Negotiation in Identity Conflicts
Negotiation in Identity Conflicts
Negotiation in Identity Conflicts
IN IDENTITY CONFLICTS
Skopje, 2007
1. INTRODUCTION
1
Sydney Mintz calls this a universal feature/capability of a human being to create cultural values
and afterwards to behave according to them; Immanuel Wallerstein says that the same feature is
added by ability to use cultural strategies in order ‘to lie oneself and others’. Cf. : Sydney Mintz
W., The Power of Sweetness and Sweetness of Power, 8th Lecture, Denventer: Van Loghun
Slaterus, 1988; Wallerstein Immanuel, The Ideological Tensions of Capitalism, in J. Smith ed,
Wesport, CT, Greenwood Press,1988.
2
There is tendency with some authors addressing this issue to
see it, let us say, from ideological/geographical aspect. That is to say,
the rise of the phenomenon of group/identity topics and conflicts is
outcome of the fall of ideological bastions of authoritarianism and
former great monarchies. In other words, that this is supposedly the
outcome of introduction of Eastern, Oriental, or, simply, non-Western
values and civilization. Huntington’s inspiration to some extent is also
outcome of this aura. In other words, this claims that cultural/national
crises emerge in societies in transition towards democracy and such
crises are explained by inherited injustice towards minority groups,
unequal access to resources, actually a struggle to ‘… keep
minorities from losing…’ (W. Zartman, 1996).
This is the horizon of debates on territorial demarcation,
secession, or irredentism in societies in transition (S. Woodward), or
on instruments as discussed by W. Kymlicka: rights of self-rule, and
special representation rights.2
However, a more profound and empirically more responsible
analysis shows quickly that identity conflicts are not only the outcome
of intergroup diversities in culture, or of primordial hatred,
remembering blood, distribution of resources, etc, but also of the
stress caused by contemporary mass anonymous life and the global
economy, i.e., that they are equally ‘a Western phenomenon’. Then
‘fear’ (Z. Baumann) is introduced in the discourse. Namely, fear and
issues on uncertainty, security, safety of human life and own group –
that identity and primary links/groups provide (regardless if it is
realistic or illusory).
Whether you would approach this ‘awakening’ or process in
defensive manner, as done by S. Huntington (with his thesis on the
start of threats to Western democracies and nation-states), or you
would approach it in context of further ‘democratization of
democracy’, of re-establishing balance between liberal individualistic
principles and group rights/justice, depends on the very profile of
authors in this field. For us, it is important to define the basic
character of this process, in order to be able to establish the identity
of issues on its thematization in the political theory.
Among other things, this debate opened new perspectives
within discussions on the theory of equity, human rights, theories of
2
Susan Woodward, Redrawing Borders in a Period of Transition , ed. Milton J. Esman and
Shibley Telhami, International Organizations and Ethnic Conflicts, Cornel University Press , New
York , 1995 ;
Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995.
3
transition, conflictology, crisology, and, even more important, it
opened a line of new return to the notion of ‘culture’.
3
H.V.Gunsteren, A Theory of Citizenship, Westviev Press, Oxford, 1998.
4
few authors: sociologist Sigmund Baumann,4 and two philosophers
Richard Rorty,5 and John Gray.6
Three connecting ethical judgments or theses make the ethical
configuration. The first one is that violence as such is not necessary;
that it is not ‘destined’ or ‘predetermined’ to conflict resolution, in any
context, be it even in context of interethnic political situation. On the
contrary, violence makes conditions harder and sometimes even
destroys any chances for political solution. In other words, it is
claimed that majority of people, experts, or ‘reasonable’ citizens can
understand this and be motivated to eliminate violence, or at least its
most cruel forms, from the political discourse.7
The second ethical premise refers to our attempt to suggest
resolution. Then we would need to carefully avoid that modern,
universalistic model, that specific universalism that is in constant
search of rules that ‘will be valid on all occasions’ and of foundations
that will not ‘be shaken’. We will try to clearly distance ourselves from
such ‘modern’ ethics that suggests non-ambivalent, non-aporetic
ethical code. Especially when such attempts hide a campaign to
suppress differences and eliminate all ‘wild’, autonomous,
disobedient, and uncontrollable sources of moral judgments. Modern
societies practice, sometimes, moral narrow-mindedness under the
pretext of promoting universal ethics.
We will try to advocate another position and try to support it by
political and law-based methodology and technique, which consists of
the following: skepticism in ‘objectively established moral’. A moral
4
Reference would be especially his Postmodern Ethics, published by Templum, Skopje, 2005.
5
Richard Rorty, see in: The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, Objectivism, Relativism and
Truth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994; Contingency, Irony and Solidarity,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
6
Cf. John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000; False Dawn, The
Delusions of Global Capitalism, London, Gants Books, 1998; Enlightenment's Wake, Routledge,
London, 1994; End-games, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997; Isaiah Berlin, Princeton University
Press, Princeton , 1996 .
7
We would like to express our gratitude especially to Richard Rorty’s pragmatic defense of moral
obligations in democracy which he amounts to several conclusions: the only moral obligations of
people in democracy is the capacity for empathy, elimination of humiliation of the others, and
solidarity. In the cited essay, Priorities of Democracy Over Philosophy, Rorty advocates the thesis
that for a functioning of a reasonable democracy, it is not necessary to have philosophical
foundation of the system and universalistic ethics (this is also our point of departure). Rorty
indeed concludes in powerful manner that once we have freed ourselves from the obligation to
serve supernatural determinants and nonhuman sources of power and legitimacy, the only thing
left to us as basis for regulation of our society is our definite human destinies and contingency,
i.e. our feeling of being related to others in the group and solidarity in context of our culture.
LIBERAL CULTURE is the cement of the public moral, and justification of democracy is simply
based on its comparative advantages from other societies in history or the non-feasibility of
Utopian projects. Such non-metaphysical advocacy of democracy represents a sound basis for us
for the situation of inter-cultural evaluation so needed in mediation in interethnic conflicts.
5
position is always ambivalent and depends on the individualistic
responsibility of the person making moral decision. It seems this is
some kind of ‘the original sin’ of moral as such. Moral judgments are
undeniable aporetic, difficult to make universal, and to some extent
‘irrational’. Uncertainty, moral responsibility, and evaluation always
follow every moral situation, even this one of evaluation and
proposing resolution to interethnic conflicts.8
None of this put together certainly advocates a moral or cultural
relativism to the ultimate consequences. This position only wants to
morally conceive and/or evaluate the fact of appreciating cultural
diversities and make further consideration of the question: how is it
possible for people living in one country and sharing diverse cultures
that even cannot be reduced to a common denominator, to have a
common moral position?
If it is possible to have some kind of aesthetic soft universalism,
then it must come out of a self-reflexive, morally responsible and (at
the same time) uncertain evaluation by citizens themselves. To
evaluate what is best to do for myself and others, in concrete
situation full of tensions and conflicts, as found in societies of late-
modern or postmodern conditions. This would especially be the
outcome of reflexive deconstruction of those small national/cultural
exclusivities and statements of the type: ‘after us, the Deluge’.
Deconstruction of nation-states, of nations in quest of their own
states, traditional communities, or communities in search of traditions.
Deconstruction of ancient and new tribes and similar vanity fairs.
6
between cultures is present everyday on the street and ‘philia and
phobia’ towards foreigners and ‘others’ grows and becomes evident
as fluid. This further becomes ‘political’, within the good old definition
of the political by Karl Schmidt (antagonizing opposition all the way to
hostility itself).
7
2. SECTION ONE
9
P. A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, American Books, New York, 1937 .
Q. Wright, The Nature of Conflict , Western Political Quarterly, IV, 2, 1951.
10
For more detailed chronology, see: Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution,
Sage, London 2000; Preventing Violent Conflicts, Uppsala, 1998; and William Zartman,
Peacemaking in International Conflict, Washington USTP Press, 1997; Elusive Peace,
Negotiation an End to Civil Wars, Brookings, Washington 1995.
8
The aforementioned colloquial term must include certain value-
mobilized communities, such as: the Muslim countries and the
petroleum-producing countries; China; India; and Russia. Finally
these communities should be compatible with a ‘group’ called Pax
Americana, powerful grouping of countries especially connected with
the American role as leader in global politics; however this group
membership might change depending on focus of action.
Complementary subgroups can be additionally added to the
above groups. These subgroups can be identified as: Pax
Democratica, a group of democratic countries with stronger value-
centered cohesion; regional groupings, such as the Group 77 or
special, so-called security communities (according to words used by
Karl W. Deutsch, 1957). Some authors pay special attention to the
latter due to their decisiveness to carry our action when stability and
security of shared values and states are threatened.
I would like to set forth these designations since analysis of
subject matter of conflicts has produced an almost cult term of
‘guarantors, third side, arbiters’, and the likes that refer to the so-
called international community. This term can be considered basic
when one talks about the so-called preventive diplomacy or
preventive actions. In all these cases, mention is made of certain and
some ‘international factors or community’. This is not always done in
scrupulous manner. We consider it important to bring some clarity
and exactness in use of this term in every concrete situation of peace
agreements or conflict resolution agreements. Given these reasons,
we will emphasize which group has the role of mediator, guarantor, or
‘international factor’ in every concrete situation.
9
marked by ongoing conflicts or by appearance of new and cessation
of old conflicts, with tendency of small reduction (1989 – 47 internal
conflicts; 1999 – 37 internal conflicts). The total number of internal
conflicts in this period was 48; on average 1/3 of them ended with
some kind of peace agreement or conflict resolution agreement.
These data shows us interesting tendency of reduction of internal
conflicts and corresponding increase in their number that were
negotiated and terminated with some kind of settlement or agreement
(according to customary standards, such agreement should last for a
year at least after the conflict in order to be considered an
implemented agreement). Namely, the 1945-1992 period recorded a
total of 56 internal clashes, 13 of which were ended by settlement,
i.e., 23% of the total number.12 Authors, who processed this issue, are
within the boundaries of percentage of internal conflicts with
‘negotiated settlement’ – going from 15% (Stenadman), then 17%
(Lickleader), and to the mentioned 23% (Mason and Fat), for the
relatively same period.
10
dynamic confrontation of their interests, which they consider
incompatible, incongruous. On the other hand, a CONFLICT is such
phase of a given dispute when said confrontation of interests (which
is a normal situation in social, especially democratic relations) has
tendency to become violent, involves threats, or violence has already
been used.14
Therefore what is colloquially called in everyday language and
even in parts of literature a ‘conflict’, actually represents a dispute; on
the other hand a conflict means a ‘violent phase’ of a given dispute. It
is possible to deconstruct dispute and conflict from different aspects;
in this context, two groups of definitions are mostly present in
literature: one aspect of definition involves the pragmatic and
phenomenological part of the term; the second aspect involves the
psychological, perceptive aspect of the term dispute/conflict.
Namely, according to first group of authors, it is important for a
conflict to give a single, synthetic definition, which is reductive and
minimalist. Afterwards, this definition can be deconstructed to its
integral parts and have them in detail further explained or analyzed.
This type of definitions is best represented by those given by
Ross Stagner, 1967. According to him, a conflict is situation when two
or more human beings desire goals and have interests they know or
are aware of that they cannot implement them all together at the
same time, but one. Stagner further says that there should be at least
two sides in a conflict. Additionally, every side should mobilize energy
to attain own goals, and every side should consider the other side an
obstacle or even a threat to own individualistic goals.15
14
The classical 'crises model' or conflict model is described by J. D. Morrow (1994), Game Theory
for Political Scientist, Princeton, NY, USA, Princeton University Press. He says that every conflict
has three players: the nature of the conflict; the challenger; and the challenged. The nature of the
conflict determines it as solvable or not solvable; while the challenger draws the second move
and decides whether to challenge or not the status quo. Regardless of the confronted interests, if
the challenger fails to draw a confrontational move, then there is no crisis/conflict.
15
Ross Stagner (1967): The Analysis of Conflict , ed R. Stagner, The Dimensions of Human
Conflict, Wayne State University Press, Detroit; Cf. Psychological Aspects of International
Conflict, Brooks/Cole, Belmont, California.
16
C. R. Michell, The Structure of International Conflict, MacMillan Press, UK, !981, p.17.
11
from the term dispute and potential conflict. This is especially
important in assessing situations in internal conflicts and in efficient
conflict management.
