Date Posted: 17-Feb-2011

Jane's Intelligence Review

Out of time - Egyptians force out Hosni Mubarak

Key Points
Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak stepped down as president on 11 February after 30 years in office. Mubarak's departure marked the culmination of 18 days of widespread popular protest, with the military's unwillingness to forcibly disperse the crowds proving a key factor in his downfall. With the protesters having apparently achieved their objectives, attention is now shifting to the transition, with a modified constitution due to be released by the end of February. Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak has succumbed to people power and stepped down after 30 years in office. Mitchell Prothero assesses the possible transition to civilian government, the role of the military in the process, and the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. No one could say that Egypt's Hosni Mubarak was not a fighter. The former army commander, who had held Egypt in his grip for 30 years, stubbornly refused to leave office for 18 days, while thousands of protesters gathered in Cairo's central Tahrir Square to call for his departure. At one stage, it even appeared that he might ride out the protests and survive in office, following a number of concessions apparently designed to weaken the crowd's determination. However, his final concession, that he would step down as president in September, appeared to tip the balance; with Mubarak having made the decision to go, the protesters saw little point in him waiting. On 11 February, he resigned as president and handed over power to a council of army officers, plunging Egypt into uncertainty. The army council, headed by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, now has a series of major issues to address. While what is being called the '25 January uprising' can claim success in that the government and military eventually acquiesced to its demands that Mubarak and his associates step down, the constitution be re-written to accommodate political pluralism and that free and fair elections be held, the details of how such a transition from an authoritarian regime to a more open parliamentary democracy should happen remain vague. On 14 February, the national army council announced that a modified constitution would be released within 10 days, followed by a transfer of power to a civilian government in less than six months. Whether this accelerated timetable, which gives the appearance of returning control to civilians as soon as possible, will allow for full participation in a country that has never been allowed to develop a vibrant opposition remains to be seen, but many in Egypt fear that such a speedy transition will only result in superficial changes and the return of many members of the old regime to power.

Drivers for change

Although Mubarak's regime had for years been battered by popular criticism and waves of protests over deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the heavy-handed behaviour of Egypt's security forces in quashing dissent, the events of January and February are unlikely to have taken place without the example of Tunisia barely a month before. There, the regime of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was abruptly toppled by a wave of popular protests and huge street demonstrations, forcing the longserving leader to flee the country on 14 February. The wave of unrest in Tunisia happened to coincide with a low-key protest movement already underway in Egypt, which began with far more modest goals than complete regime change. Rather, a small group of organizers used the one-year anniversary of the death of political activist Khaled Saed at the hands of internal security forces to call for a rally on 25 January. However, after the success of the first day's protest, and the sense that the demonstrations had quickly outgrown and surpassed those few initial organizers, protesters and internal security forces squared off on 28 January for a

day of clashes that left hundreds dead and wounded. Although the exact casualty count has yet to be confirmed, most media reports suggest that at least 100 people died on 28 January alone. Although the internal security forces almost immediately managed to arrest and imprison most of the key organizers of the first rally, including Google executive Wael Ghonim and leaders of the opposition Kefaya movement, the protests resonated with Egypt's extensive poor and disenfranchised working class population. By the time the regime cut off internet and mobile telephone services in an effort to disrupt the protests on 28 January, the movement had already assumed a leaderless approach that did not rely on central organization, and so was immune to the targeted arrests and communications interference that had so effectively disrupted protests in the past. The failure of the internal security forces to end the protests on 28 January led the Egyptian military to send armored units of the presidential guard into Cairo for the first time in decades to restore order, as the police and other ministry of the interior forces disappeared from the streets. This deployment underlined one factor that would be crucial to the evolution of the situation: the dependence of the Mubarak regime on the stance taken by the military. Other factors were more long-term in nature and provided considerable incentives for unrest on their own. Endemic corruption throughout every segment of society, rising food prices, brutal suppression of political dissent and a rapidly growing population that continued to see its middle class slipping into poverty as regime-connected elites prospered all played a part in the widespread dissatisfaction that found expression on the streets. According to regime insiders contacted by media outlets as the government collapsed, the surge in social unrest began with the rise in 2005 of steel magnate Ahmed Ezz as a powerful force within the Mubarak regime. Insiders claim that Ezz spearheaded efforts by the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) to ensure that the influential opposition group the Muslim Brotherhood would not be able to retain its 88 parliamentary seats in the November 2010 elections. Although banned, members of the Islamist group had been allowed to run in that election as independents. In a 14 February interview with McClatchy News, Mohammed Abdullah, a founding member of the NDP and Mubarak confidant, said Ezz was "too arrogant to listen" to warnings from regime supporters who wanted to engage the population. After it was announced that the Muslim Brotherhood had failed to retain its 88 seats, Abdullah said the political system fell into disarray: "You can not just defeat 88 members of the Muslim Brotherhood overnight," he told the news service. This refusal to make concessions appears to have stemmed from a misunderstanding of the severity of the situation. By 28 January, Abdullah was telling reporters that the Ministry of the Interior had downplayed the importance of the demonstrations to the point that Mubarak failed to see the danger to his rule. "They thought [the internet and telephones] were the only means of co-ordination," he told McClatchy. "They had not dealt with the reality that the world had changed." Security officials in the region confirmed that even as late as 28 January, there was no single person in charge of managing the disturbances. In the absence of an organized crisis response, officials confirmed to Jane's that the regime's police and security forces had largely left their posts by the morning of 29 January.

