TMP CB19
TMP CB19
TMP CB19
p
2
.52, and also for novel items, F
1
(1, 36)4.4, p.04,
p
2
.11.
Based on the effect sizes, the difference in accuracy in the RVFLH
was greater for conventional items than for novel items. The main
effect of gurativeness was signicant again for both conventional,
F
1
(1, 36)24.2, po.001,
p
2
.40, and novel expressions, F
1
(1,
36)35, po.001,
p
2
.49, where the effect sizes suggest that
the higher accuracy of NLs relative to NMs was a greater difference
than the higher accuracy of CLs relative to CMs. These latter
main effects of the 22 ANOVAs were equivalent with a brake
Table 1
Examples of the stimuli from the four experimental conditions and the ller condition (translated from Hungarian).
Conventional Metaphor Conventional Literal Novel Metaphor Novel Literal Unrelated
brilliant idea famous painter soft irony adult ant corrupt pump
blind love deep water silky sunset canned radish cooked mass
light meal wilted ower worn idea funny donor ticklish roller
warm heart full stomach sparkling party kitschy bus dilled zero
dark secret straight line smoky song cycling chorus angular dew
crude joke narrow hips stinky deal elegant pimp alert edge
sharp mind frizzy hair dusty poem muddy train drunk armor
bitter cold knitted sweater cruel building boiled coke thermal acacia
B. Forgcs et al. / Neuropsychologia 56 (2014) 101109 104
down the two-way interactions of the three-way ANOVA (Novel-
ty Figurativeness and NoveltyVisual Field), however, because
both subtests were signicant in both cases, neither was possible
to explain.
The median values of reaction times (F1) were entered also in a
222 (Visual FieldFigurativeness Novelty) ANOVA, and all
main effects proved signicant: visual eld, F
1
(1, 36)12.1,
p.001,
p
2
.25, gurativeness, F
1
(1, 36)11.8, p.002,
p
2
.25,
and novelty, F
1
(1, 36)117.5, po.001,
p
2
.77. The three-way
interaction was not signicant, F
1
(1, 36)1.1, p.29, observed
power.18, but there was a signicant two-way interaction
between gurativeness and novelty, F
1
(1, 36)17.7, po.001,
p
2
.33. In order to break down the interaction, the data was
collapsed across visual elds. Conventional and novel conditions
were entered separately into a single level ANOVA with gura-
tiveness being the only within-subject variable. CLs were pro-
cessed signicantly faster compared to CMs, F
1
(1, 36)47.5,
po.001,
p
2
.57, but there was no difference between NLs and
NMs, F
1
(1, 36).2, p.66, observed power.07.
The F2 item analysis consisted of a two-level (visual eld)
repeated measures ANCOVA, with gurativeness and novelty as
between-subject variables, and valence, arousal, imageability and
meaningfulness as covariates. For response accuracy only the
three-way interaction between visual eld, gurativeness, and
novelty, F
2
(1, 136)4.9, p.03,
p
2
.04, and the main effect of
novelty, F
2
(1, 136)13, po.001,
p
2
.09, were signicant. Mean-
ingfulness was the only covariate that had a signicant effect, F
2
(1,
136)29.3, po.001,
p
2
.18. When it was not included in the
analysis, effects remained the same, except that the interaction
between visual eld and imageability became signicant, F
2
(1,
137)4.1, p.04,
p
2
.03. When imageability was removed, the
three-way interaction and the main effect of novelty remained, but
also the between-subject effect of gurativeness proved signi-
cant, F
2
(1, 138)15.7, po.001,
p
2
.1. This suggests that the main
effect of gurativeness in the F1 accuracy analysis could be due to
the higher meaningfulness and imageability of literal expressions.
To break down the three-way interaction, conventional and novel
items were introduced separately to an ANCOVA identical to the
one above except that only gurativeness was included as a
between-subject variable. For conventional expressions there
was no interaction between visual eld and gurativeness, F
2
(1,
66).2, p.66, observed power.07. Visual eld had a signicant
main effect, F
2
(1, 66)4.6, p.04,
p
2
.07, and it was in interac-
tion with meaningfulness, F
2
(1, 66)8.9, p.004,
p
2
.12, which
latter also had a signicant covariate effect, F
2
(1, 66)19.6,
po.001,
p
2
.23. When we removed meaningfulness from the
analysis, only gurativeness had a signicant effect, F
2
(1, 67)7.7,
p.01,
p
2
.1 (and visual eld not). This suggests that the higher
accuracy in the F1 analysis for conventional expressions in the
RVFLH relative to LVFRH is reliable, even though modulated by
meaningfulness, while the higher accuracy of CLs relative to CMs
could be due to the higher meaningfulness of CLs. In the case of
novel expressions, only meaningfulness had a signicant effect,
F
2
(1, 66)13, p.001,
p
2
.17, and when it was omitted, image-
ability marginally covaried with visual eld, F
2
(1, 67)3.8,
p.054,
p
2
.05. When both of the latter covariates were omitted,
the effect of gurativeness become signicant, F
2
(1, 68)7.5,
p.01,
p
2
.1, suggesting that the more accurate processing of
NLs compared to NMs in the F1 analysis, could be due to their
higher meaningfulness and imageability.
Finally, median reaction times for the F2 analysis were included
in an ANCOVA whose design was identical to the one above. There
was no signicant three-way interaction between visual eld,
gurativeness, and novelty, F
2
(1, 136)1.9, p.18, observed
power.27. We found a signicant main effect for novelty, F
2
(1,
136)28.2, po.001,
p
2
.17, but neither gurativeness, nor visual
eld was signicant. Arousal was in interaction with visual eld,
F
2
(1, 136)5.6, p.02,
p
2
.04, and imageability marginally
covaried, F
2
(1, 136)3.9, p.050,
p
2
.03. Emotionally more
arousing word pairs were processed slower only in the LVFRH.
When arousal was not included in the model, the effect of visual
eld was still not signicant, while the main effect of novelty and a
trend for imageability remained, F
2
(1, 137)3.8, p.052,
p
2
.03.
When only imageability was omitted, the main effect of visual
eld turned out to be signicant, F
2
(1, 137)4.5, p.04,
p
2
.03,
and gurativeness as well, F
2
(1, 137)7.2, p.01,
p
2
.05, other-
wise all effects remained the same. Only in the RVFLH were more
imageable expressions processed faster, and was gurativeness in
an interaction with novelty. These results suggest that in the F1
analysis the main effect of faster responses in the RVFLH could be
due to imageability and modulated by arousal, and the main effect
of faster responses to literal expressions could be due to image-
ability. In a separate analysis, bigram frequency was also included
in the relevant comparisons, but the pattern of results did not
change. No other statistical tests were signicant (all values of
Fo3.8, and p4.058).
In summary, our analyses revealed no RH processing advantage
for novel items, either for metaphorical or literal. Both novel and
conventional expressions were processed more accurately in the
RVFLH than in the LVFRH (where meaningfulness contributed
to the latter advantage), and all word pairs were processed faster
in the RVFLH (which was inuenced by imageability, and in
interaction with arousal). Irrespective of lateralization, CLs were
processed more accurately than CMs, but it could be due to
meaningfulness; NLs were processed more accurately than NMs,
but meaningfulness and imageability could have contributed to
Table 2
Mean (SD) values of psycholinguistic properties of the four experimental conditions and the ller condition.
Conventional Metaphor Conventional Literal Novel Metaphor Novel Literal Unrelated
Frequency of target word 22378 8402 22246 10290 4332
(35420) (12895) (49636) (30552) (11605)
Length of target word 5.31 4.94 5 5.19 5.31
(1.79) (1.09) (1.07) (1.04) (1.01)
Meaningfulness (1highest) 1.54 1.25 3.4 2.59 5.39
(.35) (.15) (.85) (.67) (.53)
Literalness (1highest) 4.73 1.95 4.52 2.41 3.96
(.51) (.21) (.53) (.44) (.45)
Valence (3 to3) .03 .14 .45 .16 .22
(1.26) (1.32) (1.04) (.84) (.7)
Arousal (1none) 3.95 3.57 4.29 3.99 4.04
(1.2) (1.21) (.94) (.76) (.66)
Imageability (1none) 4.31 5.56 3.77 4.78 3.26
(.78) (.58) (.6) (.61) (.58)
B. Forgcs et al. / Neuropsychologia 56 (2014) 101109 105
this effect. CL word pairs were processed faster than CMs, but NMs
did not need more processing time than NLs. We present the
results of the F1 analyses in Fig. 1.
4. Discussion
The goal of the present study was to clarify the RH
0
s role in the
comprehension of novel expressions, especially novel metaphors.
In order to separate the effects of gurativeness and novelty, we
introduced an experimental condition in which we presented
novel literal word pairs. In contrast to most DVF experiments on
gurative language (except when ERPs are recorded), we ensured
lateralized presentation by using an eye-tracker. Additionally, we
controlled for a number of factors that could activate the RH and
act as confounds. We presented stimuli without context, and in
the statistical analysis we included emotional valence, arousal,
imageability, and meaningfulness as covariates.
4.1. Novel expressions
The LVFRH processing advantage for two word novel meta-
phorical expressions was not evident in our results, either in
response accuracy or reaction times, which we attribute to our
careful control for potential confounds. Thus, our ndings do not
support the RH theory of metaphor processing. This observation is
in line with earlier studies that did not identify RH processes
during NM comprehension (Faust & Weisper, 2000; Mashal &
Faust, 2010; Mashal et al., 2009; Shibata, Abe, Terao, & Miyamoto,
2007), although these research groups presented metaphors in
sentences that could have affected their results. We presented
novel metaphors without context, similarly to experimenters who
used word pairs only (e.g., Anaki et al., 1998; Faust & Mashal, 2007;
Mashal & Faust, 2008; Mashal et al., 2005, 2007; Pobric et al.,
2008). The latter studies reported RH involvement that contradicts
our ndings. A possible resolution lies in the fact that we
controlled for potential confounds such as imageability, emotional
valence, and arousal. It is possible that novel metaphors, especially
those taken from poetry (e.g., Faust & Mashal, 2007), differed from
literal expressions in ways beyond those related to metaphoric
value or novelty. Poetic effects often evoke pragmatic processes
that are known to require RH resources (e.g., Plh, 2000; Van
Lancker, 1997). Our controlling for the aforementioned factors
could explain why we did not replicate the previously reported
LVFRH processing advantage.
The nding that novel literals were processed more accurately,
and that all novel word pairs were processed faster in the RVFLH
was not predicted by the graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 2003)
or by the rst version of the coarse semantic coding theory
(Beeman, 1998); however, the BAIS framework (Jung-Beeman,
2005) can provide an explanation. According to this model there
are two kinds of semantic activations, integrations, and selec-
tions: a nely coded one, and a coarsely coded one. The various
sub-processes of language comprehension can tax either of the
two hemispheres depending on the specic task. Selecting a
relevant meaning, or integrating the word pairs into novel
meaningful expressions could have required ne coding, even
though they were not related semantically. Forgcs et al. (2012)
found that literal and metaphorical novel nounnoun compound
words activated the LIFG. The inhibition of irrelevant, and the
selection of appropriate senses seem to be LH weighted tasks,
especially when conditions encourage strategic and post-access
processing (Chiarello, 1988, 1991; Chiarello, Senehi, & Nuding,
1987). Alternatively, semantic integration of lexical items might
be primarily a LH procedure (while contextual integration still
could be carried out by the RH). Importantly, the paradigmatic
summation priming task in the experiment of Beeman et al.
(1994) did not require the integration of words into novel units.
