Islamists in A Changing Middle East

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Edited by Marc Lynch
2012 Foreign Policy, Published by The FP Group, a division of The Washington Post Company
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Edited by Marc Lynch
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6 Introduction
9 Te New Islamic Landscape
25 Al-Qaeda
32 Tunisia
58 Egypt
104 Yemen
114 Libya
138 North Africa
152 Te Gulf
171 Syria
187 Palestine
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introduction
Islamists in a Changing Middle East brings together the best of the essays published about Islamist movements on ForeignPolicy.coms
Te Middle East Channel (http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com) since the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in December 2010. Te essays
collected here represent only a small sample of the extraordinary reporting, analysis and intepretation produced by the community
of scholars, journalists and activists who have contributed to the Middle East Channel since its launch in 2010. I would encourage
readers who nd this volume useful to also download our monthly topical POMEPS Arab Uprisings collections such as Bahrain
Burns and Jordan: Forever on the Brink (all available as PDF downloads at http://www.pomeps.org).
Te essays collected here represent the collective work of a dedicated team over years. For helping to put the Middle East Channel
together on a daily basis, I would like to thank Jonathan Guyer, Leila Hilal, David Kenner, Maria Kornalian, Tom Kutsch and Daniel
Levy. I would also like to thank Susan Glasser and Blake Hounshell for their strategic guidance and ongoing support for the Middle
East Channel, and their enthusiasm for this ebook experiment. I was very proud to learn that the Middle East Channel was named a
nalist for a 2012 National Magazine Award for Digital Media (an Ellie) thanks to the whole team for their contributions!
I would particularly like to acknowledge Mary Casey, who has been an indomitable force since joining the Middle East Channel
and the Project on Middle East Political Science. She has worked hard to make this volume a reality, while continuing her essential
work on the Middle East Channel and on POMEPS. Tis book wouldnt exist without her eorts. Also thanks to Jennifer King for
designing all of the POMEPS collections, including this ebook. I would also like to oer a special note of thanks to Lauren Bohn and
Tom Finn, who graciously shared some of their personal photos from around the Middle East for this volume.
I would also like to thank the institutions which help make our work possible. Tanks to the Carnegie Corporation of New York and
the Social Science Research Council for their ongoing support for the Project on Middle East Political Science, and to the Elliott
School of International Aairs at George Washington University for appreciating its scholarly and public value. All of my colleagues
at the Institute for Middle East Studies have contributed in some way to this project; I would particularly single out Nathan Brown
for his insights and assistance.
Finally, as always, my greatest debt goes to my wife Lauren and to my amazingly talented children Sophia and Alec. And if I must,
then grudging thanks to Jack, still the most annoying dog in the world.
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Islamist Movements After the Arab Uprising
By Marc Lynch, June 7, 2012
In December 2011, I joined my George Washington University colleague Nathan Brown for an extended conversation with Deputy
Supreme Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Khairet el-Shater. Te timing was oddly propitious, in that Brown had
just published an outstanding book about Islamist parties in the Arab world entitled When Victory is Not an Option. But, as
we explored with Shater, victory did suddenly seem to be a real possibility for the Muslim Brotherhood. How would this sudden
opportunity, after decades of participation in an authoritarian system that would not allow them to actually win, aect their behavior,
their ideology, or their internal organization?
While Shater could only speculate about how the new environment would change the Brotherhood, the organizations behavior
suggested at best confusion. Shater himself was nominated as a candidate for the presidency, after the Brotherhood had insisted
for months that it would not eld one (after Shaters disqualication, his place was taken by Mohamed Morsi, who advanced to the
run-o to be held on June 18). Tis followed massive Islamist victories in parliamentary elections, their controversial domination
of the selection of an assembly to write a new constitution, and growing mistrust and anger between them and revolutionary forces
upset with their failure to support street protests against the military leadership. For many, the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to be
gambling to seize all power in the new Egypteven as their own leaders saw themselves as besieged on all sides.
Te rise of Islamist power in Egypt had parallels across the region, as Islamist parties took leading roles in post-revolutionary Tunisia
and Libya, played a key part in the Syrian and Yemeni uprisings, and won elections in Morocco and Kuwait. Te rise of Islamist
movements in the Arab countries that have undergone political upheavals over the last year has startled and disturbed many once-
enthusiastic observers. Pessimists lament that the Arab Spring has given way to an Islamic Winter, and warn gloomily that the
overthrowing of dictators is only empowering a new generation of religious fanatics. But it is far too soon for such despair. Islamist
movements were well positioned to take advantage of political openings, and have indeed taken the lead in many of the transitions.
Te once repressed and tightly controlled Islamist movements are now in the position to at least attempt to act on their beliefs.
Teir success should not have come as a surprise. Tese movements have been reshaping the public culture of the Arab world for
decades, and have long been the best-organized and most popular political movements in most Arab countries. No observer of
the region could have failed to note the steady growth of Islamic public culture or the formidable political machines of Muslim
Brotherhood-style movements wherever they were allowed to operate. Islamists were naturally well positioned to take advantage of
the political openings in many Arab states that followed the great protest wave of 2011. But who are these movements? What do they
want? And how will they shape and be shaped by the new politics of the region?
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Tis collection of essays from the Middle East Channel on ForeignPolicy.com oers deep insights into the evolution of the Islamist
movements which are playing such a crucial role in the unfolding of a new Middle East. Tey oer accessible, deeply informed
analysis that can help to correct many of the misconceptions about such movements while also drawing attention to very real
dangers. In the essays to follow, academic experts and journalists on the ground go deep inside Islamic parties in Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, Syria, Yemen, Morocco, and more. Tese essays were written in real time, in response to particular circumstances and
challenges, and have been only lightly edited and updated for this volume in order to retain the urgency and passion with which they
were written. Te essays oer snapshots of a political moment, informed by deep experience and long study of these movements and
the countries within which they operate. Tey have enduring value.
One point which quickly emerges from the essays is simply how disorienting the newly open political vistas have been for Islamists.
It is not only foreign observers who have miscalculated. At one point in the summer of 2011, a leader of the Egyptian Sala party,
al-Nour, told me that if all went well his party might win four or ve seats; it won over 100. Te Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was
comfortable in opposition but now has struggled to deal with its own ascendance, as it suers internal ssures and unprecedented
public scrutiny. Ennahda may have swept elections, but only two years ago it did not even exist inside of Tunisia and has faced great
challenges in re-establishing itself. Te same can be said of Libyan and Syrian Islamists who for many years were forced to operate
underground or in exile.
Another is the extent to which the Islamists themselves are divided, confused, and struggling to adapt to the new realities that they
confront. Te Muslim Brotherhood is not al Qaeda, the Global Muslim Brotherhood Organization exercises little control over its
national branches, and Sala and Muslim Brotherhood parties are competing furiously for votes. Islamist political parties have to
calculate their strategy in uncertain legal and political environments, weigh both domestic and international calculations, and decide
how to reconcile their ideals with the demands of practical politics. Egypts Muslim Brotherhood nds itself facing such suspicion
from angry revolutionaries that many, shockingly, seem prepared to vote instead for the old regimes candidate Ahmed Shaq.
Te success of these movements is dicult to dispute, at least in the short term. In Tunisia, the Islamist Ennahda party emerged from
decades of complete exclusion from public life to sweep the foundational election and dominate the constitutional assembly. In Egypt, the
Muslim Brotherhood and new Sala parties dominated the rst parliamentery elections and the constitutional assembly that followed. In
Morocco, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) took a plurality of seats in parliamentary elections called following the kings limited
constitutional reforms. Islamist groups of various forms played a key role in both the Libyan and Syrian uprisings and the violence that
followed. Tere is little doubt that Islamist movements will do well in almost any country that allows elections in the coming years.
Te exercise of power also poses signicant challenges to all such movements. Some expect them to quickly move to impose Islamic
law, but at least some Islamist leaders may understand that this would quickly provoke a national and international backlash. How,
one wonders, will Muslim Brothers or Salas in leading roles in an Egyptian government deal with the need to take IMF or World
Bank loans to rescue the economy, when the Islamic sharia forbids the charging or paying of interest? How will they deal with the
need to coordinate policies toward Gaza with Israel?
Tere is nothing new about Muslim Brotherhood-aliated Islamist movements taking part in Arab electoral politics. For decades,
such movements have taken advantage of every opportunity to contest elections, partly to gain a share of power and partly as a way
to reach out into communities and spread the Islamic message. Such parties enjoyed great electoral success in countries as dierent
as Jordan, Egypt, and Kuwait. Tey relied on an elaborate, well-developed jurisprudence which provided Islamic sanction for such
democratic participation. And they consistently avowed their democratic commitments, in the face of varying degrees of pressure
from autocratic regimes. Tose on the outside who advocated democratic change in the Arab world could not avoid defending these
mainstream Islamist movements when they took the brunt of the repressive power of autocratic regimes. Tis did not make the
Islamists liberals, however, as serious grey zones remained in their views toward women, minorities, and freedoms.
Te authoritarian realities of these regimes created something of a safety net for these political Islamists. Since there was never any real
possibility that they could come to power through the ballot box, they were rarely forced to choose between their Islamist ideology and
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their democratic commitments. Tey could posture as democratic reformists, highlighting corruption or repression, without having
to signal whether they would use a position of power to impose their vision of Islamic morality on others. Te Arab uprisings have
removed that buer, forcing many of these movements to confront for the rst time the opportunity to actually dominate.
Despite their long experience of politics, therefore, their confusion in this new situation has been palpable. Tunisias Ennahda has for the
most part carefully reassured others of its commitment to toleration and cooperation. But Egypts Muslim Brotherhood has taken an ever
more aggressive political stance which has alienated many of its non-Islamist counterparts. If Islamists backed away from promises to not
eld a presidential candidate, could they be trusted to not later seek to impose their religious views on secularists or religious minorities?
Te absence of constitutions or mutually agreed rules of the game raised the stakes enormously. Te same democracy advocates who
once defended the Islamists against regime repression now should legitimately hold them accountable for their own behavior.
Te participation of Sala parties in democratic politics is more novel, however. While some Sala parties had entered the political
fray in the Gulf prior to the Arab uprisings, there had rarely been anything quite like the electoral rise of Egypts al-Nour Party. Sala
movements had for decades rejected democracy on principle, as apostasy which replaced the rule of God with the rule of man. Te
enthusiasm with which these movements now entered the electoral fray suggests that even Islamist movements may yet wear their
ideology lightly and adapt to new circumstances. But the harsh rhetoric and radical views of many of these inexperienced Sala
politicians shocked local and foreign audiences alike. So did their electoral success, which exceeded even their own expectations.
Islamist political participation is thus fraught with risks, challenges, and fears. Tere are good reasons for secularists or liberals
to worry about what such movements might do with state power. But we should not lose sight of the importance of the fact that
Islamists of all stripes have now decisively opted to accept the legitimacy of the democratic game. It is far better to have such groups
inside the democratic process than to have them as marginalized outsiders as long as they are willing to respect democratic rules,
public freedoms, and the toleration of others.
Tis marks a dramatic change since the bleak days following September 11, 2001, when extremist views and violent rhetoric
dominated views of Islamism. Te appeal of violent jihadism has clearly faded, at least for now, and few Islamists still openly reject
the principle of democracy. Al Qaeda itself has struggled to adapt to the Arab uprisings, with the American killing of Osama bin
Laden marking at least a symbolic ending to a decade dominated by a so-called War on Terror. But it would be wrong to assume
that this will necessarily last. Indeed, one could easily imagine the appeal of jihadism returning with a vengeance should democratic
politics fail or should Islamist politicians compromise so much that they alienate purists in their ranks. And, of course, state collapse
and protracted civil strife in countries such as Yemen or Syria could create new opportunities for jihadists to regroup.
Tese Islamist gains do not mean the rise of any kind of unied Islamic bloc across the Middle East and North Africa, however. Islamists
are deeply divided amongst themselves about political strategy and how to wield political authority. Some hope to immediately impose
Islamic cultural policies, while others prefer to focus on economic development. Even similar types of parties take very dierent forms
in dierent countries. Participation in politics is already changing these movements, strengthening some factions and weakening others.
What is more, their very success carries the seeds of a backlash both from frightened liberals, and from Islamist purists disgusted
by the compromises necessary to political power. And nally, the experience of the 1950s and 1960s bears recalling, when pan-Arabist
dominated states such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt proved bitter rivals rather than easy allies under the banner of Gamal Abed Nasser.
Te essays collected in this volume capture the complexity and the uncertainty of the new Islamism in the rapidly transforming
Middle East. Tey oer no easy answers. Instead, they present deeply informed analysis of these movements as they have confronted
new challenges and seized new opportunities. Tey show the Islamist movements in all their similarities and dierences, their
struggles and their advances, and their troubled engagement with a rapidly changing Middle East. Tunisia and Egypt are covered in
great depth, as bets their status as the rst successful uprisings and the most advanced in the process of political transition. But the
essays also cover Islamist movements in Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and beyond.
Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international aairs at George Washington University where he is the
director of the Institute of Middle East Studies and Project on Middle East Political Science. Follow him @abuaardvark.
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Te New Islamists
By Olivier Roy, April 16, 2012
Te following is an excerpt from the book Te Islamists Are Coming: Who Tey Really Are, which was released on April 18 by the
U.S. Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Te longstanding debate over whether Islam and democracy can coexist has reached a stunning turning point. Since the Arab
uprisings began in late 2010, political Islam and democracy have become increasingly interdependent. Te debate over whether they
are compatible is now virtually obsolete. Neither can now survive without the other.
In Middle Eastern countries undergoing political transitions, the only way for Islamists to maintain their legitimacy is through
elections. Teir own political culture may still not be democratic, but they are now dened by the new political landscape and forced
in turn to redene themselves much as the Roman Catholic Church ended up accepting democratic institutions even as its own
practices remained oligarchic.
At the same time, democracy will not set down roots in Arab countries in transition without including mainstream Islamist groups,
such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda in Tunisia, or al-Islah in Yemen. Te so-called Arab Spring cleared the way for
the Islamists. And even if many Islamists do not share the democratic culture of the demonstrators, the Islamists have to take into
account the new playing eld the demonstrations created.
Te debate over Islam and democracy used to be a chicken-and-egg issue: Which came rst?Democracy has certainly not been at
the core of Islamist ideology. Egypts Muslim Brotherhood has historically been strictly centralized and obedient to a supreme guide,
who rules for life. And Islam has certainly not been factored into promotion of secular democracy. Indeed, skeptics long argued that
the two forces were even anathema to each other.
But the outside world wrongly assumed that Islam would rst have to experience a religious reformation before its followers could
embark on political democratization replicating the Christian experience when the Protestant Reformation gave birth to the
Enlightenment and then modern democracy. In fact, however, liberal Muslim intellectuals had little impact in either inspiring or
directing the Arab uprisings. Te original protesters in Cairos Tahrir Square referred to democracy as a universal concept, not to any
sort of Islamic democracy.
Te development of both political Islam and democracy now appears to go hand-in-hand, albeit not at the same pace. Te new
political scene is transforming the Islamists as much as the Islamists are transforming the political scene.
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Today, the question of Islams compatibility with democracy does not center on theological issues, but rather on the concrete way
believers recast their faith in a rapidly changing political environment. Liberal or fundamentalist, the new forms of religiosity are
individualistic and more in tune with the democratic ethos.
Te Evolution
When Islamism gained ground during the 1970s and 1980s, it was initially dominated by revolutionary movements and radical
tactics. Over the next 30 years, however, the religious revival in Arab societies diversied, and social shifts reined in radicalism. Te
toll of death and destruction that radical Islamism left in its wake also diverted interest in militancy.
Even the proliferation of media free from overbearing state control played a role. In the mid-1990s, Al Jazeera became the rst
independent satellite television station in the Arab world. Within a generation, there were more than 500 such stations. Many oered
a wide range of religious programming from traditional sheikhs to liberal Muslim thinkers which in turn introduced the idea of
diversity. Suddenly, there was no single truth in a religion that has preached one path to God for 14 centuries.
Islamists also changed both through victory and defeat or a combination. Shiite Islamists won a political victory in Irans 1979
revolution, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini rose to power. But three decades later, the worlds only modern theocracy was
increasingly ostracized by the world, leading many Islamists to ask, What went wrong?
In Algeria, Sunni Islamists were pushed aside in a military coup on the eve of an election victory in 1992. Te party was banned, its
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leaders imprisoned. A more militant faction then took on the military, and more than 100,000 people were killed in a decade-long
civil war. Te bloody aftermath of the Arab worlds rst democratic election had a ripple eect on the calculations of Islamist groups
across the region.
As a result of their experience with the power of government repression, Islamists increasingly compromised to get in, or stay in,
the political game. In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers ran for parliament whenever allowed, often making tactical alliances with secular
parties. In Kuwait and Morocco, Islamists abided by the political rules whenever they ran for parliament, even when it meant
embracing those countries monarchies. Moroccos Justice and Development Party recognized the sacred dimension of the king in
order to participate in elections, while Jordans Muslim Brotherhood has publicly supported the king despite growing discontent
among the Arab Bedouin tribes.
A generation of Islamic activists forced into exile also played a major role in redirecting their movements. Most leaders or members
ended up spending more time in Western countries rather than Islamic nations, where they came into contact with other secular
and liberal dissidents as well as non-government organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and
Freedom House. Tese new connections facilitated the ow of ideas, and their movements evolution.
In the 1990s, exiled activists increasingly framed their agendas in terms of democracy and human rights. Tey acknowledged that
simplistic slogans like Islam is the solution were not enough to build programs or coalitions capable of removing dictators. Rached
Ghannouchi, co-founder of Tunisias Ennahda Party, concluded almost 20 years before the Arab uprisings that democracy was a
better tool to ght dictatorships than the call for either jihad or sharia.
Te Social Revolution
Islamists have changed because society has changed. Te rise of Islamists has reected the social and cultural revolutions within
Muslim societies as much as a political revolution.
A new generation has entered the political space, especially in the major cities. It is the generation of Tahrir Square, the epicenter
of Egypts uprising against former President Hosni Mubarak. When the uprisings began, two-thirds of the Arab worlds 300 million
people were under the age of 30. Tey are better educated and more connected with the outside world than any previous generation.
Many speak or understand a foreign language. Te females are often as ambitious as their male counterparts. Both genders eagerly
question and debate. Most are able to identify and even shrug o propaganda.
Te shift does not necessarily mean the baby-boom generation is more liberal or more secular than their parents. Many Arab baby
boomers are attracted by new forms of religiosity that stress individual choice, direct relations with God, self-realization, and self-
esteem. But even when they join Islamic movements, they bring along their critical approach and reluctance to blindly follow an
aging leadership.
Te transformation is visible even among young Egyptian Salas, followers of a puritanical strain of Islam that emphasizes a return
to early Islamic practices. Tey may wear baggy trousers and long white shirts in imitation of the Prophet Mohammed. But they also
often wear shiny sunglasses and sport shoes. Tey are part of a global culture.
For decades, the Salas opposed participation in politics. But after the uprisings, they completely reversed course. Tey jumped
into politics, hastily registering as political parties. At universities, clubs of young Salas including females have joined public
debate forums.
Te inuence of the current baby-boom generation will be enduring. Teir numbers are likely to dominate for much of their lives
potentially another 30 to 40 years because the fertility rate has plummeted almost everywhere in the Arab world since their birth.
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Te Tree Camps
During the centuries-old debate about Islam and democracy, Muslim religious scholars and intellectuals fell into three broad camps.
Te rst camp rejects both democracy and secularism as Western concepts that are not even worth refuting. In this fundamentalist
view, participating even in everyday politics, such as joining a political party or voting, is haram, or religiously forbidden. Tis has
been the position of the Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia, the Taliban in Afghanistan and, for decades, the various Sala schools
across the Arab world.
Te second camp claims that returning to the true tenets of Islam will create the best kind of democracy. In this conservative
view, the faithful may deliberate to understand the true path, but the idea that religion is the ultimate truth is not negotiable. Tese
Islamists invoke the concept of tawhid, or the oneness, uniqueness and sovereignty of God, which can never be replaced by the will
of the people.
Te second camp also invokes Muslim practices to claim modern political ideology meets the basic requirements of democracy. For
example, it often points to the shura or advisory council, where ideas were debated before submitting proposals to the leader as
the equivalent of a parliament.
Te third camp advocates ijtihad, or reinterpreting Islam to make it compatible with the universal concept of democracy. Tis
position is more common among lay intellectuals than among clerics. But the opening up the doors of ijtihad, which conservative
scholars had believed were closed in the Middle Ages, has already produced its own spectrum of ideas, not all in agreement.
Te Islamist reformers often have a larger audience in the West than in their own countries and not just because of censorship
and harassment. Some are deemed to be too intellectual, too abstract, or tied to an articial theology. Teir philosophical approach is
disconnected from popular religious practices and the teachings at most madrasas, or religious schools.
Te Future
Te new Islamist brand will increasingly mix technocratic modernism and conservative values. Te movements that have entered
the political mainstream cannot now aord to turn their backs on multiparty politics for fear of alienating a signicant portion of the
electorate that wants stability and peace, not revolution.
But in countries undergoing transitions, the Islamists will face a tough balancing act. In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood
cannot cede its conviction that Islam is all encompassing. Yet it risks losing popular support unless it can also reconcile Islam with
good governance and human rights.
To do that, the Muslim Brothers may have to translate Islamic norms into more universal conservative values such as limiting the
sale of alcohol in a manner more similar to Utahs rules than to Saudi laws, and promoting family values instead of imposing sharia
norms on women.
Many Islamist movements still do not share the democratic culture of the uprisings. But given their own demographics and the wider
constituency they seek, they will increasingly have to take into account the new political playing eld created by the demonstrations
even within their own movements.
Te exercise of power can actually have a debilitating eect on ideological parties. And for all their recent political success, Islamists
also face a set of constraints: Tey do not control the armed forces. Teir societies are more educated and sophisticated in their
worldviews, and more willing to actively express their opinions than in years past. Women are increasingly prominent players,
reected in their growing numbers in universities.
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Ironically, elected Islamists may face opposition from the clergy. Among Sunnis, Islamists usually do not control the religious
institutions. Egypts Muslim Brotherhood does not control Al Azhar University, the Islamic worlds oldest educational institution
dating back more than a millennium. Te Brothers may have won a plurality in parliament, but none of them is authorized to say
what is or is not Islamic without being challenged by a wide range of other religious actors, from clerics to university scholars.
Te biggest constraint on Islamists, however, may be economic realities. Focusing simply on sharia will not spawn economic
development, and could easily deter foreign investment and tourism. Te labor force is outspoken and does not want to be forgotten,
but economic globalization requires sensitivity to international pressures too. Te newly elected Islamists face political rejection if
they do not deliver the economic goods.
Israel is still unpopular and anti-Western xenophobia has visibly grown, but Islamist movements will need more than these old issues
to sustain their rise to power. Te Arab uprisings have shifted the battle lines in the Middle East, and Islamists will nd it harder to
play on the Arab-Israeli conict or tensions with the international community.
At the moment, the most dangerous divide is persistent tensions between Sunnis and Shiites. Te dierences are symbolized by
deepening political fault lines between the Sunni religious monarchy in Saudi Arabia and Irans Shiite theocracy, but they ripple
across the region from the tiny archipelago of Bahrain to strategically located Syria.
Just as Islamism is redening the regions politics, Islamic politics and sectarian dierences are redening its conicts.
Olivier Roy, a professor at the European University Institute in Florence, is the author of Globalized Islam (2004) and Holy Ignorance
(2010). He heads the ReligioWest Research project at the European University Institute.
Te Illusive Rise of Islamists
By Khalil al-Anani, December 8, 2011
Te victory of Islamist parties in Egyptian elections is overrated. Given Islamists entrenched presence in the Arab societies,
politically, economically, and socially, let alone the abundant religious propaganda, it is more striking that thus far none of the
Islamists parties have obtained an absolute majority in 2011s post Arab uprising elections. Islamists in Tunis, Morocco, and Egypt
cannot claim superiority over other political forces. Te seeming triumph of Islamist forces will soon be revealed as an illusion.
In Tunis, the Ennahda Party won only 37 percent of constituent assembly seats (89 out of 217), which placed them ahead of other
political parties but did not grant Ennhada the nal word in writing the new constitution or in forming a unilateral government. In
Morocco, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) barely won 27 percent in the elections (107 out of 395 of seats) with less than
46 percent voter turnout. True, the PJD received more than double the votes it won in the last elections (the party got 47 seats in
2007 elections), and it is the rst time for a party to get this number of seats since the rst Moroccan elections in 1963. However,
the peculiarity and complexity of the Moroccan electoral system (which creates a fractured parliament) does not guarantee a single
party dominance over the legislature. Even in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhoods Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the iconic and the
most potent Islamist movement in the Arab world, received just 36.6 percent of votes in the rst round despite its long-standing
experience in running election campaigns. (Although the movement had ocially been banned for decades, many Brothers ran in
elections as independent candidates.)
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Te greater surprise lies in the relative success of the ultraconservative Salasts, the dark horse of the Egyptian elections, who
garnered 24.3 percent of the votes. But it is highly unexpected that they will achieve the same proportion in the two upcoming
phases of elections. Not only because of their unwise and nave Islamic rhetoric which has overshadowed the media over the past few
weeks, but also because they will confront their more moderate Islamist counterparts, the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Wasat Party.
In the run-o elections between individual candidates this week, the Brotherhood crushed their Sala rivals, winning nearly ten
times as many seats.
One of the major fears associated with the rise of the Islamists is that they will use their power to reshape political institutions in
their favor. But in fact, these elections will not change the rules of the game in favor of the newcomers and empower them. Not one
of the rising Islamist parties will be able to take real power from the incumbent rulers - at least not from their performance at the
ballot box.
In Tunis, as well as in Morocco and Egypt, Islamists parties that won the elections will not be able to signicantly alter the status
quo to their benet. First, the embedded authoritarian structures are still functioning and the old elite is vibrant. Te heavy legacy
of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak will impede any attempt by new governments to dismantle these structures. For
instance, the Ennahda Party, after forming a coalition government that is still under intensive negotiations, will grapple with two
old and entrenched institutions: the army and the security establishment. Both will ght to preclude any fundamental changes that
might aect their interests. Te Tunisian army showed a remarkable degree of self-restraint from grabbing power after Ben Ali ed;
however, its generals are not angels. Tey view the army as the guardian of the republic which might hint to an oversight if not
a soft patronage role particularly if civilians could not tame their roles in the new constitution. Tey will attentively monitor the
political scene from behind the curtain. It is much worse with the security forces, which will not bow to the new realities easily. Any
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attempt to rehabilitate them to t into the new democratic settings might undermine the whole process of transition.
In Morocco, the monarch is sovereign, untouchable and operates above politics. Te constitutional amendments that were approved
last July in a celebrated referendum do not confer much power to the parliament. Tey reorganized the political domain to become
more visible, yet ineective. Te PJD will form a weak government that will seek to appease the monarchy and the street at the same
time. Not surprisingly, the PJD is not positioning itself as a contender to the palace (al-Makhzan), which retains the full power over
the state and society.
In Egypt, it is even more blatant. Te military is the only player in town and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)
appears unlikely to cede power to the Muslim Brotherhood or any other political party. Te new parliament, which will likely be
led by Islamists, will therefore be ineective and constrained. According to a constitutional declaration approved by a popular
referendum last March, the SCAF has the exclusive power to assign and dismiss the government. In a recent message sent through
SCAF General Mamdouh Shaeen, legal assistant to the defense minister, the leading parties in the elections will not be able to form
the government, dissolve the SCAFs appointed government, or question its ministers. More ironically, the parliament will not have
the authority to craft the new constitution without the SCAFs oversight.
Terefore, the mere outcome of the on-going elections will merely add to the fragmented and divisive political scene.
None of the Islamist parties will form a unilateral government. Tey will have to bargain, build coalitions, and make concessions.
By doing so, Islamists will have to rein in their political ambitions and show elasticity in sharing power. More signicantly, as a part
of transition dynamics, Islamists are more prone to abandon their original goals, such as building an Islamic state and applying the
Islamic law (sharia). Te recent statements of Islamists leaders in Tunis, Morocco, and Egypt show a tendency toward re-prioritizing
their agenda to become more pragmatic and realistic. Instead of focusing on the sacred and identity issues, they have been inclined
to address more mundane and practical problems including reforming education, ghting corruption, and rebuilding infrastructure.
With the ethos of the Arab Spring still thriving, the young Arabs will not tolerate any violation of personal freedoms and human
rights. Te new Islamist governments will be required not only to give assurances of respecting political pluralism, minorities rights,
freedom of speech, and so forth, but more importantly will need to provide genuine concessions pertaining to their Islamic pursuits.
In other words, the pressure on Islamists will not be conned to their political positions, whereby they can shrewdly maneuver against
their adversaries, but more importantly will aect their ideological convictions, which will subvert their illusive rise.
Khalil al-Anani is a Scholar at the School of Government and International Aairs at Durham University, UK and a former visiting
fellow at the Brookings Institute. He can be reached at [email protected].
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Ready for their close-up
By James Traub, December 2, 2011
Te great experiment has begun. Arab publics went to the polls in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt, and to no ones surprise, Islamist
parties came out on top in each case. Does this mean that Islamists have hijacked the revolution? Or that the Arab Spring will
become, as Newt Gingrich put it in the Republicans foreign-policy debate, an anti-Christian spring? Te one-word answer is no.
Te three-word answer is I hope not.
Tunisias Ennahda party, Moroccos Justice and Development Party, and Egypts Freedom and Justice Party (the political wing of
the Muslim Brotherhood) are not secular, but they are democratic or at the very least, they have earned the right to have their
democratic bona des tested in the real world of political practice. Tey won pluralities because they were the best-organized parties
in each country, but also because in the years before the populist upheaval they had come to be seen as forces for social justice in the
face of autocratic rule.
Teyve earned their place, but what now? Te most pressing question is not about their intentions, pious or otherwise, but about
whether they will be permitted to rule at all. In Tunisia, where there is no entrenched rival force, the answer is almost certainly
yes. In Morocco, King Mohammed VI promulgated a new constitution to give some authority to the feeble parliament, but he kept
virtually all real power for himself. Te November 2011 election aroused nothing like the enthusiasm of Tunisias or Egypts, with
turnout a relatively modest 45 percent and large numbers of voters turning in intentionally spoiled ballots. In Egypt, of course, the
interim military government, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), said it plans to rule until a president is elected,
apparently in mid-2012; but Egyptians are increasingly worried that the SCAF will not withdraw even then.
17
Still, elections have a way of changing the landscape. Moroccos Justice and Development Party (PJD by its French initials), through
which the countrys Islamists are organized, has already gently pushed back against the palace by asserting that if the king did not
choose the partys leader, Abdelilah Benkirane, as prime minister, they would reserve the right to review, and reject, his choice. (Te
king chose Benkirane.) Ahmed Benchemsi, a Moroccan journalist now at Stanford University and very much a secularist, says, No
other party leader would ever have dared say such a thing. For the rst time, he says, the balance of power is being challenged.
Te Brotherhood in Egypt has challenged the SCAF by calling for a cabinet of national salvation, which the group would lead. Tat
wont happen; but the gauntlet has, ever so carefully, been thrown down.
For this reason, some of the secular gures who led the revolution in Tahrir Square reacted calmly to the Brotherhoods showing. On
a talk show, Wael Ghonim, the Egyptian Google executive who was a pivotal gure in last years revolution, was quoted as saying, It
makes no dierence to me whether Egypt is a civil or religious state so long as it is correctly run politically and economically. Many
others, of course, fear that a Brotherhood-dominated parliament will lead Egypt deeper into obscurantism.
Te big decision for the Brotherhood will be with whom to align. Te real surprise of the ballot was that the hard-liner Salas took
about a quarter of the vote, far outpacing both the traditional liberals who have long operated in the shadows of the military state
and the more radical forces associated with Tahrir Square. Te Brotherhood is a worldly force accustomed to political maneuver
and compromise; the Salas are genuine theocrats. Te Salas would probably demand clauses in the constitution limiting the rights
of women or non-Muslims and would try to legislate morality, which Brotherhood parliamentarians have avoided seeking to do in
the past. A Brotherhood-Sala alliance would draw a line right through Egyptian society and might well turn Tahrir Square into a
cockpit of secular-Islamist confrontation.
Will the Brotherhood turn that way? Te New York Times account of the electoral outcome largely accepted that view. And its true
that the Islamists can now dispense with liberal forces if they want to. On the other hand, Saad el-Katatni, the party secretary general,
explicitly rejected an alliance with al-Nour, the main Sala group. Marina Ottaway, an Egypt expert with the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, pointed out that during the campaign season, the Freedom and Justice Party tried to build an alliance with
secular forces which ultimately formed a compact of their own and refused to join an Islamist alliance. If I had to take a bet
about that right now, Ottaway said, I would bet they would form an alliance with the more secular parties and the more moderate
elements.
Joshua Stacher, an academic at Kent State University who has studied the inner workings of the Brothers, views them less as an
Islamic body than as a giant jobs program. Stacher doesnt think the Brotherhood will provoke a civil war with secular forces, but
he also doesnt think they will stand up to the generals who replaced President Hosni Mubarak. Te Brotherhood is no longer an
opposition party, Stacher noted, theyre part of the political elite.
What is certainly true is that the prospect of nally gaining power has turned the Brothers into allies of Egypts military rulers. While
other forces stood up against the SCAFs brutality and called for a postponement of elections, the Brotherhood held its tongue and
stayed o the street. In a speech give by Mohammed Badie, the leader of the Brotherhood, known as the supreme guide, lamely
explained that his members had declined to join the mass demonstrations which led to the deaths of at least 40 protesters out
of fear of a conspiracy seeking to lure the Brotherhood to the square and then incite violence. Badie blamed the bloodshed on the
ubiquitous hidden hands Israel, the United States, the CIA rather than security forces acting on behalf of the military.
On balance the Brotherhood might be less inclined to forge an alliance with the Salas than it will be to serve as a facade and a prop
for the military. (Te same may be true of the PJD in Morocco, though it would be providing window dressing for the palace rather
than the generals.) Tat would indeed amount to hijacking the revolution. But this is what democracy is for. Should the Brotherhood
become an Islamist-accented version of Mubaraks old National Democratic Party, the Egyptian public wont stand for it. Te
Islamists could win one election, but lose the next. Of course theres the fear that they simply wouldnt stage another election. But the
Brotherhoods own members wouldnt stand for that. Te era of one man, one vote, one time is over, says Stacher.
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Meanwhile, U.S. President Barack Obamas administration has been reaching out to the Brotherhood. In November 2011, two
midlevel State Department ocials went to the organizations headquarters to meet with Essam el-Erian, a senior Brotherhood
leader and the partys vice chairman. With the Islamist victory, Obama may be tempted to pull back and perhaps even reduce
the pressure on the SCAF to hand over power to a civilian government. Te United States has, after all, been doing business with
military rulers in Egypt for 60 years. But that era, too, is over. Whatever threat the Islamists pose, to Egypt or to the West, pales
before the threat of further clumsy and brutal military rule.
James Traub is a contributing writer for the New York Times Magazine and a fellow of the Center on International Cooperation.
Terms of Engagement, his column for ForeignPolicy.com, runs weekly.
Te irrelevance of the International Muslim Brotherhood
By Nathan Brown, September 20, 2010
A while after the election of Muhammad Badi as general guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the international
Brotherhood organization a contentious and unusually public process I shared a lunch with some leaders of a Brotherhood-
inspired movement in another Arab state.Te conversation was mostly in English, but sometimes turned to Arabic (particularly
when the Brotherhood leaders were speaking to each other). One of them asked me in English, Nathan, what do you think of what is
going on in the Brotherhood in Egypt?Before I could reply, another leader asked my questioner in Arabic Who is the new general
guide?Neither of them could remember so I piped in with Badis name.Neither one noticed me at rst, so I repeated it.At that
point, one of them replied vaguely to the other, Yes, I think it is Muhammad something.
How disciplined and well-organized can an international organization be when followers struggle to recall their supreme leaders
name? In press interviews, personal meetings, and material designed for their own members, Muslim Brotherhood leaders in various
Arab countries refer very respectfully to the Brotherhood way of doing things but almost never to the authority or even existence
of the international organization. Yet increasingly, awareness of Islamist movements in the West has lead to some dark talk of an
international Brotherhood that serves as a cover for all sorts of missionary, political, and even violent activity. From a solid core in the
Arab world, the Brotherhoods tentacles are said to be reaching out from Oslo to Oklahoma City.
I have conducted little research on the Brotherhood in Europe and the United States, but I have studied it in various Arab countries
where the movement is the strongest and most active. Is there such a thing as an international Muslim Brotherhood uniting these
branches?Yes. But the odd truth is that the international Brotherhood does not matter much. And perhaps the odder truth is that it
does not seem to matter that the international Muslim Brotherhood does not matter.
Tere is an international Muslim Brotherhood.Chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood exist in a number of societies; each one of them
is headed by a general supervisor. Most chapters are members of an international body; they also accept the overall leadership of the
general guide, a gure who has almost always doubled as the leader of the Egyptian organization (the original branch, often referred
to in other countries as the mother movement).Te international organization is rather bashful: we know little about its internal
operations; we learn about its meetings and actions only when it takes a public decision.
Tere are a few movements that are clearly inspired by the Brotherhood (in Israel, Kuwait, Iraq, and Indonesia, for instance) that do
not acknowledge an open association with the international movement; some have formal ties that are not openly acknowledged and
19
all have informal ties.And there are other organizations besides the international Brotherhood such as the International Forum
for Islamist Parliamentarians that are informally associated with the Brotherhood and work to gather members from Brotherhood
chapters and Brotherhood-type movements in various countries.
Why does this international organization not matter? Because it has not (and probably cannot) do very much.First, it is sluggish
and unresponsive. On the few occasions it has been called in to settle dicult organizational questions, it has not responded with
eciency or alacrity.For instance, in 1989 a dispute among Jordanian Brotherhood members about whether to accept an invitation
to join the cabinet proved so contentious the disputants tried to kick the question upstairs to the international organization. Te
answer came far too late and contained too much ambiguity to resolve the issue.In 2007, Khaled Mishaal sought to have Hamas
recognized as a distinct member of the international organization, setting o a complex organizational tussle inside the Jordanian
organization. (Hamas has largely subsumed the Palestinian Brotherhood, which in turn was formally attached in the eyes of
the international organization to the Jordanian branch and some vestigial links survive between Hamas and the Jordanian
Brotherhood as a result).One chief bone of contention focused on what would happen to Palestinian and Jordanian members in the
Gulf (an important source of funds but also a group that sent representatives to the leadership bodies of the Jordanian organization,
tilting it in a Palestinian direction). Tree years later, the issues were still not fully resolved.
Second, the international organization is not only sluggish, it is also Egyptian dominated. Its leader is always an Egyptian and
Egyptian Brotherhood members have scoed at the idea that a non-Egyptian might be selected. Badis election was approved by the
international organization, but there was some grumbling about the rubber-stamp nature of the process. Most members do accept
that the mother organization will inevitably have a leading role, but many also nd the Egyptian leaders far more interested in
Egyptian than international aairs. Egypts harsh security climate also hampers its leaders from becoming more active internationally
many Egyptian leaders cannot travel outside their country.
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Finally, various chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood have developed an ethos of mutual deference: they increasingly hold fast to the
idea that each chapter should be free to react as it sees t to local conditions. Te various chapters do consult each other, but they
are free to reject the advice they receive. Te Iraqi Islamic Party participated in a political process sponsored by the United States
at a time when Jordans Muslim Brotherhood refused contact with American ocials because of the countrys occupation of Iraq.
Aware of the conicting stances, leaders of both organizations simply agreed to disagree. Hamas was advised by both Jordanian
and Egyptian leaders not to try too hard in the 2006 parliamentary elections. Participation, not domination (that is, run but do
not win) was the formula suggested to them. Tey listened to the rst half of the message (they ran), but not the second (they won).
Unlike their Jordanian and Egyptian comrades who only contest a minority of seats, they submitted a complete slate of candidates for
parliamentary seats, enabling their surprising (and in the eyes of some Brotherhood leaders elsewhere) ill-advised victory.
Mutual deference extends quite far: all Brotherhood movements agree on the general principle that they will work only for peaceful
change. Te exception is that violent resistance to occupation is legitimate. When is a country occupied and when should resistance
be used in such a case?Tat is for each branch to evaluate. Hamas has universal support for its violent resistance but Brotherhood
members also make clear that it is up to Hamas to decide when and how to employ violence.
But doesnt the international organization seek to recreate a global Islamic caliphate?Well, there are certainly some older ideological
documents suggesting such a distant goal but there is precious little evidence that the matter weighs much on the minds of current
leaders, focused as they are on their domestic scenes. If the international organization was the germ of a recreated unied Islamic world,
membership might be a bit more portable than it currently is. For instance, a member of a Palestinian branch temporarily residing in the
Gulf might be treated in the Gulf state as a member of the local organization. Tat sort of inter-branch linkage often did happen earlier
in the Brotherhoods history but has declined signicantly in recent years.Brotherhood branches oer each other moral (and in a few
cases material) support, but membership in a national organization is hardly treated as membership in a single, international movement.
So the international organization exists but does not matter much. But here is where we come nally to the more profound
irrelevance: it may not matter much that the international organization does not matter much.
Brotherhood-type movements whether formally aliated or not, whether nominally accepting of the leadership of the Egyptian
general guide or completely independent still show two characteristics that make formal coordination seem unnecessary, even
counterproductive.
First, the various branches have no problem trying to follow a common general model but that is because the model is so general it
can be applied very dierently in dierent settings. Members almost never refer to the authority of the international organization or the
current general guide, but they regular refer to the Brotherhoods model (manhaj) and to the thought of Hassan al-Banna.Al-Bannas
thought in turn, is hardly an abstract philosophy but instead a set of organizational techniques, inspirational speeches, and a general
approach that places a tremendous emphasis on social engagement.Brotherhood members and their movements are supposed to work
on behalf of reform on all levels personal, social, political, and religious.Tey are not to form an isolated community of saints but to
build better selves, families, and communities based on Islamic teachings. Tis model is exible but pushes the Brotherhood outwards.
It inspires branches and members to enter politics and run for oce, form charitable associations, speak softly to non-members, act
as role models in their neighborhoods, embark on self-improvement, participate in study groups, and support Islamic causes.Given
the broad range of activities Brotherhood branches are involved in and given that some of this activity does not take place under the
Brotherhood rubric it is often dicult to discern where a Brotherhoods formal organizational reach begins and ends. Brotherhood
members are often involved in a host of projects, hospitals, schools, clubs, and associations, but it is not always clear how closely
those other organizations are associated with the Brotherhood movement. It is this organizational feature that is both a secret of the
Brotherhoods inuence and a source of the suspicions and confusion that surround the movement.
Te second reason for the limited relevance of the formal international organization is that Brotherhood members recognize each
other without it.It may be dicult to tell where each Brotherhood branch organization begins and ends, but it is generally clear to
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people in the movement who is following the general model and who is not. Ask an Egyptian Brotherhood leader who represents the
Brotherhood movement in Kuwait and one will get a clear answer (even though the Kuwaiti movement cut its formal ties with the
international two decades ago).
At a global level, the Brotherhood is no maa. Nor is it a rigid and disciplined Stalinist-style Comintern. It most closely resembles
todays Socialist International: a tame framework for a group of loosely linked, ideologically similar movements that recognize each
other, swap stories and experiences in occasional meetings, and happily subscribe to a formally international ideology without giving
it much priority. Tere is every reason to be interested in the Brotherhoods myriad (and surprisingly diverse) country branches, but
there is no reason to fear it as a menacing global web.
Nathan Brown is a professor of political science and international aairs at George Washington University, a fellow at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, and a 2009 Carnegie Scholar for the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Is the Arab Spring bad for women?
By Isobel Coleman, December 20, 2011
In many ways, 2011 was the Year of the Arab Woman. From the earliest days of upheaval that started in Tunisia in December
2010, women have been on the front lines of protest, leading public demonstrations, blogging passionately, covering the unrest
as journalists, launching social media campaigns, smuggling munitions, and caring for the wounded. In December 2011, when
Tawakkol Karman became the rst Arab woman to accept the Nobel Peace Prize, she gave an enthusiastic shout-out to her many
Arab sisters who have struggled to win their rights in a society dominated by the supremacy of men.
Across the region, though, Arab women are grumbling that overthrowing dictators is proving easier than overturning the pervasive
supremacy of men. Gamila Ismail, a prominent Egyptian activist and politician, summed it up when she quit Egypts parliamentary
race in disgust after learning that she would be put third on the list in her district not a winning position. We women had a
very important role before, during, and after the revolution, and it does not work for us today, to accept this, she complained in a
television interview. (She ran and narrowly lost as an independent candidate.) In Tunisia, disgruntled women activists formed the
October 24 Front to defend womens rights in the aftermath of the Islamists electoral victory there. We want a constitution that
respects womens rights and doesnt roll back the advances weve made, said one Tunisian protester.
Arab women are embattled on multiple fronts. First and foremost are the deep-seated patriarchal customs that constrain women.
Patriarchy is certainly not unique to Arab lands, but it runs deep. It doesnt help that for decades, the womens rights agenda was
closely associated with the now-discredited authoritarian regimes: Egypts Suzanne Mubarak ran a state-aliated womens non-
governmental organization (NGO); Leila Ben Ali, Tunisias much-hated hairdresser-cum-rst lady, was president of the Arab Women
Organization, an intergovernmental body sponsored by the Arab League; and both Syrias Asma al-Assad and Jordans Queen Rania
have been active on womens issues. Te rise of politically empowered Islamist parties that contest existing laws for women on
religious grounds also pose serious complications for women. Although womens activism has clearly been important to the Arab
revolts, there is no guarantee that womens rights activists will be able to turn their engagement into longer-term economic, social,
and political gains. In fact, in some countries, there is reason for concern that women will see their rights erode.
22
Libya is a case in point. At the ceremony marking Libyas ocial liberation in October, one of the rst announcements from Mustafa
Abdel Jalil, leader of Libyas National Transitional Council, was that any laws that contradicted sharia would be annulled. He
specically mentioned that polygamy would be legal, drawing cheers and celebratory gunre from the mostly male crowd. Libyan
women expressed surprise and disappointment and wondered why, with all of Libyas pressing issues, reinstating polygamy should be
on the front burner. (NATO leaders wondered the same.) Although polygamy was technically legal under Muammar al-Qadda, it
was discouraged and today is not practiced widely in Libya, but that could change. Female university students, who largely describe
themselves as pious, vow to ght this regression.
In Egypt, a number of developments over the past year underscore womens rights as a ashpoint in society. Te inspirational images
of gender solidarity in Tahrir Square in the early days of the revolution quickly gave way to ugly episodes of targeted harassment.
A hastily planned demonstration on March 8, 2011, International Womens Day, attracted a few hundred women but was marred
by angry men shoving the protesters and yelling at them to go home, saying their demands for rights are against Islam. Around the
same time, the Egyptian military rounded up scores of women demonstrators and, in a show of raw intimidation, subjected many of
them to virginity tests. On the political level, women have been excluded from major decision-making bodies since the fall of Hosni
Mubaraks regime, and few won seats in the parliamentary elections. Teir low success rate was not helped by the militarys decision
to eliminate a Mubarak-era quota ensuring women 64 seats. Tis was a setback for womens political participation, even though the
quota enjoyed little credibility because it had been used to reward Mubarak loyalists.
Te ultraconservative Sala groups, who openly question a modern role for women in society, have many women worried. One
Sala leader refused to appear on a political talk show on television until the female host put on a headscarf. Another denounced the
military governments requirement to include women on electoral lists as evil, though Emad Abdel-Ghafour, head of al-Nour, the
leading Sala party, stated that the party does accept women candidates. Yet the Sala women who did run demurred from showing
23
their pictures on campaign materials, instead replacing their faces with pictures of owers; moreover, the party deliberately clustered
them at the bottom of its lists, making them unlikely to win seats. One Sala sheikh issued an opinion that women should not wear
high-heeled shoes in public. Along with Sala statements of intent to ban alcohol and limit beach tourism, these swipes at women
unnerve liberals.
Yet liberals have not been stalwarts of womens rights in Egypt either. Te 2000 decision to grant women the right to no-fault divorce
(prior to this, they had to jump over the onerous legal hurdle of proving abuse or abandonment) was denounced not only by Islamist
groups but by secular ones too for undermining the family. Other changes to the personal-status laws in the past decade that have
beneted women, particularly an expansion of custody rights, are coming under increasing attack. Critics discredit the reforms by
derisively calling them Suzannes Laws, after Suzanne Mubarak. Tey claim the laws were intended to accommodate the wealthy
friends of the former rst lady, and they blame those statutes for a rise in the countrys divorce rate. Given the criticism of these laws
from all sides of the political spectrum, it is likely that they will be amended by the new parliament, and not to womens benet.
Women seem to be faring better in Tunisia. Liberals and secularists have been deeply wary of the rise of Ennahda, the countrys
leading Islamist party, warning that it could mean a reversal of womens rights. Since the 1950s, Tunisian women have enjoyed the
most expansive legal rights in the region, including relatively progressive marriage and divorce laws and access to birth control
and abortion. Since returning to Tunisia in the beginning of 2011, Rached Ghannouchi, Ennahdas leader, has strived to convince
Tunisians that his party will not seek to change the countrys personal-status laws. Some, however, have accused Ennahda of
obfuscating its real intentions behind moderate rhetoric a charge that did not prevent the party from surging to victory with 41
percent of the vote in the October 2011 election. Tanks to electoral rules requiring favorable placement of women on party lists,
women gained 23 percent of the seats in parliament, a higher share than in the U.S. Congress. Most of the women are from Ennahda
and will likely reect their partys traditional views on women, but their participation in such large numbers at least normalizes an
active political role for women. Moreover, Ghannouchi and other Ennahda leaders so far have been purposefully focused on eorts
to jump-start the economy, produce jobs, and reassure foreign investors. Ennahda has forged a coalition with liberal parties, and
to maintain that coalition, it will have to continue to focus on the economy and human rights rather than getting bogged down in
divisive culture wars.
Ghannouchi seems to understand that while rolling back gains for women can score points among Islamic conservatives, ultimately
al-Nahda will win or lose on economic grounds, and women are important economic actors. With high rates of literacy and relatively
low fertility, women constitute nearly one third of Tunisias workforce. Economic reality simply demands a pragmatic approach
toward women. Lets hope that Ghannouchi can get that message through to his Islamist brothers across the region. Otherwise, Arab
women might soon be channeling their Iranian sisters, who have complained that Irans Islamic Revolution has brought them little
but poverty and polygamy.
Isobel Coleman is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of Paradise Beneath Her Feet: How Women Are
Transforming the Middle East.
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Bin Ladens Quiet End
By Marc Lynch, May 2, 2011
So Osama bin Laden was nally killed. Tis represents the achievement of a goal long sought by virtually all Americans and most of
the world, and is a cathartic moment capturing the attention of the world. As most counter-terrorism experts (and administration
ocials) have been quick to point out, his death will not end al Qaeda. It does matter, though. Tere could be some major
operational impact on the relative balance among al Qaeda Central, the decentralized ideological Sala-jihadist movement, and the
regional AQ franchises. But I will leave those crucial issues to others for now in order to focus on the impact of his death on Arab
politics and on the broader milieu of Islamism.
Te fact is al Qaeda had already been eectively marginalized within the mainstream of the Arab world long before bin Laden died.
His death removed the only al Qaeda gure still able to speak eectively to that Arab mainstream, and marked the end of an era of
Arab politics which had already largely faded away. Al Qaedas marginalization in Arab politics had been developing for a long time,
and was only further advanced by bin Ladens death. How this happened, and how it matters for the rapidly evolving Arab world, are
the questions which now need attention.
Al Qaeda was never able to attract signicant support for its Sala-jihadist ideology, and thrived with mass Arab audiences only
when it was able to pose as an avatar of resistance to the West. Al Qaeda thrived on the clash of civilizations and war of ideas
rhetoric which dominated the rst ve years of the administration of George W. Bush, since this vindicated its claim to speak on
behalf of Islam against the West. But the Bush administrations switch in its nal two years toward a more nuanced approach focused
on highlighting al Qaedas extremism and marginality proved more eective. Te Obama administration continued this approach,
and built on it by explicitly reducing its rhetorical focus on al Qaeda and pushing back against all attempts to reignite a clash of
civilizations narrative. Tat, combined with continuing aggressive counter-terrorism eorts, weakened and marginalized al Qaeda
long before they nally got bin Laden.
Te decline in al Qaedas fortunes was also driven by trends inside of Arab politics. Abu Musab al-Zarqawis brutality in Iraq and the
wave of terrorist attacks inside Arab and Muslim countries drove a serious backlash. Arab governments began to take al Qaeda more
seriously, with the Saudis, Jordanians, and many others launching major campaigns at home and across the region after suering
terrorist attacks at home. Te message that al Qaeda killed innocent Muslims, reinforced and amplied by American strategic
communications and by sympathetic Arab governments and media, took a serious toll. So did al Qaedas repeated picking of losing
ghts with more popular Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah. In short, while it was able to
appeal to and recruit from the small, extreme sub-cultures which developed around jihadist ideology, al Qaeda has long since lost its
attractiveness to mainstream Arabs.
26
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Bin Laden was the only al Qaeda gure able to command the attention of a mainstream Arab audience despite these setbacks. He
remained uniquely charismatic and able to frame al Qaedas narrative in ways which resonated with a broader Arab and Muslim
audience. His infrequent tapes would still dominate the Arab news cycle. None of his possible successors have demonstrated such an
ability. Ayman al-Zawahiri routinely issues tapes, but his pedantic lectures rarely gain any traction outside of jihadist quarters. Some
of the rising stars such as Abu Yahya al-Libi speak eectively to the radicalized jihadist base, but are somewhere between unknown
and incomprehensible to a mainstream audience. I havent seen much evidence that Anwar al-Awlaqi (even before his death at the
hands of an American strike) has any real presence with Arabic speaking audiences. To the extent that al Qaedas strategy requires
reaching out to a broader Arabic speaking public, bin Ladens death represented a major blow.
Te Muslim Brotherhood rapidly seized the opportunity to repeat its frequent condemnations of bin Laden and terrorism. Tis
should surprise no one who has been paying attention. Te Muslim Brotherhood and al Qaeda have long been erce rivals,
competing with each other to dene Islamist identity, doctrine, politics, and strategy (for a detailed discussion of this conict, see
Islam Divided Between Sala-Jihad and the Ikhwan). Te Brotherhood used the opportunity toemphasize their dierences with
al Qaeda, to condemn terrorism and violence, to defend legitimate resistance to occupation, and to denounce all eorts to equate
Islam with terrorism. It will probably try to use this distancing in its election campaign in Egypt and elsewhere, and try to reassure
the West and its domestic opponents about its participation. Ismail Haniya of Hamas, by contrast, denounced the killing of bin
Laden, demonstrating the real dierences among the various organizations within the Muslim Brotherhood milieu (and potentially
dierences inside of Hamas something to follow closely in the coming days).
Bin Ladens death only temporarily distracted the Arab medias attention from the 2011 uprisings which dominated regional politics.
Al Qaeda has been almost completely irrelevant to those upheavals, as has been widely noted, and has struggled to nd an opening
into movements based on fundamentally dierent principles. It is ironic that their leaders death has been the rst time that al Qaeda
27
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has broken into Al Jazeeras news cycle since the Arab uprisings began. It will soon fade, and Arab attention will return to Syria,
Libya, and the rest of the regional transformations.
Tis does not mean, however, that al Qaeda is forever irrelevant, as some would hope. Te horrible bombing in Morocco on April
28, 2011 should be enough to disabuse anyone of such ideas. Te small but dangerous Sala-jihadist base has always been outside
of political currents in the region, and will continue to seek opportunities to act when appropriate. Indeed, if the revolutions fail,
economies dont improve, and elections produce unattractive political leadership, it is easy enough to imagine frustrated youth a few
years from now again nding al Qaedas message attractive.
Bin Ladens death marks a symbolic point of closure to an historical period that had already faded from view. Al Qaeda as an
organization and ideology will likely adapt and survive, the threat will mutate, and Islamist politics will evolve. It oers another
opportunity for the United States to move on from the problems of the past and to establish the new relationship with the people of the
Arab world which it so desperately needs. It doesnt change everything, but it does matter. Beyond that, we will just have to wait and see.
Al Qaeda on the Ropes
By Brian Fishman and Phil Mudd, February 23, 2012
On February 10, 2012, the emir of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, ocially accepted Somalias al-Shabab movements pledge of
allegiance. In a video statement, Zawahiri crowed that such displays indicate that, the jihadi movement is growing with Gods
help. Tis may have been true just before and after the 9/11 attacks, when homegrown jihadi extremists in Western countries
and regional aliates valued the al Qaeda brand. But today, al Qaedas core organization in Pakistan is battered, the eort to spur
homegrown jihadists in the West has faltered, and its regional aliates are more often losing ground than gaining it.
Public displays of unity dont change the reality that more than a decade after their greatest triumph al Qaedas central
leadership and its aliates are generally in decline.
After 9/11, al Qaedas model seemed destined to spread. Te plan was to support and inspire aliate organizations, from the
Philippines through Indonesia and into South Asia, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and Africa. Te central leadership would organize
major attacks and develop propaganda while al Qaedas web of regional partners traded their local reach for the use of a global brand
that helped attract recruits, nancial donors, and attention.
Aliates from Indonesia to Iraq seemed to gain ground, spreading al Qaedas ideology to reject Western cultural and political
inuence among local governments and conducting major attacks that showed their relevance. At least ve close allies or co-branded
al Qaeda aliates conducted a major operation during the mid-2000s: Jemaah Islamiyah in Bali and Jakarta, al Qaedas followers in
Riyadh in 2003 and afterward, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other foreign ghters in Iraq, and groups in Algeria and Yemen against
targets from oil facilities to U.N. oces. And new battlegrounds showed promise: Al-Shabab surged into Mogadishu, and the
Pakistani Taliban threatened Pakistans government.
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Al Qaedas expansion was particularly worrisome in regions where extremists could play on deep Islamist roots within the
population. Indonesia, with a long history of Islamist politics, harbored the best-organized group beyond core al Qaeda. Te string
of attacks in Saudi Arabia looked like it might represent growing extremism among the conservative population of the Arabian
Peninsula. Jihadists gathered in Iraq, which they considered this generations Afghanistan, igniting sectarian tensions and briey
threatening to dominate swaths of western Iraq.
Yet a decade later, the strategy is faltering in almost every arena. Some aliates remain focused on local agendas; others have been
crippled by their own mistakes and operational successes against them. Two legs of al Qaedas three-legged stool, the core group
in Pakistan-Afghanistan and the aliates, are weak. Te third leg, so-called homegrown jihadists, has not shown the capability to
pose more than a modest threat. Al Qaedas allies are lethal and broadly dispersed, but they show little sign of producing the global
revolution they espouse.
So what happened?
Al Qaeda was partially a victim of its own violent success. Political overreach and excessive violence undercut its claim to be a
protector of Islam in the face of Western imperialism. Tose failures have proved debilitating during the Arab Spring, when al
Qaeda has been a sideshow to tech-savvy young people and more mainstream Islamist groups. Al Qaedas schizophrenic reaction
to the revolt in Libya backing the popular movement against Muammar al-Qadda but warning against the Western support
for the uprising that helped the opposition succeed is symptomatic of a leadership that wants to stay relevant but has little street
appeal. Al Qaedas contortions reect its desire to remain relevant in a dynamic news cycle by embracing wide-ranging aliates, an
approach that carries risk because many potential aliates have little operational capability.
Another problem for al Qaeda is that its brand is now closely identied with controversial suicide attacks that kill Muslims. Al Qaedas
senior leaders are aware of that danger. Just after 9/11, al Qaedas leadership hesitated to embrace North African militants, even as those
ghters talked openly of their transition from a local revolutionary group to one with al Qaeda-like goals. Te leaders remembered the
backlash against violent and doctrinaire jihadi movements, especially the murder of tens of thousands of Muslims in Algeria during the
1990s. Zawahiri saw rsthand the unintended consequences of excessive violence undermining jihadi movements in Egypt in the 1990s,
and he tried to steer al Qaedas Iraqi aliate away from publicly reveling in its violence against Iraqis.
