THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF JUSTICE IN

TRADITIONAL IGBO JURISPRUDENCE

Ikenga K. E. Oraegbunam

1. Introduction
Justice is a cardinal pillar of Igbo judicial and legal systems.
The Igbo have a very strong sense of justice which is littered in
many an Igbo cultural ethos and pathos. The proverbs, idioms,
folklores, folk songs and other linguistic sources are some important
purveyors of this value system. Igbo justice is practised in land
matters, inheritance issues, socio-communal development strategies,
interpersonal relationships and sundry avenues. This paper seeks to
examine these sources and scenarios with a view to deciphering the
fundamental concepts and principles of autochthonous Igbo justice
system. It will equally inquire into whether or not the principles and
practice of justice in traditional Igbo enclave are still sustainable in
the light of the present wave of globalization. This study will be
capped with a juxtaposition of traditional justice administration with
the prevailing Nigerian justice/legal system. In other words, it will
examine the status and position of indigenous system vis--vis
English-style regime imbibed, as it were, in Nigerian jurisprudence
as part of colonial legacy. Our methodology will be largely critical
and analytic.

2. Igbo Sociology and Worldview Described
The Igbo people constitute one of the major tribal groups in
Nigeria today. According to the colonial geography, the Igbo occupy
mainly the eastern part of the country. They are today found in high
concentration in Anambra, Abia, Enugu, Ebonyi and Imo States of
Nigeria. There are also large Igbo populations in Delta and River
States. Igbo people are a very migrant race. They are in large
numbers resident in Northern Nigeria and in Old Ogoja, Calabari,
Benin, and Lagos. More, Igbo migrants trooped out to the
Cameroons, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Central
African Republic, and recently to all parts of ECOWAS sub-region
and the South Africa. And apart from the trans-Atlantic slave trade
54 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


that populated Europe and the Americas with good number of Igbo
elements, the 20
th
and 21
st
centuries have also witnessed an
unprecedented influx of the people into the Western world perhaps
in search of greener pastures. More so, as a result of cultural
diffusion experienced both by the home front due to colonial
incursion and neocolonialism and by the Diaspora who presently are
in serious romance with the western culture, much of the traditional
practices have undergone serious modification. This is certainly
consequent upon Igbo receptivity and amenability to change.
1

Hence, the Igbo traditional socio-political institutions notably
communalism, communitism, republicanism and religion have
been drastically altered and modulated by imperialist incursion and
Igbo access to western education, culture, Christianity and
capitalism. City consciousness and urbanity have become integral
components of the Igbo society. Onitsha, Aba, Enugu, Owerri,
Umuahia, Awka, Nnewi, Agbor, Asaba and Abakaliki are fast
growing Igbo cities populated, as it were, by hitherto rural dwellers.
Another stamp of westernism is made manifest in physical
structures such as roads, streets, electricity, hospitals, building
architecture, house furniture and home facilities, and so on.
Yet, in spite of the above foreign influence and more, certain
traditional practices are quite resilient. In the hinterland, some
traditional Igbo communities live in dispersed settlements. The Igbo
village, which is a small face-to-face society, is still easily
recognizable. A number of closely clustered compounds and families
form the Igbo village, and several villages make up towns. Again,
despite modern alterations, the Igbo traditional political institutions
that are designed to combine popular participation with weighing for
experience and ability are still in tandem with extended family
sociology. The family head, the elders, the age grade, secret
societies, masquerade cults, etc play a leading role in this socio-
political structure. Economically, the Igbo in the urban areas are
traders and crafts-men. In the rural areas, they are largely farmers.
But in modern times, a good number are professionals in the areas of
law, science, medicine, and management. The people embrace
Christianity in large numbers. However, much of Igbo traditional
living and attitudes is still conditioned by its traditional worldview
Ikenga Oraegbunam 55



which is described by Nwala as the Igbo complex of beliefs, habits,
laws, customs and tradition of reality.
2

In spite of the relatively new religion of Christianity, the
Igbo anthropology habours a widespread belief in supreme and
unique God. Chukwu (the Great Spirit), Chineke (the Creator Spirit),
Osebuluuwa (the Lord who upholds the world), Ezechitoke (the
Spirit King Creator), Okasiakasi (the Greatest Being), etc are some
of the names with which this God is addressed. The traditional Igbo
people also believe in the lesser spirits, and the ancestors through
whom they can also go to Chukwu.
Igbo worldview also exudes a manifest anthropocentricism.
This is the view that man occupies the central position in any
meaningful human activity including religion. Writing about African
worldview generally, Metuh holds that everything seems to get its
bearing and significance from the position, meaning and end of
man.
3
This is also true of the Igbo for whom in spite of the deep
respect and recognition of innumerable divinities, the relevance
thereof is very much subject to their effect on man.
4
Hence, the Igbo
have a functional, pragmatic and do ut des approach to religion and
culture. Sequel to this anthropocentric sensibility is the life-
affirming character of Igbo worldview that is often celebrated in
rituals, festivals and ceremonies. The Igbo esteem life, value it,
celebrate it and do anything to protect and sustain it.
Further, the traditional Igbo view reality in a non-
compartmentalized manner. Their political, social, economic,
cultural, moral, legal and religious aspects of life form a continuum.
Everything seems to have a profound religious substractum mostly
in order to enhance human life hic et nunc. It is this practical socio-
religious framework that informs the traditional Igbo notion of
justice.

3. Justice Defined
There is no generally accepted definition of justice.
Etymologically, however, justice derives from the Latin ius
iustus meaning law, a legal right. In this sense, law and
justice would be synonymous terms. But this is a misnomer. What
56 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


is more correct is that law is to justice what a means is to an end, or
a cause to an effect. Thus, apart from this etymological denotation,
justice means many things and sometimes different things to many
scholars for which there are myriad theories of justice. For the
positivists, justice is seen as conformity to the law. For the social
right theorists, justice is seen as doing what promotes the social
good. But for the natural law theorists, justice is tied to the idea of
natural rights where right is regarded as the ultimate basis of justice.
5

Besides, different scholars and jurists have also expressed their own
ideas of justice. For instance, following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas
defines justice as firm and constant will to give each one his due.
6

Similarly, Spinoza identifies justice with the habitual rendering to
everyman his lawful due.
7
John Rawls describes justice as
fairness.
8

Be that as it may, the concept of justice is a very rich one.
Justice has been classified into moral, civil, criminal, distributive,
commutative, retributive, substantial, commercial, divine, private,
social, compensatory, vindictive, conservative, legal, penal justice,
and so on. In what immediately follows, this study will examine the
notion of justice in Igbo traditional Igbo thought forms.

4. Principles of Justice in Traditional Igbo Mindset: Theoretical
Perspectives
In order to discover the primordial sense of justice among
the traditional Igbo, it may be necessary to first and foremost,
analyze the Igbo words for justice: akankwumoto and
ikpenkwumoto. While akankwumoto denotes justice as a virtue
of a particular person, ikpenkwumoto or ikpeziriezi refers to the
expression of this virtue in practical judgment at the event of
dispute. The latter can also be described as truthfulness in making
judicial decisions.
Etymologically, akankwumoto derives from three other
Igbo words: aka (hand), nkwu (stand, remain, stay), and oto
(straight, erect, upright, not crooked, etc). Thus, the word
akankwumoto literally means keeping ones hand straight. It
denotes uprightness of conduct. In the same vein ikpenkwumoto
stems from ikpe (judgement, case, decision, verdict), kwu
Ikenga Oraegbunam 57