In that experiment subjects read three prime words (foot, cry,
glass), each distantly related to the target word (cut) that had
to be named following lateralized presentation. Furthermore,
priming studies show that RH activations could be explained
solely by spreading activation, but the LH dominance in semantic
processing is not merely the result of automatic activation
or focused lexical access (Chiarello et al., 1987). When one
0
s
task is to arrive at coherence, rather than predictive inferences,
the LH clearly shows a priming advantage (Beeman, Bowden, &
Gernsbacher, 2000).
The comparable reaction times for NMs and NLs indicate that
contrary to predictions of the graded salience hypothesis, there
was no serial processing of salience. If the salient (i.e. literal)
meaning of a NM had been processed rst, and the non-salient
gurative meaning inferred only afterwards (Giora, 1997, 1999,
2003), NMs should have taken longer to process than NLs. Even
though the graded salience hypothesis proposes that unlike
conventional expressions, novel expressions have no salient mean-
ing, it is not clear why NLs required as much processing time as
NMs. Does any kind of salient (literal) meaning have to be dropped
in order to reach another, non-salient (but again literal) meaning?
Thus, a saliency based explanation seems unsupported by our
results. A more plausible explanation is that the meaning of novel
expressions is not computed serially, but instead it is directly
accessible once a semantic analysis has taken place. After the
possible meanings of the constituents are activated, the most
plausible candidates are selected, and then integrated. The proces-
sing of potential meanings seems to be carried out directly both
Fig. 1. Response accuracy (%), and median reaction times (ms) according to the F1 analysis. CM: conventional metaphor, CL: conventional literal, NM: novel metaphor, NL:
novel literal expressions. All conventional and novel literal word pairs were processed more accurately, and all word pairs faster in the RVFLH. NMs were processed just as
fast as NLs, while CMs were processed slower than CLs.
B. Forgcs et al. / Neuropsychologia 56 (2014) 101109 106
for literal and metaphorical expressions. Blasko & Connine (1993)
provided evidence that gurative meaning could be quickly avail-
able for apt NMs.
Similarly, the career of metaphor hypothesis (Bowdle &
Gentner, 2005), as much as it can be generalized from nominal
metaphors, proposes that NMs are processed serially. They should
be comprehended as a comparison only after a failed categoriza-
tion attempt (that is evoked by their grammatical concordance
with literal comparisons). Since NLs do not require this extra step,
NMs are expected to take longer to process. This was not apparent
in our experiment, thus the theory is not supported by our results.
Glucksberg (2003) proposes in his category assertion view that
even novel (nominal) metaphors are comprehended via a categor-
ization. Metaphorical terms are understood because they have a
dual reference to a literal subordinate, and to a gurative ad hoc
superordinate category, both of which are available. Whether or
not this is the case, our results do not contradict his theory. During
the processing course of novel expressions probably several
potential meanings are activated and a gurative or a literal
meaning is equally accessible, within a comparable time.
4.2. Conventional expressions
In line with the graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 2003) all
conventional items were processed faster and more accurately in
the RVFLH than in the LVFRH (although accuracy was modu-
lated by meaningfulness, the RVFLH advantage was consistent).
Fixed expressions may be stored as lexical units, and it could be
easier for the LH to retrieve and evaluate them.
Irrespective of lateralized processing, we found that CMs were
processed slower and less accurately than CLs (the slower reaction
times to metaphors appeared to be inuenced by their lower image-
ability, and the lower accuracy by their lower meaningfulness). This is
an important result, since the graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 2003)
predicts no processing difference between conventional items in terms
of gurativeness. Since we did not nd evidence for serial processing
of NMs, the processing delay is unlikely to indicate serial processing of
CMs either. However, compared to CLs, CMs have not one, but two
possible meanings, a literal and a gurative, both of which could be
readily available. This dual activation is predicted by both the parallel
access view (Gibbs, 1994) and the graded salience hypothesis (Giora,
2003). Contrary to novel expressions, the gurative and literal mean-
ings are not just directly accessible, but both of them are accessed
and both of them are accessed faster than the meaning of any kind of
novel expression. The activation of two possible meanings could
explain the overall slower processing time, since one of them has to
be selected. Semantic selection is probably taking place primarily in
the LH (Burgess & Simpson, 1988), imposing extra processing load on
that hemisphere. Forgcs et al. (2012) found that conventional
metaphors (relative to conventional literal expressions) activated the
LIFG; the BAIS framework (Jung-Beeman, 2005) suggests that this area
is responsible for ne-coded selection. Based on our results Gibbs
0
(1994) parallel access viewcould be extended to CMs not presented in
a supportive context. The modulating effect of the closely related
imageability and meaningfulness is an issue that should be explored in
future studies, even though it might be an inherent feature of
metaphorical language. Most metaphors refer to abstract concepts,
which are more difcult to experience with the senses, thus are less
imageable and as a consequence less meaningful. Across all
categories of word pairs the latter two factors correlated strongly:
r(288).77, po.001.
4.3. Conclusions
In the present divided visual eld study we employed an eye-
tracker to ensure hemield presentation of adjective-noun word
pairs, without sentential context, to study the lateralized processing
of novel metaphors. With our experiment we attempted to both
replicate that of Faust and Mashal (2007) and, at the same time,
extend it by an additional condition of novel literal expressions.
With the new condition we controlled for processing novelty, and
with including in the statistical analysis a number of potentially
confounding variables (such as emotional valence, arousal, image-
ability, and meaningfulness) we were able to control for their
inuence on RH processing.
With this design, we found that all categories of word pairs
were processed faster in the RVFLH, and accuracy was also higher
in the RVFLH. Our results contradict studies in which researchers
argued for a LVFRH processing advantage for novel metaphors,
and raise the possibility that other uncontrolled variables were
responsible for previous results. Reaction times data indicated that
the degree of lateralization of processing is inuenced by how
arousing the expressions are even though only CLs and NMs
were signicantly different. Controlling for emotional factors, such
as arousal, might be crucial for future studies examining hemi-
spheric differences in gurative language comprehension.
Responses to novel word pairs were faster in the RVFLH, and
were slower than those for conventional expressions, which
together suggest that primarily a left hemisphere weighted
semantic integration is responsible for their processing costs.
The lack of reaction time differences between novel metaphors
and novel literal expressions call into question the theories that
posit a serial processing, either of salience (Giora, 1997, 1999), or
as a consequence of a failed categorization attempt (Bowdle &
Gentner, 2005). Both conventional categories of word pairs were
processed faster and more accurately in the RVFLH, while con-
ventional metaphors were processed slower than conventional
literal expressions, perhaps as a result of a parallel access to their
literal and gurative senses. The results highlight the task sensi-
tivity of the division of labor for language comprehension between
the two cerebral hemispheres, and indicate that the role of the RH
might not be as specic to metaphors, or even to non-salient
language, as it has been proposed. Previous studies could have
reported pragmatic effects stemming from the experimental
situation and task. Further empirical studies are required to
elucidate the language specic processes of the RH.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the help of Judit Fazekas
during the experimental measurements, of Ferenc Kemny in
statistical analyses, and of two anonymous reviewers, whose
comments and suggestions signicantly improved our paper.
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77
7.3 Study 3: Verbal metacommunication Why a metaphorical mapping can be
relevant?
Forgcs, B. (2009). Verbal metacommunication Why a metaphorical mapping can
be relevant? (In Hungarian) Hungarian Psychological Review, 64(3), 593-605.
DOI: 10.1556/MPSzle.64.2009.3.8
Magyar Pszicholgiai Szemle, 2009, 64. 3. 593605.
DOI: 10.1556/MPSzle.64.2009.3.
593
Szemle
VERBLIS METAKOMMUNIKCI
MITL RELEVNS EGY METAFORIKUS LEKPEZS?
FORGCS BLINT
PhD-dik
BME Kognitvtudomnyi Tanszke
E-mail: [email protected]
Berkezett: 2008. 12. 11. Elfogadva: 2009. 03. 10.
Az egymsnak ltszlag ellentmond kognitv metaforaelmlet s a relevanciaelmlet nemcsak kiegszt-
hetik egymst, de tallkozsi pontjaik rdekes elemzsi lehetsgeket nyjtanak. Egy szigorbb s egy
lazbb elemzsi pldn keresztl tekintem t azokat a terleteket, ahol az elmleteknek tartalmi ssze-
fggse lehet. Egyrszt a fogalmi metafork az absztrakt fogalmak megrtst konkrt forrstartom-
nyok bevonsa rvn segtik, amivel hozzjrulhatnak az optimlis relevancia ltrehozshoz. Ez tl-
mutat a relevanciaelmlet ltal nekik sznt szerepen, amely szerint csupn a laza nyelvhasznlat klti
eszkzei lennnek. Lehetsges, hogy a fogalmi lekpezsek nem elhanyagolhat szerepet jtszanak kogni-
tv krnyezetnkben. A msodik elemzsben a metafork metakommunikatv rtkre prblok rmutat-
ni, ami a relevanciaelmlet kiegsztst eredmnyezheti. Az indirekt beszd virgnyelve egy olyan meta-
forikus rteget jelenthet a nyelvben, amelynek a szemantika szintjn is metakommunikcis rtke lehet.
Kulcsszavak: kognitv metaforaelmlet, relevanciaelmlet, metakommunikci, pragmatika, konk-
rt, absztrakt
BEVEZET
A metafora, ez a klnleges nyelvi eszkz, nagyjbl 150 vvel ezeltt keltette fl
a nyelvszek rdekldst, m a modern nyelvszet hozzvetleg harminc ve
kezdett el intenzvebben foglalkozni vele. Ugyanakkor a kognitv nyelvszetet
meghatroz relevanciaelmlet (SPERBER, WILSON, 1995) egszen eltr llspontot
fogalmaz meg a metaforkkal kapcsolatban, mint a kognitv metaforaelmlet (LAKOFF,
JOHNSON, 1980a), amely a metaforkat a fogalmi gondolkods kzppontjba
helyezi.
8. 8
594 Forgcs Blint
594
A kt elmlet kztt feszl ellenttek a legtbb nyelvsz szmra feloldhatat-
lannak tnnek, de TENDAHL s GIBBS (2008) cikkkben amellett rvelnek, hogy
a kt felfogsra gy is tekinthetnk, mint amelyek kiegsztik egymst. Noha az
elmletek a metaforkat alapveten eltren tlik meg, szmos ponton nem
mondanak ellent egymsnak, s tbb krdst illeten az egyik ott kezdi az rve-
lst, ahol a msik abbahagyja. A legfontosabb rszek ttekintst kveten (s
azok alapjn) megprblok olyan tovbbi kapcsoldsi felleteket keresni a meta-
fork s a relevanciaelmlet kztt, amelyek a kognitv metaforaelmlettel is ssz-
hangban vannak.
A relevanciaelmlet szerint mindig az adott kognitv krnyezet hatrozza meg,
hogy a jelek pontosan mire is utalnak (pldul akkor, amikor a szkni prbl
rabok, anlkl, hogy meg tudtk volna beszlni elre, tudjk, hogy mit kell tenni-
k a mgttk stl rrel, ha a megfelel pillanatban az egyikjk fttyent;
SPERBER, WILSON, 1995). Azonban ahhoz, hogy az adott helyzetnek megfelel
jelentsrteget nyilvnvalv tegyk, konkrtnak kell lennnk ppen annyira,
hogy megrtessk magunkat hallgatsgunkkal.
