of Dept. 19.06.1987 17.02.1992 Professor of Dermatology Upper Age Limit 1.1.97/ 1.1.97 within 54 Years

Name

Remarks

Mr. Khagendra Narayan Barua Professor Dermatology G.M.C Dr. Sujit Nandi Purkayastha. Principal I/C Silchar Medical College. Dr. Ratneswar Swargiary ST(P)

GMC, Guwahati not a Head of Department. Crossed upper age limit, Principal I/C Silchar Medical College. 1. By Govt. Notification HLB 387/92/64 dtd 30.12.97 condoned over aged by 9 months. 2. By Govt. Notification HLB 387/92/69 dtd 07.03.1998 govt. relaxed teaching experience by two months.

11

16

Not Known

Not Known

above 54 years as on 1.1.97 Above 54 as on 01.01.9 7

111

20

Not Known

11.03.1993

3. Dr. Dilip Kr. Sarkar (SC) Professor & Head of Dept. of Surger, Silchar Medical College IV 18 12.03.93 22.09.95 Above 54 as on 01.01.9 9

Crosse d upper age limit. 1. Cross ed upper age limit. 2. Have far below merit cum experienc e as per advt. Crossed upper age limit.

Dr. S.N.Rana V 3 Patgiri Professor & Head of Dept., Gynecology, Dihrugrh, Medical College. Dr. (Mrs.) VI 2 Nandita Choudhury, Professor and Head of Dept. of Nephrology GMC Dr. Munidra Petition 14 Mohan Deka, er Professor & Head of Dept. of Radiology, GMC, Current charge of Principal cum Chief Superintendent GMC on 22.09.99. Note:- (A) Notification No. 7/97 (i) Qualification

Not Known

Not Known

Above 54 as on 01.01.9 9

19.02.1985

01.05.1991

(17.06.97) Joined on 06.07.87

(08.04.88) 16.05.88

Within minimum and maximu m age limit. 47 years 8 months as on 01.01.97

Have full qualification and experience besides being with age limit as notified.

Persons holding the post of professor preferably Head of Dept., And ten years teaching experience as professor/Associate Professor out of which 5(five) years should be as Professor in Department. Age limit Reservation : 40 years to 54 years of age on 01.01.97. : ST(P) 1 No SC 1 No

(B) Notification published on 14.06.99 (i) (ii) (iii) 17. Qualification and experience : same as 7/97 Age Limit Reservation : 40 years to 34 years as on 01.01.99 : ST(P) 1 No.

It would appear from the comparative table quoted above that Dr. Sujit Nandi Dr.

Purkayastha who has secured second position crossed the upper age limit.

Ratneswar Swargiary who was also over-aged was given relaxation both in respect of age and experience. Similarly Dr. Dilip Sarkar who had secured fourth position was also over-aged and did not have the experience as required. Patgiri was also over-aged. not appear in the select list. Dr. Surendra Rana But all have been recommended by the Commission. The comparative statement and the select list read

The name of Dr. M.M. Deka, who appears to have all the requisite qualifications, does together show that ineligible candidates were considered and recommended. Had they been excluded from the selection process, Dr. Deka might have secured a position in the merit list. The impugned select list, therefore, cannot be accepted as an out-come of an innocent exercise. 18. There is no dispute with regard to the law that those candidates who do not

have requisite qualifications have no right to appointment. Some of the candidates who did not have the requisite qualifications were considered by way of relaxation/condonation and recommended. This is contrary to the law an in deviation from the conditions and eligibility criteria as prescribed in the advertisement. As such, the process of selection as a whole stands tainted. This list prepared by the Commission might have been completely different had the commission acted in strict compliance with the prescribed qualification. Injustice has been caused not only to the candidates interviewed but also to the candidates who might have applied had the relaxation clause been made known to them. This shows that the selection process was not in tune with the objective sought to be achieved. 19. Next comes the question whether Dr. M.M.Deka, writ petitioner in writ petition

(C) No. 5095/1999 was duly considered by the commission. From the comparative table, it appears that Dr. Deka had all the qualifications as per advertisement. He was also within the age limit prescribed in the advertisement. I have examined the relevant file produced by Shri N. Dutta, Learned Senior Counsel for the commission in order to ascertain whether Dr. Deka was duly considered or not. The apprehension expressed by Shri Uzir, Learned Senior Counsel that Dr. M.M. Deka was not at all

considered by the commission is not correct. Records available in the file show that he was duly considered along with other candidates. It is obviously not within the powers of this court to embark upon a scrutiny as to the correctness of the marks given to him as it pertains to administrative precision involving expertise in medical science. However, the contention that Dr. Deka was not at all considered by the Commission is not supported by the materials on record. 20. For reasons above, it has to be concluded that the select list cannot be This conclusion

sustained in law and no appointment can be made from this list.

shall not, however, in any way be construed as an adverse commence to the efficiency and competence of the candidates recommended. Fault is not with them but the selection process. 21. In the result, the writ petition (c) No. 5095/1999 is allowed. The select list dtd Other writ petitions, namely, Writ petition (C) Nos. 23.09.99 is hereby set aside.

3945/1999, 2294/2000 and 2323/2000 are also simultaneously disposed of with a direction to the state to initiate selection process afresh in the light of the State to initiate selection process afresh in the light of the observations made hereinabove and in accordance with the provisions of law without further loss of time. No order as to costs. ***

JHARKHAND HIGH COURT AT RANCHI W.P.(S) Nos.289 & 322 of 2003 D.D. 22.1.2003 The Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.J.Mukhopadhaya Md. Shamim Anjun & Anr. Petitioners Versus The State of Jharkhand & Others Respondents The petitioner in the first case has challenged the cutoff date fixed for calculating the age in the advertisement for the combined competitive examination and the petitioner in the second case has sought for relaxation of upper age limit of 35 years for General categories upto 38 years. Held The power to relax age for appointment or the power to fix a maximum age for appointment or the power to fix a cutoff date for appointment is vested with the Appointing Authority and both the writ petitions are dismissed. ORDER

In both the cases as almost common question involved they are heard together for disposal. The Jharkhand Public Service Commission (JPSC for short) issued an advertisement for Combined Competitive Examination in the newspaper on 2nd January, 2003 calling for application to appear in the JPSC Combined Civil Services Preliminary Examination, 2003 for appointment in Jharkhand Civil Service and some other services, the minimum and maximum age limit of 22 and 35 respectively was fixed for general candidate. The petitioner Md. Tahari of WP (C) No. 322 of 2003 has challenged sub-clause (iv) of clause (a) of the aforesaid advertisement No.11/2002-03 whereby the cut off date calculating the age has been fixed as 1st August, 2002. The other petitioner Md. Shamim Anjum of WP (S)No. 289/2003 has prayed for direction on respondents to give relaxation of three years in the upper age limit of 35 years for general categories making it to 38 years. One of the grounds taken is that the State of Jharkhand has not made any appointment since last two years. No such employment have been given to the The other ground, as taken by candidates who were eligible in the year 1999.

petitioner Md. Shamim of WP(S)No. 289 of 2003 is that the present Combined Competitive Examination is continuity of the Combined Competitive Examination held by the Bihar Public Service Commission (BPSC for short). In earlier competitive examination always a retrospective cut off date used to be fixed to calculate the age. For example 1st August, 1994 was the cut off date fixed in the 40 th Combined Competitive Examination held in the year 1997; 1st August, 1995 was the date fixed for 41st Combined Competitive Examination held in the year 1998 and similarly 1st August, 1996; 1st August, 1997 and 1st August, 1998 respectively in the subsequent examination. According to the petitioner such cut off date should have been followed in the Jharkhand State fixing 1st August, 1999 as the date to count the age for the 1st Combined Competitive Examination held by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission. But such submission cannot be accepted as the po9wer to relax age for appointment or the power to fix a maximum age for appointment or the power to fix a cut off date for appointment is vested with the Appointing Authority/The State of Jharkhand and not with the High Court. In the circumstances, there being no merit, both the writ petitions are dismissed. ***

W.P.(C) No.522 of 2003 D.D. 28.2.2003 The Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.J.Mukhopadhaya Ganesh Prasad Sah - Petitioner Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. Respondents Held The High Court has no jurisdiction to fix a cutoff date for calculation of upper age limit under Article 226 of the Constitution.