Namely, crucial prospects of existence of a conflict situation are
DYNAMIZATION of confronting interests, and not mere recording of
their static existence. It is necessary to have concrete and active
confrontation, head collision of incompatible interests of involved
actors in social sphere or international relations. It is not sufficient to
merely state or conclude that given actors have incompatible
interests in a static situation. This is a situation of ‘potential conflict’,
which can be activated, but ultimately it does not have to. Such
potentially conflict situation can remain frozen, or, following change in
social circumstances, it can disappear - partly or entirely. Many social
situations are potentially conflictive; and yet they are not activated
into conflict; as such, they cannot be defined as conflict.17
This is important because if an erroneous prospects are made
and potentially conflict situations are overrated or turned into or
replaced by conflict situations, then there could be poor prospects of
measures required to deactivate such ‘would-be’ conflict and one
might enter fully a ‘vicious circle’ of connected mistakes that would
compromise the project of conflict settlement. This in turn is crucial to
measures of the so-called ‘early warning’.
Failing to notice the very difference between potentially conflict
situation and genuine conflict situation is very frequent confusion in
practice of conflict management (especially present in the so-called
analyses of potential conflicts in the Western Balkans) and represents
basis for many failed analyses and proposed measures addressing
zones of high risk in that region.
12
conflict, as perception, (…) consists of the belief that interests of
involved actors are incompatible, in seeing them as such (actually
they do not necessarily have to be); conflict as sensation/emotion (…)
of confrontation, disagreement, resistance, bitterness, fear, or fury
(…) in a word, its emotional component; finally, conflict as action (…)
sum and articulation of actions for confronting interests (…)
mobilization of energy, organization, focusing, and risk assessment,
or ‘cost-profit’ analysis (its behaviorist component).18
The definition is based on existence of a value system of a
group that defines itself as special and seeks social space for
protection (in passive meaning) and development (in active meaning).
Conflict furthermore implies making prospects/perception and
mobilization by a given group on possible ‘enemies’ and how to
neutralize their intentions and goals (according to L. Coser, … to hurt
and neutralize the opponent…).19
Deconstruction of a conflict into its cognitive, emotional, and
behaviorist elements, although fails to provide a single synthetic
definition, still enables us to have a better understanding of complex
of terms relating to conflict; this in turn enables increase in capacity to
resolve a conflict. An example of this would be the so-called new
imaginative leadership of confronted groups that exactly relates to
ability of leadership to transform collective determinants, perception
of interests as incompatible – into interests that can be solved or are
compatible.
18
Bernard Mayer , The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution, Josey-Bass, San Francisco, 2000, pp. 4-
9. This author both in more detailed and in different manner deconstructs conflicts, suggesting
'styles' of conflicts, such as: analytical versus intuitive; linear versus holistic; integrative versus
distributive; conflict focused on ways out versus conflict focused on process of confrontation;
emotional versus rational; direct versus indirect; threatening versus consolidation; etc.; pp. 42-44.
19
Coser L.A. , The Function of Social Conflict, Free Press, New York, 1956 .
13
From this aspect, Lake and Rothschild, for example, make
distinction on one hand between ‘large-scale’ internal conflicts
producing loss of more than one thousand lives, and medium- and
small-scale conflicts, on the other.20
14
In case of ‘insurgency’, or an armed conflict with higher
intensity and longer duration, legalistically said, foreign states and the
international community are allowed, as sole actor, to assume
corresponding authority in interfering in the internal conflict. This is
made possible without having the given states to be in a state of war
with the state where an insurgency has broken out. The level of
internal crisis called insurgency is used to protect commercial and
private interests of foreign nationals as well as for opening the
process of conflict management by a group of states representing the
international community.
Classification of a given internal conflict as ‘belligerency’ (that
could almost imply status of a civil war) puts such conflict,
legalistically said, at same level as a war between states or an
international conflict. In other words, all dimensions are being opened
relating to rights and obligations of sides to the conflict in full
accordance with the international war and humanitarian law. The
status of ‘warring sides’ given to sides to an internal conflict is
extremely important since it has direct reflection on forms of peace
agreements and conflict resolution.23 In this stage, third countries,
guarantors, facilitators, mediators, etc., must take a rather more
neutral stance. Even in such state of affairs of conflicts (according to
G. Von Glan), it is nevertheless necessary to maintain that a
rebellious side is an integral part of a given society and state, the
government of which is fighting against such rebellious side.
Recognition of being a ‘side’ or ‘party’ in a conflict gives opportunities
general public in Macedonia has never accepted this and thought that the conduct of the
international community regarding the Macedonian crisis was dishonest and inconsistent (by
raising the question: 'What did really happen to us in 2001?', there were also insinuations by the
general public in Macedonia of some kind of international plot or conspiring).
For more detailed and condense definitions of the relationship of international law towards this
problem, see: J. Rosenau ed, International Aspects of Civil Strife, Janus Tormented: The
International Law of Internal War , 1964 ; or in Problems of International Law and World Order,
Problems in War Prevention by E. Castren, 1966, pp. 857- 886.
23
Here again we locate one of the confusions that are often raised in debates regarding the
positions of 'the sides' in agreements such as the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia.
Namely, this agreement does not have definition of the then existing situation as belligerency and
does not have position of 'sides'; on the other hand, the signatories of that agreement are the
legal political parties, but this is not always satisfactory for the newly created political parties of
'the rebels' who formally are not signatories but they feel they deserve most of the credit for the
character of the solutions therein. They feel such agreements in a more symbolic manner – just
as result of their successful actions. These new parties usually do not cherish and do not interpret
the provision of such agreements in their legal sense and meaning; they only see them as 'good
basis' for further demands and rights. Such interpretation of agreements can represent grounds
for their weakening and abandonment, which in turn opens a new possible crisis cycle. In this
moment of crisis of agreements, the role of the GUARANTORS/third countries is very crucial;
these third countries must firmly insist on the provisions of the agreement and its original
meaning.
15
to a rebellious side to impose blockades of ports and roads and even
make confiscation of assets obtained from the so-called contraband
as part of military actions, without being labeled for ‘piracy’ or
‘terrorism’.
16
Certainly this leads to reduction of usability of the ‘rational actor
model’, or, at least, towards introduction of combinations with new
‘rationalities’ of viewpoints on logic of effects made by very actors.24
24
According to some authors (Bruce B.G. Clarke, Conflict Termination: Rational Model, US
National Security Studies, Pennsylvania, Institute for National Security), 'the rational actor'
functions taking in account: the goals of the conflict as the final points at which the attempts of the
actor are aimed at; the manners, as methods for attaining the goals; and the means, as resources
that need to be used in some concrete manner in attaining the goals.
25
In this context, Benedict Anderson talks about the nation (that might expand to all cultural
groups) as 'the imagined community. See: B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, New
York, 1992.
17
authenticity, demand for recognition, diversity concept, and principle
of equal dignity.
Adding to this, Richard Rorty and Wang underline that the
process of identity building through self-reflection differentiates
various levels of meanings, desires, and values that make it. Human
identity is formed by a set of ‘central desires and values’ that have a
more profound meaning for him. According to the said authors, these
would include: individual somatic dispositions; psychological
parameters and human temperament; social roles, social group
identities and cultural narratives; and the ideal identity (as
project/desire).
Making further connection to this line, another group of authors
underlines that, in cases of identity definition, great role is played by
moral conflicts and dilemmas, which an individual solves and is faced
with, thus forming his own identity. Such ones would involve four
types:
- conflict of obligations; - conflict of goals; - conflict between
moral codes or views of the world; and, - views between different
moral requirements.
26
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, Gutman (ed) 1994; Multikulturalizam, ogledi za
politikata na priznavanje, Evro-Balkan, Skopje, 2004 pp.: 25-57. Taylor says that identity is
partially formed by recognition, i.e., by its absence or mistaken recognition... Actually identity
recognition is part of the fundamental human rights because it has universal basis – everybody
has his own identity and a universal requirement authorizes recognition of specifics. Certainly
every identity implies a dialog character, sometimes in struggling with others...
18
The note raised by Taylor is very important in context of our
topic; namely that lack of recognition or, even worse, wrong identity
recognition creates ‘wounds’, makes damage, produces a form of
subjugation and so entraps an individual in reduced form of
existence. Sometimes forms of wrong identity recognition even can
imply various techniques for subjugation, should subjugated groups
accept underrated pictures about themselves and their own culture.
27
Cf. David A. Lake, Donald Rothschild, ed., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, pp.154,
317, Princeton University Press, Princeton , 1998. In this book, Sandra Helperin claims that an
ethnic conflict is a conflict about political, social, economic, cultural or territorial issues between
two or more ethnic communities or groups. Cf. Dynamics Of Conflict Resolution, Bernard Mayer,
p. 9, Josey-Bass, San Francisco, 2000.
19
Some authors notice this and so underline that identity is based
on making constant differences from other identities, i.e., identity is
DIALOGICAL. Therefore, based not on finding similarities of the
single human kind, or common denominator of equality before the law
(this is presumption for democracy and constitutionality), but based
on constant construction of differences – cultural and traditional. In
this context, the notion of BORDER with and away from other
identities represents the most important notion for consolidation of a
given identity. Border, not similarity; demarcation vis-à-vis others;
pathological intensification of creating taboos on closeness within
given group members.
Herman Van Gunsteren claims that deep groups, as he calls
them, dominate social perception of its own members, their social
relations, and, ultimately, their self-perception. In place of ‘normal’
political conflicts, or demand making to the system by its citizens, we
have in turn constant raising doubts and threats about the very
‘citizenship’ and the fundamental consensus, i.e., the constitution of a
given society. Members of such identity groups become ‘primary
reality’ that determines all other things and so becomes challenge to
established civil consensus. This reality is additionally sees as
‘obvious’, ‘natural’, and undeniable; by this it attains advantage over
other socially constructed concords and consensuses.
Confliction of self-definition and social activity of group
IDENTITY, according to some authors, is universal human tendency. 28
It is much easier and more efficient to predict reactions of other
people when you base such reactions on their group characteristics
than on individualistic features of their members. Such slipping away
into creating clichés on making group characteristics, rude
oversimplification or demonization of others, is called
STEREOTYPING. Sumner (1906) calls this same phenomenon
‘ethnocentrism’.29 Ethnocentrism is such ideological viewpoint where
my own group is the center of everything and everything else is
valued in relation to my own group… This phenomenon both favors
internal relations within a given group and tends to discriminate
everything outside a group.
28
Cf. Brewer M. B. and Miller N. (1996), Intergroup Relations, N.Y., Brooks/Cole, Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology , 68, 403-412; Cf. Tajfel H. and Turner J. C. (1986) The Social
Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, (ed) Worchel S. and Austin W. Chicago, IL, Nelson-Hall,
USA.
29
Sumner W. G. (1906) The Role of Evil, The Origins of Genocide, N.Y., Cambridge University
Press .
20
A desire to increase our value/importance is pathologically
related to making stereotypes and ridiculing others. Very close to this
is also ‘demonization of others’: what is called remembering blood
and justice inflicted by history. RETALIATION or, better, collective
retaliation is the operative sensation which remembering injustice
turns into. This implies non-selective violence to members of the
group considered to have inflicted the very ‘injustice’. It is interesting
to note that individual retaliation is sanctioned in majority of known
political systems; however, it seems that collective retaliation
somehow ‘is tolerated’. Such intergroup tolerance and justification of
retaliation gives moral stand-up for the act of retaliation (sometimes
even to level of genocide!?).
Collective memory of injustice and retaliation often leads to
sensation of HATRED (as more durable ‘cultural’ determinant of
group behavior), or, more exactly, collectively remembered hatred for
members of certain groups. Such situation is recognized by:
obsessive focus on hated groups/members; belief that hated group
has evil characteristic per se; belief that all members of such group
are equally bad and guilty; and need for retaliation motivating
destruction of such group.
If such ‘tendency of negative emotions’ and stereotyping is
established, this in turn can be solid basis for numerous ethno-
conflicts and their escalation to level of genocide.
21
exposed to CONSTRUCTION, namely an imposed notion. Ethnicity
and identity based on ethnicity represent an entity that is constantly
under construction and reconstruction. This is similar to situation of
ancient, huge shrines and cathedrals whose parts are constantly
being reconstructed and you are never able to seem them entirely
reconstructed. Ethnicity and identity originating from ethnicity are
more of PROCESS and PROJECT then implying structure or a ‘solid
body’ of meanings.30
22
is very important, when this it not determined by exclusive range or
set of topics and issues, but by intensity of feelings and confrontation
level. Indeed such angle does function in identity conflicts; every
issue that seems not to be of priority/political nature (for example,
education or network of schools), can be transformed into priority,
political question and even question of profound confrontation, if
ethnical communities perceive that question as crucial in their identity
preservation.
