Statcon Cases 7-12

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7.) Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993 Cruz, J.

FACTS: The petition assails the constitutionality of Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 (An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith) which withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. ISSUE: Is RA 7354 unconstitutional because: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes? (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage? HELD: (1) NO. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. If the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. (Pages 11-12 of Agpalo) Furthermore, a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith. The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable. (Pages 12-13 of Agpalo) (2) NO. A conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House but it is not limited in

its jurisdiction to this question. Occasionally, a conference committee produces unexpected results beyond its mandate. The conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President. (Page 8 of Agpalo) 8.) Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994 Mendoza, J. FACTS: Republic Act No. 7716 or Expanded Value-Added Tax Law seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. In enacting this, petitioners contend that the Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution (2) Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution (3) Whether or not the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress HELD: (1) No. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of Representatives." (Page 4 of Agpalo) (2) NO. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The

phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) negates the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. (Page 7 of Agpalo) (3) NO. According to the Rules of the Senate (Rule XII, Sec. 26) and Rules of the House of Representatives (Rule XIV, Sec. 85), the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses. Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. The third version is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," and the only requirement for which is that it is germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. (Page 9 of Agpalo)

9.) Alvarez vs. Guingona G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996 Hermosisisma, Jr., J. FACTS: HB No. 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was filed in the House of Representatives, was passed on Second Reading, was approved on Third Reading, and was transmitted to the Senate for concurrence. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. The House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives HELD: YES. Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim that RA 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional

requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

10.) Garcia vs. Mata G.R. No. L-33713, July 30, 1975 Castro, J. FACTS: Eusebio B. Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his reversion to inactive status. He brought an action for Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money to compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the AFP, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status. While the petitioner was yet in the active service, Republic Act 1600 was enacted into law. Paragraph 11 of the "Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines" prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service. On the other hand, the respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 11 of RA 1600 is vaild and constitutional

HELD: NO. Paragraph 11 is unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Government, the said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental government policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. It also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 (no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill) of the 1935 Constitution. As expressed in Republic Acts title, it is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation of the government" and the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP is clearly not embraced in the subject of the act.

11.) Philconsa vs. Gimenez G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965 Regala, J. FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization, assails the Constitutionality of Republic Act 3836, amending Subsection (c) Section Twelve of Commonwealth Act 186, which allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress) ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Philconsa has a standing to institute this action (2) Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 is unconstitutional and void because its title is not germane to the subject matter expressed in the act

HELD: (1) YES. When the petitioner, like in this case, is composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed to bring this suit. Republic Act 3836 involves the disbursement of public funds and there are many decisions nullifying laws providing the disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misappropriation of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of the taxpayers. (2) YES. Under RA 3836, the retirement benefits are granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of C.A.. 186. However, the portion of the amendment which refers to the retirement benefits for Members of Congress and to elected officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House, who are not members of GSIS, is not related in any manner to the subject of C.A. 186 establishing the GSIS and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members. The Court further stated that this provision of the Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory. It is needed (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

12.) Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987 Melencio-Herrera, J. FACTS: Valentin Tio filed a petition on his own behalf and on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected which assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 (An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board) with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. Section 10 of the Decree imposes 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Section 10 is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter

(2) Whether or not there is factual or legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6 (3) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power and authority HELD: (1) NO. It is not necessary that the title expresses each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. Section 10 is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the objective of the Decree to regulate the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. (2) YES. Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution (whenever in the judgment of the President ... , there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.). The 8th "whereas" clause of the Decree sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch. (3) NO. The grant in Section 11 of the Decree (authority to solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board) is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation.

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