Counterterrorism successes have played a role as well in weakening al Qaeda. Te decapitation of leadership across al Qaeda aliates
has limited these groups ability to plot major attacks and has undermined the resonance of al Qaedas message when prominent
communicators are either captured or killed. Such activities have spurred popular backlash in some arenas, but they have no doubt
had a major impact on the al Qaeda organization itself. Sometimes killing leadership has redirected the strategic focus of aliates.
From Marwan in the southern Philippines through Hambali, Dulmatin, and Abu Bakar Bashir in Indonesia, to Zarqawi in Iraq,
Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin in Saudi Arabia, and Anwar al-Awlaqi in Yemen, the elimination of leadership gures has moved the focus of
jihadi aliates toward local concerns rather than the United States.
As a result, some aliates have abandoned the al Qaeda moniker, both to avoid attention from the United States and due to the
weakening of the al Qaeda brand. Al Qaedas Iraqi aliate abandoned the label in 2006 and now operates as the Islamic State of Iraq.
And the Yemeni Ansar al-Sharia, which has seized swaths of territory near the southern port of Aden, seems to have a relationship
with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), but has avoided taking the al Qaeda name. Jihadi groups with the most expansive
local agenda seem to avoid the al Qaeda brand.
Another problem is that al Qaedas aliates tend to think global when they are losing the ability to act local. Tere is dissonance
between al Qaedas eort to build a global brand and its ability to project power in regional settings. Al-Shabab is a good example.
Pushed out of Mogadishu and battered by the international community and tribal forces in Somalia, the group is less capable of
projecting power in Somalia today than it was three years ago. Even reports of the groups recruitment of Westerners over the past
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half-decade, many of which came from the Somali-American community around Minneapolis, have declined amid a renewed push
against extremism. Al-Shababs decision to swear allegiance to al Qaeda comes at a moment of weakness, not strength.
One measure of al Qaedas decreased brand is the attention it gets in international media. After 9/11, the international community
pilloried Al Jazeera, the pan-Arab satellite channel, for showing al Qaeda propaganda videos at length. Today, though such
propaganda is available online, the reach of such material is an order of magnitude smaller. Al Jazeera is no longer seen as too close
to jihadists, but rather as a critical media outlet that has contributed some of the most daring and powerful coverage of the Arab
uprisings. Te impact is that voices like Zawahiris are largely unheard outside already friendly circles.
Tese successes come not just from Western powers but from political leaders across the globe who confronted al Qaeda, even
when doing so required serious political courage. Operations in the southern Philippines, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria have
limited the aliates ability to build the sort of networks Jemaah Islamiyah used to devastating eect a decade ago. Consistent U.S.
intelligence and military assistance to these countries has been vital, from sharing technical information that helped local units track
terrorists to military backing for strikes in isolated areas, such as the Philippines archipelago.
None of this is to say that al Qaeda is dead. Jihadists in Iraq are aggressively eyeing Syria, where sectarian dynamics and escalating
violence oer the group an opportunity to project inuence. Besides the still-dangerous al-Shabab in Somalia, al Qaedas Yemeni
aliate has proved resilient and forceful locally, and the allied group Ansar al-Sharia has proved its ability to take and hold territory
amid the countrys political unrest.
Its important to remember, though, that the ght against al Qaeda was begun not to prevent jihadists from exerting power in Yemeni
political squabbles, but to limit attacks on the United States and the West. Tats why the elimination of Awlaqi was signicant: not
because he was the leader of AQAP he wasnt but because as an American, he was uniquely positioned to threaten the United
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States. Eective counterterrorism policy must be ecient to be sustainable. Tat means killing or detaining individuals that oer
al Qaeda unique capabilities to threaten the United States; it also means being willing to call al Qaedas blu by responding with
resolute subtlety to empty provocations.
Al Qaedas leaders brag that they only have to plant their black ag in a far-ung corner of the globe in order to provoke a massive,
and potentially counterproductive, American response. Ten years after 9/11, we should not hesitate to attack real threats, but must
be tenacious enough to carefully ensure that we are reacting to a persistent threat, not the empty uttering of an al Qaeda that
intends to provoke us into hurting ourselves.
Al Qaeda is down, but not out. Te groups ideology is now global, and a small but serious rash of homegrown arrests underscores
the persistence of this message over the course of years. Carefully calibrated and quietly delivered counterterrorism support
training, money, technology, even military backing to regions that face an ongoing threat, from Africas Sahel to the southern
Philippines, could prevent a local Qaedist group from evolving into a more globally oriented threat. Engagement with the Islamists
who gain power in the new Arab world, such as in Egypt, Tunisia, and potentially Syria, will be critical. Recent arrests of extremists in
Tunisia highlight how more moderate Islamist groups can help isolate radicals on the fringe. But the outcome of the Arab revolutions
is far from clear; Syria, Yemen, Libya, and even Egypt could slip into chaos. And al Qaeda, while very much in decline, is patient.
Brian Fishman is a counterterrorism research fellow at the New America Foundation and a fellow with the Combating Terrorism
Center at West Point, where he previously served as director of research. Phil Mudd is senior global advisor at Oxford Analytica and
previously served as deputy director of the CIAs Counterterrorist Center and deputy director of the FBIs National Security Branch.
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Tunisias New Ennahda
By Marc Lynch, June 29, 2011
Tunisias post-revolutionary politics are being profoundly shaped by the meteoric rise of the long-banned Islamist movement,
Ennahda. Decades of erce repression during the regime of former President Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali crushed almost every visible
manifestation of Tunisias Islamist movement. Te banned movement played a very limited role in the revolution. But since Ben Alis
ight and the triumphant January 30 return of exiled leader Rached Ghannouchi, Ennahda has grown with astonishing speed. A
June 2011 survey found support for the party at just below 30 percent, almost three times that of its closest rival. Its ascent is fueling
a dangerous polarization, leading putative champions of democracy to endorse the postponing of elections, and frightening many
secularists and women who fear for their place in the new Tunisia.
In June 2011, I returned from a trip to Tunisia focused on the resurgence of Ennahda. I emerged impressed with Ennahdas
organizational strength, democratic rhetoric, political energy, and by their determined eorts to engage with their political rivals
and reassure their critics. But I also emerged with real concerns about the growing polarization and collapse of trust across the
political class, which risks dividing the Tunisian public and crippling the desperately needed democratic transition. And I found even
Ennahdas leaders unsure about how to grapple with the rising Sala trend, which may be more of a source of weakness than a source
of electoral strength.
Tere is far more to Tunisias emerging political arena than just Ennahda, of course. Its rise and the resulting polarization come at a
time of deep uncertainty about the fate of the revolution. Much of the old regime remains in place within state institutions, as well as
in the Tunisian media, business sector, and cultural elite. Many of those who drove the popular uprising are deeply disgruntled about
how little the revolution has changed their lives; while many of the people with whom I spoke were delighted with their newfound
freedom, few saw real improvement in economic conditions. Many, particularly in the southern cities where the revolution began,
feel that the world has abandoned them and that their revolution has been stolen. While the world largely turned away from Tunisia
to focus on crises elsewhere across the region, the transition to democracy there is far from accomplished.
During my visit, I spoke at length with Ennahda President Rached Ghannouchi, Executive Committee member Ziyad Djoulati, and
a number of the movements top political strategists. At a conference organized by the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy,
I watched a tense panel featuring Secretary-General Hamadi Jebali (with whom I had met with previously), which turned into a
riveting political spectacle of erce debate with critics from all directions. I spoke at that conference on a panel alongside Rached
Ghannouchi on the role of religion in democracy a daunting assignment! I sat through a packed press conference announcing
Ennahdas withdrawal from the High Committee to Protect the Revolution, and watched a blistering exchange between the partys
leaders and a prominent member of the committee. I attended two Ennahda campaign rallies outside of Tunis, and had lengthy
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informal conversations with local activists and party leaders. I saw a lot of pro-Ennahda and anti-Ennahda grati on the streets. I
also got to talk to a wide range of journalists, civil society activists, academics, foreign observers, and ordinary people in cafes. And
sure, I talked with taxi drivers.
Te picture that emerged is more complex than the simple assumption of automatic Arab support for Islamist parties would
suggest. Te Ben Ali regime spent decades crushing any form of visible Islamist political organization in Tunisia. Tens of thousands
of the movements members were imprisoned or exiled, and according to all the leaders with whom I spoke no formal Ennahda
organization existed before the revolution. Tis is a sharp contrast with Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood maintained a highly
visible public presence despite being ocially banned. Tis history is double-edged. Te long repression meant that Ennahda had
to start virtually from scratch in reconstituting itself, and did not have deep existing relationships with Tunisian youth. But it also
meant that it was absolutely uncompromised by any relationship with the hated old regime, and could claim an attractive mantle of
principled resistance and clean hands.
Ennahda set out to quickly rebuild itself after Ben Alis ight. Its leaders had been increasingly active in Tunisian opposition circles
since the mid-2000s, including convening a forum where representatives of most major political trends came together for sustained
dialogues about democracy. A movement which had been largely shaped by its leaders in exile for decades began to nd its feet again
on the ground, even though continuing regime harassment of members even after their prison terms ended prevented any rebuilding
of the organization.
On March 1, 2011, Ennahda was legalized by the interim government, and quickly moved to rebuild the movement. Te core
leadership immediately reached out to the tens of thousands of former activists just out of prison, many who became locally
respected business or civic leaders. Tey established oces in every Tunisian province, quickly setting up sections for youth, women,
social services, and politics and holding internal elections to select a new leadership. Many Tunisian critics of Ennahda asked where
the money for all this came from, often pointing to foreign support; when I asked, I was told that the nancing came primarily from
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these successful former members now rejoining the cause. Whatever the case, money alone is clearly not the whole story. Ennahda
threw itself into tireless organizing and mobilization, with Ghannouchi himself visiting 22 out of the 24 provinces since his return
to the country. If Ennahda is better organized and more present at the local level than its rivals, this is due less to some natural
Islamist appeal than to a tireless organizational campaign which others might have also tried.
Te rallies I attended in Hammam Lief and the small southern town of Hajeb lAloun (60 km from Kairouan) showed the care and
energy Ennahda brought to these mobilization eorts. In Hammam Lief, some 4,000 people turned out to see Ghannouchi, including
everyone from men dressed in signature Sala style and veiled mothers with young children to young women in tight jeans and tank
tops. Te rallys rst speaker was a female academic who spoke forcefully about the role of women in the revolution and in Tunisian
society. Music was provided by a small troupe which included both men and unveiled women performing under an enormous
banner of Jerusalems Dome of the Rock (for all the careless talk of how the Arab revolutions were not about Palestine or America,
this Ennahda rally featured a tremendous amount of evidently well-received pro-Palestinian rhetoric as well as a rousing, sure to be
chart-topping song with the refrain no to American military bases, no to foreign interventions). Ghannouchi himself was received
like a rock star a far cry from his careful intellectual performance on our panel at the conference. Te smaller rally in the south,
by contrast, attracted a much more conservatively dressed crowd, and focused on local issues. Where the other rally ew Libyan
rebel ags and posters of Jerusalem, these banners highlighted local health care concerns and slogans defending the centrality of
democracy, toleration, and pluralism to Islam.
Ennahdas leaders are highly sensitive to the fears among other Tunisians and in the West about Islamist movements. Ghannouchi
told me that Ennahda had instructed its supporters to not come to the airport to meet him upon his return for fear of creating
images reminiscent of Khomeinis return to Iran. Everyone pointed out the dangers of repeating the experience of Algeria in 1991,
where massive electoral victories for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) led to a military coup and descent into years of horric,
brutal civil war, and the Hamas electoral victory in 2006 which resulted in international sanctions and an enduring intra-Palestinian
political divide.
Te word of the hour was consensus, with all stressing the need for broad societal agreement on major policy decisions. Djoulati
said Tunisia would need at least ve years of consensual democracy until the consolidation of the democratic transition, with all
parties committing to not use electoral gains to impose their preferences on others. Ghannouchi spoke frequently about the model
of Turkeys Justice and Development Party (AKP) whose approach his own writings reportedly inspired and all Ennahda
leaders point to their documents supporting political and civil freedoms and political democracy. When pushed on the extent of
its commitment to democratic norms, Ghannouchi said that even if the constitutional convention decided to eliminate article one
declaring Tunisia to be an Arab Islamic state, Ennahda would respond by campaigning to convince the Tunisian public that this had
been a bad idea and mobilizing pressure within the system.
But for all of these eorts, Tunisias politics are increasingly polarized into two camps and the foundations of this consensus are
crumbling. Te tremendous uncertainty about virtually everything makes credible commitments almost impossible. Tere is
no consensus on the relative strength of the dierent political trends, no new constitution, no new political party law or other
foundational rules of the game. Ennahda leaders complain that they are the victims of a massive scare-mongering campaign in
the media, fueled by remnants of the old regime and by the Francophone, secularist elites who beneted from the old order. Tey
also complain about the decision to postpone the rst round of elections by three months, which they took as a clearly partisan
intervention designed to give their competitors more time to organize against them. Teir decision to withdraw from the Council for
the Achievement of the Aims of the Revolution in protest over what they call anti-democratic and non-consensual decision-making
only demonstrated concretely the rapid deterioration of the early hopes of consensus.
Ennahdas critics view the partys calls for consensual democracy as a thinly disguised quest for hegemony, and express deep fears
about whether the Islamist party will maintain its moderate discourse once in power. Tey see Ennahdas political maneuvers as
evidence of a more extreme agenda, and put little stake in the mild rhetoric of its leaders. Tey complain that Ennahda refused to
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put out a concrete program, which may be a rational move for the front-runners to avoid giving their rivals something to attack but
which also raises doubts about their true commitments. I saw no to Ennahda grati scrawled on an impressive number of walls
(most people I asked thought that the old regime hands were behind it, but who knows), and heard both intensely positive and
negative comments from a wide variety of people (most of whom had nothing but contempt or indierence for any other political
party). In a political environment increasingly wired for polarization and harder-line rhetoric, and with great uncertainty about
either the rules of the political game or the real political balance of power, these doubts and mistrust will only grow. Te discourse
of Ennahdas leaders is not the practice of its activists in the mosques and on the street, complained one prominent feminist. I heard
quite a bit about this alleged gap between the Ennahda leaderships progressive, reformist, democratic rhetoric and the more extreme
behavior of its cadres from the movements critics.
It is here that the rising Sala trend poses a particular challenge to Ennahda. Tere is no clearly dened Sala political leadership
Hezb al-Tahrir, which gets a lot of press, represents only a small fraction but by most accounts the trend is large and growing.
Ennahda leaders argue that Ben Ali encouraged the rise of the Salas as a counter-balance to their politically-minded movement,
for years allowing Sala books to be sold freely and for Sala preachers to dominate local mosques while Ennahda leaders were
imprisoned and their literature banned. Indeed, several Ennahda leaders told me that the rise of Tunisian Salas demonstrated that
repression creates extremism. Tis is particularly the case with the youth, few who remember Ennahda and who were far more
exposed to Sala ideas in the mosques and on satellite TV during the Ben Ali years.
While this trend might at rst glance be seen as a source of electoral strength for Ennahda, it poses a challenge because suspicious
Tunisians worried about Islamism in general may hold Ennahda responsible for Sala actions. In June 2011, a group of Salas
attacked a movie theater in downtown Tunis, shocking many Tunisians and sparking a wave of media commentaries. At a
subsequent press conference at the party headquarters, Ghannouchi strongly condemned the attacks, arming that Ennahda rejects
any form of political violence or intellectual extremism. But at the same time, he reserved the right to defend Tunisian values a
caveat which immediately triggered the suspicions of his critics about Ennahdas true intentions.
It is vitally important that Tunisias politics nds a way to deal with the rising strength of Ennahda within a broad social and
political consensus on political order. Te decision to delay the elections for a constitutional convention may have been necessary
on technical grounds, but proved destructive in other ways undermining trust among the major players, giving more time for
the old regime to nd its footing and entrench its interests within the new system, and blunting the democratic transition. Tunisias
politicians should pull back from their rush towards polarization...but probably wont, since each side has strong political incentives
to continue to play those cards. Fear of Ennahda should not be accepted as an excuse to further delay Tunisian elections, the writing
of a new constitution, and a democratic transition.
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Suspicion and Strategy in Free Tunisia
By Christopher Alexander, June 20, 2011
Walls across Tunisia where the Arab Spring began display a dramatic red calendar with an image of joined hands above the phrase
Tunis Hurra Free Tunisia. Te image reects more aspiration than reality. Tunisians may have freed themselves from a dictator,
but they are not holding hands. Economic stagnation, pent up social demands, and a combination of political and cultural tensions
are generating deep suspicion and anxiety across the country. Te country which began the wave of revolution and has arguably
advanced the farthest toward a democratic transition faces deep challenges.
After former President Zine el-Abdine Ben Ali and his family ed the country on January 14, 2011 in the face of a massive popular
uprising, Tunisias interim government in March 2011 decided to begin the countrys democratic transition with elections for a
constituent assembly rather than immediately select a new president. Te elected assembly will appoint a new interim president, act
as an interim legislature, and most importantly write a new constitution. Once voters ratify that constitution, they will go to the
polls again to elect a new legislature and president.
Tis sequence came from the High Commission for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, of Political Reform, and
Democratic Transition a body made up of political parties, civil society organizations, and inuential personalities that has
become the chief architect of political reform in Tunisia. Te High Commission wanted to reform the constitution rst in order to
avoid the possibility of an elected president who might use an undemocratic constitution to become a new dictator (a model which is
looked to with some envy by many Egyptians).
Te process initially commanded widespread support, but has since encountered turbulence. Te government initially scheduled
the constituent assembly elections for July 24, 2011. In late May, however, the electoral commission announced its intention to delay
the vote because it needed more time to ensure that it would be fair and credible. After several days of heated debate, interim Prime
Minister Beji Caid Sebsi announced that the vote would take place on October 23, 2011. Most of the countrys 93 political parties
supported the delay, but it extended and intensied the anxious uncertainty that has reigned in the country since Ben Ali ed the
country on January 14, 2011.
Te stakes in the rst election were high. Many Tunisians believed that the October 2011 vote would provide a preview of the likely
outcomes of presidential and legislative elections. More importantly, the fact that the assembly will rewrite the constitution forces
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Tunisians to confront profound questions about Tunisias political values and identity. Many people, and not just Islamists, believe
that Tunisian politics has been dominated since independence by a privileged caste of Francophone elites, educated in European or
European-style institutions, whose lives do not look very much like the lives of the majority of the population. Tese elites in both
the government and the opposition parties share an interest in maintaining a closed, self-serving political game that tracs in the
language of democracy and development but does little to address the needs of real people. Teir critics resent those elites who they
view as smugly dismissive of the values of the majority of the population.
Many secular Tunisians fear that a strong showing by the Islamist Ennadha Party and its allies will result in a constitution that makes
it easier for Islamists to chip away at individual liberties. Ennadha leaders insist that they do not want to dominate the assembly
and that they support democracy, individual freedom, and womens rights. In the absence of any legal safeguard, however, many
secularists are not ready to take Ennadha at its word. Tey accuse the party of saying dierent things to dierent audiences and
refusing to accept a clear distinction between religious and political spheres.
Many socially conservative Tunisians and it is important to say that they are not all Islamists also express concerns about
individual liberties. Tey fear that an assembly dominated by secular left politicians will craft a constitution that limits their right
to practice their faith in their private lives. If our secular left was like the left in the United States, we wouldnt be so worried, one
Ennadha leader commented. But theyre not. Tey are inuenced and supported by the secular left in France. How do we know that
they wont invoke European notions of modernity and progress to follow Frances example and ban the veil?
Te beginning of the electoral campaign accentuated these fears and suspicions. Te new electoral code created strong incentives
for coalition-building, and three camps are taking shape. Parties on the far left formed a democratic modernist pole. Te other
two camps are dominated by Ennadha and by the center-left Parti Dmocrate Progressiste (PDP). Past polls showed that Ennadha
and the PDP are the two most popular parties among the minority of Tunisians who have decided they would vote in October 2011.
Both parties enjoy name recognition and credibility as longtime opponents of the former regime. Both have well-known leaders and
they have done more than the other parties to expand their organizations across the country. Both parties are rumored to receive
substantial funding from like-minded organizations outside Tunisia.
Consequently, the ght for allies is on and that ght is generating rhetoric and tactics that reinforce popular fears and stereotypes.
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Concerned about the possible consequences of leaving fundamental issues to a body that might contain a strong Islamist contingent,
some on the left suggested that the High Commission, rather than the constituent assembly, should reform the constitution. When
that proposition failed, several left gures proposed a set of statements that lay out fundamental principles that all the parties must
accept in the elections. Ennadha argued that these initiatives, along with the delay in the elections, revealed the lefts mistrust of the
Tunisian people and its willingness to circumvent democratic politics. Left parties ramped up their rhetoric about the importance of
defending Tunisias modern and progressive values in ways that emphasize the cultural divide between them and the Islamists.
Much of this rhetoric was strategic. Away from the microphones, many politicians on the left and the right say that they do not
believe the other camp could dominate the assembly. But they need to rally their troops in what could be a close race. Many of
todays parties will not survive the October test. As one party leader put it, We will have to start a graveyard for parties once the
October vote is done. Some will simply close down; others will blend with larger parties. Ennadha itself will likely change under the
pressure of competition. But this is a necessary part of the transition to a more consolidated eld of options for Tunisian voters when
they elect their rst democratic government.
Tunisia continues to be the regions best hope for a democratic transition in the near future. Tunisians know that others are watching
them closely. Much of their contemporary anxiety is a product of uncertainty economic and political. Tunisians are accustomed to
the former, but the latter is a new thing.
Christopher Alexander is Davidson Colleges McGee director of the Dean Rusk International Studies Program, an associate
professor of political science, and author of Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb.
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Te Limits of Anti-Islamism in Tunisia
By Melanie Cammett, October 31, 2011
Most commentary about the results of Tunisias historic election on October 23, 2011 has focused on the success of the moderate
Islamist party Ennahda. With 41.5 percent of seats in the constitutional assembly, Ennahda certainly did score an impressive victory.
But two other results of equal importance should not be overlooked. Several liberal and leftist parties also did well, giving strong
representation to the major political trends in the assembly. And even more striking, the parties that banked upon an explicitly anti-
Islamist campaign message lost badly.
By any standard, Tunisias elections marked a crucial step toward the institutionalization of democracy in a country that has endured
decades of dictatorship. Te peaceful and orderly process of holding elections set an important regional precedent. But the election
campaign exposed an important rift between Islamists and secularists that will have enduring eects on Tunisian politics. How the
assembly and the competing political forces deal with those issues will be decisive in determining whether the elections paved the
way for a genuine democratic transition.
Ennahdas performance demonstrated its very real strength across the country. Although Ennahdas share of the popular vote
was lower in many districts given the number of wasted votes for parties that failed to win seats, the results clearly showed that
Islamists have signicant appeal across the country not just in the poor and marginalized districts of the south and west but also
in the wealthier, more developed coastal areas. Ennahda has enjoyed widespread legitimacy because its members were the most
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repressed under Ben Alis rule, particularly in the 1990s when many in its leadership and rank and le endured torture and long
prison sentences. Te party is also viewed as honest and not corrupt, a perception that holds a lot of weight in light of the abuses of
the Ben Ali and Trabelsi families. As many Tunisians told me, Tey are not thieves.
However, Ennahda is not the only actor in Tunisian politics that is seen as honest, and there are other elements that contributed to
the partys success. Key gures in Ettakatol or the Forum Dmocratique pour le Travail et les Liberts (FDTL), the Congrs pour
la Rpublique (CPR), and the Ple Dmocratique Moderniste (PDM), among other parties and political gures, also enjoy clean
reputations. Ennahda also ran an extremely professional and eective campaign, with a ground game that put its rivals to shame.
When I asked Ennahda ocials how they managed to develop an extensive grassroots presence in Tunisia in a short time period and
despite decades of exile, imprisonment, and repression, they replied, We were always there. Neighborhood residents have known
Ennahda supporters for decades, and were impressed by their good behavior, honest dealings with other citizens, and commitment
to their principles. Furthermore, the message of Ennahda resonates broadly in the population. Clearly, religion and apparent respect
for Islam matters to many Tunisians, and Ennahda beneted from this, particularly in light of perceived attacks on religious values in
the weeks leading up to the elections.
Te second-ranked party, the CPR, gained about 14 percent of the seats and the third-ranked party, Ettakatol, received about
10 percent of the seats in the assembly. Based in London, Hamdi is a former member of Ennahda who split from the party and
apparently had some dealings with Ben Ali. Despite almost no local media coverage during the campaign, Hamdis lists won 19 seats,
allegedly because he appealed to voters in his own region of the historically marginalized south and because he promised lavish
social benets.
Te elections highlighted and heightened the apparent Islamist-secularist cleavage in contemporary Tunisia. Te vote for the
members of the constitutional assembly was presented by some secularists and Ennahda ocials alike as akin to a referendum on
the cultural identity of the country. In the months leading up to the elections, secularists expressed their fears about the prospect of
an Ennahda victory, claiming that the partys leadership continually engaged in double speak by failing to present strong positions
defending free expression and womens rights and by craftily concealing a longer-term agenda to impose sharia law on Tunisia. In
the campaigns closing days, the Parti Dmocratique Progressiste (PDP) aired an inammatory advertisement warning about the
extreme measures that Ennahda would supposedly impose on the Day After its election.
Te outcry following the airing of the lm Persepolis on Nessma TV, a private television station, likely worked in favor of Ennahda
and hurt those parties, such as the PDP and PDM, which defended the stations right to show the lm and, by extension, the right
to free speech even when it oends the religious sensibilities of some people. Although Ennahda leaders renounced the acts of
violence against the home of Nessmas owner, they remained opposed to the stations decision to air the lm, which includes a visual
depiction of God, as an aront to religion. Tis position likely appealed to a portion of the electorate. Ennahda supporters often
claim that Tunisian secularists espouse foreign values and aim to impose their own, alien vision of society on what is at base a more
conservative society.
In the end, the parties that played the anti-Ennahda card most vehemently lost while those that presented themselves as more
tolerant and open to possible coalitions with the Islamist party performed relatively well. Moncef Marzoukis CPR and Mustapha
Ben Jaafars Ettakatol are run by longstanding secular opponents of the Ben Ali regime who chose to adopt a relatively conciliatory
tone vis--vis Ennahda. As an ocial from Ettakatol told me, We dont attack Ennahda directly because everyone who cares about
religion will think were against religion and that only Ennahda defends it. But Ahmed Njib Chebbis PDP and the secular leftist
PDM both rejected an alliance with Ennahda and made opposition to the Islamist party a key part of their platforms. Tese two
parties fared poorly in the elections with 17 and 5 seats out of 217 in the assembly, respectively.
Tese mutual suspicions have characterized the post-revolutionary institution building process. From the beginning, Ennahda was
concerned that the High Commission for the Fulllment of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reform and Democratic Transition, which
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acted as the main policy making body and selected the electoral rules, was disproportionately staed by members of leftist and
secularist opposing groups. Although Ennahda had representatives in the High Commission, periodic tensions ared up over specic
issues and the party ultimately resigned when the body opted to adopt decisions by majority vote rather than consensus. In part to
allay its fears that the elections would be rigged, Ennahda placed monitors in each of the more than 7,000 polling stations across the
country. Based on information gathered from its extensive network of representatives at the ballot boxes, the party preemptively
announced its victory less than one day after the elections and well before the ocial results were released. At a press conference
held by the National Democratic Institute the day after the elections, Said Ferjani, a member of the partys political bureau, told me
and several journalists a fairly precise estimate of the number of seats and margin of victory that the party would obtain, even as
candidates from other parties emphasized on television talk shows that the votes were not yet tallied.
While Islamists have feared that transitional governing institutions were stacked against them, their secularist opponents worry
that Ennahda will use its newfound power to impose its social and religious agenda on Tunisians and, therefore, they will lose their
hard-won liberties as well as the rights bestowed on women under the dictatorship. Te split between Islamists and secularists
is the dening issue of Tunisian society and politics at this juncture and, with such deep-seated mutual suspicions and seemingly
irreconcilable positions on what constitutes free speech and liberties, it is dicult to see how a resolution can be achieved.
Te election results most directly aect the composition of the new government and the process of writing new rules of the game.
It is almost axiomatic in politics that victors aim to rewrite the rules in their favor. Te relative weights of the dierent parties and
their respective preferences for the design of executive institutions and electoral laws will therefore shape the structure of the new
governing system. But Ennahda has demonstrated considerable sensitivity to the fears it provokes in the West and at home. Ennahda
claims that it is open to negotiations with all willing partners and, even before the results were ocially announced, established
alliances with other parties elected to the assembly. Tis may reassure some of its critics that the Islamist party will not fully
dominate the process of writing the new constitution.
Ennahda claims that it is a moderate party along the lines of the Turkish Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP). Indeed, the intellectual
foundations of the two parties are intertwined leaders of the AKP were apparently inspired by the work of Rached Ghannouchi,
the Ennahda party leader, whose writings emphasize the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Nonetheless, the AKP analogy does
not reassure Ennahdas staunchest opponents who claim that the Kemalist legacy of secularism, constitutional guarantees, and the
prospect of accession to the European Union put automatic constraints on the Turkish Islamist party that are not present in Tunisia.
Te AKPs growing control over the media and dierent branches of government give some Tunisian secularists further misgivings
about the AKP model. Bridging this deep divide and building trust between Islamists and secularists will require continuous dialogue
and debate over the long-term.
Melani Cammett is associate professor of political science and director of the Middle East Studies Program at Brown University.
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Ennahdas Tight Rope Act on Religion
By Aaron Y. Zelin, November 18, 2011
On November 13, 2011, the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda fresh o its win in the October elections came under re
following a rally in Sousse, Tunisia with Houda Naim, a member of Hamas. Ennahdas general secretary, Hammadi Jebali, who
became the new Prime Minister, made some controversial remarks about the return of the Caliphate. Jebali stated: My brothers, you
are at a historic moment...in a new cycle of civilization, God willing...we are in sixth caliphate, God willing. Tis quickly raised alarm
bells with Tunisias secular and liberal elements who had been warning prior to the elections about Ennahdas purported double
speak: saying one thing publicly while saying something more nefarious privately to its followers.
In response to Jebalis pronouncement Ettakatol, a party that won the fourth largest bloc of seats in the October 2011 election, said
the party was suspending its participation in talks on a governing coalition in the Tunisian Constituent Assembly. Khemais Ksila,
a member of the executive committee of Ettakatol, stated: We do not accept this statement. We thought we were going to build a
second republic with our partner, not a sixth caliphate. While Lobna Jeribi, an Ettakatol constituent assembly member, proclaimed
that Jebalis statements raised major concerns that needed to be claried before any coalition talks resumed.
Tis is not the rst controversy that Ennahda has been embroiled in since they won a little more than 40 percent of seats to draft
the constitution in the constituent assembly. Talking to Radio Monte Carlo Doualiya, Souad Abderrahim, a prominent female
member of Ennahda, stated that single mothers are a disgrace to Tunisia, do not have the right to exist, there are limits on full and
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absolute freedom, and that one should not make excuses for people who have sinned. In both cases, Ennahda had to walk back the
statements of both Jebali and Abderrahim, downplaying their signicance.
Are these two rexamples a sign of double speak nally seeing the light of day in the aftermath of its election victory or is it a sign
of Ennahdas political immaturity and lack of experience? Te latter is more likely. Prior to and following the election there have were
no signs of some type of hostile Islamist takeover by Ennahda that would then try and institute a radical interpretation of the sharia.
A few days before the election, the president of Ennahda, Rached Ghannouchi, emphasized the importance of reconciliation even
if Ennahda did not win a plurality, stating: We will congratulate the winner and will collaborate with them just as other parties
should do the same if we end up winning; Tunisia is in need of everyone. Te keyword is reconciliation, our foremost concern is
reconciliation in composing the upcoming government without regard to ideological dierences. After the elections, Ghannouchi
stressed that Ennahda did not plan to instrumentalize the new constitution as a blunt tool to force a certain interpretation of Islam
on Tunisian citizens, arguing, Egypt says sharia is the main source of its law, but that didnt prevent [deposed President Hosni]
Mubarak from being a dictator. Ghannouchi in the past has also pointed to Turkey as an example where one can balance both
democratic and religious values without compromising either.
Further, Ennahda participated in talks over with two secular parties, Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol, to form a coalition
government for the constituent assembly. As one can see from the above comments by Ettakatol, the two secular parties will no
doubt play a productive role and provide a check on any potential Ennahda overreach.
One should be cognizant, though, that the transition will not be perfect. Moreover, with every potential accommodation Ennahda
makes now that they are in power, it could erode potential grassroots support. More radical youth elements may believe that after
years of suering under the yoke of former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali it is time to nally implement the oft-quoted
phrase al-Islam huwa al-Hal; or Islam is the Solution. By not living up to these words one could foresee a scenario in which some
support is shifted to the less mainstream Sala movement, fomenting a potential culture war in Tunisia in the medium future.
Ennahdas pledge to respect womens rights and not regulate social issues, such as wearing a bikini at the beach or the sale of alcohol,
could become contentious issues in future elections that could pull Ennahda further to the right. Even if they do not, as more time
passes since the fall of the Ben Ali regime and there are more freedoms and openness in Tunisian society, the contestation of the
role of religion, its meaning, and interpretation will become a heated debate. In the near-term, though, with Ghannouchi stewarding
Ennahda through the transition, such potential drift or confrontation is less likely.
Ennahdas transition from banned opposition party to a leading voice of reform for civic Islamism is still playing out. Tere will
be ups and downs, but its political discipline and maturity will rise over time. If there is one political party in the Middle East and
North Africa that can navigate the tough challenge ahead on debating the contentious issue of the role of religion in society, Tunisias
Ennahda Party is best situated for the task. Although talk of the Caliphate is a head-turning event for many in Tunisia and in the
West, since January 2011, Ennahdas actual actions should be speaking louder than some of their ill-conceived words.
Aaron Y. Zelin is a research associate in the Department of Politics at Brandeis University. He is a co-editor of the al-Wasat blog
and maintains the website Jihadology.net.
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Rached Ghannouchi: Te FP Interview
By Marc Lynch, December 5, 2011
I think the Muslim Brotherhood [in Egypt] should govern by coalition that includes the people from secular parties and the Copts.
Tat was the advice that Rached Ghannouchi, president of Tunisias Ennahda Party, oered his Egyptian Islamist counterparts
during an interview with the editors of the Middle East Channel on December 1, 2011. He warned pointedly against repeating the
mistakes of Algeria when, as he put it, the Islamists won 80 percent of the vote but they completely ignored the inuential minority
of secularists, of the army, of the business community. So they did a coup detat against the democratic process and Algeria is still
suering from that. Avoiding a replay of that catastrophe weighs heavily on Ghannouchi and his party.
Ghannouchi was in Washington at the invitation of Foreign Policy, after being named one of its Top 100 Global Tinkers. He
took full advantage of the opportunity to visit the United States for the rst time in 20 years, appearing at a wide range of think
tanks including the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy, and meeting
with a range of U.S. government ocials, journalists, and policy analysts. He had warm praise for the Obama administration as
supportive of the Arab Spring, and described the new willingness in the United States to talk about a more positive relationship
between democracy and Islam, and between Americans and the Islamic world, as a very important new development. His reception
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in Washington is a sign of the times, as the United States struggles to adapt to the reality of Islamist electoral success and Islamist
parties struggle to reassure those who fear their ascent while delivering on their own programs.
I last saw Ghannouchi in June 2011, when I was in Tunisia researching an article about Ennahda. I had asked Ghannouchi at that
time what Ennahda might do with an electoral victory, and he had assured me that it would seek a national unity government. It did
just that. After Ennahda scored a major victory in Tunisias rst post-Zine al Abedine Ben Ali election, it quickly formed a national
unity government while ceding the post of president to the secular human rights campaigner Moncef Marzouki. Ghannouchi
explained that his party would opt for a coalition government even if Ennahda achieves an absolute majority, because we dont want
the people to perceive that they have moved from a single party dominant in the political life to another single party dominating the
political life.Such reassurances have been meant to respond to the suspicions of Islamists and the political polarization endemic to
post-Ben Ali Tunisia and seem thus far to have succeeded.
When I asked Ghannouchi what Ennahdas top priority would be in government, he answered not with talk of sharia [Islamic law]
but with a guarantee that dictatorship will not return to Tunisia. He dismissed fears that Ennahda employed a double discourse
(i.e. saying one thing in English and something else at home) as a relic of the Ben Ali eras propaganda. He acknowledged that
Ennahda was a large movement, with many distinct points of view, but insisted that there are no people in Ennahda who are takri
[i.e. declaring opponents to be non-Muslims]; there is no one in Ennahda that believes that violence is a means of change or to keep
power; there is no one in Ennahda that does not believe in equality between men and women; no one in Ennahda believes that jihad
is a way to impose Islam on the world.
But Ghannouchi clearly understands both the diculty and the urgency of convincing Tunisian secularists and outside observers of
those convictions.He told me that he expected the party to be judged by its performance. He insisted that Ennahdas commitment to
democracy had been strengthened by the Ben Ali experience, when thousands of its members were imprisoned or forced into exile.
Te prosecution of Ennahda movement could have led us to violence, and this is what Ben Ali wanted. But our experience in prison
has deepened our belief in freedom and democracy, and Ben Ali failed to drag us into violence. And thats why he fell.
And what of the Salas with more extreme views? Ghannouchi laughed, if Tunis becomes Sala country, nothing can be
guaranteed. Tunisians tended toward moderation in their Islamic beliefs, he emphasized, which shaped Ennahdas approach.
Turning serious, he went on to argue that Salas grew radical under torture and repression, and argued that in a more open
environment Ennahda would help convince them to adopt more moderate understandings of Islam. When I pushed him, he said
bluntly that Ennahda would actively resist any Sala eorts to push for a more Islamic constitution.His party will be judged by
whether it lives up to such commitments.
An edited version of the interview follows:
ML: Last time we met, you were preparing for elections and you didnt know what would happen. Were you surprised by the
results?
RG: I was not surprised by the results. All the polls that were conducted showed that Ennahda was ahead. I was expecting the results
to be slightly better for Ennahda, but the electoral code did not allow a better result to happen.
ML: Te Ennahda party in the constituent assembly now has formed a coalition. Could you describe your thinking, or the
thinking of the party, in forming that coalition?
RG: We have declared since before the elections that we would opt for a coalition government, even if Ennahda achieves an absolute
majority, because we dont want the people to perceive that they have moved from a single party dominant in the political life to
another single party dominating the political life.
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[We did this] because the picture on the Tunisian scene is more beautiful and colorful with a coalition and also, frankly, because the
next phase is a sensitive phase and there are big challenges, and it is an adventure for a single party to go it alone during this phase.
ML: How are you trying to reassure people who are afraid of Ennahda?
RG: Tere is denitely a faction of people that are still not reassured with Ennahda. But the results show that we succeeded with a
good chunk of the population, from men and women, in showing that we are serious about our projects in establishing democracy
and assuring development.
In any case, we are not aspiring to reach 99 percent. Te people who do not trust us, its normal, because for 22 years they have been
subject to propaganda from Ben Ali which has discredited us, and made people fearful of us.
ML: What about the people who truly are scared, how do you reassure them?
RG: We will defend their right to be in the opposition. And we will prove to them by our deeds that their fears about double
discourse about us saying [things] we will not do that this is just an old heritage from the Ben Ali era.
ML: How can people be sure that Ennahda as a whole, as a movement or as a party, will follow your thinking?
RG: Ennahda is a movement, it is not just a small party. It is not strange in Ennahda that we have many currents and many thoughts,
and thats why the president of Ennahda has never achieved 99 percent but hes elected. So he reects the opinion of the majority.
Ennahda is not a collection of many parties, it is just one party. Tere are common denominators that unite all members of Ennahda:
Tere is no one in Ennahda who doubts about Islam. Tere is no one in Ennahda that believes in extremist views of Islam. Tere are
no people in Ennahda that are takr people. Tere is no one in Ennahda that believes violence is a means of change or to keep power.
Everyone in Ennahda believes that democracy is the only way to reach power and to stay in power. Tere is no one in Ennahda that
does not believe in equality between men and women, and the rights of women. No one in Ennahda believes that jihad is a way to
impose Islam on the world. But we believe that jihad is self-control, is social and political struggle, and even military jihad is only a
way to defend oneself in the case of aggression.
ML: What are the priorities of Ennahda?
RG: We will guarantee that dictatorship will not come back to Tunis. We are for a parliamentary system which no longer gives us a
person with concentrated powers. Our utmost priority is to guarantee freedoms: personal freedoms, social freedoms, and womens
rights. We did not ask to add anything to the rst article of the old constitution, which says that Tunisia is an Arab and a Muslim
country. And everyone seems to agree on this in Tunisia.
ML: How will you respond if Sala parties try to push for more Islam in the constitution?
RG: Te law is always made by people, through their representatives, and the people are not asking for more than this today.
ML: So, if a Sala member puts on the table...
RG (in English): If Tunis becomes Sala country, nothing can be guaranteed. (laughing)
ML: So you would actively resist?
RG: Yes.
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Te Salas in Tunis are a very small minority, very small groups. We defend their right to exist, and to express themselves. We believe
that in a free environment we can convince these people that their understanding of Islam is not a good understanding. We are not
afraid or concerned. What we are keen on is the establishment of freedom in the country.
Te Tunisian people are moderate in their Islamic beliefs, and these currents the Salasts have been established in the absence
of Ennahda, and the absence of freedom. It started in Egypt, in the dark places of prisons of Abdel Nasser, and also in light of torture.
Te prosecution of Ennahda movement could have led us to violence, and this is what Ben Ali wanted. But our experience in prison
has deepened our belief in freedom and democracy, and Ben Ali failed to drag us into violence. And thats why he fell.
ML:Were you able to maintain any organization under Ben Ali?
Our organization had been dismantled during Ben Ali term; the only thing is we kept a very small organization just to keep feeding
our families.
ML: How did you rebuild it so quickly?
RG: People unite around ideas so when the idea is there and the people who carry these ideas are there its very easy to bring them back.
We did not start from nothing. We started from our histories through 40 years now. Tere was not a single family in Tunisia that was
spared from this. Every family had either a martyr, a prisoner, or somebody who was kicked out from their work. Ennahda is deep
rooted in the Tunisian society. Its not just into individuals, its into families. People have sympathy for those people who have been
prosecuted in general.
ML: So tell me about Egypt. How is Egypt dierent from Tunisia? Have you personally had conversations with leadership of
the Muslim Brotherhood?
RG: Many times we had conversations and dialogue. Te Egyptian youth read my books with admiration.
But the Egyptian equation is much more complicated than the Tunisian equation. Tere are religious minorities and ethnic
minorities in Egypt. Tere is a strong Sala movement. Te role of the army is dierent in Egypt than it is in Tunisia.
ML: So what is your advice to the Muslim Brotherhood? Can they repeat what you did?
I think the Ikhwan should govern by coalition, a coalition that includes the people from secular parties although they are minorities,
the Copt also, people close to the military. Tese minorities are small. But they are extremely inuential. For them to succeed its very
important to bring all these people together into a coalition.
In the election process its an honest competition and everybody should get their fair share. However, governing is another issue. Te
balance of power should represent the weight of the people not in terms of numbers but in terms of inuence.
Tis is the mistake that happened in Algeria when the Islamists won 80 percent of the vote but they completely ignored the
inuential minority of secularists, of the army, of the business community. So they did a coup detat against the democratic process
and Algeria is still suering from that. Tis is why we always insisted on a national unity government.
Te MB is a big movement, its an entrenched movement and a responsible movement as well and I dont think they will embark on
any foolish adventure.
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ML: What about America? Do you think the United States is doing the right thing?
RG: I think America this time did the right choice. It supported the people instead of supporting the rulers.
I found in Washington a great optimism about the Arab Spring, especially in Tunisia. Te ocial positions by President Obama, by
Secretary of State Clinton and the ambassadors in the region in general are positive and are supportive of the Arab Spring. Tis is
very rare that it happens. But I think its a good thing and a very good start.
Im very pleased when I come to Washington and people are starting to talk about harmony between democracy and Islam. Tis
is a new thing and this pleased me a lot. Tis is a very very deep and important change in understanding especially in the area of
interrelationship between Islam and the west. Tis is very important at the level of political understandings.
ML: And Obama?
RG: President Obama has a dierent view about the future and the relation with the Muslim world. Hes an intellectual. He has a
vision. He has a world vision and vision toward history as well and the importance of Islam in the world. And his speeches in Istanbul
and Cairo show his deep understanding and vision.
Im really pleased and I think his policies toward the Arab Spring are good and positive, for the record.
Tunisians Voted for jobs, Not Islam
By Michael Robbins, Mark Tessler, December 7, 2011
On October 23, 2011, Tunisians went to the polls to participate in the rst elections since the Arab Spring. Te elections were widely
considered free and fair, representing a signicant triumph in a region long beset by authoritarianism. With a turnout rate of just
over 50 percent, the plurality of Tunisians around 40 percent cast their votes for Ennadha, or the Renaissance Party, a moderate
Islamist party. Despite a clear victory over its nearest competitors, a number of more secularly minded parties won a similar
percentage of the vote implying that this was not an absolute victory for the Islamist camp. Given the repression of political parties
and the relatively short period between the Jasmine Revolution and the election, it is not entirely apparent what these election results
mean about the preferences of ordinary citizens.
Shortly before the election, between September 30 and October 11, 2011, the second wave of the Arab Barometer an 11-country
public opinion poll was conducted in Tunisia. Te surveys ndings demonstrated that Ennahdas victory was not a clear call for
a more religious political system. Te survey also provided insight into the broader political concerns of ordinary citizens, their
attitudes toward the Jasmine Revolution and Tunisias ongoing political transition, as well as their preferences about the type of
political system that should be utilized to govern their country.
Based on the election results, there appeared to be a more-or-less equal division between supporters and opponents of political
Islam. Tere was some evidence for this understanding in the Arab Barometer. In response to a question on the proper basis for
making laws, 65 percent of respondents indicated that they agreed with the statement that the government should implement only
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the sharia laws compared to 84 percent who stated that the government should make laws in accordance with the wishes of the
people. An even higher percentage 86 percent stated that the government should implement the sharia laws in some areas
and make laws according to peoples wishes in others, indicating that Tunisians believe that Islam should inform some elements of
political life. Tus, it appears that Tunisians tend to support laws that are both grounded in the will of the people and in accordance
with religious law.
Other indicators suggest that Tunisians are not overly supportive of a signicant role for Islam in political aairs. Although divisions
exist within the party, Rached Ghannouchi, the long-time leader of Ennahda, has consistently stated that he and his party represent
a progressive strain of Islamic reformism rather than a movement seeking to institute an Islamic state. Tis understanding of
Islams role in politics informing but not driving appears consistent with the desires of a majority of respondents. When asked
specically about the role Islam should play in public life, sizeable majorities believed it should be minimal. For instance, 78.4 percent
of respondents agreed that men of religion should not inuence how citizens vote in elections, only 30.6 percent believed that it
would be better for Tunisia if more religious ocials held public oce, and just 25.4 percent stated that men of religion should
inuence decisions of government. Moreover, 78.5 percent agreed with the statement that religion is a private matter that should be
separate from social and political life. Tus, while many Tunisians believed that laws should generally not contravene sharia, most do
not seek an active role for religion or religious ocials in public life.
Nevertheless, perceptions of Ennahda as an organization are more favorable than might be expected given its self-identication with
Islam and the Islamist movement. Approximately half of respondents (49.4 percent) stated that they trust the party. Tis level of
trust exceeded that of many organizations, including the Tunisian Labor Federation (37.8 percent), civil society organizations (43.8
percent), and political parties in general (28.2 percent). Trust was signicantly higher for other political actors, however, including
the transitional government (66.3 percent), the courts (55.9 percent), the police (61.2 percent), and the armed forces (92.6 percent).
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Despite fairly high levels of trust in Ennahda, stated support for the party was signicantly lower. When respondents were asked
which party best represented their aspirations for political, social, and economic development, only 11.9 percent chose Ennahda.
Yet, when asked which party they would vote for in the elections, 19.9 percent stated Ennahda, likely implying that local factors and
candidate selection were key elements of Ennahdas electoral success. Other factors also help to explain why Ennahdas vote share
was signicantly higher than the proportion of respondents who favor the partys Islamist platform. One is Ennahdas eective get-
out-the-vote eort, which was far superior to that of any other party. Another is the legitimacy earned through years of opposition
to the Ben Ali regime. Moreover, as one of the international election monitors was told, many Tunisians voted for Ennahda because
the party knows those who were involved in the systematic oppression and, accordingly, it is better able than others to ensure that
important members of the former regime do not slip back into the political arena.
Reecting on the Jasmine Revolution in the days prior to the election, half of respondents stated that they had beneted from the
Revolution while a further 40 percent responded that the situation was more or less unchanged. Only 10 percent believed that they
were worse o because of these political changes.
Citizens also remained overwhelmingly optimistic about the long-term changes that may result from the Jasmine Revolution. Vast
majorities believed that the result would be a democratic system (93.5 percent), better economic opportunities (94.9 percent), an
improvement in human rights (93.9 percent), the establishment of the rule of law (92.4 percent), and greater social justice (92.5 percent).
Although Tunisians desired sweeping changes from the previous system, most attributed the cause underlying the Jasmine
Revolution to economic grievances. According to 63.0 percent of the respondents, the primary cause of the uprisings was economic
dissatisfaction and a further 17.9 percent identied this as the second-most important factor. Te next most common reason cited
was corruption within the system with 16.7 percent stating this was the most important reason and 45.4 percent stating it was the
second-most important factor. By comparison, only 13.9 percent respondents stated that demands for political liberties were the
most important reason for the uprisings; 28.6 percent said that they were the second-most important. Very small minorities cited
other factors including the establishment of an Islamic state or ending Tunisias pro-Western policies.
Given the nature of the grievances leading to the Jasmine Revolution, it is unsurprising that economic concerns still dominate the
political arena. Nearly 70 percent of respondents stated that economic concerns such as ination and unemployment were the most
important challenge facing Tunisians. Tis was followed by the challenges of corruption (12.9 percent) and domestic security (7.5
percent).
By comparison, only 1.9 percent of respondents cited democratic consolidation and only 1.4 percent cited free and fair elections as
being the most important challenge facing Tunisia. Tis nding does not indicate that Tunisians are not supportive of democracy,
however. Rather, 90.0 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that democracy may have its problems, but it is the best
form of government. Similarly, 98.3 percent of respondents stated that a democratic system represented a good or very good manner
of governing Tunisia.
Additionally, this lack of concern about the political challenges does not appear to come from the fact that Tunisians believe the
democratic transition has already been consolidated. Rather, only 28.1 percent of respondents believe that Tunisia is closer to being
fully democratic than being fully authoritarian with the mean on a scale of 0 to 10 being 4.5.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Tunisians believe that some aspects associated with liberal democracy have been achieved. Te vast
majority (90.2 percent) stated that one could criticize the government without fear. Yet, when asked to assess the state of democracy
and human rights in the country, only 26.7 percent stated that it was good or very good compared to 18.6 percent who stated it was
bad or very bad. By far the most common response was that it was neither good nor bad (45.6 percent), further demonstrating that
citizens believe there is still much to be achieved in the political realm.
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One possible explanation for these relatively low ratings of democracy but lack of concern about political outcomes was related
to how Tunisians have understood democracy. Rather than understanding it in primarily political terms, as is common in many
Western liberal democracies, many Tunisians, as Arab Barometer surveys showed to be the case in other countries as well, focused
on economic issues when thinking about democracy. Nearly half of Tunisians (48.3 percent) stated that the primary characteristic
of democratic governance is a small income gap (21.1 percent), the provision of basic necessities for all members of society (22.4
percent), or the elimination of corruption (4.8 percent). By comparison, 27.4 percent stated that the most important characteristic is
free and fair elections, 11.3 percent said that it is the ability to criticize the government, and 11.1 percent stated that it is equality of
political rights among citizens.
One of the primary tasks for the newly elected constituent assembly is to devise a constitution that denes the future political
system. One of the most critical decisions is to determine whether Tunisia will operate as a presidential or parliamentary system.
Respondents were asked their opinion on this complex issue and, unsurprisingly, a large number stated that they did not know (21.5
percent). Of those who did oer an opinion, a majority supported a parliamentary system (52.9 percent). Only 15.4 percent indicated
that they supported a presidential system similar to what existed between 1957 and the Jasmine Revolution and the remaining 32.0
percent stated that they preferred a mix of the two forms of government.
While Tunisians desired a parliamentary system, they also sought a system that is civil rather than religious in nature. Over three-
quarters (76.5 percent) of respondents indicated that they supported a civil state compared to 23.5 percent who stated that they
wanted a religious state.
Overall, Tunisians had strong and clear preferences about the future of their country. Support for a democratic system broadly
dened was high and there was a general consensus that parliament should play a greater role in the political process than before.
Importantly, despite Ennahdas signicant victory in constituent assembly elections, the vast majority of Tunisians desired a civil
state with a limited political role for Islam in the political process, although most agreed that laws should generally be consistent with
sharia. As a result, Ennahdas future popularity likely depends on its commitment to remaining a moderate Islamist party.
It was also clear that Tunisians continued to have high hopes for the achievements of the ongoing political transition, although
most central to these were hopes for a better economic future. Although political outcomes are also important, it is apparent
based on the results of the Arab Barometer that a desire for greater economic opportunity drove the Jasmine Revolution and has
continued to be the key demand of the average Tunisian. Tus, while the constituent assembly will debate the merits of dierent
forms of representative government, it is critical that the transitional government not lose sight of economic issues and that it
promote reforms that bring benets to all sectors of society. Otherwise, regardless of the political makeup determined by the draft
constitution, grievances against the system are likely to continue.
Michael Robbins is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Michigan and a former Dubai Initiative Fellow at
the Harvard Kennedy School. Mark Tessler is Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor of Political Science and Vice-Provost for
International Aairs at the University of Michigan.
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Tunisias student Salas
By Monica Marks, January 6, 2012
Giggling over a communal pot of couscous, the girls swap stories and take turns pushing each other across the room on wheely
chairs. Douha Rihi, 20, a German language major, wants to study abroad in Berlin. Sana Brahim, 23, is pursuing a masters degree
in Microbiology. Tey dont look like the kind of young women youd expect to nd at the center of a major ideological controversy,
but here they are all 10 of them perched on the second level of the university administration building, ghting for their right to
wear the full Muslim face veil, called niqab, inside classrooms and during exams.
Along with a group of scraggly-bearded young Sala men, these girls have been occupying the University of Manouba College of
Arts and Humanities administration building since November 28, 2011. Teir protest has resulted in the continued closure of one of
Tunisias largest campuses since December 6 and has kept an estimated 13,000 students from attending their classes.
Te so-called Sala sit-in has ignited impassioned debate concerning the extent to which religious expression should be tolerated
in Tunisias public sphere, particularly in traditionally secularist strongholds such as universities. What began with the demands of
two students, Iman Melki, 20, and Faten Ben Mahmoud, 21, to wear the face veil during exams in late November has mushroomed
into a seemingly intractable stando between secularist university administrators and a tiny but determined group of about 50 to 60
Sala-sympathizing youth on campus.
At the beginning we had two demands, explains Mohamed Souli, a 21-year-old student standing sentry in front of the administration
building. We wanted a prayer room inside the university and the right of all girls to wear niqab inside classrooms and during exams.
Tese are still our demands.
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Te faculty board at the University of Manouba, however, has steadfastly refused to allow niqab in classrooms or during
examinations, citing a variety of security and pedagogical concerns. Tese concerns include the danger that students may hide
weapons or cheating devices under their niqabs and the diculty of teaching pupils whose facial expressions are concealed.
Some professors noted that the revolutionary atmosphere has inspired a wave of more vocal student demands on Tunisian campuses.
After the revolution there were so many student demands, said Faiza Derbel, an assistant professor of linguistics at the University of
Manouba. Students wanted their papers re-graded and said that their exams were too dicult. I was able to handle their problems
on an individual basis. But this seems to be an unmanageable situation.
In the wake of the January 2011 revolution, Tunisians have breathed a collective sigh of relief. Ben Alis clampdown police state
has been replaced by a startlingly vibrant atmosphere of laissez-faire engagement. Students are speaking up, a raft of new non-
government organizations (NGOs) and media outlets has been founded, and people are feeling comfortable experimenting with
formerly suppressed modes of religious expression. Whereas Ben Alis Ministry of Religious aairs scripted preachers Friday
sermons and distributed them to mosques across the country, local mosques are now free to preach what they wish, and Tunisians
can wear headscarves, niqabs, and long beards without fear of imprisonment or government reprisal.
Unable to reach a compromise with the protesters, Habib Kazdaghli, dean of the College of Arts and Humanities, called upon the
Ministry of Higher Education in early December 2011 to resolve the Sala issue. Mr. Kazdaghli and the faculty board presented the
ministry with requests to relocate the sit-inners away from the administration building and evacuate any protesters who are not
registered students at the University of Manouba.
Te Ministry of Higher Education, for its part, has hesitated to involve itself in the controversy, possibly afraid that sending police
to forcibly remove protesters will exacerbate an already volatile situation and serve as an unwelcome reminder of the former
regimes heavy handed treatment of protesters. In a statement broadcast on Tunisian radio, the newly appointed Minister of Higher
Education, Moncef Ben Salem, reiterated that the sit-in is an internal aair and that police will not enter the university.
At the point when the sit-in exceeded a month, a group of about 200 anti-niqab demonstrators, fed up with the sit-in, gathered in
front of the Ministry of Higher Education. Te group, comprised mainly of professors and students from the University of Manouba,
called for immediate government intervention to disperse the Sala protesters and restore security on the Manouba campus.
Many professors at the University of Manouba are incensed at the ministrys lack of involvement and have joined in the anti-niqab
protest. We needed a categorical answer either these Sala sit-inners go or we stay. Tats why we came here today, said Amel
Grami, a lecturer in gender and Islamic studies.
Ms. Grami and a number of other female professors reported being verbally harassed by the Sala students in early December, and
Mr. Kazdaghli was pushed and physically prevented from entering his oce in the administration building on December 6. In a
report issued on December 9, Human Rights Watch called on the Tunisian government to ensure swift intervention of security
forces whenever requested by the faculty to prevent third parties from seriously disrupting academic life.
Te niqab dispute at Manouba has acquired a politically polarized and ideological tone. Ms. Grami, like many of the professors at
the anti-nijab demonstration, places much of the blame for the Salas rise squarely on the shoulders of Ennahda, the center-right
Islamist party that won a plurality of the vote in the October 2011 elections. At the end of the day, this is Rached Ghannouchis
decision, said Ms. Grami, pushing her black bangs away from her sunglasses. Ennahda has created an environment where these
people feel comfortable imposing their will on us.
Said Ferjani, an ocial spokesperson for Ennahda Party, said that Manouba must nd a solution to the niqab dispute without
infringing in any shape or form on a womans fundamental right to choose her own clothing. Te niqab debate and controversy over
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women wearing skimpy bikinis on Tunisian beaches, Mr. Ferjani said, are two sides of the same issue. We live within the dynamics of
a edgling democracy, and we must respect democratic principles.
For some students, the stando at Manouba represents little more than a frustratingly alarmist tug of war over largely irrelevant
issues of Tunisian identity. We, the students, are the losers, said Houda, a head-scarved 21-year-old who attended yesterdays
anti-niqab demonstration purely out of curiosity. We want to return to our studies without thinking of any ideology. Tese girls who
wear niqab are just as Tunisian as all the people here.
Te faculty board at Manouba, however, seems unlikely to budge. Other universities around the country, in Sfax, Sousse, Ariana,
and Kariouane, have dealt with similar instances of girls wearing niqab to class. Some have found creative compromises to end the
stando. According to members of the Manouba faculty board, the dean of April 9th University in Tunis solved his universitys
niqab crisis by oering the three girls wearing niqab the option of taking their exams in a classroom with blind students and a female
invigilator. Tey accepted his oer, and things appear to be running smoothly.