ORDER

The petitioner has challenged the cut-off date to count age limit as prescribed in advertisement No. 12/2002-03 for appointment to the post of Junior Engineers & Assistant Engineers. The main plea taken by the petitioner is that the posts are being filled-up after about 10 years and the petitioner will not get opportunity to appear in the forthcoming examination. Admittedly, the petitioner is a member of other backward category for which maximum age limit of 37 years have been prescribed. Even if it is accepted that the post were last filled-up about 10 years back in that case it will also be presumed that the petitioner got opportunity to make application being about 27 years of age at that stage. The difficulty is that the High Court has no jurisdiction to fix a cut-off date for calculation of upper age limit under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Such power is only vested with the appointing/competent authority. In this background, there being no other infirmity or illegality, this Court cannot alter the cut-off date under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There being no merit, the writ petition is dismissed. ***

W.P.(Civil) NO.942 & 946 of 2003 D.D. 2.5.2003 The Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.J.Mukhopadhaya Ram Badan Singh - Petitioner Versus The State of Jharkhand & Others Respondents The petitioner has challenged the cut off date of 1.8.2002 to count the minimum age of eligibility of 22 years for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer in Public Health Engineering Department. The High Court following the earlier decision has rejected both the writ petitions holding that the power to relax the age for appointment or the power to fix a maximum age for appointment or the power to fix a cut off date for appointment is vested with the Appointing Authority and the High Court has no jurisdiction - Hence both the writ petitions are dismissed. ORDER In both the cases, as petitioner is common and common question of law involved, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. In WP(C) No. 942 of 2003, the petitioner has challenged the cut off date of 1st

August, 2002 as fixed to count the minimum age of eligibility of 22 years for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer in Public Health Engineering Department (PHED for short) and notified vide Advertisement No. 12/02-03 with further prayer to direct the respondents to decrease the minimum age limit, as mentioned in Clause-IV of the advertisement aforesaid and to accept the application of the petitioner for consideration of his case for appointment against the post of Assistant Engineer along with others. In the other case, W.P.(C) No. 946 of 2003, similar prayer has been made by the petitioner against the minimum age of 22 years as on 1 st August, 2002 prescribed for appointment in different State Civil Services, vide Advertisement No. 11/02-03 published by Jharkhand Public Service Commission (J.P.S.C. for short). 3. The case of the petitioner is that, he passed the matriculation examination in

1995 with Division, completed Intermediate (Science) and thereafter look admission in BIT Sindri in the year 1998. He completed Engineering course and provided with provisional certificate from BIT Sindri in the year 2002 and is otherwise eligible for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer and the State Civil Services.

The date of birth of petitioner being 9th October, 1980 he attained 22 years of age on 9th October 2002. His grievance is that in view of clause IV of Advertisement No.12/02-03 for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer in PHED he has been made ineligible and thus debarred from consideration of his case for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer though he is otherwise eligible on the date of advertisement. Similar plea has been taken in respect to the Advertisement No. 11/02-03 published by the JPSC in the newspaper "HINDUSTAN TIMES" on 2nd January, 2003 for appointment on different posts of Jharkhand Civil Services and Labour and Employment Services. 4. According to the petitioner, there is absolutely no legal reasoning or valid

basis for fixing the minimum age limit of 22 years on a particular day of the previous year, rather when the advertisement itself is being published in the year 2003, the JPSC should have either fixed the minimum age requirement as 21 years as being done in all other competitive examinations should have fixed such minimum age requirement as on the last date of submission of application. According to petitioner, in most of the cases/advertisements, almost all the concerned organizations have fixed the minimum age requirement of 21 years for appointment in Government services. 5. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha, the counsel for the petitioner relied o Annexre-5 series,

the advertisements published by the Union Public Service Commission on 18th January 2003, Public Service Commission, Uttar Pradesh in 2003, two advertisements published by the Union Public Service Commission in 2003 Advertisement published by the Electricity Service Commission Lucknow in 2003, Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal on 19th August, 2002 etc to suggest that all the Selection Bodies/Public Service Commissions have fixed the minimum age of 21 years. 6. Learned Advocate General, Jharkhand appearing for the JPSC submitted that

the posts in Civil Services used to be filled up as per Bihar Civil Services (Executive Branch) & Bihar Junior Civil Services (Appointment) Rules 1951. The said rule has been adopted by the State of Jharkhand with certain amendments under section 85 of the Bihar Re-organization Act, 2000, vide Notification No. 2/NI-005/2002 KA-6184 dated 9th November 2002.

The minimum age has been fixed as per Rule 6 of 1951 Rules and the maximum age has been fixed as per the amendments made vide Notification No. 6184 dated 9th November, 2002. 7. So far as appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer, PHED is concerned,

the learned Advocate General relied on Rule 4(a) of the "Rules regulating the method of Recruitment to the Bihar Public Engineering Services Class-II". 8. Under Rule 6 of the Bihar Civil Services (Executive Brach) and Bihar Junior

Civil Services (Appointment) Rules 1951, as adopted by the State Jharkhand, vide Notification No. 6184 dated 9th November 2002. The minimum age for appointment in the Civil Services has been prescribed. The relevant part of the original Rule 6 is quoted here under: "6 A candidate may either be a male or female, and:-

(a)

be under 25 years and over 22 years of age on the 1st day of August last preceding the month in which the examination is held: Provided that (i) in the case of candidate belonging to the scheduled castes or the scheduled tribes, the upper age limit shall be under 30 years."

The maximum age limit, as was prescribed has been enhanced by the State Government. 9. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the month in

which the examination is to be held having not yet fixed, the Respondents should not have fixed the cut-off age of 22 years as o 1st of August 2002. According to him if the examination is held after August 2003 then as per Rule 6(a) the candidates having minimum age of 22 years as on 1st August 2003 will also become eligible. However, the aforesaid submission cannot be accepted in view of recent advertisement published by JPSC on 1st April, 2003 in the newspaper "HINDUSTAN", Rachi, wherein 6th July, 2003 is the date of preliminary examination has been fixed.

10.