A kognitv metaforaelmlet szerint a metafork gy szervezik gondolkodsun-
kat, hogy az elvont fogalmakat konkrtabb fogalmak rvettsvel rtjk meg,
ezrt a metafork segtsgvel tulajdonkppen hatkonyan nyltt s nyilvnvalv tehetjk
mondanivalnk lnyegt. A htkznapi beszdben gyakran elfordul, hogy egy gon-
dolatot egy msikkal helyettestnk, vagyis tttelesen fejezzk ki magunkat (pl-
dul azt, hogy bevsrolok, kifejezhetjk gy, hogy leugrom a boltba). A me-
tafork is hasonlan mkdnek, de a lekpezsek rendszere hatkony tmponto-
kat biztosthat a relevns vonatkozsok megfejtsben: ezzel a nyelvi eszkzzel
lugrsban haladhatunk a beszlgetsek relevns informcii fel (hiszen val-
jban senki sem ugrik a boltba).
A metafork tovbb nagyban megknnythetik az absztrakt fogalmak haszn-
latt, mert nlklk lehetsges, hogy nem tudnnk megfelelen ktni a szavakat,
illetve elvont jelentsket az adott kontextushoz, gy sokkal nehezebb lenne meg-
tallni a pillanatnyi relevancijukat. Ez a krds a mentlis s a nyilvnos lexikon
kzti tfeds krdskrhez kapcsoldik, hiszen pldul a szinonimk azonos vagy
legalbbis nagyon hasonl fogalmakra utalnak, mikzben a tbb jelentssel br
szavak eltr fogalmakhoz kapcsoldnak, s gy nem valszn, hogy egy az egy-
hez lenne a megfeleltets a fogalmak s a szavak kztt (SPERBER, WILSON, 1998).
A metaforaelmlet egy msik ton is hozzjrulhat a beszlgetsek relevanci-
jhoz. A lnyeges mozzanatokra rmutat (osztenzv) jegyeket a metakommuni-
kci is hordozza (pldul a hangslyozsban), m a metafork rvn a meta-
kommunikci nyelvi rtegt rhetjk tetten, mivel az elsdleges metafork
(GRADY, 1997) fiziolgiai s gyermekkori lmnyekre utal forrstartomnyai,
amelyek rejtetten tszvik a beszdet, folyamatosan kzvettenek egyfajta m-
lyebb, szenzomotoros jelentsrtegrl is. A metafork metakommunikcis httr-
jelentse tudattalanul (is) folyamatosan tudst a beszl szmra a relevns moz-
zanatokrl. Lnyegt tekintve ez az rtelmezs kzel ll FNAGY Ivn (1974) ketts
kdols koncepcijhoz, mely szerint a beszd nknyes kdrendszert egy archai-
kus, termszetes kd egszti ki, amely a jelek s a jelensgek kztti szimptoma-
A metafork relevancija Mitl relevns egy metaforikus lekpezs? 595
595
tikus vagy szimbolikus kapcsolatokat is hordozza. Az elsdleges metafork ese-
tben a termszetes kdot a szenzomotoros lmnyek hordozzk.
Ide kapcsoldik a ktrtelm beszd (PINKER, 2007), amely gyakran metafork
segtsgvel jn ltre: a metafork virgnyelve egy olyan nyelvi rteget biztost,
ahol a ktrtelmsg httern egyrtelmen ki lehet fejezni a relevns informci-
kat (pldul a vgyakat) anlkl, hogy el kne hagyni a semlegessg biztonsgos
terept. A metaforkkal osztenzv jegyek nylt kommunikcijra van lehetsg,
mikzben forma szerint nem hangzik el semmi klns. Ilyen kifejezs pldul a
mlyebben megismerkedtek egymssal.
A KOGNITV METAFORAELMLET S A RELEVANCIA
LAKOFF s JOHNSON (1980b) kognitv metaforaelmletnek lnyege, hogy a meta-
fork nem csak szrevtlenl hatjk t mindennapi beszdnket, hanem fogalmi
rendszernk is metaforikus szervezds. A fogalmi metafork egy konkrtabb
forrstartomny elemeit szisztematikus lekpezsek rendszerben vettik r az
ltalban elvontabb cltartomnyra. A fogalmi metafork (pldul AZ ELMLE-
TEK PLETEK) olyan metaforikus nyelvi kifejezsekben nyilvnulnak meg, mint
a szilrd alapokon nyugszik az rvels (KVECSES, 2005). Amint eltvolodunk a
konkrt fizikai tapasztalatoktl, s absztrakcikrl vagy rzelmekrl kezdnk be-
szlni, metaforikus nyelvi terepre rkeznk (LAKOFF, 1992). Az egybknt res,
absztrakt fogalmakat metafork segtsgvel fogjuk fel: ezeket ltalban elvonts-
guk miatt nehz sz szerint kommuniklni, st, bizonyos helyzetekben taln egy-
ltaln nem is lehet. Pldul elg nehz akr csak beszlni is elmletekrl, ha nem
szeretnnk hasznlni AZ ELMLETEK PLETEK fogalmi metafort.
A metaforkat tbbflekppen szoktk csoportostani. GRADY (1997) felosztsa
szerint az elsdleges metafork gy jnnek ltre, hogy bizonyos szenzomotoros l-
mnyek nem szenzomotoros lmnyekkel kapcsoldnak ssze (pldul A DH
EGY FORR FOLYADK). Ezek kombinciibl llnak ssze a komplex metafork,
amelyek motivcis httere mr nem nyilvnval (pldul A CGEK NV-
NYEK), de ha elsdleges metaforkra bonthatjuk ket, akkor knnyen meglla-
pthat. A klnbz tudsterletek tapasztalati gestaltok smiban kapcsoldnak
ssze (LAKOFF, JOHNSON, 1980a), teht egysges megtapasztalsuk miatt jnnek
ltre az sszekttetsek a tvolabbi fogalmak kztt.
Az elsdleges metafork integrlt elmlete szerint (LAKOFF, JOHNSON, 1999) elkp-
zelhet, hogy nemcsak hasonl lmnyek, hanem azonos agyterletek aktivld-
nak, amikor szenzomotoros lmnyek vetlnek absztrakt fogalmakra. Az elsdle-
ges metafork kt terlet prhuzamos neurlis aktivcija rvn jnnek ltre, amit
ksrletek is igazolni ltszanak (ROHRER, 2005).
596 Forgcs Blint
596
Relevanciaelmlet s metafora
A relevanciaelmlet (SPERBER, WILSON, 1995) lnyege, hogy az emberi kommuni-
kci a relevancia maximalizlsra trekszik. A relevancia kommunikatv elve az,
hogy minden kijelents figyelmet von magra, ami sajt relevancijt ellegezi
meg a hallgat szmra. A relevanciaelmlet szakt a jelelmlet klasszikus s jabb
formival is: a Grice-fle kzs tuds helyett a kognitv krnyezetre helyezi a hang-
slyt, amelyben a beszl rmutat (osztenzv) viselkedsvel nyltt (manifesztt)
teszi kommunikcis szndkt, hogy ezzel tjkoztassa hallgatsgt kijelentse
tartalmrl (vagyis sajt mentlis llapotrl). Ebben a helyzetben kt vezrlelv
mkdik: a kognitv hats maximalizlsa s a kognitv erfeszts minimalizlsa,
amelyeket ersen meghatroz a kognitv krnyezet. Kognitv hatst j informci,
vagyis egy korbbi felttelezs megerstse vagy egy meglv felttelezs cfolata
rvn rhetnk el. Minl nagyobb a hats s minl kisebb az erfeszts, annl
relevnsabb a kijelents.
A beszdben ez kt lpsben valsul meg: elszr az adott kijelents logikai
formjnak kidolgozsa trtnik meg (morfolgia, szemantika, szintaxis), ami egy
nem propozicionlis vzat hoz ltre. A propozcihoz mr szksg van a relevan-
cira: az adott kognitv krnyezetben elhangz kijelents alapjn egyrszt explika-
trkat dolgozunk ki (mik kvetkeznek az adott kijelentsbl pldul abbl,
hogy hideg van itt, az kvetkezhet, hogy nyitva van az ablak) msrszt implikat-
rkat hozunk ltre (vagyis miket foglal magban a kijelents pldul azt, hogy be
kne csukni az ablakot). Ezek a jelents tulajdonkppeni hordozi. A kt lps a
gyakorlatban vals idben, prhuzamosan megy vgbe, elvrsok s hipotzisek
alapjn (TENDAHL, GIBBS, 2008).
A relevanciaelmlet szerint a metafork egyltaln nem foglalnak el klnleges
helyet sem a htkznapi beszdben, sem a gondolkodsban. A metafora mindsz-
sze egyike a klti hatskelts eszkzeinek, melyek rvn olyan laza nyelvhaszn-
latra nylik md (a beszl nem szigoran az igazsgot mondja), amely optimali-
zlja a kijelentsek relevancijt. A laza nyelvhasznlat gyenge implikatrkkal
jr, amely utbbi azt fejezi ki, hogy a hallgat nem lehet egszen biztos abban,
hogy mire is utalt a beszl. Ez aztn tbb kognitv erfesztshez vezet, ami vi-
szont cserbe nagyobb kognitv hatssal jr, s gy jn ltre a klti hats a rele-
vancia optimalizlsa mellett.
A laza nyelvhasznlat pontosabb meghatrozshoz szksg van a ler
(descriptive) s a magyarz (interpretive) reprezentcik megklnbztet-
sre. Minden reprezentci, amely llt valamit, vagy 1. lerja az (akr hipotetikus)
llapotokat, vagy 2. egy msik lltst magyarz. A kapcsolat egy llts s a besz-
l fejben lv gondolat kztt minden esetben pusztn magyarz jelleg. Teht
a hallgat mindig valamilyen magyarz felttelezst dolgoz ki a beszl inform-
cikzlsi szndkrl. Tovbb maga a kijelents sem teljesen azonos a beszl
gondolataival; gyakran nem is lehetsges sz szerinti kifejezst tallni egy-egy sz-
szetett gondolatunkhoz, ezrt beszlnk lazn. A relevanciaelmlet szerint a kett
teljes egyezse s a kett egszen kicsi tfedse egy kontinuumot alkot. A metafo-
ra is valahol ezen helyezkedik el, s ezrt nincs lnyegi klnbsg a metaforikus s
A metafork relevancija Mitl relevns egy metaforikus lekpezs? 597
597
a nem metaforikus kijelentsek feldolgozsa kztt: a hallgatk sosem veszik gy,
hogy teljesen sz szerint rti a beszl azt, amit mond. Az optimlis relevancia
rdekben lazn beszlnk, s ezrt a hallgatk sem vrnak sz szerinti kijelent-
seket, st a metaforikus kijelentsek gyakran relevnsabbak, mint a sz szerintiek
(TENDAHL, GIBBS, 2008). Ezek szerint, noha nem metaforikus az a kijelents,
hogy a terem res, ltalban mgsem sz szerint rtelmezzk, mert btorok is
lehetnek benne, s a mozitl az iskolig sok mindenre utalhat.
A metafork laza hasznlatt CARSTON (2002) pontostotta, ad hoc fogalmakra vo-
natkoz elmletben, amely szerint ezeket online hozzuk ltre, a lexikai fogalmak
laztsval (enciklopdiai s lexikai rszeik visszatartsval denotcijuk nvelse,
pldul Gza egy zsirf), illetve szktsvel (megszort informcik hozzad-
sval denotcijuk cskkentse, pldul Gza rugalmatlan). Ezltal jn ltre a
metafork explikatrja. Pldul a Robi egy buldzer kifejezsben a buldzer
fogalmat addig lehet tgtani, hogy ember is lehet belle. Tulajdonkppen csak a
szigoran sz szerinti kifejezsek nem alkalmazzk a fogalmak szktst vagy t-
gtst.