(stand, stay, remain), and oto (straight, erect). Literally,
ikpenkwumoto means judgement that is straight. The analysis of
these two Igbo words shows that the Igbo concept of justice stresses
the notion of physical straightness akin to the meaning of the
Hebrew sedaqa.
9
This idea of straightness in relation to justice
can refer to an action or person. In the former sense, it means that
ones life is straight-forward, upright, honest, predictable and
impartial. In the latter understanding, a just action is one that is not
crooked, is performed as it should be, is done in a disinterested
manner, or has followed a due process.
But on a more profound consideration, the word
akankwumoto derives from the context of farming on the land
which was largely the main occupation of the traditional Igbo. The
traditional Igbo owned land family by family. That is to say a large
piece of land instead of to a private individual and sometimes to a
community belonged to an extended family. It is only by way of
temporary partition that each nuclear family or individual got a
specific piece of land to cultivate. Even up till today, this practice of
communal ownership of land is still prevalent in the hinterland. In
order to divide the land among nuclear families, since the Igbo had
no theodolite or official surveyors for that purpose, they normally
chose young men who were of good reputation, trusted by
community and known for their previous experience of keeping their
hands straight while dividing the farm land. In addition to these
qualities, the young men must be willing to undertake the difficulties
involved in going through the equatorial scrub during the process of
division in order to make sure that a straight line is maintained.
Above all, they must be docile to listen to the wise counsel of the
elders who intermittently advised them in these words: Nwa m
kwuba aka gi oto (My son keep your hand straight), or Emegbuna
onye obula (Do not cheat anybody). It is in this sense of
straightness in dividing the farm land that akankwumoto came to
denote the idea of justice in traditional Igbo sensibility. It is thus by
extrapolation that Ikpenkwumoto also became an explanation for a
just judgment emanating from a just and straightforward man.
58 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


Be that as it may, Nzomiwu observes that as the history of
the Igbo people progressed, the words akankwumoto and
ikpenkwumoto gathered a metaphorical and a more
comprehensive meaning.
10
According to this development, justice
becomes any action that conforms to the omenala (tradition), which
constitutes the grundnorm, to use kelsons terminology.
11
Justice,
thus, becomes conformity with the requirements of the custom and
tradition. A man who keeps the injunctions of Omenala which
contains the duties of a citizen in all its ramifications is regarded as a
just man. In the same vein, the word ikpenkwumoto became a
judgement that conforms to the tradition (omenala). In other words,
any judgment that is not consistent with the Omenala is not
constitutional and as such null and void. Such a judgment cannot be
binding on any party. It somewhat violates what the English law
would call the principle of stare decisis and it is bound to be
unjust (mmegbu) which condition aims at or attempts to deprive one
of his life or entitlements.
Besides, the Igbo sense of justice is quite condensed in Igbo
oral tradition. Illustrations from two of the sources of this tradition
may be helpful. Thus, justice is expressed in Igbo proverbs and
names. Let us take them one by one. Among the Igbo people, the use
of proverbs in the communication of ideas is very invaluable. A
proverb for them is a figure of speech in which many lofty ideas and
philosophy are concealed and congealed. In referring to African
proverbs, Herskovits regards them as constituting the grammar of
values.
12
In proverbs are condensed the nitty gritties of Igbo
customs, ethical standards, traditional wisdom, and wise sayings. For
the Igbo, proverbs constitute the spice or salt of human
communication (nnu e ji eri okwu). Certainly, the Igbo
understanding of justice in all its ramifications is well expressed in
various proverbs. Let us now give some instances of Igbo proverbs
that explain different aspects of Igbo conception of justice.
Firstly, there is a group of proverbs that emphasize the Igbo
sociological philosophy of live-and-let-live, harmony, peaceful co-
existence, and consideration for the needs of others. Examples of
these proverbs include Egbe bere ugo bere nke si ibe ya ebela nku
kwapu ya (let the kite perch and let the eagle perch also, whichever
Ikenga Oraegbunam 59



denies the other its perching right, let its wings break off), Obiara be
onye abiagbula ya, O ga-ana mkpumkpu apuna ya (The guest should
not harm the host and while going home the host should see that he
goes home peacefully, or literally, may the peaceful visitor go
home without a hunchback), Okeleku amana uma taka akpa dibia
ma dibia amana uma bu okelekwu onu (let the rat not eat furrows
into the native doctors bag but let the native doctor not curse the rat
for mere flimsy reasons), Onye anwuna ma ibe ya efuna (let nobody
die nor let his neighbour get lost), Onye ilo m diri ma m diri (let my
enemy live and let me also live), Iwe nwanne na-ewe adighi eru
nokpukpu (the anger against a brother does not penetrate down to
the bone), etc.

There is also the second group of proverbs that emphasize
justice as co-responsibility within the community. Some instance
can be quite illustrative: Ofu mkpulu aka luta mmanu o zue ndi ozo
onu (when one finger gets soaked with palm oil, it quickly spreads to
other fingers). This explains the social or corporate dimension of
justice or injustice among the Igbo. Other proverbs under this group
includes Aka nri kwoo aka ekpe aka ekpe akwoo aka nri (let the right
hand wash the left hand and let the left hand wash the right hand,
that both may be clean), Onye ji akwu toolu nchi na nchi adighi ali
enu (whoever has palm nut let him drop some to grass-cutter because
it does not climb). The implication is that among the Igbo, justice
includes help to the needy and obligation to help the poor, the lowly
and the helpless members of the society. Also among the proverbs
that emphasize the value of corporation and community life in
matters of common good is the one: A nyukoo mamiri onu ogboo
ufufu (much foam would be made if many people urinate into a place
together).
More so, some proverbs describe Igbo sense of justice as
equality of opportunity, metaphysical equality of all human beings,
and justice as fairness especially within the context of a community.
Ya bara onye bara onye (let the advantages or opportunity be
equally shared) and Isi ntutu a karo ibe ya (no individual human
being is greater than the other) are examples of such proverbs.
60 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


Furthermore, some group of proverbs stress the idea of penal
and retributive justice for those who are opposed to the community
goal or attempt to trample on other peoples rights. Such proverbs
include Isi kote ebu ebu agbagbue ya (if any body attracts the bee,
the bee will sting him to death), Ochu nwa okuku nwe ada (he who
pursues the cock or the hen is the one to fall), Onye si anyi adina, ya
bulu okuku uzo naba ura (may he who wishes us death experience it
prematurely), Onye si ala adina mma, ya doo ya nazu (let him who
glories in sowing seeds of discord in the community not live to see
order and harmony restored), Okpa nsi na okpa aja, aka nsi na aka
aja ba ya onu (may he taste poison who seeks to poison others or
may the perpetrator of injustice and disharmony be a victim of his
very action), Okuku bere na ngige, ngige egwn okuku egwu
(whenever a cock perches on a rope tied to two ends, both the cock
and the rope will be dancing), Oji anyi amu ije ga-agho ngworo (let
him be a cripple who uses us for a walking stick), etc.
Finally, some proverbs assert the need for individual rights
in spite of the community consciousness of the Igbo. E kechaa nobi
eke na mkpuke (after sharing on the basis of extended family, there
will be sharing on the basis of nuclear family), Nke m bu nke m, nke
anyi bu nke anyi (my own is my own, our own is our own), Olu onye
dokwa ya ndu (let ones occupation provide for ones old age), Nke
onye diri ya (let each man enjoy his right), Nriko na nkeko egbunam
(may I not die for living community life) are some instances of those
proverbs that emphasize the respect for individual rights and
entitlements.
Yet another form of Igbo orature that conveys the Igbo
conception of justice is found in the various names the Igbo give to
their children. Unlike in some Euro-American cultures where
importance is not so much attached to names for which Shakespeare
asks the question: Whats in a name?, names are quite meaningful
and symbolic in Igbo enclave. While some Europeans give such
names like Kettle, Bush, Wood, Stone, and so on, to their children
without much reasons therefor, the Igbo names are not just tags or
mere sounds. Igbo names are not mere conventional nominalistic
signs or verbal puffs but summarize ones conception of the thing so
named. Personal names are thought to reveal information about the
Ikenga Oraegbunam 61



