Introduction To Blumenberg (Wallace)

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Introduction to Blumenberg Author(s): Robert Wallace Source: New German Critique, No. 32 (Spring - Summer, 1984), pp.

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Introduction toBlumenberg,
by RobertWallace
onMyth 1. Blumenberg'sWork Hans Blumenberg with emergedas a philosopherof major stature in 1966,ofhisDieLegitimitiit - The thepublication, der Neuzeit Legitimacy Modern was publishedbyMIT Pressin ofwhich Age(mytranslation ofthe orientedscholarship, in theperiod 1984). In Germanphilosophically since the 1960s,the seriesof major worksthatBlumenberg has publishedare comparable,forboth path-breaking and widely originality Habermas. Havrecognizedimportance, onlyto theworksofJiirgen in the history of ideas than Habermas has (a ing a broader interest is evident, breadth that for ofthehisexample,inhiselaborateanalysis toricalnexus betweenmedieval Christianity and modernity in The the Modern and witha bentthattends(outsidephilosLegitimacy Age), of than towardsocial theory and politics ophy) more towardliterature has a great deal tooffer (thoughhe also toucheson these),Blumenberg to anyonewho wantsto undertand therelations betweenthought and in in that are manifested modern as well as literature, imagination modern philosophy. in thisrespectis hisArbeit amMythos Especiallyimportant (1979) onMyth, ofwhichthefollowing "To Work toan End," Bring Myth piece, is a chapter. willbe publishedbyMIT Press (The completetranslation in 1985.) The book's titlerefers to the creativeworkthathas been in the Western storiesand motifs expended on mythical by writers tradition eversince Homer, workthatcontinues- with,ifanything, - in the mostrecentcouple of centuries of even increasedintensity of thattradition from draws much his which (centuries Blumenberg illustrative The book's purpose is to determine whatsuch material). has disworkcan mean inan age likethemodernone,whichostensibly ofmyth, and abused itself "prejudice"in alongwith fairy-tales, dogma, in orderto turn to "the facts" ofhumanciritsattention general, strictly cumstances and whatone choosestomakeofthem.Atthebeginning of "To BringMythto an End" Blumenberg describesFontenelle'ssur*The ofthis translation Translation the wasmadepossible from preparation bya grant oftheNational Endowment oftheHumanities. Program 93

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94 Introduction toBlumenberg at thewaytheold stories continuedto prise,in thelate 17thcentury, fascinate writers and their audiences(Racinewas a leadinginstance of thatby thenwas generally this,at the time)- despitethe skepticism thetruth about the first acceptedas thenecessary stepinanysearchfor The ininterpreting same and world. it, incongruity, thesame difficulty are stillwith us today. Under the influenceof Romanticism, ethand psychoanalysis, we mayby now be somewhatless surnography in (at least)modernart than Fontenelle was at prised myth's longevity and literature. We understand thatmyth has otherfunctions besides that ofexplaining from which it has been science. things, displacedby and how Butwe are unclearabout thestatus ofthoseotherfunctions, to relate the one. In Romanticism they (Friedrich Schlegel, explanatory tendto swallowitup: "True science"(i.e.,poetic,mythiNovalis)they cal science) is expected to be symbolic, to orientus in the world,as once and to causal explanadid, myth onlyincidentally supplyus with tionsofwhatis thecase. Those ofus who are notwilling to go thatfar, in favor because it seems to implyabandoningrationality of fantasy, have nevertheless been led to wonderwhyexplanationis so sharply from in our culture, whenethnolorientation distinguished symbolic in has discovered so cultures this which is thecase. But not ogy many evenpsychoanalysis, morethananyothersingleinfluence, has which, made us awareofthepersistence ofnon-rational and fansymbolism in our lives,is foundedon theassumption that cannotcoexist tasy they with science: id shall "Where there was, indefinitely ego be," thatis to and say, rationalcomprehensionof the mechanismsof symbolism mustultimately their effectiveness toan end,finally comfantasy bring taskof clearingthe way forscience. Our pletingthe Enlightenment likesymbolism and fantasy, cannot pervasive assumptionis that, myth - byitsnature- coexistwithscience,because thetwoare essentially sequentialphenomena,one ofwhichis destinedto replacetheother. The onlyexceptionbeing cases of atavism, of regression; whichonly underlinethe assumptionof the normality of progressin the other direction. on Myth is thatthis Blumenberg'sfirst major argumentin Work schemaofnecessary "from to progress mythos logos" is nottheonlyor thebestwayto understand therelation betweenmyth and rationality; nordoes abandoningitentailceasingtodistinguish as myth, logosfrom tendsto occur in Romantictheories. instead Whathe proposesis that ofunderstanding in terms ofwhatit"comes from" as and serves myth a "preliminary" for (namely,logos, science), we should substitute understand it primarily in relationto whatitcomes and servesto after overcome. This pointofdeparture is something thathe entitles the"absolutism ofreality," a situation in which"man comes close to nothav-