A metaforkrl alkotott elmletek keresztmetszete
A kognitv metafora- s a relevanciaelmlet radiklisan eltr szemlletmdja elle-
nre TENDAHL s GIBBS (2008) szerint a kt szemllet megfr egyms mellett st,
ki is egsztik egymst. A klnbsgek abbl fakadhatnak, hogy a kognitv metafo-
raelmlet kutati ltalban a nyelvbe mr beplt metaforkra, implicitt vlt
forrstartomnyaikra s egyfajta fogalmi-reprezentcis szintre koncentrlnak,
mg a relevanciaelmlet kapcsn ltalban a hasonlsgon alapul, jszer meta-
forkkal foglalkoznak (pldul ezrt nem kapunk magyarzatot tlk arra, hogy
mirt hasznlunk bizonyos bejratott, konvencionlis metaforkat). Teht a fo-
galmak s kifejezsek s a kommunikci s kontextus rtelmezsi szintek oly-
kor jelents, de inkbb csak ltszlagos ellentteket hozhatnak ltre.
Fontos krds, hogy a metafornak mi a kontextulis hatsa pontosan ho-
gyan is jrulnak hozz az optimlis relevancia elrshez. ltalnossgban a be-
szlgetsekben felbukkan metafork a relevancia elvtelezst segtik, ezzel
teszik grdlkenyebb a kommunikcit: A fogalmi metafork kszlett, amit
metaforikus kijelentsek rtelmezse sorn hvunk el, a kognitv krnyezet meg-
hatroz rsznek tekinthetjk, amely ersen manifesztt vlik, ha bizonyos
kulcsszavak elhvjk (TENDAHL, GIBBS, 2008, 1840).
SPERBER s WILSON (1998) a relevanciaelmlet kapcsn a fogalmi rendszerrl
is kifejtik llspontjukat, amely szerint szprototpusok helyett mindig csak ad hoc
jelentseket konstrulunk, amiket a rendelkezsre ll szavak segtsgvel prb-
lunk kifejezni. Ezrt viszonylag laza a megfeleltets a mentlis s kznyelvi lexi-
kon kztt, s ezrt van sokkal tbb fogalmunk, mint szavunk. Sok szemlyes
fogalmat ismerhetnk (lehetnek olyan rzeteink, amelyekre tbbszr rismernk,
mondjuk egy bizonyos fjdalom), mg sincs mindre kln szavunk. Ez az elgon-
dols rtkes informcikkal szolgl az jszer metafork megalkotsrl, de
598 Forgcs Blint
598
ellentmond a konvencionlis fogalmi metafork puszta ltnek, ahol a fogalmi
lekpezsek mr rgzltek a nyelvben. Az jszer metafork esetben egy bizo-
nyos fogalmat, gyakran hasonlsgi alapon, egy msikkal helyettestnk, de raj-
tunk mlik az, hogy pontosan mivel. Pldul azt, hogy jl megy az zlet, mond-
hatjuk gy is, hogy virgzik a kereskedelem, de kereshetnk ms kifejezst is.
Teht egy elvont fogalmat a helyzetnek megfelelen tbb konkrt fogalommal
is kifejezhetnk. A konvencionlis metafork esetben ezek az eleinte ad hoc kife-
jezsek mr rgzltek, gy egy kisebb gondolatmenetet is magukban foglalhatnak
(pldul a leugrom a boltba azt fejezi ki, hogy csak nagyon rvid idre, s csak a
boltba megyek). Ez utbbi az implikatrval van kapcsolatban, s inkbb a prag-
matikrl szl, mikzben az, hogy a leugrom sz tbb rtelmet kaphat, inkbb a
fogalmakrl szl, ami ezt a vonatkozst az explikatrhoz kapcsolja.
sszefoglalva: a metafork tulajdonkppen kis rvidtsekknt mkdnek a
nyelvben: egy-egy sz kerl kisebb gondolatmenetek helyre, kiemelve a helyzet-
ben leginkbb relevns vonatkozst. A denotci szktse s laztsa rvn az
implikatrk mellett explikatrk is megjelennek, s a laza nyelvhasznlat rvn
amennyiben a hallgat megrtette a metafort optimalizldik a relevancia,
mert nagyon pontos s aktulis jelentst kaphat az adott llts, egy viszonylag
rvid kifejezs rvn.
KONKRTSGRA TREKVS
A fentiek alapjn elkpzelhet, hogy a kognitv metaforaelmlet szorosabban is
sszekapcsolhat a relevanciaelmlettel, mert a fogalmi lekpezsek mkdst
magyarz elmlet fontos clt szolgl a nyelvben: a mondanival konkretizlst.
A fogalmi metafork absztrakt cltartomnyaikat konkrt forrstartomnyok r-
vn kpezik le, gy gyakorlatilag konkrt mozzanatokkal helyettestik be a mon-
danival absztrakt, nehezen rtelmezhet rszt. A relevancia rdekben a hallga-
t a helyzetnek megfelelen, konkrtan igyekszik rtelmezni a mondottakat, ezrt
a beszl is konkrtan prblja kifejezni magt teht igyekszik leszkteni az
explikatrkat. Tulajdonkppen ehhez kellenek a metafork, ezrt alkalmazzuk
ket, gy vlik tlthatv a mondanival (A MEGRTS LTS).
Radsul bizonyos fogalmakrl rendkvl nehz msknt gondolkodni, mint
metafork segtsgvel: mit tudunk mondani az elmletekrl, ha megprbljuk
kikerlni AZ ELMLETEK PLETEK fogalmi metafort? Ez ma mr fogalmi
rendszernk rsze, rtelmezsnk nehzkes nlkle, de amikor mg jszer me-
tafora volt, valjban a konkretizlst segtette. Ez a szerepe persze ma is nyilvn-
val, hiszen a htkznapi beszdben sem gy mkdik, hogy az elmleteknek az
plet jellege lenne lnyeges, hanem megalapozottsga vagy felptse. A re-
levancia adja meg, hogy mit kpeznk le a forrstartomnybl, s hogy a cltartomny mely
rszre kpezzk le azt. ppen ezrt a konvencionlis metaforkat csak a kontextus
adekvt helyein hasznlhatjuk, mshol nem. A metafork konkrt forrstartom-
nyai, illetve kpi nyelve gyorstja a kommunikcit, ezrt knny elkpzelni ket
s ppen ezrt vlnak idvel konvencionlis szkapcsolatokk, vagy akr sz-
A metafork relevancija Mitl relevns egy metaforikus lekpezs? 599
599
lsmondsokk. Az elvont mondatokba behelyettestett konkrt fogalmak a cltar-
tomny relevancijt adjk meg, illetve emelik ki.
A metaforikus lekpezsek nem pusztn a kontextulis felttelezsekhez trt-
n hozzfrst mdostjk (s ezltal az erfesztst, ami a metafora interpretci-
jnak feldolgozshoz szksges), hanem a lekpezsek felelsek a kapcsolatrt a
pszicholgiai (elvont) s fizikai (konkrt) jelentsrteg kztt (TENDAHL, GIBBS,
2008).
Az lltsok nmagukban teljesen absztraktak lehetnek (ezrt lehet olyan sok
vita pldul a szent szvegek rtelmezse krl, lsd SPERBER, WILSON, 1998), de
az adott kognitv krnyezet, illetve a konkrt pldk, hasonlatok (s persze meta-
fork) az optimlis relevancia szintjre szktik le az explikatrkat. Egy metafo-
rikus kifejezs egyarnt lehet az explikatra vagy az implikatra rsze, ezt a kon-
textus dnti el, illetve az, hogy inkbb a kognitv erfesztsen vagy a kognitv
hatson van a hangsly az adott lltsnl mi visz kzelebb az azt megelz ll-
ts relevancijhoz.
Mivel a metaforkban szerepl kifejezseknek van egy nem metaforikus rtel-
me is, krds, hogyan tudja kivlasztani a hallgat a relevancinak megfelel je-
lentst online. A hagyomnyos megkzeltsek szerint, a szval egytt asszocicis
hlja is azonnal aktivldik, teht a metafork is egybl kzre llnak. Ennek
ellentmondani ltszik, hogy bizonyos szavaknak asszocicik nlkl is akr 100
vonatkozsa is lehet, s gy nehz megmagyarzni a feldolgozs gyorsasgt.
TENDAHL s GIBBS (2008) szerint mg azt sem zrhatjuk ki, hogy semmilyen h-
lzat sem aktivldik. Eszerint a ltom sz esetben nem szmtana, hogy konk-
rtan ltok valamit, vagy elvontan. Ennek nem mond ellent ROHRER (2005) kuta-
tsa, amely szerint a lekpezsek valban mkdnek neurlis szinten is. A.
GONDOLATOK (KZZEL MEGFOGHAT) TRGYAK metafort (pldul ne-
hz megragadni a lnyeget) EEG-vel s fMRI-vel is vizsglta, s azt talltk, hogy
a kezekkel kapcsolatos metaforikus s a sz szerinti mondatok olvassa kzben
egyarnt sok olyan szenzomotoros terlet aktivldott, amely a kz taktilis inger-
lse sorn szokott. Teht a klnbz rtelemben hasznlt szavak esetben ugyan-
az a reprezentci aktivldhatott.
GIBBS (1994) szerint a metaforkat online dolgozzuk fel, gy a metaforikus ki-
fejezsek megrtse sorn egybl a fogalmi metaforra asszocilunk, s valszn-
leg nem kell lpsenknt lekpeznnk a metaforikus kifejezst ahhoz, hogy meg-
rtsk. Ezt POBRIC, MASHAL s munkatrsai (2008) vizsglata is megerstheti,
amely szerint a jobb oldali Wernicke homolg agyterlet transzkranilis mgneses
zavarsa jelentsen lelasstja az jszer metafork feldolgozst, mikzben a kon-
vencionlis metafork feldolgozst ez nem befolysolja, ami arra utal, hogy ez
utbbiak mr bepltek kifejezseink kz. Vagyis ez a terlet a metaforikus rtel-
mezsben jtszhat szerepet: egyfajta metaforakapcsolknt ms dimenziba he-
lyezi az adott szt s gy nincs felttlenl szksg arra, hogy ltrehozzuk a teljes
lekpezst egy-egy kiemelked vonatkozs megrtse rdekben. Teht nem kell
egy minden jellemzre kiterjed megfeleltetsi rendszert ltrehoznunk ahhoz, hogy
megrtsk az jszer metaforkat, lehet, hogy elg csak az adott metaforikus ki-
fejezs ltal kiemelt, leglnyegesebb jellegzetessget rvettennk a cltartomnyra.
600 Forgcs Blint
600
TENDAHL s GIBBS (2008) javaslata a ktrtelmsg feloldsra a kvetkez: a
kognitv metaforaelmlet a fogalmi terek megalkotsrt, a relevanciaelmlet
pedig a megfelel jelents kivlasztsrt felels. Teht a ktrtelm szavak szn-
dkolt jelentse lehetsges, hogy kzvetlenl hozzfrhet, ha a megfelel kogni-
tv krnyezetben tallkozunk vele. Az adott sz olyan fogalmi trre is mutathat,
ahol tbb rtelmezsi lehetsg tallhat, s ha a kapcsolds a sz s a kifejezni
kvnt fogalom kztt nincs szigoran meghatrozva, akkor egy metafora vezet-
het el a sz megfelel rtelmezshez.
Mit nyjthat a kognitv metaforaelmlet a relevanciaelmletnek?
