Ekonomi och samhlle

Economics and Society

Skrifter utgivna vid Svenska handelshgskolan
Publications of the Hanken School of Economics
Nr 212
Abdirashid A. Ismail
SOMALI STATE FAILURE
PLAYERS, INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONS
Helsinki 2010
<


Somali State Failure: Players, Incentives and Institutions
Key words: state failure, state collapse, social contract, principal-agent theory,
institutions, tribalism, patrimonial leadership, cold war, Somalia, Barre,
military regime, civilan regime.
Hanken School of Economics & Abdirashid A. Ismail
Abdirashid A. Ismail
Hanken School of Economics
Department of Economics
P.O.Box 479, 00101 Helsinki, Finland
Distributor:

Library
Hanken School of Economics
P.O.Box 479
00101 Helsinki, Finland

Telephone: +358-40-3521 376, +358-40-3521 265
Fax: +358-40-3521 425
E-mail: [email protected]
http://www.hanken.fi
ISBN 978-952-232-080-3 (printed)
ISBN 978-952-232-081-0 (PDF)
ISSN 0424-7256
Edita Prima Ltd, Helsinki 2010

1


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to express my deepest appreciation to my adviser Professor Hans Christer
Blomqvist whose unlimited patience and careful advice over the years have
made this dissertation worthwhile experience. I deeply appreciate everything he
has done for me.
I would like to take this chance to express my gratitude to professor emeritus
Paavo Okko for his kindhearted tolerance during my undergraduate (MSc.)
studies at the University of Vaasa.
I have been fortunate to have Professor Christer Gunnarsson from the Lund
University and Professor C Kartik Roy from the University of Queensland as the
pre-examiners of my dissertation. Their insightful comments and suggestions
were useful when finalizing this study. I am also thankful to Professor
Gunnarsson for accepting to serve as my opponent.
I am grateful to the Hanken Foundation, the Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth
Foundation, and the Waldemar von Frenckell Foundation for providing
generous financial support for this project.
I want to thank the Puntland Development and Research Centre (PDRC), where
I was a visiting researcher while I was carrying out the fieldwork, and want to
especially thank Abdurahman Adbulle Osman (Shuuke) for his enthusiasm to
help this research and for the valuable information and Ali Farah Ali for his
endeavor of making my stay in PDRC more pleasant. The entire staff of the
PDRC was too kind to me and I appreciate that. I also want to thank Puntland
State University (PSU), where I was a visiting lecturer in the autumn of 2008.
Especial thanks goes to Mohamud Hamud, the President of the PSU, and
Professor Mohamed S. Samater, my former teacher. It was a pleasure being with
them.
My gratitude also goes to those who participated in the interviews I conducted
for this research. Mohamed Abshir Walde, Mohamed Yussuf Weyrah, Mohamed
Warsame Ali (Kimiko), Ahmed Sh. Jama, Mohamed Ali Warsame, Abdulaziz
Nour Herssi, Aden Sheikhdon, Hassan Aden and many others provided
information that was vital to a successful completion of my dissertation. One
fortunate evening with Ismail Ali Abokor in Hargeissa modified my way of
thinking towards the process of state failure in Somalia.
Many friends provided moral support, valuable backing, and logistical support.
Mohamed M. Abdulle, Suleiman M. Farah-Ghedi, Jama Aden Ismail, and
Mursal H. Shirwa deserve to be mentioned in this regard. There are also many
friends and colleagues whose acquaintance provided immeasurable support and
encouragement. Among them, I would like to highlight my thanks to Maija
Kajava, Dr. Marja Tiilikainen, Arshe Said, Abdirizak H. Mohamed and Muddle
Lilius.
2


Finally, I did save the best for last, I am very grateful for my mother Maryan.
Her firm and compassionate personality has affected me so many ways. The
hardships and sacrifices she confronted for my wellbeing, are surely un-
compensatable, but will be remembered. My heartfelt thanks go to my older
brother Mohamed (Journale) by not only replacing my father by nurturing me
but also instilling in me the importance of an education.
Aqoon la'aani waa iftiin la'aane
Waa aqal iyo ileys la'aane
Ogaada ogaada dugsiyada ogaada
Oo aada oo aada wlaalayaal oo aada
Waa oomanaa iyo abaare
Omos iyo oon biyo la'aane
Ogaada ogaada dugsiyada ogaada
Oo aada oo aada walaalayaal oo aada
My sister Seynab shares much temperament with him. For them I was more like
a beloved son, rather than a young brother. I am also grateful to my mother-in-
law Rahmo. She spared no effort for my family to be successful. Last, but
certainly not the least, my warmest thanks and appreciation go to my wife,
Hibo. I am greatly indebted to her amazing devotion. Surely, without her
boundless support this journey would have been much difficult one.
Helsinki March 22, 2010
Abdirashid Ismail

3


CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION...................................................................................... 9
1.1. Background of the Study ..................................................................................... 9
1.1.1. State Failure and State Collapse ............................................................. 9
1.1.2. Why States Fail? .................................................................................... 10
1.1.2.1. A View from Political Science ................................................ 10
1.1.2.2. Economic Causes of Conflict .................................................. 11
1.1.2.2.1. Structural Economic Factors ................................................. 11
1.1.2.2.2. Motivations ............................................................................ 12
1.1.3. State Formation in Post Colonial Africa ............................................... 15
1.1.4. Research Problem ................................................................................. 18
1.1.5. Research Objectives .............................................................................. 19
1.1.6. Research Method and Theory .............................................................. 20
1.1.7. Research Outline ................................................................................... 22
1.2. The Model: Social Contract Approach .............................................................. 22
1.2.1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 22
1.2.2. A Common Agency Model ..................................................................... 22
1.2.2.1. Asymmetric Principals ...........................................................26
1.2.3. State and the Agency Theory ............................................................... 28
1.2.4. The Other Principal: the Superpowers ................................................ 30
1.2.5. Asymmetric Principals .......................................................................... 31
1.2.6. State Failure and State Collapse ........................................................... 33
1.2.7. State: a Predator or an Agent of its Citizens ......................................... 34
1.2.8. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 35
2 INSTITUTIONS ...................................................................................... 37
2.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 37
2.2. Institutions Matter ............................................................................................ 37
2.3. Tribalism: a Socio-Political Institution ............................................................ 40
2.4. Leadership Institution .......................................................................................42
2.5. The Cold War .................................................................................................... 49
2.6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 55
3 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CIVILIAN REGIME ......................... 58
3.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................58
4


3.2. Socioeconomic Development ............................................................................ 59
3.3. Integration .........................................................................................................62
3.4. Unification .........................................................................................................62
3.5. Causes of the Failure ......................................................................................... 65
3.5.1. Leadership ............................................................................................. 65
3.5.2. Society ............................................................................................... 68
3.5.3. Superpowers.......................................................................................... 73
3.6. The Failure ........................................................................................................ 77
3.7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 82
4 SOMALIA UNDER MILITARY RULE ................................................... 85
4.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................85
4.2. The Cou D`eLuL .................................................................................................85
4.3. SRC`s Power ConsoIIduLIon ............................................................................... 91
4.4. Legitimising the Military Regime ..................................................................... 98
4.5. Socioeconomic Development .......................................................................... 101
4.6. State as an Agent of its Citizens ...................................................................... 112
4.7. Conclusion: Constituting New Social Contract ................................................ 117
5 SOMALI STATE FAILURE .................................................................... 119
5.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 119
5.2. Economic Development .................................................................................. 119
5.3. Abrogating the Social Contract ....................................................................... 131
5.3.1. External Reconstruction ..................................................................... 131
5.3.2. The Soviet Union: An Unhappy Principal ........................................... 134
5.3.2.1. From Development to Unification ....................................... 137
5.3.2.2. Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party .................................. 138
5.4. Burre`s PersonuI RuIe und Lhe Re-birth of the Tribalism ................................ 147
5.5. The Ogaden War and the Somali State Failure ............................................... 149
5.6. Conclusion: State as the Instrument of the Ruling Elite .................................. 151
6 SOMALI STATE COLLAPSE .................................................................153
6.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 153
6.2. The State Collapse ........................................................................................... 153
6.3. The Armed Opposition Movements ................................................................ 159
6.4. USA: a Reluctant Principal .............................................................................. 162
6.5. Political Economy of Predation ....................................................................... 167
5


6.5.1. Political Economy of Public Employment .......................................... 167
6.5.2. Political Economy of Financial Management ..................................... 174
6.5.3. Political Economy of Non-Financial Public Enterprises .................... 181
6.5.4. Political Economy of Agriculture ........................................................ 183
6.5.5. Political Economy of the Financial System ......................................... 187
6.5.6. Political Economy of Foreign Aid and Refugees ................................. 191
6.6. The Death of the Post-Colonial State in Somalia ............................................ 195
6.7. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 197
7 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 199
7.1. Somalia failed and Botwsana Prospered ........................................................ 205
REFERENCES ........................................................................................... 211

TABLES
Table 3.1, Foreign Aid to Somalia, 1960-3 ...................................................................... 59
Table 3.2, Source of Development Finance, 1963-9 ........................................................ 61
Table 3.3, Elite Structure, Legitimacy and State Building in Somalia 1960-90 ............ 66
Table 3.4, External Trade Deficit, 1964-9 ....................................................................... 77
Table 3.5, Rates of Implementation at Selected Dates, by Industrial Sectors ............... 80
Table 3.6, Sectoral Distribution of Development Expenditure by Source of Finance,
1963-9 (S0. Sh. 000) ..................................................................................... 84
Table 4.1 Investment in the Three-Year Development Programme, 1971-3 ................. 102
Table 4.2 Investment in the Five-Year Development Programme, 1974-8 ................... 102
Table 4.3 Proportion of Development Funds from Local versus Foreign Sources ....... 103
Table 4.4 Growth of Production .................................................................................... 104
Table 4.5 Structure of Production ................................................................................. 104
Table 4.6 Current Budget (Million Somali Shillings) .................................................... 105
6


Table 4.7 Exports of Live Animals from Somalia, 1970-1975 ........................................ 106
Table 4.8 Producer Income, 1970 & 1978 ..................................................................... 107
Table 4.9 Price Index of Livestock Sold in Wardiglei Market, Mogadishu ................... 107
Table 4.10 Food Imports (Million Somali Shillings) ..................................................... 108
Table 4.11, Banana Exports ........................................................................................... 109
Table 4.12, Non-recurrent Government Expenditure in Development Programs ........ 114
Table 5.1 Investment for the Five-Year Development Program, 1982-6....................... 120
Table 5.2 Official development assistance: receipt (Selected African countries) ......... 121
Table 5.3 Financial Requirement for the 1982-6 Plan: Local versus Foreign Sources . 123
Table 5.4 Balance of Payments (Millions of US dollars) ............................................... 129
Table 5.5 Central Government's Current Budget .......................................................... 130
Table 6.1 US Economic and Military Aid to Somalia, 1980-90 (Bilateral Loans and
Grants, Millions of Dollars) .......................................................................... 166
Table 6.2, Exchange rate between US$ and So. Sh.(selling rate) ................................. 169
Table 6.2, Civil services salary structure, Somalia1975 and 1989 ................................. 170
Table 6.4, Central Government non-defense Expenditure ........................................... 172
Table 6.5 Ordinary Expenditure, 1984-88 ................................................................... 176
Table 6.6, Utilisation of Installed Capacity in Selected Industrial Enterprises, 1982-6
(percentage) .................................................................................................. 181
Table 6.7 Total Loans Approved by SDB by Region, 1986 (Sh.So. 000)....................... 188
Table 6.8 Total credits 1981 - 1989 (In millions of So.Sh.) .......................................... 189
Table 6.9, Money supply 1981 - 1989 (In millions of So.Sh.) ....................................... 190

7


FIGURES
Figure 1.1, Basic Principal-Agent Set-up: Agency Cost ................................................... 23
Figure 1.2, Common Agency Problem: United principals and Agency Cost ...................24
Figure 1.3, Common Agency Problem with Low Powered Incentive ..............................26
Figure 1.4, Common Agency Problem with Low Powered Incentive plus Power
disparity .......................................................................................................... 27
Figure 2.1, Traditional Somali Political Flow System .................................................... 44
Figure 2.2, Colonial Political Flow System ...................................................................... 45
Figure 2.3. Post-Colonial Political Flow System ............................................................. 56
Figure 4.1, Social Progress: School Enrolment ............................................................. 112
Figure 5.1, Percapita GNP ............................................................................................. 127
Figure 5.2 Formal Authority Structure in 1976 ............................................................. 144
Figure 5.3 The SRSP Authority Structure (National) .................................................... 145
Figure 5.4, the SRSP Authority Structure (Local) ......................................................... 146
Figure 6.1, Ordinary Budget: Economic and Social Services ....................................... 178
Figure 6.2, Total Tax Revenue as Percentage of GDP, 1975-89 ................................... 180
Figure 6.3, Ordinary Budget: Foreing Affairs and Finance & Services ......................... 193


8


9


1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background of the Study
1.1.1. State Failure and State Collapse
To Lhose who know, uncIenL SomuIIu wus Lhe und oI PunL . u IubIe source oI
weuILh und Iuxury (quoLed in Adibe, 1995) whereas post modern Somalia can
be seen us u rIme exumIe oI u coIIused sLuLe und becomIng unoLher
SomuIIu Is Lhe IuLe Lo be uvoIded by every AIrIcun sLuLe (uIIng, 1qq;).
What is more puzzling is how this could happen in a country like Somalia, the
most homogeneous country in Africa both ethnically, religiously, culturally, and
IInguIsLIcuIIy, or In oLher words, Lhe onIy oIILIcuI socIeLy In Lhe conLInenL (.)
whIch Is u nuLIon In Lhe reuI sense oI Lhe word (Emeh, zooq). However, muny
other countries, on the continent and elsewhere followed the footsteps of
Somalia. And, it seems, that many other countries are bound for a similar fate
(Rotberg, 2004).
In the state failure literature, authors employed various classifications of the
state failure concept. Rotberg identified the following types of state: weak,
failing, failed and collapsed state. Georg Sorensen, on the other hand,
distinguished between two different types, the fragile and failed states, and
muInLuIns LhuL IuIIure Is when IrugIIILy InLensIIIes (Sorensen, zoo1). OLhers,
such as Peter Wallensteen, classify the phenomena into ten types (Spanger,
2000). Sometimes it is assumed, as the State Failure Project
1
does, that such a
distinction is not necessary and even placed these two concepts and civil war in
a single category.
However, we conceptually need to distinguish between failed and collapsed
state. Rotberg (2004) proposed a range of public goods including, security,
education and health services as parameters for state failure. He considers
coIIuse us un exLreme versIon oI sLuLe IuIIure. Doornbos (zoo1) reIers Lo sLuLe
IuIIure us u condILIon where Iess Lhun comIeLe coIIuse occurs.
n LhIs LhesIs, sLuLe coIIuse Is deIIned us u sILuuLIon where Lhe busIc IuncLIons
of the state are no longer performed. Where the structure, authority (legitimate
power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in
some Iorm, oId or new (ZurLmun 1qq). oIIowIng Gros (1qq6), u urLIcuIur
polity will be considered us u IuIIed sLuLe when ubIIc uuLhorILIes ure eILher
unable or unwilling to carry out their end of what Hobbes long ago called the
social contract, but which now includes more than maintaining the peace among
socIeLy`s muny IucLIons und InLeresL (Curment, 2003).

1
Research project commissioned by the CIA, see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/
10


According to Milliken and Krause (2003), the analysis of the concept of state
failure contains two dimensions: the institutional and the functional
dimensions. or Lhem u oIILy Is IuIIed us IL Is unubIe 'Lo rovIde securILy und
public order, legILImuLe reresenLuLIon, und weuILh or weIIure`, und sLuLe IuIIure
is analysed through the functional aspect of the state. On the other hand, similar
to William Zartman, they consider state collapse as a situation where an
exLreme dIsInLegruLIon oI ubIIc uuLhorILy occurred, und LhIs cun be
approached through the institutional dimension of the entity. My analysis is
based on these distinctions. I will consider the functional aspect of the state
when dealing with the process of state failure and the institutional aspect of the
state whenever I am considering the process of state collapse.
1.1.2. Why States Fail?
1.1.2.1. A View from Political Science
2

State failure is a worldwide phenomenon and one of the greatest political and
humanitarian problems facing the world in this century. Naturally it has
attracted much attention in both academic and policy-making circles. However,
the literature lacks consensus on the definition of state failure and consequently
researchers followed different approaches to identify what went wrong.
To start with, Robert Rotberg (2004) distinguishes between human and non-
human (structural) factors in the process. For him some researchers blame
accidental factors as the cause of the state failure. He agrees with them that
these factors play their role, but rejects the idea that they are the whole story or
even that they are dominant in the process. He maintains that, human agency is
to blame.
Concerning the human factor, we can divide the existing literature into three
parts.
3
Some researchers pointed their fingers toward foreign actors. Robert
Jackson argued that post-coIonIuI AIrIcun sLuLes where 'quusI sLuLes`, noL sLuLes
In Lhe word`s reuI meunIng. n hIs reuIIsuLIon, Lhese quusI sLuLes ure onIy IormuI
institutions created by the colonising power and supported by the international
community (Jackson, 1990). Among the often-mentioned causes of state failure
are ethnic division, religious clashes, social antagonism, and regionalism. These
structural factors could be located at the society level. Due to this it has been
sLuLed LhuL becuuse Lhe sLuLe couId noL emuncIuLe ILseII buL remuIned
subordinated to the logic of social ties it acquired a neo-patrimonial character
and gradually fell prey to the rising power of traditional intermediaries such as
IocuI chIeILuIns und bIg men (Sunger, zoo1). InuIIy, mosL schoIurs bIumed
state failure on the state itself.
It has been argued that these countries, with their wrong sovereignties, their
social fragility, and the destructive behaviour of their leaders, survived not

2
Although this is a thesis in economics, we need also a political view.
3
I consider structural factors, like geography, as given and do not deal with them in this study.
11


because of their internal order and public support, but due to their external
protection (Herbst, 2004). The Cold War was the main reason for such
protection.
For these reasons one is led to believe that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
withdrawal of outside help from the shadow states was the final disapproval of
Lhese sLuLes. As SLedmun oInLed ouL Lhe LrIumh oI Iree murkeL Ideus.
undermIned Lhe exLernuI sources oI suorL Ior AIrIcu`s uLrImonIuI regImes
and left some with no legs to sLund on (SLedmun, 1qq6). ThereIore,
Iulucmc's `the end oj histor' beccme the end oj Reno's `shcdou stcte'.
1.1.2.2. Economic Causes of Conflict
During the Cold War conflict analysis was, mainly, undertaken with the bloc
politics of the time as a heavy backdrop. Conflict theories were, in one way or
another, influenced by ideology struggles between the East and the West
4

As the Cold War came to an end, a new wave of conflicts and new ways of
explanation, expectedly, came hand in hand. In economics two fundamental
causes of conflict, and other humanitarian emergencies, are declining economy
and inequality (Lundahl, 2000). These where considered as creators of
vulnerability.
1.1.2.2.1. Structural Economic Factors
Van de Walle (2004) on the one hand distinguished between economic
structural factors, such as low levels of economic activity, largely rural
settlements and low population density, and on the other contingent factors,
and argued that the former, as constraints on state formation, create a
vulnerability that allows for state failure. He then defines contingency factors
us shorL Lerm evenLs urIsIng Irom ucLIons oI oIILIcuI und economIc ugenLs und
muInLuIns LhuL Lhe move Irom weukness Lo IuIIure Lo coIIuse und vIoIence
IurgeIy resuILs Irom Lhese IucLors. . Bud oIIcies can lead to the failure of the
state, until the state ceases to provide virtually any public goods, and state
ugenLs become uImosL enLIreIy reduLory (Vun de WuIIe, zooq).
Low per capita income, whether generated by a high rate of population growth
and/or by declining or stagnant national income, has been considered a chief
cuuse oI socIuI conIIIcLs. PuuI CoIIIer (zooo) Iound LhuL conIIIcL Is more IIkeIy In
countries with fast population growth: each percentage point on the rate of
population growth raises the risk of conflict by around 2.5 percentage points.
Conflict is also more likely in countries in economic decline. Each percentage
point off the growth rate of per capita income raises the risk of conflict by
uround one ercenLuge oInL (CoIIIer, 2000). Auvinen and Nafziger (1999)
show how slow, real GDP growth could explain conflict and found that
stagnation or protracted decline in real income precedes major conflicts.

4
For review of these theories see PRIO (1999).
12


While the preceding argument maintains a positive relation between scarcity
and conflict, a counterargument provides that it is wealth that drives people to
fight. Some authors argue that economic growth and prosperity may increase
the incentives to use violence to secure the valuable assets available in the
economy (Bates 2001). Others, Collier and Hoeffler (2001), argue that it is the
abundance of exportable natural resources that may make a country prone to
conflict.
In the literature on conflict, the role of economic inequality has been given great
attention. Lichbach (1989) identified more than 40 studies which used cross-
sectional data and found that, in most of them, a positive relationship between
economic inequality and political violence has been identified. In a cross-
sectional study of 71 developing countries Alesina & Perotti (1996) found that
income inequality, by fuelling social discontent, increased political instability.
Frances Stewart maintains that it is the horizontal inequality, inequality
between groups in the society, rather than the vertical inequality, inequality
between individuals, that matters most. However, it has been argued that
InequuIILy muy generuLe conIIIcL even under condILIons oI osILIve (even ruId)
growLh und exundIng resource uvuIIubIIILy (NuIzIger und AuvInen, 1qqq). n
addition, other recent studies of conflict, Collier & Hoeffler for instance, found
that vertical inequality does not increase the risk of conflicts.
1.1.2.2.2. Motivations
The presence of these economic factors, poverty and inequality, and (other)
non-economic structural factors as well do not automatically drive violent
clashes among groups. The human motivation, rather, plays a central role in any
conflict situation (Stewart, 2000).
Perhus Lhe besL enLry on LhIs Issue Is PuuI CoIIIer`s greed or grIevunce
dichotomy. Collier and Hoeffler, distinguished between two possible human
moLIves Ior conIIIcL: jusLIce-seekIng or grIevunce und IooL-seekIng or greed.
According to the latter, economic motivations and opportunities drive violent
conflict. Rebels have an incentive to challenge governments because of private
gain, which is a function of opportunities foregone by engaging in violence and
the availability of lootable resources, which is the payoff for successfully
engaging in a rebellion. Apparently, this theory views conflict as the outcome of
un execLed uLIIILy muxImIsuLIon decIsIon. As ruLIonuI IndIvIduuIs oLenLIuI
rebels evaluate their expected gains from war, given their grievances, and
compare these expected gains with the expected losses, which include the
opportunity costs of foregoing productive economic activity. Rebellion is
therefore a rational decision. What determines whether a rebellion will be
observed is the financial viability of a rebellion, which depends on the material
beneIILs oI Lhe rebeIIIon (SumbunIs, zoo1).
The grievance approach, on the other hand, maintains that conflict is motivated
by hatred which might be intrinsic to ethnic and religious differences. Here the
real motive of conflict is to eliminate the inequality between the groups or
13


classes. This approach was adapted long ago in the study of conflict analysis.
Gurr (1970) argues that the gap between expectations and achievement would
contribute to the willingness of people to rebel. So relative deprivation, the
ucLors` erceLIon oI socIuI InjusLIce derived from a discrepancy between goods
and conditions they expect and those they can get or keep, fuels social
discontent and anger, which provides motivation for violent conflict. Gurr
(1q6q) urgues LhuL Lhe greuLer Lhe derIvuLIon un IndIvIduuI erceives relative
to his expectations, the greater his discontent; the more widespread and intense
is discontent among members of a society, the more likely and severe is civil
sLrIIe. The reIuLIve derIvuLIon, however, needs Lo be oIILIcIsed Lo ueur us
collective violence (Gurr, 1970)
5
. In line with the recent internal conflicts,
reseurchers sLuLed LhuL Lhe rIsk oI oIILIcuI dIsInLegruLIon Increuses wILh u surge
of income disparities by class, region, and community, especially when these
disparities lack IegILImucy umong Lhe ouIuLIon (AuvInen und NuIzIger, 1qqq).
CoIIIer`s greed bused Lheory hus been crILIcIsed by muny Ior ILs reducLIonIsL
nature and being ill-specified (Porto, 2002; Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2003;
Nafziger and Auvinen, 2002). However, Collier, with Hoeffler, later stated that
Lhere Is, however, no reuson Ior Lhe uccounLs Lo be excIusIve und Lhe uIm oI our
econometric tests is to arrive at an integrated model which gives an account of
conflict risk in terms of all those opportunities [greed] and grievances that are
sIgnIIIcunL. . Lo Lhe quesLIon oI whIch modeI, oorLunILy or grIevunce,
rovIdes u beLLer exIunuLIon oI Lhe rIsk oI cIvII wur . whIIe Lhe oorLunILy
model is superior, some elements of the grievance model are likely to add to its
exIunuLory ower (CoIIIer und HoeIIIer, zooq).
Perhaps the best explanation of how the actions and strategies of the state
agents can lead a polity into collapse and civil conflict is presented through the
logic of Shadow States initiated by WilIIum Reno. He urgues LhuL u Shudow
State is the product of personal rule, usually constructed behind the faade of de
jure sLuLe sovereIgnLy (Reno, zooou). Reno's shudow sLuLe Lheory Is useIuI noL
only because it is able to focus on the interplay between economic and political
aspects of the conflict but also due to his realisation that greed and grievance are
comuLIbIe und cun Iuy vurIubIe roIes und LhuL exIuInIng Lhese vurIuLIons
requires an analytical framework that has some contact with the world of
oIILIcs und cun deuI wILh comIexILy (Reno, zooq). The muIn Irume oI LhIs
argument is that Post-Colonial African rulers recognised that they could not
survive by encouraging efficient formal institutions. Realising that strong formal
institutions would give a competitive advantage to their enterprising rivals,
African leaders sought other strategies for survival; a colonially constructed
mechanism for control was, perhaps, the most easily accessible strategy. To
exercise their power these leaders used economic tools through patronage. And
us Reno urgues, |u| key eIemenL oI LhIs uLronuge-based strategy of rule lay in
the fact that over time high officials found it in their interests to undermine the
IormuI InsLILuLIons oI Lhe sLuLe ILseII (Reno, zoo). To generate revenue, they
converLed IormuI usecLs oI Lhe sLuLe, ILs InsLILuLIons, Iuws, credILworLhIness,
and capacity to attract aid from outsiders, into patronage that they could

5
For Gurr this is the second stage of the process.
14


dIsLrIbuLe Lo IoIIowers Lo udvunce LheIr own ower (Reno, zooob), Lhey also
attracted foreign investors for enclave operations. As a complementary strategy,
African rulers make the life of their subjects less secure and their properties un-
protected. They were also materially impoverished by denying individuals
unregulated access to markets and other economic opportunities. Instead, they
were encouruged Lo seek Lhe ruIer`s ersonuI Iuvour (Reno, zooou).
Beyond these economic incentives and disincentives, the rulers of these shadow
states utilised divide and rule policies. They fostered social conflicts among
LheIr subjecLs us |L|hIs encouruges IocuI sLrongmen Lo ueuI Lo Lhe ersonuI
favor of the ruler to settle disputes that in the past were settled amongst
LhemseIves. (Reno, zooou). The sLuLe noL onIy oIIers roLecLIon to its favoured
groups but also gives weapons to destroy their common enemy. This patronage-
based strategy creates non-state armed, ethnic and regional groups and
generates new types of potential rivals. As rulers of the shadow state
increasingly become dependent upon cooperating strongmen, some of these
strongmen and ambitious army commanders, in addition to the former
contenders, may feel that they would be better off competing with the
incumbent ruler (Reno, 2000a). This is the basic principal of making war as
business or commercial policy as anti-insurgency strategy which is the original
source of state collapse (Reno, 2000b)
6
.
In short, Reno argues that to enrich themselves and to hold the political power
African leaders, intentionally, have chosen to undermine their governments. For
Reno there was an alternative path for these leaders: by formulating a sense of
nuLIonuIIsm und by LryIng Lo unILe Lhe eoIe`s energy Lowurd economIc
prosperity and building strong state institutions (Reno, 2000c, 2004).
In many situations it is the ambitious subordinates who started undermining
the formal state institutions by using existing informal socio-political networks.
Thus, the opportunity was equally available for both incumbent rulers and
opponents. Douglass North emhusIsed LhuL Lhe vIubIIILy, roIILubIIILy, und
indeed survival of the organizations of a society typically depend on the existing
institutional matrix. That institutional structure has brought them into
existence; and their complex web of interdependent contracts and other
reIuLIonshIs hus been consLrucLed on IL (NorLh, zooo). So IL wouId be more
useful to look at the institutional framework that creates the opportunity for the
actors before one considers the choices made by the individuals and
organisation, be they the state rulers or insurgency organisers.
7

The roIe oI Lhe eoIe, us consLILuenLs, Is uIso mIssIng Irom Reno`s unuIyses. We
know that in both predatory and contract based explanations of state behaviour,
the role of the society is important.