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Robert Wallace 95

ing controlof the conditionsof his existenceand, whatis more imbelievesthathe simplylackscontrolof them." Blumenberg portant, calls thisa "limitconcept,"whichwhileitmay neverhave been fully in reality is a necessary a "limiting case," which present extrapolation, makessense ofwhatwe do observein myth and in therestof human of theoriginof It is consistent, he says,withcurrent theories history. humanbeings- ofwhathappenedwhenourancestors adoptedan upwere from the forest intothe sheltering displaced right, bipedalposture; them and found that their instincts did not tell how to open savannah; the with this new situation. that dramatically Blumenberg argues cope whichthey could perceive(and within enlargedhorizonofwhatthey could beperceived) would be, forthem,a situation ofgreatambiguity, - such as fleeing from one in which some of theircentralinstincts immediatedanger,an instinct thathad servedto clarify many situ- would be of little Our ancestors ationsforthemin theforest help. oftheconditions oftheir existence" "came close to nothavingcontrol a clearly because theyhad become, as we remain,a species without were notdealtwithin some definedbiologicalniche.If thissituation newway,itwould producethementalstatethatBlumenberg radically as "anxiety"butwould be calls "Angst,"whichis normally translated fear better rendered the "intense ordread by psychiatrist's paraphrase, cause a an or threat." The lacking unambiguous specific resulting or both. behaviorwould be panic, paralysis, Thus the"absolutismofreality" in is a fundamental threat, implicit our biological natureand itsrelationto our naturalenvironment, to our capacityforsurvival. Our responseto thischallengehas been to in all its that we lack,culture, develop,in place oftheadaptiveinstincts forms. of a role to those that has crucial forms, myth Among play.That roleis toovercomeor forestall theAngst that the"absolutismofreality" ofspecifwould otherwise itintoplainfear produce,by"rationalizing" ic, named agencies,more or less personalizedpowers,whomwe can address and (to thatextent) deal with.It also helps thatthesepowers, areplural, and each whichareoften (intheearly stages) theriomorphic, has a limiteddomain - thereis a "separationof powers" between whateach ofthem,individually, can do to us. And them,whichlimits whatis more,thestories weremorehorrible, and lesspredictsay,they Monsters likeMedusa (whoislikean emblem able, "in thebeginning." ofAngst and thevariousGiants,and theheroeslikePerseusand itself) illustrate thelatter Heracleswho overcomethem, aspect.So do thehis- "the old storm-god Zeus toriesof the Olympiangods themselves becomes theworld-orderer," as Blumenbergmentionsbelow. Thus thetemporal axis is indeedcrucialtoan adequate understandaning of myth(as Blumenbergargues below againstLfvi-Strauss's

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96 Introduction toBlumenberg Eleaticism).But thisaxis is notthatof myth's thropological "replacement"by logos (a versionof history to whichLevi-Strauss cormight that but of of the initial absolutism rectly object) myth's overcoming of reality. The result as "disofthis"overcoming" can be describedessentially "at arm's thethreat alien reality ofan overwhelming, tance"- putting one can havetime("breathing so that length," emotionally, space") in whichto develop means to deal withit.Thus myth and rationality are the each from the one other, inseparable functionally, beginning: fromn room fortheothertodo itsthing. The fact thatrationality did making not get organized as "method" or "science" until(by various reckonings)350 or 2400 yearsago does not,ofcourse,mean thatitwas absent fromhuman functioning beforethatthreshold was crossed, culturestoday.But our any more thanit is absent from"primitive" withthegreatnew "beginningfromscratch"- from preoccupation thesole certainty ofthecogito, caras in Descartes- that we supposedly riedout 350 years or so ago has made us receptive toschemasthat presentthe emergenceof reason (and the supercessionof all thatwent beforeit) as occurring withinhistory. to the fundamental Contrary modernrule of excludingteleologicalhypotheses, we have regarded thesupposed passage"from tologos" as, ineffect, theworking mythos ofdestiny. in good scientific wantsto removethis Blumenberg, style, moststubborn illusionfrom ourviewofourselves and ourworld. final, The result, when is this is reason removed from interestingly, pedestal, thatother human accomplishments, such as myth, some of regain theirproperdignity. The book containsother theoretical innovationsthatI can only mentionhere.' It containsa verynovel hypothetical account of the contents a sortof"naturalselection" over genesisofmythical through milleniaof story-telling; an account thatsupplements thatof myth's overallfunction thatI havejust sketched. This "Darwinismofwords" serves tofurther viewofmyth from thecomdistinguish Blumenberg's mon Romantic in this one, prominently exemplified century injung's towhichmythical contents that writings, according express archetypes - outside history. There are are, as it were, "given" frometernity extendeddiscussions ofFreud'sand Ernst Cassirer's ofmyth, analyses the discussion in of Levi-Strauss the complementing chapterwe are is here. There a careful the and difof relations printing very analysis ferencesbetween mythand monotheistic and religion, mythand
1. A morecomprehensive, is containedin myarticle, "A thoughbrief, summary Reconciliationof Mythand Rationality," in Humanities, vol. 5, no. 1 (Feb., 1984), 6-8.