A fentiek alapjn, egy rtelmezsi vagy gondolatksrletknt, megfordthatjuk a
relevanciaelmlet azon lltst, hogy a metafork csak a laza nyelvhasznlat egyik
esett kpviselik (s nll elmletre sincs szksg az rtelmezskhz), s tekint-
hetjk gy a laza nyelvhasznlatot, mint a metaforikus gondolkods terept. Bizo-
nyos rtelemben a jel-jelents megfeleltets is metaforikus: a jeleknek lehet egy
kzvetlen jelentse, de a relevanciaelmlet szerint valjban mindig loklisan, a
kognitv krnyezetben szletik meg a tartalmuk, teht gyakran valami msra
utalnak, mint elsdleges lexikai jelentsk az adott helyzetnek megfelelen an-
nl konkrtabbak. gy lehetsges, hogy a metaforikus s metonimikus fordulatok
s a metaforikus rtelmezs rendkvl gyakori. Termszetesen ez szlssges l-
lspont lenne, s a metaforikus az elvont szval hasonl rtelemben jelennek
meg. De a relevanciaelmlet keretei kztt, a fogalmi szinten mkd ad hoc
jelentsmegfeleltetsnek egy ilyen rtelmezse is elkpzelhet. Ennl azonban
valsznbb, hogy a kt elmlet inkbb kiegszti egymst, s a jel--jelents megfe-
leltetsek egy fokozatos tmenetben tvolodnak egymstl: bizonyos jelek jelent-
se minden krlmny kztt egyrtelm (pldul a tulajdonnevek), a trgyak
nevei mr rugalmasabban hasznlhatak, s a kontinuum msik vge fel tall-
nnk az igket, s mg tvolabb azokat az elvont fogalmakat, amelyek a legrugal-
masabban kaphatnak klnbz jelentseket. Mivel a kognitv krnyezet fogalma
igen tg, valsznleg szksg van egyfajta szimblumlehorgonyzsra (HERND,
1996), hogy valamilyen jelentshez kpest lehessen rtelmezni a kijelentseket,
hogy ne mindig helyzetrl helyzetre kelljen kitallni a szavakat illetve a jeleket
(mg akkor se, ha a relevanciaelmlet ezt lehetv teszi, pldul a fttyent rabok
esetben).
A kognitv metaforaelmlet ezzel a fogalomlehorgonyzssal jrulhat hozz a re-
levanciaelmlethez, ami tlmutat a kognitv krnyezet mindig aktulis vilgn, de
nem teszi szksgess a jelelmlet kzs tuds gondolatmenett. Ez a szint az
alapmetafork forrstartomnya, a fiziolgiai/szenzomotoros szint, amely egyszer-
re univerzlis s szubjektv is. Ha a jelek akr egy viszonylag szk kre egyrtel-
men s kzvetlenl van ktve a krnyezet bizonyos tulajdonsgaihoz (pldul
sznnevek), akkor a hozzjuk kapcsold jeleknek vagy ezek kombinciinak
(pldul sznekkel kifejezett rzelmeknl: srga az irigysgtl, vrs a dhtl)
referencija mr lazulhat. Ezltal a legtbb szt knnyedn lehet laza beszd-
A metafork relevancija Mitl relevns egy metaforikus lekpezs? 601
601
mddal hasznlni a relevanciaoptimalizls rdekben, s mgis megmarad egy
olyan fogalmi rteg, amely a jelek hasznlatt viszonylag lehatrolja, vagy leg-
albbis lehetsget biztost a bizonytalansgok feloldsra.
Kontextusfggetlensg s krnyezetfggsg
Elkpzelhet, hogy a jelek lehorgonyzsa csak a beszd elsajttsa sorn ilyen
kzvetlen, s ksbb knnyen llhatnak a jelek szinte brmilyen fogalom helyett.
Azonban ppen a beszdtanuls idszaka az, amikor az osztenzv kommunikci
meghatrozv vlik a csecsemk szmra. GERGELY s CSIBRA (2006) termszetes
pedaggiai elmlete az osztenzv-referencilis kommunikcis jegyeket emeli ki a
pedaggiai tanuls-hozzlls kivltsban, ami a kultra- s minden bizonnyal a
nyelvtanuls alapja is. Ezt a folyamatot nagyobb nehzsgek nlkl ssze lehet
kapcsolni a relevanciaelmlettel: kora gyermekkorban a kulturlis s nyelvi rele-
vancit az osztenzv jelek adjk meg, tbbek kztt a dajkabeszd rvn.
A nyelvet mg nem ismer kisgyerekek s gondozjuk kognitv krnyezetben
a szhasznlat annl knnyebben r clt, minl kevsb laza. Eleinte mindenkp-
pen nagyon laza lesz a jelentsmegfeleltets, a pontos elsajttshoz ezt elszr
szkteni kell, s csak a biztos hasznlat teszi lehetv az ismtelt laza hasznlatot
ksbb. Felteheten ennek kvetkezmnye, hogy a gyerekek knnyebben tanul-
jk meg a fneveket, mint az igket, s az absztrakt fogalmak mg ksbb jelen-
nek meg (HARLEY, 2001). Idekapcsoldik TENDAHL s GIBBS (2008) rdekes fel-
vetse, hogy bizonyos metafork elbb mkdhetnek, mint maguk az absztrakt
fogalmak. Pldul A TUDS LTS fogalmi metafora lehet, hogy korbban
hasznlhat a gyerekek szmra, mint nmagban a tuds fogalma. Teht el-
kpzelhet, hogy az absztrakt fogalmakat metaforkon keresztl tanuljuk meg
s ezrt ll el az a helyzet, hogy ksbb sem tudunk igazn msknt gondolkodni
rluk.
A jelek kombinlsnak, majd metaforkon alapul jrakombinlsnak kpes-
sgrl idevg, hogy a metafork megrtshez mr az elsszint mentlis llapot-
reprezentcik elegendek, mikzben az irnihoz legalbb msodszint meta-
reprezentcik (reprezentcik reprezentcii) szksgesek (GYRI, 2006). Ez ar-
ra utal, hogy a metafork hasznlathoz nincs felttlenl szksgnk magas szint
tudatelmleti funkcikra, s lehetsges, hogy a relevanciaelmlet jslatval szem-
ben mely szerint a gyenge implikatrj metafork megrtshez mr szks-
gnk lenne metareprezentcikra elegend csak a fogalmi tartomnyok kztti
kapcsolatokat megtanulnunk, ahogy azt a kognitv metaforaelmlet jsolja
(TENDAHL, GIBBS, 2008).
A metafork s jeljelents megfeleltets krdse szempontjbl fontos LAKOFF
s JOHNSON (1980a) metaforkkal kapcsolatos alapvet gondolata, mely szerint a
metafora elszr is gondolat s cselekvs, csak azutn nyelv. Teht amint kontex-
tusfggetlen a (r)mutats, mindjrt egy metaforikus vonatkozst kap. Persze az
ilyen kontextusfggetlensg mr jrszt nyelvi jelleg, ppen ingerfggetlen,
illetve behelyettesthet jellege miatt. Lnyeges azonban, hogy a gesztikulci fel-
602 Forgcs Blint
602
teheten meghatroz volt a homonidk korai nyelvben, hiszen a beszdkzpont
a jobb kezet mozgat agyterletre ntt r (HMORI, 2005).
A konkrt jeljelents viszony magval az emberi nyelvvel tnhetett el, hiszen
amint ingerfggetlenn vlhattak a jelek, gykeresen megvltozott jelentsk
minsge is. A nyelvi jelek nknyesek, a jelents mindenkppen kzvetetten
kapcsoldik. Ugyanakkor szksges egyfajta meta-reprezentci arrl, hogy mi
mit jelent (legalbbis a nyelvtanuls idejn), hiszen msknt lehetetlen kontextus-
fggetlenl hasznlni a jeleket, s a szavak nem tudnnak valami (idben s tr-
ben) tvolira utalni.
A trtl s idtl, teht a kontextustl fggetlen idegrendszer reprezentcii
egy ehhez hasonl fogalomrendszert tesznek lehetv. A metaforikus tbbletjelen-
ts abbl fakadhat, hogy a valamennyire eleve elvont jelents tovbbi terletekre
is tvihet, s ott is felhasznlhat. Azonban a metafork valdi elnye az, hogy a
szenzomotoros forrstartomnyok rvn lland kapcsolatot biztostanak egy
olyan viszonylag konkrt fogalmi szinttel, ami testi s kisgyerekkori lmnyeken
(vagyis tapasztalati gestaltok kpi smin) nyugszik. gy lehetsgnk van valami
korbbi, ismert dologra utalni. Ez egy nagyon hatkony nyelvi ugrst tenne lehe-
tv a kognitv krnyezet relevns vonatkozsainak manifesztt ttelre. Mindeh-
hez elg, ha a kpi smk csak idlegesen, online mdon emelkednek ki a folya-
matos elme, test s klvilg interakcikbl (TENDAHL, GIBBS, 2008).
VERBLIS METAKOMMUNIKCI
A metaforaelmlet msik hozomnya a relevanciaelmlet szmra a nyelv metafori-
kus rtelmezsben rejlik. A pszichoanalzis szimbolikus rtelmezst tekinthetjk
egyfajta kiterjesztett metaforikus szvegrtelmezsnek, amit az elszlsokra, a
viselkedsre, az lmokra s vgs soron magra a patolgira is kiterjeszt. Felfog-
hatjuk gy, hogy mindezekben a jelensgekben a tudattalan indulatok mkd-
snek metaforit ltta Freud. A pszichoszexulis fejlds gyermekkori lmnyei s
a libid fiziolgiai megnyilvnulsai tapasztalati gestaltoknak tekinthetek, ame-
lyek olyan metaforkat motivlnak, ahol a tudattalan mkds mint forrstarto-
mny a viselkeds klnbz cltartomnyira vetl r. Pldul a trauma szimboli-
kus (metaforikus) kifejezdse (kivetlse) lehet a hisztria. A tudattalan indulati
mkdsrl folyamatosan tjkoztatnak minket pldul az elszlsok, teht a
metakommunikci rvn a tapasztalati gestaltok forrstartomnyai klnfle
cltartomnyokban nyilvnulnak meg.
Tulajdonkppen a htkznapi beszlgetseket folyamatosan alfesti a beszlk
indulati lete, tudattalanja: a szveg maga is rendelkezik egy olyan rteggel, amit
metaforikusan rtelmezhetnk, ahol a tudattalan motivlja a (gyakran rejtett)
metaforkat. Ez a nyelvi rteg azrt kaphat jelentsget, mert az osztenzv kom-
munikcis jegyeket a felnttek is alkalmazzk, de a leggyakrabban tudattalanul.
A metakommunikci nmagban is sok osztenzv jegyet hordoz, ami a figyelem
irnytst szolglja (pldul hangslyozs, sznetek, hanghordozs), s ez a kom-
munikcis rteg az emocionlis llapotok kzvettse rvn, noha mindkt fl
A metafork relevancija Mitl relevns egy metaforikus lekpezs? 603
603
szmra ltalban tudattalanul is, de jl jelzi a szndkokat. Ezltal vlik nlklz-
hetetlenn a kommunikci relevns rtelmezse szempontjbl. Ez a mlyebb
nyelvi szint a beszdtl fggetlenl, zavartalanul mkdik akkor is, ha nagyon
direkt mdon verbalizljuk, illetve tudatostjuk. Sajt s beszlgettrsunk rzel-
mi-indulati llapota, a kognitv krnyezet rszeknt mindenkppen hatssal van a
kijelentsek rtelmezsre. Tulajdonkppen a manifesztt tett tartalom httere-
knt, referenciapontjaknt mkdik. Mivel kevss vagyunk kpesek irnytani,
inkbb hisznk a metakommunikcinak, mint az elhangzott lltsoknak, ezrt
ez az rzelmi szint folyamatos, de kzvetett osztenzv jelzseinek tekinthetjk.