6
Some Post-Colonial Latin American countries had a situation which resembles this. See
Blomqvist and Lundahl (2002) for the case of Haiti during the 1800s and 1900s.
7
L Is IuIr Lo suy LhuL Reno reuIIses Lhe ImorLunce oI Lhe InIormuI socIuI InsLILuLIons Lo conLroI
predation without building u sLrong sLuLe uuruLus. (Reno zooq).

15


AnoLher shorLcomIng oI Reno`s unuIyses, Lhough IL cuLures muny usecLs oI Lhe
state collapse process and the political economy of the civil war, is that it does
not pay enough attention to the process of state failure. Based on `Qucsi Stctes'
notion of Robert Jackson, he assumed that post-colonial African states where
failed in nature and its leaders were like racketeers rather than state leaders. It
is worthwhile to understand why those state leaders, such as Major General
Mohamed Siyad Barre, who once tried to, and actually did, carry out
programmes of social and economic transformation and build strong state
institutions, including both military and bureaucratic administration, finally
decided to destroy what they had built. General Barre headed the military
government that ruled Somalia between 1969 and 1991.
Reno`s unuIyses muInIy concenLruLe on Lhe resource rIch counLrIes where
IoreIgners` InvoIvemenL In Lhe conIIIcL wus u mere economIc ugendu; InvesLIng
enclave operations, diamond smuggling etc. Here local predating actors
cooperated with these, mainly private, foreign groups. It is, however, hardly
conceivable that either the Soviet Union or the USA had direct economic
interest in a country like Somalia. Its geographical location was the most
valuable available capital in Somalia. This and other exportable resources, such
as agricultural products and livestock, were usable only through capturing the
state apparatus. In this respect in Somalia, as well as in some other countries,
the cooperation between conflicting local elements and the super powers,
through the logic of the geopolitical programme that dominated the Cold War
rivalry, needs to be addressed to find a comprehensive explanation for these
conflicts.
1.1.3. State Formation in Post Colonial Africa
Mux Weber`s cIussIcuI deIInILIon oI Lhe sLuLehood us u humun communILy LhuL
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within
u gIven LerrILory und, uccordIngIy, Lhe conLroI over Lhe meuns oI Lhe vIoIence Is
the central character of the modern state. Political historians, such as Tilly
(1990) emphasized two main ways in which external threats contributed to the
formation of the states. Firstly, in the midst of the violence competition among
sLuLes one`s reIuLIve ower to defend itself from external aggressions determined
its survival. Weaker ones were conquered and incorporated into the stronger
states. Secondly, to defend themselves, the states were to finance warfare
projects which is very costly and, thus, securing sufficient source of revenue was
essential for states to survive. Effective collection of revenue required relatively
established administrative capacity (Eriksen, 2005). Throughout this logic
political economist, i.e. Olson (2000) and Bates (2001), developed economic
theories of state formation.
According to Herbst (2000) this process of state formation has not taken place
in Africa. The main reason that Africa took a different process than Europe is
that structural conditions confronted by African state builders were different
than those faced by their European predecessors. Scarcity of land and
population growth was the source of conflict among the medieval European
16


kings, these wars were the ultimate source of the formation of states in Europe,
but the uvuIIubIIILy oI Iund wus noL u robIem In Lhe hIsLory oI AIrIcu. The
fundamental problem facing state-builders in Africa - be they pre-colonial
kings, colonial governors or presidents in the independent era - has been to
project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low
densILIes oI eoIe( HerbsL, zooo). HerbsL`s urgumenL Is LhuL sLuLe IormuLIon
in Africa has been hindered by low population density and thus the problem of
extending authority over sparsely settled areas and distant territories.
Projecting power into the hinterlands and territories far from the capital city
tended to be more costly and outweighed any potential gains accrued through
the increased tax revenue.
AccordIng Lo BuLes (zoo8) oIILIcuI order Is noL u gIven; it is the product of
decIsIons. Here Lhe sLuLe, us secIuIIsL In vIoIence, uses ILs ower oI coercIon Lo
protect its citizens. In the case the state decides to prey rather than protect the
wealth of the citizens political disorder is eminent. Bates (2008) emphasized
three main conditions that make predation preferable than protection for the
specialist in violence. First is a low level of tax revenue. Here benefits of
predation may be tempting. Second is an increase in the relative rewards that
predation might yield compared to the benefits accrued by state leader if acted
as protector. Third is a high rate of discount for the specialist of violence. Here
he becomes more greedy or insecure and therefore may find that benefits of the
predation outweigh that of guardianship.
Bates (2008) dealing with post-colonial Africa found that events that took place
in Africa during the late 20th century encouraged African leaders to prefer
predation, and thus political disorder, over protection and stability. Due to
global economic crises and predatory behavior of the elites, African states
confronted fiscal crises in late twentieth century. The disintegration of the
Soviet Union caused foreign patrons to abandon their African clients and as a
result local political forces demanding reform emerged and this in turn
shortened the time horizon of incumbent elites. Finally, in the midst of fiscal
crises, abundance of natural resources in many African countries provided their
governments alternatives sources of income. However, use of physical force is,
mosL robubIy, requIred In order Lo seIze Lhese resources. WILh Lhe Ioss oI
public revenues, governments became more predatory. With the loss of their
political monopolies, they became less secure ... [and] So great are the riches
oIIered by AIrIcu`s nuLuruI resources LhuL, In Lhese InsLunce uL IeusL, Lhe rewurds
to be gained by seizing them appear to have outweighed the prospects of living
In Lhe mIdsL oI oIILIcuI dIsorder. und LhereIore Lhe condILIons LhuL rendered
political order and equilibrium no longer prevailed and states collapsed in late-
cenLury AIrIcu (BuLes, zoo8).
Another recent study on the state failure of post-colonial state is Collier (2009).
Collier dealing with the causes of state failure in post-colonial state emphasized
what he termed the Failure Security-Taxation Nexus. Using the logic of state
formation presented by Tilly (1990) and others, Collier noted that states that
emerged after the World War Two, unlike their predecessors, were saved from
external aggression and therefore had no incentives to establish effective
17


military. Consequently, there was neither a pressure to improve the tax revenue
nor was an adequate demand to invest fiscal capacity and legal system. This
relatively hindered the creation of private prosperity in the post-colonial
countries. Another factor that further negatively affected the state capacity to
grow is the foreign aid which substituted the tax revenue and therefore reduced
the need to invest in state capacity. In addition, Collier (2009) argued that
rebellion and coup threats created insecurity and shortened time horizons of the
regimes in post-colonial states which further refrained to invest state capacity.
Furthermore, Collier (2009) found three common characteristics that, in
compound with the failure of Security-Taxation Nexus, aggravated the
conditions of post-colonial states; small size of their economies, ethnic diversity,
and resource richness.
These sources provide useful insights and perspectives explaining AIrIcu`s sLuLe
formation tragedy. Somalia case is not an exception in that perspective. Most of
the obstacles pointed out in these literatures were in one way or another present
in Somalia. For instance, the structural factors, such as low population density
and hostile train, emphasized by Herbst (2000), were very significantly present
in Somalia. Post colonial rulers, in Somalia, confronted with a very small
population who were mainly nomads and enormously scattered and roved over
the vast area of the country which is itself was very huge in per capita terms.
The physical infrastructure of the new republic was very weak with less than 100
km of paved road. I addition, Somalia had its share of the impacts of the global
recessions on the continent, such as global economic downturns triggered by the
unexpected increases of energy prices in the 1970s and 1980s.
However, as noted, Van de Walle (2004) maintained that economic structural
factors, such as low levels of economic activity, largely rural settlements and low
population density, are constraints on the processes of state formation and
therefore create a vulnerability that allows for state failure. However, he noted
that the propensity of the weak states to fail is seriously affected by the way their
leaders respond to and handle their underlying economic frailties. And,
according to Van de Walle, structural factors create fragility but bad policies are
the source of failure and collapse. Furthermore, both in early 1970s and 1980s
Somalia was hit by the the global recession caused by the rise of the oil prices.
The impact of the crises was very harsh to many African economies. In Somalia
Lhe neL ImucL oI Lhe Lwo shocks wus osILIve. ThIs wus so becuuse SomuIIu`s
livestock export was aimed at the consumers in the oil producing countries. The
increase of the oil prices increased the purchasing power of these consumers,
whIch In resonse Increused LheIr consumLIon oI meuL und, LhereIore SomuIIu`s
export increased. Another factor was that Somalia exported labour force to the
oil producing Middle Eastern countries. The rise of the oil prices increased the
migrant laborers and thus the remittance sent by these expatriate to back home.
However, uccordIng Lo Muburuk (1qq6), Lhe SomuII governmenL`s oor oIIcy
responses made the country unable to take full advantage of this positive shock
. Though exorL voIumes Lo SuudI ArubIu hud Increused by Lhe mId 1q;os,
SomuIIu exorLs couId noL kee u wILh SuudI ArubIu`s ruIdIy growIng murkeL,
und SomuIIu`s murkeL shure consequently declined. Still, considering the boom
18


in labour exports and the remittances they produced, the effects of the oil
shocks were overwheImIngIy osILIve. On Lhe one hund, In SomuIIu, unIIke
other African countries, the global recessions of the 1970s and 1980s that
adversely affected development objectives of many developing countries were
not bad Somalia, as it may appear to some observers. On the other hand, it is
quite clear that the role of policy makers is very important in all situations.
In short, it is quite clear that these economic structural factors create
vulnerability in the process of state formation, but the basic assumption of this
study is that human agency is to blame for the state failure. And therefore, in
order to concentrate what policy choices were made by the rulers and why these
policy choices were made, I choose the social contract approach of the state
formation. This does not mean that in post colonial Africa there were well
established social contracts between rulers and citizens. On the contrary, in
many cases such as the case of Somalia, the absence of social contract was the
rule. But what we are interested in is why social contract is missing and why
post colonial states and societies failed to generate one?
1.1.4. Research Problem
In 1960, the Somali Republic gained its independence with, perhaps, unrealistic
expectations at both the elite and grass-roots level. At that time Somalia was
described as a model for democracy in Africa. However, within a decade,
Somalia abandoned its democracy and adopted an authoritarian form of
governance with similar expectations. Both were bold if not sacred goals: to gain
the Greater Somalia
8
and Self-Reliance
9
.
Three decades later on from its independence the republic was a country on the
verge of mass starvation. The civil war, which started in 1990, exacted a heavy
toll in both human and material terms, causing the destruction and the collapse
of the statehood of Somalia and fundamental changes in the economy. The
economy suffered from destruction of infrastructure and industrial facilities,
and the flows of goods and factors of production were disrupted as a result of
the fragmentation of the country. Ahmed I. Samatar (1994) lists among the
consequence of the civil war, the following: 350,000 have died since the
inception of full-scale civil war in 1988; almost 4.5 million Somalis are being
keL uIIve Lhrough emergency ussIsLunce; 6o ercenL oI SomuIIu`s busIc
infrastructure has been destroyed; 80 percent of all social services (e.g., schools
and hospitals) have been rendered non-operational; social and political
institutions have been shattered.
A range of different answers has been suggested for the causes of the Somali
agony. Clanism, psychopathology, militaristic despotism, nomadism vs.
sedentariness, and super power strategic competition, has been mentioned
(Samatar, 2001). Two dominant interpretations for the Somali problem are

8
Uniting the Somali nation at the horn of Africa under a single jurisdiction,
9
At least basic needs level
19


traditionalists and instrumentalist views (Kivimaki, 2001). The first and oldest
view, the traditionalist view, is fronted by I. M. Lewis of the LSE. The
LrudILIonuIIsLs` LhesIs Is LhuL Lhe segmenLed cIun sysLem remuIns Lhe IounduLIon
oI usLoruI SomuII socIeLy, und LhuL 'cIunnIshness` - the primacy of clan
interests - is its natural divisive reflection on the political level (Doornbos and
Markakis, 1994). The other school of thought, the instrumentalist view, is
fronted by Ahmed I. Samatar, and argues that the Somali problem is not the
clan reality and its culture, but the elite manipulation of the ruling class is the
real virus of the Somali case. This thesis, while not rejecting the relevance of
these explanations, concentrates on finding and analysing economic functions
behind the state failure and state collapse, and as such tries to answer the
following questions:
Why did Somalia fail?
What where the sources of bad policies which led the country into total
breakdown?
What were the economic incentives and political opportunities that led
the main players to behave as they did?
What were the institutional matrix that formulated these opportunities
and incentives?
What was the role of the political elite, predating technique and
redistribution strategies, which led the country into complete anarchy?
Why did the Somali public fail to keep their leaders accountable to
revenL Lhe IuLLer`s exLrucLIve oIIcIes und desLrucLIve ucLIons?
What was the role of the Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet
Union? Why did the US and Soviet Union choose the certain policies and
actions they took?
1.1.5. Research Objectives
The main purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the
sources, processes, patterns, and actors of state failure, state collapse and civil
conflict. It is thus the objective of this research to use and further develop the
economic literature on conflicts outlined above. This study intends to fill that
gap by seeking an answer to the broad research question posed in the previous
section. To do that, it will seek convincing answers to the sub-questions.
My approach is based on the idea that all players in the game; society, politician,
and foreign power, are self-interested. I will pay special attention to the
institutional conditions, which determine the incentives of those engaged in the
state failure and collapse processes. I use the tools of the Principal-Agency
theory to analyse the preferences and behaviour of these agents. There is a
growIng InLeresL In Lhe IILeruLure In Lhe roIe oI InsLILuLIons on socIeLy`s
behaviour and preference, and there is a consensus among economists and
political scientists that institutions have a strong impact on economic
performance. Another objective of this research is to contribute to that
literature, by analysing one of the worst cases in the history of modern state
collapse, Somalia. I will combine the principal-agency framework and the logic
20


of the New Institutional Economics and intend to fill the literature gaps by
surveying the case of Somalia.
1.1.6. Research Method and Theory
There is a consensus among economists and political scientists that institutions
have a strong impact on political and economic performance of any polity. By
framing the behaviour of individuals and organisations and creating incentives
for them, institutions can be good or bad. Good institutions have three main
roles: firstly, they enforce property rights; secondly, they put a constraint on the
actions of political elites; and thirdly, they create equality (Acemoglu, 2003). My
argument is that tribalism, the identity based patronage system of leadership
and the Cold War were the main institutions, which determined the incentive
structure and constrained the interactions of specified actors in pursuit of their
gouIs In SomuIIu. Here IoIIow DougIuss NorLh`s deIInILIon LhuL |I|nsLILuLIons
are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised
consLruInLs LhuL shue humun InLerucLIon und us he uLs IL InsLILuLIons IncIude
uny Iorm oI consLruInLs LhuL humun beIngs devIse Lo shue humun InLerucLIon
(North, 1990). Scholars, including Douglass North, have emphasised two types
of institutions: formal institutions such as political, judicial and economic rules,
and informal ones which are moral values, traditions, customs, religious beliefs,
conventions, etc.
These institutions, tribalism, the identity based patronage system of leadership
und Lhe CoId Wur, ure bud becuuse Lhey weuken Lhe socIeLy`s burguInIng ower
and, thus, its ability to control the behaviour of the elite. These institutions
enabled political elites, Barre and others as weII, Lo ursue 'dIvIde-and-ruIe`
strategies, in which they used them as a bridge to power and to maintain their
rule despite pursuing economically, politically and socially destructive policies.
The presence of these institutions can not only explain why African elites failed
to establish developmental states (state failure dimension), but also why they
have chosen to undermine their formal institutions (state collapse dimension).
Methodologically, I follow Bates and his colleagues, in their analytic narratives
approach. Since the second half of the last century a number of social scientists
have adopted a combination of historical and comparative research with
rational choice models. The authors of analytic narratives share with the former
LheIr convIcLion that theory linked to data is more powerful than either data or
Lheory uIone (BuLes, eL uI., 1qq8) und Lhe rojecL Is un uLLemL Lo muke LhuL
approach explicit (Levi, 2003). However, two factors made analytic narratives
appealing to our purpose here. First is its adherence to the tools of the new
institutional economic to investigate the enduring questions of political
economy und uccordIng Lo evI (zoo) IL Is Lhe cIuIm oI Lhe unuIyLIc nurruLIvIsLs
that understanding the institutional context within which events occurs can
explain outcomes in certain (but not all) important historical situations: where
sLrucLured choIces huve sIgnIIIcunL consequences. The second Is LhuL uILhough
the approach does not exclude the use of other forms of theory they rely on the
game theory.
21


A simple informal model will be developed to check the logical consistence of
the argument and to make the identification of causal mechanism easier. Then
Lhe cuse oI SomuIIu wIII be sLudIed. wIII Luke DIxIL`s (1qq6) modeI und modIIy it
Lo IIL my urose, In LhuL resecL my urouch Is unuIyLIc In LhuL IL exLrucLs
explicit and formal lines of reasoning, which facilitate both exposition and
exIunuLIon (DIxILs, 1qq6). My, urouch Is uIso nurruLIve becuuse IL uys cIose
attention to sLorIes, uccounLs, und conLexL und || unuIyse gumes, sInce || IInd
them useful in order to create and evaluate explanations of particular outcomes.
[I] identify agents: some are individuals, but others are collective actors such as
elites, nations, electorates or legislatures. By reading documents, laboring
though archives, interviewing, and surveying the secondary literature, [I] seek
Lo undersLund Lhe ucLor`s reIerences, LheIr erceLIons, LheIr evuIuuLIons oI
alternatives, the information they process the expectations they form, the
strategies they adopt and constraints that limit their actions. [I] then seek to
Iece LogeLher Lhe sLory LhuL uccounLs Ior Lhe ouLcome oI InLeresL BuLes, eL uI.
(1998).
My analysis is based on the logic of the previous paragraph. In the theory
chapter, it will be identified the actors of the Somali state failure and collapse
processes: the Somali state, Somali society, and the super powers. During the
civilian rule, 1960 - 69, the Cold War rivalry was relatively calm in Somalia as it
was elsewhere in Africa, and thus neither the US nor the USSR dominated
Somali foreign relations. Instead, former colonial masters, Italy and Britain, had
a significant influence on Mogadishu. However, during the 1970s and 1980s
Somalia became a major hotspot of conflict between the Soviet Union and the
United States, and this period will be given great attention. From 1969 to 1977
Mogadishu enrolled itself on the side of the Soviets. During this period the
Moscow strategy mainly coincided with the interests of the Somali public, or in
other words, the two principals had the same preferences and thus assigned the
same tasks to the agent, self-reliance, or socio-economic development in
generuI. n LhIs erIod, 'churucLerIse Lhe sLuLe Lo be an agent of its citizens and
Lhe SovIeL UnIon`: Lhe robubIIILy oI sLuLe survIvuI wus consIderubIy hIgh und In
uddILIon Burre`s erIormunce wus noL Loo bud. rom Lhe IuLe 1q;os SomuII
became an ally of the US, and Washington adopted a strategy that did not
coincide with the interest of the Somali people, or in other words the two
principals had different preferences. Consequently the agent is expected to
meet, and exert more effort on, the objectives of the able principal, as ill-
perceived actions by the agent can result in a greater punishment from the
strong principal compared to that of the weak principal. Therefore, it will be
churucLerIsed Burre`s regIme Lo be un ugenL oI Lhe UnILed SLuLes, buL noL oI
Somalis.
There are three types of data used in this research. The most important
information is from the written sources in archives i.e. books, academic
journals, official documents, annals, newspapers and magazines. Data collected
in a field study, which was carried out mainly in 2008, but also in 2007 and
2009, is another source of information. In the field study, informal interviews
were conducted where open-ended questions were asked to former high ranking
political figures, both from the former governments and opposition groups, and
22


well-informed personalities. A third source of information was the rich but
largely unwritten Somali traditions i.e. poems, songs and suchlike.
1.1.7. Research Outline
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the study. The chapter
presents a simple common agency model and will describe the theoretical
framework of the study. In Chapter 2, so as to understand preferences and
constraints of the game players I in some depth analyse the evolution and
structure of three central institutions: the identity based patronage system of
leadership, tribalism, and the Cold War as a determinant institution of the
suer ower`s InvoIvemenL In SomuIIu. consIder Lhese Lhree InsLILuLIons us 'the
rules oj the cme in the Somcli stcte jcilure'. My argument is that tribalism,
identity based leadership and the Cold War are the main institutions which
determine the incentive structure and constrain the interactions of specified
actors in pursuit of their goals, in Somalia.
Chapters 3-6 will, in a chronological way, cover the period between the
formation of the Somali Republic and the breakdown of state authority in
SomuIIu. ConcenLruLIng on Lhe ucLors` roIe und how InsLILuLIons shued Lhe
policy making, the study will narrate the processes of state failure and collapse.
Chapter 7 will conclude the study by summarising the main findings.
1.2. The Model: Social Contract Approach
1.2.1. Introduction
This section presents the theoretical argument of the study. It recapitulates a
simple common agency model that will be a base for the study. In the first sub-
section of this part, I will sketch a simple common agency model and present
several extensions to suit our purpose. I will then summarise the logic of
principal-agency theory with the respect of the state society relationship and the
implications of the model in case of state failure.
1.2.2. A Common Agency Model
To check the logical consistence of the argument and to make the identification
of causal mechanism easier, a simple model based on Dixit (1996) is sketched.
In order to understand the problem, a simple principal-agent game is depicted
in Figure 1.1. There is one principal and one agent. The agent controls a vector
of effort t that could be transformed into an output and the principal hires the
agent to perform the task of producing a required outcome x, which is beneficial
for the principal, and in return the principal gives resources and support to the
agent as payment. Each of the actors maximises his welfare in the presence of
conflicting interests. The thin vertical round dotted line indicates the
reservation line. This shows the minimum level of outcome expected by the
23


principal to uphold the contract. At any outcome point less than that level the
principal concludes that the agent deviated and in response retaliates. The
retaliation might involve abrogating the contract alone or inflicting more
unIshmenL on Lhe ugenL deendIng on Lhe gIven rIncIuI`s ower Lo do so. The
risk-averse agent has private information of his actions while the risk neutral
rIncIuI jusL observes u sIgnuI oI Lhe ugenL`s ucLIons which is the outcome.
In the situation where the principal fully observes the actions of the agent, the
rIncIuI`s robIem Is Lo desIgn u conLrucL LhuL wouId enubIe hIm Lo muxImIse
the welfare he receives from this relationship and that the agent will accept as
far as the optimal risk sharing payment is concerned. Here the agent will choose
an efficient action by devoting all the effort he controls in to the production
process and the outcome is efficient, as Figure 1.1 illustrates x = 8. This is the
first-best situation and the interests of all parties are best served.

In the situation where the principal observes just the outcome rather than the
ugenL`s ucLIons, Lhe rIncIuI hus Lo Incur Lhe ugency cosLs, whIch Is u cuLegory of
transaction costs, to mitigate the delegation problems. This is the second-best
situation in which the outcome that the principal could enjoy is reduced to x =
6, in Figure 1.1. This is shown by shading the level of the outcome. Dixit argues
that |L|he IncenLIve schemes bused onIy on observubIes gIves Lhe ugenL Iess
Lhun Lhe murgInuI conLrIbuLIon oI hIs eIIorL . ThIs In Lurn Ieuds Lo Iess eIIorL,
und smuIIer LoLuI surIus. The ouLcome Is u second besL (DIxIL, 1qq6).
Beyond the ordinary setting of a single principal vs. a single agent in the
literature, situations have been formulated where a single principal deals with
multiple agents (Holmstrm, 1982). A significant part of the literature
considered the opposite situation, the common agency paradigm, where there
are multiple principals delegating to a single agent. Bernheim and Winston
urgue LhuL |I|requenLIy, however, Lhe ucLIon chosen by u urLIcuIur IndIvIduuI
(the agent) affects not just one, but several other parts (the principals), whose
preferences for the various possible actions conflict. We refer to such situations
Support/Resources/Payment
Figure 1.1. Basic Principal-Agent Set-
up: Agency Cost
1 6 5 4 3 2
Principal
B
Agent
Task delegation
7 8
First-best outcome (x)
Second-best outcome (x)
Agency cost
24


us InsLunces oI common ugency (BernheIm und WInsLon, 1q86). Some
researchers have modelled adverse selection cases in this common agency
setting. However, in this study I will consider the case of moral hazard.
Although the common agency setting had been analysed some time before
BernheIm und WInsLon (1q86), LheIr semInuI uer reresenLs u IIrsL sLe
towards developing a coherent, widely applicable, abstract framework for
anuIyzIng InsLunces oI common ugency (BernheIm und WInsLon, 1q86). n LhIs
setting there are two possibilities: one is that the principals cooperate, the other
Is LhuL Lhey comeLe. n generuI, rIncIuIs ure beLLer oII II Lhey co-operate.
Anything that they can do in a non-co-operative way can be done in a co-
operative game. Under co-operative behavior, the game is similar to the simple
moral hazard model, since in that model the principal could be either an
individual or group of individuals acting co-operuLIveIy (Mucho-Stadler and
Perez-Castrillo, 1997). In other words, this makes the common agency problem
similar to the simple one principal one agent problem I presented in Figure 1.1.
Here B is a composition of several principals rather than a single one.
Everything else is almost the same. In Figure 1.2 I illustrate a situation where,
with the presence of asymmetric information, two principals, A and B, firstly get
together and reach jointly an agreement upon two main issues: the incentive
scheme they offer to the agent and the way they will divide up the outcome
among themselves. Here I assume absolute equality among the principals and
here they could achieve the second best (Dixit, 1996). As Figure 1.2 shows,
compared with Figure 1.1, principal B gains one-half of the second-best outcome
he would have received in the situation where he is the sole principal. The
reason is that the agent equally splits his limited effort between the two
dimensions. So x = 3.