Many professors at Manouba, however, feel their university has a special role to play as a key holdout a fortress of secular
enlightenment, so to speak, in a nation that is backsliding into the recesses of Saudi-style Salasm. We are ashamed of what
happened at April 9th, said Nabil Cherni, a lecturer in English at the University of Manouba. Our position is uncompromising.
Meanwhile, back at the administration building, the bearded boys have taken a break from playing football to roll out large green
oor mats for the sunset prayer. It seems theyre taking delight in protecting the niqabbed young ladies upstairs and they make sure
to register my name and contact information before I walk up to meet the girls. I ask Mohamed Souli what the boys would do if the
security forces came to physically expel the sit-inners from their building. We will resist and try to be tolerant, he says, but if police
use violence we will respond. Our only protector is Allah, and were serving him.
Later, sharing dates with the niqabbed girls upstairs, I ask Ms. Melki what has motivated her to spend 37 days in a chilly upstairs
administration room. Every girl has the liberty to wear whatever she wants, she proclaims. Tis is a university and we are free.
Ten she stands up, lowers her face veil, and carries a pot of food down to the boys.
Ennahdas re-election strategy
By Erik Churchill, March 27, 2012
Less than six months after the countrys rst democratic elections and only four months into the governments mandate, Tunisias
ruling party, Ennahda, announced itsintentions to holdthe countrys next elections in March 2013. Te announcement came as a
surprise as some thought the government was set on taking its time, while others questioned how a government that has only just
begun writing a constitution could plan for elections. Although some parties in the constituent assembly have dissented from the
announcement, with Ennahdas backing, it will likely proceed as announced.
While outside the country Tunisias successful elections and relatively peaceful transition have been praised, Tunisians have been
more skeptical. Many have criticized the governments slow pace and opposition parties have capitalized on the perceived inaction by
the government on the economy and security situation. Te electoral timetable, along with the budget released by the government,
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are both tactical and strategic. Te timetable will ward o criticism of its intentions to hold power indenitely and the deadline
will set the pace for constitution writing within the year. Te budget-busting spending will aim to curry favor among voters, who
are eager to see tangible material benets from their historic uprising. Together, one begins to see the foundations for Ennahdas
electoral strategy.
Te announcement of the timetable was most welcome and a relief to those who feared the government would try to preserve its
mandate indenitely. Despite that the timetable exceeds the one-year limit that had been agreed upon by a coalition of parties,
including Ennahda, in September 2011, it will allow all political parties to focus on their electoral strategies, their potential
weaknesses, and areas they will want to exploit for electoral gain in March 2013.
For Ennahda, its strategy approaching elections is coming into focus. It is based on threeprinciples spend big, marginalize
opponents, and blame others for failures.
During the elections for the constituent assembly, Ennahda promised to turn around Tunisias economy, however, it has struggled
in its rst few months to hold true to those commitments. Te ruling party is attempting to change that with itsnew budget,which
proposes a massive 10 percent increase in government expenditures. Based onrosy projectionsof increased tax receipts and tracking
down and selling o Zine el-Abidine Ben Alis assets, the budget increases development spending, in particular, by 23 percent.
Economists (and international institutions like the World Bank) have supported increased development spending, particularly for
rural areas. Whereas the World Bank has advocated long-term structural changes to the economy, the 2012 budget makes it clear
that Ennahda will look to disburse these development funds as quickly as possible.
Tis poses risks, however, particularly with Tunisias creditors. While the United States and Qatar have recentlysupporteda Tunisian
bond auction, ratings agencieswere concernedover Tunisias budget decit of 3.7 percent in 2011. With the decit expected
toballoonto over 6.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012, the country, and itsfragile banking sector, may be subject to
increasing speculation about its long-term nancialstability.
A second tactic Ennahda seems intent on employing is thecharacterization of itsopponents as extremists. Te party aims to project
itself as the guarantor of Tunisias moderate center, while at the same time pushing the center to the right. Recent statements by
Ennahdas leadership group fundamentalist and extremesecularists with radical Islamist groups. Tis is an interesting strategy
because it co-opts the language used by the regimes of Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali that described the government as the guarantor
of a certain Tunisian moderation. It also shows opponents of the regime as not only divisive, but also dangerous.
Tis is a strategy fraught with risks. It opens the doors for political speech to much more extreme language. In reality, Ennahdas
reverence for a civil state and modern, democratic institutions is quite similar to the secularists. Tis vision diers from radical
Salast parties, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, that advocate for a rejection of democracy and a return to a caliphate. By using the language
of extremism, Ennahda is equating a party like the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), a moderate left wing group, with the Hizb
ut-Tahrir. Tis is an absurd comparison. Ennahda and its secular opponents have much more in common with each other than with
Hizb ut-Tahrir. But by characterizing its secular opponents as extremists, Ennahda looks like the party that is trying to divide Tunisia
into two not the other way around.
In contrast to the marginalization of the left, Ennahda is employing a light touch when dealing with fundamentalist conservative
parties. Many Tunisians have been shocked to see images of Salast groups tearing down the Tunisian ag at Manouba University or
climbing the historic clock tower on Bourguiba Avenue to wave Salast ags. To the consternation of many, Ennahda has preferred
to let these groups participate in public life, and have sometimes even supported their positions such as guaranteeing the rights
of women who wear the full face veil. While the Ennahda-led government has spoken out against the dangers of violent jihadism, it
prefers to engage the far right, rather than push them underground.
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A third strategy utilized by Ennahda is to blame its opponents for any challenges. For example, the governmentreviseddown its
GDP forecasts because of ongoing labor unrest. Tis is undoubtedly an important factor in Tunisias economic situation, but it is
certainly not the only one. Te instability with the countrys major trading partner, Libya, the debt crisis in Europe, and problems
with security also play into the equation. Te Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the countrys leading trade union, and other
critics of the government, however, remain the best scapegoats for Ennahda. Likewise, the government often blames violence on
rogue elements of the former regime accusing them of trying todestabilizethe government. Meanwhile, Ennahda fails to address
whether the government isadequately responding to the security situation.
Ennahdas strategy is not just aMachiavellian calculation to retain power; it is also due to the corner they have been painted into
by their opponents. For decades Ennahda has been labeled an extremist party, despite all eorts to throw o the label including
20 years of statements by the movements leader, Rached Ghannouchi. Te party seems to have nally realized that it is more
advantageous to use extremist terminology on its opponents than to ght it. Te same is true for the economic situation. Before
the new government even took power critics were blaming the party for indecision and inaction on the economy. While Ennahdas
strategy is political and often mischaracterizes itsopponents, the party is playing by the electoral rules.
Te electoral timetable announcement and the agreement to reinstate the electoral commission, the Independent High Authority for
the Elections (ISIE), are positive steps. Ennahda has done the country a service in setting out a clear path. It is in the drivers seat for
the months leading up to March 2013 and it will be an interesting ride to see how Ennahda campaigns and whether its opponents
can nd a counter-attack against what remains a very popular movement.
Erik Churchill is an analyst and development consultant based in Tunisia. He blogs about Tunisian politics atKefteji.
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Egypts cobra and mongoose
By Robert Springborg, Feburary 27, 2012
Te deadly struggle for power between Egypts rulers and the Muslim Brothers dates back to the rule of King Faruq, with each
episode following virtually the identical script. Each time, for a brief period ruler and Brothers cohabit, but the marriage of
convenience soon breaks down amidst mutual recrimination. Te ruler, recently arrived on the monarchial or presidential throne,
reaches out to the Brothers to benet from or at least neutralize the political support they command. For their part the Brothers seek
purchase within the state to ward o threats, obtain resources, and gain footholds from which they may commence their nal ascent
to power. But this cooperation will not last, to judge by history a history well known to all players in todays unfolding story.
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In the case of King Faruq, the Brothers overreached with a campaign of assassination, which provoked a counter-campaign that
included the killing of the movements founder-leader Hassan al-Banna, and a general crackdown on the movement. In the case of
Gamal Abdel Nasser, the new regime went so far as to provide the Brothers a cabinet seat before using an alleged assassination attempt
on Nasser almost two years on to launch the campaign of terror against them that lasted virtually until the end of his life. For his part,
Anwar Sadat reached out to the Brothers to ll the political vacuum resulting from his purge of leftist Nasserists only months after
becoming president. For several years they enjoyed his patronage and protection, before falling victim to his fear and megalomania.
Hosni Mubarak followed a similar script when he replaced the assassinated Sadat, re-opening political space for the Brothers in
the rst years of his long rule, before settling on a formula in the 1990s that sharply constrained but did not eliminate their political
presence. For years, Mubarak tolerated, and indeed beneted from, this limited presence. But like his predecessors, Mubarak
ultimately tightened the screws on the Brotherhood further, seeking vainly in the nal years of his presidency to destroy their
economic and political base through an escalated campaign of arrests and repression.
Te history of relations between modern Egyptian rulers and the Muslim Brotherhood has played out again and again in the same
manner of the epic clash between the mongoose and cobra, with the former always winning. Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein
Tantawi and his fellow generals on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) are of course well aware of this history. Teir
behavior suggests that they too want to benet from the Brotherhoods political support during a transitional period. But almost as
farce, history seems destined to repeat itself. Te rivalry inherent in the relationship renders political cohabitation dicult to the
point of being impossible, so the military mongoose can be expected to strike at the Brotherhood cobra yet again. But this time the
outcome may be quite dierent.
Te comparative evidence of relations in other authoritarian regimes between a ruling military and religiously based opposition
parties is not as one-sided as the mongoose-cobra analogy implies. While General Franco and his military came to dominate
all of Spain, including the Catholic church and its right wing political arm, Opus Dei, fascism elsewhere in Europe, including in
Germany and Italy, saw the party, at least partially supported by the church, ascendant over the military. In Latin America the
military generally had the upper hand until democratic transitions subordinated it to institutional control. In Iran, however, the
mullahs appear still to have the upper hand against both the regular military and the Revolutionary Guard Corps they created as a
counterbalance to it. Tese battles do not inevitably result in the army subordinating the party.
Nor do the specics of the current SCAF-Brotherhood political cohabitation suggest that history will necessarily repeat itself. Te
SCAF is playing a clumsy political game that may backre. As a scheduled transition to civilian rule looms, the military is busily
trying to draw redlines behind which of its interests will remain inviolable. But that eort has undermined its political support and
brought into question the very exercise. Over the long haul the military will be hard pressed to defend the lines it has drawn in the
face of a contentious political arena and energized the Egyptian public. Demands will intensify for scrutiny of its budget, its internal
management, and for it to at least share responsibility for making national security policies.
One possibility is that a cabal of ocers, perhaps of a pan-Arabist neo-Nasserist persuasion, could decide that the SCAF, the
Brothers, the revolutionaries, and indeed everyone else had made such a political mess of things since February 11, 2011, that they
needed to intervene to save the nation. But in todays Egypt, they would be hard put to assert themselves over the newly empowered
Brothers and fellow traveling Islamists. In none of the historic episodes did the Brothers seek to mobilize their supporters in the
street against the state. But this time, after the events in 2011, no one could be guaranteed of such reticence now that they have
nally arrived almost at the seat of power.
Te underlying political economy of the military-Brotherhood cohabitation similarly seems to favor the latter. Te current
division of the political system gives the military and Brothers control over the hard and soft states, respectively. Te former
now encompasses all of the armed forces, including the security and intelligence services as well as the police, plus provincial
governorships and heads of provincial, district, and local executive councils. Te potentially threatening position of chair of
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the parliamentary national security and defense committee was awarded by the Brothers to a former general, signaling their
acquiescence to the military in this potentially key domain. Te hard cabinet portfolios of defense, military production, interior,
foreign policy, nance, and international cooperation are presently all in the hands of SCAF loyalists, where they are likely to remain
in the rst independent government to be formed later in 2012. On paper the military looks to be in an unassailable position.
But the Brotherhoods hold on the soft state and its political inuence more broadly is far from trivial. Te parliament which it
dominates will have greater power than at any time since the rst following nominal independence in 1923. While the Brotherhood
is unlikely to institutionalize that power in an elected body that it cannot be certain to control in the future, its leaders will be able
to threaten to deploy parliaments latent powers to enhance their leverage. Assuming that they perform as well in local government
elections as they have in parliamentary ones, the same will hold true in the governorates, districts, and municipalities. Councils
at these levels will be able to contest for power with their executive branch equivalents. Te Brothers domination of professional
syndicates and strong inuence within the judiciary, as evidenced by their present role in the Judges Club and Supreme Council
of the Judiciary, provide additional bases upon which they can build political power. While the constitution is yet to be written, it
is widely assumed that it will establish a system in which considerable executive power is transferred to the legislative branch. Te
betting now is that the president will be a compromise candidate between the SCAF and the Brotherhood, thereby ensuring that this
key gure cannot be a complete tool of either.
Te Brothers are likely to attempt to begin to move against the armed forces simultaneously from the bottom and the top. Te police
on the beat, already deeply unpopular and demoralized, are going to nd it very hard to push back against the Brothers, who have
real power on the streets. Many police are likely to begin to nd common cause with them. Te same will be true, although in lesser
degree, of military and security service conscripts, especially in the central security force of the ministry of interior. From the top
down the Brothers undoubtedly already have supporters within the various corps of ocers, which they will seek to bolster. Te
potential for a bandwagon eect is certainly there, as careerists in the armed forces and those just serving their terms of conscription
perceive that it is better for them to get with the coming strength rather than to be swept away in the ebb tide associated with the
ousted regime and its ocer legacy. So while the Brothers only dominate the soft state at present, it already provides a weighty
counterbalance to the hard state, the control of which by the military will be challenged in the coming years.
Te economic system is similarly, although not yet as sharply divided into hard and soft components, but likely soon to be more so.
Te military economy includes consumer goods and services, but its principal concentration is in heavier industry. Tat tendency
will probably be reinforced as the generals lay claim to assets seized from Gamal Mubaraks cronies, most notably those in iron
and steel and other areas of energy intensive production. Te Brothers economic activities, such as those run by Deputy Supreme
Guide Khairat el-Shater or businessman Safwan Sabit, are almost entirely in consumer goods and services, including retail shops,
restaurants, food processing, household furniture, and the like. Tey also have interests in formal and informal nancial institutions.
As is the case with regard to politics, while at rst glance controlling the hard economy seems to be an advantage for the military,
over the longer haul controlling its soft components may give the Brothers the upper hand. Given the size and rate of growth
of the population, consumer demand is bound to expand, thereby advantaging providers of consumer goods and services. And
as important as economic advantage will be the direct contact between Brotherhood controlled companies and the public and
the possibilities that provides for general reputational enhancement, resource accumulation, and recruitment. In addition, the
Brotherhood will move to expand its existing social safety net and will draw upon state resources to do so, lest the appeal of the
Salas among the poor, as demonstrated in the parliamentary elections, become a serious political threat. Tis too will serve to
reinforce its political standing and extend its reach.
Another economic consideration is the Brothers ability to tap resources from the Gulf. While the Mubarak regime was kept on drip
feed from Gulf sources and the SCAF has yet to obtain really major contributions from those sources, the Brothers prospects are
considerably brighter. Various of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have already demonstrated an interest in investing in
the Brotherhoods political futures and as they brighten, more investors are likely to follow, whether through direct subventions,
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investments in businesses, or public assistance to the state. Finally, the expansion of the Islamic economy, as suggested already by
the promised oating of a $2 billion sukuk (Islamic bond) issue, not only will provide another bridge to the Gulf, it will bolster the
standing of the Brothers as competent and moral economic managers and as gatekeepers and stimulators of this ow of funds. By
comparison, the militarys hold over capital intensive factories producing military and intermediate goods will provide them few
directly political advantages, either at home or in the region.
Te comparative advantage of the Brotherhood over the military has already been displayed in the area of foreign policy. In a move of
near desperation as it saw its support ebbing away, the SCAF launched an attack on the United States, using the issue of U.S. funding
to Egyptian NGOs to do so. Tis not only bit the hand that feeds the military, it stimulated anti-Americanism and anti-westernism
more generally, a tendency that is a threat to the militarys interest and a boon to the Brothers. Now that this whole subject has been
opened, it can be manipulated almost at will by those who will benet from chauvinism, which over the longer haul will assuredly be
the Brothers, not the military.
Te present cohabitation of the military and the Brotherhood, based as it is on the transient supremacy of the former, is therefore
inherently unstable. A preemptive strike by the generals, or even by a colonel, as was done in the past, would be unlikely to succeed
this time around. And failing such a strike, time is on the side of the Brothers. Tis time, they will be the victorious mongoose and
the military the defeated cobra. Egypt is thus at a historic turning point as profound as when the republican era replaced the colonial
one. Will they try to directly control the cobra they have defeated, or will they seek instead to subject that military to institutional
control within an at least quasi-democratic polity? In other words, will they opt for an Iranian style system of control of the armed
forces, thereby converting them into a base for their own power, or will they chose instead to depoliticize the military, thus making
democracy possible? Here, nally, neither history, nor the mongoose metaphor, oers us lessons.
Robert Springborg is a professor in the Department of National Security Aairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. Te views
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.
Will Slow and Steady Win the Race?
By Nathan Brown, February 28, 2011
Egypts Muslim Brotherhood has just declared that it would form a political party it settled on a name (Freedom and Justice) and
asked one of its leaders (Sa`d al-Katatni) to oversee the eort. Since its founding more than eight decades ago, the Brotherhood has
never been able to take such a step. What should those who care about Egypts future look for in this party?
In the early days of the Egyptian revolution, international attention seized on whether the Brotherhood would move immediately to
hijack the revolution. But the Brotherhood is a cautious and deliberate actor less likely to seize anything tomorrow but very careful
about its long-term positioning. Just as it declared it would form a party, for instance, it also rejected any idea of applying for recognition
under the current legal framework. If it is not an impetuous actor, it still seems to be an imposing one indeed, it is often described as
the best organized of all political forces in Egypt. And indeed, if a democratic order does emerge in Egypt, the Brotherhood party will
be an important actor. But the transition may be a bit more dicult for the Brotherhood than many observers anticipate.
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Muslim Brotherhood movements pride themselves on being simultaneously principled and practical; they hold fast to their general
beliefs but insist they are exible in application. Indeed, part of the motivation to establish a party is to allow a group of leaders
within the movement to develop the specialized skills and structures to take full advantage of political opportunities. But the
challenge of political activity is that it can force a choice, at least in the short term, between their strategic vision and their tactical
calculations. If kept far from power, they can nesse the gap between ideology and reality. When they play partisan politics on a daily
basis that becomes harder.
Part of the challenge for the Brotherhood will be to convert selected parts of a movement with a broad social, religious, and political
set of agendas into a more narrowly focused political party. And another part (as I have argued elsewhere) will be to enter a political
eld that will be far more crowded in a society that is much more politically conscious and populated now by hardened and
experienced political organizers than it has known in the past.
Brotherhood movements are large and broad enough to seek to be many things to many people. In February 2011, I sat in the living
room of a senior Hamas leader in the West Bank. He argued forcefully that Israel was illegitimate and explained that while an Islamic
state would hardly slaughter the Jews and instead let them live in peace, there was no other solution than an Islamic one to the
Israeli-Palestinian conict. His son, sitting next to him, listened respectfully but then said, What my father said is completely correct
from a religious point of view. However, from a political point of view, Hamas accepts a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders. When
he nished, his father nodded as if in agreement. Tey both looked at me as if Hamas was being perfectly clear. And, in its own way,
it was. Both religious and political logic could be right for now. Hamas can be militant and compromising at the same time as long
as it does not have to make a decision. Other Muslim Brotherhood movements are like Hamas with their broad members, wide
range of interests, and deep social and political engagement that can thrive on ambiguity.
And in that one limited but real sense, Egypts authoritarian political order has thus been kind to a Brotherhood movement by
allowing it to live in the grey zones. Tose days may be numbered. Hard decisions will have to be taken soon. Te Brotherhood will
not rush into any of them, but it cannot avoid them forever. How can those interested in the Brotherhood understand what direction
it is taking?What are the choices that it will have to make? Let me turn to three important questions: what, who, and how.
What will it stand for? In 2007, the Brotherhood drafted an extremely detailed platform in preparation for forming a political party.
While there was no prospect of gaining legal status any time soon, the Brotherhood wished to begin to prepare for any opening that
might develop, resolve some internal arguments, and communicate to external audiences that it had a comprehensive political vision.
Te goals were not realized: the draft platform was never nalized but it sparked tremendous controversy both within the movement
and outside of it. Later that year, when the regime eectively embedded the ban on a Brotherhood party into the constitution, the
leadership put the brakes on the project there was no point in sparking divisions or courting controversy for the sake of a party
any time soon; as the head of the Brotherhoods parliamentary bloc told me in 2010, the feeling was that if the Brotherhood actually
attempted to form a party at that time, it would be tantamount to signing its own death warrant.
Tat is obviously no longer the case, and the Brotherhood leadership has therefore indicated that it will dust o the platform and nail
down the outstanding details. While the platform ran to more than 100 pages, much of the debate focused on two articles one that
favored limiting high state positions to Muslim males and another that proposed that Egyptian religious scholars elect a body that
would have the authority to review legislation and measure it against the Islamic sharia.
In reviving the project, indications are that the second proposal has been dropped. (Te idea of having religious scholars elect their
own leadership rather than have the government appoint them is gaining traction outside of the Brotherhood and was probably the
main thrust of the original Brotherhood proposal; leaders seem to have been taken aback by the vociferous criticisms of the draft
platforms further suggestion of allowing such a body veto power over legislation and dropped the idea). On the restrictions on high
state positions, retreat has been more limited: the Brotherhood is insisting on its position but seems to be limiting its focus for the
ban on non-Muslims and women to the presidency alone. But it is also attempting to nesse the debate by explaining that while the
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movement itself would not support a Christian or a woman candidate running for the oce, it would not reject the legitimacy of
anyone who was elected to the post in accordance with constitutional provisions. Indeed, that was where the debate was suspended
in 2007, and in the intervening years, there appears to have been little change.
But perhaps most frustrating for the Brotherhood was that the rest of their program was ignored in that earlier debate. By presenting
itself as the potential party of freedom and justice it seeks to revive the idea that its conception of an Islamic agenda is not just
about narrow religious strictures but also about broad social, economic and political reform.
Who will lead it? Te Brotherhoods choice of Sa`d al-Katatni to lead the eort is highly suggestive. Katatni has been identied
variously as both a conservative and a pragmatist. (My vague impression is that the former description may be more accurate but is
less than useful, since he is not strongly identied with any particular set of positions.) More signicant than his private thoughts are
his public and institutional positions. First, Katatni was the leader of the parliamentary bloc from 2005 to 2010. He seems to have
been selected for his political skills and he has certainly demonstrated them in recent years. While far from charismatic, he comes
across as gentle and conciliatory in tone as well as honest and thoughtful. With a solid reputation inside the movement, Katatni is
also the kind of gure that other political leaders would nd easier to deal with. He will set few crowds on re but will reassure many
who are suspicious of the movement. In that sense, his selection can be taken as an indication that the Brotherhood is serious about
playing politics in a pluralist environment.
But Katatni is also a member of the movements guidance bureau, the highest decision-making body in the organization. His
selection suggests the party will have a gentle face but also a short leash, at least for the moment; the movement wishes to keep a very
close eye on the development of the party. And that leads to the third question about the Brotherhood party.
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How will it be organized? Te subject of the relationship between the movement and any potential party has been a subject of
internal discussion for years; in past meetings with the designated founder, I had the impression that Katatni personally wished to see
a party that had considerable autonomy in day-to-day decision making but was still anchored rmly in the Brotherhood vision.
Mindful that his designation sent the signal that the Brotherhood might seek to control the party, Katatni insisted that his mission is
a temporary one to get the party o the ground; after that point, its membership will select the leader and guide the partys direction.
And one newspaper account attributed to him the statement that if a permanent leader came from the guidance bureau, he should
resign that position.
Tat suggests a far more autonomous body, free to take positions, make compromises, and forge alliances with more of an eye to the
short-term exigencies of electoral and parliamentary politics. An autonomous Islamist party could still take strong positions likely to
antagonize less religious forces (especially if it saw such positions as likely to pay o in electoral terms), but it would still be far easier
to integrate as a political actor because it would be operating according to a political logic. Moroccos Justice and Development Party
(PJD) and Turkeys AKP are sometimes cited as examples of such parties. But Jordans Islamic Action Front is an example of how
formal autonomy can be undermined by closely overlapping structures: in Jordan, because the same individuals move back and forth
between movement and party positions, it becomes very dicult to discern where the organizations are distinct. Te partys ability
to escape micromanagement from the movement is limited.
Up to this point, therefore, the Brotherhood has been able to keep to its past patterns of living in ambiguity. It has suggested a broad
reform agenda but also kept rm hold of some positions that disturb more liberal political forces; it has selected a conciliatory gure
to head the movement but given very mixed signals indeed on the shape that the future organization will take.
Te movement will likely not decide these matters more denitively before it has to do so. But if a true transition takes place in
Egypt, the hurly-burly of daily politics will soon require Brotherhood leaders to make up their minds.
Nathan Brown is a professor of political science and international aairs at George Washington University.
Sectarianism Stalks Egypt
By Michael Wahid Hanna May 9, 2011
Egypt was once again the scene of sectarian conict when an angry mob gathered in front of a Coptic church in Cairo on the night
of May 7, 2011, in the false belief that a Christian convert to Islam was being held against her will, setting o hours of ghting in the
streets. Te incident, in the poor working-class Cairo district of Imbaba, resulted in the deaths of 12, six Muslims and six Copts,
with more than 200 wounded and two churches burnt. Te identity of the perpetrators and instigators remains to be determined.
What is clear, however, is that this incident of sectarian strife has deep roots in recent Egyptian history, and raises the specter of
broader communal violence. Coming at a delicate moment during Egypts transition toward multiparty elections, it also represents
a clarifying moment for the Muslim Brotherhood and a vital test for Egypts emerging democratic order. Egypts latest descent into
sectarian madness is ultimately a reection of longstanding discrimination against Copts and the unchecked climate of religious
intolerance that has increasingly come to mark Egyptian society. How the evolving political system deals with these issues may be the
most urgent test of how much Egypt has actually changed since the fall of Hosni Mubarak.
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Te 2010 New Years Eve bombing of the Two Saints Church in Alexandria brought millions of Egyptians, both Muslims and Copts,
out into the streets to protest the wanton violence directed at a Christian house of worship. Te attack was one more indictment
of the sclerotic regime of former President Hosni Mubarak. Te scenes of cross-sectarian solidarity that ensued helped galvanize
popular sentiments and inuenced the trajectory and tenor of Egypts unprecedented popular uprising which began on January 25,
2011. A common sentiment linking public outrage was that this was not the Egypt that many Egyptians knew sectarian violence
of this sort was what happened in Lebanon or Iraq, but Egypt was dierent, and the faiths lived side by side harmoniously. But, in
fact, sectarianism and bigotry are a part of Egypt, as is the attendant denial that has underplayed these growing trends. Tere are
reasonable suspicions that sectarian tensions are now being manipulated for political ends by members of the former regime. Te
role of the state in fostering the sectarian divide was reinforced for many when the former minister of interior, Habib al-Adly, was
accused formally of orchestrating the Alexandria church bombing. How the state now responds will answer lingering questions
about the extent of its transformation.
Since the toppling of the Mubarak regime, the reality of the countrys sectarian divide has been on display with escalating tensions
and more frequent acts of violence directed at Egypts Christian minority, the largest non-Muslim religious minority in the Arab
world. Tis violence has been particularly disappointing when contrasted with the scenes of communal solidarity that marked Egypts
18-day uprising. Te profusion of the crescent and cross intertwined on protest banners harkened back to Egypts 1919 Revolution
when Copts and Muslims joined forces against British imperialism and an ineectual monarch under the banner Religion is for God
and the Nation is for All. Te broad-based, disciplined, and self-conscious eorts by protesters to eschew nakedly sectarian slogans
were a heartening development that many interpreted as a rst step toward the building of a new social compact for an inclusive civil
state. In Tahrir Square and other locales of protest throughout Egypt, one often heard the chant of Muslims and Christians are One
Hand. Conscious of their surroundings and wider audiences, individuals sought to give such sentiments vitality through actions,
such as the now iconic pictures of Christians forming a human barrier to protect praying Muslims in Tahrir Square and other scenes
where Muslims took the lead in protecting their fellow Christian citizens in acts of public prayer.
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Many Copts were initially wary of the uprising and feared the possibility of the further Islamization of the Egyptian state, reecting
their increased marginalization within Egyptian society in recent decades. In keeping with regional trends, particularly following
the crushing defeat in the June 1967 War against Israel, Egypt had undergone a religious revival and retrenchment that touched all
aspects of its public life and helped popularize notions of political Islam. While Egypts authoritarian leaders often repressed Islamist
opposition forces, they also sought to protect the state from such challenges by indulging public religiosity, co-opting many Islamist
demands, and shifting support among Islamist groups to combat the rise of others. Tis legacy of polarization gained increased
prominence under the negligent watch of the Mubarak regime, which had long manipulated sectarian issues to pacify Egypts
Christians, ensure their fealty to the regime, and paralyze eorts at cross-sectarian political mobilization. Increased social atomization
also suited the interests of the Coptic Church hierarchy, whose authority was reinforced in a manner akin to the Ottoman millet
system, whereby the church was granted wide communal authorities and was the primary interlocutor with governmental organs.
Te attacks in Imbaba were preceded by several other post-uprising incidents of sectarian strife. While details remain murky and
confusion reigns as to the precipitating causes of these events, many have sought to explain these outbursts as a manifestation of
counter-revolutionary forces that are seeking to halt the progress of Egypts revolution. In this telling, shadowy forces associated
with the ancient rgime seek to restore its foundations by creating chaos, sowing fear, and laying the groundwork for a crackdown
on dissent and protest by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military body has ruled the country during the period of
transition. Te possibility that former regime gures are exploiting Egypts security vacuum and ongoing instability to further their
narrow self-interests is real, but there is little tangible evidence at this point to buttress such allegations. However, past practice
does point to this possibility, as the elements of the former regime sought to create a security vacuum in the opening stages of the
Egyptian uprising, in an eort to provoke a popular backlash against the protest movement.
Others have pointed to the sudden public emergence of Salasm as a force within Egyptian society. While labeling others as Salas
has become an overly-broad method for describing extremist religious currents, many self-declared Salas, who previously shunned
political life, have sought a role for themselves in Egypts tumultuous political transition. Te Salas are not a monolithic entity, and
some Sala leaders have sought to distance their groups from incitement and violence against Copts. However, other Salast leaders
have actively sought to exploit sectarianism and have latched onto unfounded allegations against the church and its aging Patriarch,
Shenouda III (since deceased ed.). Sala incitement to intolerance is now a disquieting aspect of Egyptian public life. In this period
of confusion and paranoia, the Salas have also come to be seen by some as the tip of the counter-revolutionary spear and a concrete
manifestation of Saudi intolerance for Egypts revolutionary moment. Current Sala trends are often linked with Wahhabi-style
religious practice and Saudi proselytizing, and, as a result, popular suspicions have quickly developed that Saudi Arabia is backing
Salast groups as a move against revolutionary change in Egypt.
Te emergence of the Salast current poses a serious test for the Muslim Brotherhood as they seek to normalize their political
existence. While the Brotherhood is not responsible in any way for the attacks on Copts and has denounced such actions publicly,
as the most signicant political force calling for religion in the public arena, they have a heightened responsibility to act proactively
against these abuses of religious sentiment that now threaten to destroy Egypts social fabric. Moreover, at a time when the
Brotherhoods intentions are being questioned by other opposition forces, they have an additional responsibility to increase public
trust. Much of this distrust has been fuelled by their public dalliance with the Salas, which most recently took the form of a massive
joint public rally. As sectarianism threatens to undermine the stability of the transition period, the organization at times appeared to
be more concerned with contesting the parliamentary elections and protecting its ank from Sala encroachment.
Te political participation of the Muslim Brotherhood is a critical and necessary step for Egypt and the Arab world beyond the
unsustainable and counterproductive repression that has characterized the Egyptian states relationship to the countrys largest
organized opposition force. However, if the Brotherhood expects to be treated as a responsible political actor in Egypts new political
order, they should be called to account for these actions, and they should clarify their own red lines with respect to cooperation with
Sala forces. Te Brotherhood should understand that perceptions of the group by secular Egyptians and within the international
community will be shaped by its response to these developments. At a moment of national peril, the Brotherhood and the emerging
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political actors across the spectrum will have to take time from their organizational and electoral eorts to stem this tide of social
unrest. Egypts preeminent Islamic religious institution, al-Azhar University, should also take a greater public lead in combating
rising tensions. Egypts Coptic community will have to act with discipline and ensure that it does not further the sectarian divide,
whether through rhetoric or actions. In this vein, misguided and self-defeating calls for international protection, even if only made
by fringe groups in Egypt or the diaspora, will only further fuel sectarian narratives that regard Egypts Christians as a suspect fth
column. Similarly, Copts should not evince nostalgia for the purported stability of the former regime, as the existing sectarian divide
was cultivated and manipulated by that regime for its own ends.
Te provenance of the current wave of anti-Christian sentiment is now a matter that should be dealt with by Egypts civilian
judiciary. But regardless of the identity of the instigators, the ability of sectarian and bigoted narratives to instigate public unrest
should be another reminder of the seriousness of Egypts sectarian divide. As the incidents have piled up, it is no longer enough
for Egyptians to voice their shock and bewilderment following each successive attack. Te current course, taken to its extremes,
represents the unthinkable path to civil strife and conict. At this moment of hope and opportunity in the Arab world, the example
of Egypt remains critical, and the countrys fate will help shape the emerging regional order. Te autocrats of the Arab world will no
doubt happily use the example of Egypt to justify the continuation of their repressive order if Egypts transition now falls prey to the
forces of sectarianism and extremism.
Michael Wahid Hanna is a fellow and program ocer at the Century Foundation.
Egypts Democratic Jihadists?
By Omar Ashour, July 13, 2011
We were not in love with combat...if there was a way to hold a government accountable, Sadat would probably be alive today...we
didnt know another way to change things. Tat is how the Jihadist icon Abbud al-Zumur, a former leader of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiris
al-Jihad Organization, recently explained the most famous assassination in modern Egyptian history. Zumur is currently an elected
member of the Consultative Council of the Egyptian Islamic Group (IG).Until March 2011, he was also the most famous political
prisoner in Egypt.
Zumur was one of the eight IG leaders who signed a unilateral ceasere declaration in July 1997. Te Initiative for Ceasing Violence
ultimately transformed into a comprehensive process of abandoning and de-legitimating armed activism against political enemies.
Zumur was the only one of the eight signatories who was not released from prison. While he agreed to abandon political violence,
he did not agree to stop vocally opposing Hosni Mubarak. His commitment to political opposition, combined with a principled
rejection of violence, represents the current face of Egypts Islamic Group as it faces a rapidly transforming Egypt.
Egypts Islamic Group was the largest armed Islamist organization in the country and second largest in the region, after the now
defunct Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Te estimated number of the IG members is somewhere between 15,000 to 25,000
men. During its Jihadist phase, the IG operated in more than a dozen countries. In armed conicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and
Chechnya; in training camps in Pakistan and Sudan; in assassination attempts in Ethiopia; in bombings in Croatia and the United
States, and in a ve-year insurgency in Egypt, the name of the IG usually came to the fore.
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In its post-Jihadist phase, the IG abandoned violence, strongly criticized al Qaedas behavior and strategies, and accepted participating in
elections. Now, it lies on the right of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) when it comes to social conservatism and constitutional liberalism.
For example, the IG still categorically denies the right of Copts and women to run for presidency (the MB does not deny that right, but
says it will not support any female or Coptic candidates). When it comes to the Salas, there are more similarities. Te IG is Salast in
religious doctrine, though its relationship with mainstream political and apolitical Salas was quite tense in the past.
Te IG entered the post-Mubarak period with some serious credibility problems. Te head of the IGs Consultative Council, Karam
Zuhdi, and his deputy, Nagih Ibrahim, did not only call on Islamists to abandon politics, but also declared that any opposition to Mubarak
and his son was futile. Tose guys became a mouthpiece for the interior ministry, a leading gure in the Muslim Brotherhood said. He
was not too far o. Te position of some of the IG leaders between 2003 and 2011 was quite close to that of the regime, especially when
it came to criticizing other Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Traumatized by the experiences in Mubaraks
jails and estimating that he would survive, both Zuhdi and Ibrahim supported the dictator until his last days in power.
Tis was not the case with the IG mid-ranks and grassroots. Most of the ones I spoke to described the position of the leadership during
the revolution as a disgrace. Tey told us it is illegitimate to join the revolution...we disobeyed them...now they want to jump [capitalize]
on the blood of the martyrs said a former member of the dismantled armed wing. Te relationship between the leadership and the
members was always characterized by strong emotional ties and solid loyalty. But their stance with Mubarak killed it, said another.
Post-Mubarak, the IG held elections for its highest executive body, the Consultative Council, on May 23, 2011, and both Ibrahim and
Zuhdi were voted out by members. Others, including Zumur, came to the fore. Te Consultative Council of today is quite dierent
from the one that decided to assassinate President Anwar Sadat. Four of the nine members hold PhDs, including Dr. Safwat Abd
al-Ghani, the former head of the armed wing. He was also the author of Another God with Allah? Declaring War on the Parliament,
the IGs anti-democratic manifesto, which was also quite popular among other Jihadists. Abd al Ghanis dissertation, however, was on
political plurality and democratic transition.
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Te IG, in its new form, decided to participate in the parliamentary elections. Te question is why? Te likelihood of losing was quite
high, especially to Islamist rivals like the Brotherhood and the Salas. Te reactions to the IG leaders speaking on TV were largely
negative, with thousands of tweets mocking them. Moreover, the mid-ranks complained that the grassroots were not so eager to ll
in the party membership and registration forms. I am responsible for Aswan City, but I know others who are asked by the leadership
to ll a number of forms that are 10 times the number of members...we should be led by the realities on the ground, not by the
wishful thinking of the leaders, says Ismail Ahmad.
Indeed, a coalition or a merger with a larger, more experienced group like the Brotherhood makes more sense. But the quest for
legitimacy and legal protection is one of the main determinants of the current behavior of the IG.In Egypt, there is a saying: A white
dime will serve you in a black day. Aside from the political incorrectness, the reality of the IG is similarly saying a good party today
will serve you in the bad moment tomorrow. In addition, like other Islamists, the IGs history is that of punching above its weight. It
can pull an upset, sometimes.
Egypts Jihadists today are relatively insignicant and too individualized. (Some also argue that they are good in hiding.) Tis is
not their time. Unarmed civil resistance delivered a heavy blow to Jihadism and signicantly undermined its rationale (that armed
activism is the most eective and most legitimate tool for change). Te Islamic Group sacriced a lot in the 1990s, says Ibrahim.
Two thousand its sons were killed, 100 were executed by military trials, and some of our 20,000 prisoners were detained for 20
years without a court order, despite having more than 45 court judgments ordering their release. Tis is a high price, without
achievements. [Te] January 25th revolution accomplished great things in 18 days and it was all done peacefully.
Tus far, the IG has adhered to its commitment to abstain from violence, even as a good opportunity to engage in violent activism
presented itself. Te proliferation of small and mid-size arms is currently a security problem in Egypt, due to the Libyan conict and
other factors. Any group that strategizes for a future armed campaign should be using this rare opportunity. But rather than stockpiling
weapons, rebuilding its armed wing, recruiting and training angry teenagers, and manipulating the weak security arrangements, the IG
is holding internal elections, asking its members to ll party registration forms, holding anti-sectarian violence rallies, and issuing joint
statements for peaceful coexistence with the Coptic Church of Assyut. We were nally capable of taking revenge from the state security
ocers who tortured us. Instead we chanted silmiya (peaceful), said Muhammad Abbas, a former member of the IGs armed wing, a
graduate of the famous Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan, and a veteran of multiple battles against the Soviets.
But if most of the problems between the IG and the Egyptian government were resolved, this is not necessarily the case with the
United States. Te United States still holds Dr. Omar Abd al-Rhaman, the rst leader of the IG and its inspirational godfather, who
was convicted of seditious conspiracy in October 1995. Te IG held several rallies in front of the U.S. embassy in Cairo demanding
his release. It also organized several widely attended conferences to support him. Te IG is also on the State Departments list of
foreign terrorist organizations (which generally needs an update). Tey are still on the black list, despite abandoning violence 14
years ago. What message does that send? stated Dr. Osama Rushdi, a democracy activist who was the IGs spokesperson in the mid-
1990s who left the organization in 1998. He told me this while showing me a handwritten letter by Abu Musab al-Suri, the famous
Jihadist strategist, in which al Suri was complaining that Rushdi was undermining Jihadi activities in Europe.
In any case, U.S. policymakers may want to keep in mind that the group will play a role in the future politics of Egypt, either by
forming a coalition with other Islamists or by rebuilding its support base in Upper Egypt. From what I saw, the latter process is
ongoing with determination. What is certain, though, is that the IGs subscription to Jihadism is currently expired. Whether others
will follow its model or not in the post-Mubarak era is yet to be determined. Egypt was the birthplace of modern Jihadism. But after
Mubarak, it may also be its graveyard.
Dr. Omar Ashour is a lecturer in politics and the director of the Middle East Graduate Studies program at the
Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter (UK). He is the author of Te De-Radicalization of the
Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements.
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Tahrir turning points
By Marc Lynch, August 1, 2011
Al-Shaab Yureed Tatbiq Sharia Allah!Te people want to implement Gods Sharia! Tat chant rang through my ears as I struggled
through a jam-packed Tahrir Square on Friday July 29, 2011, as hundreds of thousands of Islamists packed the symbolic home of
Egypts revolution to demand that their presence be known. Two days later, the ill-advised occupation of Tahrir Square by mostly
secular and leftist political trends which began on July 8 largely ended, as most groups decided to pull out and then security forces
cleared the remains. Feelings were running raw in Egypt as the revolution approached yet another turning point. Te galvanizing
events of the weekend marked a new stage in one of the most urgent battles in post-Mubarak Egypt: who owns the revolution, and
who may speak in its name?
Fridays demonstration was originally planned as an Islamist show of strength, dened by demands for identity and stability,
support for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and rejection of liberal eorts to draft supra-constitutional
principles. Te Day of Respecting the Will of the People brought together an Islamic Front uniting most of the major Islamist
trends including the Muslim Brotherhood, the Gamaa al-Islamiyya, several Sala parties, and others. Its planners saw it as a response
to the July 8 protests which launched the Tahrir sit-in, and to a series of political gambits launched by liberals and secularists which,
in their view, were meant to sidestep the will of the people as expressed in the March 2011 referendum.
In the days before the demonstration, a group of political activists brokered an agreement to focus on the unity of the revolution
rather than on divisive demands. Tis was a noble eort, but it proved impossible to maintain in the face of the enthusiasm of the
mobilized Islamist cadres. Many of the political trends felt betrayed by the slogans and behavior of the Islamist groups, and pulled
out of the demonstration in protest only to return for a counter-demonstration in the evening after most of the Islamists had
departed. Te days after the rally were consumed with furious arguments and counter-arguments. Islamists argued that there should
be nothing divisive about demanding sharia, and that the tense Friday passed without any of the feared violent clashes proved that
they lived up to the most important part of the agreement.
Te arguments are about far more than the question of who violated which agreements. Te Islamist demonstration directly
challenged the claim of the secular political forces to embody the revolution or the will of the people, and marked a signicant
escalation in an ongoing battle of narratives and identity. Why should a coalition of a few dozen small groups of activists have a
greater claim on revolutionary legitimacy than the millions of ordinary people who made the revolution? Did the 77 percent yes vote
in the referendum on constitutional amendments truly reveal, as so many argued, that the silent majority rejected their revolutionary
vision? Te show of massive Islamist numbers was meant to show that they, not the political trends, represented the Egyptian people.
I overheard a number of proud and excited Salas on the square marveling at their own presence and numbers. Tat the Muslim
Brotherhood demonstrated its well-honed organization skills came as no surprise, but the ability of the usually disorganized Sala
trends to organize transportation for a large number of members into Cairo could not be dismissed.
Te Western media coverage of the Islamist rally was misleading. I cant say that there were no chants or slogans about Osama bin
Laden, since it was a long, crowded day in Tahrir. But bin Laden had virtually nothing to do with the days message. Te closest
thing I heard to supporting terrorism was a surprisingly huge number of posters and chants for the repatriation of the blind sheik
and convicted terrorist Omar Abdel Rahman, a pet issue of the Gamaa al-Islamiyya. Nor is the frequently repeated claim that the
Islamists avoided Egyptian ags accurate; in fact, there were thousands of Egyptian ags throughout the square. And while there
were not nearly as many women as in earlier rallies, there were plenty there including a group of women wearing niqab who
reached out to help one of my female colleagues during a frightening crowd surge.
Te common slogans demanding sharia or the cries of Islamiyya Islamiyya should not be taken as a sign of the consolidation
of a single, undierentiated Islamist trend rising to power. Te joint slogans masked considerable ongoing disagreements and
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competition among Islamist groups. All chanted for implementing sharia, but when pressed on specics few seemed to have much
more in mind than keeping Article 2 of the constitution which denes Egypt as an Islamic country. Te Muslim Brotherhood and
the Salas do not agree on what implementing sharia in Egypt would look like, or on many other issues, and will as likely be political
rivals as a unied bloc. I watched two Salas during the rally argue furiously over a ier opposing any constitution other than sharia,
with the other equally enthusiastic Islamist insisting that there must be a constitution informed by sharia.
Te more important point, easily lost in the political tumult, was that the Salas and the Gamaa have now shown themselves to be
all in for the game of democratic politics within the framework of the nation-state. When I met with leaders of the Sala al-Nour
Party in Alexandria a few days before the march, they spoke eagerly about democratic participation and drafting a platform oering
practical solutions to economic and social problems (though of course Islamic identity, demands for sharia, and conservative social
norms still loom large in their worldview). For Salas who have long dened themselves by the rejection of political participation
and of nationalism, this is no small thing. After years of reading ideological tracts by Sala gures explaining the illegitimacy of
democracy and denouncing the Muslim Brothers for their political participation, it was rather exhilarating to hear hundreds of
thousands of them demanding early elections. Many Egyptians continue, with reason, to worry about the depth of their democratic
commitments and their conservative social agendas. But the changes have been remarkable.
Te Muslim Brotherhood, for its part, faces a delicate situation. While it clearly relished the show of Islamist power, it also now has
to worry about a backlash against that display of strength and the blurring of long-cultivated distinctions from other trends such as
the Salas. It has long sought to position itself as the moderate face of Islamism, triangulating against the more radical Salas and
Gamaa to capture the pious middle ground. Sharing the stage with those forces on July 29, not only infuriated potential secular
coalition partners but could also complicate its long-term eorts to reassure mainstream voters. Brotherhood leaders such as Essam
el-Erian and Mohammed el-Beltagy were almost immediately backpedaling, disavowing the more controversial slogans and claiming
to have honored the agreements with the other political forces even if the Salas violated the deal (the Salas, for their part, claim to
have never signed the deal in the rst place). Muslim Brotherhood youth activists I spoke with after the rally were furious about how
it had unfolded, and many even refused to participate.
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But the Brotherhoods dilemma pales next to the new reality facing the political activists. Te decision to occupy Tahrir looks
increasingly like a grievous strategic blunder. Teir appeal to revolutionary legitimacy grows more threadbare by the day, absent
direct engagement with the issues about which Egyptians really care. While they clearly felt that they had no other way to maintain
pressure on the SCAF, the sit-in quickly alienated almost everybody. Te violence led by hostile locals that greeted their march on the
ministry of defense in Abassiya seemed to symbolize their loss of popular sympathy. During a week in Cairo and Alexandria, I could
not nd a single person other than the protesters with a good word to say about the Tahrir sit-in. Te decision by most groups to end
the sit-in ahead of Ramadan oered an opportunity for a fresh start though the tenor of political discussion among the various
activist groups suggests that there is no consensus about the lessons of the sit-in or the path forward.
Te SCAF has contributed to the tense political environment. Its attack on the April 6 Movement and the activist community more
broadly for its alleged foreign funding has cast a pall over their activities. In Alexandria, the sit-in organizers made me leave after
an hour out of fear that I would be photographed in the tent city and used as evidence of American backing. Many participants in
the ill-fated march to the ministry of defense believe that the hostile reception by the local neighborhood residents was the result
of systematic disinformation and agitation against them. Te SCAF has encouraged some of these problems by responding to
some protester demands, and thus validating their choice of street politics, but never going far enough on core demands like police
reform, stopping military trials for protesters, or compensation for the (increasingly controversial) martyrs families. It is not clear
why they felt the need to forcibly empty Tahrir square after most groups had already decided to leave. But at least it seems to remain
committed to the most important point of all the need for elections as soon as possible to create a legitimate civilian government
and allow their return to the barracks.
Te display of bearded men and women in niqab clearly shocked the political groups that had made Tahrir their own. Te reaction
was not just about the violation of the agreement, but ran much deeper. On Twitter and Facebook and around the square, they made
fun of the Islamist interlopers, ridiculing their behavior and their appearance and their intellect. But their fury could not hide some
uncomfortable truths. How could these Islamists not be viewed as an integral part of the Egyptian people? Te people wanted Hosni
Mubarak gone, but they do not necessarily share the radical political demands of determined socialists or anarchists or cosmopolitan
liberals. Te Salas bused in from the provinces are also Egyptians, and they cannot simply be dened out of the newly emerging
Egypt if it is to become genuinely democratic. Te activists have long talked about bringing Tahrir to the people. But when those
people came to Tahrir, the activists ed.
It is easy to understand why frustrated protesters feel that taking to the streets is the only way to meaningfully pressure the SCAF,
but street politics are not democratic politics. Making the size of crowds the currency of political power actively invited the weeks
Islamist response. Te Islamist demonstration and the end of the Tahrir sit-in should be a moment for all sides to catch their breaths,
focus on their shared desire for a return to civilian rule and a transition to democracy, and prepare for the coming elections and a
return to civilian rule.
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Inside Egypts Salas
By Lauren Bohn, August 2, 2011
All Americans think Im a terrorist, 34-year-old Sala political organizer Mohammed Tolba exhales with his trademark belly laugh.
He grips his gearshift and accelerates to 115 miles per hour down a winding overpass in Cairo. But I only terrorize the highways.
Since the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Tolba has constantly been on the go. Te media says we all wear galabeyas (long
Islamic dress), put our women in niqabs (a face veil), and will cut o peoples hands, Tolba says, dramatically feigning a yawn. Were
the new boogey-man, but people need to know were normal that we drink lattes and laugh.
To this end, the silver-tongued IT consultant shuttles regularly from the modish oces of popular television personality Bassem
Youssef (hes starring in a segment on the Egyptian Jon Stewarts highly anticipated new show) to the considerably less shiny
quarters of Cairos foremost Salast centers. Hes been conducting leadership and media-training workshops for Salas. Tese guys
dont know how to talk to the public, says Tolba, rubbing his eyes in exhaustion. Once they open their mouths and face a camera,
man, they ruin everything.
Te same might be said for their debut on Egypts main stage on Friday July 29, 2011, as hundreds of thousands of Salas joined other
Islamist groups in Cairos Tahrir Square. Droves of people from governorates across Egypt got o buses near Tahrir Square, chanting,
Islamic, Islamic, we dont want secular. One Sala, Hisham al-Ashry, beamed with pride as he walked back from the square to
his tailor shop downtown. Today is a turning point, we nally showed our strength. Meanwhile, the liberals and the leftists are
freaking out. God protect the nation and revolution, noted popular blogger Zeinobia.
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Who are the faces and voices of an oft-deemed bearded and veiled monolith that packed the square? And what exactly do they want?
Sala has become something of a catchall name for any Muslim with a long beard, but Salasm is not a singular ideology or
movement with one leader. As Stphane Lacroix, a French scholar of Islamist movements, explains, its more a label for a way of
thinking guided by a strict interpretation of religious text. Salas aspire to emulate the ways of the rst three generations of Islam.
Many Salas have cultivated a distinctive appearance and code of personal behavior, including untrimmed beards for men and the
niqab for women.
Te Sala culture has been growing in Egypt for decades, but until the revolution had little formal political presence. Satellite
Salasm hit Egypt in 2003, with around 10 Sala-themed TV channels broadcasting from Egypt on Nilesat. Te intensely popular
Al-Nas, Arabic for the People, began broadcasting in 2006. Its programming focuses on issues of social justice and sermons by
prominent Sala preachers, like Mohammed Yaqoub and Mohammed Hassan, whose tapes and books are common xtures among
street vendors throughout Cairo. Nobody knows exactly how many Salas there now are in Egypt, but Abed Moneim Aboul Fotouh,
a presidential candidate formerly of the Muslim Brotherhood, recently estimated their number at around 20 times the number of
Muslim Brotherhood members (unocial reports estimate Muslim Brotherhood membership between 400,000 to 700,000 members).
Salas in Egypt abstained from politics for decades. Under Mubarak, many were arrested and tortured. Sala gathering points like
Aziz Ballah, where the charismatic Tolba has been doing most of his media training and outreach to Salas, were known as the most
intensely monitored institutions in Cairo. Tey rationalized their apolitical conditions with an elaborate ideological argument that
rejected political participation as contrary to the Islamic sharia. Most Salas stayed away from the January 25 revolution. For decades,
they lambasted the Muslim Brothers for their willingness to participate in a secular political system based on the laws of man rather
than the laws of God. But now they are rushing to join that same system. What do they hope to achieve through the ballot box?
Almost all Salas currently agree on the need to protect and strengthen Egypts Islamic identity, which in practice means defending
the second amendment of Egypts Constitution which preserves sharia as the main source of Egyptian law. Te argument that sharia
is not only compatible with democracy, but actually required by democracy, is a new approach for Salas who have traditionally
rejected the very concept of democracy. Sixty-two percent of Egyptians believe laws should strictly follow the teachings of the
Quran, according to an April 2011 Pew Research Center poll. Majorities usually run countries. So why should the minority
[secularists] rule everything, poses Abdel Moneim Al-Shahat, a prominent Sala scholar and the spokesperson for the Sala
movement in Alexandria.
What would this mean, exactly? Many non-Salas fear that implementing sharia on Sala terms would force women into niqab, turn
Christians into second-class citizens, and impose Quranic punishments for serious oenses such as ogging or cutting of hands for
theft. Some Salas give ample causes for such fears, but others see this as a red herring. Egyptians arent against sharia, they just fear
the people who they think will impose and enforce it ignorantly, reasons Doaa Yehia, Tolbas equally quick-witted wife.
Te Sala party al-Nour, Arabic for light, has tried to present what it considers to be practical solutions to economic and social
problems, in part to avoid the perception that they are only interested in imposing sharia. Nour spokesman Mohammad al-Yousri
argues that everyone thinks sharia is our only aim, but thats like someone who has cancer and you tell them to get a nose job. Right
now, Egypts a poor, weak underdeveloped country. Or, as Sheikh Ahmed Bin Farouk told me after Friday prayer in Ain Shams, a
poor section of Northeastern Cairo, everybody wants to talk about the cutting of hands. Khalas, stop. Before this could ever happen,
wed have to assure almost full economic and social equality. And obviously that could take anywhere from ve to 500 years.
Where the politically savvy Muslim Brotherhood gures have mastered a public discourse of moderation and compromise, Yousry
says Salas know when to take a stand. Were not all smiles like Amr Khaled [a popular moderate Muslim televangelist whos
consistently likened to the Billy Graham of Islam.] We know what we believe and there are limits to exibility. When asked how he
lost two ngers, he recounted his ghting in Iraq in 2004 with the resistance against U.S.-led forces.
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During another conversation with scholar and cleric Sheikh Hassan Abu Alashbal, known for one of his televised appeals to
President Obama to revert to Islam, I asked what Salas might do if a moderately liberal gure, like famous opposition leader
Mohammed ElBaradei, should come to power through the ballot box. Dont worry, were not going to kill him, Hisham al-Ashry,
a Cairene tailor, comically interjects with a Brooklyn drawl he acquired from living in New York City for 15 years. Well just cut o
his hands or maybe his throat. Sheikh Alashbal glares at him, unfazed by the joke. We are not worried about liberals, he says. If
you only watch television, youd think theyre everywhere, but if you go to villages and among the true Egyptian people...you will nd
theyll only take sharia.
Such talk may be meant to reassure non-Salas but often only frightens them even more. Tey point to the Sala rejection of their
attempt to establish supra-constitutional principles guaranteeing personal and political freedoms as evidence of their intention to
impose their own vision on all Egyptians. Liberals warn that democracy is not only the rule of the majority, but also an agreement
on the fundamental rules of the game. But Sala slogans at the July 29 rally pointedly declared that there is nothing above the
constitution but Gods sharia.
Years of repression left the Sala movements disjointed, with each wagging the nger at the other for being the less authentic or
authoritative representative of Islam. Richard Gauvain, a scholar on Cairos Islamist and Sala organizations, argues that their power
structures are severely weakened by internal feuding. Teres little to suggest individuals within the organizations will be able to agree
among themselves on questions of political importance. Lacking a clear internal organizational structure, the hallmark of the Muslim
Brotherhood, dierent sala schools and other Islamist groups hold sway in varied areas of the country. For them to succeed at the
ballot box, they will need to overcome these deeply ingrained divides. It is not clear that they can.
Tere are also generational divides. Many high-prole Sala sheikhs voiced opposition to the Arab uprisings on grounds they were
not modeled on the behavior of the prophet and that the suicide of the iconic young Tunisian Mohammad Bouazizi who set himself
on re was haram. It remains to be seen whether these sheikhs can regain popularity among a younger generation of Salas who
deantly took to the streets despite contradictory calls from a fractured leadership. We actually have more trouble connecting
people inside the movement than we do connecting with liberals, says al-Nour spokesman Mohammed Yousry. Te challenge is
telling these people this is the real Sala way. Its wide open and progressive.
Such divides make it dicult for Salas to present a clear, unied message. For instance, while Sala political spokesmen emphasize
the modesty of their political aims, scholars like Sheikh Alashbal say theres no doubt the caliphate, referring to the rst system
of government established in Islam that politically unied the Muslim community, will be established. Tis is the purpose of the
revolution, he explains in his ornate living room lined with leather-bound scholarly tomes many his own. Its Allahs plan for us
to build one country in the Muslim world and rule the world. Tere is no doubt we wont.
For a movement that abstained from politics for decades, the Sala ground game has been impressive. Teir ability to organize
transportation of their cadres from all over Egypt to Tahrir Square last week opened some eyes. Te Nour party registered even
before most of its mainstream counterparts. Armed with a logo of a bright blue horizon, theyve already set up three spacious oces
in Cairo, branches in the Delta, and even up the Nile throughout the oft-neglected Upper Egypt. Its spokesman Yousry predicts
Islamists will yield 40 percent of seats in parliament. In a single breath, he rattles o the names of cities and governorates in Egypt
where he knows the party has the most presence and power on the ground.
Teir strategy rests in part on the tried and true Islamist method of outreach and social services. Mohammed Nour, director of the
Nourayn Media group and member of the new party, sits in his fashionably orange-speckled oce near Cairos Corniche, constantly
switching between his iPhone and iPad. For him, the math is simple. Other parties are talking to themselves on Twitter, but we are
actually on the streets. We have other things to do than protest in Tahrir.
One Friday in early July 2011 while protesters occupied Tahrir Square, Nour party member Ehab Zalia, 43, distributed medical
supplies in the slum city of El Ghanna. Another Friday, 24-year-old Ehab Mohammed sold gas tubes at a reduced price to residents
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of the impoverished Haram City. Tis isnt campaigning, this is our religion, he explained. One resident in the neighborhood, Aliaa
Neguib, 42, says she has no plans to ocially join the group, but in a country where 40 percent of people live below the poverty line,
eorts like these are eective. We need services. If they are loyal and give us that, we will support them. And they will, promises
spokesperson Yousry.
Te eorts of a new generation of Salas to nd their place in a post-Mubarak Egypt take many paths. In a virtual parallel reality
outside of Cairo, nestled in Egypts own Paramount studio lot, Mohammed Tolba strokes his beard and gets ready for his close-up.