bearer or describe the circumstances surrounding the birth of the
bearer, or even explain the experiences of the bearers parents.
Among the Igbo, to be nameless is to be worthless. The Igbo man
regards his name not as a mere label, but as a distinct part of his
personality. For the Igbo, to know a person fully is to know his
name. More still, in Igbo worldview, names reveal sentiments,
aspirations and hopes. They are the most accurate and succinct
records of the Igbo peoples beliefs, socio-ethical concepts and
culture. Names portray the virtues the Igbo admire and the vices they
detest. Above all, names sum up the features of the things to which
they are attached.
In line with the above mindset, some Igbo names express the
concept of justice. It goes without saying that among the people,
justice is symbolized with the word Ofo. Therefore, all Igbo names
that have the word ofo as a suffix or prefix have one thing or the
other to refer to or demonstrate about justice. A good number of
these names show the importance, necessity, effectiveness and
superiority of the virtue of justice over other virtues. Ofoka (justice
is greater or superior), Ofodile (justice does not kill), Ofoma (justice
knows) are some examples of such Igbo names. Besides, some Igbo
names express the Igbo contempt of and antipathy to certain
practices or attitudes that smack of injustice. Nzomiwu
13
observes
two Igbo names that show scorn for unjust tendencies and thus warn
the Igbo community of the danger of acting in accordance with such
attitudes. The first name is Aboka which full expression is Aboka
Ife Atunye Isi meaning that revenge will kill or undo one. By
this, a man who is vindictive is warned that if he continues with such
an attitude, he will suffer for it. In other words, by that name, the
Igbo emphasize that retaliation and vindictiveness is not part of their
understanding of justice. Hence, the idea of justice as reconciliation
and forgiveness is extolled. Secondly, the name Ikpeamaeze
which literally means The King is never guilty is quite illustrative
of the Igbo rejection of injustice as violation of the principle of rule
of law. A part of the meaning of rule of law according to Dicey is
that every citizen is under the law and that no body is above it. All
are subjected to the ordinary laws of the land as interpreted by the
62 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


ordinary courts.
14
Thus, by giving the name Ikpeamaeze, the highly
republican and egalitarian Igbo political anthropology far from
glorying in that state of affair expresses its disapproval for it.
Although some scholars have another interpretation of this name, yet
the end result is coterminous with a manifest consternation with
which the Igbo view any acts that breach the principle of the rule of
law. For instance, Nzomiwu anchors his explanation of the meaning
of the name on the so-called Igbo-enwe-eze slogan. According to
him, most Igbo communities had neither kings nor chiefs. He argues
that the existence of chiefs now in many Igbo communities is a later
development due to cross-cultural contact. Thus, the name
Ikpeamaeze is used to scorn those communities that had kings and
chiefs who naturally would never be imputed with guilt in any event.
This is because being powerful, they would either by hook or crook,
get justice on their sides. Hence, the name Ikpeamaeze expresses
the Igbo disaffection and repudiation for the resultant miscarriage of
justice. Nzomiwus point of departure based, as it were, on the so-
called Igbo-enwe eze is a highly controversial matter setting Igbo
historians and anthropologists into hot debating camps but which
discussion is beyond the scope of this study. However, Nzomiwus
conclusions are in tandem with Igbo disapprobation with the fact
that chiefs and kings do maneuver justice. More still, the Igbo
traditional religious sensibility is also replete with the Igbo
conception of justice. Some theophoric names the Igbo take bear this
out. Chukwuma (God knows), Chukwumanjo (God knows which is
sinful or wicked), Chukwumaobi (God knows the secrets of the
hearts), Chukwuobo (Revenge is Gods), Chukwugboo (May God
Settle), Chukwunagbako (God keeps record of all things),
Chuwkunweugwo (To reward belongs to God), Chukwunagolum
(God testifies to my innocence) are some instances of such names.
The Igbo therefore believe in the retributive justice of God whose
actions are identified with justice and equity. He is Chuwkujiofo
(God holds justice and equity). For the Igbo, God often dispenses
this justice through the deities especially Ala (Earth Goddess),
Ancestral spirits, masquerades, and man.
15

Even as Igbo sense of justice is also conveyed via the
folklores, folksongs, rituals and mythologies, let the above
Ikenga Oraegbunam 63



discussions suffice for the theoretical consideration of the justice
system. It may then be necessary to investigate the actual
transmutation of the theory of justice into some practical matters by
the traditional Igbo.

5. Justice in Praxis among the Traditional Igbo
There is no gainsaying the fact that the traditional Igbo
theory of justice is frequently tested in a number of areas. We shall
consider a few of these areas.

(i) Criminal Matters
Surely one salient means of practicing the Igbo concept of
justice is criminal causes and matters. The Igbo recognize two main
classes of offences: those that are nso and those that are not.
Green refers to the former as taboos and to the latter as natural
offences.
16
The first group of offences is often identified as
abomination (alu) which consists in acts regarded as violations
against the divine laws. These range from murder, incest to theft of
some highly valuable property such as yams. The second group of
offences comprises the natural crimes such as other forms of
stealing, failure to join in the community projects, and disobedience
to other man-made laws. The Igbo retributive and penal justice is
demonstrated in the punishments meted to the respective offenders
which include death penalty in very extreme cases, ostracism,
banishment, restitution, fine, compensation, forfeiture, seizure of
valuable property, caricature and so on. But above all the Igbo
criminal and penal justice systems are premised on the important
value of reconciliation and peace-making. It is not necessarily based
on the lex talionis approach of the hard core retributivism. There is
thus an admixture of the retributive and utilitarian/ consequentialist
modes that issue in the deterrent, rehabilitatory, reparatory,
reformative, expiatory, educative and incapacitative objectives of
penal jurisprudence. Suffused with a religio-moral and socio-cultural
sensibilities, Igbo criminal justice is theandric comprising, as it
were, the human and divine aspects. Sometimes, the gods are left to
decide in cases that involve oath-taking and trial by ordeal.
64 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence



(ii) Inheritance Issues
Another window through which the Igbo practice justice is
inheritance issues. However, in this regard, justice is more or less
practised in terms of equity rather than equality. It is therefore
according to this sense that the property of a man who died intestate
is inherited by male children alone. If he had no male children, the
inheritance goes to the brothers. Female children are not normally
seen as heirs in traditional Igbo anthropology for they are regarded
as transient soon to be married out of the family. Wives are also not
to inherit the husbands property since they themselves are
inheritable. Inheritance is therefore thought to belong to males on
whom it is believed that the burden of family responsibility and
upkeep lies. Even when a part of the inherited property is in the
custody of the wife, for instance, the wife is taken to be a mere
trustee thereof for the benefit of the male children especially. Thus,
Igbo sense of justice in terms of inheritance matters is administered
in accordance with the need and maturity of the heir instead of by
arithmetical equality.

(iii) Land Disputes
It is not for nothing that the Igbo concept of justice is
expressed in the term akankwumoto which is derived from the
ambience of land distribution. The Igbo have their main occupation
as farming and agriculture and as such have an unprecedented
attachment to land. In addition to this, ones land is almost an
absolutely inalienable property. Until recently, lands were a
communal property which could be partitioned to individuals for
settlement and farming purposes. At the event of boundary dispute
or trespass, the Igbo sense of justice was brought to bear by way of
traditional history and adjudicated over by the Council of Elders. In
the olden days when the use of block fence was not yet made,
boundaries were effected by the use of some resilient trees such as
ebenebe and ogirishi which can survive the adverse effects of
various weathers. In land disputes, what is therefore just is identified
with the goodness of the title and correspondence with boundary.