Principal
B
Principal
A
1 4 3 2
Agent
1 2 3 4
Figure 1.2. Common Agency Problem:
United principals and Agency
Cost
Second-best outcome Second-best outcome (x)
Task delegation
Support/Resources/Payment
Agency cost
25


The second possibility, whenever co-operation is not preferred or competition is
inevitable, is that each principal tries to unilaterally influence the actions of the
agent.
Avinash Dixit (1996) analysed the implications of the common agency problem
on government activILIes. He used WIIson`s (1q86) ugency reIuLIonshI In
government bureaucracies as a framework for his discussion. To deal with
WIIson`s Lwo key IeuLures: (1) GovernmenL bureuucrucIes LyIcuIIy huve severuI
dimensions of effort (input) and result (output), and each of these only
ImerIecLIy observubIe or verIIIubIe . ; (z) euch ugency deuIs wILh severuI
'rIncIuIs` who ure sImuILuneousIy LryIng Lo InIIuence ILs decIsIons - the
executive and legislative branches of government, the courts, interest groups,
medIu, und so on (DIxIL, 1qq6). DIxIL uLIIIsed u common ugency seL-up. He was
also forced to consider a multitask agency model, of the type developed by
HoImsLrm und MIIgrom (1qq1), whIch, us he uL IL, heIs us undersLund some
of the features of governmenL ugencIes sLressed by WIIson (DIxIL, 1qq6).
Dixit constructed a common agency model with moral hazard, where several
principals compete to influence a single agent, who controls several tasks and
assumed that outcomes are observable, not the amount of effort devoted to each
task, due to the presence of an asymmetric information problem
10
. He
consIdered LhuL ugenL`s LIme or eIIorL Is scurce, more senL on |Lusk| a will
necessarily mean less spent on b und vIce versu. . |A| consLunL conLrucL Lerm .,
some of [principal] A`s money usses Lo B vIu Lhe ugenL (DIxIL, 1qq6). There ure
two possibilities: one is that tasks are substitutes and the other is that they are
complements. In the former, the non-cooperation behaviour among the
principals weakens the power of incentives (Dixit, 2003).
Using a very special case, with two principals and two activities, Dixit (2003)
oInLed ouL LhuL when euch rIncIuI observes Lhe ouLcome oI uII Lusks, und cun
offer marginal rewards or penalties based on all observations, incentives are
weuker . The rough InLuILIon Is LhuL euch rIncIuI oIIers u cusLomury osILIve
marginal payment for the output that is of relatively greater concern to him, and
a negative marginal payment, which acts like an insurance for the output risk
(und LhereIore Lhe ugenL`s Income rIsk) ussocIuLed wILh Lhe Lusk LhuL Is oI
relatively greater concern to the other principal. The netting out of the two
rIncIuIs` osILIve und neguLIve comonenLs Ieuves Lhe ugenL wILh weuker
overall incentives on all tasks.
Figure 1.3 illustrates this problem. The lack of cooperation between the two
rIncIuIs dumens Lhe ugenL`s IncenLIves und generuLes LhIrd-best outcome.
Here the overall incentive is less powerful then those in the second-best, the
total output benefited by the two principals is four rather than six and x = 2.
Assuming that each principal concerns only the component of the output that is
directly beneficial to him, then all other components of the aggregate output are

10
At the time of contract formation both the agent and principal have the same information but
once the contract is finalised the moral hazard problem arises. The problem is that the principal
cunnoL observe, verIIy or erIecLIy conLroI Lhe ugenL`s ucLIons.
26


zero, buL concernIng Lhe ugenL`s effort the principal will penalise all its
dimensions except the one devoted to the task that is directly beneficial to him.
Although the principal, say A, directly concerns with the component of the
output beneficial to him he indirectly worsens the component of that output
that is directly beneficial to the other principal B. The reason is that principal A
would make the agent induce more effort in the dimension that is beneficial to
him, but by doing this, the agent exerts less effort on the dimension beneficial to
principal B. However, principal B would adjust the incentive scheme he offers.
DIxIL urgues, Such condILIonIng oI euch rIncIuI`s IncenLIves on Lhe ouLcomes
of direct interest to the other principals has repercussions for the Nash
equilibrium . ThuL Is why Lhe equIIIbrIum ends u wILh subsLunLIuIIy Iower-
owered uggreguLe IncenLIves (DIxIL, 1qq6).


1.2.2.1. Asymmetric Principals
Dealing with the non-co-operative behaviour among the principals, Bernheim
and Winston (1986), found that the rational, utility maximising agent chooses
the point that maximises the compensation offered by the principals. One
feature of this analysis is that the agent responds according to the payments
offered by each principal. The more powerful the principal is - in resource and
information terms - Lhe more InIIuence he hus on Lhe ugenL`s behuvIour. n LhIs
study I consider a situation where one of the principals is more powerful than
the other.
A general result of the common agency problem is that if principal A offers the
agent more benefits or incurs higher punishment than principal B, then the
output produced by the agent will be proportionately more consistent with
rIncIuI A`s reIerence. n oLher words, when rIncIuI A is more powerful
Figure 1.3. Common Agency Problem
with Low Powered Incentive
Principal
B
Principal
A
1
4 3
2
Agent
1 2
3 4
Third-best outcome
Third-best outcome (x)
Task delegation
Support/Resources/Payment
Agency cost +
common -agency cost
27


than B and, accordingly, A offers more benefit than B to the agent, consequently
A wIII huve more ImucL on Lhe ugenL`s ucLIon. yne eL uI. (zoo6), urgue LhuL
||rIncIuIs wILh more ower und resources huve u greuLer ImucL on ugenL
behuvIor. Figure 1.4 shows a situation, where principal B is weak in his
InIIuence on Lhe ugenL`s behuvIour, comured Lo rIncIuI A. Consequently, the
agent devotes greater effort on the task beneficial to principal A.
Siqueira and Sandler (2004), dealing with public goods in the common agency
setting, realised that there are a number of collective action problems as
following:
1. Common agency costs rises when two or more principals compete to
influence a single agent.
2. Agency cosL rIses when Lhe ugenL`s ucLIon Is noL dIrecLIy observable.
3. Free riding inefficiency rises as each of the collective principals treats the
necessary effort to effectively control the agent as private cost and may
thus contribute less than is optimal.


In this study I assume that one of the principals, B for instance, is weaker than
the other. One possible way to realise that is to think of principal B as a
collective principal rather than an individual principal. A collective principal,
contrary to the simple principal, contains more than one individual or
organisation where, contrary to the multiple principals, each member of the
collective principal could not have a separate contract with the agent; instead
there is only one contract between the agent and the collective principal
(Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, 2006). A main
characteristic of the collective principal is that it may suffer a collective action
problem. Actors within the collective principal may fail to come to a decision a
priori, in those situations they cannot change the status quo, for instance they
Figure 1.4. Common Agency Problem with
Low Powered Incentive plus Power
disparity
Principal
B
Principal
A
1 4 3 2
Agent
1 2 3 4
Third-best outcome Third-best outcome (x)
Task delegation
Support/Resources/Payment
Agency cost +common -agency cost +
Collective action problem
28


may fail to agree on the proper actions to discipline the agent in case of
mIsbehuvIour. I Lhe ugenL Is uwure oI LhIs dIsugreemenL, Lhen Lhe ugenL muy be
able to play members of the collective principals against each other. Such a
situation makes it difficult for the collective principals to alter, or credibly
LhreuLen Lo uILer, Lhe ugenL`s conLrucL. Hence, ugenLs cun more eusIIy Ignore Lhe
LhreuLs und reIuse Lo modIIy LheIr behuvIor (NIelson and Tierney, 2003).
1.2.3. State and the Agency Theory
In the past, the state-society relationship has been analysed from the so-called
principal-agent perspective. The main argument of this literature was that the
people delegate decision-making to the state and control it through elections.
11

The principal-agent theory - a theory dealing with contractual relationships
between two parties, with conflicting interests in which asymmetric information
exists - could be applied to two main cases; adverse selection and moral hazard.
In the case of adverse selection, the agent possesses superior and relevant
information on a certain issue prior to the signature of the contract, while these
characteristics are imperfectly observed by the principal. Moral hazard exists
when the principal is unable, without incurring extra costs, to observe the
behaviour of the agent. As a solution to the former problem, the principal may
offer several alternative contracts in which the agent reveals himself through his
choice of a preferred alternative. As to the latter problem, the principal
condILIons Lhe ugenL`s uLIIILIes Lo un observubIe vurIubIe, Lhe ouLcome. ThIs In
turn determines the actions of the agent.
In the state-society contract, people delegate their power for making political
decisions to the state authorities. The act in which one or multiple authorised
actors designate some other actor(s) to perform some tasks on behalf of the
Iormer Is cuIIed deIeguLIon. We cun LhInk ubsLrucLIy ubouL deIeguLIon us u
'rIncIuI-agent probIem.` The rIncIuI Is Lhe erson who wunLs u Lusk
performed; the agent is the person to whom the principal delegates authority to
comIeLe Lhe Lusk (McCubbIns, 1qqq).
Kuure SLrom (zoo), reuIIsIng LhuL sInce deIeguLIon meuns voIunLurIIy gIvIng
over authority to others, we must ask why anybody would do so, and indeed why
everybody (or at least every large-scuIe oIILIcuI sysLem) does, noLed Lhree muIn
consLruInLs LhuL muy moLIvuLe u cILIzen`s decIsIon Lo deIeguLe LheIr ower:
1. Capacity. Understandably, citizens of a given society are not able to make
all necessary decisions about their life. There are a number of constraints
buL one sImIe IucLor LhuL muy IImIL eoIe`s ubIIILy Lo erIorm mosL oI
Lhe reIevunL Lusks Is LIme. Hence, cILIzens muy oILen be persuaded to
delegate their authority simply to save time, and to ensure that necessary
decisions are made. One specific version of such concerns is what
economists call transaction costs. Applied to politics, transaction costs
refer to any costs that collective decision-making bodies, such as voters

11
Barro (1973), Frejohn (1986), Persson, et.el. (1997), etc.
29


or parliamentarians, confront in reaching, implementing, and enforcing
oIIcy decIsIons. These cosLs . muy suIIIce Lo ersuude Lhese oIILIcuI
ucLors Lo deIeguLe LheIr decIsIons (SLrom, zoo).
2. Competence. The rIncIuI`s Iuck oI suIIIcIenL skIIIs Lo erIorm u Lusk
efficiently is another main reason for delegation. Not every person in the
society could properly handle the production process of all the political
goods he requires. For this reason, most citizens recognise that they need
to delegate some of their political power to those whom they think could
perform the task more efficiently.
3. Social Choice and Collective Action Problem. In situations of collective
decision making, by a group of collective actors, the social choice and
collective action problems may emerge. Individual preferences of the
group members need to be combined and thus the well known problem
of preference aggregation may arise.
12
In addition, the collective action
problem may arise in a situation where a group of actors, more than one
individual, are required to contribute to a task to accomplish an outcome,
because opportunistic individuals in the group may try to get out of
contributing to the production cost and any effort required in order to
achieve the outcome, but at the same time seeking to enjoy a share of the
benefits of the outcome that the others contributed to in the production
process. Far worse, every individual in the group may pursue a similar
strategy and no collective benefILs ure roduced. One urose oI
delegation is precisely to avoid collectively self-defeating behaviors in
such sILuuLIons (SLrom, zoo).
Delegation, however, is not free of problems. Two basic characteristics may
transfer the delegation process into abdication (Lupia and McCubbins, 2000).
Firstly, in the delegation process the actors, the principal and the agent, may
have different interests. The owner of a firm may want to acquire higher profits
through the hard work of his employees, while the manager of the firm may not
feel like working and instead wants to enjoy the good life. A society of a given
polity may prefer to see an efficient redistribution of the total welfare of the
society while a political leader of that society may prefer to appropriate u IIon`s
share of that welfare for his private use or he may simply seek to stay in power.
Secondly, a common starting point of the principal-agent theory is that the
agent possesses private information on his actions. We may understand this as a
byproduct of the delegation process. Just as the principal is unable to do the
task he desires to be performed, he also often has difficulties knowing whether
the agent accomplished the task appropriately. It is understandable that the
manager of a company may have superior private information about the
company over the shareholders of that company and that political leaders may
enjoy an informational advantage over ordinary citizens. The dilemma is that
the agent may have an incentive to maximise their personal well-being at the
exense oI Lhe rIncIuI`s weIIure. ThIs Is sImIy becuuse u homo oconomicus
who possesses private information should be expected to try to manipulate it,

12
Condorcet Paradox shows the preference aggregation problem even when the number of the
actors and their preferences are very small.

30


sInce he hus In eIIecL u monooIy over hIs own Iece oI InIormuLIon (SuIunI,
1997).
Thus, by manipulating the informational advantage he possesses over his
principal, the agent may behave different than he would have behaved had the
rIncIuI hud sImIIur InIormuLIon ubouL Lhe ugenL`s ucLIons. The ouLcome Irom
this relationship is sub-oLImuI In Lerms oI Lhe rIncIuI`s objecLIves. n Lhe
literature this phenomena is called an agency loss. According to Lupia (2001),
Agency Ioss Is Lhe dIIIerence beLween Lhe consequences oI deIeguLIon Ior Lhe
principal and the best possible consequence. Agency loss is zero when the agent
Lukes ucLIons LhuL ure enLIreIy consIsLenL wILh Lhe rIncIuI`s InLeresLs. As Lhe
ugenL`s ucLIons dIverge Irom Lhe rIncIuI`s InLeresLs, ugency Ioss Increuses.
When the agent does things that are bad for the principal, ugency Ioss Is hIgh.
To mILIguLe Lhe ugency`s Iosses, creuLed by Lhe sLruLegIc behuvIour oI u rIvuLeIy
informed agent, the principal incurs additional costs, namely agency costs.
These are the costs that the principal has to pay to ensure that the agent will
behuve roerIy In resecL Lo Lhe rIncIuI`s InLeresL. They IncIude Lhe IoIIowIng:
the cost of the selection and screening process; contracting costs; monitoring
costs; costs incurred by enforcing the contract, etc. This is why the first-best
allocation of resources is lost.
To analyse the relationship between the state and citizens in Somalia, the
contract approach of the state definition is selected and, therefore, utilise the
logic of principal-agent theory. Here Somali citizens are the principal and the
state is their agent.
1.2.4. The Other Principal: the Superpowers
The super powers, either the USSR or the USA, will be considered as a principal
in the post-independence period. Understandably, there may be some hesitation
about how I could put the princiuI`s huL on one oI Lhe suer owers or u IoreIgn
ower. Here my reusonIng Is sImIe und reIIes on Grossmun und HeImun`s
reuIIsuLIon LhuL Lhe InLeresL grous ure IIke rIncIuIs, becuuse Lhey Iuck Lhe
authority to set policies themselves and thus need the policy maker to act on
their behalf. The policy maker is like an agent because her actions directly affect
Lhe rIncIuI`s weII beIng, us weII us, erhus, her own. So euch SG - Special
Interest Group - must try to motivate the agent to act on its behalf, giving her
incentives to heed its demands in addition to those of the others groups, while
she also addresses her own concerns. Like the manufacturer who tries to
motivate an agent by offering a commission schedule, so the interest group can
design a conLrIbuLIon scheduIe In order Lo InIIuence Lhe oIIcy choIce
(Grossman and Helpman, 2001).
Grossmun und HeImun`s busIc reusonIng Is LhuL SGs do Lhe IoIIowIng:
1. Collect and disseminate information, and their objective of this might
be:
31


to educate and persuade lawmakers of the wisdom of the
grou`s urgumenLs,
to educate the general public,
to educate their own members.
2. Give resources and other campaign contributions to politicians. Their
motive here is:
to buy influence,
to buy credibility,
Lo buy uccess: a chance for a lobbyist to meet with a lawmaker
Lo resenL hIs osILIons.
nLeresLIngIy Lhey emhusIse LhuL Lhe IInk beLween u conLrIbuLIon und u
IegIsIuLIon`s ucLIons need noL be mude exIIcIL . 'Lhere Is no LIL Ior LuL In LhIs
business, no check for a vote. But nonetheless the influence is there. Candidates
know where LheIr money Is comIng Irom` (Grossmun und HeImun, zoo1).
urLhermore we use LhIs Lerm - lobbying activities - narrowly to refer to
meetings between representatives of interest groups and policy makers in which
the former try to persuade the latter that their preferred position would also
serve Lhe oIIcymuker`s InLeresL und erhus Lhose oI Lhe generuI ubIIc. n
other words, lobbying involves the transfer of information by verbal argumenL
(Grossman and Helpman, 2001).
These types of games were not unfamiliar in the theatre of diplomacy, at least
during the Cold-War era. Due to its geopolitical attraction, post-colonial
Somalia became a major hotspot of conflict between the Soviet Union and the
United States. To win the geopolitical struggle, both the US and the Soviet
Union not only poured substantial amount of financial and military aid into
Somalia, which become a chief source of survival for political leaders but also
participated regime changes and encouraged what became nationally disastrous
policies and actions. In this study the superpowers, due to their roles in the
power appropriation, political survival and the behaviours of the Somali rulers,
are considered as principals of the Somali state.
1.2.5. Asymmetric Principals
The logic of the claim that citizens as collective principals may fail to discipline
the state as an agent is present in recent literature. As I mentioned, the state-
society relationship has been analysed from the principal-agent perspective. The
main argument of this literature is that people delegate to the state and control
it through elections.

However, in a recent paper Acemoglu, et al. (2003), argued
that while that is true in some countries, other societies fail to control the
behaviours of their politicians. They consider two types of countries. In
sLrongIy-InsLILuLIonuIIzed oIILIes, where IormuI InsLILuLIons ure roerIy
oeruLIonuI, Lhe behuvIour oI Lhe oIILIcuI eIILe Is conLroIIed. n weukIy-
institutionuIIzed oIILIes, on Lhe oLher hund, IormuI oIILIcuI InsLILuLIons ure
not properly operational and thus the behaviour of political elites is not
effectively constrained. Consequently citizens are no longer able to discipline
32


their leaders. Acknowledging that although there are some means to constrain
the behaviour of leaders, such as revolutionary threats, even in situations where
there are no functioning formal institutions, the authors realised that all these
means fail in a weakly-institutionalised polity.
Beyond the conventional theories of autocratic rule, Acemoglu, et al. (2003)
IurLher reIIed on conceLs deveIoed by AIrIcunIsLs, such us 'ersonuI ruIe`, und
'neo-uLrImonIuIIsm` on Lhe one hund, und OIson`s (1q6) 'CoIIecLIve AcLIon
ProbIem` noLIon on the other. They argued that weak institutions enable
oIILIcuI eIILes Lo uIy 'dIvIde-and-ruIe` sLruLegIes, In whIch Lhey muInLuIn LheIr
rule despite pursuing economically, politically and socially destructive policies.
They, furthermore, emphasise the social condition of the polities. They pointed
out that the existence of an active social division - i.e. ethnically, economically -
In muny ureus oI Lhe deveIoIng worId comIeLes Lhe IcLure by rovIdIng
selective incentives and punishments, the divide-and-rule strategy exploits the
fragility of social cooperation: when faced with the threat of being ousted, the
kleptocratic ruler intensifies the collective action problem and destroys the
couIILIon uguInsL hIm by brIbIng Lhe IvoLuI grous (AcemogIu, eL.el, 2003).
For our purposes, a central implication of their model is that the presence of an
eLhnIc IucLor In muny deveIoIng counLrIes weukens Lhe eoIes` ubIIILy Lo
overcome their collective action problem. In other words, an ethnically divided
society has relatively weak bargaining powers when dealing with its rulers. In
Somalia, the clan factor makes the society socially fragile and politically
vulnerable to the divide-and-rule strategies of contending political elites. On the
other hand, a superpower Is consIdered u sLrong rIncIuI. A gIven suerower`s
relationship with the Somali state is determined by the incumbent
administrations in Washington or Moscow. Each of these administrations is
assumed to be organisationally more efficient and economically and politically
strong in its bargaining with Somali rulers. Therefore, regarding their influence
on the state leaders, Somali citizens are considered a weaker principle while the
given superpower is considered a stronger principal.
To address this probIem, DIxIL`s modeI Is modIIIed Lo IncororuLe ower
differences between the two principals. Here, the model will be briefly described
with the help of the common agency argument represented in Figure 1.4. To
begin with, we can consider that there are two principals and a single agent. The
agent controls a vector of effort t that could be transformed into two types of
output. Principal A assigns task a to the agent and B assigns task b to the same
agent. Each of these principals, who are risk neutral, seeks to influence the
effort of the agent, who is risk averse, by an incentive contract. Principal A can
efficiently compensate the agent according to the output on task a, whereas
principal B is relatively weak at monitoring and compensating for task b.
Although Lhe Lwo Lusks ure goods noL buds Ior Lhe Lwo rIncIuIs, euch
principal strongly prefers the task he assigned to the agent. I will use both, the
involved superpower (USSR/USA) and citizens of the Somali Republic as
principals, A and B respectively. I in general consider Greater Somalia as a task,
a, assigned to the agent - the Somali state - by the superpower, and socio-
33


economic development
13
, as a task, b, assigned to the same agent by the Somali
electorate. Campaign contributions, foreign military and economic assistance
will be used as support, c, given to the agent by the superpower, and the vote,
tax and other resources, obedience etc. will be used as support, d, given by the
Somali citizens.
1.2.6. State Failure and State Collapse
With the presence of asymmetric principals in our model three situations may
emerge. In the situation where the task delegated by the powerful principal
coincides with the task preferred by the weaker principal the condition of
cooperation emerges and the two principals appear like a single principal. In
other words, the two principals are delegating one task to the agent and the
sLronger rIncIuI`s ubIIILy Lo conLroI Lhe ugenL`s behuvIour subsLILuLes Lhe
control effort required from the weaker principal. The agent is devoting his
effort to enhancing the interests of the principal as well. Therefore, there is a
social contract between the state as agent and the society as the weak
principal.
In the situation where the task delegated by the stronger principal is different to
the one preferred by the weaker principal the condition of non cooperation
emerges and the agent devotes most of his effort to the advancement of the
interest of the stronger principal and relatively ignores the task delegated by the
weaker principal. The problem may come to a situation where the weaker
rIncIuI reuIIses LhuL Lhe ugenL`s ouLcome Lowurds Lhe Lusk deIeguLed by Lhe
weaker principal to the agent is less than the minimum requirement for the
contract to be sustained. As Figure 1.4 illustrates, the outcome falls on the left
side of the reservation line. In this situation the state is unwilling to carry out its
end oI Lhe socIuI conLrucL, us Iur us Lhe cILIzen`s objecLIves ure concerned. This is
the situation I call the state failure - there is no social contract between the
state as an agent and the society as the weak principal.
In the previous situation the state is there and operating mainly because of the
social contract between the state and the stronger principal. Another feature
presented in Figure 2.4 is that the regime, even after the abrogation of the
contract, may provide public goods. The predatory state may find it in its
interest to provide a certain amount of public goods rather than the citizens of
that state actually wanting them. As there is no contract between the state and
the society, state leaders employ alternative means of control. The patronage
system is the most appealing alternative. In the patronage system, the state
leader, rather than being an agent of its citizens, emerges as a principal of a
subset of the society which, consequently, becomes an agent of the state leader.
In this situation the state is on the one hand an agent of the stronger principal, a

13
As we will see in Chapter 4, the Greater Somalia issue was one of the two most important visions for
Somalis to secure during the post-colonial era. However, for simplicity reasons, I depart from the assumption
that the Greater Somalia goal could have been viable in the existing republic if a certain level of socio-
economic uplifting would have been secured. Prominent Somali figures including the late Aden Abdulle
Osman, the first president of the republic, supported the argument.
34


superpower in our case, and on the other hand it is a principal of a certain part
of the society. The patron-client relationship is extensively developed in the
literature with it emphasising the second half of the relationship, that being the
relationship between the state leaders and their clients. According to Wintrobe
(1990, 1998), the strategies available for the patrimonial state, as a form of
dictatorship, could be grouped into two main classes: repression to punish
opponents and loyalty to reward clients. However, a careful mix is needed for
the two instruments to be effective. The state, in this situation, is predatory.
However, unlike in the literature on the predatory theory, here the state leader
does not mainly rely on his clients for his survival. The other principal is the
main source of leadership survival in this situation. The contract between the
stronger principal and the agent is still valid and as the state is safeguarding the
interest of this principal, according to the later principal, the state deserves to be
supported. To be sure, the role of the clients is also important.
However, a third situation may emerge. What if the contract between the agent
and the other principal broke down as well? In this situation, where neither of
the principals is interested in the survival of the incumbent regime, the state is a
potential candidate for collapse. Most of the predation theories that deal with
the crises of the state in Africa start their analysis from this point.
1.2.7. State: a Predator or an Agent of its Citizens
In economics, there are two consistent types of state theory (North, 1981):
contract theory, which views the state as an agent of the citizens, and predatory
or exploitation theory, which views the state as an agent of particular groups.
Grossman (2000) asks himself whether it is a useful research strategy to
characterise the state as an agent of its citizens even when the predatory
14

characterisation of the state is correct.
Assuming that to maximise the wealth of the ruling elite is a fundamental
property of every state, Grossman and Noh (1990, 1994) show that, under
urorIuLe condILIons, muILreuLed cILIzens` ubIIILy Lo deose Lhe IncumbenL
leader can cause the predatory state to act as if it is an agent of its citizens.
According to Grossman (2000), the means used by the unhappy citizens to
depose the incumbent government, legal or extralegal, are not necessary in the
analyses. In deriving these appropriate conditions the authors emphasised that
the policies of the predatory state must be credible. Here the incumbent ruler
should have an incentive to gain a reputation of being reliable and, therefore,
announces policies and sticks to them. In addition, they focused on how the
credibility requirement interacts with the possibility that the unhappy citizens
would depose of the incumbent ruler to constrain the policy choices of the
predatory state. Two underlying components are important in this interaction.
First, the survival probability of the incumbent ruler determines the credibility
of the policies of the state. Second, the possibility that maltreated citizens would
depose the incumbent ruler determines the survival probability of the

14
Grossman uses, and prefers, the term proprietary state rather than predatory state.
35


incumbent ruler. Accordingly, a political leader, while in power, has a potential
survival probability, which is determined by factors that are out of his control.
And his actual survival probability comes closer to his potential survival
robubIIILy Lhe more cIoseIy hIs oIIcIes ure InIIne wILh Lhe cILIzens` InLeresLs.
They show LhuL, gIven LhuL Lhe Ieuder`s oLenLIuI survIvuI robubIIILy Is
sufficiently high, dependence oI Lhe Ieuder`s ucLuuI survIvuI robubIIILy on hIs
governmenL`s oIIcIes ussures LhuL Lhe reduLory sLuLe, muxImIses Lhe weuILh oI
the ruling elite, and acts more like an agent of its citizens. Grossman concluded
LhuL II Ior Lhe sLuLe Lo ucL us II It were an agent of its citizens is necessary and
sufficient for the incumbent ruling elite to have a high survival probability, then
churucLerIzIng Lhe sLuLe Lo be un ugenL oI ILs cILIzens rovIdes u useIuI us II
framework for positive analysis of economIc oIIcy (Grossmun und Noh, 1qqo,
1994; Grossman, 2000).
In short, given its relationship with the citizens, there is a possibility to
characterise the incumbent ruling elite as an agent of its citizens even if it came
to power through extralegal means - revolution, military coupe etc.
1.2.8. Conclusion
As pointed out, to analyse the relationship between the state and citizens, the
contract approach of state definition is selected. Here the idea is that people
(principal) delegate their authority to the government (agent). Then agency
problems emerge in their relationship, whenever the objectives of the parts
dIIIer. KIewIeL und McCubbIns (1qq1) Iound LhuL Lhe rIncIuI Iuces Lhree
secIIIc dIIIIcuILIes when deIeguLIng. IrsLIy, Lhe ugenL cun 'hIde InIormuLIon
from the principal whose revelation would hurt the agent and help the principal.
SecondIy, Lhe ugenL cun do LhIngs behInd Lhe rIncIuI`s buck, 'conceuIIng
ucLIons` LhuL Lhe rIncIuI wouId suncLIon II known. InuIIy, Lhe rIncIuI Iuces
'MuddIson`s dIIemmu` In whIch Lhe need Lo deIeguLe uuLhorILy muy gIve owers
Lo Lhe ugenL LhuL cun be used uguInsL Lhe rIncIuI (NIeIson und TIerney, zoo).
In the literature on delegation, there are at least four types of strategies that
principals may employ to safeguard against the agency slippage created by the
information asymmetry:
1. Designing contract
2. Screening and hiring processes
3. MonILorIng und reorLIng Lhe ugenL`s ucLIons
4. Institutional checks (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991; Strm, 2000).
Constitutions have been considered an efficiently designed contract between the
principal and the agent; the logic here is that power arises from the citizens to
the state through formal political institutions and descends down to the citizens.
The constitutional theory states that the decision-making process begins with
the electorate - the ultimate holders of power - and arrives at the state, only to
end back with the people. The people elect the parliament and the parliament
monILors und conLroIs Lhe governmenL on Lhe eoIe`s behuIf.
36


As Downs (1q;) oInLed ouL, LhIs kInd oI reuIIsuLIon IurgeIy resLs on Rousseuu`s
Lheory LhuL Lhe governmenL consIsLs soIeIy oI hIred men who curry ouL oIIcIes
ordered by 'Lhe wIII oI Lhe eoIe`, Lhe urgumenL exIuIns Lhe rIvuLe moLIves oI
the men in government quite simply: They obey the commands of the people
with precision in order to keep their jobs, because the slightest disobedience
meuns ImmedIuLe dIsmIssuI und he concIuded LhuL As our whoIe sLudy shows,
this view is incompatible with uncertuInLy und Lhe dIvIsIon oI Iubour (QuoLed In
Laffont, 2000). This argument could be criticised from some other points of
view (Laffont, 2000). However, my point here is that people in the other
institutions, judiciary and legislature, are no less than men in terms of their
'rIvuLe moLIve`. A IundumenLuI IucLor Is LhuL Lhe muLerIuI beneIIL Ior Lhese
oIILIcIuns soIeIy deends, eILher dIrecLIy or IndIrecLIy, on Lhe cILIzens` own
resources.
The presence of the other principal, say the US Government, who has its say in
both the voting and policy making-process creates another cost, beyond the
ordinary agency cost. This cost, the common agency cost, imposes an unusual
burden on the citizens of those developing countries such as Somalia, where the
Cold War rivalry was present. Furthermore, since we have two heterogeneous
principals, Somali citizens are weak and they suffer from the severe effects of
some extractive informal institutions, while US foreign policy is organisationally
unified and financially and politically stronger. This heterogeneity combined
with our assumption of substitutability of the two efforts, in that more effort to
one task means less effort to the other task, deteriorates the situation of the
weaker principal, or in our case, the Somali people.