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Robert Wallace97 theimportant intermediate case ofGnosticism dogma,including (which also playedan important rolein The Legitimacy ofthe Age).Besides Modem thereare numerous discussionsof these "analytical"contributions, Mon works, literary particular comparableto thediscussionofValery's Faust in this chapter.And, finally, the latterhalfof the book is an in thelight of ofthisnewmethodology, ofthehistory survey, analytical in from thePrometheus its first Hesiod and myth, Aeschylus appearance to thetwentieth A separate, treatments ofitbyGide and Kafka. century ofthisstory central isan especially oftheroleof intensive portion study the Prometheus motifin Goethe's lifeand works,fromhis youthful und Wahrheit. This study and Dichtung "Prometheus"ode to Pandora in a of the most verystriking way many potentand bringstogether and creativity, such as his elementsin Goethe's thought problematic his ofSpinozistic and aesthetic combination pantheism "polytheism," to Napoleon, and thepeculiar conceptofthe"demonic," his relation dictum,"Nemo contradeum nisi deus ipse." It illustrates veryconwhichitdiffers almostin themannerof"psychohistory" cretely, (from nonmainly in that Blumenberg's grasp of the trans-personal, ofthehistory inwhichGoetheis embeddedis dymanics "psychological" so strong), as conceivedin howdealings withmyth and with "thefacts" our "post-mythical" can interact. age 2. "To BringMythto an End" onMyth The chapter ofWork hereis chapter4 of that we are printing Two of the of the book the last "analytical"portion, part chapter of the Prometheus myth. priorto theaccount of the history The title, "To Bring toan End," immediately makesone wonder Myth - whatcan thismean, in a book thatappears to be opposed to the - that idea that we mustmakean end ofmyth is,clear Enlightenment in itoutoftheway- alongwith all our otherinherited mentaldetritus, order to make room for science? We soon find,however,thatfor to do to an end" has nothing whatever myth Blumenberg"bringing that to a situation with"clearingit out of the way." Rather,it refers thatis "workon myth" case oftheliterary would be theideal limiting of the the subjectof the book as a whole.Justas the "limit-concept of so "absolutism the work is, reality," "the says, ofmyth" Blumenberg on to to an end, to would be of work myth bring myth limit-concept which onlyjust allows or venturethe most extremedeformation, to be recognized.For the almostno longerallows theoriginalfigure ofa final that would be thefiction ofreception this is,ofa myth, theory thatfully myth exploits,and exhausts,the form." So "to bring toan end" is theideal limiting is symmetcase that myth to the absolutismof ricallyopposite, in the directionof the future,

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toBlumenberg 98 Introduction

in thedirection ofthepast.Fromthewayhe usestheterms, reality, it is evident of "thework hereand elsewhere, thattheexpression, "work on the"breathing whereas creating space" thatI described; must isonly issomething that after that. "One already myth" possible oneself havethework ofmyth behind tobe abletoapply one inorder in the I work on from which to writes ... ," Blumenberg myth passage of "work" is havebeenquoting. The orientation ofthefirst backtype a hypothetical terror that has to be overcome; wardin time, toward a hypothetical whereas the orientation ofthe second isforward, toward "thefiction that end ofmyth, ofa final and exmyth fully exploits,
hausts,the form."What thismeans we learn fromthe examples to whichthe remainder of the chapteris devoted. in essential ofmyth refers to thehypothetical accomplishment myth,"

3. The "Final Myth"Underlying GermanIdealism fromthisschematicoutlineto someBlumenbergmoves directly but which he as that introduces an illustrative instance, merely thing thesesof the turnsout to be one of the most novel and illuminating This is thesuggesofphilosophy. wholebook,in relation tothehistory the tionthat"such a final have been fundamental of could myth myth

- theIdealism summed that Schiller Idealism" German irreverently is a has and as "the ball that the that world thrown ego up asserting only sumthatit catchesagain in 'reflection'!!" Or thatSchopenhauer marized he hadhimself madefun ofit, moresolemnly (notlongafter as Blumenberg showsus),whenhe decidedthat "theworlds are my that am thebearer ofthis is,that I, theeternal subject, representation, buta relationship whosewholebeingis nothing to me." universe, - thephilosophy Now German Idealism ofFichte, and Schelling which this orinfamous "fundamental famous underlies myth" Hegel, - isofcourse the watershed claims toemerge that from phenomenon which a critique ofKant, and against Feuerbach, Marx,Kierkegaard and Nietzsche all react; whotakes so that German anyone philosophy at all seriously Kant or Marx) of,say,either (evenifonlyin thework must with it.Evenfrom somehow cometo terms thedistance ofthe has As a this not to be careful 20th of easy. proved study Marx century, treatment of the issues that or Kantor anyother are inthoughtful volvedsoon makesclear,it is notenoughto respondto Idealism - so iton itshead,"substituting for object subject merely by"turning thatSchopenhauer's forexample, becomes:"thesubject, formula,
whosewholebeingis nothing buta relationship totheuniverse." Even ifweweresatisfied with that as a statement, wewould still need toknow
that has at

what it is about this "subject" - i.e., about ourselves -

an ontological timesmade us so eagerto giveit(i.e., to giveourselves)