Role of the military

With the security forces unable to cope with such widespread unrest, it was the turn of the military to play a decisive role. The Egyptian military has traditionally benefited from a division of responsibility with the security forces, where the armed forces are seen as the defenders of the country, while the Ministry of the Interior, police and secret services usually act as the protectors of the regime itself. The military can therefore usually avoid direct repression of the population, while allowing the civilian security agencies to carry out such activities. This tends to protect the armed forces in terms of public relations, and can permit them to step in to protect 'the nation' when no other options are available. This tactic has largely prevented the military from being identified with the Mubarak regime, something visible on 28 January, when protesters greeted the arriving army as protectors against the regime's security apparatus. This notion appeared to be shared by the army, which pledged it would not open fire under any circumstances. This decision by the military essentially signaled the end of the regime, even if the president was able to hold on for another two weeks.

This is not to say that the military did not show significant strains during the events of February. Regional security officials told Jane's that key parts of the military took the side of protesters even as units loyal to Mubarak quietly helped arrest certain opposition figures after the 28 January clashes. One regional military expert, who trained with the Egyptian military, described the split as between the regular army made up of conscripts and professional officers, who made it known early on that they would never fire on unarmed protesters, and special units loyal to the president, including the Air Force, which Mubarak once commanded. However, the hardliners were unable to prevail after the presidential guard announced on 29 January that it would not fire on protesters.

Struggling opposition
With the military now pledging to hand over power to a civilian government, Egypt's opposition is now struggling to establish itself. A major strength of the uprising was its decentralized nature that left no one person in charge for the police to arrest, but this could become a weakness, as Egypt's political class has almost no movement capable of quickly mobilizing into a fully formed political party. Ghonim emerged as the most eloquent and widely respected of the young activists who planned the 25 January demonstrations, but apparently has little interest in playing a political role. Ghonim has natural allies in the Kefaya opposition movement of secular urban intellectuals, but years of regime harassment have left the group far less organized than it needs to be to immediately become an actor in the post-Mubarak environment. It is also a movement, like much of the rest of the opposition, built around opposing the regime rather than replacing it. Mohammed ElBaradei, the former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who returned to Egypt on 28 January to join the demonstrations and was eventually asked by the Muslim Brotherhood to negotiate a settlement with the government, has an uncertain political grounding. Although widely respected around the world for his role in nuclear proliferation, ElBaradei has little name recognition in his homeland. His role could increase as disparate opposition factions strive for compromise, but he lacks sufficient popular support to become a major political figure. Amr Moussa, former foreign minister and president of the Arab League, may stand a greater chance of success. Unlike ElBaradei, Moussa has a significant following in Egypt and his popularity as foreign minister may have been a reason behind his ousting by Mubarak in 2001. This dismissal is likely to help protect him from charges of being too close to the former president's regime. However, his role as the 'face' of the Arab League, a largely ineffective regional grouping, will be a mixed blessing, as many leaders in the region are comfortable with him, but the poor performance of the Arab League, particularly during the 2006 Israel-Hizbullah war and Israel's 2008 invasion of Gaza, could leave him vulnerable to charges of incompetence and a pro-western bias. Nonetheless, whatever shortcomings he might have, he probably should be considered, at least at this stage, as the front-runner in any fair election to replace Mubarak.

The Muslim Brotherhood

Since its formation in the 1920s as a reaction to British colonialism in the region, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood has been the most consistent opposition voice in Egyptian politics despite having been banned since the mid-1950s. After a series of bloody confrontations with the government, the group renounced violence in 1972. Since its strong showing in the 2005 parliamentary elections and the loss of its 88 seats in 2010, the Muslim Brotherhood has been considered the most organized party to draw considerable grass-roots support. However, the extent of that support is as yet unclear. Although some estimates claim that the group is backed by as much as 40 per cent of the population, most analysts dispute this figure, arguing that the group's support often reflected a lack of choice for voters forced to choose between the hated regime and reasonably moderate Islamist candidates. With an opening in Egypt's political environment, the Muslim Brotherhood will now have the opportunity - and indeed be forced - to define itself to Egyptian voters, many of whom are suspicious of replacing an autocratic secular ruler with a potentially autocratic religious group. Recent interviews by Jane's and other media outlets with Muslim Brotherhood members paint a picture of a group currently unclear how to define itself. Its members cover the spectrum from older hardliners more concerned about Israel and relative moderates interested in a lasting seat at the political table, to religious technocrats intent on implementing real reform. Which aspect of the group

dominates is uncertain because it was never given the opportunity to resolve these issues in public under the old regime. Indeed, with greater freedom to express itself, the organization may even begin to fragment into its constituent factions. How the Muslim Brotherhood manages these internal conflicts as it defines itself to both Egyptians and the West will determine much of the transition to democracy. Without a doubt, any parliament that does not contain a significant Islamist voting bloc to represent millions of devout Egyptians would risk being seen as illegitimate.