Ikenga Oraegbunam 65



(iv) Marital / Family Tension
The family is an important institution in traditional Igbo
sociology. It is equally the grassroot of Igbo politics. In the family,
the husband and wife or wives unite to raise up children for the
purpose of perpetuating the family and for its progress. Infertility is
often a major cause of dispute between husband and wife. Idleness,
irresponsibility, and laziness on the part of the children normally
invite the dispute between husband and wife. Idleness,
irresponsibility, and laziness on the part of the children normally
invite the displeasure and disillusion of the father especially one who
works hard to train the children. On the other hand, lack of provision
of the basic utilities on the part of the head of the family who should
be the breadwinner would occasion ill-feeling from the wife and the
children. These are some of the causes of tension within the family.
Settlement of disputes is normally through family dialogue. At the
failure of this, the extended family (Umunna) and in some cases the
clan and the in-laws would be invited to look into the matter.
Reconciliation is usually the principal aim of such settlements since
that would be the only favourable and desirable result of resolution
of dispute between parties that are closely related and need each
other.

(v) Inter-Town Clashes
The traditional Igbo enclave was a closed society. The
concept of neighbourhood and neighbourliness was highly a
restricted one. The farther the blood ties, the more distant and
shallower the friendliness. The result is that there were often mutual
tension and hostility between neighbouring towns. More often than
not, other towns and more distant clans were regarded as actual or
potential enemies to be dealt with at the slightest provocation. No
doubt, the ready-to-hand causes of this face-off or fisticuff include
land boundary disputes, murder of a member of a particular town,
maltreatment of a towns daughter married out to another town,
market quarrels, desecration of masquerades by members of another
town, and so on. Resolution of this sort of conflicts took the form of
negotiation and plea bargaining between the two towns. Often,
66 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


representations from the two towns would meet to iron out the
differences. In the more recent times, the representatives would be
led by the respective traditional rulers and cabinets. At the end,
justice is done in terms of compensation, reparation, apology, and
payment of damages.
The above constitutes only a tip of an iceberg of the
different fields that awaken the dispensation of Igbo sense of justice.
It may however be appropriate to also note some important modes
and means of settlements of disputes as employed by Igbo judicial
system. We shall consider only three of these modes, namely,
arbitration, oath-taking, and trial by ordeal.

(a) Arbitration
Arbitration is a recognized means of settlement of dispute
among the traditional Igbo. The contention of Allot that there is
nothing like arbitration practice among the Nigerian peoples does
not apply to the Igbo. For Allot, what is called arbitration among the
traditional Nigerian peoples is a mere negotiation for settlement in
which the parties thereto are always free to resile from the
arrangement any time before the award is made.
17
This view of Allot
received a judicial stamp in the dictum of Uwaifo J.C.A (as he then
was) in the case of Okpurunwu v. Okpokam
18
in which the learned
judge held that there is no concept known as customary or native
arbitration in our jurisprudence.
Be that as it may, the above respective views of the legal
scholar and the learned judge do not represent the correct picture of
the situation. Among the Igbo, arbitration was the commonest means
of dispute resolution in which the parties in lis agree to submit their
dispute to the chiefs and elders of the community for the purpose of
adjudication and redress, and wherein the parties feel themselves
bound by the decision of the arbitrators. This practice paradoxically
had also received a benediction from the Supreme Court which held
in Egesimba v. Onuzurike
19
thus:
Customary arbitration by elders of the community is
one of many African customary modes of settling
disputes and once it satisfies the necessary
requirements, the decision would have binding effect
Ikenga Oraegbunam 67



on the parties and this creates an estoppel. It is
recognized under Nigerian jurisprudence.

Even in Okpurunwu, Oguntade J.C.A (as he then was) while
dissenting from the lead judgment by Uwaifo reiterated the existence
of arbitration among the African natives:
I find myself unable to accept the proposition that there
is no concept known as customary or native arbitration
in our jurisprudence.The right to freely choose an
arbitrator to adjudicate with binding effect is not
beyond our native communities.

Morestill, the Igbo customary arbitration is in tandem with
the courts definition of the practice in Agu v. Ikewibe
20
as that
founded on the voluntary submission of the parties to the decision
of the arbitrators who are either chiefs or elders of their communities
and the agreement to be bound by such decision Therefore,
arbitration practice among the Igbo people in particular
21
and
Nigerian peoples generally is not unknown to Nigerian
jurisprudence. Fairly recently, the Supreme Court had to re-
emphasize its understanding of arbitration in NNPC v. Lutin
Investment Ltd
22
wherein it is seen as the reference of a dispute or
difference between not less than two parties for determination, after
hearing both sides in a judicial manner, by person or persons other
than a court of competent jurisdiction. Besides, the Nigerian courts
description of arbitration is not an isolationist standpoint. It is quite
congruous with that of scholarly non-indigenous authors and jurists
on the subject. In the words of Fulton Maxwell J,
Arbitration is a process whereby a private disinterested
person called an arbitrator, chosen by the parties to a
dispute, acting in a judicial fashion but without
regards to legal technicalities, applying either existing
law or norms agreed by the parties, and acting in
accordance with equity, good conscience and the
perceived merit of the dispute makes an award to
resolve the dispute.
23

68 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence



Therefore, there is no gainsaying that what arbitration stands
for everywhere is well represented in the Igbo practices. Okafor
24

describes the process of arbitration in traditional Igbo society. At the
event of dispute the injured party may refer the matter to his
kinsmen (Umnna) if the other party is also of the same kindred.
Otherwise, or if it fails, the case could be reported to the village
elders, age grade society, or recently the town union who serve as
the arbitral panel. The panel is expected to invite the parties, fix the
date and venue, and state the applicable procedure. The honouring of
the invitation by the parties is a complete submission to the panels
jurisdiction and hence agreement to be bound by the resultant award.
Usually, the parties are expected to say the truth and the arbitrators
to stand for justice. To ensure this, the arbitral process normally
begins on a ritual and religious note as observed by green
25
and
which can thus be summarized: The two disputants are each required
to bring palm wine. Before those present would begin to drink the
palm wine, the eldest man takes a cup of the wine and pours it on the
four ofo saying to the effect that whoever is guilty, let him be
guilty, and whoever is not guilty, let him not be guilty. The second
eldest man takes a small chicken brought by the defendant and
holding it up, pulls its head off and lets the blood drip on the ofo
and then throws it away, saying: whoever sees the truth in this case,
and does not say it, may ofo kill him! Whoever speaks a lie, may ofo
kill him! Whoever hears a word in this case and does not speak it,
may ofo kill him! Whoever does not judge aright, may ofo kill him.
At the end of each statement, all those present normally respond
Ha or Iha meaning let it be so! No doubt, the essence of the
above religious ritual is to invoke and invite the supernatural to
oversee and supervise the trial process. The trial itself follows the
hear-both-sides rule of natural justice in which the plaintiff and the
defendant would be heard in turn. The parties may also field in
witnesses who are also heard. At the end, the panel hands on the
award which is understood by the parties as binding on them. The
arbitral award which normally orders restitution, compensation,
apology, specific performance, etc in favour of the innocent party, if
in civil matter, is binding on the guilty party failing which he is
Ikenga Oraegbunam 69



liable to ostracism. In criminal causes, depending on the gravity of
the offence, fine, forfeiture, banishment, compensation or even death
penalty may be meted out. Noteworthy is that this bindingness of
traditional Igbo arbitral award inter alia distinguishes arbitration
from other possible forms of dispute resolution mechanism among
the people such as mediation, conciliation, reconciliation and so on.
In these later forms where there is no stamp of finality, the parties
are free to resile midway or at the end of the process. After all, what
is envisaged is a mere negotiation for settlement.
Thus, the above discussion shows that arbitration practice
among the traditional Igbo possesses the essential features of
customary arbitration. First, there is an agreement between parties
(though sometimes implicit) to arbitrate. We refer to it as implicit
since often it is only at the instance of one party that refers the
matter to a panel that other agrees to arbitrate once he submits to the
jurisdiction of the arbitral panel. Second, there is arbitration in line
with the customary law of the parties. Third, there is the existence of
the award and its publication. Certainly these three factors are
consistent with the Supreme Courts holdings about what the
plaintiff needs to prove for the enforcement of the award. That is to
say, in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court had enumerated in a
number of decided cases
26
different factors to be established by the
plaintiff, yet the above three elements are recurrent and constitute
the essential ones. But what is also salient is that all these cases
emanated from the Igbo customary arbitral practice as evident from
the names of the parties. This is a demonstration of the fact that
dispensation of justice through arbitration is common place among
the traditional Igbo.


