G.R. No.

171774, February 12, 2010 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs APOLINARIO CATARROJA,REYNALDO ATARROJA, and ROSITA CATARROJA-DISTRITO, Respondents. FACTS: Respondents Apolinario Catarroja, Reynaldo Catarroja, and Rosita Catarroja-Distrito (the Catarrojas) filed a petition for reconstitution of lost original certificate of title covering two lots in Zapang, Ternate, Cavite.The Catarrojas alleged that they inherited these lands from their parents, Fermin and Sancha Catarroja, who reportedly applied for their registration with the Court of First Instance of Cavite sometime before the last world war. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) issued a certification on August 3, 1998. A copy of this decree was, however, no longer available in the records of the LRA. The LRA report verified as correct the plans and technical descriptions of the subject lots. The Catarrojas alleged that, pursuant to the decree, the Register of Deeds of Cavite issued an original certificate of title to their parents. But the original on file with it was lost in the fire that gutted the old Cavite capitol building on June 7, 1959. The Catarrojas also claimed that the owners duplicate copy of the title had been lost while with their parents. Since the public prosecutor representing the government did not object to the admission of the evidence of the Catarrojas and since he said that he had no evidence to refute their claims, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite issued an Order, granting the petition for reconstitution of title. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. It held that the evidence of the Catarrojas failed to establish any of the sources for reconstitution enumerated in Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) 26 (An act providing a special procedure for reconstitution of Torrens certificate of title lost or destroyed. On motion for reconsideration, however, the CA set aside its decision finding sufficient evidence to allow reconstitution of the Catarrojas title. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenges that decision through this action. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding sufficient evidence to grant the petition for reconstitution of title. RULING: Admittedly, the Catarrojas have been unable to present any of the documents mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Sec 2 of RA26. The microfilm printouts of the Official Gazette are not proof that a certificate of title was in fact issued in the name of the Catarrojas parents. The publication in the Official Gazette only proved that the couple took the initial step of publishing their claim to the property. Although the LRAs certification and its report confirmed the issuance of a decree, these documents do not sufficiently prove that a title had in fact been issued to the parents of the Catarrojas pursuant to such decree. Absent a clear and convincing proof that an original certificate of title had in fact been issued to their parents in due course, the Catarrojas cannot claim that their predecessors succeeded in acquiring title to the subject lots. The nature of reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title denotes a restoration of the instrument in its original form and condition. That cannot be done without proof that such certificate of title had once existed. The procedures laid down in R.A. 26 for reconstituting a title have to be strictly followed considering that reconstitution, if made easy, could be the source of anomalous titles. It could also be unscrupulously availed of by some as a convenient substitute for the rigid proceedings involved in original registration of title. Parenthetically, the Catarrojas did not present any tax declaration covering such vast piece of property. Although a tax declaration is not a proof of ownership, payment of realty tax is an exercise of ownership over the property and is the payers unbroken chain of claim of ownership over it. Furthermore, the Catarrojas procrastination of over five decades before finally seeking reconstitution of title has allowed laches to set in. Once again, courts must be cautious against hasty and reckless grant of petitions for reconstitution, especially when they involve vast properties as in this case. [G.R. No. 155703, September 08, 2008] THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. DOMINADOR SANTUA, RESPONDENT. FACTS: On February, 16, 1999, respondent Dominador Santua filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, a petition for judicial reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-22868. Respondent alleged that he is the registered owner of certain parcels of land with an area of 3,306 square meters, situated in Poblacion, Victoria, Oriental Mindoro; the original copy of TCT No. T-22868 was among those destroyed by the fire that completely razed the Capitol Building then housing the Office of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on August 12, 1977; the owner's duplicate copy was lost while in respondent's possession and all efforts exerted to locate the same proved futile; respondent and his family are in actual possession of the property and have been paying taxes thereon. On February 25, 1999, the RTC issued an Order setting the initial hearing of the case. It also directed the publication of the order in the Official Gazette, its posting and sending of copies thereof to all adjoining owners.Respondent complied