37


2 INSTITUTIONS
2.1. Introduction
This chapter considers the three main informal institutions that determined the
behaviour of the actors that contributed the decay of the post-colonial state in
Somalia. These institutions were bad, as far as the wellbeing of the Somali
society is concerned, because they created incentives for predators. The
incentives they created not only increased uncertainty, conflict, and hunger, but
beyond that they completely splintered the formal institutions of the state.
These institutions put the society in a very weak position in the state-society
relationship.
The independent Somali Republic, which came into existence in July 1960, was
a unification of former British and Italian Somali-lands, two of the five Somali
populated territories under non-Somali jurisdictions. Considering the objective
of this thesis, the history of Somalia could be divided into three main phases:
pre-colonial Somalis, Somalis under colonisation, and independent Somali
Republic. In each of these periods there was a special form of implicit social
contract between the citizens and elites of Somalia, and thus a set of institutions
where In Iuce. Here eIILe Is u cIuss oI ersons wILhIn u socIeLy who ure In u
osILIon Lo vIew LhemseIves . us chosen, eILher by others or by nature to
govern (ScruLon, 1q8z)
15
.
2.2. Institutions Matter
In economics, the state plays three main roles: it provides institutions,
distributes income and promotes economic development (Reinert, 1999). But,
clearly, both redistribution and growth promotion activities of the state are
subjecL Lo Lhe kInd oI roerLy rIghLs In Iuce und, LhereIore, |L|he busIc
servIces LhuL Lhe sLuLe rovIdes ure Lhe underIyIng ruIes oI Lhe gume. These
institutions or the underlying rules of the game, whether formal or in formal,
huve Lwo objecLIves: IIrsL, Lhey secIIy Lhe IundumenLuI ruIes oI comeLILIon
and cooperation which will provide a structure of property rights (that is,
specify the ownership structure in both factor and product markets) for
maximizing Lhe renLs uccruIng Lo Lhe ruIer (NorLh, 1q81). SecondIy, InsLILuLIons
reduce the transaction costs and through this they provide a set of efficient
property rights which in turn maximise the societal output (North, 1981).
In a risk free rule, every ruler, authoritarian or elected, has an interest to
provide an efficient form of property rights and reduce the transaction cost, as
Lo u regIme whose mujor InLeresL Is Lo enrIch ILseII IL muy very weII be
advantageous to reduce the transaction costs in the economy by strengthening
ILs IundumenLuI InsLILuLIons (BIomqvIsL und unduhI, zooz). urLhermore,
Lhe reduLory sLuLe reduces Lhe eIIIcIency oI Lhe economy onIy when LhIs Is Lhe

15
The following terms will be used interchangeably: elite, political elite, political entrepreneurs,
state, government, and leadership.
38


mosL roIILubIe uILernuLIve (BIomqvIsL und unduhI, zooz). An InLeresLIng
question that comes up is: When would reducing the efficiency of the economy
be the most profitable alternative for the state? Or why would a self-interested
leader of a polity choose to undermine the fundamental institutions of his state?
Since the world of politics is full of risk, an ideal place to search for the answer is
Lhe IIeId oI oIILIcuI comeLILIon und IeudershI survIvuI. Thus Lo secure ILs own
exIsLence Is u LwIn Lusk, wILh revenue muxImIsuLIon, Ior Lhe sLuLe. ThIs hus
particular relevance in Africa, where, as Roger Tangri (Quoted in Kpundeh,
1qq) oInLs ouL, Lhe osILIons oI IeudershI ure hIghIy rIzed due Lo Lhe
material and pecuniary benefits office holding brings to its occupants.
Opposition politicians as well want to acquire those positions within the state
apparatus, primarily to advance their own personal interests and further
individual accumulation. Thus, the key to transforming the petty bourgeoisie
into a property-ownIng cIuss were Lhrough sLuLe ower und oIILIcuI oIIIce.
According to North (1981), it is this conflict over control of the state that led
some countries to success and strong economic performance, while it led others
Lo u reIuLIve IuIIure or even ubsoIuLe decIIne. He muInLuIned LhuL Lhe reIuLIve
bargaining power oI ruIers und consLILuenLs wus decIsIve In Lhese resuILs NorLh
(1981). The power of who can stay in office is essential here. Is it a
representatives of the society at large or is it sub groups, i.e. special interest
groups, among the society that have the final say in this respect? In a formal
electoral system the checks and balance mechanism or legal procedure is
important to constrain the state. The crucial thing is whether electoral and
political institutions penalise state leaders or not for pursuing special interests
at the expense of the national interest. Authoritarian states are, also, subject to
various constraints. Blomqvist and Lundahl (2002) mentioned three limiting
factors of state predation: the proportion of the economy that the state controls;
the relative power of the state compared to its rivals; and the transaction costs
of resource distributions for the state. Grossman (2000), considers this issue
from another dimension: the society perspective. He mentions three constraints
that a predating ruler must consider to maximise his outcome: the ability of the
people to avoid or to evade taxation; the credibility of state policies; and the
ability of the citizens, in case of unhappiness, to depose the ruling elite. He goes
on by suyIng LhuL n this context the ability to depose the incumbent ruling elite
is a critical component of political power and, hence, is a distinguishing feature
oI Lhe subseL oI subjecLs who comrIse Lhe cILIzenry (Grossmun, zooo). Thus,
the role and ability of the society is fundamental to the direction the conflict
over state control leads to the country in general and the economy in particular.
NorLh`s unuIysIs, on Lhe oLher hund, generuLed u growIng InLeresL In Lhe
literature about the role of institutions for socieLy`s behuvIour und reIerences,
and there is a consensus among economists and political scientists that
institutions have a strong impact on political and economic performance of any
oIILy. or DougIuss NorLh |I|nsLILuLIons ure Lhe ruIes oI Lhe gume In a society
or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human
InLerucLIon und us he uLs IL InsLILuLIons IncIude uny Iorm oI consLruInLs LhuL
humun beIngs devIse Lo shue humun InLerucLIon (NorLh, 1qqo). SchoIurs,
39


including North, have emphasised two types of institutions: formal institutions
such as political, judicial and economic rules; and informal institutions such as
patron-client relationships and clan networks. Informal institutions were
deIIned us socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created,
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels und by
conLrusL, IormuI InsLILuLIons us ruIes LhuL ure oenIy codIIIed, In Lhe sense LhuL
they are established and communicated through channels that are widely
ucceLed us oIIIcIuI (HeImke und evILsky, zoo). By framing the behaviour of
individuals and organisations and creating incentives for them, institutions can
be good or bad. Good institutions have three main roles: firstly, they enforce
property rights; secondly, they constrain the actions of political elites; and
thirdly, they create equality (Acemoglu, 2003).
One possible way to approach analysing economic conflict of a society is to
consider the structure of property rights of that society. But, although I consider
the aspects of the property rights in one way or another, it is more fruitful to
consider the institutions that constrain the behaviour of the political elite.
DougIuss NorLh noLed LhuL Lhe Lwo essenLIuI buIIdIng bIocks Lo undersLunding
the structure - of political and economic organization which determine the
performance of an economy - are a theory of the state and a theory of property
rights. A theory of the state is essential because it is the state that specifies the
property right structure. Ultimately it is the state that is responsible for the
efficiency of the property right structure, which causes growth or stagnation or
economIc decIIne (NorLh, 1q81). n socIeLIes where ruIers ure noL consLruIned
by institutions, the ruling elite could formulate the property rights itself and
redistribute assets and income according to their preferences. So gaining and
losing are highly connected to political power. On the other hand, in order to
satisfy the interests of those who can remove him from power the ruler may be
forced to pursue unsustainable policies (Acemoglu et. al. 2003).
My argument is that tribalism, an identity-based patronage system of
leadership, and the Cold War were the main institutions, which determined the
incentive structure and constrained the interactions of specified actors in
pursuit of their goals in Somalia. The next sections look at the evolution of these
InsLILuLIons. These InsLILuLIons ure bud becuuse:
They weuken Lhe socIeLy`s burguInIng ower und, Lhus, its ability to
conLroI Lhe eIILe`s behuvIour. These InsLILuLIons enubIed oIILIcuI eIILes,
Burre und oLhers us weII, Lo ursue dIvIde-and-ruIe sLruLegIes, In whIch
they used them as a bridge to power and to maintain their rule despite
pursuing economically, politically and socially destructive policies. Here,
the logic is that as long as citizens do not retain the ability to replace their
Ieuders or Lhe Ieuder`s oIILIcuI survIvuI does noL deend uL uII on Lhe
acquiescence of the citizenry and thus political accountability is absent,
there is no reason that their interests should be taken into account
(Acemoglu et. al., 2003; Padr-i-Miquel, 2004).
These institutions, on the other hand, limit the expected time horizon for
Lhe ruIer`s survIvuI whIch Is Important for economic development. As
Grossmun (zooo) muInLuIned: wILh u suIIIcIenLIy Iow oLenLIuI survIvuI
40


probability for the ruling elite the state is unable to establish a credible
regime of non confiscatory taxation and secure claims to property and
even cun be Lrued on Lhe wrong sIde oI Lhe uIIer curve He Lhen
emphasised that the main factors that mitigate the potential survival
robubIIILy oI Lhe ruIIng eIILe ure InLernuI dIscord ussocIuLed wILh eLhnIc
rivalry; threat of conquest by an external foe; and dependence on the
suorL oI u curIcIous exLernuI uLron (Grossmun, zooo).
These are bad or extractive institutions because they generate predation
or actions which are unfavourable to economic development, since they
create state dependence on special interests (Blomqvist and Lundahl,
2002). Here, the survival probability of state leadership becomes
dependant not, mainly, on the state policies but on policies made by
others, internal groups or external powers. This in turn causes the
predatory state to act more like an agent of interest groups at the expense
oI ILs cILIzen`s InLeresL (Grossmun, zooo).
2.3. Tribalism: a Socio-Political Institution
As Adum (1qq) noLed, eLhnIc conIIIcLs Luke Lhe Iorm oI cIun conIIIcLs In
Somalia. However, ethnic differences in Somalia, with minor exceptions, are
based on genealogical segmentations. Clan conflicts have been seen as the
dominant factor of Somali politics, in both state formation and state collapse.
Two explanations for clan involvement in Somali politics are common in the
literature, as we mentioned earlier. In the primordial view, based on kinship
sentiments, clan attachments are a cultural given and cultural affinity. In the
instrumentalist view, tribe sentiments and loyalties are manipulated by the
political elites for political ends. However, in the words of Doornbos and
MurkukIs (1qqq), wheLher one regurds cIunnIshness - the primacy of clan
interests - as a reflection of traditional Somali society, or of its transformation
and decay, it is generally agreed that this phenomenon matured in the bosom of
Lhe modern sLuLe.
Somali social structure is constructed from some 5-6 clan families (Beelo), in
which the latest version is the so called 4.5 notion
16
. Each clan family consists of
different clans and sub-clans. I am not interested in this paper in the complex
and unknown history and origins of these groups; I rather emphasise the
development of its negatively politicised aspect, tribalism; its relation with the
state structure, national unity, and most ImorLunLIy ILs ImucL on Lhe counLry`s
economic and political development.
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, in her Africa Endurance and Change, South of
the Sahara, noLed LhuL 'TrIbuIIsm` Loduy Is Lhe IInuI munIIesLuLIon, debused by
colonialism, of pre-colonIuI 'eLhnIc senLImenL`. She hus descrIbed Lhree sLuges
of tribalism in Africa. The first phase, the precolonial equilibrium, she argued,
wus u erIod LhuL oIILIcuI, socIuI, und IIneuI sLrucLures were cIoseIy

16
Arta version of Somali Clan-families: Daarood, Digil/Mirifle, Dir, Hawiye and the half is a
collection of other clans. It was invented during the Arta Peace Conference in Djibouti, in 2000.
41


InLerconnecLed. . Lhe kInshI sLrucLures Lhen played their full role, both
assuring and representing an equilibrium between the social and the political
system, between the organization of production and commerce and the ideology
und cuILure oI Lhe grou (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1988).
The second stage, which she terms as the ethnic revival under colonialism is the
period when African societies experienced the concept of ethnicity. For political,
administrative, and religious purposes colonial authorities have either
Imosed or Lo u greuL exLenL, IubrIcuLed IL uon hILherLo undIIIerenLIuLed
grous. She oInLed ouL LhuL, desILe beIng u coIonIuI InvenLIon, AIrIcun socIuI
groups used ethnicity in their resistance movements against colonisation, and
colonial authorities, in turn, used ethnicity to crackdown on the anti-colonial
movements (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1988).
n Lhe LhIrd huse, eLhnIcILy, creuLed by coIonIzers, Lhen udoLed by IocuI
eoIe us u Iorm oI resIsLunce, she wroLe, uILImuLeIy deveIoed InLo u oIILIcuI
factor. This development was encouruged by Lhe creuLIon oI 'udmInIsLruLIve
chIeIdoms` seIecLIveIy IegILImIsed by 'coIonIuI LechnoIogy`. AL LhIs oInL Lhe LhIrd
stage appeared: neo-colonialism. Tribalism - that is to say, the conscious
manipulation of an ethnic sentiment that had been reinforced and distorted by
half a century of colonial rule - come into being. This neo-colonialism can be
seen in the choices and behaviour of the first leaders of the new independent
AIrIcun sLuLes. . 'TrIbuIIsm` hus Lhen, become u socIuI und oIILIcuI Iact that
must be accepted. It was rooted in the minds of the people by the pre-colonial
and colonial heritage and through the state apparatus, which encouraged it and
roLrucLed ILs exIsLence (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1988).
Somali tribalism, apparently, took a process similar to Coquery-VIdrovILch`s
evolutionary stages. In the 16
th
and 17
th
centuries Portuguese forces, which
domInuLed Lhe ureu, severeIy desLroyed, IooLed, und on some occusIons
burned Lo Lhe ground Lhe muIn cousLuI SomuII cILIes, whIch were the main
seats for the Somali city-states and sultanates.
17
This and the victory of the
Ethiopian empire supported by Portuguese forces over Somali sultanates aided
by Ottoman troops in the hinterland of the territory caused the disintegration of
Somali suILunuLes InLo LrIbuI und vIIIuge communILIes (uIdus, 1q88). n Lhe
period between the 17
th
century and the arrival of the imperial powers, a nearly
complete decentralised system consisting of the clan-state and clan-kingdom
dominated the Somali way of life.
ThIs, however, couId be erceIved us un ImIIcuLIon oI Juck Synder`s deIuuIL
oLIon. Synder (1qq) oInLed ouL LhuL Lhe cIun or oLher eLhnIc soIIdurILIes
redomInuLes when InsLILuLIons coIIuse, when exIsLIng InsLILuLIons ure noL
fulfilling peopIe`s busIc needs und when suLIsIucLory uILernuLIve sLrucLures ure
noL reudIIy uvuIIubIe. SImIIurIy, PeLer Ekeh (1qqo) noLed LhuL hIsLorIcuIIy sLuLe
IuIIure wus u breedIng ground Ior AIrIcun kInshI InsLILuLIons by suyIng |IL|
seems fair to assume that in the extended centuries of the slave trade in Africa,
kinship systems were strengthened and elaborated as a means of providing

17
Davidson (1968), Laitin and S. Samatar (1987), A. I.Samatar (1988).
42


protection against the dangers of the violence created by the slave trade. It is my
view that the most enduring social structure within which Africans could be
assured some measure of protection was provided by the kinship system, not
the capricious state institutions that rose and died with the turbulence of the
sIuve Lrude. . KInshI rovIded Lhe IndIvIduuI room Ior deIInIng hIs citizenship
(that is, his right and duties) and meaningful protection against the vicissitudes
oI Lhe sIuve Lrude und ILs reduLory sLuLe InsLILuLIons.
This period, unsurprisingly, witnessed periodic clashes between neighbouring
tribes, mainly over grazing and water. However, it was during the colonial rule
when clan identity was modified and politicised in Somalia, as elsewhere in
Africa. Colonial authorities, for political and administrative reasons, applied
indirect rule administration to team up Somali groups. The colony was divided
along clan lines. In other words, colonial administration adopted a policy of
tribal separatism. Furthermore, colonial administration viewed some Somali
clans as allies, while others were regarded as enemies. To discipline the enemy
clans, a range of coercive mechanism was utilised, but, probably, the least costly
and widely used one was pitting one clan against another (Samatar, 2001).
Similar measures were used to suppress anti-colonial uprisings. Here the aim
was to intensify clan competition and to stimulate conflict, so that Somalis could
exhaust their energies on fighting one another, rather than challenging and
possibly overthrowing colonial powers.
Sources of clan conflicts, in Somalia, have been grouped into four main
categories: elite manipulation, struggle for social justices and equality, historical
memories, and environmental pressures (Adam, 1995). All but the last one,
which was the main source of pre-colonial clan conflict, could in one way or
another be attributed to the colonial imposition. Adam agrees with Larry
DIumond LhuL |Lhe| eIILe do noL 'munuIucLure eLhnIcILy ouL oI whoIe cIoLh buL
rather, (can) exploit a profound cultural tendency for politics to be perceived
und exressed In communuI Lerms`. We shouId note that the main events that
generuLed hosLIIe hIsLorIc memorIes, cuLured In Lhe ImmorLuI oeLry oI
cIussIcuI SomuII oeLs huened uILer Lhe urrIvuI oI coIonIuI owers` (Adum,
1995).
To summarise, the clan based clientism - tribalism or political ethnicity - that
Somalia experienced throughout its history as a modern state took its final and
mature form during the colonial period. Since then Somalis have suffered a
severe collective action problem, and have become a deeply divided society and
thus very weak in terms of state-society relationship.
2.4. Leadership Institution
In the pre-colonial era there were no such specific pluralistic political systems
established in the Western liberal democracies in which the interests of different
groups were checked and balanced by a set of rival competing claims. Instead
there was a viable set of democratic institutions, which governed the political,
social and economic affairs of the contract. The constitution of Umma, as
43


Samatar calls it
18
, consisted of two main complementary bodies: kinship u
combination of blood-LIes und cusLomury Iuw, und qanoon u seL oI sIumIc
Iuws Lo guIde Lhe behuvIor oI Lhe beIIevers. AccordIng Lo SumuLur Lhe re-
colonial era leadership class was a combination of elders
19
and Sheikhs
20
, and
emhusIsed LhuL |u|nder Lhe uegIs oI such Ieuders, Lhe crucIuI uIIuIrs oI Lhe
community where discussed in open meetings, Shir. He Lhen concIuded IL LhuL,
IInuIIy, Irom Lhe ersecLIve oI Lhe modern worId, IL Is worLh regIsLerIng LhuL
the old Somali order carried the seeds of two essential ingredients of democratic
practice: separation of powers and open, participatory deliberation, albeit male-
cenLered (SumuLur, zoo1).
KuLeIjns urgues, In Lheory, uII uduIL muIes oI sound mInd und some meuns
could participate in exercises of political authority; age and married status were
not explicit for such participation. However, only after men had established
their own households through marriage and only as they accumulated prestige
and influence by giving suporL Lo oLher communILy members` overLIme, dId
they acquire the qualifications for leadership. Finally, wisdom and impartiality
were ideological imperatives only for older married men and not for the younger
ussIonuLe bIoods (KuLeIjns, 1qqq). However, she mentioned two possible
rouLes Ior un eIder Lo ower, one wus Lhe Iong und sIow rocess oI LryIng Lo
become a wise elder who continuously reinvested his wealth in members of his
kin group and thus acquired claims to their future labor and other services. The
other was a track for angry young men who, under leadership of a charismatic
and fearless entrepreneur (the Abaanduule, or 'wur Ieuder`) decIded Lo InLensIIy
LheIr Iubor eIIorLs und muke u bId Ior quIck weuILh Lhrough ruIdIng or wurIure
(Kapteijns, 1994).
Figure 2.1 presents a simple institutional flow-model of the pre-colonial Somali
political system
21
. The structure presented in Figure 2.1 is deduced from the
social structure of the Somalis. Although in pre-colonial Somalia there were no
formal political institutions, Somalis, through established lineage segmentation,
used to summon an informal council called shir whenever the need arised to
discuss any matter of their concern. According to Lewis (1999[1961]) shir was
Lhe IundumenLuI InsLILuLIon oI governmenL LhuL uII uduIL muIes were uIIowed
to attend, but representation was common for issues concerning larger
segments. In all cases agreements are reached by majority decisions. Every
segment had its own leader, which was responsible for the implementation of
the decisions of the shir and other government activities. The titles and power of
these leaders were different across lineages and the different levels within the
lineages. For instance, Sultan was used by some clans while others used Ugaas,
Malaaq etc.

18
See Samatar (1994, 2001),
19
EIder: Lhe IncurnuLIon oI Lhe conIIuence oI Lhose euces - Heer and Hiddid - of kinship
cuILure.
20
SheIkh: u Ieurned reverenL oI sIumIc knowIedge In generuI und qanoon in particular.
21
ThIs und Lhe IoIIowIng IIgures ure bused on DuvId EusLon`s (1q) IumIIIur InuL-output
model.
44


As shown in the figure there was a single source of support, and tasks were
directed to them. There were considerable incentive schemes for the political
elite to be responsive, as their subjects where their sole source of material and
political support; and the information problem was at a minimum since people
were aware of the political processes; and the participation was high, and
reasonable accountability instruments - both exit and voice - were in place.

In the colonial era, as everywhere else in the third world, the colonial
administration had to rely on a class of indigenous people to carry out its
imperial activities. Traditional elites, on the other hand, responded to the
colonial incursion in two distinct ways. Part of these traditional elite
coIIuboruLed whIIe oLhers resIsLed. The resIsLunce movemenLs consIsLed oI men
who chose to defend and fight for their rights and freedom. Many died in action,
others in exile. Those who survived resigned themselves to the rule of the
coIonIuI conqueror (KIwunuku, 1q;). CoIIuboruLors, on Lhe oLher hund, were
oorLunIsLs who reud Lhe sIgns oI Lhe LImes correcLIy, und Lhey muy even be
described as worldly wise. Having read the signs of the times they willingly
jumped on the colonial bandwagon and reaped the fruits of collaboration. With
the colonial administration they established a partnership, which lasted until
de-colonization. Collaborators were essential partners and allies in the process
oI coIonIuI conquesL (KIwunuka, 1975).
Somali Citizens (Clan-families, clans etc.)
Shir

Figure 2.1. Traditional Somali
Political Flow System
Sultan/Cheif
Support
Task
45



Many Somali leaders, as with other African rulers, collaborated with the colonial
powers. Two main objectives can be documented that drove this collaboration
on Lhe SomuII Ieuders` urL. AL IIrsL, some oI Lhese Ieuders formed alliances with
one European power or another, hoping that this power would protect them
against any aggression from other imperial powers, and thus signed formal
treaties with them (Lewis, 1965). The dispute among traditional Somali leaders
could also be considered as another cause for this cooperation (Hess, 1966).
However, this form of friendship did not last long and the colonial programme
was implemented after imperial powers solved the colonial disputes between
them.
Through the indirect rule those who preferred to collaborate had been chosen to
exercise the colonial rule. This was more effective and less costly for the colonial
authority. These indigenous rulers gained substantial economic privileges and
enormous political authority, which they never had in the pre-colonial Somalia.
The ultimate lever of power was reserved for the non-native administrators and
their metropolitan (colonising) country and the most important administrative
functions were in the hands of colonial authorities. The indigenous rulers were
permitted to enjoy unrivalled authority at the expenses of the welfare of the
citizens, as far as they do not question the colonial rule and its objectives.
Finally, this process created a situation where the interests of the Somali leaders
became more and more closely intertwined with the interests of the colonial
power.
During this colonial period, the traditional leadership institution was
considerably re-shaped. Both the traditional recruitment process and essential
Somali Citizens (Clan-families, clans, etc,) Citizens of the Colonising
Country
Somali Sultan
/Cheif
Figure 2.2. Colonial Political Flow
System
Colonial
Administration
Support
Task
Colonial Power
(State)
46


characteristics of the leader was altered. Kapteijns (1994), argues that
|I|eudershI wus IncreusIngIy vesLed In Lhose men who couId rovIde uccess Lo
the state and urban economy or who succeeded in exploiting such access to
build their own wealth and power. The slow and arduous track to power of the
local elder who reinvested his surplus wealth in the junior members of the kin
grou more und more obsoIeLe. . RuIdIng Loo, becume gruduuIIy Iess
sIgnIIIcunL. . To Lhe exLenL LhuL ruIdIng conLInued, or (.) Increused, uccesses to
Lhe sLuLe und Lown Ior IIreurms become u crucIuI condILIon Ior success.
Another affected area was the leadership quality. According to Geshekter
(1q8), unLII Lhe eurIy 1qos, Lhe quuIILy oI 'bruvery, hosILuIILy, und verbuI
eIoquence` usuuIIy distinguished an caaqil - chief - among Somalis, but by the
Second World War they were being selected simply on hereditary lines, exerted
IILLIe InIIuence In Lowns, und Iucked credIbIIILy umong Lhe nomuds. A IurLher
problem created by this pattern was fierce competition, sometimes with bloody
cIushes, umong Lhese Ieuders Ior sLuLe conLroIIed resources, und much oI Lhe
warfare and raiding for the period preceding and immediately following World
War I was the result of, or had as its objective, special access to the favor of the
coIonIuI sLuLe (KuLeIjns, 1qqq).
On the whole, in the colonial governance system described above, Somali
leaders were propping up legitimacy guaranteed, not by fellow citizens but by
coIonIuI ower und LheIr IocuI uuLhorILy derIved ultimately form their links to
the state and their access to the political, military, and economic benefits it
besLowed KuLeIjns (1qqq). n oLher words, Lhey were ugenLs Ior Lhe coIonIuI
udmInIsLruLIon. ConsequenLIy In Lhe Ieuders` behuvIour, Lhe nuLIve population
were not citizens but colonial subjects, governed by specialised coercive rules,
und Ior Lhe cILIzens` reuIIsuLIon, Lhe Ieuders cume Lo be seen us Lhe mouLhIece
of the imperial administration pursuing their own interests rather than as
servants of public interests. Figure 2.2 illustrates the political flow system under
the colonial rule. Colonial administration which is an agent of the colonial
power - the horizontal arrows indicate the relation between the colonial power
as principal and colonial administration as agent - was the only viable principal
for the Somali leaders - the chiefs - und Lhe sImIe reuson wus LhuL Lhe
colonial state was not designed to be accountable to the citizens of these
coIonIes buL Lo Lhe meLrooIILun sLuLes (KIvImki and Laakso, 2000). This is
shown at the left side of the figure, where Somalis as subjects were expected just
to support the administration through the traditional leaders. The right side of
the figure shows the political system of the colonising country. Here citizens of
the colonising country are principals for their government.
A wave of nationalism swept over all African colonies during the post WWII
period. According to James Coleman (1954) several political, economic,
sociological, psychological, and religious factors contributed to the rise of this
nationalism. Most of these, and perhaps other specific elements were present in
the development of modern Somali nationalism (Samatar, 1988; Geshekter,
1985; Lewis, 1965). These movements, unlike previous resisters and pre-
nationalists, were mainly organised and led by Westernised elite: those with
47