(b) Oath-Taking
It cannot be overstated that oath-taking is an acceptable
practice and a common feature of customary law resolution of
dispute in Africa generally and the Igbo in particular. In spite of
western influences, oath-taking has survived as a legitimate judicial
method which the Igbo believe as one of the assured ways of
70 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


obtaining absolute justice. Okogeri observes that oath-taking is an
integral part of the Igbo custom by which the guilty and the innocent
with regard to a dispute are exposed in view of maintenance of
social equilibrium and cohesion.
27
Edu, writing about the Igbo,
rightly asserted that oath-taking is a common feature of resolving
dispute. He notes that its use is very frequent in crime detection or as
a last resort in settling other disputes such as land, adultery and
defamation.
28
Okafor also notes that oath-taking or swearing to a
tutelary deity is usually called for in a protracted case where the
intricacies of the matter make it difficult to discern who is right or
wrong in a case.
29
The prevalence of oath-taking among the Igbo in
settlement of dispute is attested to by Oba who observes that
virtually all the reported cases on juju oaths in the country concern
Igbo litigants.
30

Besides, oath-taking is a direct submission to the
supernatural tribune for settlement of disputes and whose verdict is
final. Man plays little or no part. Sometimes this appeal to the
supernatural is made when human efforts fail or when no confidence
is reposed on the human panel. This is practised in serious cases like
murder, witchcraft, and in land matters. Okafor describes the
procedure:
As a legitimate legal action, the injured party may ask
the accused to swear on tutelary deity of his (the
injured) choice to prove his innocence. On the other
hand, the accused may opt to swear on any powerful
Alusi in order to free himself from the accusation. If
the plaintiff accepts the accuseds offer to swear, he is
bound to regard the dispute as closed and to await for
the supernatural judgement. The perjurer may die as
the result or he may suffer grave misfortune or illness.
The more dreadful consequence is that the perjurers
family and sometimes, the entire village may suffer
from some obscure illness which may put the lineage in
danger of complete extinction.
31


In the same vein, Nwakoby observes that in oath-taking
among the Igbo, time is normally given within which the offending
Ikenga Oraegbunam 71



party is expected to either be killed by the gods or be sick so as to
confirm that he is the offending party.
32
Guilt or innocence is
established depending on whether or not the accused dies or falls
sick within the time given. Generally, the oaths are worded in such a
way that the swearer invokes on himself a conditional curse. He tells
the juju to punish him if he lies. After then, all the disputing parties
wait for a year. The Igbo believe that anyone who swears falsely will
be dead or struck with great misfortune within the time limit. In a
land dispute, the person who swears to the oath enters and takes
possession of the land. But if any misfortune befalls him within one
year, the res will revert to the other party. If however he survives the
prescribed time, the swearer retains the property as he is deemed to
have told the truth. Where a party was ordered to proffer a juju for
the other party to take and he fails, the other party is judged the
truthful party.
33

More still, the use of oaths swearing displaces the need to
weigh oral evidence of the parties and their witnesses. Okany
observes that given the swearing to an oath, the dispute will not
normally be taken to court again, but the relatives of the diseased
who is believed to have sworn falsely will surrender the disputed
property or right to the other party. In some cases, the entire estate of
the deceased party will be surrendered to the juju by which he swore,
by way of expiation.
34


(c ) Trial by Ordeal
Trial by ordeal is yet another common means of settling
dispute among the traditional African generally and the Igbo in
particular. Talbot writing about peoples of Southern Nigeria, regards
trials by ordeal among them as one of the greatest safeguards of
justice.
35
The Igbo practice is ad rem to the Blacks Law Dictionary
description of trial by ordeal:
A primitive form of trial in which an accused was
subjected to a dangerous or painful physical test, the
result being considered a divine revelation of the
persons guilt or innocence. The participants believed
72 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


that God would reveal a persons culpability by
protecting an innocent person from the torture.
36


This view corroborates the observation of Elias in relation to
Nigerian, nay, Igbo peoples as regards the various ways in which
trial by ordeals can be carried out:
The ordeal might take the form of the juice of a tree (eg
sass wood) mixed with water, or a burnt powder made
from it and dissolved in water; a knife or other piece of
iron might be heated in a fire; the culprit might be taken
to a nearby pond or stream. The guilty one is he who
should drink the water and become sick, handle the red-
hot knife and get burnt, or sink when immersed in
water.
37


Penwill writing about the Kamba people notes that trial by
ordeals is most used in not only criminal cases but particularly in
cases of theft and murder when the culprit is unknown.
38
Even in
fairly recent times, Igbo trial by ordeal has been applied to
witchcraft cases. Also widows who were suspected of having killed
their husbands were subjected to one form of trial by ordeal or the
other. Sometimes, the accused was forced to drink the bath-water
used in washing the corpse of the diseased. The belief is that she
would die if she is guilty; otherwise her innocence would be
established if unharmed. The Igbo widow faced other forms of trial
by ordeal such as being locked up over night with her husbands
corpse, not being allowed to touch her body with her hands as she
constantly held sticks or knife in the hand, taken naked to shrine for
purification, not being allowed to take her bath for 7 market days (28
days), forced to do early morning cries so as to wake neighbours up
for at least 7 days, and so on. In line with these practices, an Igbo
widow, Cecilia Akuego-Onwu recounts her recent personal
experience of a trial by ordeal at the demise of her husband:
I was forced to sit near the corpse of my husband till
daybreak. They (his relations) put kola nut on his chest
and forced me to eat it. They made it compulsory that I
must eat without washing my hands or clearing my
Ikenga Oraegbunam 73



teeth for seven-market days, equivalent to one calendar
month. On every market day, about three oclock in the
morning, they sent an old widow to escort me with a
lamp to a nearby river to take a bath. This according to
them meant that if I killed my husband, he would come
out of the river and avenge his death.
39


Similarly, the goal of the above ordeals is that if the widow
was privy to the death of the husband, then in respective cases, the
dead husband would use the knive or the stick to kill the widow, or
the widow would die from the eating of the kola nut, or from any of
the tortures or treatments mentioned above.
Such as the above constitute the main lines along which the
traditional Igbo practice justice and settle their disputes. One thing
recurrent however is the fact of the religious or ritualistic
underpinning in which the practices are enmeshed. Whether in
arbitration, oath-taking, or trial by ordeal, the reference to the
supernatural is always made. This is typically illustrated in a
fictitious civil trial recorded in Achebes Things Fall Apart.
40
This
was a matrimonial case between Uzowulu and Mgbafor. In this case,
the Egwugwu oracles which symbolized judicial authority and power
presided. The petitioner and respondent presented their cases and
witnesses from both sides testified. After series of arguments and
counter-arguments, the nine Egwugwu oracles went underground to
consult after which they reappeared and passed their judgment. In
much of Igbo justice systems, the primary motif is to effect
reconciliation between disputants. This is well demonstrated in the
judgement of the Egwugwu who in the instant case held that our
duty is not to blame this man or to praise that one but to settle the
dispute. This is true as they commanded the petitioner to go to his
in-laws with a pot of palm-wine to implore his wife to return to him,
and in the same way ordered the defendants to accept such wine
should the in-laws bring it and let their sister go with them.
41
It
should be noted that it is only when human reconciliation becomes
extremely difficult or impossible that recourse is directly made to
trial by ordeal or oath-taking. Sometimes however, some of the cases
74 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


by way of latter methods are believed to be outside the jurisdiction
of man. In what immediately follows, let us see the attitude and
challenges posed to Igbo traditional jurisprudence by the prevailing
Nigerian legal system today.