The minimum and maximum age limit of 22 years and 35 years respectively

as has been fixed for appointment in the Jharkhand Civil Services vide Advertisement No. 11/02-03, fell for consideration before this Court in the case of "Md. Shamini Anjum Vs. State of Jharkhand and others" (W.P (S) No. 289 of 2003) analogous with the case of "Md. Tahri Vs. State of Jharkhand and others" (W.P. (C) No. 322 of 2003). In those cases, both the petitioners had challenged the cut off date fixed to calculate the maximum age limit and prayed for direction on the State to relax the upper age limit. A Bench of this Court, vide is (Unreported) decision dated 22nd January 2003 while rejected the prayer as was made in both he writ petitions, hold that the power to relax the age for appointment or the power to fix a maximum age for appointment or the power to fix a cut off date for appointment is vested with the appointing authority/the State of Jharkhand and the High Court has no such jurisdiction. Both the writ petitions were dismissed there being no merit. 11. In view of Rule 6(a) of the Rules 1951, as adopted by the State of Jharkhand

and the date of preliminary examination having fixed by the JPSC on 6 th July, 2003, I find that the Respondents have rightly fixed the cut off date of 1 st of August 2002 years and it requires no interference. The prayer made in WP(C) No. 942 of 2003 is thus rejected. 12. I or appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer in PHED the minimum age

has been fixed under Rule 4(a) of the Bihar Public Health Engineering Services ClassII Rules, as quoted hereunder. "4 A candidate must (a) be of an age not below twenty-three years and not exceeding twenty-five years on the first day of August in the year in which applications are invited provided that if he satisfies the Commission that he requires no further practical training in Engineering he may be of a age not exceeding twenty-six years on that date; provided Government may inn special cases relax the age-limit; provided that in the case of candidates belonging to the scheduled castes and backward tribes, the upper age-limit shall be under 28 years". 13. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha, the counsel for the petitioner having not adopted by the

State of Jharkhand under Rule 85 of the Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000 within two years of reorganization of the State i.e., by 15th November 2002, the said rule cannot be made applicable for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer in PHED Jharkhand.

Mr. Jha further submitted that the aforesaid Bihar Public Health Engineering Services Class-II Rules is not a statutory rule nor any enactment, ordinance, regulation, order bye-law, scheme notification to fall within the ambit of 'law' as per section 2(i) of the Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000. 2000 does not arise. 14. For determination of aforesaid issue, it will be appropriate to refer the Therefore, the question of it continuance or adoption under sections 84 and 85 of the Bihar Reorganization Act,

relevant provisions of the Bihar Reorganization Act. In the said Act, 'law' has been defined under section 2(f) which reads as follows:"2(f) "law" includes any enactment, ordinance, resolution, order, bye-law, rule, scheme notification or other instruments having immediately before the appointed day, the force of law in the whole or in any part of the existing State of Bihar". 'Territorial extent of laws' while provided under section 84 but the power to adopt laws has been provided under section 85 as quoted here under: "84. Territorial extent of laws The provisions of Part II of this Act shall not be deemed to have effected ay change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, the territorial references in any such law to the State of Bihar shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority be construed as meaning the territories within the existing State of Bihar before the appointed day. 85. Power to adapt laws. For the purpose of facilitating the application in relation to the State of Bihar or Jharkhand of any law made before the appointed day, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of two years from that day, by order, make such adoptions and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the adoptions and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. Explanation In this section, the expression "appropriate Government" means as respects any law relating to matter enumerated in the Union list, the Central Government, and as respects any other law in its application to a State, the State Government. 15. From section 84, it is clear that all the laws enforce immediately before the

appointed day i.e. 15th November 2000 in the erstwhile State of Bihar remain effective continue and are applicable in both the successor State of Bihar and

Jharkhad, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or the competent authority, irrespective of reorganization of State. 16. After reorganization of the State of Punjab, similar issues fell for consideration

before the Supreme Court in the case of Rattan Lal Co. Vs. the Assessing Authority, Patiala reported in AIR 1970 SC 1742, wherein the Supreme Court held. "...................... The Scheme of the State read as Reorganization Act makes the law applicable to the new areas until superseded, amended or altered by the appropriate Legislature in the new State. This is what the Legislature had done and there is nothing that can be said against such amendment." Even the Administrative Orders made by the Government of the erstwhile State continue to be in force and effective and binding on the successor States until and unless they are modified, changed or repudiated by the Governments of the successor State, was the finding of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Balbir Singh, AIR 1977 SC 629 as quoted hereunder: ".................... In our judgment when there is no change of sovereignty and it is merely an adjustment of territories by the reorganization of a particular State, the administrative orders made by the Government of the erstwhile State continues to be in force and effective and binding on the successor State until and unless they are modified, changed or repudiated by the Governments of the successor States. No other view is possible to be taken. The other view will merely bring about chaos in the administration of the new States. We find no principle in support of the stand that administrative orders made by the Government of the erstwhile State automatically lapsed and were rendered ineffective on the coming into existence of the new successor States". 17. The aforesaid provision of section 2(f) and section 84 of the Bihar Re-

organization Act, 2000 fell for consideration before a learned Single Judge of Patna High Court in the case of Singhbhum Homoeo Med. College and Hospital Vs. State of Bihar, reported i 2002(2) PLJR 80 wherein the Court held as follows:"3. from a conjoint of the above it is clear, that all 'laws' in force immediately before the appointed day i.e. the day the division of State became effective, continue to be applicable notwithstanding the change in the territories, and a 'notification' being 'law', as such remains valid and binding so far as the territories comprising the new state are concerned". 18. Similar was the view of the Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of

Commissioner Vs. M/S. Swarnarekha Cokes & Coal Pvt. Ltd., reported in 2002(2) PLJR

334, wherein while it considered the relevant provisions of sections of sections 84 and 85 along with section 2(f) of the Bihar Re-organization Act, 2000 held as follows:"9. It is significant to mention that what had fallen for consideration before the Supreme Court was an administrative order not amounting to law within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Punjab Act- as held by the Punjab High Court with which the Supreme Court agreed. It was on general principles that extended meaning was given to the administrative orders and they were held to be applicable in the successor State. The present case stands on a much higher footing inasmuch as the basis of the claim of the respondents is a statutory order/notification which amounts to law by virtue of the inclusive definition of the term 'law' in section 2(f) of the Bihar Act. 10. The above categorical an definite enunciation of law by the Apex Court leaves no room for doubt about applicability and binding nature by the statutory orders/notification of the Government of the erstwhile State of Bihar in the successor State of Jharkhand. In fact, there is no necessity of its being 'adopted' as observed by the learned judge. Under section 84-unless repudiated or otherwise modified or superseded by a legislative mandates, they continue to be applicable and binding in the successor State." 19. This court in its recent (Unreported) decision dated 7th April, 2003 in the case

of "Rajiv Kumar Vs. the State of Jharkhand and others", WP(C) No. 5341 of 2002 also held that the laws of the combined State of Bihar continue in the successor State of Bihar and Jharkhand under section 84 of the Bihar Re-organization Legislature of competent authority of the successor state. 20. In view of the aforesaid finding, I have no hesitation to hold that the "Bihar

Public Health Engineering Services Class-II Rules", whether it is a statutory rule or instruction or executive instruction or order, it is still in force and binding on both the successor States of Bihar and Jharkhand until and unless suitable provision is made by the competent Legislature or the competent authority of the State of Jharkhand. 21. The count has noticed the provision of Rule 4(a) of the Bihar Public Health

Engineering Services Class-II Rules wherein the minimum age of 23 years is prescribed on the 1st day of August in the year in which applications are invited. Learned Advocate Central while accepted that 22 years is the minimum age prescribed in the Advertisement No. 12/02-03 as on 1st August-2002 rightly clarified that it will not affect any of the candidate in any manner, the advertisement having published in the year 2002 and as all the eligible candidates will attain the age of 23 years on 1st of August 2003, as per the advertisement.