From such angle, identity conflicts are classified as the most
complicated, most violent, and most difficult to resolve. To this end,
there is corresponding need for special preparedness and knowledge
of characteristics of basic factors, techniques of preventive or
coercive diplomacy, and negotiation techniques (for mediators or third
parties, in order to have successful resolution).
Another group of identity conflict definitions, as we have already
said, bears somewhat different perspective and underlines the
structural parts/perspectives, and not so much the ‘synthetics’ in
defining. Therefore actors fight in identity conflicts for: ‘need to have
meaning’ in own existence, actions, and struggle; for need to have
specific own ‘togetherness’, characteristic ‘intimacy’ of their own
group, primacy of these sentiments that is different from all the rest;
for need for ‘autonomy’ of life within their own group. When these
values become primary in a conflict, then such conflict is defined as
identity-based conflict.32
23
psychological dimension can be dominant and we would call it a
security dilemma. This feeling, namely uncertainty assessment, can
be realistic, for example, when it is a question of inability of weak
state institutions to impose control over the ‘predatory’ conduct of
political elites from majority groups, or when there is inability to offer
political leadership that would bring consolidation of legitimacy of
state institutions and implementation of generally accepted
consensus on how society would function and on what values. The
latter does not mean lack of consensus; on the contrary, it is
weakness in implementation, thus the effect produced is ‘chaos’ and
uncertainty for identity of groups and individuals.
24
Such ‘creation of consensus’ in context of human rights is
called INTERCULTURAL EVALUATION.
Deep cultural diversities make point of departure; indeed, they
are ‘given, and in some way, even ‘imposed’, in construction of
mechanisms that would organize their functional plurality in
democracy.
Such mechanisms do not have task to reduce or suppress such
diversity. On the other hand, limit of this organization of plurality is not
by any cost itself; rather, in context of definition provided by H.
Arendt, this plurality should be transformed into freedom for
individuals, and justice for group culture practices.
25
societies; it is question of lack of necessary, so-called thin, shallow,
procedural consensus (demand making process).
Lack of such institutional and fundamental value matrix can
take place at two levels: lack of credible commitments, or weakness
of political elites to implement negotiated constitution or procedure
(frequent situation in so-called falling states and ungovermental
places).
In both cases, the situation of ‘ungovernableness’ of a system
results in a series of erroneous perceptions regarding intentions of
others, paranoiac reactions, being closed and situation of permanent
stress in groups and individuals; this in turn increases sensation of
insecurity and need to prepare for possible conflict.
26
circumcision; sacrifice of an animal; arranged marriages; the so-
called ‘murders for honor’, etc.).
Such situation of information failure to and from other groups
could represent a source of hostile communication as vicious circle of
escalation, greater fear, preparations for conflict, or could even grow
into a conflict trigger.
27
countries and their position concerning the 1991-1995 war in former
Yugoslavia). That strategy encourages forms of open racism and
calls for ethnic cleansing.
28
4. Conflict STRUCTURE
In the first scheme of the conflict sources that the author calls
‘instrumental’, an actor creates conflict situation and then uses
conflict behavior and promotion of his own viewpoints (the conflict
situation is decisive in establishing the behavior and promotion of
viewpoints). And in the second scheme that the authors calls
‘expressive’, the actor, guided by the expression of his own
ideological positions and viewpoints that are decisive, moves towards
a conflict situation and conflict behavior.
29
dispute/conflict and their position as allies, rivals, or neutral parties;
nature of other political and legal obligations that conflict sides can
have.
Some authors deconstruct a conflict situation into: conflict
sources; conflict standpoints and aims; and conflict behavior (C. R.
Mitchell).
30
it is shown that stress-reduction need leads to cognitive
consistency (concluding who is guilty), which in turn can be divided
into three separate cognitive operations: selective perception;
selective call; and group identification. All three of them lead to their
‘discharge’ into action/conflict.37
The next figure shows how this action would follow (figure 3):
37
Op.cit., C.R. Mitchell, pp. 78 and 97 .
31
4.1. PHASES of a conflict can be explained by different
classifications. We would try to synthesize the most essential ones, in
our view. Hence, first conflict phase is called CONTESTING. This
phase establishes appearance of interest incompatibility situation in
reality and gives push to confrontation of opposing intentions with
diplomatic means, through media with direct contacts, or through
mediators.
32
with morally unacceptable high price and too many victims), in order
to ‘prepare’ sides to a given conflict for a political settlement. This
settlement is then imposed in light of the fact that confronting sides
are unable to terminate such conflict with unilateral victory.
33
that is imposed as such; No conflict resolution - a resolution that is
actually not so because a given conflict continues in spite of attempts
to have negotiations and pressure exerted; and Unclear conflict
resolution, when some elements of conflict have initially ceased and
then are renewed, or when other elements of a conflict have not
ceased but have only lost momentum, etc.39
34
conflict intensification, conflict escalation not only involves increase in
energy and means of confrontation, but also special kind of
intensification that is conducted with plan and intention to produce a
desired effect. Hence, escalation can be ‘transitive’ when it is caused
and conducted by sides in conflict and when it depends only on their
own will and is initiated by a decision made by conflicting sides.
Second kind is ‘intransitive’ when it is consequence of some
developments in a given conflict or its negotiations.
Involved sides escalate conflict on different grounds. Some
escalations are outcome of rational confrontation; others are outcome
of emotional reactions. The first kind of reasons or grounds would, for
instance, include: escalation in order to obtain better (starting)
negotiations position (some authors also call it ‘constructive
escalation’ – Kriesberg and Thorson); escalation with newly perceived
prospects that indeed victory can be obtained; escalation just for the
sake of not losing and of imposing or coming (closer) to negotiations;
escalation to justify (or cover up) means and resources so invested to
that purpose, thus entering the very pit of entrapment; and even
escalation in order to receive new assistance from own allies and
partners. One can also include in this context a specific situation of
obliging oneself with too many promises and threats, thus cornering
oneself into a ‘no-exit’ position, a position of no retreat or chance for
conflict mitigation, a position of only further conflict escalation (this is
equally a doorway to entrapment).
Second kind of escalation relates to emotional or cognitive
viewpoints, or, demonization of opponent: in other words, our
opponent did deserve this; he had to be punished or humiliated; this
even might be expression of nervous overreaction to move made by
the other side.
35
Dynamic ‘propelling’ escalation is mutual distrust between sides
in conflict. There is ever-present blame what side has started such
escalation, what hidden intentions of that side are, etc. Escalation is
maintained expecting that the other side would ultimately give up and
retire. Consequently, all of this is also called ‘competitive irrationality’,
being a phenomenon that enables escalation as such.
Conflicts, Cambridge University Press, N.Y. pp. 251, 166, 254, 272, 185 .
36
This entrapment is described as sinking or ‘drowning’ in
‘quicksand’; the more you fight or struggle, the deeper you sink. From
aspect of rational prospects, such conflict actor would have to stop;
however in order ‘to save his honor’, he continues investing in conflict
and increasingly starts losing such ‘investment’.
According to the prospect theory, every actor, involved in risky
or conflict situation, is prepared to assume risk more for the sake of
loss prevention than for the sake of making profit.41
Such entrapment is also described as ‘downhill escalation’, but
not in context of de-escalation; it denotes movement or tendency
towards even more intensified conflict, with gross deterioration of
staring positions. In case of ‘being entrapped’, conflict actors make
greater efforts and demands; they even add unrelated demands,
increase costs to the very absurd; they demonize the other side,
increase risks to level of unacceptability. Due to increasing losses, all
of this ends up in reduction of maneuvering abilities of such conflict
actors, under enhanced costs and risks. Such actors, under risk, lose
sense of reality and possibilities for making definite options;
ultimately, they lose alternatives and so lose power.
In process of conflicts and negotiations, during internal
disputes, ‘entrapment’ is fascinating phenomenon, being at the same
time interesting for study, but very destructive for successful
negotiations.42
In order to avoid such ‘entrapment’, actors must maintain
control over given conflict, and, especially, the price/value of
confrontation for attaining goals. They should control lines of losses
that lead easily towards entrapment.43
At this point of analysis, we should mention that our
methodological position is the term ‘rational actor’ in conflict.
Nevertheless, we are well aware that such model is often deformed in
conflict identities (where assessment of rational behavior and cost-
41
Kahneman D. and Tversky A. (1979): Prospect Theory: An Analyst of Decision under Risk ,
Econometrica 47, pp. 263-291.
42
Paul W. Meerts (2005) Entrapment in International Negotiations, in ed I. W. Zartman and G. O.
Faure, op.cit., pp. 11-139.
43
A classical and rather sad example of 'entrapment' is the decision made by the then Serbian
leader S. Milosevic to continue 'to the very end-final victory' the war in Bosnia and Croatia in the
process of disintegration of former Yugoslavia, and, consequently, to reject the political
agreement, wrapped up in a good package, offered by Lord Carrington at the 1992 Hague
Conference on former Yugoslavia. The outcome of that entrapment was that Serbia started
intensively to lose the war and ended up as the greatest loser from the process of disintegration
of former Yugoslavia. Finally, it is the only republic of the former Yugoslavia which lost 'territory' –
Kosovo, Montenegro, while international isolation has made it one of the poorest countries in the
Balkans (something that Serbia has never been in its history).
37
profit analysis is casualty of ideas of historic missions of own or other
groups, ethno-romanticism, irrationality, and constructions).
38
defended; however, the moment of ripeness also depends on
psychological, perceptive factors, as well as on level of influence
exerted by convincing.
This is very clearly reflected in the manner used in opening
negotiations opportunity. Whether, for example, one side in conflict
has ‘saved its own honor’; namely, whether such side has not left
impression of being weak by agreeing to negotiate, a weakness that
the other opposing side might use later, etc. In those moments, the
role of mediator is crucial in definite shifting of a conflict to a so-called
pre-negotiation process.
39
escalation. Namely, diffusion can be connected in different ways with
escalation. It can mean indication of conflict escalation, by increasing
the substantial topics that are at issue and point of contention or by
increasing the territory for waging a conflict.
However, diffusion can also mean a sign of ‘diluting a conflict’,
of its de-escalation through reduction of intensity of conflictive
behavior when it is also outcome of increase in number of topics at
issue. The latter is not completely valid for the territory as well, where
a conflict is waged, because expansion of territory that is drawn into
instability is always negative indicator with regard to possible
decrease or resolution of conflict. Diffusion in context of territory can
only be related to ‘dilution’ of conflict when there are indicators
conflict intensity has gone down in the entire territory used for waging
conflict and such conflict has so become a ‘low intensity’ conflict, as
direct outcome of the diffusion.
However, the latter does not also imply that a conflict has come
closer to or has become more prepared to go over to the negotiations
phase.
40
5. SECTION TWO
41
‘National building’ lasted for about 200 years by means of
political and cultural means. It developed its own political philosophy,
theory of justice, and viewpoint on culture and its function.
In such discourse, culture was considered, until the 1960s, as
means of integration (voluntary, or, ‘little’ forceful), as ‘the melting pot’
of integration. All of this had a note of assimilation of ‘small cultures’
and diversities in creating a single ‘wider nation’ or cultural panorama.
This was the very basis of political intervention in national building.
However, the 1980s introduced a change in the role of culture.
There was an ‘outburst’ of national, ethnic, gender, and regional
identities. Such identities found or felt themselves to be under
oppression by ‘central cultures’. Consequently, instead of becoming a
venue of new consensus, culture has become an arena of conflict
and political struggle; i.e., it has been politicized and has become
more indicatively a political instrument. Classical meaning of culture
implied culture was in its essence a unique antithesis of politics.48
Nowadays culture is accepted, even underlined, as political
means or instrument. Such or similar views are shared by many
influential authors like: Terry Eagleton, Michel Foucault,
poststructuralists, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Jacques Derrida,
Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, etc.
Such ‘new’ role of culture – in context of creation, protection,
and promotion of diversities and their concurrent management at
society level – has produced a new dimension in classical view of
PLURALISM in democratic societies. This has produced a ‘culture
pluralism’, which in turn leads us further to pluralistic, segmented
societies, or nation-mosaics (Strayer), disjunctive societies (R. D.
Grillo), or ‘unknown societies' (Herman Van Gunsteren), etc.