with the jurisdictional requirements. The court thus commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive the respondent's evidence and submit his findings to the court. The Provincial Assessor testified that the Certification issued by her office is a true and genuine certification. The RTC granted the petition. On January 16, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course by the RTC.On September 23, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT TAX DECLARATIONS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION AND LOT PLANS ARE SUFFICIENT BASES FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF LOST OR DESTROYED CERTIFICATES OF TITLE HELD: Respondent's waiver of the filing of a comment is unfortunate considering that we find the petition meritorious. The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. It partakes of a land registration proceeding. Thus, it must be granted only upon clear proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed issued to the petitioner. Moreover, they are documents from which the particulars of the certificate of title or the circumstances which brought about its issuance could readily be ascertained. After all, the purpose of reconstitution proceedings under RA No. 26 is the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land.. The tax declaration obviously does not serve as a valid basis for reconstitution. At most, the tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of possession or a claim of ownership, which however is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding. As for the survey plan and technical descriptions, the Court has previously dismissed the same as not the documents referred to in Section 3(f) but merely additional documents that should accompany the petition for reconstitution as required under Section 12 of RA 26 and Land Registration Commission Circular No. 35. Once again, we caution the courts against the hasty and reckless grant of petitions for reconstitution. Strict observance of the rules is vital to prevent parties from exploiting reconstitution proceedings as a quick but illegal way to obtain Torrens certificate of titles over parcels of land which turn out to be already covered by existing titles. Courts should bear in mind that should the petition for reconstitution be denied for lack of sufficient basis, the petitioner is not left without a remedy. He may still file an application for confirmation of his title under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, if he is in fact the lawful owner. [G.R. No. 139518. March 6, 2001] EVANGELINE L. PUZON, petitioner, vs. STA. LUCIA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, Inc., respondent. FACTS: On June 11, 1988, a fire in the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City destroyed, among others, the original copies of petitioners Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 240131 and 213611 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In October 1993, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80, a Petition for the judicial reconstitution of the two destroyed titles. The October 26, 1993 RTC Order, which served as the notice for the hearing of the Petition for reconstitution, was published in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette. Thirty days before the date of hearing, the Order was also posted at the entrance of the Quezon City Hall Building and on the bulletin board of the trial court. During the trial which commenced on January 17, 1994, no opposition was registered. A representative from the Office of the Solicitor General, however, appeared and cross-examined petitioner, who was the sole witness. The RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. After discovering in 1996 that Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., herein respondent, was occupying a portion of the land, petitioner filed against it and Garsons Co. Inc. a Complaint for Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages and Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Injunction. On March 25, 1998, while the accion reinvindicatoria was still pending before the RTC of Quezon City (Branch 104), respondent filed before the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, seeking to annul and set aside the earlier Decision of the RTC of Quezon City (Branch 80) in the reconstitution case.

Annulling the Decision of the RTC (Branch 80), the CA held that petitioner had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 13. it ruled that notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land were mandatory and jurisdictional in an action for the judicial reconstitution of a certificate of title. ISSUE: Petitioner raises the following issues for the consideration of this Court: 1. The Honorable Court of Appeals grossly erred in applying the provisions of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26, which is applicable only in relation to Section 12 of R.A. No. 26. Notices to adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land are not mandatory and jurisdictional in reconstitution of titles based on the owners duplicate copy. The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that clearance from the land registration authority is a jurisdictional requirement.

2.