Shortly after Mubarak stepped down, Tolba and like-minded friends created Salafayo Costa, a spin on the international-coee chain,
as an internet-savvy public relations campaign meant to debunk stereotypes. With a Facebook group of almost 9,000 members, the
coexistence group hopes to broaden political dialogue. He and his brother, Ezzat, a liberal lmmaker, released a video on YouTube
called Wheres my Ear in an attempt to bridge what they deem a dangerously growing chasm between secularists and Salas in
post-Mubarak Egypt. Te lm is in reference to a notorious sectarian crime in late March 2011 when Salas allegedly assaulted a
Coptic Christian and cut o his ear.
Now, hes bringing these normal Salas to a broader Egyptian audience through the comedian Bassem Youssef s hit show. Under
hot lights, Youssef pretends to throw a punch at him in a battle for the future of Egypt. After taping a segment in which Tolba
and his liberal brother make light of the holy month of Ramadan, when Muslims fast throughout the day and festively break in the
evening, one of the shows directors grows nervous, worried the segment will oend Egyptian viewers.
Youssef promptly cuts him o. We need to diuse anger and tension the Egyptian way with comedy. Its time liberals and Salas
talk to each other, get out of their comfort zone. Tolba poses for a picture with one of the shows young production assistants who
excitedly announces its the rst time hes talked to a Sala. Tolba pantomines as though hes cutting o his ear.
Still, his toughest critics might be Salasts themselves. Tolbas eorts have registered unfavorably among an old guard of strident
Salas whove labeled his approach inappropriate or unnecessary. Hes received a steady ow of hate mail on his perpetually
drained white blackberry. And some scholars and even friends have refused to speak with him.
Look, Im calling for Salas to get o their chairs and talk to those people who are scared of them, and for liberals to do the same.
Stop isolating yourselves, Tolba says, before taking a call from a not so funny sheikh a gratuitous reminder the task wont be so
easy. Tis is democracy. Tis is the new Egypt.
Lauren E. Bohn is a Fulbright fellow and multimedia journalist based in Cairo. Follow her on Twitter at @LaurenBohn.
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How Egypts Muslim Brotherhood Will Win
By Shadi Hamid, November 3, 2011
Te performance of the Islamist party Ennahda in the October 23, 2011 Tunisian elections, in which it won 41.5 percent of the seats,
refocused attention on the Egyptian elections scheduled for November 28. Some analysts minimized the Muslim Brotherhoods
prospects for success by pointing to polls suggesting that the group the largest and best organized in Egypt hovered between
15 to 30 percent approval. It may be true that the Brotherhood wasnt as popular as we had thought. But elections arent popularity
contests. In fact, as the campaign unfolded, it appeared likely that Egypts Islamists would do even better than expected, just like their
Tunisian counterparts.
In the run-up to the Tunisian elections, Ennahda was polling around 20 percent. Yet they ended up with nearly double. In elections
particularly founding elections in which new parties need to introduce themselves to voters across the country organization
and strategy are what counts, not high approval ratings. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood excels on both counts. While most liberal
and leftist parties are eectively starting from scratch, the Brotherhood already has a disciplined ground game, ne-tuned from three
decades of contesting syndicate and national elections.
During the November 2010 parliamentary contest arguably the most fraudulent Egypt had ever seen I had the chance to
witness the Brotherhoods get-out-the-vote operation up close. One Brotherhood campaign worker, perhaps unaware it would
sound somewhat implausible, told me that the organization has an internal vote turnout of nearly 100 percent. In other words,
everyone who is an active Muslim Brotherhood member is expected to vote and actually does. Even if this is a stretch, it is true that
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the Brotherhood, in part because it is a religious movement rather than a political party, has the sort of organizational discipline of
which competing parties can only dream.
Tis discipline is deeply rooted in the organizations culture. Each Muslim Brotherhood member signs on to a rigorous educational
curriculum and is part of something called an usra, or family, which meets weekly. If a Brother chooses to stay home on election day,
other Brothers will know. But its not just a matter of peer expectations. At each polling station, there is a Brotherhood coordinator
who essentially does a whip count. Because the number of voters at a particular polling station can be quite small with the number
of Brothers in the hundreds this is feasible in many districts. Te whip stays there the entire day, watching who comes and goes
and tallies up the gures. If you were supposed to go and didnt, the whip will know. Perhaps sensing my skepticism, one such whip
assured me, Well, you have to understand I know every single Brother who lives in the area.
With an electoral system that is, in the words of one activist, algorithmically complicated, knowing your district takes on even more
importance. As Daphne McCurdy pointed out in a POMED report on Tunisia, Most polling in Tunisia has focused on nationwide
levels of support, entirely overlooking variation within specic electoral districts. Ennahda was the only party that had coverage
throughout the country, with tailored strategies for each district, including rural areas. Here, the Brotherhood has yet another built-
in advantage. With 88 deputies in the previous parliament (2005-2010), the group was able to provide a greater array of services on
the local level and build stronger relations with constituents.
What about the Brotherhoods competition? Te Brotherhoods political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), is joined by
Ayman Nours liberal al-Ghad party, the Nasserist Karama party, and a smattering of smaller parties, forming the Democratic
Alliance list. Tere are four other major lists, three of which have a liberal or leftist orientation (Egyptian Bloc, the Revolution
Continues, and the Wafd list). With their considerable funding and patronage networks, the right-of-center Wafd party, headed by
multi-millionaire Al-Sayyid Badawy, and remnants of the old ruling National Democratic Party, are also well positioned to secure a
signicant share of the vote.
For their part, the newly formed liberal parties have suered from an inability to articulate a clear ideology or agenda a major
failing in a country where liberalism continues to have a negative connotation. Many liberal parties have sometimes appeared to
stand for little more than not being Islamist, opting to stoke public fears of impending theocracy. Such a strategy would be likely
to backre in a country where 67 percent of Egyptians say that laws should strictly follow the Qurans teachings, while another 27
percent say that they should in some way follow the values and principles of Islam, according to an April 2011 Pew poll. In Tunisia,
the Progressive Democratic Party, which positioned itself as the anti-Islamist choice, got pummeled in the polls, while the two liberal
parties that maintained good relations with Ennahda Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol faired relatively well, nishing in
second and third place respectively.
Tis leaves an obvious course for leftist and liberal parties, one that oers considerably more promise a razor-sharp focus on
Egypts mounting economic troubles. But this, too, is challenging, as most parties leftist or not use similar rhetoric on the
economy: Poverty is bad; jobs are good; social justice is better, and so on. As Ayesha Sabayala of the Economist Intelligence Unit
pointed out regarding Tunisia, If you look at parties manifestos, with the exception of the far left parties, most have the same
economic objectives: to reduce unemployment and increase infrastructure in interior. Te Muslim Brotherhood has smartly
positioned itself as a voice for the poor, even though its economic platform (something designed more for foreign investors and the
international community) is surprisingly free market-oriented. For example, the group launched Millioniyyat al-Khayr (the million-
man act of goodwill), an initiative to provide 1.5 million kilos of meat to 5 million Egyptians for the Eid al-Adha holiday.
Tere is still the possibility that the Brotherhood may underperform as they did in the Doctors Syndicate elections. But, be careful
what you wish for. Te alternative to moderate Islamists may very well be less moderate Islamists. Well before the Arab Spring,
Brotherhood leaders often told me that their youth were increasingly being swayed by Sala ideas. One Brotherhood ocial told
me that Salas outnumbered them ve to one. Sala groups have repeatedly sounded ambitious notes, with one leader claiming
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that they would win 30 percent of the seats. Ambitious as they are, Salas are political novices, with virtually no experience running
parliamentary campaigns. But they are proving quick learners and have managed to unify their ranks, bringing together four Sala
parties under the banner of the Islamic alliance. Moreover, liberal claims (or hopes) that Salas are well outside of the mainstream
may be wishful thinking. In a December 2010 poll, 82 percent of Egyptians said they favored stoning adulterers, while 77 percent
supported cutting o the hands of thieves. Te only movement besides the Brotherhood with a nationwide grassroots base, Salas
have taken to organizing trac in congested areas of Alexandria, engage in door-to-door education campaigns, and provide health
services to the poor.
Te parliamentary elections, then, are not necessarily about ideas. Tey are about voters. And, in this respect, Egypts elections
are looking a lot like they do in the United States. Te good guys, whoever they are, dont always win. Indeed, if Islamist parties
do as well as they might winning upwards of 50 percent of the vote the alarmism and hand wringing from Western quarters
will be considerable. Te important metric for Egypts troubled transition, though, isnt who wins, but rather, if Egyptians have the
opportunity to choose their own representatives free of intimidation and interference. Democracy, as Western democracies have
long known, is about the right to make the wrong choice.
Shadi Hamid is director of research at the Brookings Doha Center and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution.
Te Muslim Brotherhood Takes Twitter
By Lauren E. Bohn, November 18, 2011
Miriam cant stop talking. And when she does, its mostly to look down at a torrent of emails, SMSs, and tweets ooding her
smartphone. Its been a heady nine months for the soft-spoken but sharp-witted 24-year-old Egyptian student turned activist. Shes
juggling the ordinary demands of a heavy course-load at Egypts top university with a slew of extracurriculars (shes embarrassed
to admit shes an avid squash player), but also working through the existential hangover of heavily participating in a leaderless
revolution thats now causing more of a headache than a thrill. While polishing some academic work on the role of social media in
Egypts uprising, shes been ferociously tweeting on the countrys virtual front-lines, elding 140-character blows left and right. And
shes doing it for the Muslim Brotherhood.
Miriam (she prefers to use a pseudonym, for security reasons) is one of the admins of @Ikhwanweb, the ocial English-language
Twitter page for Egypts Muslim Brotherhood, one of the most prominent Islamist organizations in the world. Ikhwanweb, the
Muslim Brotherhoods ocial English website, started the twitter account @Ikhwanweb back in 2009. For years, the account was
a robotic-curated Twitter feed which did little more than link to the websites posts. But Miriam has recently helped transform the
account into a virtual coliseum for some of Egypts most heated debates.
Often, @Ikhwanweb fastidiously engages journalists (You got the schedule for our daily rallies, right?), critics (We have a lot more
important things to focus on and an election to win, in response to a urry of questions regarding their funding), and curious lay-
tweeps alike (Check chapter 4 of our party platform for our position, the economy section at this link). Teir goal? To spread the
truth, they say, and engage with an English-speaking audience and liberals who wouldnt otherwise interact with them. But their
critics accuse them instead of presenting a falsely forthcoming English-language front that masks their true political intentions.
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Were tweeting to humanize the Brotherhood and correct misconceptions, Miriam says. Were not this big, scary terrorist
organization. Te social media enthusiast grew up with the long-banned Muslim Brotherhood. Her parents are something of
Brotherhood stalwarts her mother, a journalism professor, was running for parliament in an auent Cairo suburb. But shes also
very much a digital native, who came of age alongside the activist generation made famous by the January 2011 uprising. Tere
are so many people in the Brotherhood like me, who are young, educated, speak many languages, travel, she explains. Im not an
anomaly, but everyone has the wrong idea about us.
Miriams partner-in-tweeting, Hazem Malky, 36 a self-described certied Twitter addict who previously tweeted prolically at
@hazemmalky publicly, but recently locked his account to avoid hate-tweets is an editor at Ikhwanweb and medical doctor by
training. Currently based in New York, he also prefers to use a pseudonym, citing worries over Zionist elements and the United
States government. He talks a mile a minute with a vaguely Brooklyn drawl, adroitly weaving arguments together with an easy mix
of American vernacular and Classic Arabic. He says he tweets from his iPhone on the road, at the dinner table, even in his sleep.
Actually, he concedes, its sort of pathetic.
In part, their turn to Twitter reects a broader need for the Muslim Brotherhood to engage with and reassure Egyptians and the
West. Te Brotherhood has been banned since 1954 and long held down by autocratic regimes. However, their established political
arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, seemed to have the upper hand in parliamentary elections. After 24 protesters, mostly Coptic
Christians, were killed outside Egypts State TV building, Maspiro, in early October 2011, sectarian tensions ran high. Malky said
it was important for the Brotherhood to use Twitter more aggressively to respond to those concerns. Many were implicating us,
saying we had a special deal with the military, he says over Skype, blaming both Egyptian state and independent media for habitually
bashing Islamists. But were used to ghting back and this is just a new frontier. We know we wont change everyones mind in a few
months, but were using every channel we can to correct and inform.
Malky and Miriam repeatedly emphasize that the bued up Twitter feed isnt a top-down decision from the Brotherhoods
notoriously stringent and webbed hierarchy, but rather an internal administrative decision made by Ikwhanwebs editorial team
who say they have full control in managing the website without Muslim Brotherhood interference. Teir tweets are not vetted,
but do represent the ocial position of the Brotherhood a potentially dangerous combination for any political organization. Still,
they say Brotherhood big-wigs, like Khairat el-Shater, known not only as the organizational brains behind Ikhwanweb, but the most
important power broker of todays Brotherhood, actively encourages their online eorts.
Te revamping of their Twitter feed into an instant resource hub isnt the Brotherhoods rst attempt at establishing a vast digital
footprint. In addition to Ikwhanweb and Ikwhanonline, the Brotherhoods media extends to an extensive network of portals
like Ikhwanbook, Ikhwanwtube, Ikhwanwiki, Ikhwanophobia, and Ikhwanscope. Having planned to expand the unit to cover
parliamentary, and later presidential, elections throughout the country, Ikhwanwebs team of self-proclaimed media geeks ranges
from 15-20 executives, editors, reporters, translators, and technicians. And they plan to soon share a large new oce space with their
Arabic counterpart Ikhwanonline.
Teyre using the same approach they always have, just now they have a new tool, says Shadi Hamid, Director of Research at the
Brookings Center in Doha. Liberals are tweeting and providing a certain narrative about the revolution. Te Brotherhood realizes
theres a chance to push back, and say Hi, were here too. Tey wont leave the digital space solely to their competitors.
Perhaps because the English-language Twitter feed is engaging a largely skeptical audience, their online game has been one mostly
played on defense. And for good reason, says analyst Michael Hanna of the Century Foundation. Teres a lot to be defensive about
their internal authoritarianism, a lack of transparency regarding the source of their funds, their cozying up to hard-line Salas, he
says. Te list goes on.
Other critics point to worrying discrepancies and mismatched opaque strings of policy that blur just what those interests really are.
Perhaps most notable is the Brotherhoods stance toward women and Copts (the minority Christian population that makes up 5-10
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percent of Egyptian society) in leadership roles. @Ikhwanweb recently tweeted, to much confusion, that the Brotherhood would
accept and be open to nominating a Copt or female prime minister if it was necessary. Just an hour before they tweeted they would
accept a woman, whether Muslim or Copt, if shes elected by the people to be president.
Te president is dierent than the Prime Minister position, Malky claries in a t of mental calisthenics over Twitter. Te Muslim
Brotherhood is OK with woman or copt as prez IF elected by the people although, we wont nominate either on a FJP ticket.
Nominating is one thing and accepting if elected by majority or another party ticket is another, Malky direct-messages in a split-
second. Fahemtee? LOL. (Do you understand?)
Tats the thing. Not many do. Such confusion in laying out a complicated political program in 140-character snippets has led many
tweeps to chide the group for not only failing to put forth a unied stance but instead producing a disingenuous Ikhwanonline lite
version for a Western audience.
Ed Husain, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, has been tweet-spatting daily with @Ikhwanweb after he ran a piece on
his CFR blog Is the Muslim Brotherhood Bribing Voters in Egypt? Ikwhanweb promptly issued a response, to which Husain then
responded. Husain calls Malky an archetypal spin-doctor, playing a game on Twitter from New York, far from the Egyptian streets.
Tey put forward these people who are uent in English, can argue well, and produce really nice quotes, but theyre not
representative, Husain argues. Te Brotherhoods backbone is deeply conservative. Teyre playing a deceitful and dangerous game.
Khaled Hamza, Ikhwanwebs chief editor who was arrested in 2008 after meeting with a human rights activist, acknowledges they
have a responsibility to transparently discuss such matters. But he rejects the accusation of a double discourse. We dont and wont
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have an apologetic discourse. We are inherently moderate in our ideology. Teres no need for us to hedge and theres no need for
people be afraid of us.
Hamid says thats not so much manipulative as it is natural. When people look at the Brotherhood, they often ask: Dont they have
a dual discourse? Of course they do, he says. Tey have multiple discourses and theyre playing to dierent audiences. Tats what
political parties do. Tey have dierent personalities and currents. Its a group of 300,000 members, what do you expect?
Te groups casual adoption of Twitter is reective of a central issue and broader question the Muslim Brotherhood faces in
Egypts embryonic political landscape: who speaks for the Brotherhood? A doe-eyed 24-year-old media studies student? Or the
organizations number-two, a brawny engineer, who spent 12 years behind Mubaraks bars?
Both, Malky says simply.
Teres an increasingly evident dierence between the Brotherhoods use of Twitter and the more familiar constellation of liberal and
secular activists. As a new political system is being born on a slow roller coaster ride of uncertainty, Egyptians are forced to confront
the question of what they stand for, rather than the much easier one of what theyre against. Over the last several months, Egypts
Twitterati, personalities and activists, have been struggling to establish compelling ground games. Many are routinely attacked
for failing to connect with the concerns of average Egyptians. But nobody doubts that the Brotherhood has a real presence on the
streets. Teir political program spans 45 pages and theyve consistently brought out hundreds with simultaneous daily rallies in
multiple locations across the city and in multiple governorates.
All the liberals have, what they think is, popular support on Twitter, but theres no relevance on the street. For us, its the reverse,
says Miriam. Were working the other way.
Down in Beni Suef, a dusty Upper Egyptian governorate about 75 miles south of Cairo, the Brotherhood began soft-campaigning in
early summer 2011. Long the wellspring of their support, they spearheaded weekly events like their hallmark food-drives and civic
awareness workshops in nearby rural villages where the fellaheen, Egypts agricultural class, say only the Brotherhood comes around.
Weve known them for awhile, Ahmed Naguib of the al-Bidini village says, swatting a y away from one of his deep-onyx eyes
covered in cataracts from a cement factory accident a few years back. Who else can we really trust?
On a slow day, 50 people are gathered in the Brotherhoods oce, eating chocolate clair-like pastries and unpacking brown boxes,
lled to the brim with new baby-blue baseball caps baring the Freedom and Justice partys insignia two scales set against a vibrant
sea of blue and green. Te secretary general of the Brotherhood in Beni Suef, Abdel Azeem El Sharkawy, puts down his mint tea and
laughs when asked about their electoral prospects.
Were condent. Were not the ones separated from reality, he says, his entourage chuckling in unison. In Egypt, the only place
youll nd a liberal, a secular is on Twitter or on talk-shows.
Back in the bustling capital at a crowded cafe, Miriam runs through a looming to-do list, taking her smartphone out of its brown
leather case to check the time.
Hey, I have to go to Moms rally, Im late, she says. Soon, she was sweeping through a crowd of hundreds gathered in front of
Mubaraks former presidential palace, passing pocket-sized glossy yellow and blue yers roadside to drivers.
Weve got a campaign truck outside of Mubaraks old house, a few of the young men chant giddily. Weve been waiting to do this
for awhile, says 47-year-old Mohammed Ahmed, in what seems like a vast understatement. Te truck starts blasting triumphant
nationalist songs from its speakers, and soon the crowd, teeming with children propped up on shoulders, marches through a
Christian area in the upscale Cairo suburb chanting, Copts our brothers, we will protect them.
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A few nights later, close by, but in a seemingly dierent world, liberal parliamentary candidate Amr Hamzawy drew in 30 or so people at
a quiet upscale bookstore, where glossy photo-books of the revolution and books like Tweets from Tahrir line the oak shelves.
Miriam snaps a few photographs of her mother, who dashed through back alleys with a female brigade of Brotherhood members,
waving to residents watching from open-windows and shaking storeowners hands like a rock star. Tis is what we do best, Miriam
says, a sparkle in her eyes. Te streets. And this is what matters.
Lauren E. Bohn is a Fulbright fellow and multimedia journalist based in Cairo. Follow her on Twitter at @LaurenBohn.
Egypts Sala Surge
By Sarah A. Topol, January 4, 2012
MANSOURA, Egypt It was the morning of the third and nal round of Egypts parliamentary elections and Ammar Fayed, an
activist for the Muslim Brotherhoods political party, was nervous as hell.
Te 28-year-old marketing manager, who sits on the executive board of the youth branch of the Brotherhoods Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP) in the governorate of Dakahlia, sported a tiny FJP pin on the lapel of his gray blazer and a thumb stained blue from
voting. He explained the situation: Tirty-six seats were up for grabs in this province in the fertile Nile Delta. Te conservative region
is in the Brotherhoods heartland it should have been a cakewalk.
Tere was just one problem, Fayed admitted: We made a fundamental miscalculation.
Te Brotherhood found itself outanked on the right by the Sala al-Nour Party, which challenged the movements religious
credentials and gained a surprising degree of traction in the process. Who could have predicted that the Salas adherents to
a fundamentalist version of Islam that until Egypts revolution eschewed politics as un-Islamic would morph into an electoral
powerhouse? Even the Brotherhood, whose vote-counting abilities would impress the likes of Karl Rove, never saw it coming, and the
Salas success threatened to upend the movements carefully laid plans for dominating Egypts post-revolutionary political scene.
After decades of trying to convince Egypts liberals, leftists, and other activists of their seriousness in solving the countrys titanic
economic problems, the Brothers suddenly found themselves forced to talk about how and when they will implement Islamic law.
Not only did their eorts to bolster the movements religious credentials promise to cause tensions with the other parliamentary
blocs, but conicts with the al-Nour Party also provided useful fodder for Egypts calculating military rulers, who could exploit the
rivalry to keep themselves in power and above scrutiny.
Te Brotherhood couldnt aord to ignore the Salas rise. Nour was directly attacking our core, Fayed complained, saying the
Brotherhood is a party like any other, that it is playing politics instead of being a guardian of Islam.
Te two Islamist factions wer already trading barbs over the most divisive issue: legislating Islamic law. To get the Salas perspective,
I met Ibrahim AbdulRahman, the bushy-bearded Nour spokesman in Dakahlia governorate. He named the place: an upscale coee
shop in the center of the city of Mansoura.
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It was a dicult interview: Te Salas dont seem particularly keen on explaining themselves to foreign reporters. AbdulRahman
slumped in his chair and spent most of his time averting any attempt at a genuine conversation, at rst denying Nour was a religious
party and feigning confusion as to why Christians werent running on its ticket, despite public statements by its leaders that their
party would never support a Christian president.
After about 20 minutes of useless chatter, AbdulRahman nally stuck the knife into his competitors. I would say that Salas and the
Nour Party are more aware of the religious sciences and know religion more than the Muslim Brotherhood, he said.
Te parties disagreement over how quickly to implement sharia, or Islamic law, AbdulRahman explained, is at the center of their
conict. For the Nour Party, one of the primary major goals is to implement sharia at the nearest possible opportunity, he said.
If AbdulRahman was unconcerned with explaining himself to the Western media, Mohammed Yousef, the FJP spokesman in
the same governorate, was much more anxious that the world not misunderstand his party. I met him at the FJP headquarters in
Mansoura a prim oce with white walls, at-screen TVs, and computers. A map that showed the percentage of Muslims in
African countries, coded in varying shades of green, adorned the wall. Over his shoulder, an FJP banner with a rising white dove had
Freedom, we protect it. Justice, we build it written across the birds wings.
Nour is very fundamentalist, Yousef said a stark contrast with the FJP, which sees the state as a civil state with an Islamic
background. All rights to all citizens would be preserved, guarded by the law and the constitution, not by religious beliefs of citizens.
Yes, Yousef admited, the Brotherhood also wants to implement Islamic law but only gradually, with a horizon measured in
decades, so that society is prepared. Nour sees it as a hammerhead action of total transformation to a sharia system, he told me.
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In the quiet hum of the oce, Yousef described the coming conict between the two movements. If the Nour Party or a Sala party
in parliament pressures to implement the hudud [punishments stipulated in the Quran that include stoning adulterers or cutting o
the hands of thieves] swiftly, the Muslim Brotherhood will stand rmly against them to prevent that from happening, he said.
Tats not the only issue putting the two groups on a collision course. While the Brotherhood wanted to talk about its plans to create
new jobs, the Salas tried to focus the debate in parliament on public social virtues, like headscarves, religious idolatry, and banning
alcohol. Te Brotherhood was also far more concerned with increasing the powers of parliament and sending the Egyptian military
back to their barracks, while Nours red-meat issue remained the promotion of its conservative social agenda.
Some also speculated that the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) could turn to the al-Nour Party, the second-
most powerful force in parliament, to undercut the Brotherhood after all, it was a tried-and-true tactic that served Mubarak well.
Basically, the military would encourage the Salas agenda of legislating public morality in exchange for their support in allowing the
military to retain its Mubarak-era prerogatives, said Omar Ashour of the University of Exeters Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies,
who was in Cairo to observe the elections.
Te thoughts of most voters in Mansoura, however, were a long way from future power struggles. Rather, Egyptians were looking to
elect a government that would represent a clean break from the past and what could be cleaner than a party that has never sought
power?
Mosaab Talaat, a 21-year-old veterinary student drinking tea in a small mobile-phone shop with his two friends, said he voted for
al-Nour Party, but seemed abashedly shocked when asked whether he considered himself a Sala. He maintained that he voted for
Nour because he thought the party would be less corrupt than Egypts old ruling class.
Teyre dierent than what we had before, because of their religion. Because they are Muslim, theyll take care of Egypt, Talaat
explained. At the campaign events Talaat attended, he saw a famous Sala sheikh who campaigned for al-Nour Party in Mansoura. It
made him think that perhaps Islam combined with politics would breed less corruption.
Ultimately, Talaat thought competition between the Brotherhood and the Salas would be good for Egypt. Tis should be normal.
In any parliament theres opposition, he said. Now, both will be working for the betterment of Egypt.
Whether thats true remains to be seen. If competition means brandishing Islamic credentials and providing the military with
another tool to divide and rule, Egypts turbulent transition to democracy and badly stalled economy will remain just that and the
Egyptian people will pay the price.
Sarah A. Topol is a Cairo-based journalist. Follow her on twitter: @satopol.
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Old habits die hard!
By Khalil al-Anani, January 31, 2012
Despite its stunning victory in the parliamentary elections, the image of the Muslim Brothers among revolutionary Egyptians is
enormously shaking. Te clashes between the movements youth, who went to Tahrir Square to celebrate the anniversary of the
Egyptian revolution, and the revolutionary activists, who protested against the military rule, reveals the widening gap between both
groups. However, the problem is not that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is less revolutionary than other parties but rather because
it simply cannot be.
Since its inception some eight decades ago, the MB avoided revolution or comprehensive change and embraced a gradual, sometimes
sluggish, reform policy. Hassan al-Banna, the founder and ideologue of the MB, abandoned the word revolution in all his tracts
instead advocating reform (Islah). More importantly, the social construction of the movements members disavows radical change
for the sake of gradual reform. Te recruitment and socialization (tarbiyya) process, which every MB active member has to undergo,
advocates steady and incremental reform of the self, society, and the state. Hence words like change, confrontation, clash, etc. seem
alien to the MBs leaders and cadres. More signicantly, whereas the bottom-up approach, which was espoused by the MB for
decades, entrenched its social presence, nevertheless, it aborted its boldness and condence in facing the Egyptian state.
Indeed, the heavy legacy of repression and exclusion under Hosni Mubaraks regime has made the MB an over-cautious and
obsessed organization. Whilst the movement seeks to overcome this legacy, it seems unable to make a full rupture with its imbedded
ramications. True, the movement has supported the revolution since its outset; however, it never sought to initiate it or to end
Mubaraks regime through mass protests. Te mere result of such a thinking pattern was that accommodation not confrontation
has become a key strategy for the MB in dealing with those in power. However, in revolutionary moments such as Egypt is currently
undergoing, this strategy appears pointless and may even backre on the MB and erode its long-standing popularity.
Paradoxically, despite the outright majority attained by its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the MB is still thinking and acting as an
opposition movement rather than a responsible power-holder. It seems reluctant to take full power over the country or as Nathan
Brown aptly puts it, the MB confronts its success. Hence the MBs leaders are grappling with making the shift from long-standing
repressed mentalities to those of statesmen, or as one of the MBs defectors told me they need a psychological rehabilitation before
ruling the country.
However, the question is not how the MBs leaders will rule the country but rather how will they legitimize and justify their power.
Te response of the MBs leadership on the disputes with other forces provides a gloomy pattern. Strikingly, the statement the
movement issued on Tahrir Squares quarrel alarmed those who might disagree with its political stance. Whereas the movement
should have apologized for some stark blunders (e.g. disavowing Mohamed Mahmouds street events, condemning Tahrir protesters
during the cabinet building clashes, frequently granting the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) legal and political
immunity, etc.), it deed the mounting calls for an immediate transfer of power from the military to a civilian president. Ironically,
the MBs newspaper, al-hurriyya waladala, reiterated the rhetoric of notorious public newspapers toward Tahrirs protesters when it
dubbed them anarchists [who] seek to destabilize the country.
Te conformity between the MB and the SCAF in dealing with the revolution comes as no surprise due to their mutual interests. Te
MB seeks to consolidate the extraordinary gains it attained since Mubaraks disposal without risking its internal coherence. And the
junta wants to maintain their unusual privileges without any civilian oversight. Clearly, both are exemplifying an obsolete mindset.
Tey promote reform over revolution, stability not change, and procedural instead of genuine democracy. Not surprisingly,
they are involved in negotiating, compromising, and brokering the future of the country behind the scene.
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Nevertheless, the hoary leadership pattern of the MB impedes its attempt to replace Mubaraks regime and to act as a ruling power.
Te MB needs to not only reshape and normalize its relationship with the state, society, and other political forces after decades of
dierentiation and operate as a normal political movement as opposed to a sub-state actor but more importantly to restructure its
internal organization to t with the new political environment in Egypt. Besides its controversial relationship with the FJP (which
will likely discredit the party at some point), the MBs internal structures suer from inertia. Tere are ample examples in this regard.
For instance, it was expected after the revolution that the MB would rebuild its main structures (e.g. Te Guidance Bureau (maktab
alirshad alam), the General Shura Council (majlis al-Shura alam), and Administrative Bureaus (al-Makatib al-Idariyya), to be based
on more democratic and representative procedures. However, the movement maintained these structures and marginalized those
who were appealing for change. Not surprisingly, many of the MBs young activists are increasingly disenchanted and dissatised
by the movements stagnation and the unwise political behavior of its leaders. As one of the young Brothers told me the revolution
has not yet shattered the movements old narratives. More ironically, even after lifting brutal surveillance and dissolving the State
Security Apparatus (gihaz amnil dawla), the MB still practices its secrecy habit in running internal activities. Te weekly and bi-
monthly meetings of its micro-unites, the Family (al-usra) and the Branch (shuba), are convened clandestinely.
Te FJP, so far, resembles its patron. It inherited the MBs organizational and political tactics. Te way the party has selected its
General Secretary, Saad el-Katatni, to become the parliament speaker provides a striking example. Up until now, neither the MBs
grassroots nor the public knows how el-Katatni was chosen, who contested him, and how and when the selection process took
place. Te party did not issue a clear statement in this regard and none of its members asked. Unlike their Moroccan counterparts in
the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), who held internal elections for governmental positions, the FJP is inclined to replicate
the MBs pattern in appointing positions, lacking in transparency and accountability. Tus, the underlying factor behind the
partys sweeping victory in the parliamentary elections should be attributed not to its revolutionary platform or liberal credentials
but mainly because the social reservoir of its patron, the Muslim Brotherhood. Terefore, for Egypt to proceed toward a viable
democracy, its new leading power (the MB) should be revolutionized, otherwise nothing will change. However, old habits die hard!
Khalil al-Anani is a Scholar at the School of Government and International Aairs at Durham University and former visiting
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Te advent of informal Islamists
By Khalil al-Anani, March 19, 2012
Te gray-bearded sheikh appealed to his presidential candidate counterparts to join him at a press conference to be held in his
regular mosque. While his contenders eluded, the sheikhstood amid hundreds of his followers and supporters to protest and
chant against the referral of a group of civilians to the military court. Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, the 51-year-old veteran Islamist, has
compellingly captivated his followers by his presidential and charismatic merits, at least rhetorically. Clearly, Abu Ismails mosque-
show was a shrewd attempt to kick o his presidential campaign. However, it also reects how the new informal Islamists perceive
politics. For them, all politics is retail.
Te fragmentation of the Islamist scene in Egypt is a hallmark characteristic of the post-Hosni Mubarak era. After stagnation and
dominance by one force, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the Islamist scene has been drastically reshaped. More than 15 Islamists
parties have ocially or unocially emerged after the revolution. Myriad Islamists have overwhelmed the public sphere freely and
painlessly. And a parliament dominated by Islamists is in commission. It seems the lure of politics has immersed Islamists.
However, while many are preoccupied by the rise of the Muslim Brothers and the ultra-conservative Salas, informal Islamists are
stepping into politics vigorously and freely. Tey are not ocially aliated with any Islamist movement. Nor are they keen to establish
their own organizations. Ironically, they shunned joining any of the new Islamists parties. Moreover, whereas formal Islamists, for
example, the MB, ad-Dawa al-Salayya, and ex-Jihadists, rushed to formal politics, informal Islamists prefer to play outside the ocial
framework. Tey vividly operate in the new and expansive religious market that has ourished in Egypt since the revolution.
Te umbrella of informal Islamists is wide-ranging. It encompasses the full spectrum of religious actors. Starting from the classical
Sala sheikhs, including the popular preachers Mohamed Hassan, Mohamed Hussien Yakub, and Abu Ishaq al-Howini, to the
dissents of the MB, such as the well-known Islamist and presidential candidate Abdel Moniem Abuol Fotouh, to independent
Islamists, such as the Qatari-based sheikh Yussif al-Qaradawi and the lawyer and Islamic intellectual Mohamed Selim al-Awa,
informal Islamists are dominating the new public sphere in Egypt after the revolution. All are outspoken, charismatic, and
inuential preachers. Hence their followers and supporters are inestimable.
Tere are three signicant distinctions between formal and informal Islamists. First, while formal Islamists rely heavily on their
organizational structures for outreach, informal Islamists capitalize on social networks (kinship, friendships, families, etc.) as well
as establishing themselves in the virtual sphere (internet, Facebook, the media, etc.) to broaden their audience. Hence they are free
from organizational burdens and responsibilities.
Second, whereas the former are pervasive in the low and low-middle classes, the latter are a crosscutting phenomenon. Tey have
followers from dierent social strata: urban and rural, poor and rich, schools and universities, etc. For them, street vendors are
important as well as university professors.
Tird, while formal Islamists espouse the conventional approach of bottom-up eorts to accomplish their agenda, informal
Islamists reversed the course and seek to penetrate the state. Tey do not aim to Islamize individuals or reshape society but rather to
empower them in the face of power-holders. More importantly, they target the members of formal Islamist organizations. Hence, they
embody a real concern for formal Islamists such as the case of Abuol Fotouh with the MB and Abu Ismail with the Sala al-Nour Party.
Several of these informal Islamists mounted serious campaigns for the Presidency: Abd el-Moneim Abuol Fotouh, Hazem Abu
Ismail, and Mohammed Selim al-Awa.Te rst is an iconic Islamist leader with a remarkable political presence. His genuine and
distinctive discourse has made him one of the most inuential Islamists in Egypt over the past three decades. He combines an
ideologicalmosaicof Islamic, liberal, and leftist views that resonate with various spectators. Since he broke with the MB in May
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2011, he became more powerful and inuential among young Egyptians particularly Islamists who view him as the Erdogan of
Egypt, as one told me. Moreover, for many liberals and leftists, Abuol Fotouh became the revolution candidate after the withdrawal
of Mohamed ElBaradei from the presidential race.
As for Abu Ismail, he embodies a very signicant case of informal Islamism. On one hand, he is not ocially a member of any
Islamist movement. He plays on the divide lines between the MB and Salasts. Tus, he employs his preceding unocial links
with the MB to get their grassroots support. At the same time, he utilizes his Sala appearance and discourse to attract Salast
constituencies. On the other hand, Abu Ismail leapt into politics after the revolution through his antagonistic, yet useless, rhetoric
against the military. Moreover, Abu Ismail invests greatly in the Sala media to reach his supporters. His simplistic and populist
discourse resonates with many Egyptians who view religion as vehicle for change.
Nevertheless, al-Awa is the most visible brand of informal Islamist. Over the past two decades, he established himself as an
intellectual Islamist. He is one of the architects of wasatiyya, or the centrism school of thought. Hence his discourse reverberates
with the middle and upper-middle classes. Until recently he was a highly respected gure among Islamists before he discredited
himself by siding with the junta at some occasions. In addition to his oratorical skills, he has an extraordinary political intuition and
he can play all cards at the same time. Despite his informal links with formal Islamists (e.g. the MB and al-Wasat Party), he is keen
to portray himself as an Islamic thinker. Te appeal of al-Awa originates not only from his appearance as an elegant upper-middle
class gentleman but also from his intellectual credentials. His outstanding writings on Islam and Muslim issues exemplify a vital
source for all Islamists. However, his political stance and tactics are precarious and counterproductive. While appealing to the public,
he is bargaining with the military which has put his credibility at stake.
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Paradoxically, the relationship among informal Islamists is loose and vague. Although they are profoundly rivals, they tend to act
as buddies and partners. Each of them is intensely campaigning to get the presidential ticket. Even informal Islamists who are
not running for the presidency are contesting to get authority over the public sphere. All together they usher a new era in Islamist
politics that can be labeled post-Institutional Islamism.
Khalil al-Anani is a Scholar at the School of Government and International Aairs at Durham University and former visiting
Te Muslim Brotherhoods Presidential Gambit
By Marc Lynch, April 1, 2012
Te Muslim Brotherhood resolved months of speculation this weekend by announcing its intention of nominating Deputy Supreme
Guide Khairet el-Shater for Egypts presidential election. It may not seem so surprising for a countrys largest political force and the
largest parliamentary faction to eld a presidential candidate. But it was. Te announcement sent an earthquake through Cairos
already wildly careening political scene. Im happy to admit that I was taken by surprise.
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What was the Brotherhood thinking? Te nomination of Shater seems to have been a response to threats and opportunities a rapidly
changing political arena, rather than the hatching of a long-term plan. But many Egyptians would disagree, seeing it instead as the
culmination of a long-hatching conspiracy with the SCAF. I think it will reveal itself to be a strategic blunder which has placed the
Brotherhood in a no-win situation. But clearly they had their reasons for making such an uncharacteristically bold move. How will
it aect the endlessly turbulent and contentious Egyptian political transition? And could Khairat el-Shater really replace Hosni
Mubarak as the president of Egypt?
Ive been studying Egypts Muslim Brotherhood for many years, and have interviewed most of its senior leaders (including Shater)
multiple times. And Ill admit that I was surprised. So were most other MB-watchers I follow. Tats in large part because it
contradicts what I had heard for months from Brotherhood leaders in private and in public, and has dubious political logic. Whats
more, the decision appears to have been controversial inside the Brotherhoods leadership, and seems to have taken even many of
its own top people by surprise. Tere are at least three reasons to consider the Brotherhoods move surprising, despite the obvious
temptation that any political party would have to seek the top political position which it believes it can win: its promises to not eld a
candidate, the strategic risks of seeking the presidency, and the stakes of nominating Shater himself.
First, the Muslim Brotherhood had promised for months to not eld a presidential candidate. Tey left little room for ambiguity in
their promises. Indeed, it held this position so strongly that senior reformist leader Abed Moneim Aboul Futouh had broken bitterly
with his organization over his determination to run, and the Brotherhood leadership had in turn threatened to expel any members
who worked on his campaign.Tis was not a minor, o-handed promise it had been a central, often-repeated feature of the
Brotherhoods political message for many months.
Te Brotherhood-bashing over this reversal may have been a bit over the top (Boo hoo. Call the wahmbulance. Politics aint
beanbag, quipped FPs house cynic in response to the nger-pointing). But putting forward a candidate didnt simply break a
frequently repeated public promise. It also t a broader narrative (justied or not) about the Brotherhoods steadily creeping
ambitions and broken vows. Many of these complaints were exaggerated, particularly over the Brotherhoods alleged conspiracies
with the SCAF and over-performance in the parliamentary elections. But the accusations took on a new intensity in April as a wave
of liberals and independents quit the constitutional assembly in protest over perceived Islamist domination.
Te second reason for surprise was that the move carries signicant political risks for little obvious advantage. Te Brotherhood has
long worried about the perception that it seeks to dominate Egyptian politics and sought to avoid triggering the crystallization of an
anti-Islamist front. Most analysts expected the Brotherhood to practice self-restraint in order to avoid provoking these fears, and this
was generally the message which Brotherhood leaders attempted to signal. But theres no question that the Brotherhood has become
increasingly assertive as it has established its power in the transitional environment, and less willing to back away from confrontation
or back away from its own preferences.
Advancing a candidate, while in line with this newly found willingness to ex its muscles, nevertheless creates a no-win situation
for the Brotherhood. Backing an acceptable but non-Brotherhood presidential candidate would have protected their core
interests without triggering fear in others. If a Brotherhood candidate wins, then the movement would control the parliament,
the constitutional assembly, and the presidency. It would therefore stand alone in the face of the military, and would bear full
responsibility for whatever happened in Egypts economy, politics, and society in the coming period.
If it loses the election, then it would conclusively shatter its own carefully cultivated air of invincibility. And victory is not certain.
Ive been genuinely impressed with Shaters forceful presence, condence, and intellect when Ive interviewed him. In person, he
is charismatic and impressive, calm and careful but capable of dominating a discussion. But Shater is not a charismatic front-man
likely to enthrall the mass Egyptian public on television or in public speeches. He might nd it tough going to unite an Islamist
presidential eld already divided, at least for now, between Aboul Fotouh, the surprisingly omnipresent Hazem Salah Abu Ismail,
and Mohammed Salim al-Awa. In contrast to the parliamentary elections, Muslim Brotherhood members alone would not likely
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be enough to carry the day in a high-turnout presidential election and Shater has not proven an ability to appeal beyond the
organization he dominates. Finally, his presence in the race could well galvanize the non-Islamist vote to rally behind a consensus
candidate such as Amr Moussa.
Te third reason for surprise was the candidate himself. If the Brotherhood needed to eld a candidate, then it could have turned to
one of its well-known political leaders. Choosing Khairat el-Shater raises the stakes considerably. Shater is the deputy supreme guide,
and in the view of most MB-watchers the real power behind the throne. Either his victory or his defeat would have more serious
potential negative repercussions for the Brotherhood as a whole than if a less central gure had been oered up as a candidate. Tere
can be no doubting that with Shater, the Brotherhood has gone all-in for victory. And that in turn puts the organizations reputation
very much on the line, win or lose.
So why did the Brotherhood do it? Tere are two, diametrically opposed arguments circulating each, of course, rmly held as the
obvious truth by its proponents. Te rst is that Brotherhoods hand had been forced by the SCAFs mismanagement of the political
process and alleged targeting of the Brotherhood. Some Islamist leaders seemed to share overheated fears of an approaching 1954
moment in which the army again cracked down on Islamists and reasserted authoritarian rule. While expected, the Brotherhoods
attempts to use its parliamentary power to rein in the SCAF and the SCAFs counter-moves to block parliamentary action were,
by this reading, pushing Egypt toward a political showdown. Te MB has turned sharply against the Ganzoury government, after
initially cooperating with it. Shaters nomination is therefore in this scenario a response to threat, the next step in an escalating
conict between the Brotherhood and the SCAF.
A second popular argument, held by many of the Brotherhoods critics, is precisely the opposite: that Shaters nomination represents
the culmination of the long-standing collusion between the Brotherhood and the SCAF. In this reading, Shaters assuming the
presidency will complete a bargain by which the former will be handed political power in exchange for guarantees of the latters core
interests. Te public spats are dismissed as political theater designed to camouage the conspiracy. But in this reading, the x is in
and the Brotherhood is set on seizing the opportunity.
Te reality is likely some combination of threat and opportunity, as the Brotherhood seeks to navigate Egypts turbulent politics.
Tey may have preferred to nd a candidate to support from outside the organization, but couldnt nd a suitable one among the
contenders. Perhaps they feared what the leading alternatives might do with regime power: Moussa perhaps rallying anti-Islamist
forces and rolling back their gains, Abu Ismail capturing Islamist sympathies and votes and shunting the Brotherhood to the
sidelines. Tey may have realized that they were at the peak of their power right now, with parliament under their control and other
parties in disarray, and may never get another shot at the presidency. Or maybe its all of the above, and more.
Te months leading up to the presidential elections are going to be a wild period for Egyptian politics which will make or break its
deeply troubled but still just barely viable transition. Te constitution is supposedly to be drafted, the president elected, and
power transferred from the SCAF to a civilian government within this short time frame. Meanwhile, the economy continues to
badly struggle, frustrated activists continue to protest, and relations with the United States are badly strained. Shaters entry into the
presidential race just introduces one more wild card into this loaded deck. At least Egyptian politics wont be boring.
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Egypts blessed Sala votes
By Khalil al-Anani, May 2, 2012
Te green backyard at the Sala sheikhs house in the old Mediterranean city of Alexandria was full of guests. Tey werent students who
came for religious lessons as usual but rather politicians appealing for the sheikhs political blessing in the presidential elections. It should
be no surprise: Yasser Burhami, the ultraconservative Sala leader and patron of al-Nour party, has become a key player in Egyptian
politics. Ironically, in 2011, Burhami kept his distance from the Egyptian revolution and requested that his followers also do so. But now,
he is deeply immersed in political strategy and tactics as he struggles to navigate the new terrain confronting the Sala movement.
Te Sala movements strategy has become clearer with its surprising decision to endorse the Islamist candidate Abdel Moneim
Aboul Fotouh for Egypts presidency. Tis was not an obvious call. Te decision to choose Aboul Fotouh over the Muslim
Brotherhoods candidate Mohamed Morsi or other possible contenders took weeks of negotiations and discussions within al-Dawa
al-Salayya (the Sala Call), the main political Sala force in Egypt, and its political arm, al-Nour party. Tat decision has once again
reshued Egypts political cards and oered new insight into where the Sala movement is headed.
Conversations with trusted Sala sources reveal a wide range of factors behind the Sala decision to back Aboul Fotouh. Te political
partnership with Aboul Fotouh is based on mutual political interests, not ideological or religious anities. Such a partnership will be
tactical until both parties consolidate their relationship. A key political goal is to counterbalance the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which
they claim seeks a political monopoly over all institutions in Egypt. Tey also hope to avoid voting fragmentation among Salas which
would only benet the feloul candidates (the remnants of the Mubarak regime), such as Amr Moussa and Ahmed Shaq. We were
looking for a consensual candidate who can unite Egyptians and has a clear vision to the future, a Sala source said.
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Te calculations of the Salas have also been shaped by the disqualications of two leading candidates by Egypts electoral
commission. Te disqualication of the popular Islamist candidate Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail made our job easy, mentioned a high
Sala source. Weve managed to throw two birds by one stone: bargaining with Aboul Fotouh on the one hand, and overcoming an
organizational and ideological burden on the other, referring to the internal rifts over Abu Ismails candidacy. Te disqualication
of Muslim Brotherhood Deputy Supreme Guide Khairat el-Shater left the MB with Morsi, a less formidable candidate. Backing
Morsi, they feared, would strengthen the MB position at the expense of the nascent Sala movement. Alternatively, leaving the Sala
grassroots to decide on their candidate would risk causing organizational disintegration (plus losing a good card in the political
game). For many Sala leaders, therefore, the Aboul Fotouh card was the only way out of such a predicament despite their real
concerns about Aboul Fotouhs liberal inclinations.
It is clear that politics, not ideology, dictated the Salas decision. Both Aboul Fotouh and the Salas understand the consequences
of such a decision, even if just for the short term. Yet the cost-benet calculus led both to insist on making the deal. Aboul Fotouh
will get the political, organizational, and social support of the Salas, particularly in the rural areas that are dicult to reach. And the
Salas will get a friendly president who will secure them a say in high politics even if he is not from their own movement. Contrary to
the stereotypical image of Salas as ultraconservative religious monsters, religion had almost no weight in their decision to endorse
Aboul Fotouh. As Nader Bakar, an outspoken young Sala leader, blatantly put it, we were looking for a president who can be a mere
executive manager not an Islamic caliph.
Te mechanism behind the decision is another astonishing development in the Salas dynamics. Known by their regressive stance
on democracy, the vote for Aboul Fotouh was internally democratic, although it was under the banner of the religious rule the
mandatory Shura. Both al-Nour and al-Dawa al-Salayya held internal elections to vote over which candidate they would endorse in
the presidential race. According to many sources and media coverage, the voting process was transparent and clean. Firstly, they held
an election debate between Islamist candidates including Mohamed Morsi and Mohamed Selim al-Awa, as well as an aide, Ibrahim
el-Zafaria (a former MB member), delegated by Aboul Foutoh who could not attend. After the debate, the candidates and their aides
left and the voting process started. To avoid any biased pressures on members decisions, they segregated both institutions, al-Nours
high commission and its parliamentary bloc (105 members), and the Consultative Council of al-Dawa al-Salayya (150 out of 204
members voted). And the elections were conducted simultaneously in two dierent rooms. Aboul Fotouh received 70 and 80 percent
of the votes from the institutions respectively.
Te gains for the Salas for endorsing Aboul Fotouh are enormous. First, it will re-position al-Nour and its patron at the heart
of the political process in Egypt particularly if Aboul Fotouh wins the elections. Backing Aboul Fotouh, who is relatively without
an institutional or social base, will secure a foothold for the Salas in Egyptian politics. Second, the decision will increase the
public appeal and respect for Salas. It resonates with popular aspirations to have a revolutionary and consensual president like
Aboul Fotouh. Te process behind the decision oers a stark comparison between the MB and Salas on internal transparency
and democracy. Tird, the decision will inevitably hurt the MBs image and political weight. On one hand, it shows the MB as the
heartless movement that expelled Aboul Fotouh whereas Salas safeguarded him. On the other hand, it will increase the alienation
and isolation of the MB particularly within the Islamist context. Moreover, the Salas backing of Aboul Fotouh will have a signicant
impact on a large constituency of undecided voters, especially among low and lower-middle class voters. However most notably,
the endorsement of Aboul Fotouh hasnt only revealed the Salas increasing political savvy and shrewdness, but also proved that
politics, not piety will reshape their future.
Khalil al-Anani is a scholar of Middle East Politics at the School of Government and International Aairs at Durham University
and former visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute in Washington, DC. He can be reach at: [email protected].
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A Man for All Seasons
By Shadi Hamid, May 9, 2012
In January, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh was a long shot to become Egypts next president. When I walked into the Islamist
candidates basement in a far-ung Cairo suburb which was doubling as a backup headquarters it made me think back to
the early, insurgent days of Barack Obamas campaign, when Hillary Clinton was still the presumptive Democratic nominee. Te
basement, with its large spare rooms, was packed with young volunteers. It had a chaotic, bustling feel. Aboul Fotouhs supporters
may have hailed from radically dierent backgrounds, but they believed, above all, in the candidate. Tey wanted to transcend the
old battle lines of Islamist or liberal and reimagine Egyptian politics in the process.
What those grand ambitions mean in practice is, at times, unclear. As Aboul Fotouh has risen to front-runner status in the rst ever
competitive presidential election in Egypts history, he has become the Rorschach test of Egyptian politics. Liberals think hes more
liberal than he actually is. Conservatives hope hes more conservative.
Its an understatement to say that the Aboul Fotouh campaign is a big-tent movement. A former leader in the Muslim Brotherhood
and, for decades, one of Egypts most prominent Islamist gures, he has become the standard-bearer of many of the young liberals
who led Egypts revolution including Google executive Wael Ghonim. He is also, however, the preferred candidate of the countrys
hard-line Sala groups, including the al-Nour Party and its parent organization al-Dawa al-Salaya, one of Egypts largest religious
movements. Tis is all the more impressive considering that, unlike the United States or most European countries, the primary
political cleavage in Egypt has little to do with economics and much more to do with religion.
Aboul Fotouhs success stems in part from his ability to neutralize this religious divide. One of his messages and one that has
appeal for liberals and hard-line Islamists alike is this: We are all, in eect, Islamists, so why ght over it? As he explained to a
Sala television channel in February, Today those who call themselves liberals or leftists, this is just a political name, but most
of them understand and respect Islamic values. Tey support the sharia and are no longer against it. In a creative attempt at
redenition, Aboul Fotouh noted that all Muslims are, by denition, Sala, in the sense that they are loyal to the Salaf, the earliest,
most pious generations of Muslims.
Aboul Fotouh is able to make this argument, and make it sound convincing, in part because of who he is. He is the rare gure who
has been, at various points in his career, a Sala, a Muslim Brother, and, today, a Turkish-style liberal Islamist. In the 1970s, he rose
to prominence as a leader and founder of al-Gamaa al-Islamiya, the religious movement that wrested control over universities from
the once dominant leftists. In his memoirs, Aboul Fotouh recalls the early Sala inuence on his ideas: He and his fellow students
aggressively promoted sex segregation on campus. At one point, they tried to prove to the Muslim Brotherhoods leader at the time,
Umar al-Tilmisani, that music was haram, or forbidden by Islam.
Over the course of the decade, Aboul Fotouh developed close relationships with those who would later become the leading lights of
Sala thought. After the 2011 revolution, Aboul Fotouh, then in the process of splitting with the Brotherhood, was one of the few
politicians to take Salasts seriously. It helped that he knew them. While the Muslim Brotherhood tended to treat Salasts as immature,
younger brothers in the Islamic family, Aboul Fotouh exaggerated their power he once claimed that Salasts outnumbered Muslim
Brothers 20-to-1 and pledged to seek their vote. Respect, it turns out, can go much further than ideological proximity.
But the ideological tensions within the Islamist camp remain, even if Aboul Fotouhs message tends to paper them over. According to
him, all Islamists agree on the usul (the fundamentals) but dier on the furu (the specics) of religious practice. In his February
interview on Sala television, he estimated, implausibly, that Islamists agree on 99 percent of the issues.
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Tus far, his liberal supporters have dismissed such comments or explained them away. Part of it is the lack of alternatives. Te
other front-runner, former Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, is seen as felool, a derogatory term used to describe remnants of the old
regime. Part of it, however, is that they really seem to believe Aboul Fotouh is who they want him to be. Although Aboul Fotouh is
adamantly an Islamist, he has also broken with his former organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamists on key issues.
Last year, for instance, Aboul Fotouh asserted that a Muslim has the right to convert to Christianity a particularly controversial
position for a presidential candidate to take, given that most Sunni scholars hold that the punishment for apostasy is death.
Aboul Fotouh has often insisted on the dangers of mixing preaching and party politics, a position that appeals to liberals as well
as some Islamists. When I met with him in 2010 at the height of the Mubarak regimes repression and just months before the
most rigged parliamentary elections in Egyptian history he spoke at length about the need to separate the two. Te Muslim
Brotherhood, he said, can deal with political issues but should leave competition over power to political parties.
Putting religion and political authority within one hand is very dangerous. Tats what happened in Iran, he told me, peppering
his measured Arabic with choice English words for added emphasis. Historically, famous preachers were not part of the power
structure. Its these [autocratic] regimes who put the two together putting al-Azhar [the preeminent center of Islamic learning]
under the control of the state.
Aboul Fotouh consistently valued the Muslim Brotherhoods social and evangelical work over its accumulation of political power.
In July 2008, I asked him what would happen if Hosni Mubaraks regime shut the Brotherhood out of parliament. Faced with the
prospect of even more repression, he seemed surprisingly calm. Te Muslim Brotherhood is a social movement in the rst place.
Its presence in parliament is useful and good, but lack of parliamentary representation does not have an existential eect on the
Brotherhood. From 1970 to 1984, we werent in parliament, and they were 14 of the most active years for the Brotherhoods work of
preaching and education.
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In this respect, Aboul Fotouh is an old-school Islamist, seeing himself as a faithful heir to Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Bannas legacy.
According to its bylaws, the groups original aim was to raise a generation of Muslims who would understand Islam correctly and act
according to its teachings. Until 1934, the bylaws forbade direct political action. Decades later, General Guide Tilmisani, fearing party
politics would corrupt the Brotherhoods soul, prevented the organization from contesting parliamentary elections for many years.
Tere is a tension, however, between Aboul Fotouhs sometimes liberal pronouncements and his essentially majoritarian
understanding of democracy. When I sat down with Aboul Fotouh for the rst time in the summer of 2006, I wanted to understand
his philosophy of government, to the extent that he had one. He repeatedly emphasized that the people, represented by a freely
elected parliament, are the source of authority. On the thorny question, however, of what Islamists would do if parliament passed
an un-Islamic law, he dismissed the concern: Te parliament wont grant rights to gays because that goes against the prevailing
culture of society, and if [members of parliament] did that, theyd lose the next election, he explained. Whether you are a
communist, socialist, or whatever, you cant go against the prevailing culture. Tere is already a built-in respect for sharia.
Tis notion has a long pedigree in Islamic thought: Prophet Mohammed is believed to have said, My ummah [community] will not
agree on an error. Likewise, Aboul Fotouh was condent that once Egyptian society was free, the best ideas would rise to the top.
Tere was little need, then, to regulate society from the top down. On their own, without government getting too much in the way,
Egyptians would do the right thing. And this would inevitably help Islam. What happens in a free society? Aboul Fotouh went on.
I hold conferences and spread my ideas through newspapers and television to try to bring public opinion closer to me. We have
condence in what we believe.
If people are looking for a consistent strain in Aboul Fotouhs thought, it is this: that Islam has already won out and will continue to
win out. Islam is a source of unity and national strength rather than one of division. Depending on where exactly an Egyptian voter
stands, this is either reassuring and somewhat banal, or mildly frightening, particularly for the countrys Christian minority.
Nevertheless, it is an idea with analogues elsewhere in the region, most notably in Turkey and Tunisia, where moderate Islamists
came to power by tapping into a religious mainstream that had lost faith in the secular project of previous decades. Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for example, used democratization to strengthen the place of Islam in public life. He embraced
European Union accession talks while knowing full well that the required liberal reforms would weaken the militarys inuence
and empower Islamic currents in a country where the right to openly express religious values had been severely curtailed. In
Tunisia, Rached Ghannouchi and his Ennahda party have backed o from demands that Islamic law be enshrined in the Tunisian
Constitution, perhaps knowing that Islamization of Tunisian society is already well under way, regardless of what the Tunisian
Constitution says.
Indeed, the same attacks that follow Aboul Fotouhs counterparts in Turkey and Tunisia will be used against him: that he is a
proponent of stealth Islamization and that he remains faithful to the project of applying sharia. Te critics might be right. If Aboul
Fotouh becomes president, there will be a battle between his liberal, revolutionary supporters and his Islamist backers over
the direction his presidency takes. Now that the major Sala organizations have endorsed him, they are likely to have signicant
inuence in an Aboul Fotouh administration, pushing his presidency to the right on social and moral issues.
But though Salasts are a critical bloc of support for the Aboul Fotouh campaign, they have little presence in the candidates inner
circle and campaign organization, which is composed mostly of ex-Muslim Brotherhood members, liberals, and revolutionary
youth. One of Aboul Fotouhs closest aides is Rabab El-Mahdi, a Marxist political science professor, who says her biggest project
is ending the Islamist-secularist divide and focusing on the bread-and-butter issues that actually matter in peoples lives. Another
is the 30-year-old Ali El-Bahnasawy, a self-described liberal who is Aboul Fotouhs media advisor. He told me that the Salasts
endorsement was amazing and credited them for realizing that Egypt needs to end the polarization in the country now. For him,
this is the essence of Aboul Fotouhs appeal. We need someone, Bahnasawy said, who can talk to the Islamists and speak their
language and talk to the liberals and gain their trust as well.