42
5.1. A definition of cultural pluralism would be situation in a
given society where complex and large culture groups exist, while
practicing at the same time different forms of own common
institutions, behavior models, social relations, inner organizations,
and value systems – and, sometimes, even different religion.49
Diverse cultural segments observe not only different culture practice
and institutions internally, within their own culture circle, on one hand,
but equally their relationship to wider society and society institutions
is determined by culture perception established by particular
segment, on the other. The outcome of this is that the wider
consensus, which these institutions are based on, is similarly under
constant re-examination and pressure.50
Such societies are also called multicultural societies. Cultural
pluralism becomes dominant in these societies and it globally
intervenes, so to say, on the political scene, in a multi-layered
manner, at local level in form of micro communities, as manner of life,
and at trade and professional level.
43
outcome of historical agreements and practice in relations between
different culture segments in a given state or of the manner used in
establishing balance of power in recent transition events (conflict, civil
wars, international mediation, etc.).52
We could talk about multiculture society only if this refers to
culture plurality within ONE society and within ONE state. In this
regard, we do not include federative states that have ‘solved’ cultural
diversity in classical manner, by territorial and political division of
powers between culture segments and have so re-established
states/republics that fall under the majority-minority dynamics context,
with one predominant national culture.
* * *
44
democracy: search for new basis of social equity/justice; multicultural
citizenship/differentiated citizenship (citizenhood); and, overlapping
consensus – or multiplied loyalties and identities. 54
Let us start with the thesis of Young Iris Marion that the
traditionally liberal model of universal citizenship – as the right to
have rights (Justice Warren first gives such definition)55 – is unjust as
far as it requires renouncement of particularistic cultures, identities,
and social perspective for persons belonging to minority cultures, for
the sake of accepting equal formal and legal status.56
This value standpoint represents a start in overcoming the
deontological attempt of J. Rawls to create social justice.57
Namely, what lacks is the universal, neutral individualism of a
civil, formally equal status, and, in this context, its attempt to embed
collectivist, cultural diversities of citizens through a so-called ‘soft
disregard’.58
The problem is that it cannot be done by simple addition, or
‘loading’ of several more collectivist values ‘in the truck of the civil
54
W. Kumclicka and W. Norman, in the work Citizen in Diverse Societies, think the debate in the
Western societies in the last ten years about and around multiculturalism has concentrated on
two topics: minority rights – multiculturalism – civic virtues and practices; and responsibility for
democratic citizenhood (state citizenship-civic virtues, skills – debate). They think that the debate
on the first topic has a successful end for the opportunity to combine special minority rights and
liberal citizenship... ... given that the burden of proof has shifted from advocates of culturalism to
its negators... while the second topic is still open and hot. Op.cit., pp. 1-4.
55
Cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356, US 44, 1958, p. 48. On the other hand, 'citizenship' (citizenhood,
civism, citizenry, civility) has been treated since classical times as legal status of membership of
political community. Under the Roman jurisprudence, a citizen is someone who is free to use the
law, to act in accordance with the authorization of the law, and to seek protection from the law.
Such legal status indicates a special relation/connection between and individual and the political
community-the state.
There are several groups of theories of citizenhood or citizenship: liberal; communitarianist; and
republican. Liberal theories underline the individual rights towards the state (John Potter, John
Rawls). They claim that society organizes civil rights and is directly opposed to a society that
derives rights from group membership. Communitarianism on the other hand underlines
belonging to a cultural community as basis of wider community and citizenhood or citizenship.
Finally, republicanism and neo-republicanism underline public spheres of political life and ability
to organize plurality in public life.
56
I. M. Young, 1989, Polity and Group Difference, Ethics, 99/2; Justice and Politics of Difference,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990.
57
John Rawls, Teorija za pravednosta, Slovo, Skopje, 2002; Politicki liberalizam, Filip Visnic,
Beograd, 1998.
58
Nathan Glazer is considered a representative of this viewpoint. He explains his viewpoint by
means of several traditional liberal thesis: the concept of individual rights is sufficiently wide and
so guarantees cultural diversities; the rights of association and expression of religious and other
particular affiliations are sufficient to maintain the cultural diversity of groups; tolerance supports
heteronomy of contemporary states; the state should not create special measures in support of
minority cultural communities; and there should be appropriate and strict observation of the
principle of separation of the state from ethnicity. See: Nathan Glazer , We Are All Multiculturalist
Now, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1997.
45
individualistic consensus’. This is because new collectivist values
import changes and take on the brink of re-consideration the
universal character of individual rights and their domination in the
discourse. By own confirmation and entry in the agenda of civil
consensus (through multicultural citizenship, etc.), they cause
irreversible changes in the said universal character. They require new
theory of liberal justice, instead of fitting into the existing, Rawls’
theory of liberal justice and citizenship of procedural kind.
According to supporters of this kind of developments, such
justice should be basis for a more inclusive society. Then, this society
would consist of more communities; at the same time, it would be
founded on the value of individual rights and legal procedures of
guaranteeing minority (culture groups) rights. Therefore, social life
would not require sacrifice of particularities for the sake of the
common, synthetic nation identity; however, this would not make at
the same time sacrifice of individual rights on the altar on culture
collectivism.59
Indeed, this is a rather difficult task and could be ‘a quadrature
of the multicultural circle’.60
Will Kumlicka calls the described model that he supports a
‘liberal pluralism’ and confronts it with the then still dominant liberal
individualism61 of Rawls and communitarianism of Taylor.62 The cited
59
Cf. Charles Taylor, Priznavanje gradjanskog drustva, Beogradski krug, Beograd, 2000. Also cf.:
Politics of Recognition, ed., Gutman, 1994 .
60
According to John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, there are several ways to regulate ethnic
conflicts: the first group involves methods of elimination of diversity: genocide; forced transfers of
population; separation/secession; assimilation. The second group involves management with
diversities: hegemonic control; territorial autonomy (cantonization/federalization); non-territorial
(cultural) autonomy (consocietal division of power); and multicultural integration. Politics of Ethnic
Conflict Regulation, London, Routletge, 1993, pp. 4-38.
61
Liberalism of this 'type' is an attempt to respond or create a basis for liberal interpretation of
expanded citizenship or citizenhood of the so-called Marshall civil status. This appears in 1970
with the work by John Rawls, Equity Theory, 1970. Other representatives of the same paradigm
are: Ronald Dvorkin (Seriously on Human Rights, 1974), Robert Nozik (Anarchy, Utopia and
State, 1974), Nathan Glazer (Individual vs. Group Rights, 1983), Ronald Dvorkin (Speaking
Seriously about Rights, 1985), Bruce Akkerman (Social Justice in Liberal State, 1980), Michael
Sandel (The Procedural Republic and Unencumbered Self, 1984).
This concept tries to develop neontological, non-value, neutral basis of civil consensus in
democratic societies and to 'suck in' the cultural diversities by means of the concept of 'soft,
benign neglect', or the so-called 'blindness law' – a law that is blind to diversities. This is a line
leading from J. S. Mill, previously from Kant, etc.
Michale Waltzer, following the line of C. Taylor, calls this liberalism 'Liberalism 1'. He defines as it
an attempt to dedicate to the individual rights and to deduct from this a neutral state without
cultural and religious projects.
62
Communitarianists follow a line that challenges liberal individualism of Rawls with a thesis that:
liberal principles of social justice or social equity are empty without the social context, where
culture and cultural identity are major determinants. According to these communitarianists, liberal
paradigm is based on vain liberal consideration of the self; it avoids and violates our embedded
46
model afterwards also opposes the model that comes out of a
postmodernist debate on ‘deconstruction of subject’ and is hence
even called model of differentiated, discerning citizenship and
differentiated political representation (reflective representation),
based primarily on cultural diversities, and not on equal civil status.63
* * *
cultural-identity self-perceptions and procedures; and it wants to have impossible universality and
objectivity. Communitarianism is inspired by and theoretically defines social criteria on citizenship
as being dominantly collective, cultorological, relational and contextual. Leading names in this
tendency are: Michael Sandel (The Procedural Republic and Unencumbered Self, 1984, and
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 1982), Michael Waltzer (Fields of Justice, 1982), Charles
Taylor (The Sources of Self, 1989, Politics of Recognition, 1994), Daniel Bell, Alasdair McIntyre,
etc.
Michale Waltzer, being again on the trace of Charles Taylor, calls this communitarianist liberalism
'Liberalism 2' and defines it as an attempt that permits the state to dedicate itself to the progress
of a given nation, culture, group, as far as the fundamental rights of citizens who have different
affiliations are protected. Liberalism 2 has options and one of them is Liberalism 1. Liberalism 2
also has tensions that come from the attempt to make balance between individual and collective
rights. But, according to this author, this is not a reason to reject it. Cf. Multikulturizam, Evro-
Balkan, op.cit., pp. 91-93.
63
With regard to debates on this topic in the circle of the Anglo-Saxon political theory since early
1960s, see also the very interesting M.A. thesis written by Aleksandar Jovanovski at the Faculty
of Philosophy, University 'Ss. Cyril and Methodius', Skopje, 2005;
Will Kumlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Clarendon Press, Oxford,1995; Liberalism, Community
and Culture, Oxford University Press, 1995; with Norman W., Citizenship in Culturally Diverse
Societies, Oxford University Press, 2000.
The following authors, together with Kumlicka, promote the line of synthesis or liberal pluralism:
Joseph Ruts (National Self-Determination, 1990), Vernon Van Dyke (The Individual, the State,
and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory, 1989), Chandran Kukathas, (Are There Any Cultural
Rights, 1992), Jacob Levi (Classification of Cultural Rights, 1994), etc.
47
The second supposition in this regard says that the right of
‘membership of culture’, the right of culture self-identification is
important, valuable, and necessary to be protected and regulated by
law. Such self-acknowledgment of individuals through a specific
culture is necessary for preserving identity and prosperity of persons
belonging to a given society, and for acknowledgment of their civil
status.64 Such premises then make way for debates involving
dialectics between multiculturalism and civism, through concepts of
multicultural citizenship (of Will Kumlicka, etc.) and so-called
differentiated (discerning) citizenship/civism (of Iris Marion Young).65
* * *
48
of an individual (i.e., a premise stipulating that our self,
consciousness, and action are deeply interwoven with communal
practices of the culture where we have been formed; our self is not
free and unloaded). Michael Waltzer sheds further light on this
primary membership of culture under economic aspect, claiming that
distribution of primary goods certainly implies membership of certain
human community.66
M. Sandel , Liberalism and The Limits of Justice, 1982, Cambridge University Press; C. Taylor,
Sources of Self: The Making of Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1989; M. Waltzer,
Podrucja pravde, Filip Visnic, Beograd, 2000.
49
in one state, or, several ‘rules of law’ in one political system. This
experience is rather new to the ’democratic taste’ known and
practiced to date and reminds us of the medieval Europe based on
the caste system. Hence, this creates great resistance in liberal
circles with regard to both conception and practice.
If one adds the ‘social thesis’ of Taylor to all of this – namely,
analysis from aspect of the context in which the said differentiated
citizenship is being discussed today, especially: experience of non-
integration of most of ethnic communities in the mainstream of
traditional European cultures, their forced or voluntary ghettoizing;
criminalization; connecting them to or media-based propagandistic
presentation of their connections to terrorism or militant Islam;
reactions like, for example, phobia of Islam and Muslims, and reactive
phenomenon of so-called cultural racism, etc. – then the situation
with debate on multicultural citizenship becomes problematic and
politicized towards confrontation.
The way out seems difficult and still unclear. One of influential
concepts in this direction is that of ‘liberal pluralism’ (as promoted by
W. Kumlicka and others). It is based on several premises that are
interesting and important for analysis. Most important of them are:
defining which and what kind of culture identities are important and so
should be given priority – what to do with other multitude of identities
and diversities; second, what about the respect of human rights
inside, among persons belonging to autonomous identity groups,
which are relevant at macro level and are networked in the political
decision making (i.e., the well-known paradigm: whether there can be
tolerance for the intolerant, authoritarian micro groups both towards
their own group members and towards ‘the outside’, towards the rest
of society. According to Waltzer, the so-called Liberalism 2 has this
quality.); and third, what is and how to obtain equilibrium in whole
society. What does it mean having confrontation and somebody to
arbitrate it? And how can we process conflicts in conditions of a
multicultural citizenship?67
50
identities, societal cultures, pervasive cultures (term used by Mergelit
and Rutz), or, essential communities. These could be also called
‘historical communities’ and fall within the theoretical domain called
by I. Kant ‘noumenal, self-choosy selfness’.68 As such, they are only
relevant in constructing society of multicultural citizenship.