International relations
Despite considerable debate in Washington over the administration's handling of Egypt's crisis, the Barack Obama government appears to have emerged with a relatively good chance of positive relations with the new regime. The United States successfully managed to avoid antagonizing either the protesters or the army, while avoiding outright criticism of Mubarak. Behind the scenes, pressure on the Egyptian military, detailed to Jane's by US diplomats in the region, helped keep the use of force against the protestors off the table. Considering the stubbornness of the protesters in demanding Mubarak's departure, this eventually turned into a tacit endorsement of his ousting. It therefore appears that Washington and Cairo may be able to maintain good relations, helping to calm some potential concerns in the US. The situation is somewhat different for Israel. In the medium term, there is little prospect of an end to the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel or actual hostilities between the new Egyptian government and the Israeli government. With US military and economic aid tied to the peace treaty, as well as billions of dollars in economic ties, Egypt and Israel are unlikely to start making costly mistakes in their dealings. However, certain critical facts on the ground have dramatically changed for both sides. Most immediately, the security on the border with Gaza, from the Egyptian side at least, is likely to be relaxed somewhat, even if not officially. Moreover, security co-ordination in the Sinai, where both Egypt and Israel face militant attacks as well as high levels of human trafficking from Africa, will become tense, although it will remain strategically necessary for both sides. Perhaps the biggest change for Israel's leadership will be the potential arrival of a democratic Arab state of 80 million people on its southern border. Egyptian public opinion may become a greater consideration for Israeli politicians than it has been previously. Should elections take place, and should they be free and fair, Israel will be faced with making new choices on a wide range of domestic and international issues. Expansion of West Bank settlements, attacks on Lebanon or Gaza, and even draconian behaviour towards the Palestinian population could result in political boosts for anti-Israeli groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and moderate secular Egyptians. Such an outcome would be highly negative for Israel, which may lead it to consider moderating its stance, at least until Egypt's political situation becomes clearer. Timeline It is as yet unclear how Gen Tantawi and the military plan to make the transition to civilian rule, although the announcement on 14 February of a revised constitution in 10 days, followed by civilian rule within six months, would appear to benefit both former regime members and the Muslim Brotherhood, as secular and liberal parties will struggle to organize themselves in such a short time frame. If this schedule is retained, the likelihood of truly democratic reform in Egypt becomes precarious, as events in Lebanon and Iraq showed in 2005. Both countries faced a transition from authoritarian rule in 2005 and arguably they both held elections before true civil society institutions could form. In the case of Lebanon's 'Cedar Revolution,' elections held a few months after the end of Syria's 30-year occupation merely re-established the same political figures who presided over the descent into civil war in 1975. Elections were held before the nonaligned, grass-roots representatives of new civilian movements were able to organize themselves properly, leaving the new groups at an electoral disadvantage. With so little room for any opposition to develop under Mubarak, the faster a transition to civilian government that is pushed by the military, the stronger the likelihood that much of the old regime will return to power alongside Islamist groups, which tend to organize rather more quickly than secular moderates.

Future trends
The remarkable speed of Mubarak's overthrow may have sparked expectations that the remainder of Egypt's political transformation can be accomplished with similar speed. The military certainly appears to be committed to a swift transition, partly owing to popular pressure and also to its own internal ideology. The Egyptian military, so far at least, appears to take its role as a protector of Egypt seriously and its statements, and international relationships, make it unlikely that the generals currently in charge will betray their stated goal of returning the country to civilian control. Hundreds of Egyptian military officers have been trained in the US and the two armed forces maintain close relations. With USD1.3 billion in annual US aid, the Egyptian military seems likely to pursue a strategy of turning over power as quickly as possible to protect its budget and US aid package, and its reputation as a fair power broker in a currently unstable country. A caveat to this outcome would be in the event of a return to widespread civil strife. Despite its successes in the 1990s in stamping out a violent Islamist uprising that killed hundreds, Egypt remains a hotbed of militant activity partly focused on Gaza, and the vacuum within the internal security forces currently in place could leave enough of an opening for jihadists to cause significant strife. Should such a scenario come to pass, it is likely that the military would delay a return to civilian control in the name of public safety, but no such incidents appear imminent. Egypt may face an increase in Al-Qaeda related violence over the medium term, as jihadist groups attempt to capitalize on the power vacuum and attempt to roll back what is widely seen as a victory for moderates in the region. Lacking any other mechanisms for political change, these groups will be forced to resort to violence. Adding to the pressure is the yet unconfirmed possibility that scores of well-trained and motivated jihadists escaped from Egyptian jails during the uprising. If true, rounding up these actors will be time consuming and occasionally dangerous, although the long-term threat to the country seems minimal.