The State of Egypt Today
The State of Egypt Today
The State of Egypt Today
ince 2011, when Egypt's revolution swept Hosni Mubarak from power, the political landscape has undergone unprecedented changes. However, after three decades in which political opposition was suppressed and human rights openly abused, democracy is still under threat as deep political reform is blocked by the military council that has been the centerpiece of Egypt's government since the 1950's. In this sense, and in the view of many Egyptians, the revolution remains incomplete despite free elections for the Parliament and Shurra Council. Further, several actions have drawn into question the military council's desire for true political openness and their commitment to a transition to civilian rule. The effect of this is that Egyptians have been held in a state of uncertainty and divisiveness that adversely affect Egypt's economic recovery and threatens political stability. The Beginning of the Revolution The United States' foremost concerns when massive protests broke out across Egypt in January 2011 was the state of their longstanding relationship with then president Hosni Mubarak, the stability of the Camp David Accord, and the dilemma they faced in backing an unpopular ruler. Washington found itself in an awkward position as "abandoning" Mubarak would send a signal to other rulers in the Middle East who head similarly undemocratic governments yet each day that the US failed to take a strong stand against the violent crackdown on protestors eroded their already damaged credibility among Arabs. This issue was resolved only when it became eminently clear that Mubarak's time was over but was quickly replaced with the fear that Egypt's most organized and popular political movement, al Akhwan, the Muslim Brotherhood, would take control of Egypt. Since then, the Brotherhood has taken steps to assure the United States that they will uphold Egypt's peace treaty with Israel while also attempting to maintain a degree of ambiguity with respect to their conservative base. Challenges to Democracy However, what is most threatening to Egypt's democratic transition and the stability of the country are the negotiations the Brotherhood have entered with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) surrounding the new constitution and the sentiment among Egypt's youth that their revolution is being hijacked. Fear that the Brotherhood was trading political power for impunity and control over the roots of
military power sent thousands back to the streets in late 2011 when they entered negotiations with SCAF behind closed doors. The response of the military police and armed forces to the renewed protests was a brutal crackdown that yielded images of peaceful protestors, in particular women, being beaten ruthlessly and fired on with live rounds; the violence led to dozens of deaths and added to growing doubts about the likelihood of a peaceful transition to civilian rule. The Anniversary of the Revolution While the Egyptian Revolution's one year anniversary was a peaceful and for some, celebratory event, the days that followed saw protestors in the streets and renewed violence as calls for an immediate end to military rule echoed in Tahrir. But while thousands flocked to Cairo from all over Egypt for the celebrations on January 25, 2012, there were also those who called attention to the fact that there remained significant work before the revolution could be called complete. Al thawra mastamra, the continual revolution, is seen by many Egyptians though as impractical and misdirected given the economic hardships that continued instability are wreaking on the average Egyptian as tourism and investment have ground to a halt. Further, with elections having already occurred for some elements of the government and the Presidential election, despite being pushed back multiple times, scheduled for the summer, many are simply waiting to see whether it will occur before committing themselves to return to the streets. Dividing Egyptians The most striking difference in Egyptian society from 2011 to 2012 is the tangible division between those who support the continual revolution and those who regard the ongoing protestors cynically, perceived as harmful to the economy and driven less by patriotism than dissatisfaction with the performance of liberal political parties in the parliamentary elections. While some political divisions are natural in a complex society like that of Egypt, the military council has fanned the flames of distrust and sought to portray the ongoing stability as a result of foreign intervention. Further, SCAF has taken steps to shore up support among hard-line Egyptians, for example, by attacking foreign NGO's, already extremely unpopular with large elements of Egyptian society. By attacking democracy and human rights organizations that are viewed with a great deal of suspicion by many Egyptians, the military government made a public statement that gave credence to their claims of foreign interference in Egypt's affairs and allowed them to present themselves as protecting the countrys sovereignty. Their crackdown on NGO's may have also been an attempt to set a legal precedent for dismissing civil court cases that activists
fear SCAF will use to protect itself after a civilian government takes control of Egypt. Like the NGO case, violence at Port Said following a match between Egypt's most popular football clubs was perceived as resulting from ulterior motives. While the majority of Egyptians expressed anger over the failure of the police to stop fans rushing on the field or to protect players, others saw it as a reprisal against the Ultras, a group of fans and activists who played a prominent role in Egypt's revolution, often violently attacking police. Still more saw it as a way to allow unrest to prevail, returning to a tactic employed by the Mubarak regime during the revolution where government thugs were set loose in the streets and looting was rampant. By facilitating or even perpetrating acts of violence and crime, critics hold, SCAF is seeking to portray their absolute rule as the only way to protect Egypt and ensure stability. While unheard of events such as bank robberies broke news before the violence at Port Said, the violence at Egypts football stadium has become symbolic of the failure of SCAF to govern Egypt and their desire to hold on to power by destabilizing the country. The Role of the United States There are a range of threats to the stability of Egypt, its economic recovery and democratic transition. Divisions between Egyptians over the legitimacy of the ruling regime and level of trust regarding the transition to civilian rule are a cause for serious concern. Further, while the Brotherhood must be seen first and foremost as driven by a desire for political power, Washington must avoid making compromises that undermine the perception of the US in exchange for short-term stability. Ultimately any partnership between the Brotherhood, SCAF and the US alienates large elements of Egyptian society and makes the same fundamental mistake that the US made in failing to pressure Mubarak for democratic reform and human rights: sacrificing the democratic aspirations of the entire Egyptian society in exchange for upholding the status quo. Egypt is experiencing rapid political change and faces substantial challenges in emerging from 30 years of autocratic rule. However, as much as Egypt needs time to develop the institutions of democracy such as a robust civil society, judiciary, and independent media, the immediate future is crucial to ensure that segments of society are not alienated and Egypt's transition to civilian rule is deep enough to ensure the independence of the parliament and presidency and those same democratic institutions that will one day make up Egypts democracy.