Namely, according to these authors, such cultures emanate
rigid identities for their own members and so surpass all other
possible identities, while self-defining perceptions are refracted
through them. The essence of societal culture is included in
meanings, i.e., manners of self-evaluation of society: values, norms,
choices, and goals it presents to its own members as manner of life
and identity.
The term ‘societal cultures’, rigidly determined as constitutive
element of multicultural citizenship and nevertheless influential, leads
its authors into series of unintentional exaggerations and mistakes.
First we could assail the classification into ‘essential and unessential’
identities; this is especially established with these authors in their
classification into ‘national minorities’ and indigenous peoples (that
should be considered seriously and are entitled to all rights provided
for) on one hand, and, ethnic groups and immigrant communities
(actually it seems that one does not know what to do with them);
however, the latter, even at the very outset, are ranked as ‘second-
class communities’!? Certainly, this is unfounded and does not hold
water in context of the latest tendencies in expanding ‘minority rights’
or rights of cultural diversity of these and even of many other cultural
identities and diversities. Such classification also implies per se an
indefensible dosage of arbitrariness in the act of attributing such
(societal) status to a given community, which many authors have
noted and criticized.69
Some of the aforementioned authors further introduce two,
additional thesis in the said term in order to make it more appropriate
to the liberal traditions. This is the notion of ‘entry into culture’ or
membership of culture, and, accordingly, ‘right of exit’ from it, which in
turn should make a given culture pluralistic and tolerant and at the
same time should protect the individualistic choice made by
68
Such 'self' or 'selfness' is further given elaboration in communitarianist manner by M. Sandel
and A. McIntyre with theses that: a self does not precede but is formed by the communitarian
goals of the community... it is impossible to make demarcation between ME from MY GOALS...,
or that: the story of my life is always embedded in the story of the community that I derive my
identity from... In: Po doblesta, McIntyre, Tabernakul, Skopje, 1998.
69
Cf. Bikhu Parekh: Dilemmas of a Multicultural Theory of Citizenship, Constellation Vol 4, No. 1,
pp. 54-62, 1997; or, John Gray and Iris Marion Young: in op.cit.
51
persons.70 On the other hand, the second group of perhaps
somewhat more successful terms denotes classification into ‘external
protections and internal restrictions’, as attempt to deconstruct group
dynamics and political practice of collective rights and creation of
functional multicultural accommodation (adaptation).
52
decisions made by individual members should not have any influence
on traditional group procedures and customs. On the other hand,
external protections are intended to protect a group from influence by
external factors in context of supremacy by the majority, imposing
alien or other’s practices.72 This institution is acceptable and accepted
in the liberal discourse of modern democracy, in form of affirmative
actions (inverse discrimination; positive discrimination; or specific
measures) and special measures that enable maintaining and
reproduction of minority cultures. Nevertheless, there is a problem
coming from the over-extensive practice of internal restrictions, where
challenge towards a wider consensus based on individual human
rights is rather clear and open.
Regardless of the fact if cited institutions would be accepted
and/or criticized, or even another road would be taken towards
incompatibility, non-communication of diverse cultures under one
political ‘sky’, in one state – in other words, such problem amounts to
how to provide and apply new political consensus, and prevent
imposing by the majority (not even in indirect form).
We would like to elaborate this problem in more detailed
fashion, since it is the key element surrounding conflict situations in
multicultural societies; accordingly, it should be known in order to be
able to prepare negotiations strategy of avoiding or solving conflicts.
* * *
W. Kumlicka , op.cit., p. 35 .
72
Wiliam Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Duties in Liberal State, Cambridge
73
University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 221-224. Here, Galston distinguishes four groups of
skills: social skills as independence, free-thinking; economic skills as work ethics, delay of self-
gratification, accommodation to economic and technological changes; political skills as ability to
respect the rights of others, preparedness to raise demands only if supported, preparedness to
get involved in public discourse.
The quality of citizenship is a function of the preparedness to take part in such community where
civic virtues are necessary together with the procedural-institutional arrangement.
53
between the minimal threshold of shared and accepted liberal
principles of equity as impartiality on one hand, and the maximalist
aspirations of the communitarian position on incomparable and
immeasurable diversities and meanings of various cultures in one
segmented society.
54
Deep diversities are not ‘rational’ and cannot lead to
overlapping consensus even of neutral type (they lead the theory of
equity of Rawls into crisis). It is not possible to separate the public
advocacy for equity and private moral arguments of what is good and
bad in given culture groups. Some of those groups deny definitively
and in detail freedom as option or understand it in very different
manner than liberals do. Although justice as equity (in case of Rawls)
represents an instrument of cooperation, collaboration, and
avoidance of conflicts and is not an instrument for concluding truth
and final moral judgments, even this does not have to be yet shared
as important by some of culture groups. Some groups think that such
‘softness and dullness’ of the moral judgments is rather expression of
decadency and disintegration of the moral code of people and that to
die for own truth still represents the only good and important deed
that makes man a human being. This position in non-militant versions
is denial of cooperation, deliberate marginalization, and ignoring the
outside world.
55
cultural pluralism cannot be divided, i.e., to demand every individual
split himself in public rationality of Rawls’ kind, and in private –
diversity (another rationality) of every individual culture. This is
untenable, schizophrenic position and results in destruction of the
global consensus in such societies.
From this point onwards, theoretical consequences of cited
authors are different. One of them nevertheless goes back to
possibility of having a thin, procedural consensus (like the one with
Rawls) among different groups (because he thinks identities are not
definite and unchangeable, so it would be possible to stimulate liberal
values in them, and suppress patriarchal, repressive, and
fundamentalist values and wants to see state intervention in minority
cultures (Kumlicka). On the other hand, the second author is rather
pessimistic on possibility of external intervention in discourse of
cultures and takes more radical version of ‘splitting’ the state into
different jurisdictions, jurisprudences, legal systems for different
cultures in one state (J. Gray).
We find the epistemological note by C. Taylor referring to this
confrontation of values very productive (using a term coined by Hans-
Georg Gadamer - ‘fusion of horizons’). He says that in evaluating
other cultures we should move along a wider horizon where we reach
our judgments, which are outcome of partial transformation of our
starting standards. Genuine value judgments imply a fused horizon of
standards. They assumed that studying other cultures would not
make transformation. Hence we do not make our judgments only on
basis of own starting standards. In this regard, evaluation is open,
both towards and for the sake of change. Assuming values implies a
universe where diverse cultures add to one another by means of very
different types of contribution. This does not mean that everything is
equivalent, equal, or having equal contribution. Genuine evaluation
also includes perspective of civilization progress; and yet this is done
carefully, from a benchmark position of winning human freedom.
* * *
The debate in the camp of ‘the deconstructionists’, on the other
hand, took the line of defining the already said differentiated,
discerning citizenship (something close to J. Gray’s position), and
even beyond, to elaboration of a concept of democratization of
56
democracy by means of the so-called mirror representation and
deliberative democracy.77
An important component of this line is pointing out the limits
and risks in uncritical acceptance of the identity concept, in form of
the so-called rigid ethnic identities and their participation in the
distribution of power. It was done by pointing out other non-identity
communities, gender identities, and handicapped groups that are
today outside and remain outside in their marginalization and in
society with power divided among ‘the hard identities’. The
consequence of this was entire permeation of the character and
division of identities (criticism of identity logic); underlining the
importance of preservation of individual human rights within identity
communities (opening of identity); as well as further pluralization of
political actors by means of numerous non-identity communities and
handicapped groups.
77
The concept, introduced by I. M. Young, developed another relationship towards identities,
drifting from the so-called hard identities, or nomoi. Namely, this author pointed out the
appearance of non-identity communities by means of criticizing the logic of the identity of gender-
based constellations and rights; and of handicapped communities and social groups that can
remain such even in context of division of power among the hard identity groups. Groups,
according to this viewpoint, should represent in politics according to their interests, attitude and
social perspective. Cf. Iris M. Young Polity and Group Difference : A Critique of the Idea of
Universal Citizenship, Ethics, 99/2, 1989, pp. 250-274.
78
There is interesting distinction, made by some of these authors (Jane Mansbridge) in support of
the deliberative democracy, between: the descriptive and substantial political representation. The
former represents, possibly, all or almost all, while the latter is classical example where the
biggest, most often territorially concentrated, identity groups only are represented. In case of the
former, the descriptive, the parliament is transformed into 'a circus tent' of great diversity of the
represented microcosms of local and interest-based communities. Cf.: J. Mansbridge ,
Descriptive Representation in Communicative Settings.. .. Kumlicka, Norman (ed.), 2000, pp. 99-
123.
On the other hand, Charles Taylor presents a very interesting criticism against the
deconstructionists that he calls 'new followers of Nietzsche'. According to him, they have a cynical
attitude that produces a hypocritical chain thus failing to answer or respond to the question of
cultural pluralism and even distorting it into a question of power and strength. They prefer to not
seriously consider cultural pluralism and claim that all value judgments are based on standards
that are essentially imposed by power structures. They then claim that those standards further
base those power structures in reflexive manner. Cf. Multrikulturalizam, Evro-Balkan, 2004,
Skopje, pp. 58-59.
57
identity character is ASYMMETRIC from aspect of motivation power
for political action, and even more important to us, from aspect of
possibility to become violent and use force in solving own status and
perspective of accommodation. Possibility for violent conflict and
denial of social consensus by use of force – is by far greater in
context of ethno-religious diversities among groups, than it is with
others.
Such hard identity variables as: civil wars; violence; secession;
federalism; closed consensual democracy; ethnic rights connected to
territory; ethnic cleansing (violent or ‘silent’); autonomous and yet
authoritarian minorities, have marked, imposed, and even ‘colonized’
the debate (have created epistemological ‘whirlpool’) in discourse of
social plurality in transition of multicultural societies, after the fall of
communism, as well as in traditional democracies.
58
5.2. Nevertheless, let us make attempt to sum up the debate in
the theory of multicultural citizenship and define out the end position
for the needs of further conflict research.
Namely, these debates singled out the so-called hard and soft
position on multicultural citizenship. The debates also showed
intervention in conflict prevention requires pragmatically political, and
on long-term, stabilizing conception basis, a justice concept that
identified the need for intervention and lays down foundations for
future political structure after a conflict.
Regardless of sometimes rather pessimistic theory on
possibility of a soft universalism of the human rights concept and
justice based on them, it is at least implicitly needed and present,
floating in esoteric manner around every social action for prevention
or settlement of conflicts.
59
‘external protections’ (Kumlicka) stimulate ‘internal reactions’ of
illiberal type.
One could even perhaps accept the position of 'imagination' of identities or nations of B.
80
60
and temporary (never of permanent) character because they have no
future, they do not create new situation but only a status quo until the
next conflict and reaching new balance of power. Then it would be
impossible to have one multicultural society; this would only be a
phase of transition towards ‘settling the score’ among involved
identity groups and creating microcosms of ethnically ‘clean’
identities. This idea is not entirely paranoiac since it has been present
at least as hidden ideal and concept at many negotiations on conflict
resolution.81
81
Bosnia and the Dayton Accord are the most topical negotiations disasters of this kind. Part of
'the greater-nation concepts' of Serbs and Albanians in the Balkans are of the same kind. The
genocide in Rwanda is the most notorious slaughterhouse of the same concept.
82
Cf. Ayelet Shashar, Multicultural Jurisdiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001,
pp. 28-44.
61
internal restrictions. ‘Nomoi’ of such groups do not want to adapt
themselves and so make the consensus of wider society very critical.
* * *
83
This is very important point of the concept, a possibility of evolution towards limited culturalism.
Namely, this is a possibility that is evolving on long-term in the social accommodation of a cultural
group, and yet it is a possibility that is created in explosive manner and in conditions of stress
caused by conflict situation. What we have previously described as 'ripe moment' of a conflict
actually mean that – a group shifts from hard, extremist positions (reactive or even militant
culturalism) because of assessing the cost of continuing the conflict or of being exhausted from it,
to phase of preparedness for negotiations and evolving culturalism that an agreement would
certainly bring.
This is very important information or knowledge when a negotiator must have when he
approaches a moment of solving a conflict.
W. Kumlicka also notes about the possibility of evolution of a group cultural identity that there are
liberal traditions inside every culture and that they should be found, enhanced, supported, and
pulled out to the surface so that evolution of group identity and communications with others would
be possible. Ibid.