Western education - mainly the sons of collaborating chiefs - and those
working for the colonial administration (Castagno, 1964).
Tracing the evolution of modern elites in the developing countries to the
coIonIuI eru, ChurIes EIIIoLL (1q;) Iound LhuL Lhree crucIuIIy ImorLunL
ussumLIons were heId In common:
The colonising power and its representatives in the colony were superior
and in every aspect - i.e. culturally, socially, politically, economically -
different than the indigenous people.
Europeans in the colony had the right to gain a higher standard of living
than compared to their expected one had they stayed in their home
country.
Colonial administrators where social, economic, and political elites.
Based on these facts Elliott (1975), concluded that in post-colonial times these
IeveIs rovIded u LurgeL Ior Lhe new eIILe seekIng Lo Luke over Euroeun jobs. L
is difficult to over-emphasize the historic importance of the assimilation of a
small number in the indigenous population into the ruling elite. With an
ideology that hardly transcended a narrow nationalism and in the majority of
cases paid only the most perfunctory lip service to the principles of socialism.., it
was perhaps inevitable that the new leadership should be the object of a process
of economic osmosis by which the assumptions and patterns of the colonizers
were transferred virtually intact to the new masters. At that point, the rhetoric
of development so liberally proclaimed by the new leadership contained within
ILseII Lhe seed oI ILs own desLrucLIon. ConsequenLIy, Lhese eIILe used LheIr ower
and influence to achieve these targets, by distorting the allocation of resources,
and thereby impoverished the rest of the society (Elliott, 1975).
In Somalia, the Westernized elite, who led the anti-colonial movement, had a
main mission: to liberate their people from the yoke of colonialism. However, as
rational agents they were also self-interested. Furthermore, they were the
natural candidates to succeed the European administrators, since they were the
only ones who could run the colonially structured state institutions. Because of
that, their simple assumption was that they had every reason to enjoy the
privileges created for the holder of the position. Furthermore, this personal
ambition replaced independence as the main mission, as it had been secured,
22

and those educated Somalis who opposed the movement or at least had not
participated in the decolonisation movements joined those who led the
movemenL Lo urLIcIuLe In Lhe munugemenL oI Lhe counLry`s oIILIcuI desLIny.
Even in the early days of the modern nationalist movements, during the pre-
nationalist social organisations, this individualistic ambition was present, and
InvoIved SomuIIs who were begInnIng Lo see LhemseIves us u cIuss uurL. 'We
were anxious to erect better meeting places then the geedeeye
23
` recuIIed u

22
n November 1qqq LuIIun SomuIIIund wus mude, by Lhe UnILed NuLIon`s GeneruI AssembIy, u
trust territory for ten years, after which it was to become an independent polity.
23
An ordinary local tea shop at the time.
48


prominent Nadi
24
member, 'und InsIsLed on urorIuLe rIvIIeges us
government civil servants such as better allowance, shorter time in rank, and
provision of better lighting for our buildings. We were also concerned to find
suILubIe servunLs Lo serve us Leu uL our cIub IuncLIons` (GeshekLer, 1q8).
This elite was relatively small, shared a broad similarity with regard their
outlook and with minor exceptions, were adherents of liberal-democratic
institutions based on the Western model. This resulted in part from the Western
education and experience enjoyed by many of these leaders but mainlyfrom
traditional Somali political culture. The so called pastoral democracy is a
distinct political culture developed by pre-colonial Somalis which can easily
accommodate the modern democratic process. Mohamed S. Barre, the former
Somali dicLuLor, In exIuInIng LhIs SomuII oIILIcuI LrudILIon suId SomuII
traditional society is, after all, highly democratic. The chiefs were only the first
among equals. The Shir [assembly] has been our basic institution; everyone has
a voice and all issues are heavily debated. Once decision is reached, it is binding
on uII (CusLugno, 1q;1).
However, for some reasons, this broad similarity in outlook was a liability rather
than an asset for Somali national development goals after independence. Tribal
mobilisation consensually became the ideal game rule for their competition. The
formation of nearly all political parties, established after 1950, was a basic
strategy for this competition (Castagno, 1964).
Even the Somali Youth League (SYL), who spearheaded the Somali nationalist
movement and dominated the post independence civilian politics, was not
spared from these accusations, politicising the clan factor, not only as individual
members buL us un orgunIsuLIon us weII. AccordIng Lo CusLugno, DesILe ILs
desire to extirpate clanism, the SYL was compelled to rely on traditional leaders
and to employ agnatic cleavages wherever and whenever they could enhance the
urLy`s sLrengLh (CusLugno, 1q6q).
The elite road to influence and power depended upon their ability to mobilise
mass support where tribalism was a ready instrument to capitalise on.
Imperially fabricated and modified chiefs were there, and divide and rule tools
of the colonial power, as we will see, were mastered. Describing post-colonial
leadership in Kenyu, WIIIIum OchIeng (1q;), wroLe LhuL |w|hen u Ieuder IeeIs
him-self weak on the national platform he begins to calculate that the only
support he may have will come from his own tribe. He starts to create
antagonism of his sort so that he can at least entrench himself as a leader of his
tribe. Some of our politicians are people who had internalized Western values.
They had come to realize that the survival of the colonialists had depended very
largely on the colonial policy of divide and rule. Armed with this theory they are
the ones who, in their fight for survival, commandeered tribal sentiments to
heI Lhem muInLuIn und Imrove LheIr osILIons. . They seL eoIe uguInsL
others and those leaders who were triumphant in the power struggles tried to
dish material benefits out to their people quite out of proportion to what others

24
Club.
49


goL. n SomuIIu, durIng Lhe cIvIIIun regIme, LhIs sLruggIe hud Lhe Iorm oI u coId
civil war, and under the military dictatorship the only viable options were
forming an opposition front or accepting economically lucrative but politically
humiliating and toothless portfolios, as under stateless Somalia organising own
militia and becoming a warlord is strictly a dominant strategy.
John Cartwright (1983) articulated three constraints on post-colonial African
leaders:
Those imposed by foreign states and trans-national organisations.
Those imposed by their own states.
The personal capabilities of the leader.
Combining the first two constraints, Cartwright demonstrates incentives,
institutions, players and the outcomes relevant for these leaders.
He urgues LhuL mosL Ieuders ure In u weuk osILIon In LheIr deuIIng boLh wILh
other states and with foreign investors, and that they generally find few shared
values around which they can rally all the people of their state. At the same
time, however, they have to meet only a limited range of domestic demands, and
are subject to few checks from within the state of their behaviour. The overall
effect of these factors has been to discourage leaders from trying to achieve
major developmental transformations of their societies and to encourage them
to seek personal security and self-enrichment, against which widely shared
social values and strong political institutions generally act as barriers. In dealing
with forces outside their own state, African leaders have received constant
remInders oI LheIr Iuck oI ower (CurLwrIghL, 1q8).
2.5. The Cold War
During the World War II the Soviet Union joined the United States, with
Britain, in an effort to defeat the common enemy, Nazi Germany. This
cooperation took place after they agreed to recognise and reserve important
prerogatives to each other i.e. rights to veto resolutions in the U.N Security
Council and recognising the spheres of influence on each other. Due to the
preceding suspicions and mistrust, the alliance between the United States and
the Soviet Union began to crumble immediately after the surrender of the Nazi
forces in 1945. However, to avoid another world war the two powers designed a
new interstate system, based on republicanism, to replace the old imperial
system.
Although the United States and the Soviet Union collaborated to destroy the
imperial system and the construction of the new republican system, as Schaeffer
(1qq;) noLed, Lhey reserved sheres of influence
25
for themselves, a
development that led to a series of disagreements and conflicts known

25
Sheres oI InIIuence ure, us deIIned by Vuzquez (1q;), suces LucILIy or exressIy reserved Lo
Lhe hegemony oI one sLuLe.
50


coIIecLIveIy us Lhe coId wur u geooIILIcuI, deoIogIcuI, und economIc sLruggIe
between the Soviet Union and its allies and the United States and its allies. The
war took the form of i.e. networks of military alliances with an arms race and
rising military budgets; propaganda, covert activities and economic embargos
and wars by proxy, political use of military and economic aid and frequent
interventions of internal affairs of the new republics, by the superpower
(Schaeffer, 1997).
When the Cold War began, relations between the two superpowers became
critically strained. Each tried to tighten its control over its satellites within its
own spheres of influence. In the years after World War II, the struggle mainly
took place in Europe. However, within a decade the European situation was
settled, and the tensions of the Cold War moved to the other continents: Asia,
Africa and Latin America.
In Africa and AsIu, Lhe suerower` mIssIon oI consLrucLIng u reubIIcun sysLem
coIncIded wILh Lhe IocuI eoIe`s sLruggIe Lo overLhrow coIonIuI regImes und Lhe
decolonisation process frequently became entangled in Cold War tensions as the
superpowers competed to control the new republics.
DurIng Lhe CoId Wur Lhe SovIeL UnIon`s muIn sLruLegy In Lhe ThIrd WorId wus Lo
spread its communist ideology to gain a large share of clients in the newly-
liberated countries, because it believed that the world was geo-politically in
favour of Washington. The United States, on the other hand, intended to
contain Soviet communism within their current borders with the hope that
internal division, failure, or evolution might end the threat. The United States
containment policy was based on the fact that it already dominated the world
economically and militarily and its main objective was to maintain that status
quo (McClintock, 2002). George Kennan, an influential policy planner in the
State Department and the mastermind of the containment strategy, secretly
InIormed US oIIcy mukers, LhuL we huve ubouL o ercenL oI Lhe worId's
weuILh buL onIy 6. ercenL oI ILs ouIuLIon, . Our reuI Lusk In Lhe comIng
period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain
this posILIon oI dIsurILy wILhouL osILIve deLrImenL Lo our nuLIonuI securILy
(Kennan, 1948 and quoted in McClintock, 2002).
For Kennan, the United States should stop the global spread of Communism
through political, economic and ideological struggle rather than direct military
conIronLuLIons. Kennun wroLe IL Is cIeur LhuL Lhe muIn eIemenL oI uny UnILed
States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but
IIrm und vIgIIunL conLuInmenL oI RussIun exunsIve LendencIes und udded LhuL
SovIeL exunsIon couId be conLuIned by Lhe udroIL und vIgIIunL uIIcuLIon oI
counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points,
corresondIng Lo Lhe shIILs und muneuvers oI SovIeL oIIcy (Kennun, 1qq8 und
quoted in McClintock, 2002).
AILhough Lhe reuI drIvIng Iorce oI Lhe suerower` comeLILIon wus seII-interest
Lhe InLervenLIons oI oLher nuLIon`s InLernuI uIIuIrs requIred LhuL Lhese ucLIons or
oIIcIes ure resenLed In u wuy oI IuIrIy consIsLenL rIncIIes. Trumun`s docLrine
51


presented initial guidelines for the containment strategy to challenge the Soviet
expansions. It was justified not only as the strategic interest of the U.S. but also
as a moral mission to help small vulnerable nations which are friends in the
time of crises. In his famous containment speech, U.S. President Harry Truman,
stated that:
One oI Lhe rImury objecLIves oI Lhe IoreIgn oIIcy oI Lhe UnILed SLuLes Is Lhe
creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a
way of life Iree Irom coercIon. . To ensure Lhe euceIuI deveIomenL oI nuLIons,
free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the
United Nations, The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting
freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our
objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their
free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that
seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank
recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or
indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and
hence Lhe securILy oI Lhe UnILed SLuLes.
Truman emphasised that there are two alternative ways of life and every nation
must choose the one which suits it most. The first of these is based upon the will
of the majority. The basic characteristics of this way of life are: institutions
which are free; a government which is representative; free and fair elections;
guarantees of individual liberty with freedom from political oppression; etc.
The second way of life, according to Truman, is based upon the will of a
minority at the expense of the majority. The basic characteristics of this way of
life are: a reliance upon controlled institutions; political terror and oppression;
fixed elections; and the suppression of personal freedoms; etc.
Although the Truman Doctrine basically ascribed the United States the right to
intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, he noted two main pre-
condILIons Ior such InLervenLIon. IrsL, Lhe UnILed SLuLes oIIcy musL be Lo
ussIsL Iree eoIes Lo work ouL LheIr own desLInIes In LheIr own wuy und
secondly, that this support must be at the interest of the mujorILy who ure
resIsLIng uLLemLed subjuguLIon by urmed mInorILIes or by ouLsIde ressures
(Truman, 1947).
However, the basic assumption behind these conclusions was the belief, by the
United States leaders, that democracy with its economic capitalism as a
universal system will be the preferred way of life by the new African and Asian
nations that would emerge from the process of the prospective breakup of the
European colonial empires throughout these continents. The United States
considered the process as an opportunity to contain the Soviet Union and its
oppressive Marxist-Leninist dictatorship.
The actual developments were disturbing as scores of new nations, among
which were those that emerged from the decolonisation process, chose
communism as theIr reIerred wuy oI IIIe ruLher Lhun democrucy und IL`s Iree
52


institutions, while some others followed the path of democracy against
Marxism, but decided to seek required economic and military support from
Moscow. These results were acutely disappointing to Washington since the
Third World primarily became the new arena for the Cold War confrontation
with Moscow. In Washington, these developments were considered as a change
oI Lhe worId`s geo-oIILIcuI buIunce In u wuy whIch wus IuvourubIe Lo IL`s rIvuI
and, consequenLIy, us LhreuL Lo Lhe UnILed SLuLes` own InLeresLs. CurenLer
(1q8), suys LhuL WushIngLon's resonse Lo LhIs udversILy hus been u
particularly simplistic and unfortunate one. American leaders increasingly
regarded any anticommunist regime, however repressive and undemocratic it
mIghL be uL home, us un 'uIIy,` u 'Iorce Ior sLubIIILy,` und even u 'IrIend.` AL Lhe
same time, they viewed leftist governments - even those elected under
democratic procedures - as little more than Soviet surrogates, or at least targets
oI oorLunILy Ior communIsL muchInuLIons.
In response to this the basic conditions for intervention were modified in
Washington. In his inaugural address in 1961, President John F. Kennedy
InIormed Lhe worId Lo IeL every nuLIon know, whether it wishes us well or ill,
LhuL we shuII . suorL uny IrIend, oose uny Ioe. WheLher or noL LhIs IrIend
or foe is a democratically elected leader -oppressed people struggling to
maintain their free institutions and their national integrity - is not important.
Since then a set of rules for the Cold War emerged:
Unlike the traditional spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and Latin
America, which were established zones, in newly decolonised African and
Asian countries there was a fierce competition for influence by the United
States and the Soviet Union. Here each of the superpowers recognised
Lhe oLher`s rIghL Lo ursue ILs InLeresL und exIoIL unIIuLeruIIy ILs IocuI
redomInunce whIIe resecLIng Lhe oLher`s shere oI InIIuence. Euch urL
viewed the other as being behind unfavorable developments in these
countries, even if this development is local in nature with no
international dimension.
Based on how friendly local political actors are to their own interests,
each superpower developed its own criteria for Third World governments
and movements. A Third World government might be considered as
friendly government or undesirable regime. For the United States a
friendly government might be moderate, democratic or simply anti-
communist. For the Soviet Union a friendly regime should be one which
follows a non-capitalist path, has established links with the socialist
block, and more importantly the ruling regime intends to adopt
Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, a friendly government for the
U.S. is viewed, by Moscow, us u oLenLIuI LhreuL Lo Lhe USSR`s InLeresL
and consequently falls under the category of undesired regime. Similarly,
any Third World regime that is a friendly government for Moscow is
considered as an undesired regime in Washington. In addition, whenever
there is a friendly government in a country for one of the sides, any
opposition groups to that government are considered aggressive
movements or reactionary groups. Similarly, when an undesired regime
53


rules a country any opposition groups were considered as free people
seeking their rights or anti-imperialist forces. Furthermore, legitimacy
and majority representation were mainly determined by the category into
which the respective group falls. Undesirable regimes and groups are
mostly minority groups illegitimately imposing or intending to impose its
will on the majority, while friendly regimes and groups are the legitimate
forces representing the will of the majority of the people in the concerned
country.
The uLLILude oI Lhe oIILIcuI IeudershI wus consIdered us Lhe muIn
deLermInunL oI u nuLIon`s wuy oI IIIe In AIrIcu. GIven Lhe sLuLe-society
relationship the superpowers realised that the best strategy to bring
AIrIcun nuLIons on bourd wus Lo heI Lhe Ieuders wILh |Lhe| 'correcL`
outIook Lo uchIeve ower. So leadership change and survival became an
ImorLunL Issue In Lhe suerower`s InvoIvemenL In Lhese counLrIes. n
Washington, right-wIng mIIILury dIcLuLors were regurded us vuIuubIe
friends whose repressive excesses must be ignored or excused whIch
deserve Lo hoId Lhe ower, whIIe erceIvIng IeILIsL InsurgenL movemenLs
and governments as mortal threats to America's national interest,
jusLIIyIng u osLure oI unreIenLIng hosLIIILy und worked every ossIbIe
way to get rid of them. In Moscow, on the other hand, ambitious
unouIur Ieuders were consIdered us revoIuLIonury democruLs und
ussumed LhuL uILhough Lhe roIeLurIuL wus Loo weuk Lo susLuIn u
revolution, this did not matter: the revolution could be led from above
and with the support of the world, the socialist system could withstand
colonialist counter-meusures unLII Lhe roIeLurIuL hud muLured, whIIe
democratically elected leaders were considered as reactionary forces
which had to leave office (Carpenter 1985).
Each part wus reured Lo uy uny rIce, beur uny burden, meeL uny
hurdshI, Lo suorL ILs IrIend und oose ILs Ioe wheLher IL Is u
government or movement without giving much attention to the impact of
this support on the internal politics and interest of the societies at large.
This support might be political, economic or military aid. Depending on
the situation, this support might on some occasions take an extreme
form, such as political assassination, organising a military coup or direct
military intervention by one superpower or the other. According to
JeIIrey Suchs, WesLern coId wurrIors, und Lhe oeruLIves In Lhe CA und
counterpart agencies in Europe, opposed African leaders who preached
nationalism, sought aid from the Soviet Union, or demanded better terms
on Western investments in African minerals and energy deposits. In
1960, as a demonstration of Western approaches to African
independence, CIA and Belgian operatives assassinated the charismatic
first prime minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, and installed the
tyrant Mobutu Sese Seko in his place. In the 1980s, the United States
supported Jonas Savimbi in his violent insurrection against the
government of Angola, on the grounds that Savimbi was an
anticommunist when in fact he was a violent and corrupL Lhug.The CA
had its hand in the violent overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah of
Ghana in 1966. Indeed, almost every African political crisis - Sudan,
54


Somalia and a host of others - has a long history of Western meddling
umong ILs muny cuuses (Suchs, zo05).
This approach does not undermine the interest and well being of the Third
World societies alone, as we will see in the case of Somalia, but, perhaps, in the
long run it also weakens the interests which the essence of the Cold War was
supposed to protecL. CurenLer (1q8) noLed LhuL Lhe consequences oI LhIs
simplistic and morally inconsistent strategy are highly unfortunate. America
finds itself involved far too often in futile or mutually destructive confrontations
with left-wing regimes. Even worse is the evolution of a cozy relationship
between Washington and a host of right-wing authoritarian governments. A
pervasive perception of the United States as the sponsor and protector of such
dictatorships has undermined America's credibility as a spokesman for
democracy, caused Third World peoples to equate both capitalism and
democracy with U.S. hegemony, and established a milieu for rabidly anti-
American revolutions. It is an approach that creates a massive reservoir of ill
will and, in the long run, weakens rather than strengthens America's national
securILy.
The Cold War, in this way, specifies the fundamental rules of competition and
cooperation of the superpowers in Africa and Asia. Both sides were deeply
involved in the internal affairs of these nations by influencing leadership
changes and survival, and policy making-rocesses. ThIs weukens Lhe socIeLy`s
bargaining power and, thus, its ability to control the behaviour of the elite. A
purely economic foreign aid without any political or military intenLIon cunnoL
do much good us economIsL PeLer T. Buuer (1q81) noLed, whIIe IL Is
neverLheIess IIkeIy Lo do much hurm. MosL ImorLunLIy, Buuer (1q81) observed
that "since official wealth transfers go to governments and not to the people at
Iurge. . |u|Id increases the power, resources and patronage of governments
compared to the rest of society and therefore their power over it." Moreover, the
superpowers provided political and military assistance to Third World leaders,
and thus, the survival probability of state leadership became dependant not
mainly on leadership policies and performance but on policies made by external
power. By creating state dependence on foreign power, the Cold War generated
or encouraged conditions which were unfavourable to the political and
economic developments in these countries i.e. personal rule, neo-patrimonial
leadership, and the divide-and-rule system. Furthermore, each side encouraged
policies and actions which, might be seen as strategic in their struggle, but have
locally disastrous impacts.
Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa - an area comprising Somalia, Ethiopia,
Djibouti and Eritrea - whIch wus uL Lhe LImes oI Lhe CoId Wur un ureu oI Lhe
world whose strategic location has thrust it into the international arena as a
oLenLIuI crIses zone und mukes IL u IvoLuI IucLor In Lhe gIobuI buIunce oI
ower (Schwub, 1q;8). Ls geo-political prominence was based on the fact that
it controls the Bab el-Mandeb straits - a narrow passage in which, according to
some sources, 60 percent of oil to Western Europe and the US and 85 percent of
oil to Japan passes through - and that it overlaps the Middle East, the Red Sea
and the Indian Ocean. When these geopolitical dimensions are combined with
55


the internal aspects of the countries in the region, the Horn becomes an area of
immense importance internationally (Schwab, 1978; Makinda, 1982).
Accordingly, during the 1970s and 1980s Somalia became a major hotspot of
conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. From 1969 to 1977
Mogadishu enrolled itself in the Soviet camp and from late 1970s Somalia
became a US ally. The first mission of each of the two superpowers was to
ensure that the other did not succeed in extending hegemony into Somalia, a
pivotal factor in the global buIunce oI ower where boLh Lhe US und Lhe SovIeL
define what takes place in the horn of Africa within the perimeters of what they
vIew us LheIr nuLIonuI InLeresLs. . TheIr noLIon oI securILy, whIch Lo Lhe WesL
imply an absence of communism and to the East liberation from capitalism, do
not seem to take into consideration the concrete local situation and the real
needs oI Lhe eoIes oI LhIs regIon (MukIndu, 1q8z).
To win this geopolitical struggle, both the US and the Soviet Union not only
poured a substantial amount of financial and military aid into Somalia, which
became another source of survival for Barre and faction leaders, but accepted
and sometimes encouraged nationally disastrous policies and actions, such as
the Ogaden War. This geopolitical set-u Is whuL reIer Lo us Lhe 'CoId Wur
InsLILuLIon`.
2.6. Conclusion
The main frame of the shadow state concept, seen in Chapter 1, is that post-
colonial African rulers recognised that they could not survive by encouraging
efficient formal institutions. Realising that strong formal institutions would give
a competitive advantage to their enterprising rivals, African leaders sought
other strategies for survival. A colonially constructed mechanism for control
was, perhaps, the most easily accessible strategy. To exercise their power these
Ieuders used economIc LooIs Lhrough uLronuge. As Reno (zoo) sLuLes, |u| key
element of this patronage-based strategy of rule lay in the fact that over time
high officials found it in their interests to undermine the formal institutions of
Lhe sLuLe ILseII. AIrIcun Ieuders LrunsIormed sLuLe InsLILuLIons und cuucILy Lo
attract assistance from foreign powers into patronage that they could distribute
to followers to advance their own power (Reno, 2000b).
56



Undermining the formal political institutions, African leaders employed
informal methods for their survival. As we have seen in the previous chapter a
combination of two main instruments were used by African leaders for their
survival. The first is coercion. Here the security institutions established to
safeguard the interests of the citizens from internal and external predators
where mobilised to suppress political opponents. Secondly, African leaders
emIoyed u neo-uLrImonIuIIsm, or ersonuI ruIe strategy. Bratton and van
de WuIIe (1qq;) muInLuIn LhuL Lhe dIsLIncLIve InsLILuLIonuI huIImurk oI AIrIcun
regimes is neo-uLrImonIuIIsm. The busIc roosILIon oI Lhe noLIon Is LhuL
informal relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade the formal state
institutions. In this system the state apparatus is dominated by one individual
who sLuys In ower Ior u Iong LIme, oILen u resIdenL Ior IIIe, und Lhe Ieuder und
his inner circle undermine the effectiveness of the nominally modern state
administration by using it for systematic patronage and clientelist practices in
order Lo muInLuIn oIILIcuI order (BruLLon und vun de WuIIe, 1qq;). A busIc
feature of the neo-patrimonialism system is that there is no separation between
the public and the private realm.
TogeLher Lhese Lwo InsLrumenLs couId Iorm whuL Is cuIIed Lhe dIvIde-and-ruIe
sLruLegy. DIvIde-and-rule is a method used by leaders to maintain power in
weakly-institutionalized polities while simultaneously pursuing policies costly to
socIeLy (AcemogIu et al., 2003). To remove an incompetent ruler from power,
people need to cooperate and overcome their collective action problems. African
leaders, to remain in power, bribe segments of the society and selectively punish
Citizens of the Somalia Republic The US/USSR Citizens

Judiciary


Legislative
Government of
Somalia
Figure 2.3. Post-Colonial Political Flow
System Support
Task
USA/ USSR
Government
57


potential opponents and related grous. ConsequenLIy, Lhe dIvIde-and-rule
strategy exploits the fragility of social cooperation: when faced with the threat of
being ousted, the kleptocratic ruler intensifies the collective action problem and
destroys the coalition against him by bribing the IvoLuI grous (AcemogIu eL
al., 2003). Clearly, social fragility is a precondition for this strategy to succeed.
In Somalia the politicised clan differences provided the opportunity for
ambitious political entrepreneurs and, therefore, Somali leaders as, their
counLerurLs In AIrIcu were uwure LhuL Lhere wus u reudy-mude cIIenLeIe .
wuILIng Lo be Ied (HorowILz, 1q8).
However, for leaders to carry out their divide-and-rule strategy an enormous
amount of resources were required: financial and military, for which the tax
revenues from the impoverished citizens is not sufficient. Alternatively, African
leaders exploited and heavily rented the natural resources of their countries and
in addition cultivated strategic alliances with the rivals of the Cold War, the
superpowers. To the leaders of the countries with limited resource endowment,
such as Somalia, foreign assistance was extremely important. The unpopular
leaders established these strategic relationships with the US or USSR to defend
their rule.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the post-colonial governance system in Somalia. Post-
colonial government in Somalia had two principals: the Somali citizens and the
governments of the superpowers. Unlike the colonial governance system,
Somalis were now citizens and were to support their agent. The government as
agent was expected to perform tasks in the interest of its principal. In addition,
in this period the colonial administration was also to be removed. However,
governments in Washington or Moscow behaved as principals for the Somali
government in this post-colonial era.
These InsLILuLIons ure bud becuuse Lhey weuken Lhe socIeLy`s burguInIng ower
and thus allow political leaders to operate unchecked. Leaders on the other
hand not only undermine formal political and economic institutions but also
pursue destructive actions and policies that make the state, the single most
important formal institution, collapse.
In the rest of this study I intend to spell out the actions of the actors that
contributed to the eventual collapse of the post-colonial state in Somalia.
However, these actors were responding to incentives generated by the informal
institutions, which were analysed in this chapter.
58


3 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CIVILIAN REGIME
3.1. Introduction
In 1960, after almost a century of colonial rule, the Somali Republic was formed
by a merger of Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland, two out of the five
Somali populated colonies. However, the other three parts, Ogaden, French-
Somali Land, and Northern Frontier District NFD, remained under alien rule.
Since then, socio-political unification and socio-economic development have
become the central issues to be addressed by every Somali state.
In terms of the unification immediately after independence there were two
challenging tasks that lay ahead. Firstly, internally, the main task that
confronted Somali state leaders was to heal the social cleavages created by
colonial administration, whether it was clan animosity or inherited institutional
differences of the parts of the new republic. Beyond that they had to establish a
form of national unity which could accommodate or properly replace the
decentralised tradition of Somali clans. Secondly, externally, the main goal was
to re-incorporate the Somali-inhabited areas, so to complete the noble mission
oI Lhe SomuII nuLIonuIIsL movemenL, Lhe noLIon oI u 'GreuLer SomuIIu`. However,
the new Somali state should have more than anything else involved itself in
socio-economic uplifting, a task of great urgency and magnitude. This was
partially because the Somali economy had met extreme negligence during the
colonial era and partially because the nature of the unification task required
enormous amounts of resources. The basic indicator of the success or failure of
the post-colonial Somali state is how the government addressed these key
issues.
After the formal unification of the South and the North, the Somali Youth
League (SYL), a dominant political party in the South, agreed to act jointly with
the Somali National League (SNL) and the United Somali Party (USP), both
from the North, to facilitate a complete unification of the two territories. In July
1960, an elected National Assembly of 123 deputies representing the two
territories appointed Aden Abdulle Usman, a senior and very popular figure of
the SYL, president and he in turn appointed Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, another
senior member of the SYL, prime minister. The latter formed a coalition
government of the SYL, the SNL and the USP.
26
Abdirizak H. Hussein formed a
new government in 1964 after replacing Shermarke as prime minister. In 1967,
former premier, Shermarke, was elected new president of the republic and he in
turn appointed Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as prime minister. This chapter
summurIses Lhese successIve cIvIIIun governmenLs` uchievements towards
fulfilling the abovementioned national goals.