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Robert Wallace99 overthe"external world." Is thismerely ofbacka syndrome priority into was there Ifso,why sliding "pre-Copernican" anthropocentrism? in factno comparably"anthropocentric" in the ontology (Chronologically pre-Copernican)philosophyof the Greeks? Is Christianity, ofhavperhaps,toblameforitsappearanceinmoderntimes, byvirtue introduced attitudes and doctrines into ing radically anthropocentric our tradition? The relation betweenChristianity and modernphilosophy isa comin The in which Legitimacy plexquestion, Blumenberg of explored depth the he argued therethatthereis no continuity of Age.Briefly, Modem substance between medieval/Christian concepts and attitudesand modernsecularones - so thata secular,modernanthropocentrism would not simplybe a continuation, "in anotherguise," of Christian But from this does not anthropocentrism.2 Christianity having prevent in in an role the of Chrisplayed indispensable genesis modernity, that tianconcepts- in particular, the conceptof an omnipotent God were workedout in such doctrinesas late led, as theirimplications thatBlumenberg entitles medievalNominalism(partofthesyndrome human to the crisis the relation to the of "theologicalabsolutism"), is worldto whichmodern(implicitly "human self-assertion" secular) the response. - the determination The factthatsuch "self-assertion" to make whatwe can of our lives in thisworld,in viewof the absence of any divine"order" thatwe can decide to adhere to or to strive intelligible has been sufficiently toward- is notitself inherently anthropocentric in demonstrated of the Copernicanrevolution by the role, precisely, whereCopernicus' accomplishment modern man's self-assessment, has become a paradigmof the process of overcominglimited,selfifwe are a processthat we haveto pressforward centered perspectives, as they toorient our actionto"things are" - whichwe mustdo if really is to succeed.3It is thatsuccess,rather our "self-assertion" thanany thatis the essentialmodernobjective. special ontologicaldignity, modern But although it is not itself necessarily anthropocentric,
2. Of courseone could pointto thefact thatFichte, and Hegel wereall at Schelling least nominally and suggest that is notin fact their Lutherans, "modern,"in thinking the sense of being secular. But the relationof selfto God in theirthoughtis so whencomparedto Augustine, unorthodox, thoroughly Aquinas, Lutheror anyother Christian thatitseems desirableto at leasttest thepossibility of thinker, paradigmatic themas genuinely modern thinkers, beforeturning themover to a coninterpreting tinuousChristian "tradition." 3. Blumenberg's second majorbook,Die Genesis der Welt kopernikanischen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,1975), examinesthe consequences of Copernicanism, both as formodern thought. cosmologyand as metaphor,

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100 Introduction toBlumenberg did create the historical human self-assertion contextin which the characteristic of modern anthropocentrism philosophybecame possible.Thissyndrome is epitomizedin Descartes'famousschemaofthe self(res versustheworld(res as which,byarticulating cogitans) extensa), - manversustheworld- that an ontology therelationship is implicit in self-assertion, set up the termsof most of modern philosophy. withDescartes'dualism,modernmaterialism, Simultaneously beginthatknowledge is about theworld(res ningwithHobbes, said in effect so the subjectthatexperiencesor thatpossesses knowledge extensa), Forthose can be ignored. whostill tothink interms wanted ofaperspective on sheworld,ofa pointofdeparture of"self-assertion"), (in thespirit ofconnecting thedifficulties twoseparaterealms, either ontologically one individual?) or epistemologically (howdo a bodyand a mindform thatis totally fromit in different (how can a mind know something made it to to reduce bodies mental contents, as kind?), tempting did; whichwas idealism(also known,later,as phenomenaBerkeley continueto have their advocates,twocenlism).All of thesetheories turieslater.Materialism has the advantagethatit appears not to be as it does not need to draw a line betweenthose anthropocentric, that have minds things (dualism) or have ideas (idealism)and those that do not.Butnoneofthem tries tounderstand howthedebatearose, and whyit did so onlyin themodernage. So The Modern Legitimacy ofthe Age,by explainingthegenesisof the Cartesiansyndrome, went a longwaytowardexplaining Geralready man as wellas otheridealisms.But,as Blumenberg makesclearhere, GermanIdealism - theidealismthat in theaftermath of was formed Kant'sproofoftheimpossibility ofanyproofoftheexistence ofa God who could ensure our knowledgeof the world (as Descartes and Berkeley,in different ways, made him do) - requires additional The about thisidealism,in contrast to explanation. fascinating thing forexample,has alwaysbeen itsdynamic In Berkeley's, quality. every case it describesa process of movement, of activity, of emergence, whether thisis called "positing,""reflection," "negation"or "subla- and, abstract tion[AuJhebung]" sound, theseare always thoughthey describedas quasi-temporal infact, ofastory. processes:inthemanner, At thesame time,therelation betweenthesestories and theconcrete thatwe are all involvedin has alwaysbeen obscure. So when history Blumenbergsays theyare all formsof a myth- "the fundamental a significant illumythof German Idealism" - we receive,I think, mination.Science, in the sense of a body of theorythatis related, however toevidence,and capable ofbeingreplacedbynew indirectly, theoriesthatdo the same job better- thistheydo not seem to be. in thesense of Plato,Aristotle, or Leibniz, they also do Metaphysics,