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Te popularity of Aboul Fotouhs campaign is partly a reaction to growing polarization in Egypt, where fears abound of an Algeria
scenario of annulled elections, dissolved parliaments, and military coups. But just as the high hopes of the Obama campaign were
dashed by the political compromises inherent in governing, an Aboul Fotouh administration may nd it dicult to transcend the
basic realities of Egyptian political life. If he wins, his supporters will soon nd that the divisions between Egypts feuding political
currents do not dissipate quickly, if at all.
It is perhaps telling that Aboul Fotouhs rise comes at a time when religious belief has become an easy substitute for real discussion
on economic recovery, security-sector reform, or how to ght income inequality. For the vast majority of Egyptians, the debate over
sharia has been utterly beside the point. It is an elite debate and, in some ways, a manufactured one. As Aboul Fotouh will be the rst
to say, all major political forces support Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, which states that the principles of the Islamic sharia
are the primary source of legislation. Even the most secular party the Free Egyptians took to campaigning in rural areas with
banners reading Te Quran Is Our Constitution. Meanwhile, it was the Salasts, and not the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood,
who entered into serious negotiations over forming a parliamentary coalition with liberal parties. As a senior ocial in the Sala al-
Nour Party once put it to me, Here in Egypt, even the liberals are conservatives.
Sharia has become the hope and change of Egyptian politics all say they like it, but no one quite knows what it means. As the
most powerful man in Egypt and with a bully pulpit to match, Egypts rst revolutionary president will have a eeting opportunity to
redene the meaning of Islam in public life.
In the introduction to his electoral program, Aboul Fotouh, the candidate, embraces the application of sharia. But theres a caveat:
Te understanding of implementation of Islamic law is not, as some people think, about applying the hudud punishments [such as
cutting of the hands of thieves], the program reads. In its complete understanding, Islamic law has to do with realizing the essential
and urgent needs of humankind. Te program then goes on to list combating poverty and ghting corruption as two fundamental
components of applying Islamic law. For Aboul Fotouh, sharia is both everything and nothing all at once. For now at least, that seems
to be exactly the way he wants it.
Brookings Institution. You can follow him on Twitter: @shadihamid.
Brother Number One
By Shadi Hamid, June 7, 2012
Egypt is on the cusp of its rst real experiment in Islamist governance. If the Muslim Brotherhoods Mohamed Morsi comes out
on top in the upcoming presidential runo election, scheduled for June 16 and 17, the venerable Islamist movement will have won
control of both Egypts presidency and its parliament, and it will have a very real chance to implement its agenda of market-driven
economic recovery, gradual Islamization, and the reassertion of Egypts regional role.
Over the course of Egypts troubled transition, the Brotherhood has become increasingly, and uncharacteristically, assertive in its
political approach. Renouncing promises not to seek the presidency and entering into an overt confrontation with the ruling military
council, the Brotherhoods bid to save the revolution has been interpreted by others as an all-out power grab. Egypts liberals, as well as
the United States, now worry about the implications of unchecked Brotherhood rule and what that might mean for their interests.
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Tings couldnt have been more dierent two years ago. Under the repression of Hosni Mubaraks regime, the Brotherhoods
unocial motto was participation, not domination. Te group was renowned for its caution and patient (some would say too
patient) approach to politics. When I sat down with Morsi in May 2010 just months before the revolution and well before he could
have ever imagined being Mubaraks successor he echoed the leaderships almost stubborn belief in glacial but steady change. He
even objected to a fairly anodyne description of the movements political activities: Te word opposition has the connotation of
seeking power, Morsi told me then. But, at this moment, we are not seeking power because [that] requires preparation, and society
is not prepared. Te Muslim Brotherhood, being a religious movement more than a political party, had the benet of a long horizon.
Morsi wasnt well known back then. He was an important player in the Brotherhood, but did not seem to have a particularly
distinctive set of views. He was a loyalist, an enforcer, and an operator. And he was arguably good at those things. But being, or
becoming, a leader is a dierent matter. Despite heading the Brotherhoods parliamentary bloc and later leading the groups newly
formed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), Morsi struggled to command respect across ideological lines. He rarely spoke like someone
who liked making concessions or doing the hard work necessary for building consensus.
Like many Brotherhood leaders, he nurtured a degree of resentment toward Egypts liberals. Tey were tiny and irrelevant, the
thinking went, so why were they always asking for so much? In May 2010, the opposition seemed to be coming alive, but in a
uniquely Egyptian way. At one protest in Tahrir Square, each group Islamists, liberals, and leftists huddled in its own part of the
square. I asked Morsi why there wasnt greater cooperation between Islamists and liberals. Tat depends on the other side, he said,
echoing what the liberals were saying about the Brotherhood.
Tis thinly veiled disdain could be papered over when liberals, leftists, and Brotherhood members were facing a dictator they all
hated. And, during the revolution, Brotherhood members, Salasts, liberals, and ordinary Egyptians joined hands and put the old
divisions aside if only for a moment. When Mubarak fell, though, there was little left to unite them.
Te international community, particularly the United States, shares the liberals fear of Islamist domination, but for a very dierent
set of reasons. Historically, the Brotherhood has been one of the more consistent purveyors of anti-American and anti-Israeli
sentiment. While some Brotherhood leaders, particularly lead strategist Khairat El Shater, are less strident in their condemnations
and less willfully creative with their conspiracy theories in private, Morsi is not. In a conversation with me, he volunteered his views
on the 9/11 terrorist attacks without any prompting. When you come and tell me that the plane hit the tower like a knife in butter,
he said, shifting to English, then you are insulting us. How did the plane cut through the steel like this? Something must have
happened from the inside. Its impossible.
According to various polls, such views are held by most Egyptians, including leftists and liberals, but that doesnt make them any less
troubling. It is perhaps ironic, then, that out of the Brotherhoods top ocials, Morsi has spent the most time in the United States. He
is a graduate of the University of Southern California and, interestingly, the father of two U.S. citizens a reminder that familiarity
can sometimes breed contempt. At a recent news conference, Morsi discussed his time living abroad, painting a picture of a society in
moral decay, featuring crumbling families, young mothers in hospitals who have to write in the name of the father, and couples living
together out of wedlock. We dont have these problems in Egypt, he said, his voice rising with a mixture of pride and resentment.
I met Morsi again, a year later in May 2011, at the Brotherhoods new, plush headquarters in Muqattam, nestled on a small mountain on
Cairos outskirts. Te Brotherhood leader seemed surprisingly calm. He punctuated his Arabic with English expressions; he made jokes
(they werent necessarily funny), name-checked the 1978 lm Te Deer Hunter, and even did an impromptu impression of a former U.S.
president. In the early days, in the afterglow of the 18-day uprising, the groups leaders were still careful to say the right things. He was
quick to point out that 2,500 of the FJPs 9,000 founding members were not from the Brotherhood, and included Christians.
He was also dismissive of ultraconservative Sala movements. Tey werent politically mature yet, he said. Te implication was
obvious: Te Brotherhood, unlike the Salasts, had spent decades rst learning and then playing rather skillfully at times the
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game of politics. Tey learned how and when to compromise and how to justify it to their conservative base. Now, nearly 28 years
after rst entering parliament in 1984, the group was taking pains to present itself as the moderate, respectable face of political Islam.
But the Brotherhood soon realized that it had stumbled upon one of those rare moments where a countrys politics are truly open
and undened. So they decided to seize it, alienating many of their erstwhile liberal allies in the process. Tis approach was a
good t with the Brotherhoods distinctly majoritarian approach to democracy: Tey had won a decisive popular mandate in the
parliamentary elections, with 47 percent of the vote, so why shouldnt they rule?
Eventually, the Brotherhood decided to go for broke. We have witnessed obstacles standing in the way of parliament to take
decisions to achieve the demands of the revolution, Morsi said in March. We have therefore chosen the path of the presidency not
because we are greedy for power but because we have a majority in parliament which is unable to fulll its duties.
Te more important question is: Does it really matter what Morsi thinks? Te Brotherhoods presidential campaign was never about
Morsi. It was about the Brotherhood, and Morsi just happened to be the substitute candidate an unlikely accident of history
after the charismatic Shater was disqualied from the race. Tis is what makes it dicult to assess a Morsi presidency. Over the
past year, Shaters personal oce has become the address for a steady stream of big-shot investors and visiting dignitaries, including
senior U.S. ocials. Tose who have met him have come out both impressed and reassured.
It was Shater who plucked Morsi from relative obscurity to join the Brotherhoods Guidance Bureau, the organizations top decision-
making body, and then selected him to lead the Brotherhoods political arm. Up until now, there has been little daylight between
the two men. But will Shater be able to maintain his sway if Morsi ascends to Egypts highest oce? Some Brotherhood members
are already chang at the idea of Shater whom supporters and detractors alike portray as a brilliant but domineering operative
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serving as the power behind the throne: If Morsi is able to free himself from the shadow of Shater, his policies will be balanced. If
Shater stays in control, Morsi will become increasingly unpopular and fail to govern eectively, one Brotherhood member who has
worked with both gures told me. Will Morsi become the son who surpassed the father?
On the campaign trail, Morsi has proved a quick study and a hard worker. Campaign aides have worked to repackage him, coaching him
on his speaking style and how to use his hands in interviews. In the process, the candidate has grown more condent and its starting
to show. His May 30 appearance on Yosri Foudas television program showed a surprisingly uent speaker, a far cry from his earlier,
shaky media appearances. As one Brotherhood member remarked, Te new Morsi of today is dierent from the person I knew.
Although Morsi outperformed most polls in coming out on top in the rst round of elections, for the Brotherhood, his 25 percent
share of the vote amounted to something of a shock. Te groups internal projections, based on polling conducted weeks before the
vote, saw Morsi with a commanding lead it was only a question of how close he would get to 50 percent. Morsis lack of charisma
as well as the lack of respect he commands among non-Islamists was part of the reason for his disappointing showing. But
it was also the result of a series of more serious mistakes and miscalculations. Brotherhood ocials had become detached from
the changing tenor in the groups former strongholds in the Nile Delta, where the Brotherhood was overtaken by Ahmed Shaq,
Mubaraks last prime minister. Te Islamist-dominated parliament had failed to pass the sweeping reform legislation that many
had expected. Most controversial was an attempt to stack the constituent assembly with Brotherhood supporters, a classic case of
political overreach.
After the revolution, the Brotherhood like so many other political forces in Egypts toxic political scene became consumed by
paranoia, fearing that some combination of liberals, leftists, and old regime elements were out to get them. A democratic opening, as
welcome as it was, came with its own risks. Te rise of Brotherhood defector Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh as a viable candidate was
seen as an unprecedented threat to organizational unity and discipline.
Tis paranoia, mixed with an old-fashioned dose of political cynicism, seeped into the groups discourse on foreign policy.
When Egypts ruling military council lifted a travel ban on American NGO workers in an attempt to defuse a political crisis, the
Brotherhood-led parliament pounced, using the episode to call for a no-condence vote and demand the removal of the military-
appointed government. Brotherhood parliamentarians blamed the Egyptian government for giving into American pressure and
called on Egypt to refuse U.S. aid. I wish members of the U.S. Congress could listen to you now to realize that this is the parliament
of the revolution, which does not allow a breach of the nations sovereignty or interference in its aairs, said parliament speaker Saad
al-Katatni, a leading Brotherhood gure, in reaction to the debate.
Te Brotherhood has found itself doing a dicult dance, thinking one thing in private and saying another in public. Such mixed
messages are also a function of the love-hate schizophrenia that many Brotherhood members and Egyptians in general seem
to display toward the United States. I remember the early days of Barack Obamas presidency, when Brotherhood ocials would
complain bitterly about the White Houses disinterest in democracy promotion. For Obama, the issue of democracy is 15th on his
list of priorities, one Brotherhood ocial told me in May 2010. Teres no moment of change like there was under Bush.
It is true that the Brotherhood, along with most of Egypt, hates particular U.S. policies, particularly those related to Palestine.
It also tends to think that somehow usually through creative, indirect means the United States is responsible for various
nefarious plots against Egypt. But that doesnt mean that a Brotherhood-dominated government would immediately reorder
Cairos international alliances. For all the public vitriol, the Brotherhood actually feels more comfortable with America than it does
with Americas adversaries: Te U.S. is a superpower that is there and will be there, and it is not to anyones benet to have this
superpower going down, but we want it to go up with its values and not with its dark side, one senior Brotherhood ocial told me.
What are the values driving China across the globe? Its just pure prot. Te Russians and the Chinese, I dont know their values!
Western European and American core values of human rights and pluralism we practiced this when we were living there.
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Values aside, a Morsi administration simply would not be able to aord a rupture in relations with the United States. A Muslim
Brotherhood-led Egypt will need to rebuild its deteriorating economy, and U.S. and European loans, assistance, and investment will
be crucial to this eort. Teres also no certainty that a President Morsi could drastically alter Egypts foreign policy even if he wanted
to regardless of what Egypts new constitution says, the military and the intelligence services will continue to exercise veto power
over critical defense and national security issues.
While there are limits to how much the Brotherhood can alter Egypts foreign policy, there are also limits to how far it can go in
satisfying U.S. concerns. As Egypt becomes more democratic, elected leaders will have no choice but to heed popular sentiment on
foreign policy. And in an otherwise divided polity, the only real area of consensus is the need for an independent, assertive foreign
policy that re-establishes Egypts leading role in the region. Tat means tension and disagreement with the United States will become
a normal feature of the bilateral relationship. Te model to look to is Turkey, led by the Islamically oriented Justice and Development
Party, which has employed anti-Israel rhetoric to useful domestic eect.
Te eect of a Morsi presidency on domestic policy is similarly hazy. Egypts byzantine bureaucracy remains stocked with Mubarak
loyalists and could block any changes that Morsi tries to push through. As a former political advisor to the Brotherhood predicted to
me, the state machinery will devour him. To further confuse matters, Morsi is one of the rare presidential candidates who believes
in limiting the power of his own oce. In his TV interview with Fouda, he again stated his preference: an interim period with a
mixed presidential-parliamentary system, which would pave the way for a system in which the legislature held complete sway. A
Brotherhood-led assembly is set to draft a constitution that will dene the relative powers of elected institutions.
But, of course, Morsis opinion on the matter could change once he became president. Te Muslim Brotherhoods rst experience
in governance will be an experiment, and one the organization may not be prepared for. Elections have consequences. We just dont
know what theyll be. And, for that matter, neither does Morsi.
Brookings Institution. You can follow him on Twitter: @shadihamid.
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Yemens Islamists and the Revolution
By Laurent Bonnefoy, February 9, 2012
Islamist movements did not start Yemens revolution, but they have loomed large over its fate. Tawakkol Karman, an ex-member
of Islah, a coalition party that includes Yemens Muslim Brotherhood, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 for her tireless political
campaigning. Backers of outgoing President Ali Abdullah Saleh warned of the inexorable rise of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), even after the killing of ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki by a U.S. drone.
But as in much of the Arab world, the Yemeni revolution has presented both opportunities and challenges to its Islamists. At least
ve dierent Islamist trends have played important roles in the unfolding events and some have fared better than others. Tose
struggling to help Yemens political transition must recognize the diversity and internal struggles among these Islamist trends, and be
prepared to engage with them as part of the countrys political landscape.
Te Islamist trend most directly involved in the popular revolution is undoubtedly the Islah party. Islah qualies as the Yemeni
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, but should be understood as a coalition that includes conservative tribal leaders and prominent
businessmen. Islah began as a rather reluctant supporter of the revolutionary youth which was calling for the departure of Ali
Abdullah Saleh in the early days of 2011. As a key part of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), the platform of the unied opposition
established since the early 2000s, Islah appeared to be willing to make compromises and accept dialogue with the regime, then
becoming its main interlocutor.
As Saleh appeared to be losing grip in the late spring, however, Islah moved to capture a position as a central actor of the
revolutionary process. Its mobilizing capacity through its mosques, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and activists ended
up restructuring much of the revolution, both physically on Change Square in Sanaa, and in terms of agenda. No other structure
or movement seemed able to compete with it. Tis has made Islah a key broker in the political gamesmanship unfolding over the
transition, even as revolutionary youth complain that it has hijacked the revolution.
Sensitive to such critiques, Islahs leadership appears to have been willing to leave other players in the front row. It did not claim the
position of prime minister of the national unity government that was announced in November 2011. But there should be no doubts
about Islahs capacity to mobilize electors massively when general elections are organized. Te movement, with its tribal allies, is also
trying hard to challenge the narrative according to which alternatives to Saleh are inexistent or are lacking responsibility.
A less well-understood trend is the quietist Salas, with Yahya al-Hajuri of Dar al-Hadith institute in Dammaj at their head, who
have reasserted their stance of loyalty to the regime in order to ght what they describe as a chaotic situation. Tis branch of
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Salasm has played hard to delegitimize in religious terms the popular uprising, stigmatizing the revolutionary youth as well as the
Muslim Brotherhood for encouraging a process whose main beneciaries are, in their eyes, the enemies of Islam. Appearing as the
last supporters of the regime may end up being costly in the long run but could also see the quietist Salas emerge as the popular
advocates of stability should the situation deteriorate signicantly. Indeed, while precise data is hard to come by, it appears that the
quietist Salas have been losing ground over the past year.
But the Salas too are changing in the face of popular revolution. An oshoot of the quietist branch of Salasm has been increasingly
engaging in political activities for the last few years, neglecting issues of loyalty and criticism of party politics (hizbiyya). Tese
politicized Salas see the Yemeni revolutionary process as a new opportunity for overt engagement in the political sphere. With
the revolution, members of the Hikma and Ihsan associations, likely emboldened by the success of al-Nour party in Egypt, have
announced projects to create parties and participate in upcoming elections. Among them, Aqil al-Maqtari, with important support
in Taiz, has established the League for Renaissance and Change. Despite being fragmented along regional lines, these initiatives
are signicant and politicized Salas are likely to emerge as a new political force, one that analysts will need in the near future to
understand beyond criminalizing stereotypes.
Another trend are the jihadist movements, which are more or less linked to AQAP. Tey have engaged in a variety of processes
that have to a certain extent normalized them, fully embedding these actors in the Yemeni context and in what can be labeled
a continuum of violence, particularly in the southern governorates. Tey have used the revolutionary events to legitimize their
own historical narrative. Tis process has changed the meaning of an al Qaeda militant in Yemen and leaves space for possible
interactions and dialogue with other social and political actors.
Jihadi sympathizers have gained some control over territory in part because of the growing disorganization of the central state
and of its shrinking military resources. Eective control over territory (in Jaar for instance) has favored a change in focus toward
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ghting a guerilla war against the regime and its allies and, at the local level, developing public policies addressing grievances of
the population. Such a shift (which should not only be understood as the result of the assassination in September 2011 of Anwar
al-Awlaki, the so-called mastermind of the transnational outreach of AQAP) has in a way transferred militant energy and resources
on the Yemeni agenda. Tis process, which is not necessarily centralized or self-conscious, is likely to gain momentum and highlights
that confrontation, repression, and the drone attacks strategies are hardly able to address the complexity of the issues that are at stake
in revolutionary Yemen.
At another end of the Islamist spectrum, Zaidi revivalists (drawing from a Shiite background) with the so-called Houthi movement
have also been directly aected by the revolutionary process. Over the course of 2011, the diminishing military capacity of the
regime has forced it to focus on the capital, Sanaa, and therefore, in eect, to abandon much of the Saada governorate and its
surroundings to the Houthi rebels it had been ghting since 2004. Te Houthi leadership has simultaneously taken divergent
options claiming to accept to play the institutional game including, for instance, by favoring the initiative of Muhammad Miftah
to establish the Ummah party or letting some of its sympathizers reach out on Change Square in Sanaa toward non-Zaidi activists,
while at the same time engaging in violence with competing Sunni Islamist groups, particularly quietist Salas in Dammaj or
members of Islah in al-Jawf.
Te long-running, intense Yemeni crisis is thus radically reshaping the opportunities and the challenges to all Islamist trends.
Tese movements are likely to continue being central actors at the national level and to emerge as necessary interlocutors at the
international level. Te most signicant trend today appears to be one drawing, in the long run, the various Islamist movements
toward greater institutionalization, inclusion in the political process, and eventually participation in future elections. But if that
political process fails to take hold, the potential for mayhem and armed confrontation should not be neglected, including in the form
of inter-sectarian warfare.
Both diverging outcomes obviously depend on internal variables and on the attitudes of Yemenis. But international actors can make a
dierence. Te West should acknowledge the popular legitimacy of these Islamist movements, as well as their great internal diversity,
and be prepared to engage with them as an important part of Yemens future.
Laurent Bonnefoy is a researcher based in the Levant at the Institut franais du Proche-Orient, and author of Salasm in Yemen:
Transnationalism and Religious Identity (Columbia University Press).
Yemens Houthi movement and the revolution
By Madeleine Wells, February 27, 2012
Walking in January into the Shabaab al-Sumud tent in Yemens Maydan Taghayr Change Square I was greeted by eager faces
and talkative qat chewers. We love Americans, a Houthi supporter nodded his head vigorously, and, in doing so, revealed an
enormous poster on the tent ap behind him on which the groups infamous slogan was inscribed: God is Great, Death to America,
Death to Israel, a curse on the Jews. Seeing my eyes widen, he oered, We hate American policies, not people. Te roots of the
slogan lie in Americas war on the Iraqi people and support for Israeli policies against the Palestinians. Let me tell you what it is that
the Houthis want...
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Even the dedicated observer of Yemeni aairs can be forgiven for not fully grasping the complexity of the countrys political milieu
during this shaky revolutionary period. Researching Yemeni politics, one often feels stuck in an intractable game of telephone. Part
of this is the grammar of how information spreads in the Middle East, which is often informal and decentralized. But part of it can be
related to the political ecology of the country and the palpable gap between the geographical center and periphery. Te history of the
political evolution of the Shiite Houthi rebels of Saada province is no dierent. Unraveling what the Houthis want may indicate how
other independent and marginalized groups, like the southern separatists, will navigate a post-Saleh Yemen. Te political integration
of the Houthis is one among the myriad problems faced by newly minted President Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, who underwent
his ocial installation ceremony on February 27 in Sanaa. An assessment of Houthi interests also suggests a larger dierence than we
realize between the opposition movements in cities like Sanaa, Taiz, and Aden, and the supporters they claim to represent in rural areas.
Even before the mass protest movement calling for Ali Abdullah Salehs immediate ouster began heating in the spring of 2011 long
before dozens of provincial ocers quit their post or before there were battles between security forces and protesters from the Saudi
Arabian border to Aden Yemens central government exercised very limited control over vast swaths of Yemeni territory. In many
provinces, the Yemeni army has occupied little more than walled military garrisons, and ocers often had to ask permission from
local sheikhs before embarking on missions. However, Salehs regime has regularly attempted to brutally impose authority over many
of these regions. One area in which this strategy backred is the northwest most province of Saada a rugged region in northern
Yemen along the Saudi Arabian border. Starting in 2004, the war between Yemens central government and the rebels, called
Houthis after their assassinated leader, has displaced upwards of 300,000 people, destroyed Zaidi religious sites, and disrupted age-
old systems of tribal conict mediation. Te on again o again conict has spilled over into Hajjah, Amran, and al-Jawf provinces,
and even incited a brief Saudi air campaign in 2009. Troughout the war, Salehs regime arrested and forcibly disappeared people
from Yemens northern provinces and Sanaa thought to be connected to the Houthis, clogging the judiciary system and the jails with
hundreds of prisoners related to this conict.
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As my co-authors and I argued in a 2010 RAND report, the violence in the north damaged entire communities and local
economies... [causing] rst-order eects in the realm of human security and possible negative consequences for the resilience of
cultural norms that might, in other cases, diminish conict.
Saleh rallied support for the war rst by casting the Houthis as proto-Hezbollah foot soldiers for Iran a spurious claim dismissing
that Houthis are Zaidis and follow a doctrine quite dierent from Iranians and Lebanese Shiites and then by painting them as
separatists and terrorists. Despite the Houthis rather unsavory slogan, their early stated goals included regional autonomy, not
separatism, and freedom of religious Shiite education, which made them the enemy of radical Sunni Salas and al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). While those worried about Houthi secessionism have pointed to their long-standing and recently
renewed links with the southern secessionist Hirak movement, the Houthis describe themselves as independents in a rapidly
changing political process, not secessionists. Tere are still basic military garrisons and border guards in Houthi-controlled areas in
the north, but the Houthis are at peace with these forces. If they wanted to secede, the argument goes, they would have expelled the
remaining forces last year. Indeed, after the protest movement began in February 2011, Saleh withdrew his ghting garrisons from
the region in order to concentrate on his tough luck in Sanaa. Seeing an opportunity amidst the chaos, the movements charismatic
leader, Abdalmalik al-Houthi, immediately sent unarmed Houthi supporters down to Sanaa to participate in the revolution.
On the one hand, city-dwelling, college-educated 20 and 30-somethings sit in several pro-Houthi tents at Taghayr 24/7, watching
generator-powered al-Arabiya, and waxing rhapsodic about democracy, equality, and justice. A few of these youths have been
arrested for supporting the Houthis, and some have even visited Saada. But for the most part, the pro-Houthi Shabab al-Sumud
(literally Steadfast Youth) tent is frequented by Zaidi youth from urban areas like Taiz and Sanaa who have limited to no experience
with actual war. For them, the movement appeals to a sense of social justice; it oers one among many new outlets to express
disenchantment with the regimes repressive apparatus.
When asked about the Houthis goals in the revolution, Shabab al-Sumud youth leader Ali al-Imad emphasized that the group is
inherently religious, not political, with Zaidi revivalist roots. Indeed, the Houthi movement stems partly from a reaction to increasing
Sala presence in historically Zaidi-controlled Saada in the 1980s. At the same time, Imad pointed to the importance of the groups
political front. Houthis believe that Islam and politics are fundamentally compatible, and hope to get involved ocially in Yemeni
political life, that is, if they feel that political progress reects the spirit of the revolution as democratic and free. In this vein, they
were among the rst to boycott the Saudi-penned, United States-backed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement for Yemen
because as Imad put it: We are anti-oppression, for freedom of expression, and against American invasions and foreign inuence.
Te GCC agreement is none of these.
Beyond the southern movement, the Houthis in Change Square have formed a number of coalitions with parties of diverse political
bends. In early January they joined in a coalition with the Baath party and the Union of Popular Forces (a Zaidi party) against al Islah
Islamist party; they have had links with the Socialists (Hizb al-Ishtiraki) for the past several years; and they also allegedly held talks
with the Joint Meeting Parties in January. A fuss was recently made about al-Houthis letter of support for the newly formed Zaidi
Ulema-led party, al-Ummah. But al-Houthi and Imad have made it quite clear that this party does not represent them either. All of
these alliances are tactical, suggested Imad, and when the Houthis are ready to participate in politics, they will create their own party.
Much of this information tracks with press oce releases and speeches by Al-Houthi. Al-Houthi met with ocials from the
European Community this month and promised U.N. envoy Jamal Bin Omar in December that his supporters would indeed form
a political party and participate in the forthcoming national reconciliation dialogue. During a packed February 3 celebration of the
prophets birthday (Mawlid al-Nabuwi) a holiday repressed by Saleh during his war on the North al-Houthi called for the
creation of a civil state in Yemen. Al-Houthis media outt, Ansar Allah (Supporters of Allah), also released several key conciliatory
statements, on their willingness to accept Ali Muhsin al-Ahmars apology for the Saada wars and suggesting that despite Houthi
opposition to the election, polling centers in Sadaa were operational and the rights of voters would be protected.
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On the other hand, there remain troubling indicators in and around Saada suggesting the Houthis are neither so moderate nor so
democratically inclined. Despite some rhetorical support for the countrys political transformation, their rather vehement boycotting
of the GCC process including the February 21 referendum their increasingly hard-handed style of rule in the north, and
smoldering sectarian violence sets them apart from other opposition groups.
First, Houthi reticence until now to meaningfully engage in political life through the elections and forming a party suggests they
remain uncertain about their political motives. Te Houthis and other independents are right in emphasizing that uncompetitive,
one-candidate presidential elections were merely procedural. What will be signicant is a change in institutions, including military
restructuring, judicial and constitutional reforms that give the state autonomy from previous factions within it. Yet, despite al-
Houthis statement that the group would not prevent the voting process, reporting suggests only one polling station was open in
Saada on February 21, and voters in the area were allowed to forgo dipping their ngers in ink for fear of Houthi retribution. A
massive march held in Saada city to boycott the elections, and reports of Houthis storming Islah party headquarters to tear up Hadi
campaign posters and replace them with posters about boycotting the election, is evidence of voter intimidation and the silencing of
non-Houthi supporters.
Further, Houthi supporters have yet to form a political party and step beyond the merely tactical alliances in Change Square. Indeed,
given the patterns of patrimonialism in Yemeni politics, links to the central government are perhaps the only way to bring the
requisite reconstruction money to the devastated northwest. As a contact in Sanaa whose brother fought with the Houthis asked,
What do they want out of the revolution, if not political parties?
Second, while the relative security, electricity, and increased social services are a step up from a near decade of battles with the
government, anecdotes suggest that Saada today is being run with an iron st. For example, the strategic city of Dahyan, commonly
referred to as the Zaidi Najaf for its historical religious importance, has a 6 p.m. curfew for women, and non-Zaidis are not
allowed to live in the city. An interviewee whose family is from Dahyan noted that the Houthi Death to America, Death to
Israel slogan is sung at every prayer by men who pump their right sts in the air like Hezbollah. Anti-American rhetoric remains
pervasive in Houthi statements. In February, the Houthis started an online campaign to expel the U.S. ambassador from Yemen,
and further internationalized their propaganda by supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and publically condemning the
burning of Qurans by U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. While the northwest has always been extremely conservative and wary of outside
interference, it is unclear how such Zaidi fundamentalism and xenophobic rhetoric can be conducive to integration into a larger
Yemeni democratic process.
Finally, while al-Houthi consistently argues that the group has no political goals and is only temporarily controlling the northwestern
provinces until a more appropriate gure can assume control U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Gerald Feierstein expressed concern
about conicts between Houthis and others in the north and a fairly aggressive eort on their part to expand their territory and
their control. Fear of Houthi encroachment upon pockets where residents do not support them has recently led to spats between
Sala Sunnis at the Damaj madrasa in Saada, with hundreds dead from both sides since the fall of 2011. Sectarian ghting between
pro and anti-Houthi tribes in January spread to the province of Hajja and displaced an estimated 2,000 people, adding to the nearly
200,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) there from previous rounds of ghting. Te sectarian nature of these conicts threatens
to evolve into a proxy war in a way that the previous battles between the Houthis and the government of Yemen did not. Te
immense scale of online propaganda about the conict suggests increased Saudi interest and thus Sunni internationalization of what
used to be a highly localized conict. On the Shiite side, reports about an intercepted Iranian ship carrying mortars and weapons
for Houthi re-supply have lead to new speculation about Iranian exploitation of the conict. Te ratcheting up of rhetoric about
Iranian links to the Houthis essentially depicting them as foreign without hard evidence is an impediment to Houthi political
integration and that should be avoided.
Ultimately, despite so much speculation about what the Houthis want, it is not clear they actually know. Tose sympathetic to the
Houthis have argued that the revolution has changed them it has encouraged the once defensive movement to put down its arms,
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begin to articulate its goals, and come to terms with a political process however slowly it is progressing. Tis may have serious
benets for them in the future, including autonomy, lasting security, and much-needed reconstruction. According to their detractors,
however, we should look to ghting on the ground in Saada and Hajjah, as well as Houthi reticence to take part in the mainstream
operations of the changing political scene, as evidence of the groups nefarious modus operandi. Perhaps neither extreme is the
case. In the wake of humanitarian crisis, sectarian tension, and persistent paranoia about Saudi and U.S. intervention, Sadans are
more likely simply trying to rebuild their communities, and redene themselves and their place in the Yemeni state, and vis--vis
the international community. Tis contrast between the context of the center and the periphery may explain some of the disconnect
between Houthi rhetoric and Houthi action. Indeed, while the youth movement preaches unity, democracy, and peace, Abdalmalik
al-Houthi has thus far proven non-committal to the institutional paths needed to achieve these things.
Madeleine Wells is a PhD student at George Washington University.
Tawakkols Revolutionary Pluralism
By Stacey Philbrick Yadav, December 16, 2011
Watching Tawakkol Karman jump to her feet and clap along throughout Jill Scotts anthem, Hate on Me, at the Nobel Peace
Concert on Sunday, December 11, 2011, was a moment I will most certainly never forget. As a visibly emotional Scott sang with
deance, You cannot hate on me, cause my mind is free. Feel my destiny, so shall it be... the room was electric, each of us watching
to see the faces and reactions of the extraordinary women for whom we were told this song was specically requested.
But aside from the unifying fact that the three recipients of this years Nobel Peace Prize Tawakkol Karman, Leymah Gbowee, and
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf have each persisted in the face of personal and political adversity, it has sometimes been hard to determine
the common thread connecting their work. Troughout a range of festivities during the weekend, I was frequently asked how
Karman, in particular, t in.
Te 2011 co-recipients were commended for their non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for womens rights to full
participation in peace-building work. And yet, as I argued in October 2011 and as Karman made perfectly clear in her own remarks
on December 10, her project in Yemen is not really about womens rights, per se. It rests instead on a conception of non-violent
revolution that views society as a holistic unit composed of dierently-situated citizens, dened by gender, region, class, tribal
aliation, ideology, and more, endowed with the right to make claims against their government. And as she led 6,000 people in the
Oslo Spektrum through a call-and-response chant straight from Change Square, we raised our arms aloft for peaceful revolution,
democracy, rule of law, and comprehensive development rights to which Karman believes all women, but also all men, are entitled.
But understanding why and how Karmans project speaks implicitly to womens rights is important in this transformational moment
in the Middle East, a moment in which authoritarian regimes are being challenged, and Islamists appear to be ascendant. We should
remember that Karman has been roundly criticized in Yemen for her approach by hardliners in the Islamist party from which she
has risen, who have found her visibility as a woman unseemly or inappropriate, and by secular womens rights advocates who are
nervous about the Islamist tone of her approach. Karmans holistic language is indeed consistent with longstanding arguments put
forth by Islamist modernists across the region, who argue that society is ordered by relationships of interdependence and mutual
respect but not necessarily full legal equality. But in words and in deeds, she also departs in an essential and revolutionary way from
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Islamist armations of tolerance, emphasizing pluralism instead. Te message of tolerance is that some actor or class of actors has
the power to permit (and, implicitly, the power to deny) others to share social or political space. Tis is not an articulation of the
others right to dierence. One of Karmans key themes, by contrast, is the necessity of arming one anothers right to be dierent -
and diversely so.
Tis concept of diverse dierence is one that has been central to the work of another Nobel laureate, Amartya Sen, who has argued
against solitarist ways in which we regard each other through one and only one lens. Instead, Sen argues for institutions that allow
each person to dene for herself the many ways in which she may be dierent from (or similar to) others and thus to deliberate
publicly and make meaningful choices between competing forms of political solidarity. It is with this in mind that he oered in his
2010 work, Te Idea of Justice, a forceful philosophical argument for his longstanding contention that democracy is both a means and
an end of development.
Tese two ideas that individuals are diversely dierent, and that democracy is both a means and an end are central to Tawakkol
Karmans worldview and work, but also to Islamist political commitments that have been expanding in the Middle East in 2011 (and,
indeed, over several years, if cross-ideological opposition alliances across the region are any indication). Without question, Karman
does not represent all or even most Islamist thinking but her star is rising, as is her message.
So is Karman an Islamist, a woman, a journalist, an activist, a revolutionary working for womens rights? She is unquestionably
working for the rights of women to self-denition and political agency. She inhabits many (sometimes compatible and sometimes
contradictory) social roles, and assumes that each of her fellow Yemenis and each of us, more broadly is as diversely dierent
as she is. Tis fact of diverse dierence is thus ironically unifying, and it is only through democratic institutions that the multitude
possibilities of our coming together can genuinely emerge.
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Karman is articulating this revolutionary pluralism against a legacy of state feminism in Yemen (and throughout the region), where
women have largely been positioned as objects of state discourse and policy, with nominal opportunities to shape policy outcomes.
Tis has been true even with regard to the most gender-progressive policies, like those in Tunisia, where womens gains as women
have been guaranteed by at, not through deliberation or choice. Her revolutionary pluralism promises to expand opportunities for
women to dene themselves, to become agentive subjects empowered to join with others (women and men) along axes of politics
that matter most to them. Karmans project oers this even as she avoids singling out gender as a category of singular signicance.
And democracy is essential to peace, insofar as it allows for the meaningful expression of diverse dierence that is so important
to coexistence. Pluralism, and the institutions which are required to protect and nurture it, allow women (and men) the right to
multiply, not reduce, the complex ways in which they see themselves and others. During the weekend of the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize
Award Ceremony, a woman who has in the span of two short months become one of the regions most visible leaders armed that
each person must have the unassailable right to be dierent. It is hard to imagine how a political order built on this vision would be
anything short of revolutionary.
Stacey Philbrick Yadav is an assistant professor of political science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges and was a contributor to
the SHEROES exhibition at the Nobel Peace Center in Oslo, Norway.
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Getting Libyas Rebels Wrong
By Najla Abdurrahman, March 31, 2011
Te remarks by Admiral James Stavridis, NATOs supreme allied commander for Europe, alleging ickers in the intelligence of potential
al Qaeda, Hezbollah among Libyan rebels are indicative of a disturbing trend in much of the discussion and reporting on Libya
in March, 2011. Ambiguous statements linking Libya and al Qaeda were repeatedly made in the media without clarifying or providing
appropriate context to such remarks. In many instances, these claims were distorted or exaggerated; at times they were simply false.
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Te admirals comments and the subsequent headlines they engendered represent a new level of irresponsibility, constructing
false connections, through use of highly obscure and equivocal language, between al Qaeda and Libyan pro-democracy forces
backed by the Transitional National Council. Te latter is itself led by a group of well-known and respected Libyan professionals and
technocrats. Even more far-fetched is the admirals mention of a Hezbollah connection, or icker as he put it.
Statements of this type are troubling because of their tendency to create alarmist ripple eects. Such perceptions, once created, are
nearly impossible to reverse and may do serious damage to the pro-democracy cause in Libya. Tat Stavridis qualied his comments
by stating that the oppositions leadership appeared to be responsible men and women will almost certainly be overshadowed by
the mention of al Qaeda in the same breath. One must wonder, then, what precisely was the purpose of the admirals vague and
perplexing remarks.
Tere is a pressing need for ocials and commentators to clarify connections drawn between Libya and al Qaeda and to provide
more accurate and responsible analysis. And its not just Stavridiss reference to al Qaeda that is problematic; two similar claims
making the media rounds also demand careful scrutiny. One involves an anti-Qadda organization called the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) that confronted and was crushed by the regime in the 1990s. Te second involves disturbing reports of the
recruitment of Libyan youth by al Qaeda in Iraq, some who left their homes to take part in suicide missions in that country. Neither
is connected to the current uprising, but both are frequently mentioned when discussing it.
Lets start with the LIFG, whose activities were recounted to me by a former member of the groups leadership council now residing
in London, Noman Benotman, in a lengthy interview I conducted with him in December 2009.
Te exact date of the LIFGs formation is unclear, but its roots can be traced back to the 1980s. In preparation for launching attacks
against the Qadda regime, many members of the still nascent group traveled to Afghanistan to join the U.S.-backed mujahideen in
their struggle against the Soviets and to undergo military training before returning to Libya.
In the early 1990s, LIFG members, among them Benotman, Saad Furjani, and others, developed extensive plans to expand the
organization and prepare it for armed struggle; these were to be executed in several phases until the group was in a position to confront
the regime directly. However, in 1995, the groups activities were prematurely exposed when LIFG members led by Furjani and disguised
as state security services stormed a Benghazi hospital and rescued Khaled Baksheesh, a fellow member who had been arrested and was
in critical condition after being beaten by police who had discovered a concealed weapon in his possession. In response, state security
services began a sweep of the region, and several LIFG cells were eventually discovered in cities throughout the country, including
Benghazi, Tripoli, Darnah, Zawiyah, and Sabha. Te groups leadership council, most of whose members were in Sudan at the time,
elected to declare its presence as an organization in October of that year, making public its intention to topple the regime. Over the next
few years, Libyan security forces crushed the would-be rebellion, arresting or killing most of the LIFGs membership.
Given that the Qadda regime was attempting to contain a homegrown opposition that threatened its continued survival,
its decision to repair its damaged relations with the West beginning in the late 1990s was in essence a pragmatic one. Tis
rapprochement necessitated, among other things, cooperation with Western anti-terrorism eorts: Te LIFG was soon declared a
terrorist organization by the U.S. government.
In 2005, Saif al-Islam al-Qadda, leader Muammars son, proposed a dialogue between the regime and the imprisoned LIFG
membership, which numbered in the hundreds. He approached Benotman, who had been out of the country when the LIFG
was discovered and had since settled in London; Benotman agreed to act as a liaison between the government and the prisoners
beginning in January 2007.
Te result of this dialogue was the release in September 2009 of a 400-page document titled Corrective Studies in Understanding
Jihad, Accountability and the Judgment of People. Te study authored by imprisoned senior LIFG members and intellectuals
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Abd al-Hakim Balhaj, Abu al-Mundhir al-Saidi, Abd al-Wahab al-Qayed, Khalid al-Sharif, Miftah al-Duwdi, and Mustafa Qanaid
analyzes various concepts related to jihad and Islamic law in an eort to delegitimize the use of armed struggle to overthrow
the regimes of Muslim states. Te LIFG recantation made headlines throughout the Arab world, and several prominent Muslim
clerics, including Yusuf al-Qaradawi, praised the study. Even the Western media took notice. Others doubted the sincerity of the
recantation, arguing that it was coerced or done simply to secure prisoner releases.
As the Wests darling in Libya a country that over the last decade had actively sought to burnish its image on the international
stage Saif al-Islam was able to manipulate the story of the LIFG in order to make the claim that the Qadda regime had succeeded
not only in thwarting al Qaeda in Libya, but in rehabilitating it to boot. In reality, this was little more than a public relations stunt
designed to bolster Qaddas image as an eective hedge against terrorism, an ironic proposition given his past involvement in
terrorist activities.
Although the LIFG had advocated the use of force against the regime, its former leaders have been quick to distinguish their
group from radical organizations like al Qaeda, despite having trained in some of the same camps in Afghanistan and Sudan in the
1980s and 1990s. Tey point out that the LIFG never advocated the use of violence against Libyan or non-Libyan civilians, never
participated in al Qaeda attacks, and had no interest in waging war on either Libyan society or the West its target had been
Qadda and Qadda alone. Te LIFG never joined al Qaeda; in fact, LIFG leaders like Benotman have publicly denounced the
organizations use of indiscriminate violence and have in the past actively sought to distance themselves from the group, objecting
vehemently to statements by al Qaedas No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, that the two groups had merged.
Despite the LIFGs repudiation of al Qaeda, the latter did manage to inltrate Libyan society in other, limited ways. In 2008,
Newsweek reported the discovery of documents in northern Iraq suggesting that out of 606 al Qaeda militants listed, 112 had come
from Libya. More striking was that nearly half of these were from Darnah, a city of 50,000 known even among Libyas neglected
eastern regions for having suered considerably under Qaddas tenure. Even more troubling was that many of these young men
appeared to have volunteered for suicide missions.
It seems that though Qadda was successful in crushing his own internal opposition, he made little eort to stanch the trickle of
would-be militants out of the country. Not only did the regime fail to prevent al Qaeda recruiters from preying on disillusioned
young men, but it also arguably contributed to the problem by fueling the discontent and hopelessness endemic to Libyan society,
where unemployment hovers around 30 percent and a deceptively high gross domestic product (GDP) belies the reality that most of
the countrys oil wealth has not trickled down to the average citizen.
Why would young Libyans decide to abandon their homes and their families to kill and be killed in a foreign country? Te reasons
are complex, varied, and tragic, but there is little doubt that a deep sense of despair stemming from a lifetime of repression and
lack of economic opportunity played a signicant role. Although 112 individuals in a country of 6.5 million represents a negligible
proportion of the population, the recruitment of young men by al Qaeda is nevertheless a source of grave concern among Libyans,
just as it is for Europe, the United States, and other countries that have grappled with similar problems.
Although Libya is in some ways a traditional society, al Qaeda remains deeply unpopular among its people, many of whom have been
keen to stress that this uprising is in no way connected to the terrorist organization. Indeed, they have repeatedly scoed at Qaddas
absurd accusations to the contrary. Te Libyan revolution is a decidedly nationalist, democratic movement, two characteristics
that render it fatally incompatible with al Qaedas delusional goal of resurrecting a pan-Islamic caliphate; the Libyan people have no
intention of allowing their movement to be hijacked by al Qaeda. Tat a handful of rebel ghters may have a history with the LIFG
does not mean that the Transitional National Council or the pro-democracy ghters are connected to al Qaeda, yet this is precisely
what the Qadda regime would have the international community believe. Indeed, the council released a statement refuting
allegations aimed at associating al Qaeda with the revolutionists in Libya, and arming its commitment to combating terrorism and
implementing Security Council resolutions on counterterrorism.
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After his remark about ickers of al Qaeda, Stavridis admitted that he lacked the detail sucient to say that theres a signicant al
Qaeda presence or any other terrorist presence in and among these folks. But the absence of evidence cannot be passed o as the
presence of information. Ambiguous and misleading statements like the admirals do a grave disservice to the Libyan people and
their cause by eectively and unfairly lumping them together with al Qaeda in the public consciousness; they also do a disservice
to those who seek a better understanding of Libya and its people. Libyans have already had to contend with the Qadda regimes
ridiculous allegations that their movement is nothing more than an al Qaeda plot fueled by widespread hallucinogenic drug use
lets not join him in denigrating their cause.
Najla Abdurrahman, a Libyan-American writer and activist, is a doctoral student in Columbia Universitys Department of Middle
Eastern, South, Asian, and African Studies. She lives in New York City.
Ex-Jihadists in the New Libya
By Omar Ashour, August 29, 2011
Abd al-Hakim Belhaj, the commander of Tripolis Military Council who spearheaded the attack on Muammar al-Qaddas
compound at Bab al-Aziziya, is raising red ags in the West. Belhaj, whom I met and interviewed in March 2010 in Tripoli along
with Saif al-Islam al-Qadda, is better known in the jihadi world as Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq. He is the former commander of the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a jihad organization with historical links to al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Egyptian al-Jihad
organization. Does his prominent role mean that jihadists are set to exploit the fall of Qaddas regime?
Established in 1990 and ocially dismantled in 2010, the LIFG was modeled along the lines of the Egyptian al-Jihad: secretive, elitist,
and exclusively paramilitary. Te group led a three-year, low-level insurgency mainly based in eastern Libya and tried three times
to assassinate Qadda in 1995 and 1996.By 1998, the LIFG was crushed in Libya. Most of its leaders and members ed and joined
forces with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Tey even gave a religious oath of loyalty (baya) to Mullah Omar. After 9/11 and the invasion
of Afghanistan, Belhaj and most of the LIFG leaders ed that country as well, only to be arrested in 2004 by the C.I.A and then
handed over to Qaddas regime, following interrogations in Tailand and Hong Kong.
In 2010, Saif al-Islam was trying to apply the Egyptian model of deradicalization on the LIFG and then sell it to the West. Like
the Egyptian Islamic group, six of the LIFG leaders authored a 416-page document delegitimating armed opposition to Qaddas
regime and other rulers by theological and ideological argumentations, regardless of their standards of oppression. Te book, which
was titled, Corrective Studies in Understanding Jihad, Enforcement of Morality, and Judgment of People, was paraded, along with
its authors, by Saif al-Islam in front of Western diplomats and experts. Al-Tuhami Khaled, who was at the time the head of Libyas
Internal Security, publicly described the whole process as heretics repenting.
I met with Belhaj in one of these so-called reconciliation conferences. When I asked him about the status of the LIFG, he replied
that it had been dismantled. When I asked about the future, he was not sure. He had been released less than two hours before from
the notorious Abu Salim prison, where many of his followers chanted earlier to journalists cameras, Teach us our leader; teach us
how to build our futures. And by our leader they meant Qadda, not Belhaj.
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Te tyrant ed, and we will be after him, said a victorious Belhaj to the media following the storming of Bab al-Aziziya. But neither
arrogance nor vengeance dominated his tone. He repeatedly called for enhancing security, protecting property, ending vendettas,
and building a new Libya. Te moderate tone was generally consistent with what most of the LIFG leaders have stated in the last
six months, whether in eastern or western Libya. Te experiences of the LIFG leaders in armed conicts in Afghanistan, Libya, and
Algeria have forced them to mature politically, recalculate strategically, moderate behaviorally, modify their ideological beliefs, and
change the title of the organization to the Islamic Movement for Change.
However, enforcing the moderate behavior and rhetoric of the less-experienced followers in the newly open Libyan environment
will be a challenge for the leadership. In 2010, both Belhaj and Sami al-Saadi, the principal ideologue of the LIFG, complained to me
about younger members and other jihadists challenging their authority. Tis occurred within repressive prison conditions that were
supported by the pressures and the inducements of Qaddas Internal Security. In the current and drastically dierent lawless war
zone that has placed small and midsize arms in the hands of virtually everyone, the conditions change signicantly, and so do the
loyalties and the hierarchies.
Te other challenge for the LIFG is transforming from a militia to a political party. A former member of the group relayed his
concerns stating, Tey dont have the experience. Tey were trained as ghters and theologians, not politicians. So when it comes to
democracy, constitution, and elections, theyve got nothing to say.
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In the aftermath of Qadda, interactions between the National Transitional Council (NTC) and armed Islamist organizations can
take three trajectories: reintegration, inclusion, or clash. Te experience of South Africa and reintegration of the African National
Congress (ANC) ghters comes to mind as a relatively successful case, providing some useful lessons. Reintegration in the military
and security apparatuses will depend on their actual size and contributions, and of course, on the political will and calculations of the
NTC. Tis path would not only be problematic for the NTCs Western partners, but also for the security and intelligence personnel,
who will have to deal with the former terrorists as colleagues.
Te second trajectory is political inclusion. Tis will also face some hurdles. Among those is the willingness of the mid-rank and
the grassroots to participate in a democratic political process after being indoctrinated for decades with the idea that democracy is
inherently anti-Islamic. But signs of successful jihadist transformation come from neighboring Egypt. Te Islamic Group, a much
larger armed Islamist organization whose leaders authored a big section of the anti-democratic literature, successfully dismantled
its armed wing and nally formed a politically party (the Construction and Development). Tis can be a model to follow for Libyan
armed Islamist militias, if their leadership so chooses.
Te third scenario is probably the worst for Libya the clash. A civil war, even a mini one, to oust Islamists would be as disastrous
for Libyans and their neighbors as was the Algerian civil war in the 1990s. Unfortunately this scenario is not unlikely. A detailed
study on resistance to authoritarianism by Columbia University has shown that the probability of a country relapsing into civil war
following a successful anti-dictatorship armed campaign is 43 percent. Te study arrives at this gure after surveying 323 cases of
armed and unarmed opposition campaigns between 1900 and 2006. Most of the lucky countries that escaped that civil war fate
went through a successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process and, in parallel, a serious attempt at
democratization. Both processes will be critical in determining the future of Libya and its Islamistsin the aftermath of Qadda.
Te NTC with the support of NATO has a good chance of avoiding an Iraq-like or an Algeria-like scenario in Libya. Te pillars of
their policies toward the multiple armed Islamist groups following the end of the conict should be rapid disarmament and political
inclusiveness. Te disarmament process should be rewarding, and a wide variety of benets and selective inducements could be
proered in return. In the event that mediation is necessary, interactions between credible scholars and independent sheiks, and the
heads of the armed groups should be facilitated by the NTC to provide legitimacy for its policies. In all cases, the NTC is likely to
meet resistance, and its objectives should then be focused on minimizing and delegitimizing that resistance.
Omar Ashour is the director of the Middle East Graduate Studies Program at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University
of Exeter, and a visiting fellow in the Brookings Doha Center. He can be reached at [email protected].
Libyas Muslim Brotherhood faces the future
By Omar Ashour, March 9, 2012
Te Muslim Brothers established this party. We are a national civil party with an Islamic reference...we have Islamists and
nationalists, said Al-Amin Belhajj, the head of the founding committee for the newly announced Justice and Construction Party.
With the March 3

announcement, Libya seems set to follow the electoral path of Islamist success seen in Egypt, Tunisia, and other
Arab countries. After decades of erce repression of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) by the regime of Muammar al-Qadda, the
formation of a political party in Libya is a heady experience. What does it mean for Libyas future?
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Te Muslim Brotherhoods presence in Libya goes back to 1949. But their rst clear organizational structure was developed in 1968
and quickly froze in 1969 after the coup of Colonel Qadda. Te Brotherhood was never allowed to operate openly, and suered
extreme repression. Indeed, when State TV did broadcast something about them, it was the bodies of their leaders hung from street
lampposts in the mid 1980s. Qaddas media called them deviant heretics and stray dogs. Fleeing repression, the Libyan Muslim
Brotherhood was reborn in the United States, where members established the Islamic Group - Libya in 1980 and issued their
magazine Te Muslim. In 1982, many of the MB gures who were studying in the United States returned to Libya to reestablish the
organization in the country but ended up in prison or were executed.
Te Libyan Muslim Brotherhood made a comeback in 1999, and entered into a novel dialogue with the regime. Its rebirth was
bolstered in 2005 and 2006 by Saif al-Islam al-Qaddas initiatives, which aimed to coopt and neutralize opposition groups,
particularly Islamist ones. Tis led to doubts about their motivations during the 2011 revolution, charges which Brotherhood leaders
reject. No, we did not plan the revolution and we werent playing a double game with the regime, said Fawzi Abu Kitef, the head of
the Revolutionary Brigades Coalition in Eastern Libya and the former deputy defense minister in the National Transitional Council
(NTC). Abu Kitef was a leading gure in the Brotherhood who spent more than 18 years in Qaddas jails, including Abu Salim.
Indeed, from the outset, the Brotherhood was supportive of the NTC, with some of its icons joining it, such as Dr. Abdullah Shamia,
who was in charge of the economy le in the NTC.
Te Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (MB) modeled its new party after Egypts Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). It is much smaller than
its Egyptian counterpart, however. In 2009, Soliman Abd al-Qadr, the former General Observer of the Libyan MB, estimated the
numbers of MB gures in exile to be around 200 and inside Libya to be a few thousand, mainly concentrated in the professional
and student sectors. While those cadres will be critical for the movement and its party, they can hardly compare to the hundreds of
thousands of the Egyptian Brotherhood.
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During its rst public conference in Benghazi in November 2011, the Libyan MB restructured the organization, elected a new leader,
increased its consultative council membership from 11 to 30 leaders, and decided to form a political party. In their party elections,
Mohammed Swan, the former head of the Libyan MBs Consultative Council, narrowly defeated the former MB leader Soliman Abd
al-Qadr and two other candidates to become the leader of the new party, the Justice and Construction Party (JCP). Participation in
the party will be based on individual, not as group basis, said Bashir al-Kubty, the elected General Observer of the Libyan Muslim
Brothers. He meant that the party would not be a political front, and in particular not an Islamist front (like the Algerian Islamic
Salvation Front). Tey want it to be like the FJP in Egypt, 80 percent MB and 20 percent others...to be able to say that they are
inclusive, said Juma al-Gumati, a former representative of the NTC in London.
When Ali al-Sallabi, a leading Islamist activist once aliated with the MB, proposed a National Rally Coalition to include the MB and
other Islamists, the MB ultimately rejected the proposal. Te objective of the MB at the moment is to have control over its political
arm. It ostentatiously shuns alliances with ex-jihadists (like those of the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change LIMC) to avoid
any international outcry. It will also reject initiatives proposed by ex-aliates, like Sallabi, as this will send a wrong message to the
grassroots and the mid-ranks. Domestic and international legitimacy, expansion of audience, and control of members seem to be the
determinants of the Libyan MBs behavior in the current transitional period.
Te emerging Libyan political scene poses several major challenges to the MB. Unlike the MB in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia, the
Islamists of Libya have little history of interactions with the masses. Te MB of Egypt had a third life from the early 1970s, and during
the last four decades it worked hard, under hazardous conditions, to build mass support in universities, professional syndicates,
unions, and on the streets. Ennahda in Tunisia is not much dierent, although the mass-support building eorts were frozen in 1990.
Te Libyan MB did not have any similar chances to connect with the masses. Tey also did not have the opportunity to build their
organizational structures or institutions within Libya, or create a parallel network of clinics and social services.
Second, Libyan Islamists will have to deal with persistent questions about their commitment to democratic values, women rights, and
toleration of others. Te attempt to be inclusive was clear at the partys conference on March 2 and 3. Walid al-Sakran, non-member
of the MB, was a candidate for the partys leadership and ve women attempted to join the 45-member Consultative Council. Tree
were successful. Even if the leadership is committed to pragmatism, the grassroots and sympathizers expect the ideology to inuence
the behavior. Te challenge for the leadership is to legitimate its pragmatic behavior, including coalitions with non-Islamists, to their
followers. Te presence of many of these groups in exile in the West earlier, and the experience in ideological transitions may help ease
the tension between political pragmatism and ideological commitments. Tis particularly applies to the MB and the LIMC, but not
necessarily to the local Salas (who are more numerous than the members of both organizations, but lack a structure and leadership).
Tird, the constitution crafting process will pose thorny challenges. Te reference to the sharia as the principle source of legislation
in the constitutional declaration of August 2011 has raised a few eyebrows in the West and among Libyas liberals. A similar
reaction happened when Mustafa Abd al-Jalil, the Chairman of the NTC, talked about the superiority of sharia and the legitimacy
of polygamy in the liberation speech. Te MB, the LIMC, and Sala gures interviewed perceived this as a victory. Te laws of
Libya have to have an Islamic reference and that should be enshrined in the constitution, asserted al-Kubty. Te issue of the sharia
is settled. It will be the supreme source of legislation...there is no point in making this debatable or raising the Quran in Benghazi
and Sabha, said Dr Abd al-Nasser Shamata, the head of the Crisis Management Unit in the NTC. His statement was a response to
demonstrations of hundreds in Benghazi and Sabha demanding the implementation of the sharia.
If the Islamists win the elections of the National Assembly that will be held in July, as many analysts expect, the constitution is
more likely to be upheld with some provisions asserting religious identity of the state. Tis will continue a process of political and
ideological polarization that is already severely dividing the new Libya.
Omar Ashour is a visiting fellow in the Brookings Doha Center and the director of the Middle East Graduate Studies Program in
the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter (UK). He can be reached at [email protected]
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Libyas Constitutional Balancing Act
By Sean Kane, December 14, 2011
Te day-to-day priority in Libya has rightly been placed upon determining the future of the young, mostly civilian revolutionary
ghters who rose up to overthrow the Qadda regime. But what is imperative in the long term is the political contest to dene the
structure and power relationships of the new state through the writing of Libyas permanent constitution that will take place in 2012.
In November 2011, the interim government established an electoral committee charged with setting the formula to elect the drafters
of Libyas new national charter. It now bears the heavy responsibility of specifying how votes and participation in Libyas rst genuine
elections in over a half-century will be translated into seats and representation in its constitutional assembly.
Tis is a potentially pivotal question for Libyas political transition. Events in neighboring Egypt have already shown that a breakdown in
the perceived legitimacy of the supervision over the transition to a new constitutional order can bring revolutionaries back out into the
street en masse. Likewise, Libyas own historical experience suggests that the manner in which a constitutional assembly is chosen can sow
the seeds for future contention if the process is seen to predetermine answers to some of the countrys most sensitive debates.
From the very beginning Libyas 17th of February Revolution was more fraught and violent than those next door in Egypt and Tunisia.
Muammar al-Qaddas idiosyncratic rule subverted Libyan institutions to such an extent that all distinction was eroded between the
state and the regime. Unlike in Egypt or Tunisia, the Libyan army did not have a separate corporate standing that it could hope to
salvage by siding with the protesters. Rather, the Qadda regimes overthrow was only accomplished through its military defeat by
a collection of municipally and even neighborhood-level organized militias (supported by a NATO air campaign and a big nancial
boost from Qatar and the Gulf ).