Pldul ha felmerl, hogy a beszl nem az igazat mondja, hiba igyekszik tcso-
portostani az osztenzv jegyeket, metakommunikcija knnyen elrulhatja azok
valdi helyt. Ez lenne a FNAGY (1974) ltal termszetes vagy archaikus kdnak
nevezett rtege a nyelvnek.
A htkznapi beszdhelyzetekben, amikor egyik fl sem igyekszik szndkosan
elrejteni (metakommunikcis) szndkait, a rejtett osztenzv jegyek jelezhetik a
beszd metaforikus rtegt, vagyis azt, hogy mely fordulatok rendelkeznek valdi
metaforikus jelentssel, a konkrt metaforikus kifejezs pedig megmutathatja, hogy
mi is az indulati tartalma az adott kijelentsnek. gy kzvett a beszl szndkai-
rl, beemelve azt a kognitv krnyezetbe.
A metafork tudatos hasznlata: az indirekt beszd
Lehetsges, hogy ezt a msodik nyelvi rteget hasznlja ki az indirekt beszd is
(PINKER, 2007). Az indirekt beszd lehetsget biztost a nyltan nem vllalhat
vgyak s szndkok jelzsre, illetve a rluk foly alkudozsra. Az indirekt kr-
sek nagy elnye, hogy teret engednek nylt megtagadsuknak is. Pinker szerint a
beszd az zenetek kzlsn tl a beszlget partnerek kztt lv viszony tpus-
rl (a dominancirl, az sszetartsrl s a klcsnssgrl) foly alkuk helyszne
is. Ezt tekinthetjk a kommunikci indulati rtegnek.
Teht az indirekt beszd rvn az (egybknt a metakommunikci sorn
megkttt) alkuk biztonsgos jratrgyalsra van lehetsg: tudatos alaktsuk
kzben ltszlag nem vlik manifesztt a beszlgets valdi trgya a kzs kogni-
tv krnyezetben. Ezek a beszlgetsek azrt lehetnek indirektek, mert a valdi
tartalom elemei egy fed tartalom elemeinek vannak (metaforikusan) megfeleltet-
ve. Ltszlag msrl van sz, s csak akkor vlik manifesztt a valdi tartalom,
ha mindkt fl beleegyezik ebbe ebbl fakad az indirekt beszd biztonsgossga.
A kapcsolati alkuk nagyon gyakran valamilyen metaforikus virgnyelven zajlanak,
amelynl alig szmt, hogy mi a metafora cltartomnya, mert a valdi prbeszd
a forrstartomnyrl szl.
A relevanciaelmlet az indirekt beszdet valsznleg a laza nyelvhasznlat ka-
tegrijba soroln, ahol a gyenge implikatrk tbb kognitv erfesztst ig-
nyelnek, de cserbe nagyobb kognitv hatssal jrnak: a trsas viszonyok jratr-
gyalsval. Ha ezt kiegsztjk a kognitv metaforaelmlettel, akkor rszletesebb
elemzsre nylik lehetsg, ami arra vilgthat r, hogy a kt elmlet nem csak
604 Forgcs Blint
604
kiegsztheti egymst, de kzs alkalmazsuk mlyebb elemzst s rtkelst tesz
lehetv. Noha tartalmi mondanivaljuk nem vltozott, ktsgtelen, hogy az el-
mletek tgabb rtelmezsre volt szksg a fenti gondolatmenethez. Mgis, ezl-
tal a fogalmi gondolkods szintjrl inkbb a metafork pragmatikja fel told-
hatott el az elemzs.
IRODALOM
CARSTON, R. (2002) Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication. Black-
well, Oxford
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nulmnyok IV. 6976. Akadmia Kiad, Budapest
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Sociality: Culture, Cognition, and Human Interaction. 229255. Berg Publishers, Oxford
GRADY, J. E. (1997) Foundations of meaning: primary metaphors and primary scenes. PhD
Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
GIBBS, R. (1994) The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language, and Understanding. Cam-
bridge University Press, New York
GYRI, M. (2006) Autism and Cognitive Architecture. Akadmiai Kiad, Budapest
HMORI J. (2005) Az emberi agy aszimmetrii. Dialg Campus Kiad, Budapest
HARLEY, T. (2001) The Psychology of Language. Psychology Press, Hove
HERND I. (1996) A szimblumlehorgonyzs problmja. In PLH CS. (szerk.) Kognitv
tudomny. Szveggyjtemny. 207222. Osiris Kiad, Budapest
LAKOFF, G. (1992) The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor. In ORTONY, A. (eds) Metaphor
and Thought. (2nd edition) 202251. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
LAKOFF, G., JOHNSON, M. (1980a) Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
LAKOFF, G., JOHNSON, M. (1980b) The Metaphorical Structure of the Human Conceptual
System, Cognitive Science, 4, 195208.
POBRIC, G., MASHAL, N., FAUST, M., LAVIDOR, M. (2008) The Role of the Right Cerebral
Hemisphere in Processing Novel Metaphoric Expressions: A Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation Study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20 (1), 170181.
PINKER, S. (2007) The logic of indirect speech. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
105 (3), 833838.
ROHRER, T. (2005) Image Schemata in the Brain. In HAMPE, B., GRADY, J. (eds) From Per-
ception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics. 165196. Mouton de Gruyter,
Berlin
SPERBER, D., WILSON, D. (1995) Relevance: Communication and cognition. (2nd edition)
Blackwell, Oxford
SPERBER, D., WILSON, D. (1998) The mapping between the mental and public lexicon. In
DIRVEN, R., CARRUTHERS, P., BOUCHER, J. (eds) Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary
Themes. 184200. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
TENDAHL, M., GIBBS, W. R. (2008) Complementary perspectives on metaphor: Cognitive
linguistics and relevance theory. Journal of Pragmatics, 40, 18231864.
A metafork relevancija Mitl relevns egy metaforikus lekpezs? 605
605
VERBAL METACOMMUNICATION
WHY A METAPHORICAL MAPPING CAN BE RELEVANT?
FORGCS, BLINT
In my study I would like to show that in spite that they are seemingly contradictory, the cognitive meta-
phor theory and the relevance theory cannot only be complementary, but might even provide interesting
possibilities of analysis. Through a stricter and a looser example I am going to look for the points that
can be valuable for each theory. First, conceptual metaphors help understanding abstract concepts by
the mapping of concrete source domains, which perhaps helps creating optimal relevance in conversa-
tions. This goes beyond the role relevance theory offers for metaphors, that they are simply the poetic
tools of loose language use. Perhaps conceptual metaphorical mappings play an important role in our
cognitive environment. Second, I would like to show the metacommunicative value of metaphors, which
might expand relevant theory. The ambiguous language of indirect speech might reflect such a meta-
phorical layer of language that has a metacommunicative value on a semantic level.
Key words: cognitive metaphor theory, relevance theory, pragmatics, metacommunication, concrete,
abstract
91
7.4 Study 4: The right hemisphere of cognitive science
Forgcs, B. (2013). The right hemisphere of cognitive science. In Cs. Plh, L. Gurova,
and L. Ropolyi (Eds.), New Perspectives on the History of Cognitive Science.
Budapest: Akadmiai Kiad.
129
THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Blint Forgcs
Introduction
1
The aim of the present study is to establish a theoretical connection between the brain, or more
precisely the scientic concepts describing it, and the everyday and scientic expressions
referring to the mental world. These expressions often circulate around dichotomies common
in Western philosophy and thinking, like emotionalrational, mindheart, or bodysoul.
Their connotations are deeply embedded in everyday language; however, they are often hard
to notice. Still, they profoundly inuence the perception, understanding, and interpretation of
mental functions. The main question is the following: could the structure of such concepts
originate from human cognition, and from the architecture of the nervous system?
Independently of the philosophical question whether the concepts addressing mental phe-
nomena are somewhere outside in the world as proposed by reductionism, e.g., Ryle
(1949) or produced somehow inside the mind according to Berkeleys solipsism it is
possible that these dichotomies are a by-product of our mental system. For example, the
left and right hemispheres employ different sets of processes, such as propositional versus
appositional (Bogen 1969), to address the diverse task demands of the environment. Such a
neural division of labor might provide essentially different perspectives on the world which
are well known to all of us, but most individuals do not master both of them equally well.
Broadly speaking, most concepts describing the three spatial dimensions of the nervous
system seem to be bound to the traditional philosophical dichotomies: emotion and reason
(for right and left hemispheres), cognition and motivation (for the cortex and the limbic sys-
tem), and action and perception (for anterior and posterior regions). This could be a confus-
ing linguistic factor when theorizing about neuroscience and during the conceptualization and
operationalization of experiments. At the same time, realizing this bias could enable new levels
of analysis via the metaphorical reinterpretation and recombination of the tags and labels on the
brain. For example, the description of the anterior and posterior regions as being responsible
for creating the balance of consciousness between the motor and sensory areas (in extreme
cases, between involuntary actions versus hallucinatory experiences, e.g., Fischer 1986) could
be combined with the emotionalrational dimension of the two hemispheres. Such a perspective
would enable brain researchers to pose questions from novel theoretical grounds.
Concepts concerning the mental world have been brought into the scientic discussion
from the everyday language of folk psychology: for example, from philosophy, phenomenol-
1
I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the invaluable support, guidance, and help to Professors Csaba
Plh and Gyrgy Brdos realizing the study.
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130
ogy and the social sciences in the case of describing the two hemispheres (TenHouten 1985).
They are constantly linked to the neural substrates of the brain via experimentation again,
often described by a common sense language of everyday concepts. As a result, even purely
scientic descriptions and explanations might reect personal preferences of scientists stem-
ming from subjective cognitive and neural dispositions. In specic cases, this might mean an
individual hemisphericity as proposed by Bogen, DeZure, TenHouten, and Marsh (1972).
For example, taking representations as perceptual symbols (Barsalou 1999) could talk about
a right-leaning, whereas taking representations language-like (Fodor 1975, 2008) about a
left-leaning, manner of understanding. In a clinical context, the same process could motivate
the idea that the core of human functioning is either emotional (as in psychoanalysis or hu-
manistic psychology), or rational (as in behaviorism or cognitive therapy). Putting notions of
different kinds in the focus of explanations might hinder scientic discussion in the absence
of a common ground.
This problem is especially intriguing when the mind (of researchers) turns towards the
(research of the) mind itself. Some mental capacities lend themselves to quantitative scientic
analyses, such as perception, memory, or attention. However, others prove very difcult, or
almost impossible to describe and account for scientically, such as the creation and appre-
ciation of ne art, or engaging in productive inductive reasoning. What makes such soft, or
qualitatively complex, mental phenomena so complicated to explore: our language and phi-
losophy or our neuroscience? One possibility is that such fuzzy phenomena arise from the
very architecture of the human mind and brain. Logical, deliberate, sequential and scientic
reasoning is only a subset among many other intuitive, spontaneous, and parallel systems.
Some of the most fascinating feats of the mind (such as musicality) might fall outside of our
rational understanding because the subsystems instantiating them are organized according to
entirely different principles than reasoning.
Metaphors and the brain
In an attempt to address the above issue, the rst step could be taking a close look at the
relations and the linguistic structure of notions of both scientic and folk psychology. The
next step could be to try to assess how they are related to the notions describing the brain.
Then it would be possible to systematically map the connections of these distinct theoretical
levels. The cognitive conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980a) provides a
plausible framework for the investigation of the possible links between mental concepts and
phenomenal experiences, which could open the way to tracing the responsible neural systems.