62
with interaction with other groups, wider society, the state, and
international intervention.84
84
When we try to graphically present the correlation of the consensus or double loyalties of
individuals towards own cultural groups and wider society (especially in transitional, multicultural
societies), it looks thus:
In the first case, the correlation of loyalty towards the culture of own group and towards the state
are in blocking balance; in the second case, loyalty towards own group is by far greater; and in
the third case there is small but sufficient predominance of loyalty towards the state, maintaining
rather high level of loyalty towards the culture of own group. The third case is that case that would
be stabilizing and desirable in transitional multicultural societies and would lead towards
consolidation of constitutionalism and democracy in those societies.
63
The idea is to avoid falling in what Amartya Sen calls ‘plural
monoculturalism’ where dialog is conducted with the assumption to
confirm stereotypes and not to overcome or reduce their impact.
There is also the idea to create an opportunity (not to compel) for
multiculturalism that would open room for dialog with the assumption
of Charles Taylor and Gadamer: to start with own culture positions;
and yet to change the, in contact with other cultures and values;
finally, to draw conclusions through evolved own culture viewpoints,
viewpoints that include the feedback of making contacts with ‘the
others’. In other words, to provide opportunity for extended horizons
of Gadamer.
64
coordination between different jurisdictions involving diverse cultural
segments resembles the relationship between international law and
national laws. The following offers the essence of the aforementioned
theory of coordination: principles of international law are basically
valid and may not be ignored (without grave implication); however,
the very manner of their implementation is left to happen in the
tradition of national legal systems. Some basic guidelines are
mentioned, in order to prevent misuse, deformation, and non-
observance of international norms; nevertheless manner and pace of
implementation is left to national systems. The institution of ‘margin of
appreciation’ (i.e., margin of allowed deviation in application of some
norm guided by traditions of a national law) is well-known even in
rendering decisions concerning cases brought before international
courts.
* * *
65
So, it remains to explain positions on CONSENSUS and its
making as process in multicultural societies.85
Culture-related facts represent epistemological objectivity that
is different from so-called ontological objectivity (provided it exists).
Namely, culture-related facts do exist and depend on agreements and
consents reached by men on and around them. Therefore,
consensus is in principle POSSIBLE.
However, consensus in multicultural societies cannot be the
same consensus found in homogeneous liberal
cultures/democracies. Consensus in multicultural societies is a
delicate combination made up of liberal values and individual
identities. Namely, such consensus cannot be GIVEN as CONDITION
upon which one state is constructed. One cannot APPEAL for such
consensuses to be accepted by all individuals and groups, because it
is not clear what it contains or should contain as set of values in
order to be accepted as basis for further work.
Consensus in multicultural societies cannot be attained by
appeals for unity and its moralization. It is more of a PROBLEM than
a condition. It is something like ambiguous frame that is WORTH
existing and building, to be filled with values it has (yet) to come to.
From such aspect, consensus is not position, but METAPOSITION.
Being metaposition, such consensus does not represent higher type
of value or higher type of consent on values; it is DIFFERENT type of
consent. Such consent resolves conflict ethics, or values of different
identities. Consensus of this type is not able to do it by imposing a
system pf presumed liberal values; this cane be done by constant
dialog among diversities and by citizens’ action in state of civil
freedom.
Consensus in multicultural citizenship is competent, constant
working (management) with diversities or difference coming out of the
identities. These differences are sometimes hard debates on lack of
freedom, dependence, and fear and violence, and not only on human
rights and democracy as such.
Hence, we have said earlier that such consensus cannot be
granted as previous condition but only ASSIGNED or imposed as
problem, only with POSSIBLE outcome from organizing these
differences. Therefore, this means that such consensus should be
negotiated and it should be reached by civic action that happens in
state of freedom. Consensus is not a thing one has or possesses; it is
See interesting debate on this - in: Herman Van Gunsteren (1998), A Theory of Citizenship,
85
66
only an imperfect and incomplete exercise on consent among
citizens.
The only two conditions for consensus are state of FREEDOM
and DIALOGUE.
* * *
67
DEMOCRATIZATION of democratic societies by inclusion of culture
diversities.
Therefore, the tendency (if one could identify it in this manner)
is for the civil status (and national identity through it) to both include
all citizens – as equal before the law, and to accept and treat them as
equally valuable and legitimate members of the community.
The change that includes culture pluralism is not at all simple;
on the contrary, it is turbulent. Such change, because of its
symbolism and struggle of symbols of diverse cultures, mostly
involves the public sphere of political representativeness in said
struggles and then goes down institutionally to level of civil
networking and micro communities and life styles.
Thus, we come to the first CONDITION for success of
democratic politics in multicultural societies, being INCLUSIVE
politics/representativeness.
68
power; this in turn enables better chances for development and
multiple and overlapping identities. By this, chances are made to
construct a consensually based structure of authority and later in
perspective a symbiotic ‘national identity’.
69
- fallen economies, poverty, gray and criminal economy;
discriminatory and exclusive political institutions (exclusion of entire
culture groups);
- traditions of culture discrimination, bulling by the majority, and
problematic construction of history and historical memories of groups
(as antagonizing, enemy, retaliation, messianic, etc.);
- isolation of such state, its non-involvement in international
security and economic arrangements (states that are ungovernable,
criminaloid, which are split among the warlords, forgotten places,
black holes).
70
6. SECTION THREE
86
W. Zartman, Pruitt, Berman, Hopmann, Faure..., define negotiations in similar manner –
namely, like a process whereby involved sides combine and/or keep their own different positions
in a single way out... Or, at another place in the below cited work: negotiations includes exchange
of proposals for the purpose of reaching common solution starting with different positions, while
the process is guided by the thicks of reciprocity... See in: Escalation and Negotiation... cited
work, pp. 4, 11.
71
very implementation of the basic agreement; sometimes, a separate
agreement would be required for this.87
72
(intermediary; mediator; facilitator; moderator; a go-between
representative offering his good services).
Negotiation as such basically and most often is voluntary;
however, the consent of involved sides to come to the negotiating
table can be likewise obtained under ‘pressure’ from a third side,
mediator, or the international community in form of certain regional
organization, protective power, etc.
73
super-ordinate goals intended for involved sides to enable them a
way out without losing own dignity and feeling defeated.
- Preventive diplomacy
Preventive diplomacy is non-coercive collection or set of
diplomatic actions aimed at localizing a dispute or conflict before
reaching level or proportions of wider confrontations, and attempt to
guide involved sides towards dialog and agreement. Preventive
diplomacy has been promoted as special set of actions since 1960s
by the UN (Michale Lund, Dag Hammarksjold, 1960, UN; Thompson
and Gutlove, 1994).
We note that preventive diplomacy could be used in three
situations: for conflict prevention – when efforts are aimed at
prevention of outbreak of violence between involved sides regardless
of reasons or sources of dispute; prevention of escalation of already
existing conflict – when efforts are aimed at prevention of conflict
expansion by additional means, in further or wider territory and
additional actors; and post-conflict prevention – when efforts are
aimed at preventing renewal of hostilities when an agreement has
been already reached and its implementation has started.89
Like all other diplomatic measures, this also needs to be
supported by coercive diplomacy or diplomacy of threats as its
‘background’ in order to demonstrate real-life efficiency and
effectiveness. The UN and EU engagements in the Balkans by
means of such preventive diplomacy had clearly shown the need of
such connection.
- Early warning
88
Terms that are used in context of conflict prevention or conflict management are numerous. Out
of them, the following are more frequently seen: conflict control; conflict regulation; conflict
resolution. Terms that are used in the procedures of conflict management are: conflict avoidance;
conflict prevention; conflict settlement; conflict solving (conflict resolution, conflict solution – in
context not of a final act, but in context of a series of actions).
89
Cf. Breaking Cycles of Violence, cited work, p. 99.
74
Early warning is complex activity of gathering, analyzing, and
delivering information on and around a crisis region and involved
sides in order to have preparation of well-founded diplomatic and
other actions for conflict prevention. Intention of gathering data on
involved sides and circumstances of a conflict lies in preparation of
alarmed-based independent fact-finding and identification of crisis.90
It is considered that this institutions has been ‘devised’ in 1992
In the Report prepared by 28 member countries of the so-called
Brant Commission.
Contrary to intelligence services and their activities of similar
type, early warnings motivated by universal humanitarian, and not by
national interests. Some authors distinguish conflict early warning
(CEW), from humanitarian nearly warning (HEW). The latter is
concentrated on warning factors that might lead to violence, and if a
conflict has already emerged, concentrate on factors that lead to
ceasefire, truce and protection of peace-keeping forces in the field.
Therefore, contrary to national intelligence information, early
warning is not focused on threats that appear for a certain country,
but it is intended for improvement of conditions leading to effective
conflict management.
Early warning networks/constructions are built by independent
information sources and analytical experts/centers that analyze,
develop and interpret information – thus developing strategic
scenarios in short-term, mid-term and long-term reports.
Early warning needs to be made systematically and in ‘network’
of connection with other analytical centers and power centers, in
order to develop a system of efficient exchange of information and all
its parts to get chance to understand what goes on in other parts and
segments. This in turn would help detect ‘the great picture’ of conflict
factors, without taking in account only one of them.
75
come out of the bushes or cross the path of the hunters, and finally
the hunters lose track of the bear);
- information dead-ending; this usually happens when relevant
pieces of information get into the hands of irrelevant decision-makers
and so there is no effect or even feedback of what has been done
with such information.
- Facilitation
Facilitation, facilitators, assistance, assistant – all of these in
conflict resolution mean: a process undertaken by a third side,
country(-ies) involving political and expert assistance to involved
sides to reach mutually acceptable solutions.
Assisting in conflict resolution process is less ambitious and
with less pressure inspired diplomatic activity then mediation is.
- Mediation
Mediation is international law institution involving peaceful
conflict resolution by a which a third side helps involved sides to
come to terms in order to solve given conflict.
In principle mediators do not create solution that is afterwards
imposed to involved sides; on the other hand, mediators are more
engaged in assisting involved sides to come to such solution by
themselves. However, given the very fact that mediators as such
indeed have the right to propose solutions to be given for further
consideration to involved sides, and also given the fact that a
mediator is very often an authoritative side that has influence on both
sides in conflict, his proposal has enough weight of a pressure to be
accepted.
Such mediators, go-betweens, or intermediaries are chosen
among senior politicians, and reputable diplomats from countries that
have shown influence, strong integrity, experience and knowledge in
given area. They should provide or secure an atmosphere where
every involved side would feel respected, heard, and safe about its
interests.
76
Mediators should be discreet, unbiased, and salient.
However, mediators and mediation very often can represent ‘a
conservative action’; this happens when a mediator takes the
situation in the field and balance of power between involved sides as
something for granted (often this could be a very unbalanced and
unfair situation). Likewise, mediators could develop their own motive
for such mediation process and this could have an impact on the
conflict. Mediation includes its own paradox: in order to have
successful mediation, a mediator needs to be strong and influential;
however, this can be reflected by corresponding ‘underestimation’ of
involved sides, putting them in the background and compromising
them.91
- Arbitration
Arbitration is application of legal norms in solving a dispute or
part of it, along mediation activities. This is most easily done in
accordance with arbitration rules and procedures (that are
international law standard).
- Reconciliation
Reconciliation means a longer process of solving antagonisms
that were basis of certain culture identity conflict Some authors call
this institute ‘transforming’ (Lederach), or peacemaking (Curle).
Usually this process covers three elements of the solution: emotional
cognitive and behavioral.
91
This chart (borrowed from C. R. Mitchel, cited work, p. 297) is effective in showing positioning of
the best choice of a mediator in a given conflict, taking in due consideration the circumstances of
his strength, influence, and impartiality:
77
In its entirety, ‘reconciliation’ helps individuals and groups
create ways and go through a process of own self-recognition and
‘healing’ by accepting ‘the other’ as equally worth.
Reconciliation should ‘release’ victims of obsessive need to
retaliate that also results in pain and suffering: to create a safe zone
so that perpetrators of atrocities confess such crimes and discover all
others who know them so that that whole truth about sufferings see
the light of day, and when it is possible for such perpetrators to
express regrets and repentenance; and finally, reconciliation should
break the vicious circle of violence and mutual harm.
Very often Desmond Tutu, the Archbishop of South Africa, is
rightfully cited in context of the importance of reconciliation. He says
that reconciliation is not some nebulous and symbolic politics; it is
very pragmatic politics. Without forgiveness there is no future.