Te remarkable bottom-up nature of the revolution has had obvious consequences for Libyas current situation, as illustrated by the
multitude of revolutionary brigades who openly jockeyed for inuence in the forming of the interim government. More subtly though,
it has also stirred historical regionalist tendencies in Libya. Strong local identities in cities like Benghazi, Misrata, Zintan and other
major towns are now increasingly interwoven with a narrative of who suered the most under Qadda, who sacriced the most in
ghting him, and, by extension, who is entitled to the fruits of the new order.
Tis is a sensitive debate in a country where local loyalties, pan-Arabism, and membership in the global Islamic community of the
faithful have often counted for more than a sense of common Libyan national identity. Under the Ottoman rule, Libya consisted of
the three wilayets (states) of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, roughly corresponding to the countrys current west, east, and south.
Geographically separated by Libyas vast and foreboding desert expanses, the three regions developed distinct social and political structures.
Given this history, the National Transitional Council (NTC) that spearheaded the 17th of February Revolution strategically presented
itself as a national movement. Headquartered in Benghazi, the capital of Libyas east, it repeatedly emphasized that victory would
not be declared until the west was liberated, that Tripoli would remain the national capital, and that it would not be satised with a
regional enclave (nor by implication that it was the successor to the autonomous emirate of Cyrenaica that popped up on multiple
occasions in eastern Libya during resistance to Italian colonial occupation last century).
After the fall of Tripoli in late August 2011, liberation was declared in Benghazi on October 23 and the NTC formally began the
process of relocating to Tripoli. Te councils own westward move has been followed by much of the international community
and media. As the oxygen of governance and global attention has shifted to Tripoli, old feelings in Libyas east of inequality and
marginalization have resurfaced. Many emphasize that they fought the revolution not just to overthrow Qadda, but also to replace
the mindset of dictatorial centralization they see as the linchpin of his 42-year reign. Street protests in Benghazi in early December
2011 complaining that the city is being forgotten, and the swift response of the NTC to name Benghazi as Libyas economic capital,
demonstrate how much of a livewire issue this is.
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Which brings us back to the election of the 200-person National Public Conference that will draft the constitution. With an estimated
two-thirds of Libyas six million people living in western Libya, the east and south argue that an electoral formula exacted purely on
population-based proportional representation could result in a conference capable of writing and passing a constitution without their
consent. At least in the east, there is real concern that this could result in a centralized system of government. As a result, nascent
political movements in the east and south of Libya have begun calling for a geographically dened system of electoral districts, where
each district would have the same number of representatives in the constitutional conference regardless of population size.
Tripoli and the west understandably have a dierent point of view. Tey have also seen how this played out before, and it did not end
well. In 1951, the provisional national assembly that drafted Libyas independence constitution may have been appointed rather than
elected, but it faced the same dilemma. Ten, as now, Tripolitania in the west possessed approximately two-thirds of the population
and favored a more centralized state. Its representatives unsuccessfully argued that the 60-member transitional assembly should
mirror the countrys population distribution.
Instead the regions of Cyrenaica in the east and Fezzan in the south managed to persuade the U.N. Commissioner overseeing
preparations for Libyas independence that each of the three regions should have 20 representatives in the assembly despite major
dierences in their population sizes. Tis choice of representation formula proved far-reaching. Cyrenaica and Fezzan were both
advocates for federalism and as a result of the decision had a clear majority in the provisional assembly. In essence, before pen was
put to paper on the 1951 Constitution, it was already eectively determined that the newly independent Libyan state would be a
federal monarchy.
Te representation decision was also not without controversy or long-term consequence. Pro-centralization political parties from
the west repeatedly attempted to reopen the representation debate during the preparation of the constitution and protested in
Tripoli after Libyas rst parliamentary elections in 1952. Te new pro-federal Sannusi monarchy seated in Benghazi responded to
the demonstrations by banning political parties, a prohibition which Qadda and the young ocers maintained after their 1969
military coup. Some six decades later, the 1952 polls remain Libyas only multi-party elections.
Moreover, historians now argue that the loose federal structure hampered Libyas eorts to consolidate the formal institutions of a
nation-state. Indeed, substantial revision to the constitution was soon required after its regionally oriented taxation scheme proved
unable to cope with the massive inow of oil revenue that began in the early 1960s. And for that matter, oil remains the elephant in
the room in Libyas still not quite out in the open regionalism debate. It is also easy to see why given that the sector generates over 60
percent of Libyas gross domestic product (GDP) and 90 percent of government revenue. Moreover, the petro-fueled public sector
dominates the Libyan economy and is by far the countrys largest employer. With the majority of Libyas proven oil reserves and its
largest export and rening facilities found in the east, there is fear elsewhere in the country that a decentralization of oil revenue
could hollow out the national government.
Tis cautionary historical tale and display of the complexity of the choices Libya now faces suggests that it will be important for
the NTCs newly appointed electoral committee to devise an electoral representation formula which does not sideline either
Libyas populous and urban west, its oil rich and traditionally autonomy-minded east, nor its oft overlooked south. Fortunately,
the constitutional declaration that guides Libyas transition primarily concerns itself with timelines for completing the permanent
charter. It does not prescribe detailed rules for how the constitution should be adopted, leaving room for creative solutions that could
promote balanced representation.
Te most direct option would be to tackle the representation conundrum head-on using a sliding scale. Under this approach all
constituencies would receive a baseline number of representatives in the constitutional conference regardless of their population
size, with constituencies above a certain population threshold receiving additional seats. Te aim would be to produce a formula
somewhere in between pure population based representation and equal geographic representation.
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Alternatively, there could be an upfront political agreement aimed at ensuring broad consensus on the constitutional text. For
example, a super-majority of two-thirds could be required to pass the draft constitution through the National Public Conference. A
similar option would be to focus on the stage of the constitutional referendum. In this scenario the constitution would not only have
to receive a two-thirds majority nationwide as currently specied by the constitutional declaration, but also be endorsed by voters in
a minimum number of provinces.
In future elections, Libyans could consider an electoral system for their parliament that rewards political movements and electoral
alliances that win votes from across the country rather than those whose support is concentrated in one area or region.
In the end it is paramount to recall that these are sovereign Libyan decisions. Te international community can only oer technical
advice and options to accomplish the objectives that the Libyans themselves set. But respect for Libyan ownership of the transition
does not preclude pointing out warning signs in the post-liberation dynamic.
In this vein, fears in parts of Libya that Qaddas marginalization of the periphery might reemerge is leading to vocal demands for
decentralization to ensure justice and equality between Libyas regions. If the new constitutional assembly is not seen across Libya
as representative, its ability to act as a forum to constructively hold the decentralization debate could be circumscribed. Likewise,
currently limited support for fringe groups such as the proto-federalism movement in the east calling for turning the clock back to
the monarchy era could grow.
After decades of living under an idiosyncratic regime that deliberately pursued a policy of divide and rule to maintain its grip on
power, many ordinary Libyans rose up in February 2011 to ght for a free and united Libya. Ensuring balanced representation in
the 2012 constitutional conference could prove an important step toward realizing this aspiration by forestalling any potential for a
harmful regional divide to emerge in the new Libya.
Sean Kane is a Truman Security Fellow and the Deputy Team Leader for Libya at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, an
independent mediation organization supporting dialogue in Libya. Tis article represents his personal views.
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Te Libyan Rorschach
By Sean Kane, June 12, 2012
Using a bright blue pen, the young man behind the cash register in the kebab shop on the outskirts of Tripoli began to methodically
scratch out the face of Muammar al-Qadda from his stack of one-dinar notes. About halfway through the pile, he greeted a bill that
had already been defaced with a happy nod and smile of satisfaction. After exhausting the one-dinar notes he turned to the 20s, and
began surgically excising a miniature Brother Leader from a summit group photo.
Prior to February 17, 2011 everything in Qaddas Great Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was physically painted a shade
of light green to symbolize the political system of stateless government laid out in the Brother Leaders Green Book. (Te term
jamahiriya was coined by Qadda and is usually loosely translated as state of the masses or peopledom.) Today, the country is
awash in the red, green and black tricolor scheme of the pre-Qadda era Libyan ag, which has been adopted by the revolutionaries
as their standard. In Tripoli, where several neighborhoods had loyalist rather than revolutionary reputations, these coats of fresh
paint and the common practice of doctoring car license plates to cover the word jamahiriya might raise an eyebrow. But what of the
kebab sellers currency handiwork, which appeared to be a private act of conviction?
From the outside, the picture in Libya looks unremittingly bleak. A near daily chronicle of rampaging militias, conict and chaos
headlines coverage by the wire services. But perhaps a casualty of the closure of foreign bureaus and the lesser interest that exists
when no U.S. boots are on the ground, some perspective is lacking from the often barebones news reports.
Eight months after the brutal death of Qadda marked the end of the civil conict that followed Libyas popular uprising, support for the
regime change appears to have if anything grown. Even if some of this backing falls into the everyone loves a winner category, a full 97
percent of Libyans surveyed by Oxford Research International in January thought the revolution was absolutely or somewhat right.
But is the mere fact of the revolution being broadly popular enough to make it right? Is it a sucient platform to produce a secure
and brighter future for Libya?
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*****
In spite of this deep and abiding popularity of its popular uprising, Libya nds itself in the midst of a national quarrel over its
revolutionary narrative and new founding myth.
In Benghazi, the city where the uprising against Qadda began, the eve of the one-year anniversary of the Libyan revolution is wet
and windy. In the downtown of the former rebel capital and the countrys second city, the large, almost all male crowd is celebrating
enthusiastically by dancing to a catchy ballad entitled O Benghazi. During breaks in the music they chant Benghazi is the mother
and stomp whether you like it or not, Benghazi was the spark as if trying to win an argument. But whom are they trying to convince
of Benghazis status as the Libyan revolutions primus inter pares?
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Benghazi claims precedence as the cradle of the revolution, and risked all by being the rst to rise. Moving westward, the strategic
port city of Misrata saw the most intense urban combat and damage. Its ability to hold out against a siege commanded by Qaddas
seventh son Khamis perhaps kept the country from being partitioned into east and west. Meanwhile, the yspeck town of Zintan
along the border with Tunisia became the revolutions military hub in western Libya. It was from this dusty mountain redoubt that
ghters swept into Tripoli in September 2011 to deliver a knockout blow to the regime.
Tese assertions of revolutionary credentials are about more than just honor and glory. It is also about who holds the greatest lien
on its success. Convinced that not enough has changed in Libya since they launched the revolution, Benghazi has recently birthed
a proto-federalism movement advocating for its own autonomous region. Misrata meanwhile holds the ministry of interior. It is
sometimes characterized by its critics as a virtual city-state and its brigades police large swathes of the center of the country. Zintans
revolutionary prize was the ministry of defense. Its ghters are deployed around the country at key infrastructure sites such as oil
elds in the south and even famously controlled Tripolis lucrative international airport for several months.
During a visit to Libyas western mountains in early spring, a young Zintani activist put a pointed (if mistaken) question to me that
seems to capture the new orders operating assumption: Doesnt the American constitution give the states that supported your
revolution more rights?
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Tis lack of state institutions, and above all, a national identity, is perhaps the most lasting and pernicious legacy of the Qadda
jamahiriya. In fact, Qaddas spasmodic state of perpetual change was a deliberate construction. His populace was kept perpetually
o kilter by the near constant reshuing of cabinets, provincial boundaries and systems of administration. Street names, place
names, universities, and even the names of the months were always in ux, creating an almost physical feeling of disorientation. Tis
pious Muslim country even started fasting for the holy month of Ramadan on a dierent day from the rest of the Middle East.
Tere was a method to this madness. Troughout all the chaos, the only xed point for the Libyan people to take a bearing from was
the unchanging axis of Qadda himself. And on a certain level this anti-system made sense. Qadda hailed from the remote desert
town of Sirte in central Libya. He had no connection to the countrys western economic elites in Tripoli or the prominent families in
the east that made up the court of the Libyan monarchy that he overthrew. His own tribe, the Qadadfa, is small and holds little sway.
Since Qadda had no natural allies among the Libyas elite networks, he set out to unmake and unmoor them.
A country simply cannot emerge from over four decades of scrambling in this Green blender without shellshock. Following the
deliberate subversion of state institutions, Libyans retreated into identities and safety nets based on religion, kin, and geography.
Condence in government disappeared. Broader social trust bottomed out. Polls now remarkably nd that fewer than one in ve
Libyans believe that other people can be trusted. Qadda bequeathed Libya, as one of the architects of landmark elections scheduled
for later this month describes it, a state of ashes.
Tis misshapen inheritance provides some perspective on Libyas current troubles. In keeping with the overall fragmentation of
its society, neither the rivalries among the new powers that be nor the pockets of ghting that have sprung up around Libya are
surprising. What is noteworthy that these disputes are locally driven rather than motivated by challenges to the new state or its
territorial integrity. Because Qaddas erratic rule inspired feelings of shame and embarrassment rather than any sense of national
belonging, the ideological basis for an armed counterrevolutionary movement is simply not present.
Libyas ongoing skirmishes are thus a distinct phenomenon from the poisonous nationwide insurgencies that engulfed Iraq and
Afghanistan during the last decade. Instead of clearing areas of insurgents and building islands of stability, the new Libyan authorities
face the less daunting task of quarantining largely unconnected outbreaks of violence. Even where formerly pro-regime towns
or tribes have become part of the clashes, it has generally been with the aim of asserting a position in the new order rather than
dreaming of overthrowing it.
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Consider Sirte, Qaddas hometown and nal refuge in last years ghting. Situated in the middle of central Libyas vast desert basin,
Sirte was historically the midway point of the thousand-mile plus journey between Tripoli and Benghazi. Over the past few decades
it has beneted from lavish largesse and now incongruously boasts an international airport and a mammoth convention center that
once played host to all of Africa and the Arab Worlds leaders. Te town even has academic centers devoted to the study of Qaddas
Green book. If one were looking for tendrils of opposition you would expect to nd them here.
Sirtawis instead seem resigned to the reality that there is no going back to the way things were and generally want to be left alone.
Teir political grievances include resentment that Misrati transplants dominate Sirtes new local government and complaints that
people from the town go missing at the checkpoints of Misrati ghters that now ring Sirte. But this appears to be as far as their
political horizon extends. Sirtawis seem largely apathetic toward the countrys new leaders and talk little of national politics. Instead
they are pushing to have an elected local town council in order to lessen Misrati inuence in the city. A local intellectual summed up
their very everyday centered political vision to me as: Sirte does not want to see Misrata to become the policeman of Libya.
******
Sirte may be quiet, but it sometimes feels as if the rest of Libya is submerged in ghts among rival tribes or between neighboring
towns on opposing sides of the revolution. Te critical larger picture though is that so far this violence remains intermittent and
locally driven and contained. Te ghting has a complex set of triggers, but is mainly stimulated by local grievances. Disputes over
representation in local government, contested property claims, quarrels for control of smuggling revenue and even car jackings gone
wrong speak to Libyas social unraveling under Qadda. Tey collectively contribute to a troubling sense of chaos in the country that
will only be solved through painstaking institution building.
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But they are still less menacing than an ideologically organized insurgency. What data exists backs this notion that Libyas violence
is dierent from an armed insurrection bent on terrorizing the citizenry to depriving the governing authorities of legitimacy. While
there is no comprehensive record, a rough guess based on news reports suggest that about 300 - 400 people have been killed in
ghting since the death of Qada last October. Most of the victims are part of Libyas legions of armed brigades rather than civilians.
Mercifully the country has not been subject to car bombs or grisly suicide attacks. In contrast, at the nadir of Iraqs civil conict, over
100 civilians were being killed by insurgents on a daily basis.
In Libyas urban centers of Tripoli and Benghazi, the skirmishes play out almost as a ritualized form of combat. Te script typically
involves young men ring bursts of increasingly heavier caliber weapons into the air and setting o homemade explosives usually
used in dynamite shing. Like Native Americans counting coup, the purpose seems to be winning prestige or claim to a street rather
than hurting your opposite number, which would initiate a chain reaction of tribal and family revenge.
Te most vivid example of this phenomenon that I witnessed was in Benghazi in late March. Te central actor in the drama was a
memorably named revolutionary militia called Purifying the Tyrants Rats Brigade that attempted to liberate 300 cars from a farm
outside of the city. Under post-revolutionary Libyas permissive understanding of freedom, a rumor that a prominent former Qadda
ocial owned the farm made the brand new cars the property of the Libyan people. Te farms actual owner, an import export-
businessman, understandably had dierent ideas.
A rolling car chase around town ensued between the Rat Puriers and other revolutionary brigades that now make up Benghazi
police. Te show lasted from late afternoon until the early morning hours and was punctuated by frequent and escalating salvos of
shooting, including the use of heavy caliber anti-aircraft guns. Te net result of all this sturm und drang was exactly two persons
injured...by stab wounds. Benghazis revolutionaries either have preposterous aim or were not actually trying to hit each other.
Most of the grave violence that has occurred in Libya has instead been in its far-o, sparsely populated and chronically overlooked
desert south, a region known since Ottoman times as Fezzan. Over the past century, none of the Libyas rulers, from Libyas fascist-
era colonialists through Qadda, have been able to fully control Libyas slice of the Sahara. Today an engrained vacuum of state
authority strikes the visitor to this marginalized region. Post-revolution there is a near free ow of people and weapons across
southern Libyas now un-policed borders and it is unwise to travel without local escorts.
On my own late March trip to southwest Libya to attend a gathering of the nomadic Tuareg people, the roads were lled with excited
and heavily armed tribe members. Sometimes known as the shy people, the Tuareg presented a dramatic picture garbed in their
traditional owing robes topped by colorful and intricate headgear that covers their entire faces except for the eyes. Te convoy that
I joined up with somewhat disconcertingly kept exchanging greetings of loud bursts of celebratory gunre with checkpoint guards as
we sped on our way through the desert.
In late 2011, following the success of the revolution, Libyas new rulers inherited the challenges posed by Fezzan. Te biggest post-
revolutionary toll of violence in the entire country has been in the southeastern town of Kufra. Here a series of battles between the
rival tribes of the Arab Zway and black African desert farmers called the Tebou have left over a 150 dead. Separate clashes between
the Tebou and another Arab tribe in the Fezzanian capital of Sabha caused 50 more to lose their lives in late March. Living conditions
in the neighborhood of Tayuri where much of the latter ghting occurred are basic; many residents lack citizenship papers and live
only in imsy tin shacks. Having been hosted in Tayuri for the night on my trip to the south, reports in the Libyan media of the ring
of mortars into this rickety locality are hard to absorb.
Further southwest, along the old trans-Sahara caravan route, the ancient town of Ghadames is known as the pearl of the desert
and was named a world heritage site by the United Nations. Today multiple skirmishes between the Tuareg and sedentary town
residents over control of the local governing council have sadly damaged one of the Saharas oldest medinas. Tere have also been
ramications beyond Libyas borders. In neighboring Mali, surplus Libyan weapons have fueled the declaration of a breakaway
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Tuareg region called Azawad and indirectly contributed to a coup by Malian Army ocers frustrated with their democratically
elected governments incompetent handling of the Tuareg rebellion.
It is tempting to lay responsibility for this bedlam at the feet of the Libyan revolution. In Kufra, the town that has been the locus of
post-revolutionary Libyas most deadly violence, one side backed the revolution from the start (the Tebou) while the other supported
Qadda (the Zway). But the animosity between these tribes predates the revolution. In 2009, Qadda even deployed helicopter
gunships to Kufra in a show of force to end ghting between these same two communities. Likewise in recent decades the Brother
Leader armed the Tuareg as an internal proxy force and sponsored Tuareg insurgencies in neighboring countries. Its just that few
were paying attention to what was happening in these mostly forgotten corners of the Sahara then.
For all the reported (and very often real) chaos in Libya, security along the countrys more developed Mediterranean coast that
is home to some nine-tenths of its population is actually surprisingly good. Residents in Tripoli and Benghazi remark that on the
streets there are far more guns, far less police, ubiquitous protests, and anarchic trac. But despite all this, most agree that day-to-
day security remains much the same and that violence is sporadic rather than targeted.
In the absence of state security forces, social relations and interknit tribal networks provide a precarious balance of power where
everybody watches everyone else. In many neighborhoods, brigades of revolutionary ghters are appreciated as the only security
providers on oer. Some, like the Puriers of the Tyrants Rats have been bad actors. Others have run unocial detention centers
where alleged mercenaries and Qadda loyalists are subject to abuse. But many brigades have also positively contributed to the
patchwork system of stability by brokering and enforcing local ceaseres.
Te greatest votes of condence in the security situation may be the actions of Libyans themselves. New expensive shop displays
and shiny plate glass windows in restaurants are seen not just in the relatively unscathed cities of Tripoli and Benghazi, but also in
Misrata and Sirte, where the scars of extended urban warfare are fresh. Tese investments indicate little fear of a return to full-scale
combat. Most striking though were the celebrations of the revolutions one-year anniversary. In Tripoli, several hundred thousand
packed into Martyrs Square adjacent to the capital citys old town to release thousands of faerie-like colored oating lanterns in
commemoration of the struggle. Te Haqqani network in Afghanistan or al Qaeda in Iraq would have seized upon such a large
gathering to attempt a spectacular mass casualty attack. In New Yorks Times Square, the security would have been smothering. In
Tripoli, on that night, there were only perfunctory safety measures. And in a country where both explosives and knowledge of how to
use them are widespread, the celebration went o without a tremor of trouble.
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******
Social networks and a balance of arms may be just enough to maintain an unorthodox version of stability in much of Libya. A sense
of justice however has proved more elusive.
Demands for political participation, basic freedoms and transparency were at the heart of the Libyan revolution, but there is also an
intense desire to see an accounting for the 42 years of Qaddas capricious rule. In this environment the lack of a functioning court
system is a severe problem after a conict in which there were not just winners and losers, but victors and vanquished. It may even
be a more insidious threat to Libyas future than the more attention grabbing proliferation of weapons.
In Libyas rough and tumble environment, disarmament feels far o. Kalashnikovs provide the only empowerment that young and
previously idle revolutionary ghters have ever known. It makes little sense to them to give this up, especially when government
always has been and remains something to be distrusted. In a social environment in which advancement and wealth is about who
you know, there is deep suspicion that reconciliation is code for giving well-connected Qadda ocials a free pass to appropriate the
revolution. On the street, these perceived opportunists who only abandoned the regime in its nal hours even have a name. Tey are
denigrated as the algae, known as such because they are green, parasitic, and grow in swamps.
A common sentiment expressed by prominent revolutionary activist who is now a senior human rights ocial in Libyas interim
government is that there was no civil war in Libya. Tere was a revolution in which some fought for freedom and others supported
a tyrant. Having backed the wrong side, the losers need to bend to the will of the winners. With few police, prosecutors, or judges
working, this line of thinking has led the new powers that be to take matters into their own hands.
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Te darkest facet of the Libyan revolution is an actual physical place.
Motoring east from Misrata along the countrys main transport artery, it is unnerving to pass through a town of 30,000 that has been
deported of its people and denuded of all moveable items of value. Even the highway signs speak to the erasure of Tawergha, with the
name of the town either spray painted over or shot out using automatic weapons.
Earth embankments have been constructed on the turn-os to Tawergha to discourage both returnees and curious passers-by. But
it is possible to get around them to view this relic of a town. Most buildings in Tawergha have been burned from the inside to make
them uninhabitable and are empty of all material things. Te streets are similarly apocalyptic, with scattered handfuls of torched
cars and telephone and electricity poles stripped of their wires. Tere is extensive grati scrawled on the walls of the structures still
standing, much of it virulently racist or renaming the town misrata jadeeda (New Misrata).
Tawergha had a dicult history even prior to the revolution. Originally inhabited by black African cast-os from the 19th century
slave trade, Tawerghis were kept as owned slaves in Misrata until Libyan King Idris al-Sannoussi reportedly put a stop to the
practice in the 1960s. During recent times, Misratis describe Tawergha as dependent upon Misrata for everything from education
to livelihoods. Qadda reportedly sought to capitalize on this indentured form of symbiosis by promising Tawerghi leaders land in
Misrata if they would help to put down the uprising there.
Whether by force or acquiescence, Tawergha became one of the key staging points for Qadda troops in the unsuccessful siege of
Misrata upon which the fate of the Libyan revolution turned. It is now a social fact in Misrata that Tawerghis did not stop at ghting
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with Qadda, or even looting and killing in Misratas outlying neighborhoods. In Libyas conservative society, Misratis accuse
Tawerghi ghters of the unforgiveable: committing widespread rape. In Misratas eyes this is a crime so unspeakable that it is no
longer possible for the two communities to live side by side. Man, woman, and child alike, Tawergha is treated as collectively guilty of
war crimes.
As a Misrati military commander told a western newspaper after breaking the siege of his city and preparing to oust Qadda troops
from Tawhergha, residents of the latter should prepare to ee since Tawergha no longer exists, only Misrata.
Tawergha is an extreme case, but illustrative of the Hobbesian state of nature that develops without the mainstay of courts to enforce
laws. Utterly subordinated, Tawerghis lack the political or military recourse to challenge the brutal conditions imposed upon them.
Other loyalist towns or tribes in Libya possess greater military assets and the possibility of political alliances. Tey have some
wherewithal to push back when their now ascendant pro-February 17th neighbors overstep in using the front of revolutionary
credentials to settle old feuds or infringe on their municipal rights. In most of these cases, mass deportations have been avoided. But
instead the armed clashes that litter the news headlines on Libya have bloomed.
In Misrata, respected tribal elders and religious sheikhs who have tried to promote reconciliation with Tawergha have been
turned away. Tis is in large part because Misratis view themselves as victims of war crimes in need of justice. Tey do not want
reconciliation plans but activation of mechanisms for the prosecution and punishment of alleged Tawerghi malfeasance. Misratas
community leaders claim that only once trials start will it become possible to begin talking about reconciliation. Likewise, in the
host of other more symmetrical local conicts around Libya, warring parties claim that there must be a clear reckoning for their
opponents crimes in order to halt the cycle of violence and revenge.
To be sure, the tighter control of weapons and armed groups is vital to the future of Libya. But it also may not yet be realistic in a
highly unsettled landscape. In the meantime, reconciliation is indeed about more than just prosecutions. But in Libya, getting the
police and judicial machinery running is not only about safeguarding the most vulnerable. It might also be the precursor to the
powerful entertaining thoughts of reconciliation.
****
In the chaotic environment of the new Libya it is quite an assertion to make, but politics might just be the most opaque and
confused arena. Qaddas philosophy on government rejected the idea of a nation state in favor of purported direct rule by the
people. His Green Book described parliaments as the contemporary model of dictatorship that rob the public of their right to
govern themselves. Political parties also did not come in for an easy time. Te Brother Leader described them as the abortion of
democracy and instruments to divide the community by ensuring the rule of the part over the whole.
Other Arab autocrats may have subverted elections and ignored their constitutions, but in most places there was at least experience
with the motions of voting and shells of legislatures. Libya toiled in another universe altogether, one in which an array of local
popular councils, communes, and revolutionary committees governed. In practice, membership in these bodies was mandatory and
their primary purpose to demonstrate loyalty to the person of the Brother Leader and Revolutionary Guide.
As Libyas rst plebiscite in 42 years approaches the popular mood is a mix of fulllment, confusion, and even a little apprehension.
Ordinary people are excited to vote as the culmination of the revolution and have ocked in the millions to register. Tey feel a
genuine burden to select the right people for building a modern state but are not sure how to cast their ballot or what they are voting
for (a constitutional assembly rather than president). Participants at workshops on elections that my former organization held across
Libya repeat straightforward but profound questions that are dicult to answer: What is the purpose of political parties? How do I
decide who to vote for? And, most earnestly, how can I be sure they will do a good job once elected? If only we knew.
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Te most likely outcome from the historic polls is a fragmented polity that mirrors the state of Libyan society. A sense of Libyan
nationalism and even geographic regional identities do exist. Tis is especially the case in the traditional and socially cohesive east
of the country. But the most salient level of political and military organization in Libya remains its sea of tribes, towns, and even city
neighborhoods. Te map of the countrys electoral districts reects this hodgepodge and was seemingly drawn by the transitional
authorities to ensure that these local powerbrokers have seats to represent their specic interests. Political parties meanwhile remain
in their infancy, meaning that many will vote for candidates they personally know or are socially connected to rather than based on
ideology or political conviction.
*****
Regardless of the electoral outcome, one guarantee is that Islam will be an integral part of Libyas social and political path. It is a
deeply devout country where Islam is almost universally seen to play a positive and unifying role among other more centrifugal
forces. Libyans describe themselves as conservative when it comes to their beliefs, but are steadfastly opposed to extremism. In
Libyas eastern Green Mountains, an elderly religious sheikh who has twice completed the hadj pilgrimage to Mecca summed this up
by stating his hope that you and the world understand that Libyans are not obsessed with anything, including religion.
Tere is also a clear distinction in Libyans minds between personal observance, modesty and piety on the one hand and political
Islam on the other. As one young, educated, English-speaking medical student in Benghazi explained, Islam is part of our nature
and society, it is a pure thing built into our souls and habits. He was adamant that Libyans did not need anyone, least of all a political
party or the government, to tell them how to be proper Muslims.
Tese two sentiments help to explain a paradox of Libyas elections: no one wants to be identied as a secularist. But no one wants to
be identied as an Islamist either.
Secularism is understood in the Libyan context as being against religion, a political death sentence when Libyans expect Islam to
naturally play a role in guiding public and political life. Islam is seen as wholesome and perhaps the only feature of society that was
impermeable to corruption under Qaddas rule. Many think its social principles are now one of the few safety pins holding the
country together during its fragile transition. Te organizational head of the Libyas largest coalition of liberal parties went as far as to
tell me that you would have to be majnoon (Crazy!) to present a secular platform in Libya. He drolly compared it to walking into St.
Peters Basilica in Rome and shouting that the Vatican should be governed secularly.
At the same time, Libyans sometimes seem to have a stereotypical Middle Americans understanding of Islamist movements.
Tey often bracket the Islamists leading political force, the Muslim Brotherhood, with militant extremists. I have had several
absurd feeling conversations arguing with Libyans that, no, actually the Brotherhood is not the same thing as al Qaeda. And, no, its
moderate Tunisian oshoot Ennahda, which won the elections there, is not trying to recreate Taliban rule on the Mediterranean.
Perhaps taken aback by this reception, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has endeavored to present itself as a national party with an
Islamic reference rather than as Islamist rst. Its electoral vehicle, the Justice and Building Party, is well organized and will likely win
a signicant share of the upcoming vote, but faces problems even beyond the extremist label.
In a society in which an Islamic reference for the society already exists to a signicant degree, this has little to do with the Brothers
substantive positions. Instead, having been banished into exile during the Qadda years, there are widespread suspicions about whether
the secretive organization will put Libya or the broader international Brotherhood movement and especially Egyptian interests rst
in its decision-making. Tese concerns and even conspiracies are based on Libyas small and oil-rich constitution in comparison to
neighboring Egypt being large but poor. Given Egypts status as the birthplace and headquarters of the Brotherhood, some Libyans
suspect that their own branch of the movement may just be a Trojan horse to funnel lucrative contracts and jobs to Cairo.
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Tus at the inauguration ceremony of the Libyan Brotherhoods Justice and Building party at a fancy Tripoli hotel ballroom in late
May, only passing reference was made to the movements belief that the state should have an Islamic identity. Te word sharia was
not even mentioned and there was likewise no explicit call for regional Islamic solidarity. Party leaders speeches instead were almost
entirely devoted to how the party prioritized the project of activating the prestige of the state and building the beloved Libyan
homeland.
Te net result is little dierence between the public positions of both Islamist and liberal parties, with a shared consensus on Libyan
nationalism and a moderate Islamic state far from extremism. Dening what moderate Islam exactly means is a thornier question
and will surely be a subject of debate when it comes time to write Libyas constitution. But at present, it is fascinating to observe the
unusual juxtaposition of clashing political labels with the seemingly minimal divergences in the personal beliefs of Libyan liberals
and Islamists.
As an ocial in a formerly exiled opposition party that now has a mild Islamist label described it, Were all the same. Libya is an
Islamic country full stop. We do not have something like Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 Muslims.
******
Libya is astonishingly variegated for such a small and relatively homogenous country. Concisely and cogently summarizing the state
of its revolutionary transition is like grasping at smoke. Do you focus on the guns and unaccountable militias, absence of courts and
other bedrock institutions, and overall dearth of social trust? Or do you instead give weight to the intense popular underpinning for
the revolution, seeming faculty to contain violence despite weak governance, and a brand of politics that is not polarized by either
ideology or identity? Even Libyans seem to believe that their transition is too complicated to be cast as moving along the right or
wrong path and that reality lies somewhere in between.
It is possible, though, to make a make two early suppositions. Te rst is that the picture in Libya is brighter than the conventional
exposition of a country teetering on the edge of the abyss. After years spent toiling in seemingly intractable war zones, it has been
refreshing to work in a place where positive outcomes remain attainable. Te second is that many of the serious problems that Libya
faces are not of the revolutions making. Tey rather appear rooted in the countrys unique immediate past of Qaddas grandiose
ambitions and governance of Libya as the antithesis to the modern nation state.
Te spate of local violence and fragmented landscape of the new Libya certainly cannot be ignored. Likewise the plight of Tawergha
and other now relegated loyalist communities should not fade from the attention of those international powers that back the new
Libya. (As a contribution to political reconciliation, international friends of Libya should consider prioritizing technical support to
help restart the countrys justice system.) Using a wider-angle lens, the direct impact of the Libya revolutions fallout on its immediate
neighbors and Mali in particular need also be weighed.
However, the fragmentation of Libyan into town and tribe long preceded last years uprising. And in Fezzan, the current setting
of Libyas worst post-revolutionary ghting has a troubled and violently restive history. And, Qadda was not exactly a force for
stability in his own backyard. To cite only two examples, in an attempt to spread the model of his jamahiriya, Qadda launched a
pointless war with Chad in the 1980s that spilled into Darfur and helped ignite a genocidal conict. Meanwhile his notorious World
Revolutionary Center near Benghazi provided support and training to such luminaries as ex-Liberian President Charles Taylor,
recently convicted by the International Criminal Court of some of the most heinous and brutal crimes recorded in human history.
Any evaluation of the messy aftermath of Libyas revolution must therefore be made against the baseline of the uninviting features
of Qaddas jamahiriya. It is also worthwhile to consider what the alternative to the clear triumph of the revolutionary opposition
over Qadda might have looked like. Without the NATO intervention that helped bring a decisive end to last years conict, there is
little reason to believe that Libya would have escaped becoming enmeshed in a Syria-like slow motion immolation. Moreover Libyas
comparative religiosity suggests that in a protracted conict it would have only been a matter of time before foreign jihadi extremists
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descended in number and stolen the possibility of a moderate future for the country.
Instead, for all its myriad traumas, Libya escaped this fate and still has hope. Te new Libya and especially the Libyan people even
remain capable of moments of grace. Without virtually any international advice and using their own funds, Misrata and Benghazi
pulled together near world-class local elections this spring that were more akin to town-wide wedding feasts than dry exercises of
civic duty. Tese votes set important precedents where former revolutionaries willingly stood down in democratic transitions of
power. Political activists now seem to mean it when they say that the most important thing about the upcoming national vote is not
who wins, but that people participate fully. A spirit of volunteerism still ourishes at the popular level that seems to cut through the
chaos and somehow make things work at the very last minute.
A clear-eyed local ocial in Benghazi did not downplay the challenges his country faces saying, Qadda kept us separated from
the world for 42 years. It will not be easy, but we need to make up for all of this lost time. Tanks to their own courage and well
calibrated outside backing, Libyans now have that opportunity. What they make of this chance remains to be seen, but after surviving
the singular reign of the worlds longest ruling non-royal leader their fate is at last in their own hands.
Sean Kane is a Truman Security Fellow. He spent the last half-year in Libya working on conict resolution and promoting dialogue
among Libyans on their political transition.
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Te Unknown Moroccan Islamists
By Avi Spiegel, June 13, 2011
As turmoil swept one Arab country after another, Morocco seemed to oer a distinctive opportunity for peaceful reform initiated by
the government and overseen by a popular monarch. But the dreams of Moroccan exceptionalism may soon be dead, or at the very
least battered and beaten, like the thousands of protesters taking to the streets of the North African kingdom. Police brutality and
repression has reached new heights. And, as has been the case elsewhere, the more police beat them down, the more the protesters
of the Arab Spring seem to be picking themselves up and persisting.
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Despite all the Moroccan regime has done to hold itself out as unique, its tactics are beginning to appear jarringly familiar. First,
it tried denial (Morocco, ocials told us, was immune to volatility). Ten it tried belittlement (the king rst called the protests
demagoguery). It even tried reform. And as rationale for a bloody crackdown in May, 2011 (which injured dozens and killed one),
the government reverted to a favorite authoritarian pretext: the specter of Islamist manipulation.
Te Moroccan government has nothing against the February 20 Movement, the Communications Minister said, using the popular
name for Moroccos version of the Arab Spring protest group. But we suspect its members are being manipulated by the Islamists
and the movements of the left. Te minister went on to point the nger at one group in particular: the illegal Islamist movement,
Al Adl Wal Ihsan or the Justice and Spirituality Organization (JSO). But this should be seen for what it is: one more tactic designed
to put o demands for reform. I spent two years on the ground studying JSO and the slew of other Islamist groups in Morocco, and
recognize this as a familiar ploy.
In Morocco, as in every country in the region, Islamists represent a diverse, evolving, and messy eld. Te term Islamist could
reasonably be applied to the banned JSO; or to the legal political party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD); or to a bevy of
illegal Sala oriented groups. It could even pertain to the monarchy, which claims direct descent from the Prophet Mohammed and
assumes the role of Commander of the Faithful. As one of PJDs early founders, Mohammed Yatim, once noted: Our problem in
Morocco is not in establishing an Islamic state. Teoretically and constitutionally, this state is already [one].
It is not Islamists in general that the government has a problem with, but rather simply the ones that openly challenge the status
quo. In a divide which echoes the cautions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the early days of that uprising, the legal party,
PJD, has largely remained ambivalent. Many of its members still cling to the increasingly anachronistic conviction that political
change is most eectively pursued from within the system. Tis has been that movements hallmark since (or, indeed, as a basis for)
its licensed admission into the electoral system in 1997. While PJD shares historical and ideological commonalities with the Muslim
Brotherhood, it has also spoken fawningly of Turkeys AKP Party, with whom it shares its very name (in Arabic).
Te JSO, by contrast, has wholeheartedly embraced the Arab Spring. Because JSO is largely unknown outside Morocco, it is an easy
target. For years as the largest opposition force in Morocco, JSO may very well be the least understood Islamist group in the world.
It has certainly belied casuistic categorizations of religio-political activism. Te JSO is illegal but nonviolent, repressed but thriving.
Its members boycott elections, but are also politically engaged. And while nonviolence is one of the groups three core precepts,
it has not shied away from calling for the overthrow of the Moroccan regime and for an entirely new constitutional system. Such
sentiments were, until 2011, almost unheard of in Morocco.
Te JSO was ocially formed more than three decades ago by Abdeslam Yassine, who now serves as its spiritual guide, or murshid.
Despite Yassines background with the prominent Boutchichiya Sus, his writings are as varied as they are prolic, engaging with
Susm, Salasm, and even Marxism. Young members have been known to cite both Yassine and Samuel Huntington in a single
sentence. While the group is organized, in part, like a traditional Su brotherhood, it also functions increasingly like a modern
political party, replete with a political wing (or circle), ocial spokespeople, complex organizational charts, internal elections, and
multiple websites.
As is often the case with illegal movements, estimates of JSOs size are notoriously unreliable. PJDs secretary general once shrewdly
speculated that his rival only had around 5,000 followers; authorities have suggested that its closer to 50,000. Ive even heard JSOs
own activists invoke the word million. Te actual number of both members and supporters probably doesnt exceed 200,000.
But regardless of the precise gure, JSO is the only group that has had past experience in mobilizing multiple and simultaneous
unpermitted protest marches in cities throughout the country, similar to the kinds seen in 2011. As far back as 2005, a young activist
in the group bragged to me about their unmatched prowess at text messaging and web-based mobilization: We can bring thousands
to the streets at the press of a button. No one else can do that here. (Indeed, the one person killed in recent protests was a member
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of JSO.) So, while the February 20 movement is a wide compilation of voices from the left to the right, it is no coincidence that its
anti-regime marches would include JSO. But news of JSO involvement would only be shocking to those outside Morocco.
Te U.S. government, for one, has not had much luck or interest in guring the group out. A classied 2008 cable to Washington
from the embassy in Rabat released via Wikileaks revealed that diplomats couldnt even gure out what to call the group (was
it Justice and Charity Organization or the Justice and Spirituality Organization?). Te authors also seemed shocked that JSO may be
moving toward political participation even though the formation of its Political Circle had taken place a full decade earlier. Tis
confusion was understandable. Te embassy admitted that it had not had any communication with the group for at least seven years
because the last time they tried to make contact with JSO, the Moroccan government protested. In a practice that has become
only too common, the United States relied on a foreign government to determine which of its nationals it would engage.
Like most everyone in Morocco and the Arab world, JSO is still guring out how to adjust to this new political context. Tey are no
longer the sole opposition force in the country. Tey are now merely part of a much larger force for change and they are no longer
operating in the shadows. Dont forget that it was only six years ago when Nadia Yassine (a spokesperson for the group and the
founders daughter) was brought to court for simply suggesting in a newspaper interview that Morocco could function as a republic.
Moreover, until 2011, JSO was alone in calling for the king to relinquish his position as Commander of the Faithful; now such a
message can be seen on protest signs. JSOs new role in the spotlight has, at least, sparked it to state publicly its goals more rmly
than ever before. Nadia Yassine declared in June 2011 that her movement favored a civil over a religious state. Such statements are
reassuring, but still tell us little about the policies they would actually promote.
Te Moroccan government says that JSO is using the Arab Spring the call of democracy to further its own nefarious agenda in
hopes of splintering the February 20 movement. But spokespeople for the February 20 movement have responded that they wont
be manipulated by anyone and that the group, even while including Islamists, was peaceful, open, and independent. JSO, for
its part, says it is simply being used as a scapegoat to justify a violent crackdown. But one thing is certain: if the regime engages in
bloody crackdowns, the protests will only continue. It cannot pledge reform one week and then kill protesters the next, even if the
marchers include prominent Islamists.
Avi Spiegel is an assistant professor of political science at the University of San Diego and a fellow at the Strauss Center for International
Security and Law at the University of Texas, Austin. He is currently writing a book on young Islamists and the Arab Spring.
Showdown in Morocco
By Hisham al-Miraati, May 26, 2011
Te makhzen refers to an ancient institution in Morocco the extended power apparatus close to the Moroccan monarchy, made
up of a network of power and privilege. It allows the king to act as an absolute monarch and the de facto head of the executive.
Beneath the give and take of everyday politics, the makhzen has always been the ultimate guarantor of the status quo. For three
months, the pro-democracy youth movement, known as February 20, has been advocating against that status quo. Protests have
not been targeting the monarchy directly, but instead have been urging for reform that would yield a system in which the king reigns
but does not rule.
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What started as a small group on Facebook early in 2011 grew into a nationwide movement made up of a loose coalition of leftists,
liberals and members of the conservative Islamist right. Inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings and powered by new media,
the movement convinced hundreds of thousands to take to the streets. Te demonstrations held week in, week out, were remarkably
peaceful. In response, King Mohammed VI promised a package of constitutional reforms to be submitted to a referendum in
June 2011. But as protesters, unconvinced by the kings promise, have vowed to keep up pressure on the regime, authorities seem
increasingly impatient and determined to break up protests violently, paving the way toward escalation and confrontation with the
street. Te middle class is joining the mass of demonstrators, moving the protests beyond the core of mobilized youth. Teir target is
the makhzen which has become a code word for the monarchys abuses of power and monopoly over large sectors of the economy.
Protests are not new in Morocco. During the Cold War years, leftists who dared to stand up and denounce the regimes abuses
of power saw the wrath of the makhzen befall them. Tose who were lucky enough not to have disappeared suered the worst
abuses, or were thrown into secret prisons in the middle of the desert. But in the age of Internet and new information technologies,
the regime knows well that its actions are closely watched and that the indiscriminate repression of the Years of Lead (a name
commonly used in Morocco to refer to the dark era of repression under late King Hassan II) are virtually impossible to hide from the
public eye. Tis partly explains the inconsistency of its handling of the tension in the street.
From the start, the protest movement indentied key areas where reform is much needed: poverty, corruption, injustice, and the
control of political and economic life by the monarchs close entourage and some privileged families accused of misuse of public
funds. Te regimes response was tempered and conciliatory at rst. In an attempt to quell popular anger, King Mohammed VI gave
a speech on March 9, 2011 in which he announced the appointment of a committee to revise the Moroccan Constitution, pledging
to relinquish parts of his prerogatives, while setting the outlines of permissible change. Te status of the monarchy was to remain
untouched, while the king was to supervise the reform process.
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Te proposed reform plan did not convince everyone and many decided to continue their protests. Skeptical youth doubted that the
process initiated by the king was compatible with fundamental popular demands, such as the drafting of a whole new constitution by
an elected assembly. Protesters have also been calling for the dissolution of the parliament, the dismissal of the current government,
the release of all political prisoners, the clear separation of powers and the trial of ocials involved in cases of torture and
corruption. Amid continuing street protests, the palace oered a series of reforms, including the release of 190 political prisoners,
mainly Islamist and human rights activists.
But then on April 28, 2011, a terrorist bomb attack hit a popular restaurant in the heart of Marrakech, killing 17 people. Te country
was plunged into a state of shock. Beyond the unanimous condemnation, the timing of the attack raised many questions. Te fear
of a security clampdown and a freeze of liberties were the main concerns of pro-democracy advocates. Teir fear is justied. Te
makhzen has traditionally actively sought to nurture an image of stability an exception to the turmoil in the Arab world. Tat
strategy has worked for a time for the regime: Morocco is routinely praised by western ocials as an ally of the West in a rather
hostile region. Te country holds an advanced status with the European Union; it has signed a free trade agreement with the United
States; it is actively cooperating with the United States in its global War on Terror; and it enjoys the status of a Major Non-NATO
Ally. Te specter of terrorism has long been a useful card for gaining external support.
Police violence has escalated. On May 15, 2011, peaceful demonstrators who wanted to protest in front of an alleged secret detention
center in Temara (dubbed Guan-Temara by protesters) near the capital, Rabat, faced repression. A week later, anti-riot police
systematically and violently disrupted peaceful gatherings in public squares. Tis may be the sign that the regime is shifting its
attitude toward the street and taking a much more hardline stance. As with other Arab regimes, the makhzen faces a dilemma: if it
clamps down hard on peaceful protesters, it risks loosing its reputation as a model of democratic reform in a region often perceived
in the West as averse to the liberal ideals of democracy. If it loosens up, then it will have to face the challenge to its own existence
posed by a determined and organized street.
Te February 20 youth movement is vowing to keep up street pressure, rejecting the kings oer of token reform. If the regime
insists on denying the people their rights of assembly and free expression, then the country will be heading toward the unknown.
Against the backdrop of the Arab revolutions, change looks inevitable. It is still in the power of the monarchy to ensure a
peaceful transition and at the same time ensure its own survival. Te more the makhzen drags its feet, the more it runs the risk of
undermining the stability of the country and, at the end of the day, its own existence.
Hisham al-Miraat is the co-founder of Talk Morocco and a contributing author for Global Voices.
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Shakira vs Te Democrats
By Laila Lalami, May 19, 2011
Spring in Morocco means longer, warmer days, jacarandas in bloom, the taste of grilled sh, the smell of escargots wafting from
street corners and music festivals. Nearly every city in the kingdom has one, designed to reect its unique culture and musical
taste. Te Gnaoua festival in Essaouira attracts fans of jazz, rock, and fusion; LBoulevard in Casablanca is popular with lovers of
hip-hop; the Festival of World Sacred Music in Fez is for acionados of spiritual music. But the largest, and the best funded, of all the
music festivals in Morocco is Mawazine, which takes place in May in Rabat, the capital, and which features huge stars from across
dierent musical genres. In 2011, Lionel Richie, Amr Diab, Kanye West, and Shakira were all scheduled to perform.
Ten years ago, Mawazine was a small festival that had trouble nding nanciers for its sound-and-lights show, but it has quickly
grown in size, dwarng all the other musical events in the country. Its current budget is reportedly as high as $12 million. Perhaps
not coincidentally, scandals and controversy have dogged it. Last year, for instance, there were calls by members of the Party of
Justice and Development (PJD), a religious party in parliament, to ban Elton John because his appearance would be promoting
homosexuality. (In the end, Elton John performed to sold-out crowds, and there have been no reports of Moroccan men suddenly
turning gay as a result of their attendance.) In 2009, 11 people were killed in a stampede at Hay Nahda sports stadium, after a
performance by the musician Abdelaziz Stati. (An investigation of the accident is still pending.)
Tis year, Mawazine has become the focal point of a debate over the powers of the countrys governing elite. Te February 20 protest
movement, which has been calling for constitutional reforms that limit the powers of the king, has made Mawazine one of its
targets. In April 2011, the activists issued a statement asking artists to cancel their scheduled appearances. Te large sums of money
allocated to Mawazine, the statement said, would be better spent on schools, hospitals or arts infrastructure that would contribute
to sustainable cultural growth for all Moroccans. Slogans repeated during street marches throughout the kingdom in the months
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leading up to Mawazine included some directed at the festival: Where is the peoples money? In Mawazine and celebrations. (Tis
rhymes in Arabic.) Facebook groups with names such as Tous Contre Mawazine or stop mawazine cropped up.
Its not dicult to see why the February 20 movement has chosen to make Mawazine one of its issues. Te festival is organized by
Maroc-Cultures, an organization headed by King Mohammed VIs business manager, Mohamed Mounir Majidi. Majidi is also the
managing director of ONA-SNI, Moroccos largest business rm, with interests in mining, telecommunications, and real estate,
among many other areas. He is an unpopular gure who in has become a symbol of corruption, his picture pasted on protest signs
with WANTED printed across. Other signs have depicted ONA as an octopus, with tentacles reaching across dierent sectors of
the economy.
But, aside from its association with Majidi, Mawazine also riles up Moroccans with its ostentatious displays. Imagine if, like 15
percent of Moroccans, you and your family lived on less than $2 per day. Tree loaves of bread and a bottle of milk cost about as
much as that never mind housing, health care, or education. Imagine if, like a large majority of working Moroccans, you were paid
the standard minimum wage of 10.64 dirhams per hour; thats almost exactly the price of a liter of gasoline. (Assuming, of course,
youve saved up the tens of thousands of dirhams it takes to buy a car.) Imagine, now, if you found out that Shakira was paid 6.5
million dirhams to perform nearly a million dollars.
Tere are others, however, who support Mawazine as a rare opportunity for the public to see Moroccan and international music
stars perform locally. Tey argue that many of the scheduled concerts are free. Tey point out that the festival is funded by business
sponsors and that only a small percentage of its budget comes from the government. In an interview with TelQuel magazine, Aziz
Daki, spokesperson and artistic director for Mawazine, said that those who oppose Mawazine are demagogues who keep an
obscurantist discourse. And, just as there are anti-Mawazine groups on Facebook, there are pro-Mawazine groups as well.
It is true that Mawazine has many private sponsors, but these come at a much higher long-term cost for the country. In a lawsuit led
in Michigan, Peter Barker-Homek, former CEO of the energy company Taqa, alleges that he was asked by his employers to pay $5
million per year to unnamed Moroccan ocials in order to nance a music festival. (Although the festival is not named, it is widely
believed to be Mawazine.) In exchange, Taqa would be allowed to extend its electrical plant in Jorf Lasfar, a commercial port on the
Atlantic Coast. Te behind-the-scenes business deals are particularly relevant now, in the middle of a popular protest movement that
has made an end to corruption a central demand.
Te Moroccan governments ocial position with regard to the reform movement mirrors that of Dr. Pangloss in Candide: All is for
the best in the best of all possible worlds. Khalid Naciri, spokesperson for the government, repeatedly declared that Morocco has
long been engaged in a process of reform. Te March 9, 2011 speech in which the king announced some constitutional reforms was
part of this long-standing process, he said, and not a response to the street protests. In this context, the show must go on.
And while the show goes on, the Moroccan government can continue to deny that it practices torture, and its police can continue
their brutal harassment of political activists, including, and especially, activists of the February 20 movement.
Laila Lalami, the author of Hope and Other Dangerous Pursuits and Secret Son, is associate professor of creative writing at the
University of California, Riverside.
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Moroccos Islamist Prime Minister
By Avi Spiegel, December 5, 2011
Te rst elected Islamist party to take over the reins of government in the Arab world arrived in the unlikely location of Morocco.
Te Party of Justice and Development (PJD) nished rst in the November 25, 2011 elections, gaining 107 of 395 seats in parliament.
Teir leader, Abdullah Benkirane, will now ascend to what was once considered an unthinkable position for an Islamist: he will be
the countrys prime minister.
Te Moroccan case challenges conventional wisdom about contemporary Islamists and contextualizes qualms about what they
might do next. Te PJD originated as an oshoot of Egypts Muslim Brotherhood. But while the Brotherhood only formed an ocial
political party in 2011, their Moroccan brothers have been contesting elections and navigating party politics since 1998. Far from
being revolutionary or even incendiary, Islamists of the PJD rose to the top not by challenging the status quo, but rather by skillfully
and pragmatically abiding by it, even at times bolstering it. Teir rule will likely be no dierent.
Te rst time I visited the headquarters of Moroccos main Islamist party was in 2006, a year away from its second full run in
parliamentary elections. I was greeted by the unexpected sounds of laughter, as three young activists sat in the corner of the
courtyard poking fun at a more senior member. If you could have any ministerial position in government, one asked him, which
one would you choose? Before he could answer, a voice from the distance shouted, Why not minister of tourism! And then the
chuckles began. It was funny for them because back then it seemed so farfetched farfetched that the king would ever deign to ask
them to serve as the public face of the country, especially overseas. Tey would, another joked, more likely scare away visitors then
beckon them.
Te Moroccan monarchys gamble on limited political reforms is what made these daydreams a reality. When authoritarian leaders
across the region in 2011 were folding or doubling down, the king of Morocco opted for watered down reform. Beginning in March
2011, in an eort to co-opt local protests, government ocials in Morocco told anyone who would listen that the king was going to great
lengths to share his immense power. Tey then heralded his constitutional reforms that would, for example, ensure that the king would
actually appoint the next prime minister based solely on election results (rather than deciding himself, as has been known to happen).
But, in fact, the actual constitutional changes approved in a popular referendum in July 2011 left the core elements of monarchical
supremacy intact. Every Moroccan regardless of his or her political views will readily admit that the king still runs the show.
Anything resembling a budding democracy, or even a constitutional monarchy on the model of Spain or England, is still a long way
away for this North African kingdom.
Perhaps because the political reforms proved so limited, the elections that followed exhibited neither the enthusiasm nor the
dynamism of its neighbors in the region. Many activists opted to boycott. Turnout was low at 45 percent. Te percentage of spoiled
ballots, on the other hand, was high (some estimates suggest up to one third). And both of these gures were not drastically o from
where they were in 2007.
Such a managed, limited democratic faade did not bother the PJD. Troughout the last decade, these Islamists readily went along
with what can only be thought of as a puppeted political process. Authorities allowed them to participate in elections, but very
clearly set specic limitations on their behavior. Te palace, for instance, permitted the PJD to campaign, but state media regularly
lobbied against its eorts. Te party could eld candidates, but it was often told how many seats it could contest, especially in 2003,
following bombings in Casablanca. Also, the Moroccan government devised an electoral system so complex and multilayered that it
became close to impossible for any single party to garner an outright majority. Nevertheless, the PJD ignored nay saying from other
Islamists in the country; they chose to embrace elections instead of reject them.
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Te PJD were just as submissive when it came to the supposedly revered role of religion. When the palace intensied pressure against
religious parties, the PJD eschewed the label Islamist. Tey opted, instead, to call themselves a party of Islamic reference. Tey also
agreed not to campaign in mosques. In fact, before the interior ministry permitted them to take part in elections in the late 90s, the
party had to agree to certain ground rules. Most signicantly, the king at the time, Hassan II, made clear that they would have to avoid
heresy by which he meant, in language obvious to all citizens, there would be no religious challenges to the regime.
Te PJD, in sum, seldom bit the hand that fed them. In fact, labeling such Islamist parties as opposition movements might even be
somewhat misleading. For they saved their harshest verbal attacks, their sharpest criticism, not for those in charge, but for those they
competed against: Leftists and outlawed Islamists. Tey sold themselves mainly as alternatives within the system as substitutes
to the enervated and corrupt parties of yesteryear. Once in parliament, the PJD tried to shame these lackluster parties by taking
attendance during open sessions. It even supported punishing those members of parliament who were absent.
Most signicantly, unlike their Egyptian counterparts, the PJD has not displayed any ability or even desire to currently challenge or
confront state authority. Indeed, in the midst of the Arab Spring, in the midst of the most historic protests in the modern history of
Morocco (and, of course, the region), the PJD stood by the monarchy even when the other major Islamist group in the country, the
banned Justice and Spirituality Organization, led marches to oppose it.
It therefore should come as no surprise that when the future Islamist prime minister of Morocco, Abdullah Benkirane, initially
ascended to the position of party head in 2008, one of the rst people to congratulate him was none other than the king. Te
monarchs praise was a reminder of the Islamist leaders track record of working with, not against, the regime. Benkirane had long
exhibited, the king pointed out, a desire to put the supreme interests of the nation and just causes above all other considerations.
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After the PJDs rst place nish this time around, Benkirane returned the favor. He reminded citizens that the real head of state in the
country is the king. He said this, of course, in an eort to allay fears of an Islamist takeover. But he also, in the process, managed to
admit the shortfalls of recent reforms. How democratic can a country be when the head of the winning party readily admits that his
powers are limited?
Yet, both the king and the Islamist leader gained a great deal from these results. Benkirane, of course, earned the highest elected
oce in the country. But, by begrudgingly appointing him, the king showed that he was holding rm to his new constitution.
Together, they now have an opening to put forward a new partnership of Islamist governance: one in which a monarch imposes a
considerable check on the prospect of unbridled Islamist power.
Tis was not a dicult sell to many young Islamists. Tere has been good reason, after all, for the PJD to stand by the regime all this
time. Party activists wanted to continue to reap the spoils of electoral inclusion: the jobs, the generous state electoral funding, the
fancy party conventions, even the respect that comes with wearing suits and campaigning for oce. During my two years of eld
research among young Islamists in Morocco, PJD activists would often tell me: We are here because we have a future in the party.
In a country of mass unemployment, where young peoples futures are far from certain, this was a powerful inducement.
Tey also, of course, wanted to continue to hold the government positions they already had. And they carried out these jobs in much
the same manner in which they had procured them in the rst place: with disciplined pragmatism. Te partys outbursts of hysterics
tend to get the lions share of media attention, such as when its aliated newspaper blamed the Asian Tsunami on sinning Asians
or when Benkirane lashed out at a camerawoman in parliament for her immodest attire. But, for the most part, the partys stabs at
governance have been noteworthy largely for their lack of excitement.
Te PJD candidates who held local oce made ghting corruption and reorganizing city nances to eliminate waste their
overarching themes. When a PJD candidate was elected the mayor of Kenitra, a city north of Rabat, one of his rst major acts in
oce, for example, was to digitize municipal records. His rise was particularly telling: while serving as head of the PJDs youth wing
(the biggest of any party in the country) he also held a desk job doing tech support for the prime ministers oce back when the
prime minister was a Socialist. He then went on to serve as an advisor on outsourcing to the economic aairs minister.
Tis yearning to get to work more to the point, to do the work of governing has long characterized the party, and there is little
reason to believe that this will abate. At the headquarters following their second place nish in 2007, as party elites debated whether
to join the government as a junior partner or remain outside it, young Islamists were heard making the surprising (and ultimately
unsuccessful) case for the former. Te rank and le, they said, could not go another ve years without government jobs and related
patronage. Now they wont have to wait any longer.
Avi Spiegel is an assistant professor of political science at the University of San Diego and is completing a book on the rise of young
Arab Islamists.