Metaphors and the conceptual system
The conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson (1980a, b) proposes that metaphors
are not ornaments of language but the building blocks of the human conceptual system. We
understand abstract concepts by systematically mapping concrete concepts onto them. The
easily comprehendible source domain (e.g., JOURNEY) is mapped onto the abstract target
Pleh_New_Perspectives_09.indd 130 2013.06.25. 19:35:18
131
domain (e.g., LIFE). This works on a conceptual level (LIFE IS A JOURNEY) and can be caught in
metaphorical expressions like we had a bumpy year.
According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980b), only those concepts are not metaphorical that
are derived directly from our experiences concepts of orientation (updown, inout), on-
tological concepts (materials), and structured experiences (eating, moving). The seemingly
distant domains of metaphors are connected in specic experiential Gestalts, which are mul-
tidimensional structured whole[s] arising naturally within experience (Lakoff and Johnson
1980b: 202). The basis of the mappings, for example, in the expression he is a hothead is
motivated by HEAT and ANGER appearing in the same situation. Its motivation can be close-
ness in time or space, for example, although cultural aspects can also play an important role.
Hence, it is impossible to foretell the metaphors of a certain language, but one might tell
which mappings are unlikely. These are the ones that are really counterintuitive to our very
human experience, like anger being cold (Kvecses 2002, 2005).
Grady (1997) divides metaphors into two groups: complex metaphors and primary meta-
phors. Complex metaphors are constructed from primary metaphors. In the case of primary
metaphors, sensorimotor and non-sensorimotor experiences get connected in a systematic
way (in the expression warm smile, physical warmth and happiness are joint). On the basis
of this idea, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) created the integrated theory of primary metaphors,
according to which these mappings do not simply recall similar experiences, but they are sug-
gested to activate the very same neural circuitry. Some fMRI and EEG data seem to support
this prediction. When subjects read metaphorical sentences involving the hands (e.g., [it is]
hard to grab this idea), many areas responsible for the motor control of the hands are acti-
vated (e.g., Rohrer 2005). These results promise that primary metaphors with an experiential
basis might one day be traced back to certain neural areas, and that in fact we understand a
great variety of knowledge domains by the activation of a relatively few neurocognitive re-
sources (although this is a hotly debated question, cf. Mahon and Caramazza, 2008).
Concepts of neuroscience
Many notions utilized by neuroscientists to describe the brain also possess some experiential
background (although mostly indirectly). Several of these are not simply mental concepts:
some refer directly to experiences, like the labels of sensorimotor areas, and others to rather
abstract concepts like decision making. These notions are currently grounded to specic
neural systems and areas via experimentation. Therefore, notions referring to experiential
phenomena, as well as some abstract ones are possible to link to specic brain areas at least
in a specic experimental situation. Nevertheless, these words carry their connotations and
broader meanings with them, and they have a place in the conceptual space of psychological
notions.
As a result of the neuroscientic explosion of the past decades several such psychological
notions have been located in the human brain. These words became citizens of two worlds:
the networks of concepts and the networks of the brain. Several possibilities follow from
this. First, it is possible that the description of the brain somehow follows the structure of no-
tions referring to the mental world this would be a solipsistic stance. Second, it is possible
that there is simply no real relationship between notions referring to mental phenomena and
Pleh_New_Perspectives_09.indd 131 2013.06.25. 19:35:18
132
the structure of the labels for the brain a reductionist stance. Third, the correspondence is
somewhere in-between, and these layers inuence each other, but they are not related in a
systematic way.
Mental metaphors
What kind of metaphors hide behind psychological expressions? Is there a systematic
relationship? Actually, there seems to be some kind of phenomenal orientation according
to light and temperature, alluding to the experiential grounds of the mental world. Here are
some examples:
PRECISE THOUGHTS ARE BRIGHT IMPRECISE THOUGHTS ARE DARK
What a bright mind!
His talk was very dull.
PRECISE THOUGHTS ARE COLD IMPRECISE THOUGHTS ARE HOT
Cold calculation was the plan.
He has been a hothead with that decision.
POSITIVE EMOTIONS ARE BRIGHT NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ARE DARK
We had a brilliant time in the evening.
Dark intentions seized him.
POSITIVE EMOTIONS ARE HOT NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ARE COLD
His revenge was cold as ice.
She had warm feelings towards him.
Such concepts, which are based on mappings of primary metaphors, could combine, as
subtle metaphorical building blocks, into the complex structures of abstract concepts. For
example, irrationality is traditionally linked to emotions, while reasoning often seems to be
logical, and mathematical proofs seem to be objective, while attitudes or feelings are often
considered subjective. The more abstract concepts provide a kind of cognitive orientation in
the mental space of folk psychology. In this huge network of associations, expressions bring
along a number of connotations across contexts. Mappings could ground highly abstract,
complex mental concepts like empathy or intuition to low-level perceptual sensations or phe-
nomenal orientations. All this could add up to an Idealized Conceptual Model (Lakoff 1987)
of the mind in Western culture and philosophy.
According to this analysis, psychological concepts that serve as tools for scientists to de-
scribe the human brain might be a part of a mental space that refers to experiential grounds
(both phenomenal and cognitive), which in turn is a product of the brain itself. The aim of
this study is to take a look at the metaphorical space of mental concepts with respect to neural
architecture. Are there connections between the phenomenal, the cognitive, and the con-
ceptual aspects of words referring to mental life? Do these correspond to the descriptions of
the neural regions of the brain?
Pleh_New_Perspectives_09.indd 132 2013.06.25. 19:35:18
133
Hypotheses
1) Psychological concepts can be arranged in a mental space representing the three spatial
dimensions of the nervous system: the left and right hemispheres, the cortical and limbic
systems, and the anteriorposterior regions.
2) University students majoring in psychology arrange these words differently compared to
students who do not major in psychology as a result of their elaborated knowledge.
Methods
Participants
Altogether 83 graduate (MA) level university students completed the test, 48 of whom were
majoring in psychology, and 35 students who were not.
Test
In the framework of a pilot study, a questionnaire was created. Participants had to assess
psychological concepts in a forced choice task, according to three spatial dimensions of the
brain. The questionnaire constituted of 105 words, each of which had to be assessed according
to dichotomies of everyday, folk psychological expressions referring to the three neural axes
of the nervous system: thinking vs. emotion for the left and right hemispheres, consciousness
vs. instinct for the cortex and the limbic system, and action vs. perception for the anterior and
posterior regions. For every word, participants had to decide for each three axes whether it ts
one or the other dimension there were no neither or both options. The 105 test words
were a collection of the following:
1) Expressions of folk psychology (heart, mind).
2) Expressions of scientic psychology (cognition, reex).
3) Expressions of sensorimotor orientation (warmcold, innerouter).
4) Expressions having some cognitive orientation (subjectiveobjective, personalsocial).
The latter contained rather more general expressions as the sensorimotor orientation, al-
though from a more philosophical domain.
Results
The data was analyzed with the SPSS 17.0 software. A series of Pearsons chi-square tests
were used to compare the two groups. Where the two groups did not differ, a second chi-square
test (with 50% expected frequencies) was calculated on the whole sample, but when the rst
test showed a signicant difference, the second test was run on the two groups separately.
The two groups categorized the majority of the words identically. There were only 11 cases
(out of the 315) where only one of the groups was able to categorize a word according to one of
the dimensions, but the other group was not. Two more words (bright and quality) were located
Pleh_New_Perspectives_09.indd 133 2013.06.25. 19:35:18
134
on the opposite side of the actionperception axis for the two groups. Altogether this was an
approximately 4% difference. Almost all words were categorized either as consciousthought
action or instinctemotionperception, suggesting a pervasive linguistic dichotomy. Only the
word association was categorized as instinct and thought. Only the following words were cat-
egorized as action, but not as emotion, or instinct: reex, social, creativity, and mystical.
As the difference between the two groups was marginal, the next step was to aggregate
the data, in order to calculate an average value for each word on all three dimensions. On this
restructured data set a factor analysis was run that revealed that the three linguistic dimen-
sions actually t onto a single component, this being responsible for 75% of the variance in
the sample. Figure 1 shows a hypothetical three-dimensional mental space corresponding to
the three linguistic dimensions of brain. Every point represents a word, by taking its average
value on the three axes as coordinates. The single component runs diagonally from the emo-
tioninstinctperception corner to the thoughtconsciousaction corner.
Finally, a hierarchical cluster analysis was performed using the words average values on
the three axes. Two large clusters emerged. One of them crowded around the word mental,
while the other around the word hypnosis. The former constituted of two smaller clusters la-
beled as scientic and wisdom, while the latter as emotion and arousal. The structure
of the two large and a number of smaller clusters are presented in Table 1. Taken together,
neither of the hypotheses were conrmed.
Discussion
The results of the present study do not provide strong evidence, even though there are some
interesting ndings. First, the fact that university students majoring in psychology did not
differ signicantly from the other group of students indicates that the concepts used in the study
Perception
Neither
Action
C
o
n
s
c
i
o
u
s
Thought
A
c
t
i
o
n
100
80
60
40
20
0
0 20
40 60 80 100 1
0
0
5
0
0
Figure 1. The 105 psychological expressions in a conceptual space, corresponding to the three spatial dimensions
of the brain. Each point represents a word.
Pleh_New_Perspectives_09.indd 134 2013.06.25. 19:35:18
135
Table 1. Results of a hierarchical cluster analysis: Dendogram using average linkage
C A S E 0 5 10 25
Label +-------+-----+----+
heart -+
feeling -+
soul -+-+
deep -+ |
warm -+ |
mystical -+ +-----+
inner -+ | |
intuition -+-+ |
unconscious -+ | |
sensual -+ | |
sentiment -+ | |
emotion -+ | +--+
visceral -+-+ | |
empathy -+ | |
wet -+ | |
subjective -+-+ | |
reception -+ | | |
passive -+-+-----+ |
below -+ | |
hazy -+ | |
hypnosis -+ | +-------+
dark -+-+ | |
sensation -+ | |
instinct -+ | |
desire -+---+ | |
unintended -+ | | |
artistic -+ +-+ | |
affective -+ | | | |
ambiguous -+ | | | |
arousal -+---+ +----+ |
homeostasis -+ | |
re ex ---+---+ |
spontaneous ---+ | |
body ---+ | |
motivation ---+---+ |
social ---+ |
action -+ |
|
active -+ |
will -+-------+ |
direct -+ | |
intended -+ | |
planned -+ | |
evaluation -+-+ | |
verbal -+ | | |
rational -+ | | |
logical -+ +---+ | |
mathematical -+ | | | |
scienti c -+ | | +-----+ |
concrete -+ | | | | |
objective -+-+ | | | |
cleverness -+ | | | |
deductive -+ | | | |
C A S E 0 5 10 25
Label +-------+-----+----+
reason -+ | | | |
intellectual -+ | | | |
nous -+ | | | |
consciousness -+ | | | |
attention -+ | | | |
mind -+ +-+ | |
head -+ | | |
sense -+ | | |
cognitive -+-+ | | |
conceptual -+ | | | |
quantity -+ | | | |
intelligible -+ | | | |
quality -+ | | | |
high -+ | | | |
bright -+-+ | | |
dry -+ | | | |
wit -+ | | | |
mental -+ +---+ +----+
abstract -+ | |
plausible -+ | |
awareness -+ | |
analog -+ | |
above -+-+ |
inductive -+ | |
thought ---+ |
super cial -+ |
cold -+ |
outer -+-----+ |
clean -+ | |
positive -+ | |
metaphoric -+ | |
apperception -+ +----+ |
perception -+ | | |
threshold -+---+ | | |
symbolic -+ | | | |
low -+ | | | |
visual -+ +-+ | |
shallow -+ | | |
slow -+-+ | | |
wisdom -+ +-+ +--+
memory ---+ | |
experience -----+ |
negative -+---+ |
imagination -+ | |
determined -+ | |
individual -+ | |
conditioning -+---+---+ |
fast -+ | | |
association -----+ +--+
behavior -+-+ |
motion -+ +---+ |
free ---+ +-+
creativity -------+
Pleh_New_Perspectives_09.indd 135 2013.06.25. 19:35:18
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(even the more scientic ones) are deeply embedded in everyday thinking. This philosophical
and folk psychological background certainly has some inuence on the conceptualization and
operationalization of scientic research, and on the interpretation of results. Words expressing
psychological phenomena bring along their net of connotations, and these might shape the
understanding of mental life and the human brain, since researchers most of the time have to
choose from concepts with a history that is not neutral.