6. Attitudes and Challenges of Nigerian Legal System to
Traditional Igbo Justice System
Surely, the relationship of the Nigerian English-style system
and the tradition Igbo regime of justice dispensation is that of master
and servant. Precisely as a chunk of colonial legacy, the Nigeria
legal system regards the Nigerian customary laws generally as
inferior and thus adopts an a la carte approach with regard to the
acceptance and enforcement of traditional systems. The former picks
and chooses which aspects of the latter to abolish, suppress or
enforce depending on whether or not those aspects are supportive of
its interests. Although Nigeria gained independence from the British
rule nearly five decades ago, much of its laws and judicial methods
remain largely western. In the heydays of colonialism, laws made for
the colonies were styled in such a way that they either promoted the
objectives of the colonial overloads or made not to injure the
psycho-social sensibilities of the masters. The effect is that today,
partly as a result of irresponsibity but also partly due to neo-colonial
and cargo-cult mentality, the autochthonous ruling elites have
maintained almost wholesale the provisions of the colonial laws for
governance even up till today.
42
The domino effect is that much of
the colonialist antipathy to traditional customs is still retained in the
Nigerian legal and judicial systems. Such retention no doubt
harbours advantages and disadvantages. But a good piece of work
would have been to promote the advantages and suppress the
disadvantages while still adopt good foreign influences, rather than
maintain a near rigid framework.
Certainly, Nigerian customary laws are saved by the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigerian 1999 as part of the
existing law.
43
But that is only a generalized blanket provision of a
legal make-belief. In actual practice, customary laws are made
subject to the overriding provisions of the Nigerian English-type
laws. For one thing, the whole of customary criminal justice had
Ikenga Oraegbunam 75



been abolished by the effects of section 36 (12) of the Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. The section provides that
a person shall not be convicted of a criminal offence unless that
offence is defined and the penalty therefor prescribed in a written
law and which written law refers to the Acts of the National
Assembly or a Law of a State, any subsidiary legislation or
instrument under the provisions of a law. The implication is that all
unwritten crimes and all crimes not created together with their
penalties by any of the aforementioned legislative authorities or
belonging to any of the aforementioned groups of laws do not
qualify to be part of Nigerian body of criminal laws. This means that
traditional Igbo criminal jurisprudence like any other customary
criminal justice one of which characteristics is that it is unwritten is
constitutionally outlawed. Thus, all forms of criminal trials by
ordeal, by arbitration, and by oath-taking are thereby abolished. This
abolition of customary criminal justice is given an added fillip by yet
another provision at section 36 (4) of the Constitution. The section
requires, among other things, that whenever any person is charged
with a criminal offence, he is entitled to a fair hearing in public by a
court or tribunal established by law. No doubt, this is a bar to Igbo
traditional criminal courts which are neither established by law nor
are their trials conducted in public. For one thing, attending the
sessions and watching the proceedings are not open to all since
women and children are often not allowed to participate. Because of
this provision, traditional Igbo criminal trials whether by arbitration,
oath-taking, or trial by ordeal which often take place in camera are
rendered illegal.
Be that as it may, customary civil justice still enjoys the
sympathy of the prevailing Nigerian judicial and legal systems.
Hence, the courts recognize the validity of customary arbitration
practice as we noted above. They also accord legitimacy to
traditional methods of civil dispute resolution based on oath-taking.
Although there are discordant and conflicting judicial voices with
regard to oath-taking, yet long line of decided cases attracted judicial
blessings on the practice especially in matters of arbitration and
private dispute settlements. In Charles Ume v. Godfrey Okoronkwo
76 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


& Anor,
44
a case emanating from a native arbitration in respect of
title to the land in dispute, Oguegbu J.S.C. while delivering the lead
judgement stated, inter alia, that oath-taking was one of the
methods of establishing the truth of a matter and was known to
customary law and accepted by both parties. Again, in Ofomata &
ors v. Anoka
45
in which the legal validity of oath- taking was in
issue, Agbakoba J held that
Oath-taking is a recognized and accepted form of proof
existing in certain customary judicature. Oath may be
sworn extra-judicial but as a mode of judicial proof, its
esoteric and reverential feature, the solemnity of the
choice of an oath by the disputants and imminent evil
visitation to the oath breaker if he swore falsely, are the
deterrent sanctions of this form of customary judicial
process which commends it alike to rural and urban
indigenous courts. It is therefore my view that the
decision to swear an oath is not illegal although it may
be obnoxious to Christian ethics.

Similarly, in the land case of Okere v. Nwoke,
46
the
respondent admitted the custom of settling dispute by oath-taking.
Thus, the appellants having been led to take oath on the Aka Obibi
Juju provided by the 3
rd
defendant at great risk to their lives in the
belief that the customary oath would settle the dispute, the
respondents are estopped by conduct from denying that appellants
were thereby adjudged owners of the land, the latter having sworn to
the oath for over a year. Recently, the validity of oath-taking in the
process of customary law arbitration was reiterated by the Supreme
Court in the land dispute case of John Onyenge & Ors v Loveday
Ebere & Ors.
47
The Supreme Court upheld the verdict of a lower
court, which was based on the oath taken on the Ogwugwu Akpu
of Okija in Anambra State. In this case, Niki Tobi J.S.C. delivering
the lead judgment (unanimously concurred to by other Justices)
reaffirmed the courts recognition of oath-taking as a valid process
under customary law arbitration.
48

Curiously however, some holdings of the courts in some
cases show that the courts, after all, have not spoken with one voice
Ikenga Oraegbunam 77



in respect of oath-taking in customary arbitration. In a long line of
decided cases still, the courts denied validity to oath-taking as a
means of settlement of dispute. For instance, in Iwuchukwu v.
Anyanwu,
49
Ndoma Egba J. C. A stated:
The belief of the learned trial judge that disputes are
decided by swearing Juju may be true as a matter of
the past. In this century, that will be a retreat to trial by
ordeal which is unthinkable any more than swearing
Juju as a method of proof. We cannot now reel back
to superstitious fear and foreswear our religious faith.

Again, in Onwuanunkpa v. Onwuanunkpa,
50
the court
blatantly condemned practice of arbitration based on oath-taking as
not being arbitration at all. More recently, the Supreme Court
exhibited this attitude in Umeano Achiakpa & Anor v. Nduka &
Ors.
51
In this case, the appellants instituted an action in the High
Court against the respondents claiming a declaration of title to land.
The claim was founded inter alia on a judgment of the native court
delivered in 1925 which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit C. The
native court, however, did not order the parties to swear to the juju,
but rather ordered the oath to be taken by a third party from whom
the respondents traced their title. The issue before the High Court
was whether or not the Exhibit C constituted estoppel per rem
judicatam. The High Court held it did not. The Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court confirmed this. The High Court, the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court refused to accept the native tribunals
decision to refer the case to a juju as a judicial determination of the
case. The Supreme Court citing with approval the decision of the
Court of Appeal held that a judgment which enjoins the parties to
swear to a juju on to do further acts ascertained or unascertained in
order to determine where the merits of the case lie is not a final
judgment as it is not a pronouncement on the rights of the parties
which are in dispute and it cannot operate as estoppel per rem
judicatam.
52
It seems that by this statement, the courts make the
distinction between the situation of settlement based on oath-taking
before the court is seized with the matter and that of the court
78 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