It is good when this procedure also develops institutions of
regular and lasting communications – interactions by individuals and
groups whereby they are faced (in initial stages) with suffering they
went through; later; such institutions can also serve for solving other
possible conflict situations. Important element of reconciliation
represents educational programs that ‘reconstruct’ history, collective
memory of groups and make them learn it again together.
This method again underlines importance of emotions in this
type of conflicts. Emotions can sometimes play key role and
understanding them has a role in the finish has well.
by one involved side; with a long-term status quo, or with 'dying out' of such conflict; with
acceptance of a defeat-capitulation; and with series of strategies for conflict settlement by means
of negotiations.
78
prepare himself for them, and which factors can be left to be
developed during negotiation and then to take position and determine
method or technique of approach.
79
- What are the main GOALS of negotiations In the concrete
case: ceasefire; democratic consolidation; establishment of
international norms in a given area, etc.;
80
potential validity or acceptance of the so- called trial balloons of ideas
and solutions.
Pre-negotiations can also be transformed into a so-called two-
track diplomacy. Namely, even after start of formal negotiations when
pre-negotiations should end as such, a parallel line of check and
contacts between involved sides and mediator may still be
maintained that would not have same weight as that of formal
proposals and negotiations; this would serve to check acceptability of
some solutions that would appear later on the negotiation table. Such
‘two-track diplomacy’ is also a form of pressure for constructiveness
of involved sides in negotiations, and a technique for avoiding
proposals unacceptable to some involved side, thus blocking the
negotiation process.
Speaking about pre-negotiations, again one can see the
importance of the role of third sides, mediators and intermediaries, in
cultivation of that ripe moment that opens a negotiation process, for
technique in approaching involved sides, taking in account their
specific and cognitive, perceptive viewpoints on a conflict and their
own role in it.
81
strategies. However, this could remain only on solutions of this type of
negotiations.
Distributive negations have point of departure in the assumption
that a given conflict is ‘zero-sum game’ and distribution is always a
gain by one side at the expense of the other, and vice-versa. Such
type of negotiations, basically, were the Dayton Process and the
Dayton Agreement; probably the first part of the negotiations on
decentralization (i.e., territorial division) of Kosovo would be of this
type.
82
interrogative negotiations actually raise chances of successful
distributive outcomes.94
For example, Druckman (1999) cites 16 aspects through which
negotiations can be monitored and relate to such categories as:
involved sides; topics; process; conditions; or successful outcome of
these.
According to the manner of conducting negotiations, authors
classify them negotiations modeled in sequences (Douglas,
Zartrman, Gulliver, Pruitt, Druckman…), or negotiations in cyclical
model (Coddington, Snyder and Diesing, Cross…).
Both approaches have central point in locating the turning point
during negotiations, after which the process turns towards finding
solution and way out.
94
For this, see: Guy Oliver, Deadlocks in Negotiation Dynamics, in Escalation and Negotiation.. ..
(ed), W. Zartman, G. Oliver, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 23-53 .
95
For this, see also in: International Negotiation , A Journal of Theory and Practice, 7/3, 2002 The
Hague-London, pp. 332, 380.
83
solutions that should oppose risk of compromization, wasted time and
positions.
* * *
84
Hence the question is which side would propose negotiations.
The paradox of warring sides says this is not a simple job to do,
because of creates perception of weakness, defeat, or futile attempts
to avoid defeat; so involved sides are often reluctant to show this.
Therefore they might even go on with such conflict, although they are
objectively prepared for that.
In case of this type, the proposal made by the third
side/mediator represents the key in obtaining consent to start
negotiations. This could even be the key to unlock the deadlock:
which side will be the one making proposals for negotiations. Such
negotiations proposal could be reinforced by explaining the position
of the international community on the said conflict and and
impossibility of both sides to gain advantage by military means. Such
explanation given by a serious mediator can be used by any involved
side to convince its extremist wings why such negotiations should be
accepted.
Briefly, a negotiations proposal made by a serous mediator can
be a way out for every involved side to commence negotiations
without showing any signs of weakness’ i.e., to solve ‘the syndrome
of weakling’.
85
A successful negotiator manages ‘to play’ and come close to a
compromise by maneuvering between false and genuine levels of
concession by involved sides.
* * *
86
Analysis of their conduct at negotiations shows that ‘extremists’
know more clearly ‘what they want’, while moderates know better
‘what they do not want'. Hence, this creates or cements moderates in
a conservative position that has no clear viewpoint about a positive
list of solutions (since their political wing did not have any debate on
this); on the other hand, the agenda of military, extremist wings is a
list of clear demands and goals. They can be unacceptable at first
sight, and yet extremists may be well ready to make compromises
with them. If an essential part of their goals is realized, extremists
could abandon the rest.97 ‘Extremist’ military wings at the same time
have no or have less risk that someone more extremist than they are
would assault them for making compromises or concessions in
negotiations. The are, so to say, the last level after which there is no
one to challenge the agreement. Anyhow, this question of internal
split in one or both involved sides in a conflict is complex problem for
a mediator who has to consider it in phase of making choice of
negotiation sides.98 Usual recommendation for a mediator is ‘to wait’
for different parts of one involved side to reach a minimal joint
position and then to appoint their joint representatives. However,
when this is seemingly impossible or takes took long, then a mediator
can open options of pressure and sub-mediation towards a
provisional joint platform that would be modified or strengthened
depending on the course of negotiations.
87
formal activities on negotiation table. Mediators, because of that fact
and own interest to be successful, very often have tendency to be
rather conservative. Namely, this means to take the position in the
field as the given position to be used as point of departure. However,
this does not have to be in accordance with principles of legality or
legitimacy in international law. Namely those who exercise actual
control by use of force did not necessarily acquire it by lawful means;
this does not have to mean that such people are fighting for legitimate
goals either. This might result in an absurd position for a mediator
who for the sake of being successful should be ‘unjust’ and should
even legalize injustice and violence?!
Certainly this ha been noticed as a problem. This is solved by
taking in due consideration the circumstances of every specific
mediation, in accordance with the general principles of the jus
cogens norms of international law – i.e., in accordance with protected
values; however it seems there is still much room for the realpolitik or
for embedding positions of power from the field into such international
frames. However, this needs additional asymmetrical pressure and
designing negations position towards global legality of involved
sides.99
For example, very often there is pressure on ’the government
forces’ in order to enable formal equality of ‘the rebels’.100 One of
possible process solutions for such imbalance in the power of
involved sides in negotiations is to shift the debate towards common
contributions, creativity, and inventiveness of the negotiations
process and to defocus from fixation for power imbalance.
99
A legitimate mediator/mediation cannot politically and lawfully 'legalize' a position of an involved
side that, for example, commits ethnic cleansing or even a genocide; however, the position of EU
and the USA towards the regime of Milosevic in Serbia, during the Conference on former
Yugoslavia and the mediation of Lord Carrington relating to the dissolution of SFRY, was tolerated
for a long time in spite of such atrocities in Croatia and in Bosnia, until the very moment when it
was clearly seen that the Milosevic regime did not want at all any agreement on relatively
peaceful dissolution of former Yugoslavia. Since that moment in 1992, the position of the
international community changed and even turned against that regime. Had Milosevic accepted
peace in 1992, it is very likely that no international war tribunal like the one in the Hague would
have ever been established even for the atrocities committed previously.
100
Such was the case of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia. The international
community exerted huge pressure on the Macedonian government security forces in the early
phase of the conflict to restrain and not escalate the situation so that the conflict could be quickly
modified on the negotiation table. At the same time, the international community 'transformed' its
vocabulary and so 'transformed' the agenda of 'the Albanian bandits and criminals' (attributes
used personally by the then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in early 2001, at the start of
the provocations at the Macedonia-Kosovo border) from ethno-nationalist and exclusive into an
agenda of minority rights. As such, it was acceptable for international mediation that resulted in
the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.
88
* * *
Let us note here that the choice of ‘the third side’, mediator,
intermediary, or a go-between, is very important, sometimes even
very crucial for the negotiation process. In case of identity conflicts,
this is very often a central operation making other things dependent.
A mediator ideally should have an aggregate sum of several
important features, or predisposition for successful mediation.
89
The mediator includes in the process of pre-negation and
negations many of his skills and potentials (relating to sociological
assessments, anthropology, international relations, history, etc.), and
his experiences in making contacts.
A mediator offers means of communications (provided involved
sides do not have direct communications) and resources for this. A
mediator should offer procedural solutions, draft measures and
facilitatory analysis and operations. A mediator can supply conflict
sides additional information they do not have or have not paid
attention to. That is to say, he enables a process to reach solutions.
A mediator provides political coverage and representativeness of the
process in the international media. A successful mediator makes
involved sides feel ‘safe and sound’, that nothing wood happen to
them from behind their back and that their interests would be
understood and respected.
90
incapable, etc.’ There can be even an outbreak of public protests and
staging demonstrations or riots on such occasion. The mediator has a
very important role in two directions in such moments: the first is to
convince involved sides/signatories that offered solutions are indeed
fair, standard, supported and confirmed by international law and
practice and to calm down their ‘trembling hand’ which prevents them
to sign the agreement. This is called ‘trembling hand syndrome’,
when a hand of a signatory person trembles before affixing his own
signature on a document. This not only happens because of
weaknesses or ignorance of conflict actors about the type of solutions
being offered, but also because of the character of the identity conflict
that represents confrontation of values, history and signs, and not
merely interests and solutions. Every side/signatory involved in such
conflict asks himself whether he is really that subject who is entitled
to historical right to finalize such request (for example, use of
language, symbols, religious freedom, political participation ,etc.) in
the name of its own people or group in a definite way in a given
agreement? Maybe future generations would condemn the signatory
and call him a traitor?
In such moments ‘the hand starts trembling'. This is the
description of circumstances of a situation that is frequent in identity
negotiations in moments of finding agreements and solutions. The
role of a mediator is decisive in this. He should reconcile such
connection of offered solutions with history, mythology and ideology
of the nation or of the ethnicity in question and to redirect the debate
towards concrete solutions. He should present the solution as fair,
good, or at least harmless to 'the cause’ of such group.
In such given situation, a mediator shows his true position in
relation to actors and his robustness to convince and make them
adhere to the procedure. 101
Likewise, these are moments when a mediator also shows his
position towards the media outlets that cover the negotiations, i.e.,
the manner that makes them part of negotiations. He should
establish measures for constant briefing that are not
counterproductive to the negotiations process and position of
101
The negotiations on the 2001 Framework Agreement in Ohrid, in the Republic of Macedonia,
were very characteristic in this context. The very strong and powerful team of international
mediators (EU represented by Leotard, and the USA by Pardew) assumed the role of de facto
representing the positions of the Albanian minority in Macedonia concerning the government
positions. They were solving the frequent appearances of 'the trembling hand syndrome' with the
Albanians on issues relating to the use of their language or the university instruction in Albanian
language; they did this vis-a-vis the Macedonians on issues relating to the unitary character of the
state and use of the Albanian language in the national parliament.
91
negotiators; however he should also meet the justified expectations
for information from media outlets that cover the negotiations. He
should even go further: create opinion and suggest viewpoint that
would assist the negotiations. As the position of the media and the
picture they create about the negations become of constitutive
meaning for manipulation or assistance to the negotiators, and the
international community and its public opinion, then the relationship
towards the media is not secondary but a crucial part of the
negotiations process. 102
92
and are an opposition to the negotiating party (in the same bloc). The
third level is between the represented political actors and their voters
or the political public they represent.
93
Nevertheless, the one that dominates and that sets topics is the
formal line of negotiation, but even it may sometimes give in before
media interpretations or political discussions on the line negotiating
party-political party-the public.103 Experience has confirmed that if
there is greater connection and trust between the negotiators and
their own bases, agreements are more easily reached and their
implementation is more stable.
Furthermore, in view of the referred relation, the mediator is
recommended to bring to the negotiating table the whole variety of
parties and movements of the negotiating parties, thus creating
condition for making the negotiation, though more complex, more
stable, unchallenged, and the outcome implemented.104
- Negotiations start
Technically, the negotiations start by informing the negotiating
parties about the time, the venue, and the formal participants.
Additionally, a draft agenda of the negotiation is distributed on
scheduled dates and potentially a series of working information and
‘non-papers’ for certain transitional technical negotiations.