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A second chance for Algerias Islamists
By Karina Piser, April 18, 2012
Algeria has thus far kept a relatively low prole amidst sweeping regional change in the Middle East and North Africa. Te oil-rich
country, often characterized as untouched by the Arab Spring, saw no Tahrir Square or Avenue Habib Bourguiba, and, accordingly,
has drawn minimal attention from international media. Although Algerians do not loath Abdelaziz Bouteika like Libyans did
Muammar al-Qadda or Egyptians did Hosni Mubarak, they do have similar grievances high unemployment, inadequate
housing, and a dearth of social services. A recent increase in protests across the country that have resulted in clashes with security
forces reect growing social anxiety, and a number of attempted self-immolations, including one just over a week ago in the Tiaret
governorate, reveal that Algerians are actively interested in eectuating change. A cursory look at the situation might therefore
suggest, as has some recent analysis, that revolution looms; a closer examination reveals that, at least for the moment, this is probably
not in the cards. But while an increasing trend of social discontent will likely not yield drastic change from below, it may motivate
Algerians, who have a history of abstention, to turn out in greater numbers in the legislative elections to be held in May, hoping to
cast their votes for a party that will address their demands.
As transitioning North African countries are increasingly impacted by a rise of political Islam and bourgeoning democratic
consciousness, Algerian authorities are preparing for the countrys legislative elections and hedging their bets against a similar fate.
Like its neighboring (fallen) regimes, whose distaste for religion translated to authoritarian secularism, Bouteikas government is
haunted by the memory of the tragedie nationale, and, dominated by the National Liberation Front (FLN), promotes a staunchly
anti-Islamic leadership. Te highly secretive political and military elite, known as Le Pouvoir (the powers-that-be), has been referred
to as dubiously democratic, and most recently passed a series of laws that, supercially, could signal an opening of sorts for the
political spectrum and progress toward more transparent governance. Now passed, these reforms, which Bouteika promised in
April 2011 as an attempt to prevent upheaval, serve as the framework under which the legislative elections will occur.
Historically of course, Le Pouvoirs democratic gestures have hardly been a boon for opposition parties. When, in 1989, the political
system expanded from a one-party rule, dominated by the FLN, to a multiparty system, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) emerged
and garnered enough support to win the rst round of elections. Rather than respect the electoral results, however, the military
intervened, cancelling the second round. While the regime attributes the decade of violence that followed solely to the FIS and
the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) that it spawned, the suocation of a nascent democratic process was unambiguous. Te
FISs brief entry into politics therefore marks an important landmark in the countrys history and provides insight into both the
regimes hardline approach to opposition parties and a population wary of political change; it would be nave to let either regional
transformations or Algerias domestic reforms overshadow the reality of Le Pouvoirs stern grip on power.
Western ocials have lauded Bouteikas reforms, praising Algerian authorities for taking initiative toward democracy. Algerian
Minister of Foreign Aairs Mourad Medelci paid visits to international leaders, showcasing the reform process as another
monumental Arab Spring moment. But beneath new laws that impressed French Minister of the Interior Claude Guant and
that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called very signicant are highly restrictive texts, both regarding political parties
and members of civil society. A new law pertaining to political parties bars former FIS members from political participation, and
bans anyone responsible for manipulating religion in directing the national tragedy from running in parliamentary, legislative,
or presidential elections. Despite these blatantly anti-democratic undertones, the party law was still liberal enough to drastically
open the political landscape, granting approval to numerous parties for the rst time in decades, many of which are Islamist. Tis
seemingly generous gesture may well be a deliberate attempt to disperse Islamist parties, mitigating their chances for success.
But some Islamist parties are catching on to Le Pouvoirs agenda. Te Movement for a Society of Peace (MSP), an Islamist party
and, up until recently, a member of the presidential alliance, decided to withdraw from the coalition. Upon withdrawal, party leader
Bouguerra Soltani called on other Islamist parties to coalesce, and the resulting Green Alliance, which unites the MSP, al Islah and
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Ennahda, could give religious parties greater weight come May. Although the moderate MSP has traditionally been perceived to be
a puppet of the regime, its withdrawal, attributed to the presidents insucient reforms, may give it a new, autonomous edge. Te
party, an oshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood which supported Bouteikas bid for reelection in 2009, is now energized by Islamist
victories in Tunisia and Morocco and empowered to divorce itself from the majority.
As Algerias Islamist camp gears up for the election, the majority, ardently secular FLN continues to disintegrate, plagued by internal
disagreements between the partys young members and its old guard. In April, the partys central committee declared a vote of no
condence in FLN secretary general Abdelaziz Belkhadem, and the reform movement within the party, known as the redresseurs,
announced their intention to present independent candidate lists in May. Te next day, a statement from the meeting not only
cemented the partys instability heading into the elections, but revealed that, if the reform movement does succeed in gaining
sucient autonomy to present independent candidate lists, it will seek to change the partys trajectory entirely, which will only
impede its ability to organize a coherent campaign platform.
While party authorizations in Algeria can hardly be likened to the empowerment of individual political choice that emerged in
post-revolutionary Tunisia, Algerian voters, already distanced from the political process, may nonetheless nd it possible to nd
their views expressed in a slowly evolving political environment. If Islamist parties are proactive and campaign aggressively like
Ennahda did last fall in Tunisia the fragile FLN could nd itself trailing behind, unraveled by internal rancor and regional trends
that bode well for Islamists. If Algerias Islamists follow Ennahdas strategy and couch their victory as a top-down, well-organized
approach to regenerate Algerias cultural values, they may succeed in energizing a voter base that might otherwise abstain.
Te moderate MSPs role in forming the Green Alliance would also help the party frame political Islam as a source of policy,
untangling its association with violence, the tragedie nationale, and the MIA that dismissed democratic governance. Te alliance
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would have to be transparent in presenting a consistent platform, so as not to be associated with the FISs internal fragmentation
and opposing internal factions that ultimately led to its demise. Most importantly, the MSPs inherent organizational advantage over
newly established parties, against the backdrop of a dissolving FLN, makes it well poised entering the campaign period.
It must be said that the preceding analysis only matters in a world where elections are fair and transparent according to reasonable
standards. Bouteikas decision to invite international observers and establish a national monitoring commission hints at changes
from previous elections which were rife with fraud. But political parties are still skeptical, and pre-election assessment missions
from organizations like the National Democratic Institute reveal that, less than a month before election day, numerous electoral
provisions and regulations remain undetermined. Tese scenarios also hinge upon citizen engagement: despite recent attempts from
the Interior Ministry to encourage turnout, such as an SMS campaign urging participation, Algerians seem unenthused. Tough the
meager 36 percent turnout in 2007 in the countrys last elections does not bode well for a likely mobilization this time around, the
outcome of the May elections remain anyones guess. Te complete scarcity of credible public opinion surveys in a society as opaque
as Algerias makes forming predictions about voter intentions dicult.
Tese caveats considered, the elections could present an opportunity to shift the political landscape. While Islamist parties may not
obtain a majority of seats, they may obtain a plurality. Such a performance, however, would require campaign strategies crafted to attract
and energize Algerians skeptical of ties to the regime as well as those still shaken by the bloodbath they associate with political change.
Karina Piser is a Masters student in International Security at Sciences Po in Paris, France.
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Saudi Islamists and the Potential for Protest
By Stphane Lacroix, June 2, 2011
Saudi Arabia has remained fairly quiet during the recent months of Arab uprisings. A few demonstrations did take place, mostly in
the Eastern Province, but never gathered more than a couple thousand. As for the Facebook calls for a Saudi revolution on March
11, 2011, they had no real impact on the ground. Some observers found this surprising, given that many of the causes of revolutions
elsewhere in the region exist in Saudi Arabia. Tere is corruption, repression, and, despite the countrys wealth, socioeconomic
problems that particularly aect the youth it is said that at least 25 percent of Saudis below age 30 are unemployed.
Some observers argued that nothing had happened, or even could happen, in Saudi Arabia because the kingdom possesses two
extraordinary resources in huge quantities. Tis rst is a symbolic resource, religion, through the regimes alliance with the ocial
Wahhabi religious establishment, while the second resource is a material one, oil. Tese resources, however, have their limits. Te
real reason that Saudi Arabia has not seen major protests is that the Saudi regime has eectively co-opted the Sahwa, the powerful
Islamist network which would have to play a major role in any sustained mobilization of protests.
Neither Islam nor oil wealth necessarily shield the Saudi state from criticism. Religion can be, and has been, contested by opponents
of the state, particularly by Islamists. Te Wahhabi religious establishment is currently led by relatively weak gures. Te current
mufti Abd al-Aziz Al al-Shaykh lacks the strong credentials of his predecessor, Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz. Oil money, however
abundant, inevitably creates frustrations because its distribution follows established networks of patronage that favor some over
others. Tis is especially notable at the regional level, where Najd receives much more of the states largesse than does the kingdoms
periphery. What is more, the announcement on March 18, 2011, by King Abdullah of a $100 billion aid package wasnt only met
by cheers as some expected. It also provoked angry reactions in some intellectual circles, which saw this as an insult to the Saudis
dignity.
Saudi Arabia has more of a history of political mobilization than many realize. A pro-democracy current has evolved over the last
10 years. Its core component has historically been the dozens of intellectuals, Sunnis and Shiites, of Islamist and liberal backgrounds
who have come together since 2003 to repeatedly demand, through increasingly provocative petitions, the establishment of a
constitutional monarchy in the kingdom. Among the latest, and boldest, moves made by members of this group have been the
creation in October 2009 of the kingdoms rst fully independent human rights organization, the Saudi Civil and Political Rights
Association, and the establishment in February 2011 of the kingdoms rst political party, Hizb al-Ummah. Although members of
this group have been repressed, many have pledged to continue their activism.
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In addition to those older and more experienced intellectuals, a new generation of young political activists is gaining increasing
inuence. Tey are connected through social networks, especially Facebook and Twitter, and count among their friends numerous
young Egyptian and Yemeni activists, whose revolutionary know-hows they have been sharing. Tey are idealistic and bold, and
they do not feel bound by old political allegiances. Many have subscribed to the demands for a constitutional monarchy of the older
intellectuals, providing them with the young base that they were lacking. In a way, the prole of these young activists is very similar
to that of some in the April 6 movement in Egypt. And like the April 6, they could well act as a trigger for change.
But if these young people resemble the April 6 movement, then there exists in Saudi Arabia a group that shares the same
characteristics and occupies a similar position in the system as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Te Sahwa (or al-Sahwa al-
Islamiyya, the Islamic Awakening) is an Islamist group whose ideology is based on a mix between Wahhabi ideas in religion and the
Muslim Brotherhoods ideas in politics.
Like the Brotherhood in Egypt, the Sahwa in Saudi Arabia is by far the largest and best organized non-state group, with arguably
hundreds of thousands of members. Its mobilizing capacity is huge, far ahead of any other group, including the tribes which have for
the last few decades lost a lot of their political relevance. An illustration of this were the 2005 municipal elections, which provided
observers with an unprecedented opportunity to measure the ability of Saudi political actors to mobilize their supporters. In most
districts of the major cities, Sahwa-backed candidates won with impressive scores.
It is therefore unlikely that any popular movement would take hold without the Sahwas support because generating a sustained
political challenge to the state requires organized and committed activists, solid mobilizing structures, and networks things
that cant simply be obtained through Facebook and that only the Sahwa can provide. Again, Sahwis are like the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood Tey may not start the protest, but it wont succeed without them.
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Tis is where the Saudi case is dierent from others. Te Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood may have long ceased being a
confrontational force when the January 25 revolution started, but it still represented a clear opposition to the Egyptian state. Te
Sahwa, however, has a dierent track record. Although its members may be very critical of the Saudi state in private, they have
generally remained loyal to it. Tere is an organic, almost incestuous, relationship that exists between the Sahwa and the Saudi state.
While Islamist movements in most countries developed on the margins of the state and against it, the Sahwa was the product of the
cooptation of foreign members of the Muslim Brotherhood into the Saudi state in the 1950s and 1960s. It developed and spread from
the state, heavily beneting from the states structures and resources. Te fear of losing this very favorable position that the Sahwa
occupies has, until now, represented a key obstacle to its transformation into a real opposition movement.
Tis explains why the majority of Sahwis have generally remained loyal. For instance, when calls for demonstrations in the kingdom
were issued, most Sahwi religious gures came out to denounce them. Some even went so far as to explain that demonstrations were
not a legitimate means of asking for change. Aware of the Sahwas crucial importance, the state has also done all it could to reinforce
the relationship: In the $100 billion aid package announced by King Abdullah, there is money for religious institutions, including
some known to be Sahwa strongholds.
Tis does not necessarily mean that there is no potential for protest, however. Te Sahwas history shows that it behaves as a strategic
actor. For instance, in the early 1990s, in the wake of the Gulf War, when Islamist gures launched an opposition campaign against
the regime, the Sahwa rst supported the movement because it thought it could succeed before eventually withdrawing its
support when understanding the risks. Tis means that in the future, if the Sahwa sees clearly favorable opportunities, it may decide
to switch sides and support a protest.
Tere are already signs that some in the Sahwa may be willing to adopt a more critical posture. Late February 2011, for instance,
a petition came out called Towards a State of Rights and Institutions asking for democratic change (though expressed in a very
conservative language) and signed by a few notable gures associated with the Sahwa, including Salman al-Awda. Also, in late April
2011, a number of other key Sahwa gures, including Nasir al-Umar, signed a text calling for the release of or a fair trial for the
countrys thousands of political prisoners, many of whom were arrested on terrorism charges after 2003.
Despite these relatively isolated moves, however, it is unlikely that in the current context the Sahwa would be willing to sacrice its
relations with the regime. Tere is potential for Islamist protest in Saudi Arabia, but not in the near term. And without the Islamists
participation, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will be the scene of the kinds of sustained mobilization that have rocked much of the
rest of the Arab world.
Stphane Lacroix is an assistant professor at Sciences Po and the author of Awakening Islam: Te Politics of Religious Dissent in
Saudi Arabia.
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Saudi Arabias Shiite Problem
By Toby Matthiesson, March 7, 2012
At least seven young Shiite Muslims have been shot dead and several dozen wounded by security forces in Eastern Saudi Arabia
in recent months. While details of the shootings remain unclear, and the ministry of interior claims those shot were attacking the
security forces, mass protests have followed the funerals of the deceased. Tese events are only the latest developments in the
decades-long struggle of the Saudi Shiites, which has taken on a new urgency in the context of 2011s regional uprisings but have
been largely ignored by mainstream media.
Te events of the Arab Spring have heightened long-standing tensions in Saudi Arabias Eastern Province. Just three days after large-
scale protests started in Bahrain on February 14, 2011, protests began in the Eastern Province, which is a 30-minute drive across the
causeway from Bahrain. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Saudi Interior Ministry vowed to crush the protests with an Iron Fist and has
unleashed a media-smear campaign against protests and the Shiites in general. While protests subsided over the summer, they started
again in October 2011 and have become larger ever since, leading to an ever more heavy-handed response from the security forces.
Tis repressive response, with distinct rhetorical echoes of Bashar al-Assads Syrian regime, poses an awkward challenge to recent
Saudi foreign policy. Te protests of the people in the Eastern Province are as legitimate as the protests in Syria. If Saudi Arabia does
not respond to these calls for reform at home how can it seriously claim to rise to the defense of democracy in Syria? Te crackdown
in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain has given the Iranian and Syrian regime, as well as Shiite political movements in Lebanon and Iraq, a
useful rhetorical gambit to push back against their regional rivals.
Te Eastern Province is home to virtually all of Saudi Arabias oil and to a sizeable Shiite minority, estimated at between one and a
half and two million people or around 10 percent of Saudi Arabias citizen population. Te Wahhabi creed of Sunni Islam that the
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state sponsors in Saudi Arabia has developed a special hostility toward the Shiites. Saudi Shiite citizens in turn have long complained
of discrimination in religious practice, government employment, and business, and overall marginalization.
For decades, opposition groups formed by Saudi Shiites, both leftist and Islamists, as well as hundreds of petitions by Shiite notables,
have had the same demands: an end to sectarian discrimination in government employment and representation in main state
sectors including at the ministerial level; more development in Shiite areas; the strengthening of the Shiite judiciary; and an end to
arbitrary arrests of Shiite for religious or political reasons. None of these demands would signicantly undermine the position of the
royal family, or otherwise threaten the integrity of Saudi Arabia. Tey would rather cement the current political system and buy the
allegiance of two million people living on top of the kingdoms oil.
Since 2011, the demands have also included the release or retrial of nine Shiite political prisoners and a withdrawal of Saudi forces
from Bahrain, or at least a negotiated solution to the conict there, as well as more general political reforms in Saudi Arabia.
Te government promised youth activists that their grievances would be addressed in April 2011, so following a call from senior
Saudi Shiite clerics to halt protests, they did so. But the government did not follow through, and answered with repression over
the summer, even though it released some prisoners that were arrested during the February to April 2011 protests. Terefore, the
situation remained tense, and when four Shiites were shot dead in November 2011 their funerals turned into anti-government rallies
with up to a 100,000 participants.
Te perception of systematic discrimination has led some Saudi Shiites to embrace revolutionary ideologies over the decades. While
pro-Iranian groups still exist amongst Gulf Shiites, they are not the most powerful amongst Saudi Shiites and had largely renounced
violence as a political tool since at least the mid-1990s. But Saudi Arabias repressive response to the protests and the zero-
concessions policy are providing fertile breeding ground for future opposition groups. A repetition of post-1979 Shiite politics, when
hundreds of young Shiites left Bahrain and Saudi Arabias Eastern Province to become active in regional revolutionary movements,
seems possible.
As the protests in Bahrain and particularly in Qatif receive only limited attention on Gulf-owned channels like Al Jazeera and Al
Arabiya, local Shiites are forced to watch the Iranian-sponsored Arabic-language Al Alam channel, Lebanese Hezbollahs Al Manar,
Iraqs Ahlul Bait TV, or increasingly other pro-Assad channels to receive updates on the situation in their areas. Te new cold war in
the Middle East has turned into a fully-edged media war, in which media outlets are either with the protests in Bahrain and Qatif
and for Assads regime, or with the protests in Syria and against the allegedly sectarian protests in Bahrain and Qatif.
Te situation for Saudi Shiites in the Eastern Province is no secret. Te U.S. State Departments Annual Report to Congress on
International Religious Freedom for the second half of 2010, the period immediately predating the Arab Spring, records arbitrary
detentions, mosque closures, and the arrest of Shiite worshippers. U.S. diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks revealed that U.S.
diplomats, and particularly the sta at its consulate in Dhahran, have an incredible amount of information on the local Shiite
communities and seem almost obsessed with grievances they deem legitimate. But the specic problems of the Saudi Shiites almost
never come up at high-level meetings with Saudi ocials.
Tis is not only due to the close Saudi and U.S. alliance. Americans sometimes share the suspicion of the Gulf Shiites, which
permeates some of its allied regimes. Tis suspicion is partly to do with Iran, but also has its roots in the 1996 bombing of the Khobar
Towers, which killed 19 U.S. servicemen. Nine Shiite prisoners have been incarcerated since 1996 for their alleged membership in
Hezbollah al-Hijaz and their involvement in the bombings. Tey were indicted in the United States in 2001, but as U.S. foreign policy
priorities changed after September 11 they became forgotten, the name they are known by amongst Saudi Shiites. Te indictment
hints at the involvement of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran but no evidence has ever been made public. At the time some Americans
called for retaliation against Iran as a response to this bombing. But after September 11, ngers began to point toward al Qaeda as
involved in the attack, raising questions about the guilt of these prisoners.
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Te secrecy surrounding this issue has contributed to mistrust toward the state and suspicion on parts of family members of the
detained and the wider Saudi Shiite communities. Saudi Shiite protesters this year have adopted the cause of the nine prisoners.
Teir pictures were held up at rallies demanding their release, where their family members played a signicant role. Tey were the
Shiite counterparts of a simultaneous protest campaign in front of the ministry of interior in Riyadh by family members of political
prisoners arrested on suspicion of membership in al Qaeda. But contrary to those prisoners, the Shiite prisoners cannot hope ever to
be rehabilitated in one of the governments much advertised de-radicalization programs. It seems to be justied to at least ask for a
public trial, a move repeatedly endorsed by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. But such a trial does not appear to be
on the foreign-policy agenda of the United States.
Te behavior of the Saudi leadership only allows the conclusion that repression of the Shiites is a fundamental part of Saudi political
legitimacy. Te state does not want to change the position of the Shiites and Shiite protests are used by the state to frighten the
Sunni population of an Iranian takeover of the oilelds with the help of local Shiites. Similar narratives have been propagated in the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) media for months, at the cost of further deepening the sectarian divide in the Gulf States. Te
GCC intervention in Bahrain has severely worsened sectarian relations in the Gulf and beyond to levels not seen since the Iranian
Revolution. But this open Saudi sectarianism has already had negative repercussions in Iraq, as well as in Syria, Lebanon, and Kuwait.
Bahrain looks set for years of sectarian conict, community relations have broken down completely, and the state is conducting a
campaign of what Shiite activists call ethnic cleansing. Rather than completely alienating the Shiites, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
should negotiate a social contract with them. Failing to do so will lead to years of instability with uncertain outcomes. And it is far
from certain that other Saudis will not be encouraged by the Shiite protests, as a recent statement by liberal Saudis from all over the
kingdom denouncing the crackdown in Qatif has shown.
Te West should press its allies, above all Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, to stop simply shooting and arresting their Shiite citizens and
brandishing them as Iranian agents and traitors. Te alienation of Shiite youth foments a perfect breeding ground for a new Gulf
Shiite opposition movement and plays into the hands of the Iranian regime. Even without external help for the local Shiite protesters,
the area looks ripe for a return to the tense sectarian politics of the 1980s. Te United States should in its own, and in the Gulf
States, interest push for a real reconciliation between the Shiites of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and their governments. Otherwise,
sectarianism will come to dominate the Gulf, to the detriment of all.
Toby Matthiesen is a research fellow in Islamic and Middle Eastern studies at the University of Cambridge.
Why Wont Saudi Arabia Write Down its Laws?
By Nathan Brown, January 23, 2012
In 2007 and 2009 Saudi King Abdullah capped a decade of legal and judicial reforms in his country by reorganizing the judiciary and
ordering that Saudi Arabia follow the step that virtually all other states in the region did long ago by codifying its laws committing
to paper a comprehensive compendium of the operative laws in the kingdom. Since that date, however, his order has been neither
challenged nor implemented. Why is codication of law seen as such a dramatic step in Saudi Arabia? And why does the king seem
incapable of making it happen?
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Saudi kings devoted considerable attention in the rst decade of the 21st century to remaking the judicial order. Initial steps taken
were new procedure laws with new decrees insisting (with uncertain eectiveness) that courts follow prescribed rules in their
operation and making the courts, always ambivalent about the role of lawyers, friendlier to the legal profession. In the most recent
moves, besides ordering codication, the king consolidated all sorts of quasi-judicial bodies that littered the legal framework of the
kingdom, wrenched adjudication functions away from the Supreme Judicial Council (handing them to a newly created Supreme
Court), and relieved the countrys highest-ranking judge, a pillar of the old order, from his oce at the head of the system. Te kings
steps were suciently dramatic and the identity of the Saudi state so deeply enmeshed in claims to be fully Islamic, especially in its
legal structure that longtime Saudi legal scholar Frank E. Vogel, in Saudi Arabia: Public, Civil, and Individual Sharià in Law and
Politics, termed them not a shot but a barrage across the bow of his partners in rule, the conservative religious establishment and
clearly seismic events within the world of Saudi sharià politics.
Saudi Arabia is a dicult place to understand, and its legal system is especially unusual not so much because it is opaque but
much more because it is sui generis. When the country has structures similar to those of neighboring countries, it uses a dierent
word what administrative courts are called or even the word used for law. And just as confusing is that on those occasions
when the same word or term is used, the similarity in language masks deep dierences in structure and meaning. (For instance,
most Arab states have a body called a Supreme Judicial Council to oversee judicial aairs and administer the judicial sector and
often to subordinate the judiciary to the executive branch. In Saudi Arabia, a body by the same name served often to resist executive
pressure and not only to oversee judicial aairs but until quite recently served as a supreme appellate court.)
Te sorts of political experiences other Arab countries passed through imperialism, ambitious state building, socialism, and
liberalization did not aect Saudi Arabia so deeply. Most other Arab legal systems are roughly homologous, so that a Moroccan
lawyer could nd his or her way around a Syrian legal dispute with relatively little diculty. With a few exceptions the legal orders
of Arab states are essentially civil law systems that would be more familiar to a lawyer trained in current-day Paris or Rome than
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one trained in a medieval madrasa. In most Arab states, Islamic legal inuence is strong in some areas (in marriage, divorce, and
inheritance most especially), but judges rule largely on the basis of legislated texts and codes, and court systems are structured like
(and courtrooms even have a similar physical appearance to) those on the European continent. Institutions associated more directly
with Islamic law such as courts that operated primarily on the basis of sharia or schools that taught Islamic jurisprudence were
generally initially left alone by centralizing states that built their own courts, issued their own laws, and built their own schools
alongside the older, more Islamically-inclined structures. Gradually the sphere of the older Islamic structures was restricted until
there was little fuss when the state nally took them over, sometimes folding their work into the state courts, codifying the remaining
areas of law so that judges ruled on legislated texts rather than their understanding of Islamic law, and regulating curricula.
In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, sharia courts still have general jurisdiction. Judges rule on the basis of their understanding of the
relevant rules in the Islamic legal tradition. While there are many tomes on Islamic jurisprudence, there is no place where rules
are written in any authoritative or binding form. Instead the individual judge uses years of training to master the jurisprudence
developed from the text of the Quran, and the practices of the prophet and the early community, to apply that understanding to the
case at hand.
Te king does make some rules, of course, to administer the aairs of the community as even very conservative Islamic legal
authorities acknowledge is his duty. But the Saudis studiously avoid words used elsewhere in the Arab world for law, qanun, since it
suggests that human words rather than divine ones lay at the basis of the legal order. Instead the word nizam (system) refers to the
most wide ranging royal commands. Tere are also a range of lesser decrees and ordinances. None of these rules may contravene the
sharia and judges simply disregard them if they think that they do. Universities that teach Islamic law have often simply ignored the
state-issued laws rather than include them in a religiously-dominated curriculum. Sometimes Islamic legal scholars refer to areas
covered by such edicts as those that are beneath the dignity of the sharia.
In large areas of law in which the state wishes to have a bit more control than the decentralized and autonomous sharia based system
allows, Saudi kings have used their undisputed authority to structure the judiciary to form a number of bodies that oversee specic
sorts of problems. Te most signicant is an administrative law structure given the rather non-legal name diwan al-mazalim (often
translated as Board of Grievances). Other quasi-judicial tribunals have been formed over the years for labor or investment disputes.
Most modern states are, above all, law-making machines. Tat is how they mobilize and allocate resources; make and enforce
decisions; and render behavior, transactions, and even speech obligatory, permissible, or forbidden. Making law is a critical attribute
of sovereignty. And that is precisely the concern in Saudi Arabia, a polity that takes divine sovereignty quite seriously. Law is to be
made in accordance with Gods will.
So why is codication of laws merely writing down what the laws are seen as a repugnant steps by many (though not all) of the
kingdoms most powerful religious scholars? Te opposition shows some signs of waning, but it has still been sucient to prevent
any practical steps toward codication.
First, there is a basic problem with the term codication of the sharia itself the term used (taqnin al-sharia) might quite literally
be translated as rendering Gods law into man-made legislation, an almost sacrilegious concept. Some codication advocates have
therefore preferred the term tadwin, which has the same denotation without the etymological baggage.
However, far more than vocabulary is at issue. Saudi religious scholars note that previous generations of Muslim legal experts saw
no need for codication and see no reason for the change. But even more, they look quite disapprovingly at what the codication
has meant in neighboring states it has generally been European (often French) law that has been brought in by centralizing states
interested in systematizing their legal systems. In some cases, European law was introduced directly and other times indirectly
through its Egyptian oshoot (Egypt did not convert over to an adapted civil law system until the 19th century).
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Advocates of codication protest that despite what transpired in other countries, in Saudi Arabia it need not imply Europeanization.
Codes could be written in the basis of Islamic jurisprudence.Tere have been some attempts by Islamic legal scholars (and
occasionally by governments in the Muslim world) to write down sharia-based rules in the form of comprehensive law codes, though
their impact in general has not been great.
Te most inuential religious scholars in Saudi Arabia would object even to such an attempt to codify Islamic legal principles. It is not
so much writing them down that would bother them; it is obliging the individual judge to follow those texts. Te binding nature of
codes, not their written nature, provokes the strongest objections. Te reasons are closely connected with their view of what a judge is
and how the Islamic legal tradition sustains itself over the generations.
In the sharia courts of Saudi Arabia, judges rule on the basis of their own training and knowledge of jurisprudence. Religious
scholars feel they should not be bound by whatever rulers have decreed to be the authoritative version of that tradition. While judges
mightlook to various sources for guidance, no one person has nal authority. Each judge should have direct and unmediated access
to the sources of law and the full range of jurisprudential debates rather than to have them redacted and imposed by a person or
committee, no matter how powerful or learned.
Of course, judges are not set free to rule as they wish armed only with a copy of the Quran. Tey emerge after being trained in a
jurisprudential tradition over a millennium old. A civil law lawyer masters codes and legislated texts. A common law lawyer studies court
decisions in order to understand how various legal principles and texts are applied in practice. For a classical Islamic legal training, the
key texts are, of course, the Quran and those that describe the practice of the prophet and the early community. Also important is the
scholarly nding of law (the fatwa) as a means for guiding application of legal principles. No legislators edicts can trump the will of the
Almighty. No fallible court trapped in the circumstances of a particular case can bind its successors. It is jurisprudential scholarship, not
legislative texts or judicial precedents that transmits legal norms across the generations. Tis explains not only the reluctance of Saudi
judges to follow codes but also the lackadaisical manner in which judgments are published in a system in which court precedent plays
no formal role, there is less of an impetus to have the texts of judgments available to parties other than those directly involved.
Judges are educated in this body of Islamic legal scholarship though again, they are not told which rule they must apply in a
particular case or how it is to be applied. Early in its history, the Islamic legal tradition developed into schools of law within which
followers were trained. Te Wahhabi tradition, it should be noted, for all its international reputation for rigidity, is actually less
deferential to past authority than other approaches and more insistent that the individual judge be set free to rule in accordance with
his own understanding of the appropriate application of legal norms.
Judges I have met elsewhere in the Arab world have a very strong sense that they represent impartial justice and, in a very real
sense, the authority of the state. Tey often deeply resent having that authority bent to the will of the executive branch (though they
recognize that often happens). In Saudi Arabia, judges see themselves as acting in accordance with the will of an even higher authority.
No Saudi king would ever question these ideas in theory but several have chafed at the results. In a sense, the argument is less
about what Islamic law is than about who can speak in its name. In most other Arab states Islamic law, to the extent that it is operative,
becomes so after being recognized and often codied by political authorities. Tere are a few areas of uncodied law in a few
countries, but those islands have become quite rare. Yet they are the norm in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi kings would not make so ambitious a claim as to be able to speak for Islamic law, but they have striven intermittently to have
scholars sit down and agree on what it is and to record their agreement in written form of a code to guide the work of courts. But
they have still failed.
Two decades ago, the Hayat Kubar al-Ùlama (Body of Senior Religious Scholars) nally reported its response to a longstanding
request from the king for an opinion on codication. By a narrow majority they rejected the idea. Te arguments reasons in responses
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of hayat kubar al ùlama are reported very carefully in Muhammad Bin Àbd Allah Bin Muhammad al-Marzuqi, Sultat Wali al-
Amr Taqayyud Sultat al-Qadi. But rather than take no for a permanent answer, King Abdullah pressed again and nally ordered
codication to begin in 2007.
In Saudi Arabia, rulers have been willing to cede the main work of drafting to religious scholars; it is not necessarily ambitious
centralization that they are after. Instead, three sets of concern seem to have motivated the push for codication. First, litigants are
often pushed outside of the courts to resolve their disputes, where they have a greater degree of knowledge about the governing law.
Alternatives such as arbitration or resorting to foreign courts vary according to the nature of the dispute.
Second, the Saudi state has been driven to create a series of ad hoc structures to govern areas where it has a more denite set of rules
it wants to see implemented. But those quasi-judicial bodies do not have the full prestige, status, and autonomy of a court. Tey
are bodies often staed by people with administrative rather than judicial backgrounds. In some areas it is even possible that those
involved in adjudication could be ocials of the body that is involved in a dispute.
Finally, the Saudi state has had to live with uncertainty, as have potential litigants. It is not clear which of its non-sharia based laws
will be regarded as legitimate and enforced by which judges.
Tese concerns have grown in recent years as Saudi Arabia has become far more connected to international commerce and nance
and its ambitions in this regard seem currently unbounded. While there is a lively Islamic nancial sector, for instance, much
banking must take place outside the framework of the regular court system and has to make do with international mechanisms as
well as a dispute resolution body attached to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority. To engage in international trade and nancial
transactions in a country where it is not clear what contracts and rules the courts will enforce is less than ideal.
Terein lies King Abdullahs decisiveness. His order to begin preparing codes was still respectful of the judiciary laws would be
drawn from Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic legal scholars would likely oversee the process. Many scholars are convinced that the
king is right, noting that most judges are probably not suciently knowledgeable to develop interpretations of Islamic law entirely
on their own. Codication might thus be a way of enforcing sharia-based rules rather than avoiding them. It might even bring back
under their jurisdiction matters that had been transferred to quasi-judicial bodies.
But nothing denitive has happened. In a recent visit to Riyadh I asked a top legal ocial very supportive of codication whether
a committee has been formed or any work has been done. He said he knew of nothing (and likely would be in a position to know).
In a recent public event, an ocial from the ministry of justice was pressed about a personal status code developed jointly by Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states (so their laws would be harmonious in that area). He said his ministry would do whatever it was
told but that the matter was in the hands of religious scholars who are supposed to be studying it. But if they are doing so, it is a silent
process.
Te sweeping processes of political change unleashed elsewhere in the region may actually have taken the wind out of the sails of
current Saudi Arabian judicial reform eorts. Like many promises made in the past for a consultative assembly, for instance
codication will probably happen, but it may take decades more.
Nathan J. Brown is a professor of political science and international aairs at George Washington University and nonresident
senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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Te Identity Politics of Kuwaits Election
By Gwenn Okruhlik, February 8, 2012
Te parliamentary elections on February 2 in Kuwait reected the intense drama unfolding in the country youth-led street
protests, corruption charges that implicated 13 members of parliament (MPs), the November 2011 storming of the parliament to
protest corruption, the dissolution of parliament by the emir, and the resignation of the embattled prime minister. Te election
campaign was marked by vitriolic rhetoric and violence. And the results empowered a loose Islamist-tribal coalition of opposition
candidates which disappointed liberals and set the stage for continued political reworks. Despondent moderates surveying the
outcome repeatedly complained that, nobody is representing the middle.
Te election revolved around competition between a coalition of opposition candidates demanding greater transparency and
candidates who have been loyal to the government. Important political issues loom large in the background in Kuwait things
like an elected prime minister, allowance of genuine political parties, an independent judiciary, parliamentary independence from
the government, and general progress toward a constitutional democracy. However, demographic changes and the material issues
of welfare and corruption seem to have driven the election results particularly fury over evidence of ocial corruption and the
absence of accountability. Tis resulted in a 54 percent turnover in the parliament.
Te loose Islamist-tribal coalition of opposition candidates won about 34 seats in the 50-seat parliament. Islamist candidates won 14
seats, while tribal candidates, half of whom might be called Islamist, took 21 seats. Te opposition group is clearly tapping into voter
sentiment. Tribal opposition MP Musallam al Barrak from the Fourth District was elected with the highest number of votes ever cast
for a candidate.
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At the same time, the so-called Islamist-led opposition is far from a monolithic coalition. Some Islamists are ideologues; others
are not. Religious fervor was not a central campaign call. Islamist candidates proved themselves to be better organized and more
politically savvy, articulate, and eloquent. Many younger candidates have risen through social organizations and civil society. Tey
have been groomed to be eective leaders over the years. Nor are tribal voters a monolithic bloc. Tere is an emerging generational
divide among tribal voters as many tribal MPs were implicated in the corruption scandal. Interestingly, the controversial tribal
primaries were not an accurate predictor of the tribal vote in the general election.
Liberals fared poorly, however. None of the four women MPs elected in the last parliament won seats; in fact, not one of the 23
female candidates was elected. Liberals saw their seats reduced from eight to ve, and Shiite from nine to seven. Shiite MPs have
generally voted pro-government. Further, the Shiite MPs include ve supported by the Shiite institutions while only two identify
as liberal and nationalist. Tere are only four independents. Columnist and former Minister of Information Sami al Nesf called
the election results a tsunami of wrath and fury against governmental and legislative corruption...and against moderate voices.
Columnist Waleed al Rujaib saw it as a clear manifestation of tribal and sectarian sentiments and a continuation of corruption in our
society. But for their own part, the relatively small liberal contingent is divided and does not work together in any coherent way. One
liberal voter summed the electoral outcome this way, We deserved this! We allowed this to happen.
Tere is real frustration, even anger, among Kuwaiti voters about the state of the economy and development projects. In my small
poll among female voters in the Tird District, they voiced concrete concerns about the lack of jobs for Kuwaiti youth, the lack of
housing for single and divorced women, the absence of nurses in grade schools throughout Kuwait, and that Kuwait has fallen far
behind the economic powerhouses of Dubai and Doha, even behind Saudi Arabia which has burgeoning new economic cities. Tey
also complained of too much wasta, the rise of sectarian tension, and the uneven implementation of the constitution. For example,
Te constitution is not the problem. Its the way they pick and choose what to implement.
Te most powerful force driving the success of the opposition appears to have been widespread anger at ocial corruption. Tat
rage will permeate the new parliaments political agenda. Te penal code stipulates that those involved in corruption should not
be allowed to occupy public oce, a law that opposition gures are now using to challenge some of the election results. At least 14
voters have led an appeal to demand the annulment of the election of Mohammad al Juwaihel, who was charged with corruption.
Law professor and newly-elected MP from the Fourth District, Obaid Al Wasmi, spoke in alarming tones, I swear by the Almighty
God that I will be scrutinizing the les of all those corrupt...I say to you that you have 24 hours to leave the country, I would not
advise you to stay.
For some, the electoral results are not the issue. Political science professor at Kuwait University Ghanim al Najjar said before the
elections, It does not matter who win or loses. What is important is how we move on from there. And here, many worry about the
rising trend of sectarian agitation, derogatory, anti-tribal rhetoric, sexist discourse, and violent clashes among competing camps.
Some liberals do fear the Islamists will turn Kuwait into Saudi Arabia. Upon his election, MP Mohammed Al Haif announced that,
Te ground is now fertile to amend the second article of the constitution to facilitate the road to change making sharia the sole
source of legislation in Kuwait. Te simple revision of one article changing a to the alters the legal framework of the state
of Kuwait. An ocial spokesperson soon countered that the government will not stand idle in the face of such eorts. Women, in
particular, fear the imposition of dress codes and increased gender segregation. Two winners, MP Mohammed Hayef and MP Faisal
Al Mislem, had, in fact, previously formed a Committee to Curtail the Negative Phenomena at Kuwait University. Tey set limits
on womens dress and integration on campus. Tey also targeted feminine men and masculine women. But others point out that
Islamists have long competed in Kuwaiti elections and been represented in parliament, and are unlikely to behave in fundamentally
dierent ways today than in the past.
Te greater fears lie in the backlash against the rising salience of tribal voters. Many liberals view the tribes as something other than
civil citizens. It is reported that before the election, some tribes convened in front of parliament and sang traditional war songs for its
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dissolution. Tere is a sense that a tribal mentality is growing and that it will destroy the institutions of civil society as tribal MPs
lack any platform of national development. Instead, they seek material incentives and patronage higher salaries, more contracts,
and the erasure of private debt. Tey will take the law into their hands and defend their tribal MPs, right or wrong. Tis is said to
be their breaking point with the Islamists. One person said, At least the Islamist positions are based on rational thinking, even if I
disagree with it.
In some ways, the Kuwaiti government brought the tribal problem on itself. In the 1960 and 1970s, when the government was
ghting against the liberals and nationalists, they brought in an estimated 200,000 tribal people from Saudi Arabia and gave
them Kuwaiti citizenship. As one person explained, Tey were given huge parcels out [in] the suburbs. Tere was no mingling
or assimilation so the new bedu formed neighborhoods in isolation from larger Kuwaiti society.Te strategy has backred. Te
government has lost their loyalty and their vote. Tribes are now the largest bloc in the opposition. Te government still retains the
enormous welfare costs of the new bedu and their many ospring. Te tribes do indeed agitate for more material benets from the
state which they consider only their fair share vis a vis the hadhar.
In a similar way, entire neighborhoods were constructed of only Shiite citizens. An elderly voter bemoaned, What is all this Sunni-
Shia talk? I never heard this growing up. Tere is no dierence. We are all Muslim. Another supported her saying, In the past,
Shia and Sunni lived together. It was good. People try to make this division now. Tese incidents must be coupled with the volatile
anti-new bedu rhetoric of Al Juweihel and the ensuing mob violence. And that unfortunately, exists alongside heightened sectarian
tensions that overlap the bedu/hadhar tensions as the Shiite community is primarily urbanized. Taken together, it appears that socio-
political discourse in Kuwait has grown more strident.
One potential source of conict in the early days will come over the place of Islam. Te Popular Bloc announced that it would
support the move to amend the Kuwaiti Constitution so that Islam is the sole source of legislation. Tis move, strongly opposed by
liberals and the ruling family, requires two-thirds of the assembly to approve it as well as the approval of the emir. It is unlikely to pass
at this juncture but the debate will reveal much about the internal dynamics of coalitions.
While this sounds alarming, it is worth recalling that Kuwait has a long experience with parliamentary politics, a vibrant civil society,
and a robust political discussion that is open when compared with its GCC neighbors. Still, the repeated elections force actors to
expend tremendous resources, time, and intellectual energy on campaigns that might be better spent tackling concrete issues of
political accountability and national economic development.
Gwenn Okruhlik is a Brookings Doha fellow/Qatar University. She would like to thank Nathan Brown, Kristen Diwan, Lindsey
Stephenson, and Mary Ann Tetreault for their valuable comments.
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Ahistorical Sectarianism in Kuwait
By Lindsey Stephenson, April 29, 2011
Sectarian violence in Bahrain has led many to nervously speculate about the potential for these events to set rapidly into motion
a downward spiral of Sunni-Shiite relations in the rest of the Gulf, and the catastrophe that could arise should the violence pit the
regional religious rhetorical powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran against each other. One vital question is how much weight will the
turmoil in Bahrain have over other Shiite communities in the Gulf, namely the large Shiite population in Kuwait, perhaps the United
States strongest regional ally and strategic partner in the region?
Fortunately, in Kuwait sectarianism has always been a non-starter. Tough aware of sectarian dierences, these were never highly
politicized. Te Shiites in Kuwait have been an integral part of society since before there was even a polity to speak of. Tey make up
roughly one half of the countrys merchant class, and around 30 percent of the population. Unlike in Bahrain, the Shiites hold high
government positions and nine of Kuwaits 50 elected members of parliament are Shiites. Although some neighborhoods are becoming
more homogenously Shiite, contrary to the situation in Bahrain, the vast majority of Sunnis and Shiites live beside each other and
have for decades as houses generally stay within families. Simply put, the Shiites are fully Kuwaiti, and have long been regarded as such
by the government and Kuwaiti Sunnis. And yet, events in Bahrain have provided fuel for those in Kuwait who wish to make waves.
Te open Kuwaiti media has proven to be an incessant instigator of sectarianism and a forum for outlandish comments that were
previously only said in private and often written o as nonsense. Bahraini government as well as predominately Shiite news channels
have also been inuential in stoking the ames. Kuwaiti Sunnis and Shiites alike have commented that once the TV is on, there is no
escaping sectarian discussions (indeed, many TVs these days sit muted in the background). Te state of Kuwaiti newspapers is similar.
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Tere are two issues for which talking heads have raised unfounded questions: namely Shiite origins and loyalty. Polemical
comments about weird things Shiites do have played into deliberate othering tactics in eorts to drive a wedge between Sunni and
Shiite communities, and have unfortunately been picked up by the masses. Setting aside the historical fact that many Kuwaitis of
Arab origin are Shiites and Kuwaitis of Persian origin are Sunnis, many programs are propagating an idea that Shiites have Iranian
origins and are thus an alien presence. Tis has seeped into common rhetoric and fostered suspicion amongst some Sunnis that they
dont really know who their neighbors are anymore. One Sunni woman from a merchant family explained that, In school we used
to know all of our classmates. Now their are lots of families who say they are Kuwaiti, but we dont know them. Initially thinking she
was speaking about Bedouins, I asked if that was who she meant. I dont know, she said. Teyre from Iran, these kinds of places.
Furthermore, the notion of Shiite religious authority being centered in Iran (although many Kuwaiti Shiites are followers of Ali
al-Sistani, the senior Shiite cleric in Iraq) has conveniently lent itself to polemics which aim to demonstrate that the loyalty of
Kuwaiti Shiites is rst to Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran and second to Kuwait. Shiites, however, are under no false assumptions about
Persian anity for Arabs. One Kuwaiti woman who lived in Qom for many years while her husband was in seminary school put
it very plainly: Iranians hate Arabs. I only go back for pilgrimage. Many other Kuwaiti Shiites echoed her comments. Much of
Iranian animosity toward Arabs stems from the long war with Iraq in the 1980s, but it seems that Kuwaitis have carved out a unique
impression. In colloquial Farsi, the word Kuwait has become an adjective describing something requiring very little eort. In
essence, Iran is not a place where Kuwaiti Shiites feel particularly welcome (although some do make short vacation trips during the
summer). Iran may be home to important sites of religious pilgrimage, and distant relatives, but it is not a country to which they feel
any particular political loyalty.
Te issue of loyalty to Kuwait is particularly pertinent as the Gulf War is still very fresh on the minds of Kuwaitis, and stories of the
families who aided Saddam are widely circulated. Ironically the group whose loyalty was most in question during that time, those
of Bedouin origins, are the very ones at the forefront of the accusations about Shiite loyalty. Sunni merchant families, having built
the Kuwaiti state alongside the Shiites, are less willing to buy this rhetoric, but ideas about the strangeness of Shiite practices is
increasingly prevalent.
Anti-Shiite sentiment has come at a particularly delicate time for the Shiites in Kuwaiti national politics, as they must juggle their
relations with the populous and the government, who are at odds. Te ruling family, with whom they have a very good relationship,
continues to front a very unpopular prime minister, leading to countless stalemates within parliament. Although Shiite MPs are
now in solidarity with those who wish to oust the corrupt prime minister, the initial reluctance of some to do so (and potentially
jeopardize relations with the ruling family) was identied as proof that the Shiites do not really want what is best for Kuwait.
Tis othering and at least rhetorical marginalization is obviously not very helpful, and in many ways is a problem because it could
become a self-fullling prophecy. If the Shiites are made to feel separate from the rest of society, the community will inevitably
become more insular and particularistic. Already insignia of Shiite identity are on the rise, such as the wearing of a particular kind of
ring. Sunnis are keenly aware of these expressions of Shiite identity, particularly since some of them such as car decals bearing the
names of the Prophets family in a font mimicking dripping blood are found oensive. One woman from an urbanized Bedouin
family was keen to note this change in attitude. When my father was young, he lived in Bayan. Tere are so many Shiites in Bayan,
but there were no problems between them. At that time everyone was just Kuwaiti, no one displayed their dierences.
Some Shiites have discouraged these practices that distinguish them from the Sunnis, especially in the wake of the current tensions.
Others however are less concerned and remain condent that their strong position in business and politics will protect them. Indeed
the ruling family and Kuwaiti government has reassured the Shiites of their respected position, both by sending a delegation of
Shiite ocials to Bahrain in attempts to arbitrate (which was turned down by the Bahraini government), and by refusing to send any
Kuwaiti troops in the GCC coalition to intervene in the situation. Te information minister however, did take legal action against Al-
Dar newspaper, which labeled the GCC intervention a Saudi invasion into Bahrain, stating that, Te government will never let any
extremist from the opposite ends of the spectrum to achieve a political gain at a cost to the national unity.
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Tis line has been a fairly consistent theme from the Kuwaiti government in recent years, whose regional security strategy is
(quite necessarily) a practical one. In a closed meeting in 2008, a high-ranking MP explained that Kuwait cannot take a hard-line
position against Iranian nuclear ambitions because, Tey are our neighbors, they always have been neighbors and they always will
be neighbors. Being a small country wedged in between two powerful and often at odds neighbors, Kuwait certainly has a vested
interest in keeping the neighborhood peace and moderating polemical rhetoric.
Kuwaits open society and political system does have the capability to absorb this potential crisis, and will likely do so. Shiite presence
in society and their relatively equal access on an institutional level educationally, professionally, and politically does not aord
any Kuwaiti a context devoid of members of the other sect. Tis helps to maintain an integrated society in which people know
one another and are thus less likely to vilify members of the other group. However, a continuation if the sectarian polemics could
translate into more discriminatory hiring practices and a breakdown of this integration essential to sectarian harmony.
Kuwait will not become Bahrain in terms of outright violence, but if media in Kuwait continues to draw lines in the sand between
the sects, these lines could very well become perforations over time, and perhaps more quickly if tensions in Bahrain continue to
escalate. For a country located between the poles of Sunni and Shiite Islam, a weakening of Kuwaiti national unity could translate
into unwanted meddling and a loss of autonomy for the whole.
Lindsey Stephenson is an M.A. student at the Aga Khan Universitys Institute for the Study of Muslim Cultures and was a Fulbright
fellow in Kuwait in 2007-2008.
Kuwatis Youth Movement
By Kristin Diwan, June 29, 2011
On June 23, 2011, Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Sabah survived a parliament vote of no condence, the
third opposition bid to oust him. Yet with another parliamentary challenge already in the works, Kuwaits contentious politics are far
from contained and have even spread beyond the walls of parliament. Earlier in the month, a rally of several thousand was held in
Kuwait City demanding the prime ministers dismissal. Tis was not an exceptional event, but rather the latest maneuver by a new
force: youth movements taking to the streets to force a change in Kuwaiti politics.
Te Kuwaiti youth share many characteristics with the regions broader protest movements. Teir chief complaint is corruption,
the political money that, in their view, distorts the emirates governing institutions and threatens its constitutional order. Like the
youth in Tunis and Cairo, they are working toward a more civic order, grounded in constitutional rights and realized through citizen
activism. Yet while clearly in harmony with the uprisings across the Arab world, the movement predates them and is driven by
developments in Kuwaiti politics and society which have brought the historically dynamic emirate to its current malaise.
Te protesters are seeking unity at a time when Kuwait is wracked by division. Tree confrontations predominate: a leadership
competition within the ruling family; a constitutional showdown between the parliament and the ruling cabinet; and a class struggle
between state-dependent civil servants and the commercial elite. Te interaction among these leadership, constitutional, and class
struggles played out in the context of a historic oil boom and nancial bust has raised political tensions to the boiling point.
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Te dysfunction in Kuwaits political system begins at the top with the ruling Al-Sabah. Te problems within the monarchy
became apparent in the 2005 succession when a stando between two branches of the ruling family over the replacement for
the incapacitated Crown Prince Saad Abdullah provided an opening for the opportunistic parliament to step in and depose him.
Te ultimate resolution of this intra-family power struggle came down squarely in favor of one branch of the royal family, which
now holds all important posts save one. Nonetheless, this consolidation removed the balance between the two branches, and
signicantly moved the succession debate on to the next generation.
Te competition among these future claimants to the throne has intensied with ill eects. First, the endemic leadership struggles
have paralyzed the executive branch of government and seeded corruption through the bureaucracy, imperiling Kuwaits future
development. Second, the rivals have used members of the national assembly as proxies, encouraging parliamentary challenges to
weaken the others position within the cabinet. Te competition between the prime minister and Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh
Ahmed al-Fahad reached unprecedented levels earlier in June 2011 when parliamentarians loyal to Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed
withdrew their support from Sheikh Ahmed over a parliamentary grilling, forcing him to resign.
Te open political warfare of ruling family members shocked a Kuwaiti public inured to government instability. Te ve years
of Nasser al-Mohammeds leadership have seen 11 parliamentary interpolations, forcing six resignations of the cabinet and the
dissolution and early election of parliament three times. While the political opponents of Sheikh Nasser are convinced of his
ineectiveness and political corruption, at heart there is a deeper ambition: to advance Kuwaits constitutional monarchy. Having
already forced the concession of separating the prime minister position from the oce of the crown prince, the opposition seeks to
establish the principle that the prime minister can be dismissed by parliament. Te removal of a royal prime minister by popular
action is an important step toward an elected prime minister and a genuine parliamentary monarchy.
Te ability of the parliament to advance this objective, however, has been compromised due to their own internal divisions. Te
liberal versus Islamist competition that dominated the rst decade of the reinstated parliament after Kuwaits liberation remains,
but it has been eclipsed by other social divisions. Prominent among them are urban-tribal tensions whose cultural character masks
a strong class component as the late-arriving tribes, more dependent on state employment and subsidies, challenge the urban
commercial elite. Sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shiite have escalated sharply, certainly over regional issues Bahrain chief
among them, but also due to the prime ministers reliance on the urban Shiite vote to maintain his majority and his premiership.
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Kuwaits youth movement arose in response to this weakening of political institutions, both royal and parliamentary. In the face of
this political dysfunction and in reaction to a creeping encroachment on civil liberties, they oer a straightforward message to the
prime minister leave. Youth activists have been criticized for the simplicity of their message and street tactics. Yet prominent
activists in the movement describe this as a necessary rst step. Political change requires a cultural change to convince Kuwaitis
that protests are a right. It is this conviction that drives their insistence on choosing the location of their protests in the commercial
center of Kuwait City, a site with a historical connection to constitutional struggles of the 1950s. Te government has countered by
limiting protests to a park in front of the national assembly where the rst student protests, the successful campaign for electoral
reform known as the Orange Movement, were held in 2006. Te escalating tension between the deant youth and the government
is evident in the heavy police presence in the downtown Safat Square and in the emirs recent speech calling for order and the
enforcement of the law.
In spite of their deance, the youth movement cannot fully escape the political perils of Kuwaits redistributive order. Tere are
persistent rumors of their links to competing elements of the ruling family rumors sure to gain more traction as a dissident
member of the Al-Sabah just voiced his support for the protesters and even for a popularly elected prime minister. Others see them
as being led by the opposition in parliament. Tese attacks on their independence surfaced in a protest in late May 2011 when youth
activists shouted down the populist Kuwaiti MP attending their rally, evidence that some in the movement are worried about the co-
optation that they see as endemic to Kuwaits patronage-fed political system.
Teir antidote to the political money that corrupts and divides Kuwaiti society is social solidarity. And the movement can indeed
claim some success in bridging communities and drawing supporters from across the ideological divide. One former Muslim
Brotherhood youth prominent in the movement spoke animatedly about his political transformation: You cant just look at everyone
as potential converts to your Islamic program; you have to work with all elements of society as they exist. Still, the protests of today
contrast markedly with the coed rallies organized by the United States-educated activists of the Orange Movement. Tere has been a
pronounced shift toward the middle class and tribal Kuwaitis. Overcoming these cultural and class divisions remains a challenge.
Organizational cohesion is also a problem for the youth movement. On the eve of their high prole March 8 rally which sought to
capture momentum from the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian street activists, the movement fragmented into two and later
three separate organizations, falling out over personalities and tactics. Still, as Kuwait confronts the weakening of all its organized
political forces, from the ruling family to its political societies, the logic of re-formation is a powerful one. Te emergence of the new
Kuwaiti youth movements should be seen as something hopeful: evidence that a capacity for change or at least the desire for it
still exists.
Kristin Smith Diwan is an assistant professor of comparative and regional studies at the American University School of
International Service.
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Islamism and the Syrian uprising
By Nir Rosen, March 8, 2012
James Clapper, the United States Director of National Intelligence, warned in April of al Qaeda taking advantage of the growing
conict in Syria. Te Syrian regime and its supporters frequently claim that the opposition is dominated by al Qaeda-linked
extremists. Opposition supporters often counter that the uprising is completely secular. But months of reporting on the ground in
Syria revealed that the truth is more complex.
Syrias uprising is not a secular one. Most participants are devout Muslims inspired by Islam. By virtue of Syrias demography most
of the opposition is Sunni Muslim and often come from conservative areas. Te death of the Arab left means religion has assumed a
greater role in daily life throughout the Middle East. A minority is secular and another minority is comprised of ideological Islamists.
Te majority is made of religious-minded people with little ideology, like most Syrians. Tey are not ghting to defend secularism
(nor is the regime) but they are also not ghting to establish a theocracy. But as the conict grinds on, Islam is playing an increasing
role in the uprising.
Mosques became central to Syrias demonstrations as early as March 2011 and inuenced the uprisings trajectory, with religion
becoming increasingly more important. Often activists described how they had corrected themselves after the uprising started.
Martyrs became important to a generation that had only seen martyrs on television from Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon. People
got more religious, one activist in Damascuss Barzeh neighborhood explained, they got closer to death, you could be a martyr
so people who drank or went out at night corrected themselves. Some Arab satellite news stations have also contributed to the
dominance of Islamists by interviewing more of them and focusing on them as opposed to more secular opposition gures or
intellectuals. In Daraa activists complained that satellite networks were marginalizing prominent leftists.
Clerics were inuential from the beginning in much of the country, but their authority is not absolute. Sheikhs have often played a
positive role in the uprising, enforcing discipline and exhorting armed and unarmed activists to act responsibly. One reason why
Homs has not descended into Bosnia-like sectarian massacres is because of the strong inuence of opposition sheikhs.
Sheikhs have a role, said a cleric active in the opposition in the cities of Hama and Latakia, in an area where people are scared
a sheikh in his sermon can encourage them to go out. As a result many sheikhs have been arrested while others have ed the
country. Opposition supporters are also vocal when they disapprove of a sheikhs positions. In November 2011, in the Tadamun
area of Damascus, a sheikh at the Ali ibn Abi Talib mosque condemned demonstrations and spoke about conspiracies in language
resembling that of the government. A friend stood up in disgust in the middle of the sermon and walked out. Others followed him
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spontaneously and began demonstrating. After ve minutes security forces arrived and they all ran away. Its forbidden to pray in
front of him, my friend told me later that day, either speak the truth or be quiet.
In the Damascus suburb of Arbeen, opposition leaders spoke sardonically of their local clerics. Te sheikhs here all belong to
security and the Baath party, one leader there told me. Te sheikhs told us not to go out and not to watch the biased channels.
We went out against the sheikhs, shouting down with this sheikh or that sheikh. Tere were no good sheikhs with the people here,
either he was afraid or he was with the regime. Te sheikhs described the youth as thugs. Revolutionaries threatened Sheikh Hassan
Seyid Hassan, Arbeens top cleric, saying they would break his car and burn his house and oce. In a sermon he apologized for
condemning the uprising.
One of the main causes for the rst demonstrations in Arbeen was the demand for the release of 21 local young men arrested in
2006. Te young men, and some were boys, had come under the inuence of Sala jihadist clerics and were blamed by the regime
for an attempted attack on the state television headquarters. Here the main reason we came out was to demand the release of our
prisoners one local leader said. We are religious and thats why we are oppressed.
Near Harasta, in Duma, I met with Abu Musab, an insurgent commander. He claimed he had been red from his job as an imam
for speaking the truth and talking about dignity. Te strict Hanbali school of Islam dominates Duma and not a single woman can
be seen on its streets without her face fully concealed by a burqa. Piety was one of the reasons why Duma was so revolutionary,
he told me. A sheikh does not have to say ght Bashar, he said, he can just refer to a chapter from the Quran and everybody will
understand. Because they are religious they have more motivation and ethics. But he stressed that most people in Duma did not seek
an Islamic state. According to Abu Musab, he supported an armed struggle against the regime from the rst day and most others
only did after Ramadan. He took me to a funeral for two martyrs of the revolution, one of them an armed ghter. As the crowd of
hundreds left they chanted, Te people want a declaration of jihad!