22.

In the aforesaid background the petitioner being not eligible as per clause 4(a)

of the Bihar Public Health Engineering Services Class-II Rules or the advertisement, no relief can be granted in his favour. 23. There being no merit, both the writ petitions are dismissed. However, there

shall be no order as to costs. ***

THE COURT OF JUDICATURE, MADHYA PRADESH : AT JABALPUR WRIT PETITION NO.5766 OF 1998 Rajneesh Kumar Jain Vs. State of M.P. and Others Held No relaxation in age limits other than prescribed in the recruitment rules can be granted. Further held No reservation/relaxation in age limit can be granted to women as to the rules concerned have not been framed in consultation with the High Court under Article 234 of the Constitution. Cases referred: AIR 1960 SC 268 J.Panduranga Rao v.State of A.P. AIR 1967 SC 442 State of Assam v. Horizon Union AIR 1969 Allahabad 230 Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. 1986 LAB.I.C. 710 Sudhakar Govindarao Deshpande v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1988 SC 830 Thota Bhaskar Rao v. a.P.Public Service Commission AIR 1993 SC 2493 All India Judges Association case ORDER The following order of the Court was passed by D. M. Dharmadhikari. A common order is being passed in his petition and connected petitions i.e W.P. No.5770/98 (Abdul Jabbar Khan v. State of M.P. and others) and W.P.No.356/99 (Prakash Chandra Gupta v. State of M. P. and others). W. P. No. 5824/98 (Smt. Kusum Saxena v. State of M. P. and others) was allowed by the Court to be withdrawn by order dated 27.1.1999 with liberty to the petitioner of that case to urge all grounds on her behalf in this petition. 2. All the petitioners in this batch of petitions are practicing Advocates and have

applied, pursuant to the advertisement issued by the Public Service Commission, for recruitment through written test and interview for the post of the Civil Judge in the subordinate judiciary of the State of M. P. Admittedly, all the petitioners have crossed minimum prescribed age limit of 35 years and are ineligible to apply for the post under the notice of the advertisement. By these petitions, they have challenged the validity of the conditions in the advertisement prescribing essential qualifications and the bar of age.

3.

Recruitment to the lower Judicial Service of the State which included the post

of Civil Judge (Junior Scale) is regulated by the M. P. Lower Judicial Services (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 (thereinafter referred to an the rules). The above rules have been framed by the Governor in exercise of powers conferred by Article 234 read with provision to Article no. 309 of the Constitution of India. Rule 7 contains the minimum prescribed conditions of eligibility for the recruitment to the post of Civil Judge. The relevant rule 7 which was amended by Notification dated 9th December 1977 published in M. P Gazette, Part 4 (GA) dated 19th December 1997 now stands as under: 7. Eligibility: No person shall be eligible for appointment by direct recruitment to posts on category (i) of Rule 3 (1) unless: (a) he is a citizen of India

(b) he has attained the age of 25 years and not completed the age of 35 years on the first day of January of the next following year in which applications for appointment are invited. Provided that the upper age limit shall be relaxable upto a maximum of five years if a candidate belongs to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or Other backward class. Provided further that the upper age limit of a candidate who is a government servant (whether permanent or temporary) shall be relaxable upto 38 years (c) he possesses a degree in law of any recognized University.

(d) he has practiced as an Advocate for not less than 3years on the last date fixed for submission of application for appointment and (e) he has good character and is of sound health and free from any bodily defect which render him unfit for such appointment 4. The relevant conditions contained in the advertisement issued by the Public

Service Commission on 3.12.1998 inviting applications for the post of Civil Judge reads (rendered into English) as under: IV . Condition of the post a. . b. c. Essential qualification (1) Bachelor Degree Law from a recognized university and (2) practice as an Advocate for not less than three years on the last date fixed for submission of application for appointment d. Age limit. Has attained the age of 25 years but not completed the age of 35 years on the first day of January of the next following year in which application for appointment have been invited

V. Relaxation in upper age limit. (1) Upper age limit shall be relaxable upto maximum of five years if the candidate belongs to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or other backward classes. (2) Upper age limit is upto 38 years for candidates who are government servants. Permanent/temporary/work charged/contingency paid as also employees in State Corporations/Boards/Municipal/ Corporations/Municipalities and Autonomous Bodies. The same age relaxation will also available to employees working to various projects under the Project Executive Committees Note: If any candidate is a member belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe/Other backward Classes also in Government service, for such candidate maximum age limit is 40 years. The above age relaxations would be granted only to such candidates who produce certificate for their entitlement. 5. Shri. Rajneesh Jain is one of the petitioners. Shri. Haman Hagrath counsel

apiaries with him and Shri. O. P. Mishra, Advocate addressed the court on behalf of the petitioners. Shri Ravindra Shrivastava, and Shri. S. K. Seth, Advocates appeared and addressed the Court for the high court and Public Service Commission respectively. Counsel appearing for the State and for the Public Service Commission adopted the return filed and arguments advanced on behalf of the High Court. 6. We shall now take up for consideration in seriatim the challenges made by the

learned counsel for the petitioners to the conditions of the advertisement. The first ground urged on behalf of the petitioner is that under the circular issued by the General Administrative Department of the State dated 6th of July 1998 (AnnexureA/2), for recruitment to government services the minimum prescribed age limit of 33years has been increased for candidates from general category to 35 years for reserve category to 40 years and for women of general, reserved and specified categories such as divorcees, widows and deserted women to 45, 50 and 55 years respectively. It is submitted that for recruitment to judicial services no corresponding increase in the prescribed age limit from 35 to 38 years has been provided and the inaction in that respect is discriminatory. 7. The above contention has little merit. In the government services when the

age of superannuation of government servants was fixed at 58 years. The age limit for recruitment was 33 years. It is after the 5th pay commission that the age of superannuation of government servants was increased to 60 years. The government thereafter thought it necessary to increase the age limit for entry into government

service. It is in this background that the General Administration Department (G.A.D) of the government issued calendar dated 18th July, 1998 increasing the age limit for recruitment to government services from 33 to 35 years. This is clear from paragraph 2 of the G. A. D Circular Annexure-A/2 8. So far as the recruitment to judicial service of the State is concerned on the

directions of the Supreme Court in the All India Judges Association Case (A. I. R. 1993 SC 2493), the age of superannuation of members of the judiciary was increased from 58 to 60 are correspondingly, thereafter age limit of 35 was prescribed uniformly in the rules for recruitment to judicial service. The age of retirement of government servants after 5th pay commission has been increased from 58 to 60 years but there is no corresponding increase of the age of superannuation of judicial officers which continues to be 60 years as before. In these circumstances there is absolutely no justification for increasing the age limit for entry to judicial services. 9. The challenge on the ground of discrimination has no merit. Recruitment to

judicial services is not comparable to other services of the State because in the former the source of recruitment is from amongst the practicing Advocates in the Bar or these advocates who subsequently joined other services. There is no other source of recruitment. The nature of duties and functions of a judge are not comparable with the duties and functional of any other judge of a post or office in the services of the State other than judiciary. 10. The next ground urged is that there is no justification to discriminate