26
see Castagno (1964) for an excellent study of early Somali political parties and elite behaviour.
59


3.2. Socioeconomic Development
Since its independence Somalia has been one of the poorest countries in the
world with its economy consisting of three distinct sectors: firstly, agriculture,
in which the main components are herding livestock
27
and plantations
28
, had
the largest share in GDP and export earnings, and it also provided the livelihood
for the majority of the population; secondly, an urban private sector run by a
small commercial class; and thirdly the service sector where actors in this group
are mainly the public officials such as soldiers, employee of ministries,
parliamentarians, and other public services (Laitin and S. Samatar, 1984).
During the years between 1960 and 1963, Somali leaders took advantage of the
geopolitical value of their country. By placing their self in the neutralist camp,
by expressing a determination not to join any of the two Cold War camps, and
by pretending to be interested in both, they accrued an immense amount of
foreign aid. Table 4.1 shows the financial grants and loans Somalia received
Irom IoreIgn sources unLII 1q6. n uddILIon, Shurmurke`s governmenL Look
some other measures in order to attract foreign private investment and create
incentives for the local private sector. Several projects were also implemented in
this term. However, the Somali state gave socio-economic development little
attention. Furthermore, even these minimal attempts were un-planned, un-
integrated, and dependent on foreign ownership and resources (Ahmed
Samatar, 1988).
Table 3.1, Foreign Aid to Somalia, 1960-3
Source
Financial
Grants
(So.Sh. 000)
Financial
Loans
(So.Sh. 000) Total
Italy 171 150.5 321.5
U.S.S.R. 4.3 316.4 320.7
U.S.A. 109.4 12 121.4
U.N. 85.5 - 85.5
UAR 13.2 68.4 81.6
UK 65 - 65
W. Germany 2.9 37.6 40.5
Czechoslovakia - 25.7 25.7
E.E.C. 18 - 18
Others 7.5 - 7.5
Total 476.8 610.6 1087.4
Source: Lewis (1967).

27
In 1963, with a population of less than 2 million, there were as following (estimated): 24
million sheep, 16 million camels, 6 million goats, and 3 million cattle.
28
Approximately 8.3 million hectares, 13 percent of the total land area, is potentially suitable
for cultivation.
60


Somali national budget is normally divided into an ordinary budget and a
development budget. In these years the sources of revenues for the ordinary
budget were mainly customs taxes from international trade, direct taxes, sales of
1goods and services, but almost one-third of the revenues came from external
aid, former colonial masters, with Italy and Britain being the main donors.
SeveruI IucLors were urgued Lo be Lhe cuuses oI Lhe Shermurke governmenL`s
underperformance regarding economic development. Firstly, there were serious
dIIIerences beLween Lhe PresIdenL und PremIer concernIng Lhe nuLIon`s
development priorities. The prime minister and his government were mainly
commILLed Lo devoLIng u greuL deuI oI Lhe nuLIon`s energIes Lo Lhe unIIIcuLIon
project. On the other hand, the President believed that the best way to pursue
the Greater Somalia issue was by first consolidating firm foundations for the
new reubIIc. The rIme mInIsLer`s ugendu, numeIy Lo uggressIveIy ursue Lhe
Greater Somalia project, prevailed. Consequently, this took much attention
away from the demands of economic development and resources
29
. Secondly,
most of the remaining national resources were devoted to the integration of the
parts of the new republic. Thirdly, as noted above, there was no clear strategy
and plan for uplifting the national economy (Abdi Samatar, 1997; ACR,
1969/70).
In 1963 the first Five-Year Development Plan (1963-68) was developed
30
. The
funds for this development plan were mainly derived from foreign sources.
TubIe .z summurIses Lhe sources und SomuIIu`s deveIomenL budgeLs Irom
1963-1969. Less than 15 percent of the contribution came from Somali sources.
The plan, with a projected expenditure of US$266.5 million, was intended to
build a viable infrastructure for the economy, especially the export oriented
industries i.e. banana and livestock. The former was dominated by Italians and
the latter was in the hands of Somali nomads. A basic assumption was that if the
basic physical infrastructure - such as ports, transportation facilities and roads
- was improved, the plantation crops and livestock exports would increase
(Laitin, 1993). However, several industrial developments - i.e. expanding the
output capacity of the Jowhar sugar factory, establishing textile, milk and dairy
as well as fish processing factories - and certain improvements in social services
and formation of a number of state owned farms where part of the plan
31

(Mehmet, 1971).
n 1q66, HusseIn`s governmenL conducLed u mId-term appraisal and found that
the Plan was seriously behind schedule. Table 4.5 illustrates the size of the
problem. During the first three years, of the five year plan, only a quarter of the
LoLuI rojecL`s work wus ImIemenLed. The governmenL bIumed severuI IucLors
on the underperformance: lack of skilled man power and qualified personal in

29
In 1962 Britain terminated its aid after Somalia reversed the diplomatic ties with Britain due
Lo Lhe IuLLer`s decIsIon on Lhe ND.
30
This aid amounted to $15 per head while the average annual aid to developing countries was
only $4.5 (Mehmet, 1971).
31
See Table 4A.1 for details on the sector distribution of the plan.
61


the development projects; government departments hampered efficiency; the
Somali government failed to raise the required local contributions; and
insufficient working capital allocations obstructed the performance of the
completed public enterprises (Mehmet, 1971). Furthermore, other various,
mainly exogenous, factors were also indicated to be part of the problem:
successive years of drought; increased military expenditure due to border
hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964; internal political crises in
Italy disturbed its contribution Lo SomuIIu`s ordInury budgeL oI 1q6-4; and the
closure of the Suez Cannel in 1967 hampered the counLry`s exorL (MehmeL,
1971).
Table 3.2, Source of Development Finance, 1963-9
Source So.Sh. 000 %
Somali 283,531 14.9
Foreign 1,619,528 85.1
U.S.S.R. 388,928 20.4
U.S.A. 326,489 17.2
E.E.C. 245,108 12.9
World Bank 219,427 11.5
U.N. 143,567 7.5
F.R. Germany 122,951 6.5
Italy 71,339 3.7
China 39,220 2.1
Saudi Arabia 14,561 0.8
Others 47,938 2.5
Total 1,903,059 100
Source: Mehmed (1971).
Thus, in March 1966 the Government abandoned the Five-Year Plan and
instead developed an Emergency Plan, in which it concentrated on a few, but
more realistic, objectives:
To secure self-sufficiency in food by increasing production.
To improve the export oriented industries.
To close the deficit in the ordinary budget.
In addition, three new organisations were established: The Ministry of
Planning; the Agricultural Development Agency; and the Livestock
Development Agency and Fund. They were assigned to assist in the attainment
of the aims of the Emergency Plan (Lewis, 1967).
In 1967, a two year Short-Time Development Programme (1968-70) was
Iuunched by EguI`s governmenL, whIch dIIIered very IILLIe Irom Lhe IrsL Ive-
Year Plan in terms of sector priorities and sources of funding. Some USD100
million was expected to be spent this time; with 70 percent of the amount being
devoted to infrastructural improvement. The Somali contribution of the plan
was only 12.5 percent. Basically, the Government intended to consolidate the
attainments of the First Plan and the creation of basic conditions necessary for
the formulation and implementation of future more ambitious development
62


programmes. However, the Short-Time Development Programme, mainly due
to similar reasons, was no better then the First Five-Year Development Plan in
terms of its achievements (Mehmet, 1971; ACR, 1968/9).
3.3. Integration
Due to the dual colonial heritage, the two parts of the new republic were, from
an institutional perspective, almost two separate countries: firstly, government
officials from the North and the South were receiving unequal payment and
were operating under different conditions of services; secondly, from the legal
aspect, each part of the republic had a separate legal tradition inherited from its
colonial authorities; thirdly, different procedures of accounting and fiscal
systems - tariff systems, custom dues, patterns of trade etc - separated the
South from the North; and fourthly, the affairs of the two parts were conducted
in two different languages, Italian in the South and English in the North.
Physical communication between the two regions, especially the two main cities,
was too poor and economic contacts between the two were virtually nonexistent.
However, one most important issue, which does not directly relate to the
unification of the South and the North, was a politicised clan system that
emerged under the colonial governance system. This was inherited by the
postcolonial political system of the republic.
Shurmurke`s governmenL deuIL wILh Lhe InsLILuLIonuI unIIIcuLIon usecL oI Lhe
two territories with the help of some international bodies, such as the
Consultative Commission for Integration, a board created by the UN. Within the
first four years most of the institutional integration objectives were
accomplished. A single legal system was approved, similar provincial and
district administrative services were operational, the fiscal and accounting
systems were unified, and the police and the national army were integrated.
3.4. Unification
RIghL Irom ILs InceLIon Shurmurke`s governmenL Iuced u vocuI movemenL LhuL
Iuvoured Lhe creuLIon oI u GreuLer SomuIIu wILh Lhe gouI oI unILIng Lhe SomuII-
populated areas of Ogaden, French Somaliland, and the NFD with the new
reubIIc. AImosL every SomuII wunLed Lhese MIssIng TerrILorIes Lo become
part of the Somali state. However Britain, if not invented, initially encouraged
the Greater Somalia project. After World War Two, the British Government
proposed a trust territory comprising British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland
and Ogaden. Later on the liberating and unifying of Somali territories became a
noble mission for the Somali nationalists. Political leaders, on the other hand,
understood that the mission dominated the popular opinion of the Somalis.
DuvId uILIn (1q;6), In unuIysIng Lhe sILuuLIon, suId unIIke uII Lhe oLher new
sLuLes oI AIrIcu, SomuIIu wus u 'nuLIon` beIore IL becume u sLuLe. Some Iour
million people inhabit the Horn of Africa, and they share a common language, a
common reIIgIon, u common cuILure, und noLubIy . u common undersLundIng
of themselves as a long-standing political community. In the early 1960s,
63


LhereIore, when mosL AIrIcun sLuLes were uLLemLIng u sLruLegy oI 'nuLIon-
building` - the creation of a new identity consistent with their former colonial
boundaries - SomuIIu couId enguge In 'sLuLe-buIIdIng`, or Lhe enhuncemenL oI
oIILIcuI conLroI uL Lhe new cenLre.
Consequently, as one commentator noted, the countries preocupation with the
GreuLer SomuIIu shued IL`s newIy Iormed InsLILuLIons (S. SumuLur, 1qq). The
star on the Somali flag stands for freedom and each Somali territory, the three
Missing Territories and the two parts of the Somali Republic, is represented by
one of the five-points of the star. The 1961 constitution of the Somali Republic
sLuLes LhuL Lhe reubIIc romoLes by IeguI und euceIuI meuns, Lhe unIon oI Lhe
SomuII LerrILorIes (S. Samatar, 1993).
As a result, durIng Shurmurke`s Lenure, creuLIng GreuLer SomuIIa became the
domInunL Lheme oI SomuIIu`s InLernuLIonuI reIuLIons. n Lhe words oI Lhe
PremIer SomuIIu`s mIsIorLunes do noL sLem Irom Lhe unroducLIveness oI our
soII, or Irom Iuck oI mIneruI weuILh. . No! Our mIsIorLune Is LhuL our
neighbouring countries, with whom like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote
constructive and harmonious relations, are not our neighbours. Our neighbours
are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate
boundury 'urrungemenLs`. They huve Lo move ucross artificial frontiers to their
pasturelands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral
economy as ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the same creed,
the same culture and the same traditions. How can we regard our brothers as
IoreIgners? ... We shuII romoLe 'by IeguI und euceIuI meuns unIon oI SomuII
LerrILorIes (SomuIIu, 1q6z).
However, the prospect of unifying any of the missing territories with the
republic was not encouraging. In 1958, French Somaliland had voted, in a
referendum, to remain an oversees territory of France and in July the next year,
during his visit to the Djibouti, Charles de Gaulle emphasised the extreme
importance of this tiny port to his country and announced that he will not
renounce its possession (Lewis, 2002).
Given the fact that Kenya was still under the British administration and with a
growing tension for independence, the NFD initially appeared to be a soft target
for the Greater Somalia mission. Thus, while not ignoring the other two cases,
Oguden und DjIbouLI, Shermurke`s governmenL uL mosL oI ILs eIIorLs on Lhe
NFD issue. Furthermore, in 1961 the Somali parliament, responding to requests
from political and tribal leaders in the NFD, passed a motion welcoming the
union of the NFD with the Republic and urged the government to press this
using every possible means. In 1962, to ascertain popular opinion in the NFD,
Britain sent an independent commission which found that the great majority of
the people were supporting a separation from Kenya when the independence of
Kenya, in the next year, was to take place. However, despite that finding and the
fact that the Mogadishu government used every possible means to support the
separation, in 1963 the British government announced that the NFD was to
remain part of Kenya as the North-Eastern Region of that country (Lewis,
2002).
64


The Ogaden case not only dominated the other two cases of missed territories,
but became a focal point that determined the future of the new Republic. The
Ogaden
32
, commonly known as Western Somalia by the Somalis, like many
other areas of the Somali populated lands came under the control of the
European colonialism in the late nineteenth century through various
agreements between the Somali leaders and colonial authorities. On the other
hand, Ethiopia did not only escape from the yoke of colonialism and remain an
independent empire while the other African nations were under colonial
control
33
, but joined the European colonials in the scramble of Africa. This was
the period when Ethiopia gained control over Somalis in Ogaden
34
. Later on,
due to extensive efforts by successive Ethiopian emperors, the Ogaden was
formally placed under Ethiopian control through Anglo-Ethiopian and Italo-
Ethiopian treaties regarding boundary demarcations. Since then Ethiopia
argued the validity of these agreements and that Ogaden is part of Ethiopia.
Ethiopia also realistically feared that if Somalis in the Ogaden are to be granted
seII deLermInuLIon, LhIs wIII Ieud Lo u sImIIur demund Irom mosL oI ELhIoIu`s
major ethnic groups, which may see the beginning of the complete
disintegration of the Ethiopian state itself. Somalis, on the other hand, rejected
the validity of these boundary agreements and considered them artificial
colonial arrangements.
To defend its position, Ethiopia constructed a political fence for what it termed
as its territorial integrity. Ethiopia took over a leading position in both the
creation and direction of the Organization of African Union (OAU) established
in 1963. The Union supported the permanence of the colonial boundaries, which
it saw as necessary for the territorial integrity of the member states. The reason
was that most African leaders, like Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, knew the
territorial disputes that re-opening the fragile colonial border issue would create
in their own countries. For that, in 1964, the member states of the OAU pledged
Lo resecL Lhe borders exIsLIng on LheIr uchIevemenL oI Indeendence
(Makinda, 1982).
SomuIIu`s reIusuI oI LhIs rIncIIe uL her in an isolated position in Africa. At the
international level, the United Nations considered Ethiopia a sovereign African
country, not a colonial power, and thus as a member state its sovereignty must
be preserved. Consequently, although both the OAU charter and constitution of
Lhe SomuII ReubIIc ermIL onIy u euceIuI seLLIemenL oI dIsuLes by
negoLIuLIon, medIuLIon, concIIIuLIon or urbILruLIon (ArLIcIe oI Lhe OAU
Charter), it was clear that diplomatic processes would bear little, if any, fruits.
The other option for the Somalis was to use military means.
However, US trained and equipped Ethiopian Armed Forces had little to worry
ubouL Irom SomuIIu`s III-equipped army of only 5000 men. Understandably,
Somali leaders were keen to establish a professional army. This created a great

32
In fact there are two areas in the region - Ogaden and Haud - which are, in most of the cases,
generalised as Ogaden.
33
Liberia is the other country that was spared the legacy of colonialism.
34
And also Oromos and Afars in the Horn of Africa.
65


opportunity for the Cold War rivals in the Horn of Africa, particularly the Soviet
Union. From then on, the military aspect of the Ogaden issue, as we will see,
became a magic card used by the superpowers in pursuit of their strategic
interests. Both superpowers supported or encouraged Somalia to take military
confrontation with Ethiopia whenever they see it promoting their interest and
vice versa.
3.5. Causes of the Failure
3.5.1. Leadership
In general, the primary motive of a political leader is to keep themselves in
power and consequently in doing so has to answer to those that keep them in
power. For the Somali civilian leaders to win the conflict over influential
positions, the state and leadership survival gradually became the most
important tasks for the majority of the Somali elite. There were, however, some
notable exceptions (Abdi Samatar and Ahmed Samatar, 2002; Ahmed Samatar,
1994).
The main reason for this development was that the inherited economy was
extremely poor and thus access to the state power became a main determinant
of economic success. Losing this competition was seen as losing an economic
opportunity as well as losing political power. In 1956, under the Italian
trusteeship, Somalis in the south were given an opportunity to form the first
Somali government. Abdullahi Issa was appointed as the first Somali prime
mInIsLer. He InsIsLed LhuL, uILhough hIs urLy`s dedIcuLIon Lo eIImInuLIng
clanism is valid, the situation forces him to consider the ethnic balance in the
new government. Although the Prime Minister sought the satisfaction of every
group, another factor, knowledge of the Italian language, forced him to narrow
his choice (Castagno, 1964; Abdi Samatar and Ahmed Samatar, 2002).
However, no one complained about ethnic imbalance in the government and
even most of those approached by the Prime Minister to give them a ministerial
portfolio declined the offer, indicating that they did not have the necessary
education and experience to effectively manage the institutions (Abdi Samatar
and Ahmed Samatar, 2002).
Unfortunately, within a short period of time it was apparent that, due to its
material and pecuniary benefits, such ministerial positions were highly prized.
For instance, each senior government official had access to credit to build his
own luxury villa and ministers were each given a car with its own chauffeur and
other staff including housekeepers. In addition, SYL supporters, realising the
improved condition of the ministers and having witnessed the habit of the
Italian authorities, especially in the first years of the trusteeship, which used the
government positions to reward their own supporters, assumed that the current
udmInIsLruLIon wIII do Lhe sume Ior IL`s suorLers. MogudIshu und urLIcuIurIy
the residences and offices of the elected officials were crowded by their
66


supporters from the other regions to secure government employment or
monetary reward (Abdi Samatar and Ahmed Samatar, 2002).
Furthermore, influenced of course by the opportunity the ministerial portfolios
provide their occupants, the SYL leaders considerably changed their attitude
towards holding these positions. When Abdullahi Issa was reappointed as the
Prime Minister in 1959 by the Italian Governor, unlike in 1956, most SYL
political leaders visILed Lhe PrIme MInIsLer`s home Lo muke sure LheIr numes
were included on the list of the ministers of the new government.
On the other hand, Post-Colonial Somali leaders, like their peers in Africa, were
aware that they could not survive by encouraging efficient formal institutions.
Realising that building strong formal institutions does not serve their interest,
Somali leaders formulated other strategies for survival. These short sighted
strategies undermined the formal state institutions and leadership institution
itself and put the country in a political trap. As Abdi Samatar noted, there was
only one short period that the Somali government encouraged formal
institutions. As Table 3.3 shows, all post-colonial Somali governments, except
for Premier Hussein`s one, never InLended Lo buIId sLuLe InsLILuLIons.
Table 3.3. Elite Structure, Legitimacy and State Building in Somalia 1960-90
Regime Elite unity Conscious
leaders
Legitimacy Clarity of
strategy
Institution
building
1960-64 high Low High no no
1964-67 low high/low High yes/no yes
1967-69 low Low high/low no no
1969-77 high Low High yes/no no
1977-90 low Low Low no No
Source: Abdi Samatar (1997)

Unfortunately then, Somali leaders discouraged formal state institutions. Let us
next consider the democratic institutions of control. In Somalia, separation of
powers was not considered a method of limiting the amount of power in one
grou`s hunds In order Lo muke IL more dIIIIcuIL Lo ubuse. The IormuLIon oI Lhe
different state institutions - executive, legislative and judiciary - was perceived
as a distribution mechanism, a method with which a leader could use to
parameterise the share of the national cake he deserves in relation to the size of
his clan, his personal ability to mobilise enough resources to that end, and his
level of understanding and playing within the rules of the game.
ConsequenLIy, Lhe democratic parliamentary process which has seemed to
blend so well with the traditional Somali political institutions and had begun
with such verve and promise, had turned distinctly sour. The National Assembly
was no longer the symbol of free speech and fair play for all citizens. It was now
widely regarded cynically as a sordid market place where, with little concern for
the interest of those who had voted for them, deputes traded their votes for
ersonuI guIn (ewIs, zooz).
67


Conciliation between conflicting interests of the society, especially a divided
one, is necessary if the national government is to operate efficiently. By
developing enough common ideas among enough people and by articulating
diverse interests into a single platform, political parties facilitate this
conciliation process. In Somalia, with few exceptions, political parties were not a
collection of enough people with similar political ideologies and ideas. Most of
them were created and existed to promote and defend the private interests of
the political leaders, in the government and state institutions. Many of these
parties where founded by former members of another party after the member in
question failed to secure an appropriate position in that party or the party
refused to let him hold, or run as a candidate, for a an influential position. A
considerable number of the Somali parties existed for a short period before and
after an election time. Founders of these parties, on many occasions, left their
party and joined the ruling party to secure government portfolio as Somali
Ieuders hud Ieurned Lhe IeusL bIoody wuy Lo beheud oIILIcuI oosILIon Is Lo
bestow politicuI Iums (CusLugno, 1q6q).
Political parties play an important role in controlling the government. The
ruling party in the government transforms its principals and social prefernces
InLo rucLIce. And Lhe ubIIc, when judgIng Lhe governmenL`s erIormunce, can
Iook uL Lhe udmInsLruLIon`s ucheIvenLs In Lhe IIghL oI Lhe busIc rIncIuIs oI Lhe
urLy und eoIe`s reIernces. The oosILIon In Lhe urIIumenL ooses und
informs the public on government policies and underperformances, whilst at the
same time promoting and defending the interests of the signifcant number of
the society, or its members at least.
As Castagno (1964) noted, even though it was apparent that the Somali Youth
League, the ruling party, could not achieve significant goals in the field of socio-
economic development, the opposition parties, did not, by and large, criticise
Lhe governmenL`s oIIcIes or InIormed Lhe ubIIc on whuL Lhey regurd us Lhe
objective needs of modern government. Their main task was, however, to secure
compensation for the leaders of the opposition.
In order to win and survive, political leaders formed competing, unstable and
often changing coalitions. The group that attracted a significant number of
political leaders won and became the winning coalition. However, the top
leaders in this group required resources to maintain the group unity and each
member of the group was expected to bring a significant number of voters.
Tribal mobilisation and playing the clan card commonly became the ideal game
rule for their competition. Firstly, it was common that a Somali leader, in order
to get a government position, informs his superior about the importance of his
clan in society (Abdi Samatar and Ahmed Samatar, 2002). Here the goal was to
remind the boss that the survival of the latter will seriously be questioned unless
Lhe Iormer Is u member oI Lhe boss`s couIILIon.
Secondly, the Somali leader, in order to qualify himself for the winning
coalition, has to make sure that his clan is behind him. Using the resources at
68


his disposal, the leader should secure the loyalty of the influential, traditional
leaders of his clan.
Thirdly, Somali leaders, to keep the members of their clan in their camp,
exacerbated the clan conflicts. In his Dugsi maleh Qabyaaladi poem Mohamed
H. D. Gaariye (1979) said:
Qabiilkii dorraad yiil Isticmaarki baa dumay
Shalay daba-ka-naax iyo Dibitaati baa waday;
Maantana dillaal iyo Dibbir baa ku xoogsada
Waa dabin qarsoodi ah Ummadday ku dagayaan
Boobkay ku dedayaan.
.
Isku soo dabbaaloo Waa dabaqad maal jecel;
Waxa loo dig leeyey Dhididkayga dahabka ah
Sidii loo dudubin laa.
(Tribalism of the day before yesterday - colonial period - was formulated by the
colonial powers.And that of yesterday - during the civilian regime - was exploited by
the parliamentarians. While that of today - during the military regime - is the source
of income for political entrepreneurs.It is a hidden trap to deceive the public and to
cover u LheIr IooLIngs. n shorL, Lhese enLrereneurs ure u weuILh seekIng cIuss LryIng
to misappropriate my production).
Finally, ethnic cleavages within the society became an important weapon for the
Somali leaders. To destroy the credibility of a political opponent they often
stressed the dark side of clan differences, by magnifying past conflicts between
LheIr cIun und LhuL oI LheIr oonenL. L wus u common rucLIce LhuL us soon us
a leader gains national stature and prominence, his clan affiliation is exploited
by his competitors, within and outside his political party, in order to reduce his
ueuI und consequenLIy, gIven Lhe oIILIcIsIng oI Lhe cIun IucLor durIng Lhe
coIonIuIIsm whuLever nuLIonuI conIIdence he muy huve guIned muy be
LrunsIormed InLo wIdesreud mIsLrusL bused on eLhnIc rovIncIuIIsm
(Castagno, 1964).
3.5.2. Society
Somali electorates were aware that their government could not achieve the
major goals of the Republic, they were also aware that politicians were abusing
Lhe oIILIcuI InsLILuLIons. SLudyIng eoIe`s erceLIons und uLLILudes Lowurds
the state makes that clear. Xaaji Aadan Af-qallooc, in describing the attitudes of
the Somali post-colonial leaders towards i.e. the state positions they occupy -
were each is as a lion at his kill - and his relation with the citizen, said;
69


Tallaabada mid gaalkii shabbaha, tegay ma-liibaane,
Adigoo wuxuun tabanayoo, tegay halkuu joogay,
Markuu sida libaax raqi u taal, qoorta kor u taago,
Uu `tcc' luquntiisc sudhcn, tccbto jcrcqiisc,
Oo inaad addoonkiisa tahay, taa na la ahaatay,
Iya na waa tabaalaha adduun, taynu aragnaa.