94
The second stage starts when the mediator gives the floor to
the parties to present their views on the problem and its sources, as
well as their views on the main obstacle to its resolution. This stage
can last two or three days and sometimes even more if the parties
rejoin the views of the other party or delay the process from entering
the subsequent stages for tactical reasons.
95
negotiations. Negotiations should be conducted with the expectation
that the positions of the parties, while not changing in their essence,
will agree with each other, will be set at the level of realism and that
the parties will endeavor to make the best for their interests from that
position into a mutually acceptable resolution.
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and remarks of the other party, making this technique tense by
definition.
107
In the Ohrid negotiations in Macedonia in 2001, the first issues that were selected were the
issues of ceasing the clashes, the position on the unity of the state (unitary principle), and later
the contentious issues were approached: dimensions of the use of the languages of the
minorities, police and army recruitment, and university level education.
In the negotiations on the status of Kosovo (Ahtisaari, 2006-7), the levels of protection of the
rights of the minorities and the issue of decentralization were approached first, followed by the
major issue of the status and the form of independence of that entity.
108
Naturally, there are counter-examples, as are the negotiations for the status of Kosovo. In spite
of the relative successes with the initial issues of decentralization (which were convenient for the
Serbs), the Serbian party entirely rejected the final formula for ‘conditional independence of
Kosovo’. Unsurprisingly, the diplomats and the analysts who are acquainted with the issue
expected this as the ‘technique’ which the Serbs have applied ever since the regime of Milosevic
for this type of negotiations (on issues they considered exclusively ‘theirs’): participation in the
negotiations for anything which is of Serbian interest, but by the point of final resolution, which
was always rejected on account of some ‘consistent’ positions, whether it was about the plan of
Lord Carrington for peaceful dissolution of SFRY at the 1992 Hague Conference on former
Yugoslavia, or about the negotiations for Kosovo. Only the Dayton negotiations were different
because the situation on the field, the isolation of the negotiators and the strong pressure from
the mediators prevented such maneuvers of the Serbs.
97
This technique implies that the agreement includes a clause by
which certain sections or even the entire agreement may be opened
for revision after a certain period. This technique intends to
incorporate an element of temporariness, impermanence in the
agreements with hope that the parties will accept the agreement
more readily. The starting point is the experience that the parties are
‘closed’ to accepting provisions that permanently resolve a certain
issue. This increases their responsibility and causes the ‘trembling
hand syndrome’, which is discussed above. It is possible that the
pressure from the grass-root level and rival parties increases until it
becomes intolerable to the negotiating party, resulting in its
withdrawal from the negotiations. Such situations are countered with
the inclusion of a contingency clause, which relieves, in a certain
manner, the situation of an atmosphere of ‘fatality’, of once and
forever made decisions, and provides a possibility for the parties to
address certain issues or the entire agreement, after the period
envisaged by the clause, on their own initiative or through the
mediator.109
- Shuttle diplomacy
Technique of so-called shuttle diplomacy. This technique
implies robust and strong role of the third party – the mediator in the
negotiations. It exerts active and strong pressure on the parties to
reach an agreement by submitting series of proposals, insisting on
regular contacts and persisting that the parties present their views on
the proposals, thus progressing one step at a time. This may be
combined, at a certain point ('the ripe moment' of the negotiation
process), with a proposal of a package of overall resolution to the
dispute by the mediator and renewed pressure on the parties to
accept the package on the grounds of ‘take it or leave it’, without
negotiations for the details of the package.
This technique can be combined with temporary isolation of the
negotiating parties at a suitable site for conducting negotiations and
with strong safeguards for the parties if they accept the agreement.
This technique implies a powerful third party, which possesses
109
Such clause is included in the Accord regarding the name dispute between Macedonia and
Greece and it envisages a period of 7 years; such clause, which envisages a period of 10 years,
was included in the last proposal of the mediator M. Nimitz for compromise on the resolution of
the dispute submitted in 2006.
98
instruments for coercive diplomacy or diplomacy of coercion and
capacity to offer safeguards and rewards for constructiveness.110
- Bypassing
Bypassing, or circumventing, is a technique with which when
the negotiators or the mediator encounter an issue which is
particularly complex and conflicting for the actors or when they
anticipate that a certain issue is such before it is put forward for
discussion, they suggest, formally or informally, that it be bypassed
(postponed) or resolved by means of bypassing resolutions or
proposals. For example, if they encounter the issue of territorial
demarcation of a certain disputed area, they can propose to postpone
its resolution, and in the meantime a referendum of the local
population conducted under international monitoring or a similar
measure that will determine the future demarcation of the dispute
area can be agreed. In similar manner, for the issues of the overall
constitutional, status position of an entity, the direct denomination of
the status can be bypassed by listing a series of prerogatives.
Occasionally, although non-ambiguity of agreements is
recommended, keeping the resolutions ambiguous and subject to
different interpretations is a necessity that can provide an answer to
or way out from critically conflicting stages. This approach takes into
consideration that a period of time under close international
monitoring will facilitate the explanation and clarification of the issue
resolutions in the agreement, which have been left ambiguous or
have been bypassed.
The risk of this approach is, naturally, that the ambiguous or
bypassed resolutions can be permanent source of disagreement and
new conflicts. However, basically the break-out of new conflicts or
renewal of old hostilities primarily do not depend on the ambiguity of
resolution but in the general climate and will to settle or resume the
conflict (by the actors) and on the power and authority of the
international mediators. The latter should press for ending the conflict
and prepare a plan for implementation that will engage and duly
reward the constructive actors. Thus, the motives for renewal of the
disputed ambiguous parts will diminish and disappear.
Classic examples for this method are the Oslo talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis,
110
99
- ‘Double interpretation’
Technique of leaving intentional ‘double interpretation’, different
reading, or interpretation of certain provisions of the agreement.
This technique provides for deliberately leaving certain parts or
provisions of the agreement open to partial different interpretation by
each actor. With this technique, rather than bypassing the disputed
issue is legally resolved but the resolution is later interpreted
differently and each party can present it according to their political
needs and their voters. For example, the same provisions for the
status of the municipalities in a given entity whose structure is
negotiated can be interpreted by one party only as decentralization,
while the other party can interpret them as special status of the
municipalities similar to cantonization or cultural autonomy.
This allows the actors to present the same provisions as ‘their
success’ in the negotiations. This can be useful, especially in the part
of the negotiations called ‘marketing of the agreement’.
- 'Logrolling'
'Logrolling' (tit-for-tat) or trade-off. This technique of exchange
of concessions is based on the endeavor to trade one concession of
one party with a similar one of the other party. This can be
accomplished within one topic or for a concession from a different
area of the whole of the dispute. It is important that the parties have
a feeling of fair ‘exchange’, which would enable the agreement to
‘live’.
The restraining framework of this exchange, which largely
depends on the will of the parties and feeling of balance, lies in what
is called ‘international standards in the area’. The mediator should be
111
An illustrative example for this is the provisions for the use of the languages of the ethnic
communities of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia. There, the same provisions,
later regulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia on basis of this Agreement, allow
for the Macedonians to define the use as restrictive and classified-by-name official use of another
language beside the official Macedonian language (which is exclusively used in international
relations), and whereas the Albanians can interpret the same provision (Article 7 of the
Constitution) as ‘official use of the Albanian language'.
Such solution is applied in the document on Kosovo proposed by the mediator Ahtisaari, where
the Albanians interpret the status of the Serbian municipalities only as expanded decentralization,
while the Serbs interpret it as de facto cantonization, special autonomy, asymmetric
decentralization etc (in order to avoid partition of Kosovo).
100
fully acquainted with the situation of the international norms and
standards as well as the international practice in the area and be fully
aware and responsible when proposing resolutions by exchange of
concessions that they comply with the standards. The reason for this
is that the set ‘breakthroughs’ can cause negative reactions from the
international community when the agreement is published because
they provide unwelcome precedent that could be used in other similar
conflicts. Such overcoming exchanges can cause a reaction of
additional withdrawal of the parties when the negotiating process
settles down and when they see from distance what they have
accepted and where it leads them.
- Re-entry problem;
- Impasse, deadlock;
- 'Trembling hand syndrome'
101
other party. In such situation, it seems that further bringing closer of
the positions of the parties is not possible and the negotiations come
to a standstill.112
Therefore, impasse is a standstill in the dynamics of making
concessions and reaching compromises in the negotiation process. It
should be distinguished from the similar term ‘stalemate’, i.e. status
quo, which is defined as standstill in the dynamics of the conflict on
the field where military clashes take place.
102
the negotiation process becomes paralyzed. One of the parties can
construct, simulate a tactical deadlock if it considers that the
negotiations progress ‘too fast’, that the parties do not have enough
time to realize where the agreed resolutions lead them and that they
need a break in order to evaluate all dimensions of the hitherto
accepted agreements. There can also be reactions from the ‘bases’
of the parties that the negotiations are ‘suspicious’, or a media
reaction for the harmfulness of the negotiations aimed negatively at
the negotiating parties etc. In such cases, the parties may conclude
that a tactical deadlock can be a temporary exit serving the purpose
of gaining time and consolidating their positions.
103
expansion of the crisis resulting in undesirable human and material
loses.
1988, pp. 474-495. In societies with predominant group-oriented culture, the informal social credit
which is received with actions of ‘preserving, saving and losing honor’ is of vital importance.
104
Then, the mediator needs to approach the key operation of
identifying the negotiating PARTIES from the numerous actors
involved in the conflict. The most important question at this stage is to
compose a single negotiating party from the political and the radical
military wings and actors of each conflict party. This can pose a
particularly difficult problem since, as we have mentioned, the political
wings may feel ‘punished’ for their moderation with the act of bringing
radical wings to the same negotiating side. On the other hand, the
radical wings are pushed to compromise by the same act of sitting to
negotiate (with the ‘enemy’), which is good and important for the
mediator. At the same time, this is also important for the mediator
from the aspect of having all options from each side around the same
negotiating table.
The mediator needs to be especially convincing in order to
compose a single negotiating party from such different and
sometimes warring actors on one side of the table. The mediator will
possibly not be able to assemble a single negotiating team from such
actors, but then he needs make a decision which of the actors will be
defined as a party and which will be maintained in the gravitation of
the negotiation process, being regularly informed and consulted, in an
informal position of ‘shadow actor’. This control and consultation
serves the purpose of ensuring that the negotiation process
significantly represents all options and that the agreement will not be
threatened eventually by someone that was not included in the
process.
Subsequently, the mediator must decide which of the so-called
grass-roots actors – the population in whose territory the conflict
takes place and who are essentially its greatest victims – will be
included in the process and at which stage.
Finally, the mediator must carefully choose his expert support.
The experts assist the mediator, especially in drafting resolutions and
the legal outline of the agreement.
The role of the experts and the mediator in proposing
resolutions is particularly important as it creates a matrix for the
concrete and a precedent for future resolution of similar conflicts.
Therefore, the experts must be well acquainted with the international
standards in the field together with the traditions and the balance of
forces in the dispute in question.
105
Upon assembling negotiating parties and expert support, the
mediator enters the nest stage of defining the procedure for
conducting the process.
Usually, the work should be divided into ‘plenary’ meeting
sessions – all actors at one meeting – working (face-to-face)
meetings with each side. The optimal timing is usually two separate
sessions of three hours every day.
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etc., all for the purpose of attaining initial, small but successful
breakthroughs.117
117
The general form of the ‘non-paper’ is actually an unofficial document in which a resolution is
drafted. This form does not bring reaction by the potentially unsatisfied party as it is unofficial and
can be withdrawn as if it never existed; but it is a good instrument to explore and define a
possible resolution that can afterward be officially proposed.
107
6.9. IMPLEMENTATION of the agreement
108
This supports the thesis presented at the beginning of this text
that the negotiators actually make a special political decision
(separated from the ones to start negotiations) that concerns the
determination to implement the agreed.
109
change towards social conditions of togetherness and healing of the
wounds from the conflicts.
110
The corruption of the elites of the parties that were in conflict is
an endemic problem (they consider that they should reward
themselves for their ‘success’ from the assistance from the
guarantors). If these two types of corruption deteriorate, the
implementation faces its most serious obstacle to success.
There is no cure-all for corruption, but an efficient system of
monitoring the facilitation of assistance (by the guarantors) that will
include coercive diplomacy and coercive threats for the manner in
which it is conducted (if there are corruptive occurrences) is
absolutely necessary.
A second means are the training programs for the
administration at all levels that provide education in management and
administrative skills for normal utilization of assistance, as well as
functioning of the system as a whole.
111