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Robert Wallace101

inthe not seem tobe.Nor Butstories usual sense. history, they definitely
arestories whotell them willcerthat those are,andfurthermore they
"made up." Thus "myth" notacknowledge seems tainly having merely them in. to be the most appropriate to category put

- a derogaisnot Itneed not itcertainly be- andfor Blumenberg in initial tory (like "fairy-tale" categorization Schopenhauer's reaction effort ofa serious toFichte, which Itis part to Blumenberg quotes). isgoing what on here.4 Ifwhat isgoing understand onisnot history, itismyth. or'justa made-up To science, story," maybe metaphysics, been be more "such a final could have the funmyth specific, maybe ofGerman Idealism." this damental To appreciate explanation, myth theterms "final" and "fundamental," we needto understand as well as "myth." the ideaofa "funthe onefirst: borrows To take easier Blumenberg used itinanalyzdamental from who myth" (Grundmythos) HansJonas, in his und Geist It Gnosis a Gnosticism ing (1934-54). signifies spiitantiker of schema a that underlies varietyapparently heterogeneous mythical suchas those theGnostic sects. It that stories, among proliferated ina ismore asthough such a schema tobedemonstrable seems likely inquestion, isalsoa"doctrinal" side case where there tothe stories that andphilinpart tothepressure ofa literate is,where they respond that audience wants (or theologically) osophically "sophisticated" This iscertainly itisalready familiar with. "truths" tocompare tothose thecasewith theIdealist and in anycase,someideaofan myth, inorder what itisthat isclearly todefine schema necessary underlying thediverse offered andHegelhavein accounts byFichte, Schelling common. Now:Why a 'final" The concept ofa "final fundamental myth? to was what introduced here, illustrate; Idealism, Blumenberg myth" "Theultiso hisdiscussion elucidates both simultaneously. subjects ultimate mate final: a of the was doubt," myth consequence letzter] [or hishypothesis hetells us:ofthe doubt Descartes introduced with that in ofthe malicious version, (anextreme Blumenberg suggested spirit
The oftheNominalists' Modem God) who might Legitimacy Age, posofthe deceive us about the external world. The insidious sibly completely

4. Habermas in inthe aneven takes more interest Idealists, especially sympathetic and Human Interests He finds inFichte an important Beacon, Knowledge 1971). (Boston: train ofthought indifferent that andnever clarified continues, (seep. 38ff.) adequately inHegeland inMarx. of"the Buthedoesnottelluswhat tomake forms, systematic intention of Fichte's to transpose itsreaders, Doctrine which ofKnowledge, purports a single ofan absolute self-intuition act,intothecentral through produces ego that bothitself and theworld" (p. 210).

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toBlumenberg 102 Introduction as I menwas givenitsfull createdbythishypothesis force, uncertainty of the of a existence of the tioned,by Kant'sproof impossibility proof ofa (perfectly havingbeen Descartes'meansof good) God - thelatter this "There was onlyone way,"Blumenberg overcoming uncertainty. from theworld,namely, forthe remove this last monster "to writes, that is reinto the to make itself authority cognitive subject [Instanz] knows." As I modern for the that it described above, object sponsible is still with theproblems very posed byDescarpreoccupied philosophy in his tes' analysisof mind and body, which he himself(confident ens his of the to with the aid of God as solve them ability perfecproof of themalicious withhis hypothesis tissimum) pushed to the extreme it has not been possible to refute As Leibniz foresaw, deceivingspirit. in regardto its thathypothesis, howevermuch it may be discredited the theoretical In problemofthe possiblepracticakrelevance.general, relationof the selfto the world is as unsolved as ever,and forpure of science,whichgoes theory (thoughobviouslynot forthepractice this to itsvery with no merrily whatever) is a threat along epistemology as to put existence.The one definitive out, way, Blumenberg points thisultimate theoretical doubtto rest would be tomakethesubjectthe originand ultimatereference point of theworld,whichwould then it "come into the horizon of [thesubject's]experienceas something has made" and whichit therefore cannotbe fundamentally deceived about. But in excludingthistheoretical doubt, the Idealist fundamental would also radicallyexclude the absolutism One itself. myth ofreality cannotbe terrified by,any more thanone can be deceived about, a thatone has created.Thus theIdealistmyth would be a "final" reality notonlybecause itwould settle theultimate doubt,butbecause myth itwould removethe need foranyothermyth. It would completethe inaway that was begunbytheprimeval "workofmyth," those taskthat who performed that workcould notevenhavedreamedof:by original ofreality, as he was at themercy man,who once thought establishing itssovereign instead. master, But of course such a projectis thoroughly paradoxical. No more once we than we criticalmoderns could ultimately accept a myth, it as as a solution to a theoretical such, recognized problem (we are to depreciatetheory than much more likely as such,"pragmatically," - no morecould we,as "workers to knowingly combineitwithmyth) as truly "final"and insurpassable. on" myth, accept one actual myth in the As Blumenberg Work onMyth, last sentence after discusof says Kafka's of the version sing amazing one-page "eschatological" if all?" Prometheus "What still to after there were story, something say, Here he explains: "For one mythto be distinguished as an ultimate