candidates who are practicing lawyers vis--vis candidates to the services of the state or state organizations for giving to the latter class age relaxation upto 38 years and deny such relaxation in age to the former class. It is argued that as compared to such candidates who are in services, the candidates who are active practitioners at the Bar are more suitable for recruitment to the service and such discriminatory treatment to members of the Bark is unconstitutional. 11. The above argument appears to be attractive, but keeping in view the object

for which such relaxation is provided, it is also found to be unacceptable. It has not to be forgotten that the source of recruitment to judicial services is only from amongst law graduates. Majority of law graduates join the bar to practice law in the Courts. A small section of the law graduates join different legal or administrative departments of the State and government organization. Such law graduates who are in service

and have minimum prescribed three years experience at the bar are also required to be given a chance of improving their career. There are candidates who had practiced at the bar for certain number of years and who voluntarily or due to compulsions of circumstances were required to join services. They also deserve to be given avenue of career in judiciary. Their chances cannot be blocked for entry into judicial services. Such in-service candidates who had been earlier practicing law at the bar committee a distinct class. A grant of different treatment to them by providing age relaxation has justification. Such candidates having spend initial period of their career at the bar and then in the government services suffer from disadvantage as compared with those who are in active practice. As has been mentioned in the return of the High Court, the class of government servant has traditionally been recognized as forming a distinct class in the matter of relaxation of upper age limit in recruitment to services. In virtue of services being rendered by them, subject to fulfillment of qualifications and other eligibility criteria, it has been a sound policy to provide them opportunity and encouragement to neck further and better employment if so desired to improve upon their career. The candidates belonging to this class of government servants are not comparable with candidate available in the Bar. Grant of age relaxation to the former class is based on a reasonable classification which has a reasonable nexus with object to make recruitment from all available sources. Such age relaxation cannot be extended to the members of the bar because that would mean increase of the prescribed age limit for members of the bar from 35 to 38 and thus fixing an age limit which would not give them a reasonably long tenure to seek promotion to the highest post of the District Judge in the judicial career and would be deterrent to the successful members of the bar in competing for judicial services. 12. Age relaxation to in-service candidates to be found in other statutory service

recruitment rules of other departments of the State. A mention of it has been made in the return of the High Court. The departments mentioned are Forest Services, MP State (Gazetted) Services, P. W. D (non-gazetted) services, Irrigation, Engineering and Geological service. 13. It has also been found that large number of law graduation are working in

legal and administrative departments of the State such as in the staff of the High Court, on the ministerial post in the Courts, Law Officers, Legal aid Officers, Halb Tahsildhars, Police Prosecutors and various other categories of employees. It has been found that necessary to give such in service candidates with post practice and experience in law a chance of entry into judicial services. Entry of such candidates in

the judiciary would pave way for multination of their legal and administrative experience in discharge of their judicial functions. If such candidates are found suitable to be provided with the career in judicial service, the grant of age relaxation to them is necessary because they have spent a considerable period of their life in serving in other departments and branches of government or government organizations. 14. In the above respect, it needs mention that the present statutory rules of

recruitment under Articles 234 read with Proviso to Article 309 were framed on the direction of the Supreme Court in All India judge Association case (supra) with a view to bring uniformity in recruitment to judicial service in the whole of India as a first step suggested towards constitution of an All India Judicial Service. In implementing the directions and observations of the Supreme court in the All India judge Association case, occasion to neck clarification arose in view of the provisions in Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Rules for recruitment of law graduates working in subordinate courts and on the establishment of the High Court or in legal section of different department of the state. In the Gujarat rules for staff members minimum prescribed 3 years practice at the bar was not initiated upon. The validity if such rule came up for consideration on a clarification sought from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in upholding such rule of the Gujarat State providing avenue of recruitment to in service candidates in different legal departments and legal sections of the State approved the proposal for not insisting on practice at the bar for such members of the staff. The relevant part of the observations in the order of the Supreme Court (a copy of which is filed with the return of the High Court as Annexure A-2/1) needs to be quoted in full to meet the challenge made to the rule of relaxation for candidates in government service as discriminatory. This court whole considering review petition No. 249 of 1992 in writ petition no 1022 of 1989 along with the certain other review petitions arising from the main judgment. In the case of All India Judges Association v. Union of India (199) I SCC 119 laid down certain requirements one of the which related to the qualification required to be prescribed and the procedure to be adopted for the recruitment of judges at the grass root level in all states (vide paragraph 20 of All India judges Association v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 288). This court laid down that legal practice 3 years would be one of the essential qualifications of recruitment to the judicial posts at the lowest rung in the judicial hierarchy. This direction related to the appointments to be made from the bar. This direction is consistent with the observations of the law commission 77 the report found at paragraph 9.5 in the chapter 9. The relevant recommendation reads as under :

 We have considered the pros and cons and are of the opinion that the present system of initiating upon a number of years of practice at the bar an mandatory for recruitment to the subordinate judicial service should continue. The minimum period of practice in our opinion should be three years. Some exception regarding requirement of minimum practice may possibly have to be made in the case of law graduates employed in the courts. In so far as the recruitment rules are concerned, the relevant rule is rule 5 of the Gujarat Recruitment Service Rules, 1965.That rule provided the method of recruitment to class 2 of the judicial branch. According to that rule besides the members of the bar members of the staff of the high court as well as subordinate courts, members of the staff working as Assistant in the legal section of the Legal department, Sachivalaya, members of the staff of office of the Government Pleader, High Court and City Civil Court, Ahmedabad are eligible fro appointment provided they have obtained the Special degree or are qualified for enrollment as an Advocate and have served for a period of not less than 5 years case including not less than 2 years after obtaining such degree or qualifying for such enrolment and are certified to have sufficient knowledge of Gujarati and Hindi and are able to translate from Gujarati etc. Besides these requirements, those staff members are required to pass an examination called the Civil Judge (Junior division) and Judicial Magistrates, first class recruitment examination comprising two papers. Only these of the staff members who pass this rigorous test are eligible to be recruited to lowest rung of the State Judiciary. The directions given by this court in the judgment referred to hereinabove concerned the minimum practice requirement for entry into service from amongst the members of the bar. The Court in regard to the recruitment of staff members with sufficient experience. The experience of 5 years service is equated to the experience of 3 years in such cases the direction in regard to the minimum 3 years practice at the bar does not apply. We, therefore, clarify this position and hold that the staff members who are eligible under Rule 6 and who comply with requirement of the Rule discussed above could be considered for appointment at the lowest rung in the subordinate judiciary. We would, however also make it clear that any dilution of this rule will render them imp facto ineligible for appointment to the service of the lowest level of state judicial service. 15. The above quoted observation of the Supreme Court fully justify preferential

treatment to the candidates who are law graduated and are employed in the services of the state. So far as the M. P. rules are concerned, even for in-service candidates the requirement of minimum 3 years practice at the bar has not been dispensed with. Such candidates have to fulfill minimum prescribed three years practice at the bar to compete with other practicing lawyers in the written test and viva-voce test. Some favorable treatment of age relaxation is given to them because after completing 3 years law practice they might have joined the services at their violation or due to

compulsion. Their experience in services is however found to be worth giving some weightage for providing them avenue of recruitment to judicial service. 16. On the question of grant of relaxation to inservice candidates, the second limb