Another interesting nding was that the dichotomies corresponding to the dimensions of
the brain do not differentiate sufciently among the psychological expressions examined in
the study according to the factor analysis, their majority actually ts on one axis. This
could be important for brain researchers since it sheds light on the conceptual ambiguity of
words used to describe very different levels of processes in the nervous system. Perhaps the
philosophical mindbody problem appears here: although it was often difcult for individu-
als to make a decision regarding one word or another, the fact that notions were eventually
arranged according to one dimension suggests that a Cartesian dualism is deeply embedded
in scientic and folk psychology. This could be true even for scientists or philosophers who
actually deny being Cartesian. Another problematic aspect is the categorization that a hidden
assumption creates. For example, psychological notions, which most people would consider
emotional, eventually should be linked to the mind, and not the body. There may be a
number of lurking paradoxical consequences of language use in natural sciences exploring
the human brain.
The cluster analysis revealed an interesting structure among concepts: they grouped to-
gether more or less in accordance with the predictions of the conceptual metaphor theory. For
example, in the emotion cluster, words of perceptual orientation (deep, warm, inner, dark),
and cognitive orientation (subjective, spontaneous, active) were located near to folk psycho-
logical expressions (heart, soul, body), and scientic expressions (empathy, unconscious, and
the main label of the cluster, hypnosis). These four levels were in similar correspondence also
on the other large, the mental, cluster as can be observed in Table 1.
The reason for choosing these categorizing concepts was that they were everyday expres-
sions with a meaning that can be easily taken for granted by researchers as well. Thus, they
seemed to be good candidates to bridge the gap between scientic and everyday language
regarding the mental world. Nevertheless, it is possible that the test was not constructed ac-
curately, and only one axis emerged because the test did not differentiate enough between the
three dimensions. Another possibility is that the description of the brain does follow the struc-
ture of notions referring to the mental world. It is precisely the way language is used, both in
folk and scientic psychology, that distorts the perception of the nervous system and does not
allow for a sophisticated differentiation between the three spatial dimensions of the brain. Is
it the right hemisphere that deals with emotions, or the limbic system? What is the role of the
limbic system in the left hemisphere? The constraints of language might be important to be
taken into consideration when studying the neural systems of the brain.
Scientic metaphors in psychology
On the basis of this arrangement of the psychological concepts, and when expanding the
analysis to the mental worlds conceptual space, it is possible to interpret the words describing
Pleh_New_Perspectives_09.indd 136 2013.06.25. 19:35:18
137
the nervous system in a metaphorical map. The key concepts of various theories and approaches
in psychology (Plh 2010), some of which are associated with certain brain regions in one
way or another, might talk about the neural dimension being central in the specic theory at
hand. For example, the key concepts of psychoanalysis (e.g., libido, unconscious, instincts)
could be viewed as metaphors mapped onto a broad variety of human functions representing
limbic level functions. In other words, psychoanalysis might project limbic level functions
on the whole brain. This analysis could be broadened to include further schools, approaches,
or simply theories in psychology.
Gestalt psychology proposed a holistic view, its name directly referring to the shape as
a whole, or the form as a unit; the dening Gestalt principles (similarity, continuation,
closures, etc.) all come from the visual domain. Combining these two main characteristics
would put Gestalt psychology somewhere in the right (holistic) occipital (visual) regions.
Behaviorism, emphasizing stimulusresponse-based classical and operant conditioning as the
main processes of human functioning could be linked to frontal areas, which are responsible
for learning, attention, inhibition, and control. The denial of consciousness (and even mental
phenomena) links this perspective also to subcortical regions, and more specically to regula-
tory systems. Humanistic psychology, or the third force emphasizing self-actualization and
creativity could be linked to the right hemisphere, where the representation of the self seems
to be more elaborated. The case of cognitive psychology is going to be addressed in the next
section. As a result, approaches within psychology can be arranged in the brain based on their
key metaphors (Figure 2).
The search for new paths in cognitive science
Looking at cognitive science from this perspective, an interesting picture emerges. Key ideas
of early cognitive science, such as generative grammar, the formalization of mental functions,
Turing machine-like serial operations on symbols, and allowing for conscious thought
Behaviorism
(conditioning, behavior, etc.)
Humanistic psychology
(holistic, self-actualization, etc.)
Psychoanalysis
(unconscious, instincts, etc.)
Cognitive psychology
(thinking, computations, etc.)
Gestalt psychology
(holistic, visual Gestalt principles, etc.)
Figure 2. The different approaches within psychology, arranged according to their key metaphors
in a hypothetical brain
Pleh_New_Perspectives_09.indd 137 2013.06.25. 19:35:19
138
might all talk about a left-hemispherical, language-based, and sequential approach, dealing
with primarily cortical processes. Chomskys (1957) groundbreaking ideas came from the
linguistic domain, and syntax was (metaphorically) mapped onto the brain as computations,
more specically as the Language of Thought (Fodor 1975, 2008). The brain was considered
to be a special computer, where even emotions are calculated.
It is important to note that cognitive science dened itself as an interdisciplinary approach
right from its outset, and as a result has bridged various disciplines like psychology, linguis-
tics, anthropology, philosophy, neuroscience, and articial intelligence (Plh 2010). This has
provided a broad epistemic capacity that promised to cover all major epistemic approaches
(towards the mind) that the brain seems to produce (Figure 3).
At the same time, a number of the soft functions of the mind remained elusive, not just
because it is extremely challenging to write a viable computational protocol for them. An-
other reason could have been the initial linguistic, and rule-based approach coming from the
left hemisphere, and it might not be possible to map procedures of one hemisphere on the
whole brain.
Intriguingly, from the 1970s cognitive science went through a gradual shift, perhaps driv-
en by the need to take the missing aspects into consideration. As the rst era lived up its
theoretical resources, new currents appeared, still, primarily within the established domain.
Connectionism (and pragmatism in general) offered models that were not based on rules or
computations in the classical sense, but on information processing carried out by the structure
itself (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986). This could reect a shift towards the right hemisphere,
having relatively more white matter, and being generally more interconnected than the left hem-
isphere (for a review, see Beeman 1998). The architecture (the body) or the procedure was
proposed to be prior to knowledge, or rules. Using terms that are describing memory systems,
this was also a move from the declarative to the procedural, a distinction stemming from Ryles
(1949) knowing what vs. knowing how. Similarly, as opposed to explicit rules or functions,
implicit processes became an independent research area, exploring verbally and/or consciously
inaccessible (not left-hemispherical) functions.
Trends surfacing in cognitive linguistics during the 1980s addressed right-hemispherical
language capacities such as pragmatics (Plh 2000) one outstanding example is relevance
theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995). Embodiment (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) put the body
(represented stronger in the right hemisphere) in the center of cognition. The idea that sen-
Artificial intelligence Philosophy
Neuroscience Anthropology
Linguistics Psychology
Figure 3. Cognitive science, as a common approach within disciplines, covers a broad variety of epistemic
capacities of the brain
Pleh_New_Perspectives_09.indd 138 2013.06.25. 19:35:19
139
sorimotor areas are responsible for semantic processing not only challenged the Cartesian
mindbody distinction, but also practically reduced the mind to the body (with the latter
having stronger neural representations in the right hemisphere), advocating a neo-empiricist
agenda. Figure 4 shows a brief summary of the various threads within cognitive science that
seem to be open enough to integrate new approaches corresponding only loosely to some
original ideas.
Epistemology and the brain
The main message of the present work is that every paradigm or approach might have a model
of the mental world which is motivated by the neural preferences of scientists. Every attempt
to give a complete account of the broad and diverse phenomena produced by the human brain
is a result of specic personal dispositions in perceiving, understanding, and interpreting
cognition. Metaphorically speaking, by projecting a subset of neural functions on the brain as
a whole, every approach creates brains that are skewed to one region or another, as a result
of overrepresenting it compared to the rest. For example, Chomskyan generativists could be
conceived as having a metaphorical brain of a set of large left-hemispherical language areas,
and a microscopic right hemisphere. Researchers and their approaches might be identied
according to their way of reasoning: what kind of work methods, and more specically,
neural processes do they prefer when they frame problems and solutions?
When a certain approach is clearly articulated by a scientist, followers with similar neural
dispositions join the new track, and schools are formed. The trends in the second phase of
cognitive science are inspiring because they attempt to introduce research topics that can be
associated with the other side, the right hemisphere. This has opened up ways to explore
aspects of the mind that are especially difcult to describe logically, formally, or verbally.
However, importantly, waves in science do not follow one another in a linear fashion: ap-
proaches often exist and develop parallel. The brain might not be a computer as we know
computers today, but this is still a strong model with testable predictions. Even though em-
bodied cognition claimed a revolutionary approach, it has rather added a new perspective
than put aside thousands of years of philosophy of the mind. Chomskys or Fodors legacy
and contributions are not washed away by newcomers but are placed in a broader perspec-
tive in a more complete metaphorical brain. Recent tendencies also emphasize one specic
Generative grammar
(Chomsky 1957)
Implicit processes
Language of thought
(Fodor 1975, 2008)
Turing machines
Relevance theory
(Sperber and Wilson 1995)
Connectionism
(Rumelhart and McClelland 1986)
Embodiment
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999)
Figure 4. Approaches of cognitive science, arranged metaphorically in a hypothetical brain
Pleh_New_Perspectives_09.indd 139 2013.06.25. 19:35:19
140
neural perspective over another, thus they also have a novel and innovative skew to their
epistemology. Only the combination of the various approaches can provide a comprehensive
picture of human cognition.
In this respect, scientic research itself serves as a diagnostic tool to gain insight into
the workings of the brain. The Idealized Cognitive Model of the mind in Western culture
provides a basic framework that is not neutral in the rst place. It serves as a background be-
hind the gure, the models and metaphors that scientists propose according to their preferred
working methods and mental perception. The interaction between these gure(s) and the
background is what makes cognitive science a unique endeavor: this is the point where un-
derstanding turns towards understanding; the mind becomes the subject as well as the object
of research. However, only the novel metaphors of the mind, which are yet to come, can tell
us which part of the brain is going to have the privilege to lead (again) science and research
during the next period of time.
The present pilot study has attempted to bring attention to the intricate relationship be-
tween psychological concepts and brain research. On the one hand, it tried to shed some light
on the strong heritage of language referring to human cognition, which is deeply rooted in
folk psychology, and perhaps inuences neuroscience, as well. On the other hand, it tried to
highlight how the personal perspectives of scientists could be expressed in their works and
in the threads of science in general. Hopefully, it can contribute to the study of the mind by
reecting on the language of cognitive science.
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