RULING: Respondent and the CA contend that notices to owners of adjoining lots are mandatory in the judicial reconstitution of a title. The clear language of the law militates against the interpretation of respondent and the appellate court. The first sentence of Section 13 provides that the requirements therein pertain only to petitions for reconstitution filed under the preceding section, Section 12, which in turn governs those petitions based on specified sources. In other words, the requirements under Sections 12 and 13 do not apply to all petitions for judicial reconstitution, but only to those based on any of the sources specified in Section 12; In the present case, the source of the Petition for the reconstitution of title was petitioners duplicate copies of the two TCTs mentioned in Section 3(a). Clearly, the Petition is governed, not by Sections 12 and 13, but by Section 10 of RA 26. Nothing in this provision requires that notices be sent to owners of adjoining lots. Verily, that requirement is found in Section 13, which does not apply to petitions based on an existing owners duplicate TCT. There is no question that in such actions, notices to adjoining owners and to the actual occupants of the land are mandatory and jurisdictional. But in petitions for reconstitution falling under Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 where, as in the present case, the source is the owners duplicate copy, notices to adjoining owners and to actual occupants of the land are not required. When the law is clear, the mandate of the courts is simply to apply it, not to interpret or to speculate on it. G.R. No. 141256, July 15, 2005 ESTANISLAO PADILLA, JR., Petitioner, PHILIPPINE PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE MARKETINGASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent. FACTS: Petitioner and his wife are the registered owners of the following real properties situated in Bago City. Respondent is a marketing cooperative which had a money claim against petitioner. On April 24, 1987, respondent filed a civil case against petitioner for collection of a sum of money in the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. Despite receipt of summons on May 18, 1987, petitioner (then defendant) opted not to file an answer. On March 3, 1988, respondent (then plaintiff) moved to have petitioner-defendant declared in default, which the trial court granted on April 15, 1988. Respondent presented its evidence on October 9, 1989. On November 28, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in respondents favor. On May 31, 1990, the Court issued a writ of execution. On June 4, 1990, the three were levied by virtue of that writ. On July 4, 1990, sheriff Renato T. Arimas auctioned off the lots to satisfy the judgment, with respondent as the only bidder. On July 10, 1990, ex-officio provincial sheriff and clerk of court Antonio Arbis executed a certificate of sale in favor of respondent. When petitioner failed to exercise his right of redemption within the 12-month period allowed by law, the court ordered on February 5, 1992 the issuance of a writ of possession for the sheriff to cause the delivery of the physical possession of the properties in favor of respondent. On May 17, 1995, respondent filed a motion to direct the Register of Deeds to issue new titles over the properties in its name, alleging that the Register of Deeds (RD) of Bago City would not issue new titles unless the owners copies were first surrendered to him. The trial court issued an order granting the motion. In a subsequent order dated August 8, 1995, it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed. Four years later, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the order of the trial court. Petitioner contends that respondents motion for the RD to cancel the existing certificates of title and issue new ones in its name was in fact a real action and that the motion was procedurally infirm because respondent did not furnish him a copy. He also claims that under Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the execution of the judgment was barred by prescription, given that the motion was filed more than 5 years after the writ of execution was

issued on March 23, 1990. He also argues that respondent failed to follow the correct procedure for the cancellation of a certificate of title and the issuance of a new one, which is contained in Section 107 of PD 1529. ISSUE: whether or not the motion in question is the proper remedy for cancelling petitioners certificates of title and new ones issued in its name. HELD: Petitioner is correct in assailing as improper respondents filing of a mere motion for the cancellation of the old TCTs and the issuance of new ones as a result of petitioners refusal to surrender his owners duplicate TCTs. Indeed, this called for a separate cadastral action initiated via petition. Respondent alleges that it resorted to filing the contested motion because it could not obtain new certificates of title, considering that petitioner refused to surrender his owners duplicate TCTs. This contention is incorrect. The proper course of action was to file a petition in court, rather than merely move, for the issuance of new titles. Before the entry of a new certificate of title, the registered owner may pursue all legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul such proceedings. It is clear that PD 1529 provides the solution to respondents quandary. The reasons behind the law make a lot of sense; it provides due process to a registered landowner (in this case the petitioner) and prevents the fraudulent or mistaken conveyance of land, the value of which may exceed the judgment obligation. Petitioner contends that only his interest in the subject lots, and not that of his wife who was not a party to the suit, should have been subjected to execution, and he should have had the opportunity to prove as much. While we certainly will not condone any attempt by petitioner to frustrate the ends of justice the only way to describe his refusal to surrender his owners duplicates of the certificates of title despite the final and executory judgment against him respondent, on the other hand, cannot simply disregard proper procedure for the issuance to it of new certificates of title.