of argument advances on behalf of the petitioners had a great force that such relaxation in age cannot be granted to work charges contingency paid or those employed in government corporation, boards, local authorities and autonomous bodies. The relevant rule contained in Second Proviso to clause (b) of rules has been quoted above. The rule permits relaxation of age upto 38 years to government servants of specified two categories only mentioned therein i.e. permanent or temporary. The rule does not contemplate or permit grant of age relaxation to government servants of any other category such as work charges or contingency paid. The rules does not permit a relaxation to employees of government corporation, boards, municipal corporations, municipal bodies and other autonomous bodies. This part of the advertisement giving relaxation to all categories of employees could not be supported by the counsel on behalf of the High Court. At the bar it was said that this found to be a mistake and has been corrected in the recruitment advertisement issued for the future year. Learned counsel for the petitioner insisted that all such ineligible candidates who have applied on the basis of age relaxation should be eliminated from the process of selection and for this purpose this petition be treated as public interest litigation. We may observe that none of the petitions was filed as Public interest litigations and no foundation for treating them so, has been laid in the petition. No directions pertaining to the candidates in general or public have been sought in the prayer clause of the petition. We, therefore, refrain from issuing any such direction in these petition by treating them as petitions in public interest. We are not informed by the P. S. C as to how many candidates, on the basis of the age relaxation belonging to the ineligible category (i.e. those working in government corporations, boards, local authorities and autonomous bodies) have actually applied pursuant to the advertisement. The preliminary examination for the post under the advertisement is already over and the written test has been held on 2nd of August 1999. It would be a matter of guess as to how many candidates of the above mentioned ineligible category would not selected. It is for the P. S. C to scrutinize the applications and at the final stage if any candidates of such categories which are held to be ineligible get selected their names b eliminated after due notice to them. Not much reasoning is needed to hold the offending part of the advertisement as invalid in respect of grant of age relaxation to such categories of employees. They are neither permanent nor temporary servants in the government. No term/terms can be

prescribed in the advertisement which are contrary to statutory rules. With these observations, but without issuing any specific direction, we uphold the second limb of contention advanced against grant of age relaxation to candidates not strictly in government employment as contained in para 5 (2) of the advertisement. 17. The next ground urged on behalf of the candidates is in accordance with the

provisions of the M. P. Civil Services Special Provision for Appointment of Women rules, 1997 there should be 30% reservations for women candidates and relaxation in age upto 10 years in accordance with G. A. D circular of the government dated 6/10 th July 1998. Under the above mentioned rules of the year 1997 framed by the Governor in the exercise of the powers conferred by the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, for recruitment to Public service and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, 30% reservation shall be given to women candidates. In accordance with the circular issued as provided under the said rules, women candidates for general category would have age relaxation upto 45 years those from reserved category upto 50 years women candidates from general category who are divorcees, widows or deserted upto 50 years and those from above mentioned category of reserved classes upto 55 years. 18. In our opinion, the claim for reservation of posts for women and age relaxation

on the basis of abovementioned rules of 1997 is misconceived. Recruitment to judicial service cannot be regulated by rules made by the Governor along under Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The source of power to legislate and frame rules for recruitment to judicial service is to be found in Article 234 of the Constitution. Under Article 234 of the Constitution, the appointment to judicial service of the State for the post other than that of District Judges shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with the rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such state. The Rules of 1977 providing reservation of posts for women and age relaxation to them are not framed by the Governor in consultation with the High Court and P. S. C. The rules of 1997 framed under Article 309 of the Constitution can have not application for recruitment to judicial services which are governed only by the specific rules of 1994 framed for judicial services under article 234 read with Proviso to article 309 of the Constitution. 19. The other argument advanced on behalf of the women candidates, in this

regard is that there is no justification to discriminate between women seeking

employment in other services of the government and the judicial services of the State. It has been observed in the All India Judges case by the Supreme Court, the judicial services is not service in the strict manner because the holder of the judicial office is not servant of the state. His conditions of service and tenure are therefore distinguishable from holder of any other post in the government service where there is relationship of master and servant. The source of recruitment for judicial services is limited to the law graduate either at the bar or in any department of the government. Since the source of recruitment is limited, the availability of women candidates is also limited to such law graduates amongst women who are at the bar or in services. In other departments of the state, there are posts and wings well suited for recruitment of women. Opportunity of employment to women who suffer pecuniary and social disabilities such as the divorcees, deserted woman and widows may be provided in other departments but it not found suitable in judiciary. In the matter of reservation of seats for women and for grant of age relaxation to them differential treatment is justified from the nature of judicial service and the source of recruitment. The attack to the rule on the ground of discrimination under the article 14 and 16 therefore, cannot be sustained. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. Panduranga Rao V. State of A. P. (AIR 1963 SC 268) on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioners in support of the above argument is distinguishable. In that case, for recruitment to the post of District Muncif discrimination in the rules was found in prescribing the qualification of practice as an Advocate only in the High Court of A. P. The Supreme Court held that the Advocates of other High Courts cannot be discriminated for recruitment to judicial service of A. P. Such is not the case here. On the question of reservation of seats and age relaxation for women for recruitment to judicial services, we do not propose to express any final opinion although on the circumstances brought on record, at present, we find not ground to issue any such direction for reservation of seats and age relaxation to women candidates as is prayed on one of the petitions filed on the behalf of a women candidate who has crossed the prescribed age limit. 20. In the course of hearing the learned counsel appearing for the High Court

placed before us a copy of the formal decision taken and conveyed by the High Court on the subject to the Government refused to accept the proposal of the government to introduce provision of reservation of seats and age relaxation for women in recruitment to judicial services at bar with provision made for women for recruitment to posts in services in other departments of the state stating that there are enough number of women in judicial services.

21.

As we have held above the source of recruitment to judicial services is limited

to law graduates with three years practice at the bar. We have presently found no ground to discriminate between them on the ground of sex alone. We, however, for see a situation where women judicial officers might be required to be appointed to courts specially constituted for dealing with laws concerning women, children and families. 22. The grant of reservation of seats and reservation to women candidates for

recruitment to judicial services is essentially a policy matter to be decided by the appointing authority depending upon various relevant factors such as the nature and sources of recruitment, availability of suitable of number of posts, the need for representation of special class and the requirements of the service. 23. We, therefore, do not rule out a valid policy of reservation in future in favour

of women for recruitment to judicial services. The reasonability and constitutionality of the same would then be a question for decision if brought to the court by any of the parties. 24. The last argument that needs consideration and some observation although

advanced by the learned counsel appearing an individual grievances of the petitioners, is on the condition with regard to minimum prescribed period of practice at the bar. On behalf of the petitioners it is emphasized that the condition in the advertisement and the relevant rule prescribed three years minimum practice as an Advocate on the last date of submitting the application under the advertisement. It is contended that the condition requires that the candidate should be in continuous practice on the date of submission of the application and such candidates who has practiced in the past for three years but not continuously before the last date of the application are not eligible. Very strong reliance has been placed on the Single Bench decision of Bombay High Court in Sudhakar Govindrao Deshpande v. State of Maharashtra (1986 LAB. I. C 710). In the Bombay case (supra) by dissenting from the view of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Chandra Mohan v. State of U. P. (AIR 1969 Allahabad 230=1969 LAB. I. C 521) and construing the provisions of Article 233 (2) of the Constitution laying down the qualifications for members of the bar for appointment as District Judges, it was told that the Article refers to members of the bar who have been of seven years standing and not to persons who have ceased to be the members of the bar and are employed elsewhere at the time of their

application for appointment as District Judges. The learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court noted the fact that the phrase has been in capable of two interpretations namely (i) has been some time in the past (ii) has been in the immediate past denoting a continuous state from the past. It observed thus: Looking to the history of the provisions contained in the Article 233(2) and the context, the correct interpretation of the Article 232(2) is that it refers to persons who have been advocates or pleaders and who continue to be so at the time of their appointment. 25. The learned judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Chandra Mohan