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Robert Wallace 103

of its 'form' is the highest and insurpassable pure representation but itis nota status thatcan be stimulus to dealingswiththemythical, and end are symmetrical also in thatthey shownto be final.Beginning Mythhas alwaysalreadypassed overintotheprocescape tangibility. whatvioess of reception,and it remainsin thatprocess no matter lence is applied in order to break itsbonds and to establishitsfinal form." and insurIdealism's fundamental mythseems to be "an ultimate in that, ofmyth's whilecontaining 'form' passable purerepresentation itaims to deal, definitively, with none of myth's traditional contents, the problem thattraditional mythexistedin order to deal with:the in theusual manabsolutismofreality. Ratherthandismissing myth, it ner of modern philosophy, (implicitly) recognizesthe need forit of philosophy'satwas the frustration suggestedby (which,indeed, its and to meetthatneed by to deal with own seeks problems), tempts "final"myth. means of a singleall-encompassing cannot But,Blumenberg pointsout,thesuccessof such an attempt "finalmyths" The seriesofcompeting thatGerman be demonstrable. philosophyhas produced since the Idealists- a seriesthatincludes of souls, Nietzsche's Schopenhauer's mythof the transmigration Scheler's "werdender "eternalrecurrence," Gott,"and Heidegger's of makes this evident.The sufficiently "story Being" impossibility reason forit, Blumenbergsays,is that"Beginningand end" - the and thebringing to an end - "are symabsolutismofreality ofmyth metrical also in thatthey Both are limit-concepts, escape tangibility." ideal end-states that we seek(respectively) to escape and to attain, but which we cannot knowlingly has alwaysalready experience."Myth whichwe imagineas having experiencethe initial"workof myth," distancefrom theabsolutismofreality; and conseachievedtheinitial the which that distance was achieved always"come by quently myths down" to us as something that we have notourselvescreated, but can to acceptthisfunonlyreceiveand "workon." Idealism is notwilling damentalreceptivity: withthecreative Itclaimsan identity subjectthat It wants to "break produces all human culture(indeed, all reality). myth'sbonds [to reception]and establish its finalform." But the ofthe"finalmyth" bywhichitseeksto do this- themyth plausibility - itself of a subject thatis the source of all reality depends on the of mythical traditional form(ifnot the traditional contents) speech. did notcreate, that Without "mode," whichthey and whichit mythical tothestory, would makeno sensefortheir according "subject"(which, has no priorabsolute reality to deal with)to create,theIdealists(and theotherphilosophicalmyth-makers who came after them)could not
passed over into the process of reception .. ." - that is, we can never

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toBlumenberg 104 Introduction evenhavegotten started. To that extent atleast,then, "remains in myth the processof reception"despiteall theirefforts to breakout of that processand bringit to an end. Faust to an End 4. Bringing at bringing to an end is supremely Idealism's attempt ambimyth sincethatscope vulnerable, tious,in itsscope, but is correspondingly its pretensions as philosophy, and thus invitescriticism of its reflects ofliterary The apparentscope,and thevulnerability, content. mythical "toan end" (likeKafka's at bringing traditional myths attempts particular whichI mentioned)aremuchmorelimited, sincethey "Prometheus," or to present do notpretendto be anything otherthanstory-telling, a Butthatdoes notprevent themfrom brand new,and ultimate, story. claimtobring a says,"In every Blumenberg beingvery potent.In fact, if is exposed an the more claim to end myth far-reaching,onlyimplied toan end whenone displays Prethatone brings onefinal myth myth." is the of this so because somesumably bydemonstrating terminability thathad seemed uncreatable and interminable, one would prothing diminish sort had servedto that of that theproblem things portionately - one would proovercome(or - whichamountsto thesame thing enhance the status of the subject that had had the portionately problem). In any case, the transformation thatValerycarriesout in his Mon Faustis,to saytheleast,striking. The keychangesare,first, a reversal of therolesofFaustand Mephistopheles, the former, now, making tempt and second, a redefinition of the"suprememoment"that the latter; was the subject of Faust's wager withMephistopheles,in Goethe's self-oblivion Faust,and which now becomes a mystic/sensual that, in to the fundamental of that cannot, contrary premise princiwager, whetherfor ple, "tarry."Consequently,Faust no longer "strives," else. Instead,he is resigned.Likewisehis knowledgeor foranything here called "Lust," "does not entanglehim and does not Gretchen, "a tactile redeemhim,"butis merely elementin theimpressionism of thegardenscene." Butthesedeformations arenotarbitrary: The reverthesheerpowerthat reflects knowlsal ofthetemptation relationship withit since Goethe'stime,and which edge, as science,has brought dwarfsMephistopheles'sold wares; and the redefinition of the suhas also moment reflects the that science preme impersonality which with has made the old "Faustian" for it, brought craving knowledge as personalexperienceand personalpowerobsolete.5Likewise,
5. The factthatscience does not replace mythdoes not preventthe two from inimportant in thecase ofa myth ofthepersonalrelation ways, interacting particularly