Many of the names chosen for Friday demonstrations are religious in connotation and many of the insurgent groups who
misleadingly call themselves the Free Syrian Army have names that are particularly Sunni Muslim in nature. Te insurgent groups
names are increasingly Islamic and even Sala in their tone, such as the Abu Dujana Battalion, the Abu Ubeida Battalion,
theMuhajireen wal Ansar Battalion and even a group named after Yazid, a divisive gure in Islamic history who is hated by Shiites
but respected by hard line Sunnis (who do not like Shiites).
What about the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)? Syria saw MB inspired uprisings in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. In the 1980s a radical
group that found the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) too moderate split o and called itself the Fighting Vanguard. Tey were
responsible for much of the violence that was blamed on the Brotherhood that traumatizes Syrian society to this day, much as
the regimes attack on Hama where the armed Muslim Brothers concentrated also left permanent scars that have been reopened
in the last year. SMB members ed into exile and remained active in the opposition, which also led them to dominate the Syrian
National Council (SNC). During the administration of President George W. Bush the United States reached out to the SMB in order
to undermine the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Within the SNC, the SMB is behaving in a very authoritarian fashion and is facing
growing criticism from both secular and Islamist opposition. Te divides in the SNC are not Islamist versus secular. Te secularist
SNC President Burhan Ghalioun walks with the SMB. Other Islamists like the Imad al Din al Rashids Syrian National Movement are
hostile to the SMB.
Te regime has sought to conate the opposition with the SMB of the 1980s, knowing that if it succeeds it can legitimize dealing with
them with violence but if it ghts them on the political front it will lose. Te ideology of the Muslim Brothers has remained quite
inuential in Syria, but as an organization, they completely ceased to exist inside the country in the early 1980s, Tomas Pierret,
a lecturer in contemporary Islam at the University of Edinburgh, said. A proof of that is that the Islamist cells dismantled by the
authorities over the last decades were linked to the Islamic Liberation Party or to Jihadi networks, but never to the Muslim Brothers. In
reality popular mobilization does not require the orders of the SMB, but for some in the opposition the uprising is revenge for the 1980s
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and the SMB is indeed playing a role. Most Syrian supporters of the opposition associate the 1980s with a time of draconian regime
repression and collective punishment while regime supporters and minorities associate it with sectarian violence and terrorism.
In January, I spoke with a knowledgeable ocial from a dierent national branch of the MB who was based in Beirut. Te revolution
in Syria today has nothing to do with the MB of the 1980s, he said, but he told me that the SMB was involved in the current uprising.
Individual members of theSMB played a role organizing the uprising in Homs, Hama, and in the coastal areas, he said. Te SMB
and its Lebanese branch, the Jamaa Islamiya, were sending money and aid via Tripoli in Lebanon. Tey were also hosting families
eeing from Syria, providing them with food, clothing and shelter while sending aid to their relatives left behind in Syria. Te Jamaa
Islamiya has a very clear loud position on Syria, he said, they are against the regime and supporting revolution. And the Brotherhood
does not just support with words. It might be money and it might be some tools and facilitation. And if the Lebanese Brotherhood is
doing it, it is with the cooperation of the Brotherhood of Syria. Te Jamaa Islamiya was playing a role via the SMB, he explained. Te
Brotherhood shares the same school of thinking of Hassan al Banna, he said, so I hold the same ideas that a Lebanese, Jordanian,
Yemeni, Libyan, Tunisian Brotherhood or even in Jakarta. Every group has the same thoughts. We share ideas and thoughts. We are an
organization looking for a new era so we are organized and ready to deal with a new situation in the region. Te Brotherhood has a huge
responsibility on their shoulders. If they succeed they will have legitimacy to be leaders of Muslims and Arabs and if they fail they might
lose their opportunity. We are preparing ourselves for 80 years. We are not dreaming we are dealing with reality.
Te Brotherhood is not like they were in the past, said one leader of the Homs Revolutionary Council (HRC) who receives money from
them among many others. Tere are Muslims Brothers in groups of two or three and they are giving support to people inside Syria.
Tey are not organized like they were before. Leaders of the SMB in Saudi Arabia do not have good communication with the SMB in
other places. Abu Mohammed al Rifai, an SMB leader in Lebanon gives support to some groups in Homs and elsewhere. Te SMB does
not have cadres on the ground, nor does it have much ideological inuence. Most people I spoke to admitted that their role was limited
to sending money but they were not sending it as the SMB, only as individuals who happened to belong to the SMB. In Homs some
leaders view their role as positive but they did not see it as the SMB acting as an organization, which it did not have the capacity to do
anymore. Homs receives help only from members of the Syrian wing of the MB who are based in the Gulf, Lebanon, or Jordan. Most of
the money has gone to aid and medical support. In late 2011, the SMB had a meeting in Saudi Arabia during which they decided against
supporting the armed groups. As the SMB they did not want to be involved in this, perhaps as a result of their experience in the 1980s,
but individual members of the SMB send money that is channeled to insurgent activities as well.
I met Syrian activists who met senior SMB leader Melhem al Drubi in Turkey, where he was giving money to activists. Members of the
Drubi family who live in Saudi Arabia are also important nanciers of the uprising. We told him we want money for weapons when we
met him in Turkey in May [2011], one activist told me. He said no money for weapons this is peaceful revolution. We asked for money
for hardship funds, he said we have people on the ground but we have not organized ourselves yet. He gave nobody that he met in
Istanbul any money. He just wanted to know the situation on the ground. He wanted to know level of support for the Brotherhood. Now
the Brotherhood controls a lot of access to money in Homs and the Damascus suburbs. But just because people take money from the
Brotherhood does not mean they support it. Te Brotherhood wants to improve and increase its name. Tey are not scary but they are
trying to control. Some people are not happy about how the Brotherhood is nancing on the ground. Some people who buy weapons
are not ready to deal with the Brotherhood. Te Brotherhood only gives certain people money for hardship or weapons.
Abu Abdu, a eld commander who deals with military and civilian elements of the opposition in the Damascus suburbs told me
that he had received calls from people in Jordan, Turkey, London, and the United States who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood.
People oer us money but there is a hidden agenda to it and we refuse it, he said. Tis is a popular revolution, I work for God and
the nation. I come out against oppression. He picked up his cigarette pack. Im not going to replace Marlboro with Gaullois.
Te Brotherhood doesnt scare me, said one leading activist from the Ismaili sect. Tey dont have representation on the ground
that can endanger democracy. A Christian activist he worked with on delivering weapons and aid throughout the country agreed
with the assessment, adding that, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. One prominent Druze activist in Damascus said, I am not
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afraid of the Brotherhood. Tey have been outside, they became more secular.Syrian Islam is moderate and Su. Su brotherhoods
are mystical groups organized around a sheikh who is believed to have a personal connection to God. Susm is very mainstream in
Syria, since most of the countrys Muslim scholars have received some Su training and often specialize as Su sheikhs.
Many other members of the opposition are less sanguine about the role of the SMB. One young activist in Barzeh told me he did not
want the Brotherhood. I dont want women to be completely covered up, he said. Tis is not nice. But like many people in the Arab
world, he associated the word ilmani, or secular, with anti-religious, and as a result was also against Ghalioun. I want something
in the middle, he said. An older opposition supporter in the same neighborhood told me he wanted a civilian Islamic government
like in Turkey, he said, but not Islam by force. Te Brotherhood made a mistake in the 1980s, he continued. While the SMB in
Damascus was engaged in peaceful proselytization, the Brotherhood in Aleppo and Hama took up arms. Its a mistake to take up
arms against a brutal regime. In reaction the regime thought anybody who prayed was in the MB. Tis is a revolution of the youth
and it was good for the Brotherhood to deny that they are behind the revolution. Te Brotherhood have no presence on the ground.
Another Damascus activist worried that many demonstrations in the Damascus suburbs had Islamic slogans. Indeed in Harasta
I heard songs about Muslims and indels. In Duma and Sanamein I heard demonstrators calling for jihad while in Zamalka in
evening demonstrations people prayed in the middle of a busy commercial street. Te activist told me that in Homss Dir Baalbeh
neighborhood, the Brotherhoods slogan of Islam is the solution was raised. In the last months the Brotherhood became strong on
the ground, he said. Communists told me they wont go out in demonstrations that say God is great and religious things. A lot of
demonstrations in Daraa, Homs, Idlib are led by clerics and it scares secular people. He complained that the SMB chose the names
for the Friday demonstrations. So National Unity Friday becameKhalid bin al Walid [the early Muslim leader who conquered
Syria in the 7th century] Friday andWe wont Kneel Friday became We Wont Kneel Except before God.
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Many Syrians with ties to the Brotherhood ed in the 1980s. Now, like the Attasis of Homs and the Abazeeds of Daraa, they send
money back home. Troughout Syria I heard concerns from the opposition that money from SMB members was ending up in the
hands of the wrong people. In Homs some funds were going to former criminals or to armed groups who acted without consulting
with the local civilian political leadership of the uprising. In Hama and Idlib I heard similar complaints.
We dont work with anybody, said Khaled Nasrallah, a leader of an armed group operating in Hama and Idlib, not with the
Brotherhood. We are a popular revolution. Tey want to control you and we are nationalists. We wont nish this oppression
so somebody else will come and tell us what to do. We are worried about the future, after the revolution, worried about the
Brotherhood or Salas or other parties. We dont want somebody to tell us what to do in the future. A senior leader of the Homs
Revolutionary Council told me there is no organization called the Muslim Brotherhood inside Syria. Tis is the dierence between
Syria and other Arab countries. Te sheikhs in Homs who have a revolutionary role are Sus. None of them belong to movements.
In the Jabal Azawiya town of Fleil people still recall the three times the Syrian army raided the area by helicopter and arrested
locals. Tey raided every village, according to one local leader. From 1980 to 1988 they would constantly raid the villages. Tey
also point to a massacre committed by the regime in the main square of Jisr al Shughur in 1980. In Idlibs Jabal Azawiya I met Yusuf al
Hassan, a powerful former cigarette smuggler who leads an armed group and has been ghting the regime since June 2011. Hassan,
who is said by other insurgent commanders to receive some help from Turkish military intelligence, crossed the border into Turkey
and met with SMB Secretary General Riad al Shaqfa. But he didnt trust the SMB, he told me, and as a result the SMB now opposed
him as well. I asked for ve representatives from the whole area to distribute aid through them, Hassan said. Te Brotherhood was
against this.Tis was cause of my problems with the Brotherhood in Jabal Azawiya. Te Brotherhood are not accepted among us,
they are racist, thieves, corrupt. We are the middle Islam. Tey divided the revolution, sent money to a few people. People came to
me and I gave weapons and bullets to everybody without discrimination. When our revolution got weaker in the summer four or ve
months ago, the Brotherhood intervention appeared. A ghter from Jisr al Shughur agreed with him. We are Muslims, not Muslim
Brothers, he said, provoking the laughter of other insurgents with us.
In rural Hama leaders of various armed groups resented a man called Abu Rayan who received help from the Brotherhood in Turkey
and Jordan to fund his armed group. I met with him and other leaders of armed groups in a mountain safe-house bordering Hama and
Idlib. Abu Rayan had a gray beard. He wore a pistol under his armpit. As we talked Abu Rayan sent a group of his men from his Abu
Fida brigade to help men from Hamas Salahedin brigade who were besieged in the citys Hamidiya area. Other commanders resented
him for not cooperating with them. Bassim, a commander from Hama told me that he had asked Abu Rayan for help in the past but
had not received a single bullet. He only helped Hama city, the other leaders told me, while others cooperated as needed, including
across the line into Idlib. Abu Rayan said he had met with Turkish intelligence. He was a vulgar man, whose cursing made the other men
uncomfortable. We kiss one thousand asses just so they can send us money for a satellite phone, he complained. Te other men told
me he was a former drug dealer in Hama city. It made me hate the Brotherhood even more that they support a man like this, said a Su
sheikh from rural Hama called Sheikh Omar Rahmun who also had an armed group which operated in rural Hama and Idlib.
Te city of Hama was still a reservoir for the SMB, he told me, but the resistance was taking place in the rural areas surrounding it
and Abu Rayan was not helping out the rural insurgency. Abu Rayan doesnt ght, said the sheikh. He is a leader. Abu Rayan gets
help from the SMB but the people in his group dont know this. Ninety percent of Abu Rayans men would leave if they knew he
works with the SMB. We want the revolution to win. We want the people who get help not to put it in their pocket but to give it to
the people in need. People have empty ammunition clips. Abu Rayan has money, we dont.
Te U.S. won with an alliance with the Brotherhood in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt he said. America cooperates with the
Brotherhood. But the alliance has to be studied. Tis alliance is failed. Tere was a long information war against the Brotherhood
and it is now an expired product. It is being treated as bigger than its size on the ground. Te Brotherhood does not have a presence
on the ground but it gave some money and communication devices to some groups. Tey give you money now so they can ride on
your shoulders in the future. After June or July [2011] groups and parties started to appear. I am from this party or that party. Our
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disaster is the Brotherhood in particular. Te Brotherhood dont have future in Syria without coercion. In Syria one party cannot win
over other parties. We refuse to work under any party. We dont want a party that society doesnt accept. We dont want people to
be coerced. Syria is a Su society. With two beats of the of miz-har (a Su drum) you can get all of Syria behind you, but they wont
follow Salas after 50 years.
Te word Sala haunts the Syrian uprising. Te regime has turned this conservative practice of Islam into a smear of the
opposition, hoping to associate them with jihadist Salas like those of al Qaeda in Iraq. In nearly every demonstration I attended
opposition songs dismissed the notion that they were Salas. But in Syria, as elsewhere in the Middle East, some practices associated
with Salas have become popularized even if people do not identify themselves as such. In part this is thanks to the inuence of
Saudi Arabia. And it is Syrians in Saudi Arabia who play a major role in nancing the uprising, giving them additional inuence. In
four months traveling through Syria, I found Salas to be a minority within the uprising, but nevertheless they play a growing role.
In November 2011, I rst met one of the most powerful men in Damascuss urban suburb of Harasta. Tough looking activists in
tracksuits who arranged our meeting were contemptuous of the local opposition coordination committee. Te Sheikh, or Abu
Omar, was not from the committee, said one, he is from the group that fears God.Te men explained to me that it was not the
coordination committee that was in charge of Harasta, it was the shabab, the guys like them.Abu Omar was a thick man wearing
a dish dasha and leather jacket. As we spoke over dinner, he asked me if I knew what a Sala was. I said it was somebody who
followed the righteous companions of the Prophet Mohammed. Its somebody devoted in his religion who doesnt stray to one side
or another, he said. Now they use Sala to mean al Qaeda or terrorist. Te Syrian regime is trying to persuade the West that it is
ghting terror like the West, adding that they failed. We sat in a room full of religious books and talked about the very active armed
opposition in Harasta. Violence has bred violence, he said. Abu Omar explained that their struggle against the regime was a jihad,
but without foreign military intervention (and he did not care from where), the regime would not fall.
Abu Abdu, a military leader in Harasta conded that many people hoped there would be a declaration of jihad against the regime.
But they dont want to be accused of being Salas. He did not expect such a declaration because the regime was not led by indels
and there were many Muslims in it, while the opposition also feared being accused of sectarianism.
In the Ghab area of rural Hama I spent many hours sitting with insurgents and local sheikhs. We dont meet in mosques because
the revolution is Islamic but because mosques are the center of gathering for people, said Sheikh Amer, an imam in the town of
Qalat Mudhiq. Men in the room dismissed the governments accusations that they were Salas. Some of these guys drink, one of
them told me. Our religion Islam is tolerant, one said, we wont be like them, meaning Alawites. Tere will be no mercy for the
Alawites who carried weapons or were shabiha, the sheikh told me.
In March, Sheikh Amer gave a sermon about speaking right in front of an oppressive sultan. A demonstration followed the prayer.
Syrian security called him in and asked why he was inciting people. Sheikh Amer is now a spiritual and moral advisor to the armed
men. I was told, he teaches the guys what is permitted and forbidden, values, dont harm Christians and Alawites, dont steal.
I drove through many liberated villages where insurgents had their own checkpoints and patrols. I met Abu Ghazi, a self-
proclaimed moderate Sala and the representative of the Ghab coordination committee on the Hama Revolutionary Council. Abu
Ghazi was respected by other militia commanders in the Ghab. He was in his 30s and had a short beard with no mustache. His house
had just been attacked by regime security forces for the third time and destroyed. He complained that the committee was neglected.
Te Brotherhood support their group, Salas support their group, secularists support their group. I am buying a satellite phone with
my own money. I have a farm, so I make money from that. People are selling sh so I can buy bullets for the guys. We have a national
agenda. I dont want the agenda of the Brotherhood or Salas. I want a national agenda, even if I am a Sala. I know the situation
here better than somebody in Europe, Saudi, or UAE. I dont want a sectarian war here. We would get a lot of help if we gave our area
to one current. Te Sala jihadi current oered help. Sala jihadis have a lot of money but need an oath of loyalty. Te man who gives
weapons doesnt give them for free. He feared chaos in the future if such parties gained inuence. I want law and order, he said.
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I was in the Ghab when Syrian security forces raided nearby villages. Hundreds of ghters from village militias in the area gathered
on the mountains above in case they were needed. Among them were insurgents from the Saad bin Muadh brigade, led by a Sala
called Abu Talha, who had links with groups outside Syria. Abu Talhas group only works for themselves, a local militia commander
complained. Tey dont share and dont cooperate much. Abu Talha was originally from the village of Tweina in al Ghab. Like many
Syrian Salas he had spent time in the Sednaya prison. Tey are all graduates of Sednaya, he said.
A Sala commander of an armed group called Abu Suleiman united the area against him. When people heard he wanted to make
his own emirate all the mountain turned against him, said a local village militia leader. We are all brothers from here to Daraa. We
are revolutionaries and thats it. No parties.
Salas like Abu Suleiman in Jabal Azawiya oer to loan you weapons for specic operations, other insurgents told me. But they
had refused. Abu Suleiman was a former drug dealer, they said, who became a Sala after spending time in the Sednaya prison. Abu
Suleiman had conditions for helping others, said a ghter from Kafr Ruma village in Jabal Azawiya. He said be under my emirate
and give me back the weapons when the operation is over. But we wont remove Bashar to be under somebody else. So Abu Suleiman
is rejected by the mountain. We expelled him, he was extreme. He was now in Turkey, they told me.
In quiet evenings the ghters of Jabal Azawiya gathered for large meals in dierent houses. One night I was with them for an
immense tray of knafeh as they watched the nightly talk show with the sectarian exiled opposition cleric Adnan al Arur. He was very
popular in the region, they said. Al Arur, whose anti-Shiite rants were divisive long before the uprising in Syria and whose name is
often chanted in demonstrations, famously warned Alawites who participate in the repression that they wouldbe chopped and that
their esh would be fed to dogs. Arur has not often spoken about Alawites and his popularity does not stem from his sectarianism
but because he has religious credentials and speaks in an angry colloquial voice when praising the demonstrators every day. But his
popularity has encouraged secular Sunni and minorities to prefer the regime.
We are grateful to the Sala ghters, said the Su Sheikh Omar Rahmun who led an armed group in Hama. But I am against
canceling people, I am against canceling you and you canceling me. Of the ghters, Salas are less than one percent. One night
Sheikh Omar led a group of ghters in a Su style of singing called a Mulid. Its good that Sus raise their head a little bit so people
wont think the revolution is Sala, one of the local ghters told me. Te role of Su clerics in the opposition should not come as a
surprise. I have seen Su insurgent groups in Falluja and other parts of Iraq and as well as armed Sus in Somalia and Afghanistan.
Further north, rural Aleppo has hundreds of ghters in the insurgency. In the town of Anadan, slogans for the Faruq revolution are
written on walls. Faruq is another name for Omar, a gure revered by Sunnis. On other walls people sent their greetings to Omar as
well as Abu Bakr and Uthman, who are also revered by Sunnis. Many men from the area volunteered to ght in Iraq. While most of
the activist leaders in Anadan have university degrees in subjects like chemistry, mathematics and Arabic, all of them are Islamists
and some are Salas.
A 48-year-old man called Abu Jumaa leads the uprising there. His son spent one year in an Air Force intelligence prison, accused
of belonging to the jihadist group Jund Asham and enduring severe torture. Before the revolution many of Anadans youths were
accused of Islamic extremism and arrested. One Friday in February demonstrators shouted, the people want a declaration of jihad!
Abu Jumaa arranged for the armed and unarmed needs of the revolution in Anadan. In his house he has Kalashnikovs, shotguns,
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). One of the spiritual leaders of the revolution in Anadan is a sheikh called Yusuf who is not
a Sala. Te Muslim Brotherhood still has inuence in Anadan, which suered in the 1980s during the Brotherhoods uprising and
many residents were banned from state employment.
Armed locals in Anadan claim that security forces have not raided the town because if they come security will be massacred. Non-
Sunnis were removed from the military security headquarters in Anadan so that they would be less likely to be killed by insurgents.
One Friday morning in December 2011, opposition activists tore down a large picture of Assad in the main square. One of the guards
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in the nearby security headquarters cheered them on. By February, the security forces had been expelled by the insurgents from
Anadan and its men were working on helping their brethren in Aleppo.
Another pan-Islamist movement, Hizbultahrir, or the Party of Liberation, is also reappearing. In Sanamein, the second largest
town in Daraa province, I met with Abu Khalid, one of the political leaders of the uprising there who also often led demonstrations.
Sanamein was a conservative town. Most people prayed. All its sheikhs were Shai, there were no Sus, and it seemed as though
everybody loved sheikh Adnan al Arur. Abu Khalid belonged to Hizbultahrir, a utopian pan-Islamic organization committed
to reestablishing the caliphate through peaceful means. Despite his aliation with this movement Abu Khalid was against the
involvement of any political party. I am against giving a religious tone to the revolution. He added, Its a popular revolution.
In January, leaders of armed groups in Homs including those from the oppositions Faruq Brigade sent messages to the Muslim
Brotherhood complaining that the Brotherhood was smuggling weapons into Homs but hiding them or burying there. Tey avoid to
use their weapons now to ght and we are afraid that they want us to defeat the regime and then they will use their arms when we are
tired. Te Brotherhood had no people on the ground, all leaders in Homs agreed, but there were signs they were trying to recruit from
other groups. Te discovery that they were hiding weapons had created a crisis of trust. Te utopian group Hizbultahrir has long had a
presence in Homs. Many of its members were arrested over the years, but it was not a violent group and hence they spent less time in
prison than others. Tey have made their presence felt in Homs once again, building a network and nancing some armed groups.
In late December 2011, some men belonging to Hizbultahrir tried to raise the black and white ag of Islam in the Inshaat neighborhood
of Homs. Tey also distributed leaets in Inshaat saying it is religiously prohibited to deal with the Americans or ask for support from
NATO, people should only depend on God. Te local political opposition committee in Inshaat told them they did not want these things
in their neighborhood. Likewise HRC activists stopped the Hizbultahrir men from raising the ags, explaining that only ags approved
by the HRC could be raised. Te HRC leadership warned their people in Inshaat to be careful because Islamists could use this incident
to say the HRC is against Islam. But others complained to the HRC about their refusal to raise the ag of Islam.
Islamists are going so fast, a leader of the HRC told me. Tey are not waiting. A few days ago Hizbultahrir put up ag of Islam, but
everybody knows that this slogan is for Hizbultahrir. Hizbultahrir started recruiting, they were arrested in previous years, and now
they started again building their networks. Tey started working with armed groups. Financing them. Other Islamists also started
working, they believe the regime is about to fall and they started building their relationships.
Tis generation is enlightened and was not raised in Sala education, unlike Egypt, said one leading activist from Homs. Sala
satellite television stations like Safa and Wesal are popular in Syria because Syrians were deprived of being religious for years, he told
me. Syria was the kingdom of silence for a long time, he said. Arur was the rst to speak with this courage. People dont like Arur
because he is Sala or Su. I watched him in the beginning. He was a sheikh and the words that came from him were trusted and he
spoke with courage.
He spoke of Syrias most senior cleric Said Ramadan al Buti. If Buti spoke in one hundred degrees less than Arur he would be more
popular than Arur, he said. Butis thoughts are good, if he was with the revolution and spoke then Bashar would have left a long
time ago. We want a man who is enlightened and a thinker. People liked Burhan Ghalioun at rst. Tey stopped liking him not
because he was secular but because they feel like he didnt deliver. I respect him because he is enlightened and stood with the people.
Te people are more simple than the parties, they want a program, to eat to live freely, not to live under oppression and a security
member will mess up the neighborhood, and they want something tangible and something to be proud of. Tis generation is not
Muslim Brothers, Hizbultahrir, or Sala. Tey want somebody who will serve them. But we cant deny that this is an Islamic society
so somebody could take advantage of Islam for electoral purposes.
Some people are disappointed, said another leader of the HRC. And dont expect anything from the Arab League which is a League
of Arab dictators and the security council did nothing for us so some Islamists think we have to depend only on god and call on jihad.
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Tose depressed people now blame the sheikhs because sheikhs do not call for jihad and people try to pressure sheikhs to make call
for jihad. But he disagreed with this. Why should we announce jihad? Just to give regime excuse to kill us?
Te Syrian uprisings reliance on outside help will only increase radicalization. In January ocials from the HRC complained to
me that the live broadcasts of Homs demonstrations shown on networks like Al Jazeera Mubashar were controlled by a Sala, Abu
Yasir, who falsely claimed he was in Homs and was causing problems for them. During a January sit-in in the Homs neighborhood
of Khaldiyeh the HRC tried to arrange for a senior member and founder of their council to speak to protesters live from his exile in
Jordan. Tis member was a Su sheikh from the Bab Assiba neighborhood who had played a key role from the rst days of the uprising
encouraging people to demonstrate and maintaining discipline over the armed groups. We wanted him to talk to the crowd because
the people of Homs love him and they will obey him, an HRC ocial told me. But the guy on the laptop said rst I want to ask the
coordinator (Abu Yasir) and the coordinator said no we dont want him, we want Arur, so Arur spoke to the crowd. He complained
that in Homs too many of the media coordinators were in Saudi Arabia.
Unlike places I visited in Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, in opposition strongholds the residents do not live in fear of Salas and there
are no armed Salas imposing themselves on the population. But the alleged suicide bombings of December 2011 and January 2012
in Damascus and February in Aleppo do raise the possibility that the regimes propaganda will be a self-fullling prophecy. Te more
time the revolution extends the Salas will be stronger, one activist told me. Each month that goes by the movement turns more
Islamic and more radical Islamic. If it had succeeded in April or May of 2011 there would be more civil society.
Te Americans and Europeans assess that the regime was not behind the attacks. A westernocial based in Damascus said the bombings
were both against known staging groundsformukhabarat and shabiha. Where they gather and get their assignments. Our defense attache
used to see hundreds of mukhabarat in front of the branch buildings every Friday morning. A seniorwesterndiplomattold me, Te car
bombs are a murky matter. If my time in Algiers and Baghdad is any guide, we may never know the full story. Before the December 23,
2011 attacks a seniorwestern diplomattold me that al Qaeda was in Syria and he was very worried they might conduct attacks. Syria was
a major source of jihadists and suicide bombers in Iraq, as even Syrian security ocials often admit. It was a transit pointforother foreign
ghters going to Iraq. One seniorwesterndiplomatworried that veterans of the Anbar campaign would use their expertise in Syria.
Residents of Daraa, the suburbs of Damascus, or other opposition strongholds feel like they live under occupation. Opposition supporters
talk about occupied or liberated areas. Opposition strongholds that are occupied are surrounded and divided by checkpoints.
Security and soldiers demand identity cards from passers by, ask men to get out of their vehicles, enter bus and check the identity cards of
all men on the bus, conduct armed patrols through neighborhoods, kick down doors, and arrest military age men. I was reminded of the
feeling I had in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and southeast Turkey. While security and soldiers in Syria are not foreign, they are not local
either and often have an Alawite accent. It is enough to create a sense of occupation. Occupation is a major cause of suicide attacks. On
Fridays, which is when the suicide attacks occurred, security men gather in large groups at the same places every week so they can chase
demonstrators, beat them, and shoot at them. Tey are a tempting target, easy and unprotected. While Syria is indeed a security state, its
security apparatus has been overwhelmed lately and it is very easy to smuggle anything or anybody into and around the country.
One colonel from the political security branch complained that before their primary job was to prevent al Qaeda activity but now
they allocated all their resources to repressing activists and responding to the armed opposition. Between 2005 and 2008, while I was
researching my book Aftermath jihadi Salas in Jordan and Lebanon from the Zarqawi network told me the nal battle would be in
Sham, the classical nameforSyria. Tey hated Alawites. Tey are an experienced bunch who would support suicide bombings against
security forces workingfora regime they could describe as indel who attacked people coming out of mosques. As the crackdown
increases, as the local oppositions sense of abandonment by the outside world increases, and the voices callingforjihad get louder,
there will likely be more radicalization.
Nir Rosen, author of Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of Americas Wars in the Muslim World, spent four months in Syria
reporting on the uprising for Al Jazeera.
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Islamic Evolution
By Piotr Zalewski, August 11, 2011
ISTANBUL Fawaz Zakri was 17-years-old when his father told him to pack his bags, bid goodbye to his family, and cross the
border into Turkey. Te year was 1981, and the northern Syrian city of Aleppo, where Zakri had grown up, was in the throes of a
violent anti-government insurgency led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.
Zakris father feared that his sons links with the Brothers would be enough to land him in jail, or worse. I was a sympathizer, Zakri
qualies, but not a member. Two years earlier, the Brotherhood had attacked a local military academy, killing dozens of cadets in
an assault that marked the beginning of an all-out war between the Sunni Islamist group and the Alawite regime of Syrian President
Hafez al-Assad.
Protests, assassinations, and terrorist attacks, many carried out by the Brotherhood, had since become routine. Syrian troops and
security forces responded with a ruthless crackdown, at times employing artillery re against neighborhoods in Aleppo. Te war
culminated in 1982, when, in the wake of another Brotherhood uprising, Assads troops killed tens of thousands of people in the
city of Hama. Te massacre crushed the Brotherhoods Syrian wing, and its surviving activists scattered many eventually settling
across the border in Turkey.
Zakris escape placed him beyond not only the reach of the Syrian regime, but also the militant ideology of the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood of that era. Tirty years removed from his ight, Zakri is a graduate of one of Turkeys nest universities, an iPhone-
toting businessman with a trade in grains and heavy machinery, and a uent English speaker. He is also, at least to some extent, a
changed man a committed Islamist, to be sure, but one of a dierent hue. After we came to Turkey, he says, people like me, we
faced a revolution in our thoughts.
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While many in Europe and the United States fear that Turkeys ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has introduced a
dangerous Islamist inuence into the countrys traditionally secular and Western-oriented stance, religious groups struggling to
overthrow stagnant autocracies across the Arab world take a dierent lesson from the partys success. Particularly in Syria, where
President Bashar al-Assads crackdown on a domestic uprising has become increasingly brutal during the holy month of Ramadan,
pious activists have looked to Turkey as a model for reconciling their faith with the democratic hopes of the Arab Spring.
But Turkish politicians steer clear of the M word. We do not use that language because we do not want to patronize anyone,
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogans chief foreign-policy advisor, Ibrahim Kalin, told me. We do not want to impose our
experience on others. Tere is more to this, of course. Te days when the Arab world suspected Turkey of being a U.S. Trojan
horse in the Middle East might be long gone, but the Turks, who remember President George W. Bushs repeated references to the
Turkish model, remain wary of being seen as doing the Wests bidding.
As Syrians continue to risk their lives to call for an end to the Assad regime, however, the impact of the Turkish experience on the
Brotherhoods political evolution is coming into clearer focus. In 2002, under the leadership of Ali al-Bayanouni, the Brotherhood
publicly disavowed violence and embraced parliamentary democracy. In the years that followed, it called for free elections in Syria
and announced its support for womens rights. In April 2011, during the early days of the Syrian uprising, Brotherhood leaders held
a news conference in Istanbul in which they denounced the Assad regime. And then in June, at a Syrian opposition conference held
in the Turkish city of Antalya, Brotherhood members put their signatures on a declaration that called for the freedom of belief,
expression, and practice of religion, under a civil state.
Bayanouni, who headed the group from 1996 to 2010, continues to strike notes that place him more in line with todays pious
Turkish politicians than the hard-edged Brotherhood leaders of days past. Firstly, we believe that the state in Islam is a civil state,
not a state ruled by any religious leaders or clerics, he told me, speaking from London. Secondly, we cannot impose any particular
way of dressing on citizens....We do call for and encourage [women] to wear the hijab and to follow Islamic behavior and action, but
individuals must be free to choose what they want.
Although the Brotherhood isnt new to parliamentary democracy, said Bayanouni, citing the groups participation in Syrias 1961 elections,
the AKP has provided it with a blueprint for reform. Te AKP is neutral in the area of religion neither does it impose religion upon
Turkish citizens nor does it seek to ght religion, Bayanouni noted, and for this reason we nd [it] to be an excellent model.
Erdogans critics would shudder at the thought of his government being upheld as a model for liberal reform. Concerns about creeping
authoritarianism in Turkey are on the rise: Te 2010 Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders ranked Turkey 138
out of 178 countries, dropping it almost 40 notches from 2007. A high-prole investigation into an alleged coup has led to the arrest of
several prominent journalists, feeding fears that the government is using the judiciary to jail or silence its critics. Most recently, Turkeys
top generals quit en masse, sparking fears of a confrontation between Erdogan and the strictly secular military establishment.
It is a matter of debate whether the Brotherhoods makeover reects a genuine change of heart or an eort to strengthen its ties with
the Turkish government one of the most critical international players in the eort to increase pressure on Assad and make the
organization more presentable to the rest of the Syrian opposition. But at the very least, the rhetorical shift represents a triumph
of pragmatism over Islamist ideology. I think [the Brothers] themselves know that the very strong fundamentalist positions are
impossible to apply these days in Syria, says Rime Allaf, a Syrian researcher at Chatham House. Twenty or 30 years ago, they were
a force that would have presented a lot of question marks for the rest of society. Today, however, speaking as somebody who is
secular...I can give them the benet of the doubt.
Turkey did not spark the Brotherhoods interest until the 2000s, with the rise of the AKP. Te party was built on the ashes of the
Islamist Welfare Party, which enjoyed its heyday in 1996, the year its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, rose to become prime minister in a
coalition government. Te fall from grace came quickly. Erbakan viewed as a challenge to the countrys secular system and its pro-
Western orientation was unseated by the army after only a year in power.
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For Erbakans protgs, including Erdogan, the experience was as sobering as it was formative. Teir new party, founded in 2001,
ditched the Islamist rhetoric, promised a range of democratic reforms, and embraced the prospect of Turkeys accession to the
European Union. Te AKP swept to power a year after its birth. It has not lost a single election since.
Te AKPs success in bridging the gap between Islamist principles and Western norms attracted the admiration of Brotherhood
sympathizers such as Khaled Khoja, head of the Turkish chapter of the Damascus Declaration committee, an umbrella group of the
Syrian opposition. Khoja spent two years in a Syrian jail between 1980 and 1982, he says, on account of his fathers aliation with the
Brotherhood. Following his release, Khoja left Syria and arrived, via Libya, in Turkey. He was only 17 years old.
[Abul Ala] Maududi, [Ruhollah] Khomeini, Sayyid Qutb, he says, listing the names of the Islamist rebrands from years past. Teir
manner was not successful for Islamic communities, producing division and conict. Te Turkish manner has showed us a dierent
[way].
Te debate on Islam in the West often centers on the question of whether the religion can be a vehicle for democracy. But for
activists like Zakri, the most pressing question has been whether democracy could be a vehicle for Islam. Now, armed with a
modied version of what constitutes an Islamic state, he believes the answer is yes.
When we were young, we thought of an Islamic state as a state ruled by Islamic laws, he says. Our conversion, in Turkey, was to see
that Islamic states give the freedom to choose, provide justice, protect religion, human life, thought, dignity, and property.
Although the experience of living abroad, particularly in Turkey, has helped moderate the Syrian Brotherhoods Islamist agenda,
it has also aggravated a generational conict within the group. Younger activists such as Khoja refer to themselves as part of the
Brotherhoods second generation, a moniker that distinguishes them from the groups traditional leadership. Teir grievances have
less to do with the Brotherhoods agenda than with its style of governance. Te Brotherhoods autocratic, tribal structure, says
Khoja, has become antiquated and ineective. Te old generation is focused on leadership, he says. Were focused on solutions.
Obeida Nahas, director of the London-based Levant Institute and a Brotherhood member, notes that members of the Brotherhoods
old guard are heavily burdened by the experience of life under authoritarian rule in Syria. He maintains that leaders of the new
generation, including himself, have dierent views that are informed by growing up in places like Europe or Turkey. Te ideological
[component] in the new generation is very light, he says.
Te Brotherhood in Syria was shattered after its confrontation with the Assad regime in the early 1980s, the group now a shadow
of what it once was. Syrias uprising, however, has shown that dissent is still alive in the groups former strongholds; Hama, the
Brotherhoods graveyard in the 1980s, has seen massive protests and a brutal government crackdown in recent weeks. Te Turkish
model may just provide the Brotherhood with a way to shake o the mistakes of its past, harness the momentum of the Arab Spring,
and help a new generation of activists bring down Assad.
But rst, activists like Nahas may need to break ranks with their own leaders, they say. Te story of the AKPs rise Erdogans break
with Erbakan, his former mentor, and his subsequent embrace of a more inclusionary type of politics has not gone unnoticed
among the Syrian Brotherhoods younger members. Te AKPs success, says Nahas, made people feel that they could do a revolution
inside their organization and get somewhere. Groups like the Brotherhood were designed as secretive, underground organizations to
escape the reach of hostile security forces. Tis means that now, with the openness, they have to change.
Piotr Zalewski is the Turkey correspondent for Polityka, Polands bestselling newsmagazine. His work has also appeared in the
National, TeAtlantic.com, Insight Turkey, and Turkish Policy Quarterly.
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Meet Syrias Opposition
By Randa Slim, November 2, 2011
Te divisions among the Syrian opposition groups remain daunting, despite prodding from abroad and some progress toward
unication. Te Syrian National Council (SNC), recently formed in Istanbul, Turkey, remains a work-in-progress. Te Damascus-
based National Coordination Committee (NCC) is at odds with the SNC. Te organizations disagree on two of the most urgently
contested issues: dialogue with the regime and foreign intervention. Meanwhile, youth activists are divided among three national
coalitions. Te military defectors formerly divided between the Free Ocers Corps and the Free Syrian Army have coalesced under
one organizational umbrella, but according to ocials in both the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army, there are no
formal communication channels yet between the two entities.
Tis fragmentation and disunity poses a formidable challenge. It makes it dicult to assess who is representing whom, the level of
public support each enjoys among Syrians, and the role each is playing in the protest movement. While it is impossible to know
which side commands a majority, a critical mass of Syrians has clearly opted for regime change. In this quest, they are laying their
lives on the line. Te challenge is whether the dierent leadership centers in the opposition could overcome their dierences and
coalesce under a unied organizational umbrella akin to Libyas Transitional National Council.
Two main political umbrella organizations have emerged within the Syrian opposition: the Syrian National Council (SNC) chaired
by Burhan Ghalioun and the Syrian National Coordination Committee (NCC) chaired by Hussein Abdel Azim. Te Syrian National
Council is a group of political parties, movements, and independents. Its principal components are the Damascus Declaration
Group (Syrian reformist intellectuals), the Muslim Brotherhood, representatives of the Istanbul Gathering (a group made up mainly
of Islamists and independent technocrats), youth activists, individual Kurdish activists, and Assyrians. Minority groups such as the
Alawites, Christians, Shiite, and Druze are poorly represented. Te National Coordination Committee is an internal opposition bloc
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consisting of 13 left-leaning political parties and independent political activists including three Kurdish political parties and youth
activists. Te Syrian National Council oers a better constellation of the major political parties and movements in the opposition,
and has been the object of most recent international attention. But neither of them can claim to be the sole interlocutor in the name
of the Syrian opposition forces.
Te two groups dier over the urgent questions of dialogue with the Syrian regime and foreign intervention. Te NCC calls for dialogue
conditional on the withdrawal of the military from the streets, the cessation of the regime attacks against protesters, and the release
of all political prisoners. Te SNC is opposed to a dialogue with the Assad regime except one that would address the modalities of the
devolution of power from the Assad regime. While both the NCC and SNC are in principle opposed to foreign military intervention,
the SNC membership is not united around this principle. Some SNC members, especially the youth activists, have been calling for the
imposition of a no-y zone and the protection of civilians including a NATO-led intervention akin to the one in Libya. Te NCC prefers
economic sanctions and other diplomatic measures in order to ratchet up pressure on the Syrian authorities.
Te youth activists who launched the revolution on March 15, 2011 and are now leading the demonstrations are the true heroes of
the revolution. Tey range in age from 17 to 35 and hail from dierent socio-economic and professional backgrounds. Tese men
and women have shed the fear of political engagement that has always plagued Syrian citizens under the Assad regime(s), and some
have used social media to reconnect with the public sphere. Te majority of the youth activists is non-ideological in the traditional
sense of Arab political parties, and is motivated by the quest for freedom, dignity, and economic justice. Te core of the protesters
comes from the Syrian poor and middle classes that have been marginalized politically and economically by the Syrian regime.
At the outset, the activists organized themselves into small local committees to document and publicize the uprisings. Over time,
they have evolved into a web of commissions, councils, and unions formally grouped around three coalitions: the Syrian Revolution
General Commission (SRGC), the Ghad alliance (including the Local Coordinating Committees or LCCS), and the Higher Council
of the Syrian Revolution. While all three groups have pledged their support for the Syrian National Council, only the latter two
have formal representatives. Te Higher Council of the Syrian Revolution is mainly Islamist in its orientation. Its leading activists
originally hail from Homs and its suburbs as well as Idlib. Of the three coalitions, the SRCG and Ghad are the better organized, have
good media outreach, and have bureaus and networks in dierent parts of Syria. Activists in all three coalitions oppose the NCCs
call for dialogue with the regime.
Te Syrian opposition also includes three Islamist groups, the largest of which is the Muslim Brotherhood. Historically, they have
been locked in a war against the Assad family. Te most notable period of tension was between 1975-1982 leading up to the Hama
massacre when the Syrian regime killed close to 20,000 Syrian civilians and forced the Brotherhood leadership into exile. Because the
organizations leaders have worked outside of Syria for over 30 years, it is hard to accurately assess the current level of support within
Syria. Te Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leadership was initially taken back by the uprisings and has now become one of three major
political factions inside the SNC.
Te other two groups of Islamists are Syrian based Islamist scholars and activists and the Salas. Te scholars and activists lie at the
moderate and liberal end of the spectrum of Arab Islamist parties. Te Salas constitute the smallest group of the Islamists, and are
based in Deir el-Zour, Jisr Al Shoghour, and Syrian towns bordering northern Lebanon. In the past, many of these Salas were given safe
haven by Syrian intelligence services that relied on their services and networks to eld suicide bombers and ghters into Iraq. Since the
start of the Syrian uprisings, these groups have turned against their former masters and according to unconrmed reports, have been
involved in some sectarian revenge killings. Tere are also claims by that regime that this group consists of former al Qaeda.
Military defectors play an unclear role in the Syrian opposition. Tey claimed responsibility for an attack on a Syrian army convoy
killing a military ocer and eight soldiers in central Syria. In Homs, they are defending the neighborhoods coming under attack
from the Syrian military. In other cities, they establish a ring around the protesters helping to defend them against soldiers and pro-
regime militias. Teir role is dicult to assess because it seems to dier from one region to the next. It is also hard to gauge the type
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and level of coordination between the protesters and the defectors on one hand, and between the dierent hubs where the military
defectors are located on the other. It is also still unclear what weapons the defectors have at their disposal and whether they are able
to secure military assistance from neighboring countries.
Te defectors are organized under the banner of the Free Syrian army (FSA), which is more a collection of small disparate groups
than an army. Te FSA leadership, headed by colonel Riad Al Assad, is headquartered inside Turkey along the Syrian border. Te FSA
is sectarian in character as nearly all the defectors are Sunni, while Alawites remain supportive of the Assad regime. In an interview
with Al Jazeera TV, Burhan Ghalioun stated that the number of military defectors is estimated between 10,000 and 15,000, however
these numbers are unconrmed. According to activists working inside Syria, defections happen on a daily basis. An FSA ocer told
me that the rate and pace of defections has accelerated to the point that it is becoming dicult for the FSA leadership to keep track
of them. Yet, these defections occur on a small-scale involving few ocers and soldiers at a time. Tere have been two recorded
incidents of battalion-level defections in Deraa both of which were quickly crushed by the Syrian security services.
Most of the Syrian opposition agrees on a few basic principles: toppling the Assad regime, maintaining the national unity of Syria,
and remaining committed to the peaceful nature of the Syrian revolution. But there are sharp disagreements over dialogue with the
regime, foreign intervention, and the militarization of the opposition.
Te NCC is the only entity that still calls for a conditional dialogue with the regime. Tey argue that dialogue remains the least
costly route to a political transition. All other components of the Syrian opposition including the SNC reject dialogue with the Assad
regime arguing that any dialogue will be used by to divide the opposition and break down its resolve.
Tere are diering perspectives on the issue of foreign intervention inside the opposition ranks. One group consisting mostly of the
NCC is opposed to any form of foreign intervention that would involve military measures including imposition of a no-y zone,
because it could wreak havoc in Syria as was the case in Iraq and Libya. Another perspective championed by the youth activists
and the FSA calls for foreign intervention to protect civilians, establishment of a no-y zone and the set up of a demilitarized buer
zone. Te no-y zone could escalate the rate of defections in the military ranks. Te buer zone could create a safe haven for military
defectors and their families.
Te SNC membership is divided among three groups in respect to their positions on military intervention. One group is opposed
to any form of military intervention and argues that protests and other forms of civil disobedience should remain the only means to
topple the regime. A second group is for military intervention irrespective of who leads the eort with some preferring a NATO-led
eort. A third group argues that military intervention should be considered as part of a broader strategy including a host of legal,
economic, and humanitarian measures and that the military intervention should not be NATO-led but fashioned more along the
lines of the international coalition recently established in Libya under Qatars leadership.
Te great majority of the opposition including the SNC, the NCC, and the leadership of the youth activists argue for maintaining the
non-violent character of the protest movement. Tey assert that militarization of the opposition would play into the hands of the
regime that has been trying its best to cast the uprisings in a Sunni armed insurgency light. Tis position puts them at odds with the
Free Syrian Army. Te SNC is still unsure how it should deal with the Free Syrian Army. Some SNC members say the council must
be careful not to support the FSA since it should not side with the defectors against the large bulk of Syrian soldiers. As one SNC
member put it, the others [soldiers] in the army are our sons too. Another SNC member argued that the FSA could represent the
military wing of the Syrian opposition. To-date, there have been no ocial contacts between the SNC and the FSA despite the latters
call for the SNC to send a delegation to Turkey for negotiations.
Despite the majoritys best eorts to maintain the peaceful character of the protest movement, developments on the ground might
over time push toward the militarization of the opposition. Tere is accumulating evidence that there is ongoing weaponization of
segments of the Syrian population. Activists inside Syria explain this development as citizens acquiring weapons for self-defense
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purposes. As one activist from Homs told me, we will not allow another Hama (massacre) to take place. To-date, there are no signs
of an armed insurgency a la Iraq. Tis is partly because there has not yet been an overt push by regional powers such as Turkey and
Saudi Arabia to arm the Syrian opposition including the Free Syrian Army. An FSA ocer denied the report that Turkey has been
arming them, but in his words are merely helping with our protection and meeting our basic needs.
As the Saudi-Iranian confrontation intensies, this situation might change. Like Iraq, Syria could become another proxy for the
Saudi-Iranian competition. In his recent interview with Russian TV, Syrian president Bashar al Assad accused neighboring countries
of funneling weapons and funds into Syria. He further added that specifying the countries responsible for these activities would
require additional investigation. Pro-Assad Lebanese allies told me that Qatar and Saudi Arabia were the main funders. Tere is no
independent evidence to substantiate such claims.
Absent an international intervention to force Assad out as was the case in Libya, there will be increasing calls from the activists
for weaponization of the Syrian opposition and in particular, the Free Syrian Army to lead a military campaign to topple the Assad
regime. Te FSA would need funding, weapons, and training. Qatar and Saudi Arabia are poised to be the main funders of this eort.
Being the host of the FSA leadership, Turkey is best positioned to provide the necessary logistical, operational support, and training
for the FSA.
Randa Slim is an adjunct researchfellow at the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation and a scholar
at the Middle East Institute. You can follow her commentary on Middle East aairs @rmslim.
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Gazas Salas Under Scrutiny
By Jared Maslin, April 25, 2011
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip were shocked in April 2011 when an Italian activist and journalist, Vittorio Arrigoni, was kidnapped
and then murdered by a self-proclaimed Sala jihadi group. Arrigoni, a bighearted man who I met several times during a two-month
stay in Gaza, was well known around the Strip as a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause. I come from a partisan family, he once
told an interviewer. His grandparents had fought and died while ghting fascism in Italy. For this reason, he said, probably, in my
DNA, there are particles that push me to struggle.
In a YouTube video Arrigonis captors demanded that Gazas Hamas government release Sala prisoners from its jails within 30
hours or they would execute their hostage. With police closing in, the captors apparently decided not to wait for their own deadline
and killed him the same day. Later, Hamas-aliated police and security forces surrounded three suspects in a house in the Nuseirat
refugee camp. Nuseirat is where the Sala group Tawhid wa Al-Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) is based. As documented in a video,
Hamas authorities brought Hisham Saidini, the leader of Tawhid wa Al-Jihad, whose release the kidnappers demanded, from prison
in an attempt to negotiate their surrender. Police also summoned the mother of one of the suspects, a Jordanian citizen, to aid in the
negotiating process. According to Hamas ocials, the stando ended in a shootout in which the Jordanian threw a grenade at his
two accomplices then shot himself.
In the initial days after the murder, Hamas ocials insinuated that the perpetrators of this inexplicable crime were Israeli agents,
although they were reluctant to make this statement unequivocally when speaking on the record. Of course, no evidence has
emerged publicly to support this conspiracy theory. Others, particularly in right-wing Israeli and U.S. circles, seized on Arrigonis
murder in order to depict the Gaza Strip, and Palestinian society at large, as a monolithic den of fanatics. It ought to go without
saying that this is not the case. Gazas people, who belong to a wide and overlapping spectrum of religious and political views,
universally condemned the murder. Similarly, all political parties, including Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Resistance
Committees, and even Sala leaders, denounced the killing.
Beyond the tragic events of the story, however, Arrigonis death highlights a complex political context, a web of power relations
among various actors in Gaza including Israel, Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, the Salas, other Palestinian factions, and the
international community. At the root of these dynamics is the Israeli and Western policy of isolating Gaza and ignoring Hamas. Te
crippling four-year-long blockade of Gaza has created the conditions of human misery and desperation in which a handful of people
have turned to extremism. A report from International Crisis Group states that the blockade has amounted to an assist provided to
Sala-Jihadis, who benet from...Gazas lack of exposure to the outside world.
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Te Jihadi Salas
Salasm is a stream of Sunni Islam that espouses a literalist reading of scripture and adheres to a conservative, puritan lifestyle. Te
International Crisis Group (ICG) states: Te Salas attempt to follow the example of salaf as-salih (pious ancestors) the rst three
generations of Muslims. Most contemporary Salas in Gaza and elsewhere also practice nonviolence, and according to the ICG, the
majority focus not on politics but on conventional daawa activities scholarship, education and social outreach that serve as
a means of calling others to Islam. In an interview in Gaza, Hamas ocial Ahmad Yousef described these traditional groups as a
few people on the street, knocking on doors, calling on people for soul purication.
Traditional Salasm arrived in Gaza in the 1970s when Palestinian students returned from religious schools in Saudi Arabia. To this
day Sala groups in Gaza receive support from Saudi sources. According to ICG, some, like the Ibn Baz Islamic society, are named
after Saudi sheikhs. In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has allowed Sala groups to receive funds from Saudi Arabia
as well. Fatah and the PA hoped the Salas could pose an Islamic counterweight to Hamas. ICG reports: Salasts have enjoyed the
support of Fatah, which appointed them to PA institutions in an eort to compete with Hamas, and have voiced no opposition to the
presidency of Mahmoud Abbas, whom they consider the wali al-amr (ruler). As recently as late 2010, the PA reportedly appointed
Sala preachers to mosques in the West Bank.
Militant wing
Te subset of jihadi or militant Salas in Gaza includes four main groups: Jund Ansar Allah (Soldiers of Gods Supporters), Jaysh Al-
Islam (Army of Islam), Jaysh Al-Umma (Army of the Nation), and nally Tawhid wa Al-Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad), whose members
were blamed for the killing of Vittorio Arrigoni. Although membership estimates vary widely, the jihadi groups are believed to include
no more than a few hundred activists, mostly young men, some of them still in their teens. Two Hamas ocials said these groups
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together number fewer than 100 members. Many of these adherents are recruited from the armed wings of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. An
unknown further number of cadres within these larger factions have sympathy for the Salas or may participate in Sala armed action.
Te jihadi Salas are opposed to Hamas over two primary issues: implementation of Islamic law the jihadis want the imposition
of a puritanical reading of sharia and ceaseres with Israel, which they oppose on principle. Tawhid wa Al-Jihad, the organization
whose alleged members were blamed for killing Arrigoni, is said to be one of the smaller groups. According to Hamas and other
Salas quoted by ICG, the groups leader, Hisham Saidni, is more vehemently against Hamas than other Sala-Jihadis. Saidinis rst
arrest by Hamas was followed by an escape, ICG reports, during Operation Cast Lead, when Gazas central prison was destroyed.
Te second of the two issues has arguably been more troublesome for Hamas. Salas have been blamed for launching homemade
rockets into Israel in violation of a ceasere agreed upon by Hamas and the other armed factions in Gaza. With the exception of an
escalation of violence in March 2011, Hamas and most other armed factions policy since the end of Israels devastating 2009 military
oensive has been to maintain calm and to arrest ghters responsible for unauthorized attacks.
More recently, Hamas has enforced a system in which each of the main armed groups Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance
Committees, and others discipline its own members for ceasere violations. Tose who commit infractions are also denied the
protection, prestige, and support of the faction, even if they are killed in the process. Perhaps realizing that a heavy hand can create
further radicalization, Hamas has also recently taken a more nuanced approach to the Salas, including sending religious scholars
into prisons in hopes of nurturing a more tolerant outlook among them.
In November, Israel assassinated two members of the Sala group Jaysh Al-Islam in separate strikes, alleging that they were plotting
attacks on Israeli and U.S. targets in Egypts Sinai Peninsula. (Te Mubarak government in Egypt also accused Jaysh Al-Islam of
carrying out the bombing of an Alexandria church, which killed 21 people on New Years Day, 2011.) Hamas denied the Israeli
allegations. Maybe this is what the Israelis think, that they can justify to the Americans that they are targeting those people, because
some of their rhetoric is that they [the Salas] are targeting Americans, or trying to depict them as al Qaeda, said Hamas ocial
Ahmad Yousef, when asked about the accusations leveled against Jaysh Al-Islam.
In both hits, Israeli drones or helicopters red missiles at the mens cars as they drove on the busy streets of Gaza City, leaving only
blackened wreckage. Te killings threatened to trigger a wider crisis. Fighters said to be aliated with the Popular Resistance
Committees responded by ring mortars, homemade projectiles, and one Russian-type Grad missile into Israel. Te Grad
produced a loud explosion and a reball in the sky over my temporary Gaza City residence. Less than a day later, that barrage ended
with a meeting among the various militant groups and a renewed agreement to maintain the ceasere. A well-connected Gaza
analyst told me that Hamas might have turned a blind eye to the brief spurt of attacks in order to allow ghters to let o steam.
Tis is the crux of Hamas dilemma: if it allows attacks on Israel, it risks massive retaliation from the Israelis; if it imposes too strict
a ceasere, it risks eroding its credibility among its political base in Gaza, particularly among its armed cadres. A U.N. diplomat,
quoted anonymously by ICG explained the problem: How long can Hamas sustain a policy of not engaging in resistance, while
this non-engagement doesnt produce any results in terms of liberating Palestine, easing the blockade, or any other political goal for
which the movement exists?
Still, Hamas ocials I spoke with dismissed the theory that the Salasts posed a signicant challenge. Ehab Al-Ghussain, the
spokesman for Hamas ministry of interior, also downplayed the issue: If you look by percentage, Gaza has the lowest percentage of
these people [Salas] in the world. Ghussain did explain, however, that the rst of the assassinated men, Muhammad An-Nimnim,
had been jailed by Hamas authorities in the past for actions against the Palestinian government.
Nimnim was widely believed to have been a top aide to Mumtaz Doghmush, the leader of Jaysh Al-Islam, a former member of the
PAs Preventive Security Forces, often described as a Maoso-like gure. Doghmushs group cooperated with Hamas in the capture
190
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of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006, but relations between the two groups soured over Jaysh Al-Islams kidnapping s of
westerners, which began with the August 2006 kidnapping of two Fox News journalists, and culminated in the prolonged captivity of
BBC reporter Alan Johnston in 2007. Johnston was freed days after Hamas seized full control of Gaza in June 2007. He was the last
foreigner kidnapped in Gaza until Arrigonis abduction. Indeed, many Gazans credit Hamas for ending the lawlessness and chaos
that characterized the last years of Fatah rule. According to Ghussain, however, Nimnim had been imprisoned for assisting another
group, Jund Ansar Allah, whose challenge to Hamas rule marked another turning point in relations with the Salas.
Rafah shootout
Jund Ansar Allah, which came into existence in late 2008, became prominent in June 2009 when it mounted a failed attack on Israeli
soldiers using explosive-laden horses. After a summer of mounting tensions with Hamas, on August 11, 2009, the groups spiritual
leader, Sheikh Abdul Latif Musa, delivered a sermon in a mosque in the city of Rafah in which he chastised Hamas and declared an
Islamic emirate in Palestine. Tis declaration began a stando with Musas supporters that ended when Hamas security forces and
Al-Qassam Brigades re-took the mosque by force. In a night of ghting, 28 people were killed including at least seven police all
Qassam members.
A man who identied himself as one of Jund Ansar Allahs only remaining members told me in an interview that the battle in Rafah
had been a turning point, the beginning of a comprehensive crackdown on Sala jihadis. Tere is more pressure these days, we can
hardly move here and there, he said. It is very hard to work with [other] Salas now, we are pursued by the Hamas government and
the Zionists, both sides. More than 20 of his comrades were in Hamas-run prisons, he said. Salas do not convene like they used to
do before because of the Hamas crackdown on them. Each group works alone, we cannot work as one group.
In regard to the assassination of Muhammad An-Nimnim, he even accused Hamas of passing information to Egypt that Israel
could have used in the killing. I believe a kind of coordination occurred between the Hamas government and Egypts intelligence
in detecting him, he said. It is very well known that Egypts intelligence sends security information to the Jews, provides them with
information; Hamas thinks that this information actually is delivered to the C.I.A and the Mossad. (Asked about this later, interior
ministry spokesman Ghussain denied this account, claiming, Nobody actually imagines that Israel needs information from Egypt
about Nimnim. Tey know everything. Maybe they give information to all sides. Tey have technology. Tey have spies. Tey
have collaborators.) Te man, who appeared to be in his 20s, said he was originally a member of Islamic Jihad but prefers Salasm
because, I believe its good to follow a respected ideology than a corrupt one. We are completely against any truce with Israel. We
will attack our enemy by every means according to our military capabilities, we will never hesitate or shy from resisting.
Te role of the Sala jihadis is not to be exaggerated, and much ambiguity still surrounds these groups activities, intentions, and
relations with other internal and external forces. Interior ministry spokesman Ehab Al-Ghusssain theorized that by targeting them
for assassination, Israel was attempting to elevate these groups importance. Te jihadis have become, he said, like a white paper,
whatever you write on it, it will be.
Jared Malsin is the former chief English editor of the Palestinian news agency Maan. His Twitter feed is @jmalsin.

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