(One who even walking imitates the departed infidel,
May he never be blessed,
While in need of assistance, you go where he was,
And then as if he were a lion at his kill,
He raises up his neck in haughtiness,
Touches the tip of the tie around his neck,
And behaves as if you were his slave.
These are the misfortunes of the times that we are witnessing.)(APD 2002)
Similarly, Lhe greuL AbduIuhI SuIdun TImu`ude dIsuoInLed wILh Lhe behuvIour oI Lhe
political leaders during the civilian regime said, in his Dawarsadaha Qaawani (the
Naked Beggar):
dawarsadaha qaawani kuwuu daasadda u madhiyay
ee daaskeenii wixii yaalay lagu doortay
dikhsi lama xisaabsanid haddaad dow ku kulantaane

(Those that the naked beggar emptied his own pockets
And for their election we paid all we had
You are worth less than a fly if you meet them in the street)

n greuLer deLuII Aden Arub AbdI`s oem, The MInIsLer suorLs Lhe cuse. He
emphasised that elected politicians never served the interests of their
electorates and blamed them for devoting efforts to their own satisfaction. He
70


also indicated that ordinary citizens were excluded from the benefit of the
statehood and estimated that only one thousand men - political leaders -
enjoyed Lhe IruILs oI Lhe Indeendence. n concIudIng he usks hImseII, Were the
men seIecLed Lo romoLe LheIr own ends uIone?
Ingiriis dalkiisii mudhxay oo, cunay magoolkiisa
Isagoo masaafira haddaan, subax ka miidaanshey
Oo lagu mintiday waw dhamayn, minawarkaan fuullay
Maskab kama dhaxline wiilal baa, helay macaankiiye
Kun nin baa martabadii u hadhay, ama muluugtiiye
Inta kale mus ood laga rogtey, meerayaan dibade
...
Isagaa maqsuuda ee wax kale, looma maamuline
Bal muxuu micneeyoo na taray, ministarkaan doortay?
Af uun malaba shicibkii haddii, lagu mashaysiiyey
Oo aan muraadba u qumayn, mooye say noqone
Waa nala madaarshaynayaa, tan iyo maantiiye
Mahdigii naloo sheegay iyo, malihi beenowye
...
Mukhlis iyo haddaan lagu shaqeyn orod maleegnaana
Ma xiniin yahay moodayaan muunad nala saaray
Ma naftiina maara u qabtaa nimanka loo miiray
Political leaders misused the political power partially because Somali
electorates, due to ethnic cleavages, failed to reward good behaviour and punish
bad behaviour. As Castagno (1964) noted, political leaders who selflessly tried to
promote the national interests did not get public support for that. Thus, the
conceL oI ubIIc servIce Lo Lhe nuLIon musL necessurIIy be resLrIcLed when
nuLIonuI recognILIon oI LhuL servIce Is rureIy, II ever, IorLhcomIng.
After the general elections of the National Assembly held in March 1964,
President Osman appointed Abdirizak H. Hussein, outgoing interior minister, to
form the new government. The President believed that new leadership, with
Iresh Ideus, wouId soIve Lhe counLry`s oIILIcuI robIems und Lhe rIme mInister-
71


desIgnee, IIke Lhe PresIdenL, wunLed Lo gIve greuLer uLLenLIon Lo Lhe nuLIon`s
socio-economic problems (S. Samatar, 1993). In addition, both the elections and
Premier-designee seemed to be one step in the right direction of Somali political
development. The elections, both the process and the way parties participated,
were secIuI In AIrIcu, und sIgnuIIed SomuIIu`s commILmenL Lo Lhe rIncIIes oI
urIIumenLury democrucy. The new PremIer on Lhe oLher hund wus u oIILIcIun
of considerable charisma und couruge. DesILe Lhese osILIve uLLrIbuLes, SomuII
oIILIcIuns, muInIy Lhe SY runks, severeIy hurussed HusseIn`s governmenL uL
every possible opportunity (Lewis, 2002).
Most importantly, politicians joined forces to obstruct the new government
from being constituted. As a constitutional rule, the new government must be
supported by the majority of the deputies in the National Assembly. It took
uImosL sIx monLhs Ior HusseIn`s governmenL Lo be ucceLed. The IormuI conIIIcL
was between the President on the one hand and senior politicians from his party
and others from the other main parties on the other. The President stressed the
quuIILy; IIrmness, IuIrness, devoLIon Lo work und churIsmu oI HusseIn`s
government, while opponents stated that their rejection was based, firstly, on
Lhe GovernmenL`s reducLIon oI Lhe mIIILury shure In Lhe budgeL, whIch wus
InLerreLed us Lhe GovernmenL`s shIIL Irom Lhe greuLer SomuIIu ssue. SecondIy,
the Premier was branded as pro-Western (Ahmed Samatar, 1988).
However, the reality on the ground tells another story. Firstly, Somali
oIILIcIuns, sInce Lhe 1qos, huve enjoyed Lhe beneIILs oI Lhe cIun buIunce
docLrIne. ThIs docLrIne romoLes Lhe IdenLILy or Lhe cIun uIIIIIuLIon us Lhe mosL
important qualification of the candidaLe. OonenLs oI HusseIn`s, mosL
prominent members of the previous administrations, knew his position on this
doctrine. He openly rejected the clan balance practice ever since it was
introduced into Somali politics. In 1959, he openly complained before the UN
Trusteeship Council that clan balance formalises clanism in politics and argued
LhuL ILs rucLIces ure IncomuLIbIe wILh Lhe oIILIcuI evoIuLIon oI SomuIIu und
IuLuI Lo ILs unILy (CusLugno, 1q6q). SecondIy, Mr. HusseIn InsLeud InLroduced
Lhe kurLI Iyo HuInuun - competence and integrity - motto in the selection of
his government. Thus the list of ministerial candidates he proposed included
less senior young technocrats and, unlike previous administrations, was
proportionately dominated by the Northerners (Ahmed Samatar, 1988).
ThIrdIy, uccordIng Lo some InLeIIecLuuIs, HusseIn wus Lhe mosL rogressIve und
the least tribal-mInded member In Shermurke`s governmenL, und revIousIy he
was mentioned as someone who can reinvigorate Somali politics (Castagno,
1964). His position towards corruption and mismanagement was clear to all.
For instance, each of his cabinet members was asked to publicly declare his
property and business interests (Ahmed Samatar, 1988). That was, as we have
seen, in contradiction with the behaviour and political interests of the majority
of the Somali political elites, the ruling group and the opposition alike. Finally,
the group that opposed Hussein, as mentioned previously, complained on
grounds of the Greater Somalia issue and his leaning towards the West.
However, the group that spearheaded this coalition were the same group that
broughL down HusseIn`s governmenL by deIeuLIng Osmun In Lhe resIdenLIuI
72


election three years later. Their position about the two issues became very clear
in the tenure of their administration (see below).
However, although the reason they were blocking the corrective policies
primarily involved personal political and economic ambitions, they not only
succeeded to bring the Osman and Hussein government down, but they
successfully inherited the office. However, for the Somali public there was no
preferential difference between the two groups. The identity of the politician
matters the most.
Every formal political institution was abused by the politicians and electorates
IuIIed Lo uLIIIse oIILIcuI InsLrumenLs Lo correcL Lhe governmenL`s mIsbehuvIour.
One oI Lhe mosL reIevunL oIILIcuI InsLrumenLs, us Iur us Lhe cILIzen`s
empowerment is concerned, is the election. This is because votes are essentially
in the hands of individual voters and any kind of abuse of it may need some kind
of preference and voluntary action by the owner of the vote, the individual. All
other institutions of leadership control depend on the quality and the rules of
the election.
The main logic of institutionalising and organising an election is that politicians
wIII be resonsIve Lo LheIr eIecLoruLe`s demunds, und Lhe muIn reuson Ior LhuL Is
that the politicians could be held accountable at election time as voters control
the resources they need to win the election. However, as James Fearon noted,
Lhere ure sILuuLIons where voLers mIghL undersLund eIecLIons us meuns oI
seIecLIng or conIerrIng honor on . |u| mosL dIsLInguIshed erson .wILh
conferring or recognizing honor without any instrumenLuI urose.here Lhe
voters have no expectation whatsoever that the elected officials have a
resonsIbIIILy Lo ucL on behuII oI Lhe eIecLoruLe und In LhIs cuse Lhe eIecLIon wus
undersLood sImIy us decIuruLIon oI who In Lhe grou mosL deserves Lhe honor
oI oIILIcuI uuLhorILy (euron, 1qqq).
Somali voters are perhaps the best example of those who do not understand the
essential instrumental aspect of their votes. The clan identity of the candidate or
his tribe is the key denominator for whom to vote. In other words, the campaign
bid, merit and performance had no meaning for the Somali voter. Thus election
was not a tool of accountability, but a process of conferring an honour on a
member oI one`s cIun. AILer AbdIrIzuk H. HusseIn wus uoInLed rIme mInIster
in 1964 to succeed Abdirashid A. Shermarke, both where from same sub-clan
family, a Somali voter played the famous shirib:
Mugna Rashiid mugna Risaaq
Inta kale ma raashinaa ( rootiyaa)?
One Lerm Ior RushIId (AbdIrushId A. Shermurke) und Lhe oLher Ior Rizaaq (Abdirizak
H. Hussein). Are all others a ration (or bread -worLhIess)?
Despite the proven personal quality and performance of Hussein as a political
leader during his previous portfolios (see Samatar and Samatar, 2002) as the
73


shirib shows, based on his identity many Somalis demonstrated their rejection
of his premiership.
Indeed, in Somalia, to vote for a clan member is a moral obligation supported by
the fear that if a member of another clan succeeds, the latter will mistreat the
fellow clansmen of the former. This fear is, as noted above, an outcome of
political programmes undertaken by the political leader of the respective clan.
Thus, for a Somali, voting is not a strategic action for maximising his own
welfare. This is why the National Assembly becume u sordId murkeL Iuce und
LhIs Is why SomuIIs voLed Ior Lhose who hud IILLIe InLeresL. |Ior|. Lhose who
voLed Ior Lhem . |und| Lruded LheIr voLes Ior ersonuI guIn (ewIs, zooz).
3.5.3. Superpowers
Prior to 1967, although there were allegations that some opposition parties, the
pro-Italians parties for instance, were getting political funds from foreign
countries, the political struggle was mainly between Somali groups and
coalitions. However, from 1967, the superpowers played a crucial role in
determining the winning coalition among Somali groups. Here the intentions of
the superpowers were not to give mere support, but they wanted mainly to
achieve geopolitical objectives, and for that were influencing public policies.
Thus, using the terminology of the theory chapter, the Somali state had two
principals: the Somali electorate and the superpowers.
The United States of America established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in
1903 and commenced its presence, as a strategic partner, in Ethiopia after
World War II. In the early 1960s the Soviet Union established its presence in
Somalia after the new republic was formed. Since then, resulting from the
geooIILIcuI vuIue oI Lhe regIon, boLh Lhe US und Lhe SovIeL UnIon deIIne whuL
takes place in the Horn of Africa within the perimeters of what they view as their
nuLIonuI InLeresLs (MukIndu, 1q8z). BoLh consIsLenLIy urLIcuIuLed LheIr concern
for the security of the region. However, the notion of security to each
superpower implied an absence of the other from the region and neither of them
wus LukIng InLo consIderuLIon Lhe concreLe IocuI sILuuLIon und Lhe reuI needs oI
Lhe eoIes In Lhe regIon (MukIndu, 1q8z).
The United States had two main objectives in Somalia and in the region in
general. Firstly, as I noted above, the US wanted to prevent Soviet control in the
region. The former US ambassador to Somalia, Raymond L. Thurston, noted
LhuL our objecLIve shouId be Lo excIude Lhe mIIILury buses or reIuLed IucIIILIes oI
IoreIgn owers Irom Lhe Horn oI AIrIcu (Thurston, 1978). Secondly,
Washington wanted to be the sole superpower in the region. In the words of
ChesLer Crocker, Lhe Iormer ussIsLunL secreLury oI sLuLe Ior AIrIcu uIIuIrs, Lhe
Horn oI AIrIcu . hus consIderubIe sLruLegIc ImorLunce Ior Lhe UnILed States as
IL Is reIevunL Lo boLh Lhe securILy oI Lhe MIddIe EusL und Lo AIrIcu . We seek
access to airfields and harbours for our military forces should they, in times of
crises, be required to defend against Soviet expansionism in the Persian Gulf or
74


the IndIun Oceun (Crocker, 1q8).
35
The Soviet Union, on similar grounds,
unsuccessfully sought to establish its presence in the region after the summit
meetings of Allied leaders in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam in the mid-1940s.
Somalia established diplomatic relationship with Moscow in September 1960.
Between 1961 and 1963 the government of the new Republic of Somalia, was
repeatedly asking the West, the US especially, for military assistance with the
aim of establishing a professional army, but all was in vain. Although previously
refusing to accept offers of arms from the East, Somali leaders unsatisfied with
the responses of the West, now approached Moscow and received military aid
from the Soviet Union (Patman, 1990). Here Moscow got the opportunity it was
looking for. The Soviet Union knew that, through its economic and political aid,
it would be able to influence Somali politics, particularly foreign relations, but
Moscow did not interfere in the internal affairs of Somalia.
Several things, on the other hand, constrained the relationship between Somalia
und Lhe US, buL Lhe mosL ImorLunL one wus Lhe SomuII governmenL`s GreuLer
Somalia policy and its support for movements against Addis Ababa in Ethiopia.
The US strategy on Somalia, since its independence, was to encourage Somalia
to maintain its neutral foreign policy (Schraeder, 1994).
n Lhe words oI Ambussudor ThursLon (1q6q), The enLry oI Lhe SovIeL UnIon
InLo Lhe mIIILury IcLure In Lhe Horn due Lo Lhe deLerIoruLIng reIuLIonshI
between Somalia and the West coupled with improving ties with the East,
showed LhuL SomuIIu wus movIng uwuy Irom Lhe oIIcy oI sLrIcL nonuIIgnmenL
the Somali Government had professed to pursue from the inception of
Indeendence (ThursLon, 1q6q). ConsequenLIy, some oIIIcIuIs In Lhe State
Department, particularly Ambassador Thurston himself, were keen to see a
dIIIerenL scenurIo Iuy ouL on SomuIIu`s reIuLIons wILh WushIngLon, whIch Is
ILseII subordInuLed, us IndIcuLed, Lo SomuIIu`s reIuLIons wILh Lhe regIonuI
states, particularly, Ethiopia.
A significant shift was observed in the Somali foreign policy in the late 1960s. In
July 1967, former premier Abdirashid A. Shermarke defeated Aden A. Osman,
the incumbent president, in the presidential elections. Shermarke appointed
Mr. Mohamed I. Egal as Prime Minster. Immediately Egal abandoned the
hostile approach to the Greater Somalia issue and tried to normalise the tension
between Somalia and the neighbouring states first, and then with the West. US
officials at the embassy in Mogadishu, perhaps Ambassador Thurston himself,
descrIbed EguI us our mun In SomuIIu (Schrueder, 1qqq). n Murch 1q68, EguI
visited Washington and he was warmly received by President Lyndon Johnson.
The US State Department, in a memo to brief the President before he met with
Lhe PrIme MInIsLer, InIormed PresIdenL Johnson LhuL Egal, 39, took office last
summer. He seuks EngIIsh IIuenLIy . He Is u rugmuLIc AIrIcun moderuLe und
is pro-WesL. He hus Iew InLeresLs ouLsIde oIILIcs . EguI hus comIeLeIy
reversed Somaliu`s oIIcIes In Lhe IusL nIne monLhs . HIs eIIorLs . exceed our
mosL oLImIsLIc execLuLIons (DS, 1q68). The IucL wus LhuL EguI owed much

35
Quoted in Schraeder (1994).
75


politically to the US. Schraeder (1994) noted that according to several sources
Lhe CA IucIIILuLed EguI`s uoInLmenL. One oI Lhose sources Is oIIowIng Lhe
Scenario: Reflection on Five Case Histories in the Mode and Aftermath of CIA
nLervenLIon by Roger MorrIs und RIchurd Muuzy (1q6;). The uuLhors
indicated that their findings are not based on the written sources alone, but also
many oral conversations that they both had with US decision-makers and
foreign policy officials who, through their extensive contacts, provided them
revIousIy unubIIshed deLuIIs. They muInLuIned LhuL beIore 1q6; Lhe oIIIcIuI
U.S.-Somali reIuLIons were dIsLunL . suddenIy, eurIy In 1q6;, hIsLory Look u Lurn
for the better. President Abdirashid Shermarke was elected for a six-year term
us PresIdenL In June und In JuIy uoInLed us PremIer Mohummud EguI . n
1968 Egal visited the United States, following a visit to Somalia by Vice
PresIdenL Humhrey, und wus huIIed by PresIdenL Johnson us 'enormousIy
consLrucLIve In u LroubIed ureu oI AIrIcu.` What the two leaders did not discuss,
suy oIIIcIuI sources, wus how 'consLrucLIve` Lhe CA hud been Ior Mr. Egal, whose
rise, to power was reportedly facilitated by thousands of dollars in covert
support to Egal and other pro-Western elements in the ruling Somali Youth
eugue urLy rIor Lo Lhe 1q6; PresIdenLIuI eIecLIon. The suorL wus muInIy
financial Ior Lhe cumuIgn und uILhough very modesL by Lhe CA sLundurds .
its immediate benefits - In rIsIng U.S. InIIuence . - no doubt seemed real
enough uL Lhe LIme (Morris and Mauzey, 1976).
This was the first involvement of a superpower in the process of the leadership
chunge In SomuIIu. WushIngLon`s InLenLIon wus, us revIousIy IndIcuLed, Lo
reverse SomuIIu`s IncreusIng LendencIes Lowurds Moscow Lo ILs Iuvour und Lo
redIrecL Lhe SomuII Ieuders` energIes Irom Lhe GreuLer SomuIIu Issue whIch wus
the basic jusLIIIcuLIon Ior Lhe SovIeL`s mIIILury InvoIvemenL In SomuIIu. SmuII
financial contributions did an excellent job at least in the meantime.
Washington did very little to encourage the socio-economic development in
Somalia, but the task it assigned to Egal was to bring Somalia into the camp of
the West.
The US wanted Somalia to restore its former neutralist foreign policy and to
ubundon ILs growIng IInks wILh Lhe SovIeL UnIon. Thus, WushIngLon`s mosL
important mission in this stage was to reshape the Greater Somalia issue in a
wuy IuvourubIe Lo Lhe US`s InLeresL; regional dtente. Consequently, during his
first year in office Egal devoted most of his time and government energies to
revising the regionally hostile attitude of previous Somali governments. Egal
initiated more conciliatory diplomacy towards neighbouring countries, France,
and Britain.
In September 1967, at the OAU Heads of State Conference, the Premier met
with Emperor Haile Sellasie and Vice President Daniel A. Moi
36
of Kenya in
Kinshasa, Zaire and later in that month sent a team of ministers led by the
interior minister, Yassin N. Hassan, to Addis Ababa for a preliminary meeting
regarding a planned future conference for the heads of the two states. The
Somali delegations and their Ethiopian hosts issued a joint communiqu with a

36
President Jomo Kenyatta did not attend the conference for health reasons.
76


serIes oI ugreemenLs, IncIudIng LhuL sLes be Luken Lo remove condILIons whIch
affect adversely relations between the two countries, irrespective of the nature
oI Lhese condILIons (ACR, 1q68Jq). The IoIIowIng ebruury, Lhe Ethiopian
delegation led by the Foreign Minister, Ato Ketema Yifru, arrived in Mogadishu
for further talks. Another communiqu was issued in which both delegations
exressed LheIr greuL suLIsIucLIon uL Lhe rogress uchIeved In Lhe ImrovemenL
of relations beLween Lhe Lwo counLrIes (ACR, 1q68Jq). They uIso ugreed u
further meeting at a future date between the heads of the two states to discuss
major issues.
In September 1968, Premier Egal visited Addis Ababa for the planned talks with
Emperor Selassie. For the two leaders these talks were of an exploratory nature
aimed at the eventual settlement of major differences. Again, a number of
ugreemenLs were Issued. The heuds oI Lhe sLuLes reuIIIrmed revIous
undertakings to remove all causes of tension, and undertook not to engage in
subversIve ucLIvILIes uguInsL euch oLher (ACR, 1q68Jq). Trude ugreemenLs und
establishing air and telecommunication links between the two countries were
among the discussed issues. Great satisfaction at the progress achieved was also
expressed by the two leaders.
In October 1967, Premier Egal met with President Kenyatta at Arusha, Tanzania
in a follow-up meeting to the Kinshasa meeting. The heads of the states agreed
LhuL Lhe InLeresLs oI Lhe eoIe oI Kenyu und SomuIIu were noL served by the
conLInuunce oI LensIon beLween Lhe Lwo counLrIes und Lhus decIded Lo exerL uII
efforts and do their utmost to create good relations between the two countries in
accordance with the OAU Charter. Over the next two years a series of
negotiations further improved the relations between the two countries. In
addition in December 1967 Egal, after visiting London, restored diplomatic
relations with Britain.
The Premier visited Paris for talks with French authorities in September 1968.
In Paris Egal, as reported by Le Figaro, admitted that his government had
modIIIed hIs counLrIes urouch Lowurds DjIbouLI und suId LhuL DjIbouLI
belongs to France and that its independence will have to be negotiated directly
wILh runce. On z1 SeLember u joInL communiqu was issued. The two
countries decided to pave a way for a good-neighbourhood policy and economic
cooperation between Somalia and France (ACR, 1968/9).
To maintain that trend Washington realised that it had to sLrengLhen EguI`s
position, relative to his contenders, and encourage his policies (DS, 1968). Lewis
(1q;z) oInLs ouL LhuL |w|ILh Lhe IInuncIuI resources uL hIs dIsosuI Lhe new
PremIer wus soon ubIe Lo secure u IuvorubIe buIunce oI cuuLIous suorL In Lhe
national assembly
Although the Prime Minister cultivated a good relationship with the West and
initiated reconciliatory diplomacy in the region, the internal consequences of
the US involvement in the leadership change were very unfortunate. Egal, the
president and the Minister of Interior Yasin Nur Hassan emerged as triumvirate
77


in Somali politics. Egal soon dominated the SYL, the dominant ruling party that
he had joined only several months before he assumed office.
37

3.6. The Failure
During the civilian regime, both physical and social infrastructure improved: the
level of schooling increased; the health sector improved; new roads were paved;
ports and factors were built. However, the overall picture shows that the 1960s
was, in an economic perspective, a lost decade. Far worse, the state institutions
mysteriously vanished.
Table 3.5 illustrates that the development projects did not produce any
proportionate returns in this period. In 1969 about one-third of the total
development programmes were implemented. On the other hand, the World
Bank estimated LhuL SomuIIu`s GNP er cuILu decIIned uL un uveruge oI 1.6
percent annually (Mehmet, 1971). Although in the early 1960s the export
significantly increased, the foreign trade remained in deficit, due to an increase
of imports (see Table 3.4). The ordinary budget deficit was never eliminated.
Table 3.4, External Trade Deficit, 1964-9
Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Imports 391,000 353,700 300,300 286,400 339,800 369,798
Exports 227,000 192,000 213,900 198,500 212,000 231,910
Defict 164,000 161,700 86,400 87,900 127,800 137,888
Source: Lewis (1973, 1974).

One reuson Ior LhIs IuIIure wus Lhe governmenL`s reoccuuLIon wILh Lhe GreuLer
Somalia issue and administrative problems created by the merger of the two
different systems, British and Italian, formerly adapted by the two parts of the
republic. Lack of absorptive, both institutional and man power, capacity is
another.
The InherILed sLuLe becume u source oI weIIure, where resLIge, weuILh, und
power are obtainable almost exclusively in government areu und Lhe besL men
huve usuuIIy been ubsorbed InLo Lhe Lhree brunches oI Lhe governmenL, Lhe
IurgesL reuIm oI IucruLIve emIoymenL In Lhe SomuII ReubIIc (CusLugno, 1q6q).
In addition, the foreign aid became an instrument of venality and produced, as
one commenLuLor suId, Lhe IIrsL generuLIon oI mIIIIonuIres (uILIn, 1q;). n
these circumstances it is not unexpected that Somali leaders wanted to gain and
keep their positions of power and privilege. Consequently, instead of responding
to the country`s demund Ior urgenL socIo-economic uplifting by adopting pro
growth policies, Somali leadership initiated an atmosphere of cut-throat
competition were everyone sought to secure a share of the national cake. Indeed

37
In October 1966 Egal left the opposition party that he was leading previously, the SNC, and
joined the Somali Youth League. Of course, this was a necessary step for preparing him for the
Premiership since only a member of the SYL would be able to assume that office.
78


there was no reason to worry about the nuLIon`s economIc deveIomenL sImIy
becuuse voLes . hud IILLIe or noLhIng Lo do wILh Lhe usL erIormunce oI Lhe
governmenL und, IurLher more, Lhe economIc sLuLe oI Lhe counLry wus neILher
un eIecLIon Issue nor Lhe mujor concern oI Lhe governmenL (ACR, 1969/70).
Although the last civilian administration shifted its attention from the Greater
Somalia issue to focus on the economic development aspect, most of the traps
that constrained previous administrations were still present. In addition to
those mentioned earlier, several other factors added insult to injury.
Firstly, as noted above, Egal spent most of his time and energies on
hurmonIsIng SomuIIu`s reIuLIons wILh Lhe neIghbourIng counLrIes und Lhe WesL.
He successfully established a regional dtente and pursued more conciliatory
dIIomucy. ndeed, reversIng SomuIIu`s IsoIuLIon wus necessury Ior LuckIIng ILs
economic problems, but more than that it was essential for the survival of his
government, as Washington might not be pleased if he failed to bring Somalia
onto the right track.
Secondly, having eased the tension there was an opportunity to deal with the
economic development aspect of the country. However, after several months of
the approval of the 1968-70 development plan, the political temperature begun
to rise as the parliamentary elections of March 1969 were approaching and by
the mid of 1968 the politicians threw on a mantle of self-protection, and
everyone was busy securing enough votes, which had nothing to do with the
economic performance of the state (ACR, 1969/70).
SecondIy, durIng EguI`s governmenL u sIgnIIIcunL number oI romInenL cIvII
servants, influenced by the behaviour of the political leaders, left their
professional jobs seeking their share in the political rents. This departure of the
professionals undoubtedly weakened the economic performance of the country.
But their actions attenuated further the already commercialised political system
oI Lhe reubIIc. As ewIs wroLe wILh such InLense comeLILIon InvoIvIng un
unprecedentedly large number of senior civil servants who had [left] their posts
to enter the lists, electoral expenses had been unusually heavy, and those who
had succeeded in gaining a seat in the National Assembly were naturally anxious
to recover their costs at the earliest possible opportunity. In a country where the
national budget was running at approximately $35 million some candidates are
esLImuLed Lo huve senL us much us $o,ooo (quoLed In SumuLur, 1q88).
Corruption and economic mismanagement, and tribal manipulations by the
political leaders were common during the civilian rule. In addition, as we have
seen, Somali state leaders weakened the formal state institutions. However,
thanks to WushIngLon`s suorL LhuL enubIed Mr. EguI Lo wIn und reLuIn Lhe
loyalty of key figures of the political elite
38
, the last civilian government installed

38
The US dId very IILLIe Lo suorL EguI`s oIIcIes oI economIc deveIomenL. There Is no known
change in the US assistance on Somalia in this respect. Even the conversation the Prime
Minister had with President Johnson, during his first visit, indicates WushIngLon`s reIucLunce Lo
chunge ILs oIIcIes concernIng ILs meLhod oI suorLIng SomuIIu`s deveIomenL gouIs. Perhus,
79


a typical personal rule in Somalia. The new leadership sought to put the power
base into their hands.
Firstly, the institutions of accountability were brought under the Prime
Minister`s conLroI. The ruIIng urLy wus Lhe IIrsL vIcLIm oI Lhe subordInuLIon. A
group of prominent members of the SYL, led by the General Secretary Mr.
AbdIrIzuk H. HusseIn, oosed Lhe PrIme MInIsLer`s oIIcIes whIch on 1;
November 1967 caused the expulsion of the Prime Minister from the party by
the Central Committee. But Egal succeeded initially in bringing the party under
his control after amendments were made to the constitution of the party. Now a
new post, the leader of the party, was created and given to the Prime Minister.
In addition, the new amendments gave Egal powers to appoint and dismiss the
Secretary General and dissolve the Central Committee. He initially appointed
Ali Mohamed Hirave
39
and later on assumed the position of the secretary
general by himself. Here the leadership of the state and the ruling party were
brought into a single hand for the first time in the history of the Republic.
Further more, the new administration chased out opponents from the Party
(Samatar, 1994, ACR, 1968/9).

the only gains that the Prime Minister scored from Washington, as far as his socio-economic
development objectives are concerned, was to the amount of US $1.1 million (DS, 1968).
39
Mr. Hirave was a close ally to both the President and the Prime Minister. He held ministerial
orLIoIIos In boLh Shermurke`s (1q6o-q) und EguI`s governmenL (1q68-9).



T
a
b
l
e

3
.
5
,

R
a
t
e
s

o
f

I
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n

a
t

S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d

D
a
t
e
s
,

b
y

I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l

S
e
c
t
o
r
s



A
c
t
u
a
l

d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t

e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e


T
o
t
a
l

e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d

e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e

t
o

c
o
m
p
l
e
t
i
o
n



T
o

e
n
d

o
f

1
9
6
7



T
o

e
n
d

o
f

1
9
6
9


S
e
c
t
o
r

S
o
.

S
h
.

0
0
0

%

o
f

e
s
t
.


S
o
.

S
h
.
0
0
0

%

o
f

e
s
t
.


S
o
.

S
h
.

0
0
0

%

1
.

A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e

1
2
4
,
6
9
5

3
3
.
5


1
3
7
,
9
8
8

3
7


3
7
2
,
6
1
8

1
0
0

2
.

A
n
i
m
a
l

h
u
s
b
a
n
d
r
y

2
,
9
0
7

3
.
2


1
4
,
7
1
4

1
6
.
2


9
1
,
0
6
6

1
0
0

3
.

I
r
r
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

2
1
,
7
8
7

2
0


2
5
,
3
7
1

2
3
.
2


1
0
9
,
1
5
6

1
0
0

4
.