ordering an oath-taking and depending on the result for a judicial
determination of the case before it. To this extent, the courts have
very strong points. However, it seems that the courts never adverted
their minds to the fact that native court system was designed to be a
judicial elongation and arm of the traditional political system
administering substantial justice almost in the same manner as the
local communities. Besides, the Supreme Courts approach is
premised on the common law methodology which places more
emphasis on evaluation of evidence by the judge rather than on
preternatural sanctions which constitute the quintessence of
traditional oaths. In our considered view, what the courts would have
done is to determine whether the parties at the point of the native
courts order accepted the finality of the settlement of dispute
consequent upon oath-taking so as to operate as estoppel per rem
judicatam. For us, the decisions of the courts in Umeano Achiakpa v.
Nduka are tantamount to a rejection of settlement based on oath-
taking.
Furthermore, some scholars have expressed their
disapproval against oath-taking as a means of traditional justice
administration. These opinions are well represented by Nwakobys.
The arbitration expert anchors his views on oath-taking on
customary arbitration practice. He argues that since an important
feature of arbitration award is finality, any arbitral award based on
oath-taking is not good as the award is conditional and contingent
and becomes effective only after the prescribed time in relation to
the oath-taking. He also holds that there is no test of efficacy of the
oath as the medical condition and state of health of the oath-taker is
neither ascertained nor possibility of accident considered, and which
might result to the death of the swearer even within the time
prescribed. Again, for him, the entire exercise of oath-taking
crumbles at the application of an antidote (ndagbu iyi) which
possibility is well known to certain people. Nwakoby finally states
that practice of oath-taking is not only fetish, barbaric, uncivilized,
outdated, anachronistic, criminal, illegal but also contrary to
Nigerian jurisprudence as it is superstitious, mysterious, and
spiritualistic
53
in a society that is supposed to be dynamic and not
static.
Ikenga Oraegbunam 79



Certainly, much of the above observations of Nwakoby is
quite salient and harbours some merits. Yet it cannot be denied that
even up till today in spite of western education and Christianity,
many Igbo people still resort to oath-taking as a means of dispute
settlement and which is given recognition by courts. As such, the
practice is not outdated or anachronistic. Besides, it would not be
fair to the traditional society for its practices to be judged using the
parameters of western standards. Using such adjectives as barbaric,
fetish or uncivilized to qualify the traditional oath-taking would not
do as such is tantamount to evaluating it ab extra which attitude is
not acceptable in studies in cultural anthropology. The traditional
people need not embrace the western culture in toto in order to be
civilized or get developed. Regarding oath-taking as criminal and
illegal is certainly not correct as the practice is saved and
accommodated within modern Nigerian legal system as a form of
statutory oath by virtue of the Oath Acts and laws. Even though the
courts do not sometimes attach serious importance to oath-taking in
judicial proceedings,
54
yet the fact that a person may take an oath in
such a manner that he considers binding on him
55
is a confirmation
of statutory preservation of traditional oath-taking. In Kwara State,
the Oaths and Affirmation Law provides that an oath may be offered
to the other party challenging him to support his allegation by
swearing to a traditional form of oath.
56
Therefore, in spite of the
ambivalent attitudes of the courts, both civil arbitration and justice
system based on oath-taking are known and recognized by Nigerian
jurisprudence. Yet as we earlier noted, the a la carte treatment meted
to traditional justice system boxes it into the corner of a slave
serving the interest of its master. This is made manifest in many a
legal provision.
First and foremost, the traditional customary laws are
relegated to the level of facts to be proved before the English-style
court. In other words, even though Igbo customary laws, for
instance, constitute a mirror of accepted usage
57
they are not
regarded as laws which attitude is statutorily enshrined in Nigerian
evidence law and practice.
58
Hence, while one need not prove the
other laws in courts as the judge is taken to have known them, one
80 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence


needs to establish the customary laws as he would facts by adducing
evidence either by calling witnesses or by way of manuals and
books
59
unless in situations where the courts had taken judicial
notice of the custom.
60
The implication is that the judge is regarded
as not being aware of the customary laws of his own people as the
proof would still be required even if the judge comes from the same
customary area with the parties.
Secondly, local customs are subjected to certain validity
tests through which they must pass for them to be enforced. Thus,
traditional customs must not be repugnant to natural justice, equity
and good conscience. They must not be incompatible to any known
written law. And they must not be contrary to public policy.
61

Although this judicial attitude has helped to suppress certain
obnoxious practices, yet it is not without paying the price of
subjecting the indigenous customs to the servitude position of
kowtowing the neo-colonial legal regime operating in Nigeria today.
Therefore, it goes without saying that the Igbo customary
justice system is neither here nor there. It is allowed to operate only
insofar as it pays a poll tax similar to that paid by a conquered
people to their conquerors for the latter to allow the former to exist.
The customary system is allowed to operate provided it does not
conflict with the interest and operation of the received English
method that is regarded as all-too superior. The effect is that the
indigenous framework is quite vulnerable and susceptible to be
abolished at any time by the simplest legislative act which may not
be diligent enough to carry out a proper study of the situation.

7 Conclusion and Recommendation
In the course of the above discussions, this paper has been
able to identify the principles and practices of the Igbo sense of
justice and judicial system. It is discovered that the Igbo have a very
rich notion of justice which quintessence is precipitated into its
reconciliatory, communal, social, and religious nature. However, this
indigenous idea of justice is primordially anchored on a traditional
worldview that is fast undergoing rapid transformation due to
contact with western culture. This contact which is packaged in a
colonial baggage gave birth to a judicial methodology that
Ikenga Oraegbunam 81



superimposes itself on the autochthonous system. Yet even as it is
true that the Igbo of today is a hybrid, some aspects of its customs
including judicial practices still die hard. The compromise stance of
genuine socio-cultural symbiosis between the two judicial systems
would have been the panacea. Since it is important to respond to the
comprehensive judicial need of the Igbo person, it is quite apt to
indigenize and inculturate the received English system. This will
require a diligent study of the traditional ways in view of a proper
integration with the prevailing English-style mode. There is also the
urgent necessity to drop the cargo-cult mindset by which everything
western is deemed the better in relation to the native counterpart.
Certainly, no culture is a finished product. By means of diffusion
and borrowings, each culture adjusts itself in order to still be
relevant to its people. Justice systems no doubt are an important
aspect of this process. Rather than maintaining the prevailing
posture, the Nigerian judicial system would be better for it if the
babies of the home-made and received styles are respectively saved
as though in a good marriage while throwing away their bath waters.
















82 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence



Notes and References

1
Cf. S. Ottenberg, Ibo Receptivity to Change in W.R. Bascom and M. J.
Herskovits (eds), Continuity and Change in African Cultures, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1959, 103-104.
2
T. U. Nwala, Igbo Philosophy, Literamed Publications Nig. Ltd, Lagos,
1987, 28.
3
E. I. Metuh, African Religions in Western Conceptual Scheme, Imico
Press, Jos, 1985, 109.
4
J. S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, Heinemann, London,
1977, 92.
5
Cf. O.A. Bird, The Idea of Justice, Frederick A. Praeger, New York,
1967, 10ff.
6
T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 58, a. 1.
7
B. Spinoza, A Theologico - Political Treatise, New York, 1951, 208.
8
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Howard Press, Cambridge, 1981.
9
J. D. Douglas, The New Bible Dictionary, Inter Versity Press, London,
1962, 681.
10
J. P. C. Nzomiwu, The Concept of Justice Among the Traditional Igbo:
An Ethical Inquiry, Fides Publishers, Awka, 1999, 41.
11
Grundnorm is the key concept developed by Hans Kelson in his pure
theory of law. It is the supreme norm from which all other norms receive
their validity. Cf. H. Kelson, The Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley, 1967, 200-
218.
12
M. J. Herskovits, Dohomean Narrative, Northwestern University
African Studies, 1958, No. 1., 62.
13
Nzomiwu, Op. Cit., 72.
14
A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of Constitution, 10
th