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Robert Wallace105 thesimultaneous deterioration Gretchen/Lust's changedrole reflects of our consciousnessof sin and redemption as real possibilities. The of this Faust with the one we knew from is Goethe reduced to identity that oftheold triad ofhimself, and in Mephistopheles, Gretchen/Lust, in whichFaustparticipates whichthetwodyadicrelations are stilldison at least the knowlsurface, tinguished, by involving, respectively, and of be edge sensuality (althoughpart Valhry's point may that,as these coincide). experience, ThusVal&ry comesvery close to,as Blumenberg the says, "venturing mostextreme whichonly or allows no almost deformation, just longer allows theoriginalfigure to be recognized."Whatmore undisclosed could theold story stillcontain?We can't know,of course, potential unlessand untilitis disclosed,whichiswhytheprovisoalways applies, that successinbringing toan end is notdemonstrable. a myth ("Whatif therewere stillsomething to say,after see all?") Butwe can certainly how such an approach to the ideal of the "final myth"involves"a a perfection, whose fateful effectiveness consists... in its totality, timeto experiencethefascination that makingitpossible forthefirst does notallow one to restuntilone has imitated themodel, equalled the standardthat it sets, or even surpassed it." Which is why the "finalmyths" ofmodernphilosophy and literature havenot attempted been followed the of all that would accord by condition, purified myth, withthe originalexpectations of modern thought, but have instead formedan unceasingseriesof attempts to equal or surpassprevious "finalmyths." 5. The Mythof Reincarnations as Settingthe Standard for "Final Myths" The last section of "To Bring Mythto an End"examines "final myths" proposed by Schopenhauer,Feuerbach,and Hans Jonas,in This orderto focuson "the standard has to satisfy." thata 'finalmyth' see it down standard, first laid "was, ifI Blumenberg says, by correctly, of Schopenhauer,"in some unpublishednoteson thetransmigration "the souls,whichis forSchopenhauer(in Blumenberg's words) epitome ofa story thatcomes as close to philosophicaltruth as anystory that could be devised,"and is to be consideredas the"Non plus ultra" of myth,"its richestand most importantinstance." Blumenberg of the fromNietzsche's"eternalrecurrence pointsout thatit differs on the subject'seventualliberation same" by focussing fromreality,
discussion ofthat Anextended andthe toknowledge. ithas relatiorr transformations in of Western course can be foundin partThreeof The the history, undergone "TheTrialofTheoretical the Modern Age: of Legitimacy Curiosity."

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toBlumenberg 106 Introduction ofthereality that he creates, as the rather thanon theeternal repetition forhis responsibility. a less calculatFeuerbach,preferring argument ingGod thantheone he sees impliedin theidea ofthetransmigration who imaginesa God who has puttheentire ofsouls,and Jonas, fateof for hisuniverse, good or ill,inhumanhands,bothresembleNietzsche that their thanSchopenhauer)in thisrespect, (rather myths emphasize for the rather than universe, responsibility responsibilityfor oneself. Blumenbergrecently published a shortessay on a sentencethat Nietzsche's notes fromthe period when Zarathustra appears among a different was comingintobeing,butwhichsuggests approach from the one thatNietzscheactuallypursued in thatwork.'The sentence reads: "That we could bear being immortal- thatwould be the this as referring not to the highestthing." Blumenberginterprets constituted "eternal but to the recurrence," quasi-"immortality" by of one's actions and consetheir possibility remembering following in the world one's death. To continue after eternally quences willingly as the same person whom one would thenremember without fully, offorgetfulness benefit and whose fullconsequences and repression, one would perceive- to continuethus ratherthan to "dissolve in tothequality ofone's life. shame" - would indeedtestify Blumenberg does notexplicitly call thisconceptiona "finalmyth," butitappearsto whathe describes,in thepresent possess precisely piece, as themost such characteristic of a important (whichSchopenhauer'smyth myth itpresents ofreincarnation "thesubject'sresponillustrates here):that to himself and for himself." sibility ifnotto to preserve, Blumenberg praisesSchopenhauerfor"trying his of of the Kant's intensify myth postu[in reincarnation], concept late."After intheCritique ofGod, that thereality Reason, proving, ofPure of freedomand of immortality could neverbe demonstrated, Kant wenton to assert, in theCritique that all ofthesewere Reason, ofPractical nevertheless in moralaction.Ifimmorpresupposed,as "postulates," weredemonstrable, itwould interfere withmoral action,whichin tality Kant'sviewmustproceed fromreverence in forduty(as formulated theCategoricalImperative), and cannotinvolvecalculations ofprobable rewardor punishment after death. However,while one has no of or of God one is permitted to hope, indeed immortality, knowledge a and an immortal that God soul exist so thatgoodone must hope ness maybe justlyrewarded in thehereafter. Also,pure dutyis sucha
6. "Nachdenken iiber einen Satz von Nietzsche," the second of three "Uber den Rand der Wirklichkeit hinaus," in "Kurzessays" entitled,collectively, Akzente (Munich),Feb. 1983, 16-27.