(supra) while construing the provisions of section 233(2) of the Constitution relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam v. Horizon Union (AIR 1967 SC 442) and held that the words has been in the phrase, when not followed by a principle is the present perfect tense of to be and accordingly the language indication that the state of being has existed an may be (but not necessarily in) continuing. It was, therefore, held by the Allahabad High Court that article 233(2) of the Constitution does not disqualify a candidate who had practiced for 7 years at the bar in the past and may not be in the bar on the date of his consideration for appointment as District Judge. From the aforesaid decisions of Bombay and Allahabad High Courts and the decisions of the Supreme Court which we shall hereafter discuss, the relevant recruitment rule providing minimum prescribed period of practice at the bar needs construction. The rule uses the expression he has practiced as an advocate for not less than 3 years on the last date fixed for submission of application for appointment. The expression has practiced as advocate is susceptible of two interpretation conveying (i) the candidate who has been in continuous practice for not less than 3 years on the date fixed for submission of application and (ii) the candidate who had practiced in the past for 3 years at the bar. In interpreting the above rule, the object with which the above rule and the legal history for introducing such a rule cannot be overlooked. The Law Commission in its 77th Report recommended that there should be insistence upon the number of years of practice at the par an a mandatory requirement for recruitment to subordinate judiciary service. The part of that report has already been quoted above as part of the order passed by the Supreme Court clarifying the observations and directions in the All India Judges Associations case the following observations were made for providing in the recruitment rules minimum three years period of practice as a necessary eligibility condition:-

The qualifications prescribed and the procedure adopted for recruitment of the judges at the lowest rung are not uniform in all the States. In view of the uniformity in hierarchy and designations as well as the service condition, it is necessary that all the States should prescribe uniform qualifications and adopt uniform procedure in recruiting the judicial officers at the lowest rung in the hierarchy. In most of the States, the minimum qualifications for being eligible to the post of the Civil Judge-cum- Magistrate First Class/ Magistrate First Class / Munsiff Magistrate is minimum three years practice as a lawyer in addition to the degree in law. In some States, however, the requirement of practice in altogether dispensed with and Judicial Officers are recruited with only degree in law to their credit. The recruitment of law graduates as Judicial Officers without any training or background of lawyering has not proved to be a successful experiment. Considering the fact that from the first day of his assuming office, the judge has to decide, among others, questions of life, liberty, property and reputation of the litigants, to induct law graduates fresh from the Universities to occupy seats of such vital powers in neither prudent nor desirable. Neither knowledge derived from books nor pre-service training can be an adequate substitute for the first hand experience of the working of the court system and the administration of justice begotten through legal practice. The practice involves much more than more advocacy. A lawyer has to interact with several components of the administration of justice. Unless the judicial officer is familiar with the working of the said components, his education and equipment as a Judge is likely to remain complete. The experience as a layer is, therefore, essential to enable the judge to discharge his duties and functions efficiently and with confidence and circumspection. Many States have hence prescribed a minimum of three years practice as a lawyer as an essential qualification for appointment as a Judicial Officer at the lowest rung. It is here necessary that all the States prescribe the same minimum practice as a lawyer as a necessary the judiciary in this connection. It may be pointed out that order Art. 233(2) ot the Constitution, no person is eligible to be appointed a District Judge unless he has been an advocate or a pleader for no less than seven years while Arts 217(2) (b) and 124 (3) (b) require at least ten years practice as an advocate of a High Court for the appointments of a person to the posts of the Judge of the High Court and the Judge of the Supreme Court, respectively. Therefore, the Supreme Court directed that all States shall take immediate steps to prescribe three years practice as a lawyer as one of the essential qualification for recruitment as the judicial officer at the lowest rung. The direction is calculated to ensure recruitment of competent, Independent and honest judicial officers and thus to strengthen the administration of justice and the confidence of public in it. The states should, therefore, take immediate steps to comply with the said direction by amending the relevant Rules. 27. We have already quoted above along with the observation of the

Supreme Court clarification to the said observations made while considering the Gujarat Judicial Service Recruitment Rules which provided avenue of recruitment to members of the staff working in the Courts and legal department of the State. The

Supreme Court in the directions and orders issued in the matter of clarification, upheld the Gujarat Recruitment Rule dispensing with 3 years practice at the bar and instead requiring only minimum 5 years service in the concerned legal department for in service law graduates. 28. Interpreting, therefore, the rule in the M.P. Recruitment Rules, the above

quoted observations in the All India Judges case as initially made by the Supreme Court and subsequently clarified will have to be given due weightage and office under the Recruitment Rules, the avenue of recruitment in provide both to the lawyers practicing at the bar for three years and those who have practiced for the minimum required period but on the date of making the application are employed in the government service. If the interpretation sought to be placed on the rule by the petitioners in accepted, then all these government servants who are law graduates but are not actually in practice on the date of making application by them actually in practice on the date of making by them would be debarred from applying for the post. It is well settled that an interpretation whereby part of the rule is rendered ineffective should be avoided and the interpretation which would make all parts of the rule workable should instead be preferred. We have shown from the extracts of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the All India Judges Case (supra) which was subsequently clarified by it (supra), the in service candidates who had practiced for minimum three years at bar have to be considered for appointment being from one of the suitable sources for recruitment to judicial services. In the background of the directions of the Supreme Court and in the context in which the rule was introduced, it has to be held that the expression has practiced would mean all candidates who might have practiced for minimum period in the part and also these who are in continuous actual practice till the last date fixed for making the application. The decisions cited at the bar are distinguishable on the language of the particular rule in those cases. In the case of Thota Bhaskar Rao v. A.P. Public Service Commission (AIR 1988 SC 830) the language of the relevant rule was that in case of candidate who in already in government service he must have actually practiced for a period of more than 3 years immediately prior to the date of his entering the Government service. The rule under consideration before us i.e. Rule 7 (d) does not have similar language. In the case of Thota Bhaskar Rao (supra) the question that arose was whether the service in Hindustan Shipyard which is a government company would be deemed to be government service for the purpose of the rule and the answer of the Supreme Court was in the negative. The decision of the learned Judge of Bombay High Court was on interpretation on Art. 233, which provides experience at the bar for seven

years as a qualification for appointment to District Judge and the language of the Article was interpreted . The Bombay view dissents from the earlier view of the Allahabad High Court in which it has been held that candidates who have practiced for seven years in the post but may not be in actual practice on the date of making the application, are eligible to apply for the post of District Judge. The decision of the Allahabad High Court in based on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Horizon Union (AIR 1967 SC 442). For the reasons we have already mentioned above, particularly in view of the interpretation of the rule laying down prescribed post experience at the bar as has been clarified by the Supreme Court in All India Judges Association Case, we are of the view that the decisions of Bombay and Allahabad High Courts concerning interpretation of Art. 233(2) are not helpful in construing the rule framed for recruitment to the lower judicial service of the State under Art. 234 of the Constitution. In the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Horizon Union (supra) , under Sec 7-A (3) (aa) of the Industrial Disputes Act , a candidate who has for a period of not less than three years been a District Judge was held qualified, for appointment as Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal . Shri B.C.Datta who was appointed as Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal had held the office of the Additional District Judge for the requisite period of three years in the past but on the date he was appointed toe the Tribunal he was holding the office of the Registrar of the High Court of Assam. His appointment as proceeding Officer of the Industrial Court was challenged on the ground that the requirement of the section is that a candidate who was continuing as the District Judge or Additional District Judge alone was qualified for the appointment. In interpreting the provision contained in Section 7-A (3)(aa), the Supreme Court held that the High Court was in error in thinking that in order to satisfy the conditions of Section 7-A (3)(aa). Shri Datta would have actually worked on District Judge/Additional District Judge for a period not less than three years. For over three