Edition, Macmillan, London, 1959.
15
Nzomiwu, Op. Cit., 75-99.
16
M. M. Green, Ibo Village Affairs, Frederick A Praeger Publishers, New
York, 1904, 99.
17
A. Allot, Essays in African Law, Butterworth & Co. Ltd, London, 1960,
126.
18
(1988)4 NWLR (pt 90) 544.
19
(2002) 15 NWLR (pt 791) 466 at 512-513.
20
(1991) 3 NWLR (pt 180) 385 at 407.
21
Eg. Egesimba v. Onuzuruike (supra), Agu v. Ikewibe (supra), Idika v.
Erisi (1988) 2 NWLR (pt 78) 563; Njoku v. Ekeocha (1972) 2 ECSLR 199;
Mbagwu v Agochukwu (1973) 3 ECSLR (pt 1) 90; Okere v. Nwoke (1991)
Ikenga Oraegbunam 83




& NWLR (pt 209) 317 at 316, Ohiaeri v. Akabueze, (1992) 2 SCNJ 76 at
94; Onwu & Ors v. Nka & Ors (1996) 7 SCNJ, 140 at 255; Ojibah v.
Ojibah (1991) 6 SCNJ 156 at 169; Igwego v. Ezeugo (1992) 7 SCNJ 284;
Oparaji v. Ohanu (1999) 6 SCNJ 27; Ume v. Okoronkwo (1996) 12 SCNJ
404; Okereke v. Nwankwo (2003) 4SCNJ 211 at 221 22; Onyenge & Ors
v. Ebere & Ors (2004) 6 SCNJ 126 at 141 43; Ofomata & Ors v. Anoka &
Anor (1974) 3 ECSLR 251 at 254; Achiakpa v. Nduka (2001)7 SCNJ 585;
Iwuchukwu v. Anyanwu (1993) 8NWLR (pt 311) 311 at 323; Nzeoma v.
Ugocha (2001) FWLR (pt 48) 1299 at 1306; Onwununkpa v. Onwuanunkpa
(1993) 8 NWLR (pt 310) 186, etc.
22
(2006) 25 NSCQR 77 at 111-112.
23
Fulton Maxwell J, Commercial Alternative Dispute Resolution, The Law
Book Co. Ltd, 1989, 55.
24
F. U. Okafor, Igbo Philosophy of Law, Fourth Dimension Publishers,
Enugu, 1992, 70.
25
Green, Op. Cit, 120 121; Cf also Okafor, Op. Cit., 70 71.
26
In Agu v. Ikewibe (supra) and Ohiaeri v. Akabueze (supra), the Supreme
Court adumbrated the following factors to be proved by the plaintiff in
order to succeed in enforcing the arbitral award: (1) that the dispute
between the parties was deliberated upon by a third party, (2) that the third
party gave a decision in his favour, (3) that a valid customary arbitration
existed where the parties voluntarily submitted to the arbitration, (4) that
the parties agreed before hand to be bound by the arbitral decisions, (5) that
none of the parties withdrew from the arbitration midstream, (6) that none
of the parties rejected the award immediately it was made, (7) that the
arbitrators reached a decision and published their award. In Egesimba v.
Onuzuruike (supra), the Supreme Court rephrased the listing of the factors
with some nuanced implications. The factors are: (1) voluntary submission
of the dispute to the arbitration of the individual body, (2) agreement by the
parties either expressly or by implication that the decision of the arbitrator
will be accepted as binding, (3) that the arbitration was in accordance with
the custom of the parties, (4) that the arbitrators reached a decision and
published the award. A little further in Egesimba, the court extended the
factors thus: (a) that the parties voluntarily submit their dispute to a non-
judicial body, to wit, their elders or chiefs as the case may be for
determination, (b) the indication of the willingness of the parties to be
bound by the decision of the judicial body or freedom to reject the decision
where not satisfied; (c) that neither of the parties has resiled from the
decision so pronounced. It should be noted that the factor of resiling from
84 Justice in Igbo Jurisprudence



or objecting to the award as included in the list in Agu, Ohiaeri and
Egesimba is quite controversial. It seems to be an assault to common sense
that one is permitted by law to resile from the awards of an arbitral panel to
which he initially submitted. The decision of the West African Court of
Appeal in Foli v. Akese (1930) 1 WACA 1, is quite preferable. In that case,
Deans J stated that in submission to arbitration, the general rule is that as
the parties chose their arbitrator to judge in dispute between them, they
cannot when the award is good on its face object to his decision either
upon the law or on the facts.
27
G. O. Okogeri, Ezi Okwu Bu Ndu in Igbo Customary Law in N.
Otakpor (ed.), Ezi Okwu Bu Ndu: Truth is Life, Hope Publications, Ibadan,
2006, 174.
28
O. K. Edu, The Effect of Customary Arbitral Awards on Substantive
Litigation: Setting Matters Straight, 25 Journal of Private and Property
Law, 2004, 43 at 49.
29
Okafor, Op. Cit, 72.
30
A. A. Oba, Juju Oaths in Customary Law Arbitration and Their Legal
Validity in Nigerian Courts, Journal of African Law 52, I, 2008, 139,
footnote no. 4.
31
Okafor, Op. Cit, 72.
32
G. C. Nwakoby, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in
Nigeria, Iyke Ventures Production, Enugu, 2004, 87.
33
Ume v. Okoronkwo, (supra).
34
M. C. Okany, The Role of Customary Courts in Nigeria, Fourth
Dimension Publishers, Enugu, 1984, 174, n. 44.
35
P. A. Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria III, Oxford Univ. Press,
London, 1926, 620.
36
B. A. Garner (ed.), Blacks Law Dictionary, 7
th
Ed., West Group, St.
Paul, Minnesota, 1999, 1123.
37
T. O. Elias, The Nature of African Law, Manchester Univ. Press, U.S.A.,
1962, 229.
38
D. J. Penwill, Kamba Customary Law, Macmillan, London 1951, 67.
39
Cf www.oneword.org/tips2/jan99/1340041.htm.
40
C. Achebe, Things Fall Apart, Heinemann, London, 1958, 62-66.
41
Ibid.
42
The Present Nigerian Criminal Code was enacted in 1916. The Evidence
Act was enacted in 1943 and took effect in 1945.
43
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, section 315.
44
Supra.
45
Supra.
Ikenga Oraegbunam 85




46
Supra.
47
Supra.
48
Ibid.
49
Supra.
50
Supra.
51
Supra.
52
Ibid.
53
G. C. Nwakoby, Customary Law Arbitration Practice: Validity of
Arbitral Award Based on Oath Taking, Unpublished Lecture to LL.M.
Students, UNIZIK, Awka, 2007.
54
Section 4, Oaths Law of Anambra State, Revised Laws of Anambra State
of Nigeria, 1991.
55
Ibid. Section 8.
56
Sections 7 and 8, Oaths and Affirmation Law, Cap 108, Laws of Kwara
State 1994.
57
Owonyin v. Omotosho (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 304 at 309.
58
Section 14 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap E. 14, Laws of Fed. of Nigeria
2004.
59
Ibid, sections 14 (3) and 59.
60
Ibid, Section 14 (2).
61
For detailed study of the validity tests, cf Eleko v. Officer Administering
the Government of Nigeria (1931) A. C. 662 at 673; Lewis v. Bankole
(1908) I N.L.R. 81 at 99 102; Dawodu v. Danmole (1958) 3 F. S. C. 46;
Edet v. Essien (1932) II N.L.R 47; Re Adedevoh(1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 304 at
310; Adesubokan v. Yinusa (1971) N.N.L.R. 77., Muojekwu v. Muojekwu
(1997) 5 NWLR (pt 512) 208; Alake v. Pratt (1955) 15 WACA 20; Cole v.
Akinyele (1960 5 F.S.S. 84, etc.