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Wallace107 Robert rigorous requirementthat Kant eventuallyrecognized that actual towardit.This gap behuman behaviorwillneverdo morethanstrive the and theaction)gave will tweendutyand human reality (between in Kant'sthinkthe"postulate"ofimmortality an additionalfunction the infinite It individual soul to made room for an progress ing: pursue in moral goodness thatalone could bringits actions into fullcomBut thiswould onlybe pospliance withthe CategoricalImperative. sible if the soul had an endless series of lives. Hence Kant's final interest in the idea of reincarnation thathe shared with (an interest as well as Lessing, Schopenhauer). This mayall seem, as Blumenberg says,likea lot of "obsolete rubofconbish." However,as he goes on topointout,"theoppressiveness does notcease." whichliesbehindthemyth tingency, [ofimmortality], This oppressivenessis also the ultimateexplanation of Idealism's in thechapofthesubjectas origin. As Blumenberg wroteearlier myth on itsabsolute thatthe subjectthatreflects ter,"The deepest conflict in the root can have withitself is the confirmation of itscontingency in or ... [that that consists world,ofitslackofnecessity is,the]conflict thefact arisesfrom that a subjectisa result ofa physical processand for but rather, thatveryreason does not experienceitsself-constitution, from itspossessionofthesole absolutecertainty ofthecogito sum, gains as something to it." In addiaccess to thisconstitution heterogeneous - to thepriority tionto thiskindofcontingency oversubjecofmatter ofsociety: tivity we maybe equally oppressed by the priority by (as further Blumenbergcalls it a little on) "the overwhelming presumption thatone is produced by alien, social agencies," which existenresists withits doctrinethatexistenceis priorto tialismdesperately essence.Bothkindsofcontingency, itseemsclear,will(ifanything) be ofscience,whichwhileitcreatesnewmeans increasedbytheprogress forus touse incontrolling a continuously at increasing rangeofreality, thesame timecontinually the the most that strengthens presumption fundamentallayer of our personhood is exogenouslydetermined. This ultimate seems to be, in fact, theirreducible, "contingency" pertheperoftheabsolutismofreality, and thusconstitutes manentform to deal. When willhave to try manentissue withwhich"finalmyths" ofpresentmust the standard that a final Blumenberg says satisfy myth he is sayto for himself and "the himself," subject'sresponsibility ing of our the issue I it is to to deal with that no think, good ing, try as the for the world as a whole, contingency byclaimingresponsibility Idealistsand Nietzsche(theNietzscheofthe"willtopower"and "eteris nal recurrence") andJonasareall inclinedtodo, butthecrucialthing to and forourselves,as to recognize and accept our responsibility in spite of the conindividuals.That we have such a responsibility,

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toBlumenberg 108 Introduction thatprevents us from that we are "in command" in tingency knowing thisarea,iswhatKant'sethics,7 hisdoctrine ofthe"postulates," and all of our "finalmyths" aim to tellus. Like the myth of reincarnations, and dependence on the world," and they"reconcile individuation - undermine thus- ironically thedepreciation ofindividuation that Schopenhauerhimself preached. One mightsay,then,thattheydefendthepossibility ofmodern"individualism" (as impliedbymodern - thosethat But it is clear thatsome "finalmyths" "self-assertion"). our for toand ourselves do so moreeffectively suggest responsibility thanthose thatmake us responsiblefortheworldas a whole.
7. Two important earlydocumentsofBlumenberg's withKant long involvement are"Ist eine philosophische inStudium 6(1953), mdglich?" Generale, Ethikgegenwirtig 174-184,and "Kant und die Frage nach dem 'gnidigen Gott,'" Studium 7 Generale, (1954), 554-570.

INTERNATIONAL
Volume 4 no. 3 Articles

Markovic andMihailo Feher Ferenc Editors:

October 1984

andCounterquestions Habermas, Questions jurgen Problem as an Ethical ofHumanity TheSituation Karl-Otto Apel, andtheProblem ofSovereignty Civil SocialMovements, andJean Arato Society, Andrew Cohen, Normative ofCritique: Method TheMarxian Presuppositions SeylaBenhabib, toSocialScience andHisErrors Contributions Branko Marx's Horvat, andtheIntellectuals Orwell Israel, Joachim
CriticalReview

OverNeeds"is notSocialism Golubovit, "Dictatorship Why Zagorka


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