years, Shri Datta held the post of Additional District Judge. Consequently, during this period he had been an Additional District Judge as required by Section 7-A (3)(aa), of the I. D. Act. It was not necessary that he must have actually worked as Additional District Judge for this period. 29. Taking some support from the above decision of the Supreme Court and Association

relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in All India Judges

Case with the clarification issued by it subsequently in the matter of in-service law graduates, we are of the opinion that the rule harmoniously construed along with

other rules makes it clear that law graduates in service who had practiced for minimum 3 years at the bar are qualified to apply for the post. 30. Having thus answered all the contentions advanced on behalf of the There is also no Justification to issue any direction or writ in

petitioners, we find no ground to grant any relief to any of the petitioners in this batch of petitions. these batch of petitions treating them the Public Interest/Litigation. 31. Consequently, the petitions are dismissed, but in the circumstances, without

any order as to costs. ***

O.J.C. No.4429/98 D.D. 8.4.99 The Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice Mr.A.Pasayat The Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.C.Naik Bidyadhar Palai Petitioner -vsOrissa P.S.C. & Ors. Opposite parties Age relaxation Recruitment to the post of Assistant Engineer (Technical) - Upper age limit 32 years and benefit of age relaxation by 5 years given to SC/ST/Ex-Servicemen and Women candidates and 3 years to OBC candidates; 5 years to in-service candidates. Petitioner In-service candidate who was 39 years as on the prescribed date claimed benefit of 3 years as OBC besides 5 years as in-service candidate. Held Petitioner is entitled to benefit of relaxation of 5 years as in-service candidate only. JUDGMENT In this writ application judgment of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench (in short the Tribunal) dated 15.1.1999 in O. A. No. 1673 (C) of 1996 is under challenge. 2. Background facts leading to filing of the applications is as follows: Petitioner had moved the Tribunal for a direction to the State of Orissa, Department of Commerce and Transport and the Director of Printing, Stationery and Publication to consider his case for appointment to the post of Assistant Director (Technical) as a departmental candidate by allowing him age relaxation of three years as available to candidate belonging to Socially and Economically Backward Classes (in short OBC) and five years in respect of candidate serving under the State Government. The Tribunal held that the plea was not acceptable and dismissed the original application. 3. Petitioners stand before the Tribunal which is reiterated before us is as He was a candidate to the post of Assistant Director (Technical) in the Directorate of Printing, Stationery and Publication, Orissa in Class II service for which an advertisement was issued by the Orissa Public Service Commission (in short OPSC). Petitioner belongs to SEBC as evident form the caste certificate, According

follows :

to the advertisement a candidate for the post should not be below 21 years and above 33 years as on 1.1.1994. The upper age limit is relaxable upto 5 years in case of SC/ST/Ex-servicemen and Women candidate and 3 years in case of other backward class as per rules. The advertisement also stipulates that the upper age limit is relaxable upto 5 years in respect of candidates serving under Government. The petitioner is a departmental candidate working as Copy Holder in the Directorate of Printing, Stationery and Publication. Had he appeared as a candidate from the open market he would have been entitled to relaxation of upper age limits by 3 years. Since he is a departmental candidate, the upper age limit can be relaxed for further 5 years. His contention is that he is entitled to concession both as a Member of SEBC and as a departmental candidate. In other words, according to him, his upper age limit should be relaxed by 6 years. If this contention has been accepted, the petitioner who was 39 years old as on 23.5.1996 when the original application before the Tribunal was filed would have been eligible to compete for the post but allowing him extension of age by 5 years, he was not allowed to take part in the selection. Prayer in the original application was to quash the impugned letter/order issued by OPEC rejecting his application as age barred and to direct it to call the petitioner for interview on 30.5.1996 for selection on merit. OPSC took the stand that it had sought for clarification from the General Administrative Department on the petitioners claim that he was entitled to the relaxations as claimed. The G.A Department in its reply dated 21.3.1996 clarified that according to rule 9(2) (C) of the Orissa Printing and Stationery Service (State Service Class I and Class II) Rules (in short Rules) he is entitled to get relaxation of age upto 5years. The said rule provides that for a direct recruitment, a candidate must be above 21 years and below 32 years of age on the first January of the recruitment year, and the upper age limit shall be relaxed by 5years in respect of the candidate serving in the Government. Thus, as a departmental candidate the petitioner is entitled to relaxation of age upto 5 years and since he was more than 37 years old as on 1.1.1994 he was considered age barred for taking part in the recruitment test. The Tribunal did not accept the stand of the petitioner and as a foretasted rejected the application 4. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that if a comparison is made

between two advertisements i.e. one issued by the OPSC in the instant case and the other issued by the Department of Telecommunications, Orissa Telecom circle, Bhubaneswar, Government of India, for recruitment in another case, the fallacy is the reasoning of the Tribunal would be apparent. Reference is also made to an advertisement vide no 140-D which was issued in February, 1998 for the post of

Technical Officer in Class II of State Service. According to it, a candidate must not be over 32 years and below 21 years as on 1st August 1997. The upper age limit is relaxable by three years for candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, women and eligible Ex-servicemen. The upper age limit in respect of candidates working under State Government is relaxable upto to maximum limit of 45 years. By analogy it is stated by learned counsel for petitioner that the Government servants belonging to reserved category are to get 5 years of relaxation of age over and above that generally applicable to all government servants. 5. The question as to what would be the age limit is a policy of the competent

authority and unless the same is irrational, the High Court whole exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution cannot interfere. So far as the advertisement no. 140-D which was issued in February 1999 is concerned there is nothing in the same which support the stand of the petitioner. In fact in the advertisement itself, no distinction is made between government servants belonging to any of the categories and all Government servants below 45 years have been allowed to participate. The petitioners stand is based on the supposition that particular limit of 45 years has been fixed by adding eight years to 37 years of age limit, which is the upper age limit, according to him for entry into service. Emphasis has also been laid on the Employment Notice issued by the Department of Telecommunications, Orissa Telecom Circle, Government of India, referred to above. A close look at the advertisement shows that relaxation of age is not available to all departmental candidates but only to those who are eligible to appear in the Departmental Examination for recruitment against departmental quota vacancies. Even otherwise merely because in another case or other cases there is any prescription in the advertisement, which is not there in the advertisement under consideration, that cannot be applied, particularly when a set of statutory rules govern the recruitment i.e. the Rules referred to above. The Rules specifically provides that a departmental candidate is to get a concession for five years. That being the position, there is no scope for granting any further relaxation in the absence of any specific provision in the Rules. The conclusions of the Tribunal do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference by this Court. The writ application fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. ***