SCADA Security: Challenges and Solutions: Make The Most of Your Energy
SCADA Security: Challenges and Solutions: Make The Most of Your Energy
SCADA Security: Challenges and Solutions: Make The Most of Your Energy
Summary
Executive Summary .................................................................................... p 2 Protecting Critical Infrastructure Includes Secure SCADA ............................ p 3 The Growing Vulnerability of Control Systems ............................................. p 4 Proactive Cyber Security is Smart Business ................................................ p 6 Encryption and Authentication .................................................................... p 7 Achieving Your Secure SCADA with Schneider Electric ............................... p 8
Executive summary
This paper presents the case for improving security to SCADA systems. It examines the factors that have contributed to the growing vulnerability of control systems, and presents new standards designed to protect critical infrastructure including the use of encryption and authentication for SCADA systems.
Myriam Dunn, Critical Infrastructures: Vulnerabilities, Threats, Responses, CSS Analyses in Security Policy, Vol. 2, No. 16, June 2007. Typically, each country has their own definition of Critical Infrastructure. For more information on the 17 U.S. sectors visit http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1189168948944.shtm.
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United States General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Challenges and Efforts to Secure Control Systems, GAO-04-354, March 2004. Philip Leggiere, Infrastructure Security, Securing SCADA, HSToday, www.hstoday.us, September 2008.
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Most recently to shake the cyber security world was the Stuxnet malware, discovered in June 2010. On Nov 29, 2010, Irans president Mahmound Ahmadinejad publicly disclosed that the Stuxnet cyber-threat had affected his countrys uranium enrichment efforts. It is believed that the code was designed to sabotage nuclear plants, specifically targeting an individual companys configuration software and control devices. This intelligent worm was primarily spread via USB sticks but was found to also infect systems through network shares and SQL databases. According to Symantec, the worm would search for specific models of frequency converter drives made by two firms. Once the worm found the right configuration, it sabotaged operations by introducing subtle changes to the speed of the frequency drives over several weeks, while displaying normal readings to maintain its stealth.
The Stuxnet malware began infecting systems in January 2009 and reports indicate that more than 100,000 computer systems have been infected worldwide. Historic data from the early days of the attack showed that 58.85% of infections occurred in Iran, 18.22% occurred in Indonesia, and 8.31% occurred in India.4 Although no serious damage was caused to any utility sectors, this sophisticated malware highlights the risks modern SCADA systems face with respect to connectivity, insecure remote connections, standardized technologies, and readily available technical information. Cyber security is a topic for utility experts and manufacturers that can no longer be ignored.5
Jarrad Shearer, W32.Stuxnet, Symantec, www.symantec.com, September 17, 2010. For control system security program information and incident reporting, visit Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) at www.ics-cert.org.
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Government regulations also exist and continue to evolve with the goal of securing critical infrastructure industries. The most ambitious for influencing government policy is the non-profit North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standard. Known as NERC-CIP, this standard has its roots in the Electricity Modernization Act which is part of the US Energy Policy Act of 2005. Within the Energy Policy Act of 2005, there is a section which dictates that the NERC-CIP standard requires all power plants and electric utility facilities to develop new cyber security systems and procedures in accordance with a 3-year implementation plan. There are eight different CIP standards covering everything from Security Management Control and Critical Cyber Assets, to Incident Reporting and Recovery Plans. Each one of the eight standards defines a series of specific requirements. The standards are:
The International Society of Automation, ISA99, Industrial Automation and Control System Security, http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositeID=988&CommitteeID=6821. Philip Leggiere, Infrastructure Security, Securing SCADA, HSToday, www.hstoday.us, September 2008.
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Like many forms of physical or electronic security, encryption uses a key. This type of key is a secret sequence of data that determines how the information being sent between devices is obscured (encrypted). Keeping this key secure is a fundamental part of SCADA security. It is therefore important to reiterate that employing a diverse range of security measures will always prove more effective. The other layers of security, like physical locks, operating procedures, and separately secured corporate and SCADA networks are necessary to protect encryption keys, and the system as a whole.
a SCADA system proves its identity to another. A SCADA device receiving a critical message, such as a command to perform controls or respond with data, can challenge the sending devices identity. The sending device must then provide the challenge response. If the receiving device is satisfied with the challenge response then it will act on the original command. Like encryption, authentication requires the communicating SCADA devices to have a mutually know secret key. Whereas encryption uses its key to transform entire messages into an encrypted data stream, authentication challenges and challenge responses use their key to create special digital signatures. The mathematics used in authentication is similar to that of encryption, but a smaller amount of data needs to be manipulated. This means that authentication is computationally far cheaper than encryption and typically uses the structure of the original SCADA protocol for better communication efficiency. Authentication prevents malicious parties from controlling a secured SCADA device, but it will not stop them from intercepting messages and reading their content.
Conguration Software
Secure
Communication Network
Secure
SCADAPack E Controllers
Schneider Electric
Telemetry & Remote SCADA Solutions 48 Steacie Drive, Kanata, Ontario K2K 2A9 Canada Direct Worldwide: 1 (613) 591-1943 Fax: 1 (613) 591-1022 Toll Free within North America: 1 (888) 267-2232 http://www.schneider-electric.com Document Number M01012-32
April 2011
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