I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y

2
0
9
,
2
0
3

4
2
.
5


2
5
0
,
7
9
5

5
0
.
9


4
9
2
,
6
9
1

1
0
0

5
.

B
a
s
i
c

I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

2
5
2
,
7
5
5

1
7


4
2
0
,
6
2
1

2
8
.
2


1
,
4
8
9
,
2
3
4

1
0
0

6
.

S
o
c
i
a
l

I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

9
9
,
1
4
9

2
8
.
5


1
4
4
,
5
6
2

4
1
.
6


3
4
7
,
8
9
7

1
0
0

7
.

T
o
t
a
l

7
1
0
,
4
9
6

2
4
.
5


9
9
4
,
0
5
1

3
4
.
2


2
,
9
0
2
,
6
6
2

1
0
0

S
o
u
r
c
e
:

M
e
h
m
e
t

(
1
9
7
1
)

80
81


In March 1969, in an infant republic, with a population of only 2 million, and
0.9 million voters and with an annual budget of approximately $40 million,
1002 candidates representing 62 parties stood for election competing for a place
in the National Assembly with 123 seats. When the votes of the general elections
were counted, 73 out of 123 seats went to the SYL and the remaining 50 seats
went to other parties. However, during the first meeting of the parliament all
but one
40
of the non-SYL deputes crossed the floor and joined the SYL. This can
be explained simply by viewing the accounts of the Prime MInIsLer`s oIIIce Irom
the time of the election.
As all the deputies, except one, of the national assembly were members of the
SYL and as the winning coalition cleared the Party from opponents, the
members of the party were expected to support the policies of the
administration, and thus the parliament lost its role as an instrument of
uccounLubIIILy. AccordIng Lo ewIs (zooz), Lhe democruLIc urIIumenLury
process which has seemed to blend so well with the traditional Somali political
institutions and had begun with such verve and promise, had turned distinctly
sour. The National Assembly was no longer the symbol of free speech and fair
play for all citizens. It was now widely regarded cynically as a sordid market
place where, with little concern for the interest of those who had voted for them,
deuLIes Lruded LheIr voLes Ior ersonuI guIn.
A Somali advocate was appointed to the Supreme Court to replace its former
Italian president. Being free from political pressures, the court under the
leadership of the Italian president handled allegations against violations of
election rules from earlier occasions. The new president refused to act on forty
petitions alleging a variety of electoral malpractices by arguing that he had no
such jurisdiction.
As political institutions of democratic check and balances were undermined by
the state leaders, a system of personal rule established itself in Somalia, were
almost every state institution was abused. There were serious allegations that
government rigged the elections. The state treasury was heavily channelled to
political expenses, as Lewis had noted, according to a detailed statement based
on u cIose sLudy oI Lhe PrIme MInIsLer`s uccounLs mude ubIIc by Lhe mIIILury
regime in 1969, which showed Egal has given over U.S. $1 million of public
funds
41
to members of the national assembly (Lewis 1972). Other national
institutions were similarly abused, i.e. the widely respected chief of the police
force, General M. Abshir Mussa, resigned before the election in a protest that
his authority was being usurped for political ends by his superior, the Interior
Minister.

40
Abdirizak H. Hussein, former Prime Minister and General Secretary of the SYL who had now
formed an opposition party, was the sole exception.
41
The countries total revenue of 1968 was about forty million US Dollars, including foreign
budgetary aid.
82


3.7. Conclusion
Somalis, since the inception of the post-colonial Somali state, had two main
missions: socio-political unification and socio-economic development.
Accordingly, these were the key issues to be addressed by every Somali state.
However, even before the independence Somali intellectuals raised their doubts
about the future of the forthcoming republic. Osman Y. Kenadid professed that
Somalis may loose their destiny. In his Tabaha Fuulaanka (The Raiding
Strategies), he warned Somalis
Istiqlaalkii lagu taami jirey tiirki soo durugye
Hadaan tabar u leenahay xornimo timi waraaqdeede
Waa kaa Talyaanigu salimey tacabadii qaare
Istaxkumadi ma fufududee hadaan taag u heli weyno
Tiiraanyo iyo ciil hadey taawo nagu reebto
Tadbiir xumo darteed xaal hadduu toosi kari waayo
(The long awaited for self-determination is too close to be achieved
If we are able to manage properly, the letter of our sovereignty has arrived
As you are aware, the Italians have transferred some of the authority
How about if we fail to rule ourselves efficiently, as it is not an easy task
How about if we are infected by despair and anger
How about if, due to misgovernance, we fail to address our vision)
Neither of the two main national goals was achieved by the civilian regime that
ruled Somalia in the first decade of post-colonial Somalia. Instead, formal
institutions eroded, political values commercialised and personal rule took its
shape.
Somali civilian leaders, as leaders of independence movements during the 1940s
and 1950s, wanted to see a better Somalia. However, their primary motive, as
rational agents, was to gain and keep the political power. On the other hand,
post-colonial Somali leaders realised that they could not survive by encouraging
efficient formal institutions and formulated other strategies for survival. These
short sighted strategies undermined the formal state institutions and leadership
institution itself and put the country into a political trap. Formal institutions of
democracy, i.e. separation of powers and political parties, were missused by the
Somali leaders. They instead used divisive informal institutions, i.e. tribalism.
83


Somali society, although having a democratic system of governance, failed to
utilise the basic instrumental objective of the institutions of accountability, i.e.
elections. Therefore, since there is no effective system of accountability, the
Somali electorate was unable to control their leaders. Far worse, due to ethnic
cleavages among the Somalis, they simply became victims for political
manipulations by the political elites.
In addition, Washington, with the intention of reversIng Lhe SomuIIu`s
increasing tendencies towards Moscow, involved itself in SomuIIu`s eIecLIon und
policy making processes in 1967. This involvement in the internal politics and
leadership change worsened the situation by contributing to the total erosion of
Somali democracy and enabled the triumvirate group in the last civilian regime
to seek to install personal rule in the country.
Studying the causes of the military takeover, David Laitin (1977) wrote that,
The cIvIIIun regIme whIch uLLuIned Lhe Indeendence In 1q6o oeruLed In u
LumuILuous envIronmenL . The modern sLuLe wus rIIe with corruption, and
political leaders bought votes, used government cars as taxis, and hired relatives
Lo sIng LheIr ruIse.By 1q6q, Lhe corruLIon oI Lhe cIvIIIun regIme hud reuched
egregious proportion, to a degree that was an insult to the morality and the
intelligence of most Somalis. The last election in March 1969 was rife with
candidates openly and unabashedly buying their parliamentary seats.
Afterwards the ruling party bought out the opposition members, and this kind
of cynicism filtered down to the bureuucrucy.The mIIILury InLervened onIy uILer
Lhe cIvIIIun InsLILuLIons coIIused.



T
a
b
l
e

3
.
6
,

S
e
c
t
o
r
a
l

D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n

o
f

D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t

E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e

b
y

S
o
u
r
c
e

o
f

F
i
n
a
n
c
e
,

1
9
6
3
-
9

(
S
0
.

S
h
.

0
0
0
)


S
o
m
a
l
i

F
o
r
e
i
g
n

T
o
t
a
l




M
u
l
t
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l



B
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l


S
e
c
t
o
r


E
.
E
.
C
.

U
.
N
.

W
o
r
l
d

B
a
n
k


C
h
i
n
a

F
.
R
.

G
e
r
m
a
n
y

I
t
a
l
y

S
a
u
d
i

A
r
a
b
i
a

U
.
S
.
S
.
R

U
.
S
.
A
.

O
t
h
e
r


1
.

A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e

5
2
,
8
2
2

2
3
,
2
7
9

4
,
2
1
9






1
,
8
5
3

2
1
5
,
9
7
2

6
9
,
4
0
3

1
,
7
0
0

3
6
9
,
2
4
8

2
.

A
n
i
m
a
l

h
u
s
b
a
n
d
r
y

1
7
,
6
6
4

3
7
,
2
9
2

2
4
5




3
,
8
9
6




7
9
6


5
9
,
8
9
3

3
.

I
r
r
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

5
,
0
0
1


1
0
,
5
9
8







7
,
7
5
3

1
,
5
4
2


2
4
,
8
9
4

4
.

I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y

1
0
7
,
6
7
0

3
,
9
2
0

7
,
2
3
6




2
7
,
4
5
0

2
3
,
9
2
8


8
5
,
5
5
7

1
2
,
0
1
5

4
0
,
1
3
9

3
0
7
,
9
1
5

5
.

B
a
s
i
c

I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

6
7
,
7
8
3

1
3
9
,
5
7
6

2
2
,
7
1
9

2
1
9
,
4
2
7


3
9
,
2
2
0

7
1
,
4
6
5

2
9
,
3
7
0

1
2
,
5
0
0

5
5
,
0
3
2

2
1
4
,
8
6
4

6
,
0
5
9

8
7
8
,
0
1
5

6
.

S
o
c
i
a
l

I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

3
2
,
5
9
1

4
1
,
0
4
1

9
8
,
5
5
0




2
0
,
1
4
0

1
8
,
0
4
1

2
0
8

2
4
,
6
1
4

2
7
,
8
6
9

4
0

2
6
3
,
0
9
4

7
.

T
o
t
a
l

2
8
3
,
5
3
1

2
4
5
,
1
0
8

1
4
3
,
5
6
7

2
1
9
,
4
2
7


3
9
,
2
2
0

1
2
2
,
9
5
1

7
1
,
3
3
9

1
4
,
5
6
1

3
8
8
,
9
2
8

3
2
6
,
4
8
9

4
7
,
9
3
8

1
,
9
0
3
,
0
5
9

S
o
u
r
c
e
:

M
e
h
m
e
t

(
1
9
7
1
)
.
85


4 SOMALIA UNDER MILITARY RULE
4.1. Introduction
The preceding chapter analysed and established the failure of the civilian
governments between 1960-69. This and the subsequent chapters deal with the
military regime that ruled Somalia between 1969 and 1991. In its assumption of
power, the regime abrogated all formal political institutions of democracy; the
National Assembly, the Constitution, the Supreme Court and political parties
were suspended and political activities banned. The Somali Revolutionary
Council (SRC) monopolised all rights and responsibilities of these institutions.
Consequently, Barre - with his wing in the SRC - consolidated the power in his
hands. On the other hand, during the first phase, the military rulers tried, with
considerable success, to advance the socioeconomic bases of the society. The
present chapter considers Lhe regIme`s sLruLegIes Ior survIvuI und ILs
socIoeconomIc uchIevemenLs. The regIme`s urouch und uchIevemenLs on Lhe
unification mission will be considered in Chapter 5.
4.2. The Coup `etut
Due to the chronic mismanagement and fatal inefficiency of the civilian regime,
people felt that the state betrayed the confidence they had put in it. Expressing
that discouragement by comparing the Somali state leaders with colonial
authorities, Abdi Idan Farah, said;
Ma waraabe dad-qaadiyo,
Libaax diifi ku taallaan,
Isku doorsanayaa,
Ka dugaag ka dugaag,
Ma daacuun ka tagoo,
Fanto soo dalbo baa,
Ninkaa diirka madow leh,
E` duurLII guuIku IudhIIsLuy,
Haddii anu ii damqanayn,
Ma dan baa iga haysa,
(Farah equates the Somali government and colonial administration as a hungery
lion and a man-eating hyna and argues that for the black man who replaced the
86


departed white man, there was no difference as neither of them cared for his
well-being).
In addition, Somalis wished for a reversal of the situation and vowed that a
system like this will soon come to an end. Ahmed Ismail Dirie (Qaasim)
professed before the revolution the following:
Carruuraha la dhacay awliyada laga cadhaysiiyey
Carshigaaba laga soo aqbalay cabashadoodiiye
Caawaa la kala soocayaa caabud iyo gaal'e
Casha aan fogeyn waxays beddeli ciidan fara weyne
Caaddaa rag koraybuu nabsigu hoos u soo celinne
Caanuhu dhawaan way ka quban ciil dar loo qabaye
Inay curaddo khayr lihi kacaan ciiddan la arkeeye
(He hoed LhuL God`s urovuI oI Lhe cuII uguInsL Lhe Ieuders by the
impoverished children and maltreated saints would be immenent. He argued
that, as it is the time of judgement, the current leadership will be replaced with
humiliation. He hoped that glorious leaders would replace them soon).
On 15 October 1969, the president of the Republic, Abdirashid A. Shermarke,
while visiting drought stricken areas in the Northern region was assassinated by
a member of the police force on duty to guard the president in-front of the
resIdenL`s guesL house In us Anod. ThIs ussussInation was preceded by an
uborLed uLLemL when u grenude exIoded neur Lhe resIdenL`s cur In 1q68.
Premier Egal hastily returned from Washington, where he was on an official
vIsIL, Lo MogudIshu Lo musLer-mInd Lhe NuLIonuI AssembIy`s eIecLIon oI u new
PresIdenL who wouId suIeguurd hIs own osILIon (ewIs, 1q;z). Soon uILer hIs
arrival, the Premier along with the top SYL leaders started the process of
appointing their candidate for parliament; this is required so as the new
president can be approved by a two-thirds majority vote within thirty days.
During this period the president of the Parliament, Sheikh Mukhtar Mohamed,
was the acting president of the Republic.
The ideal candidate for the surviving members of the previous triumvirate was
Haji Mussa Boqor, un oId cumuIgner und cIose ussocIuLe Lo Lhe PremIer und u
busIness coIIeugue oI Lhe nLerIor MInIsLer (ewIs, zooz; ACR, 1q6qJ;o). AILer
Iong hours oI heuLed debuLe, Lhe PremIer`s cundIduLe wus ucceLed Lo be
supported by the party caucus in the late hours of 20 October, the night before
the planned date for the Parliament to elect the new president. However, at
Lhree o`cIock Lhe nexL mornIng, Lhe urmy occuIed Lhe key InsLuImenLs In
Mogadishu staging a bloodless military coup organised by a group of young
army officers responding to the opportunity provided by the mismanagement
87


and inefficiency of the last civilian government. Later on, twenty-five dominant
figures of the group established the Somali Revolutionary Council (SRC), under
the leadership of General Mohamed Siyad Barre, the commander of the Somali
Army.
The SRC started uprooting formal democratic institutions. Leading civilian
politicians, including Mr. Egal, his main rival Abdirizak H. Hussein and the
former president Aden A. Osman, and some army officers were either detained
or put under house arrest. Nearly all formal political institutions were
suspended and political activities banned. All rights and responsibilities of these
institutions were transferred to the SRC or its affiliates. The SRC transformed
the Somali Republic into the Somali Democratic Republic and promoted the
military coup as a political revolution undertaken by an angry society led by its
armed forces.
However, few tears were shed for the termination of liberal democracy and the
disappearance of leaders for the independence struggle from the political stage.
Many disappointed Somalis were expecting that every change would bring some
sorL oI reIIeI und Lhe mosL neuLruI grous beIIeved LhuL democrucy hud Iused
into commercial anarchy, and strong rule of a new type was desperately needed
II Lhe sLuLe wus Lo be rescued (ewIs zooz). Beyond LhuL, SomuIIs weIcomed Lhe
military move. Aden Arab in his Damaashaad CeIebruLIon suId:
Dibitaatiyadi uummiyaha kala dillaalaayey
Ee aanay doocba u tarayn dabaqaddaan saarnay
Ee sida dameeraha biqlaha dabada noo jeedshay
Ee shicibku meeshuu ka diday nagu dudduucaayey
In Ilaah ku daalacanayiyo duni ma faallayne
Concentrating the two main objectives of the Somalis, the economic
development and the greater Somalia, he expressed his wishes by saying:
Xooggii dalkiyo ciidankii siday dabbaabbaadka.
Kol hadday dugaagtii qabteen Doollarka eryeysay
Daacuunka Soomaali galay inuu dawoobaayo
Oo caafimaad irra daf odhan waa daliil run ahe
Daalkiyo harraadka i hayiyo diifta iyo oonka
Gaajada i dubaye laftiyo diirka kala siibtay
Darbo waxaan ku noolahay dhakhasaba waa debberayaane.
88


.
Dalkayaga cidhiidhiga ku jira waa durkinayaane
Deyrkiyo xuduudkoow Hawaas dacalka kuu saarnay
Doogada rnadoobeey Wajeer duhurka kaa taagnay
Dakaddii Jabbuutaay cashuur dalab leh kaa qaadnay
.
Duulkii amaah nagu lahoow deynka idin siinnay
It was true that Somalis, in general, wanted a leadership change in Somalia. But
what about the US? In July 1969 emperor Selassie warned the White House
LhuL Lhere were dungers LhuL oLher Iorces In SomuIIu whIch ure under SovIeL
InIIuence couId nuIIIIy EguI`s consLrucLIve InIIuences In wuys LhuL wouId ose
greuL dungers Ior ELhIoIu (DoS, 1q6q). DesILe LhuL eurIIer wurnIng, Lhe
United States Government was completely ignorant about the forthcoming
military coup. On 20 October, the day before the coup, Henry Kissinger, then
Lhe PresIdenL`s AssIsLunL Ior NuLIonuI SecurILy AIIuIrs, InIormed PresIdenL
Nixon that, as a consequence of the murder of President Shermarke, the
intelligence information they have reveals that an army takeover, the army by
nature being anti-dtente, in the near future is not likely and added that
potential candidates for the presidency are pro-Western, and would probably
conLInue SomuIIu`s LIes wILh WushIngLon und Lhe regIonuI dLenLe.
The NIxon udmInIsLruLIon`s dLenLe oIIcy Lowurd Lhe SovIeL UnIon LhuL eused
the tension between the two and the Nixon Doctrine which assumes that other
countries have both the ability and responsibility to deal with local disputes
reshaped US foreign policy. After visiting Africa, Nixon stated the African
versIon oI hIs docLrIne us beIng |L|huL Lhe ConLInenL be Iree oI greuL ower
rivalry or conflict in any form. This is even more in AIrIcu`s InLeresL Lhun In
ours. We wIII noL InLervene In Lhe InLernuI uIIuIrs oI AIrIcun nuLIons. We
strongly support their right to be independent, and we will observe their right to
deal with their own problems independently. We believe that the national
InLegrILy oI AIrIcun sLuLes musL be resecLed (DoS, 1q;o). ThIs reversuI oI US
IoreIgn oIIcy mIghL ossIbIy exIuIn WushIngLon`s Iuck oI InIormuLIon ubouL
the coup.
In 1972, Christopher Clapham recognised his inability to find clear evidence
showing that there was a direct role played by the Soviets in the Somali military
coup, but insisted that military advisers from Moscow may have been involved
in the coup of 1969 (Clapham, 1972). Today, as far as I know, the situation
seems to have remained the same, i.e., there is no clear evidence of direct Soviet
involvement.
89


As I indicated earlier, the Soviet Union had been supporting Somalia since the
formation of the republic. However, Moscow was not very happy with its
relationship with Mogadishu. Moscow was Lhe IurgesL source Ior Lhe SomuIIu`s
development finance, providing over 20 percent of the total development
budgets of 1963-9. But this aid showed no viable return to the national
development perspective, in despite of it creating several Somali millionaires.
From the military aspect, Moscow was the principal supplier for the Somali
army from 1963. It transformed the Somali army from an ill-equipped and ill-
trained 5,000 men to a professional army of over 20,000 men. This put the
Soviet Union in an unfavourable position. Offering little or nothing in return to
Moscow, it made the Soviet Union a threat to the stability and integrity of
SomuIIu`s neIghbourIng counLrIes (BeII, 1q;).
nILIuIIy Moscow dId noL consIder EguI`s governmenL u LhreuL Lo ILs InLeresL in
the region and welcomed the Somali dtente with the neighbouring countries.
This was based on the fact that Shermarke, who initiated the Somali
relationship with the Soviet Union, was the new president of the Republic.
Realising that the dtente with Ethiopia, Kenya, and France resulted in a
rapprochement between Somalia and the West, Moscow soon changed its mind.
Prior to the elections of March 1969, it took several steps to express its
unhappiness with the Somali government. The Soviet press stopped covering
PremIer EguI`s InLernuLIonuI dIIomuLIc munoeuvres, urLIcuIurIy Lhe uccords
sIgned by SomuIIu und ELhIoIu. AccordIng Lo PuLmun (1qqo) LhIs wus u
sIgnIIIcunL omIssIon. n uddILIon, SovIeL wrILers uccused Lhe PremIer oI SomuIIu
of abandoning SomalIu`s non-alignment and its open support for the West.
With the United States preoccupied with the Vietnam War, in early 1969, the
Soviet Union realized that actions taken by the United States and China were
endangering its Asian strategy. This strategy was challenged by the growing
uccommoduLIon beLween WushIngLon und PekIng. Two ouL oI Moscow`s Lhree
logistic routes of transporting arms from the industrial centres in the western
USSR to South-East Asia, were interrupted by the Washington-Peking
rapprochements. Firstly, China limited the arms supplies entering Vietnam
which were transported by Chinese railways. Secondly, during the first half of
1969, Soviet and Chinese troops clashed repeatedly along the border between
the two nations. This conflict disrupted the Soviet arms supply to Vietnam;
Moscow previously used to transport the supply along the Trans-Siberian
ruIIwuy Lhen ussed ucross ChInu`s XInjung ProvInce beIore IL InLersecLs wILh Lhe
North Vietnamese transportation system. The route was mainly used by the
Soviet forces opposing the Chinese army. In addition, the military supplies to
VIeLnum were severeIy dIsruLed by WushIngLon`s bomburdmenL oI CumbodIu
which completely blocked the overland weaponry supply lines from
Sihanoukville to the Ho Chi Minh trail. It became clear to Moscow that Peking
was willing to cooperate with Washington, at the expense of Moscow, in order to
end the Vietnam War. The Soviet Union had to find an urgent solution to
protect the remaining sea route and this forced it to reconsider its strategy in
AIrIcu In generuI, und SomuIIu In urLIcuIur. n Lerms oI gIobuI sLruLegy,
therefore, there was every reason for a Soviet interest in naval facilities in the
ndIun Oceun (PuyLon, 1q8o; PuLmun, 1qqo).
90


urLhermore, EguI`s government agreed to stop the North Vietnamese vessels
from trading under the Somali flags of convenience after Washington
threatened to terminate the American foreign aid to Somalia if the practice was
to be continued in September 1969. This was argued to be another concern for
the Soviets already affected by the consequences of the US-China
rapprochements (Payton, 1980).
From 1960 the Chinese relationship with its main ally, the Soviet Union, had
dramatically deteriorated. The Nixon administration sought to improve US
relations with China in order to gain a strategic advantage over the Soviet
UnIon. One sLe In Lhe sLruLegy wus ChInu`s enLry InLo Lhe UnILed NuLIons.
Nixon himself, even before his term, urged bringing China into the United
Nations. In a 1967 article in The Foreign Affairs NIxon wroLe LukIng Lhe Iong
view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of
nuLIons. WhIIsL In oIIIce he decIded Lo use Lhe SIno-Soviet conflict to shift the
balance of power towards the West in the Cold War. He, with his new National
SecurILy AdvIser, Henry KIssInger, mude moves Lo encouruge ChInu`s enLry Lo
Lhe UnILed NuLIons. OLher counLrIes were requIred Lo suorL WushIngLon`s
position on the issue to be voted for. On 7 October 1969 Egal strongly supported
ChInu`s enLry InLo Lhe UnILed NuLIons uL Lhe GeneruI AssembIy by suyIng LhuL
|w|e cunnoL huve u sLuLe Lo resecL our uuLhorILy when we excIude LhuL sLuLe
from participation in our decision making machinery. In addition, we cannot
expect the authority of the United Nations to carry full weight if we turn a blind
eye for the principle of the world co-shurIng (EguI`s seech, uL Lhe UN GeneruI
Assembly, in Oct 1969).
All these developments, augmented by regional power alignments around the
Horn oI AIrIcu, see PuyLon (1q8o), conLrIbuLed Lo Lhe SovIeL UnIon`s IncenLIve oI
a regime change in Somalia. On the other hand, several factors created an
opportunity for Moscow. Firstly, political anxiety among the general public was
created by the governmenL`s oIIcy Lowurds Lhe GreuLer SomuIIu gouI wILhouL
any improvements on the economy, fuelled by the March election. Secondly, the
mIIILury wus budIy uIIecLed by Lhe governmenL`s oIIcy oI dLenLe. AccordIng Lo
Y. Y. ELInger Lhe SovIeL InLeIIIgence uuratus was aware of dissatisfaction in
urmy cIrcIes (PuLmun, 1qqo). ThIrdIy, sInce 1q6 Lhe SovIeL UnIon hud been
used by Somalia to train its military officers which probably made the military
more receptive to Soviet influence. In this vein, it was noted that the Soviets
who visited Somalia after the coup were surprised by the large number of
Somali military officers who spoke Russian. Fourthly, thanks to the relatively
substantial number of Soviet military advisers, Moscow had the necessary
infrastructures for collecting required information and means to convey its
messages to the Somalis, particularly the military officers. And perhaps, this is
what Moscow did as far as the military coup is concerned (Patman, 1990).
According to Patman (1990), several aspects of the coup support this
conclusion. Firstly, in August 1968 Moscow signed an economic agreement with
the Somali government that allowed Mogadishu to repay its outdated debts, or
those falling due before 1970, in annual instalments from 1972, while other
loans for certain projects were written off. However, in June 1969 Moscow
91


changed its mind and adopted a hard-line approach on the debt rescheduling
issue. Payton (1980) interpreted this action as a destabilisation policy towards
EguI`s government. This seems to be the case, especially if one takes the soft
approach Moscow adopted in December, after the coup, on the same debt
repayment issue and the cancellation of the scheduled visit in July of both Egal
and Shermarke to Moscow.
Secondly, Moscow`s subsequenL denuncIuLIon oI EguI`s overLhrown governmenL
was followed by a prompt and warm reception of the military takeover by the
USSR. Within days Pravda churucLerIsed Lhe cou us u re-emptive measure to
forestall efforts by Somali reactionaries to take power and arrest progressive
reIormers (PuLmun, 1qqo).
Thirdly, Soviet military, rather than political, representatives established the
initial contacts with the new regime in Mogadishu. These military contacts were
followed by 14 Soviet economic delegations, headed by the Chief of the African
Department of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations,
which arrived in Mogadishu on the 2 December 1969 (ACR, 1969/70). The
delegation offered new financial assistance and certain outstanding loans were
wrILLen oII. CommenLIng on LhIs PuyLon (1q8o) noLed LhuL LhIs III-flop in the
soviet position from the previous June only adds credence to the suggestion that
Lhe summer crIsIs wus munuIucLured In Moscow.
PuyLon`s (1q8o) LhesIs Is LhuL uILhough the available evidence does not support
the idea that Moscow orchestrated the October coup, it assures that a
coIncIdence oI InLeresLs exIsLed beLween SIyud Burre und Lhe SovIeL sLruLegIc
objectives. He concludes that the Soviet decision to destabilise the elected
government in Mogadishu dramatically changed the character of the Somali
sLuLe und sysLemuLIcuIIy reshued Lhe regIonuI buIunce oI ower und by sLrIkIng
the afforded target, Moscow guaranteed itself a prolonged period of military and
political opportunity on the Horn of Africa, and insured that its full range of
oLIons remuIned oen (PuyLon`s, 1q8o).
Whatever the connection between Moscow and the coup plotters was, one thing
is for certain, that carefully planned strategic actions of the Soviet policy makers
facilitated the smooth implementation of the military takeover.
4.3. SRC`s Power Consolidution
Soon after the coup, the SRC took all necessary steps to fully assume power.
uLer on Lhe mornIng oI Lhe cou, MogudIshu RudIo broudcusLed LhuL the
National Army, supported by the Police, this morning, at 09.00 Mogadishu
LIme, Look over Lhe udmInIsLruLIon und oIILIcuI ower oI Lhe counLry . u
Revolutionary Council set up today, October 21, 1969, has taken over all power
in order to protect the securILy oI Lhe counLry (ACR, 1q6qJ;o). The SRC, wILh
the concrete help from Moscow, invented its own governing institutions and
vested them all political and administrative powers of state institutions. It took
the responsibility of the following: enacting laws, and approving those proposed
92


by the secretaries of state; appointing the executive branch of the state; and
approving politically sensitive functions of the secretaries of state, such as high
level appointments in their ministries. So the functions of the president and the
parliament were directly attached to the SRC.
A council of secretaries was appointed to administer the day-to-day ministerial
duties, without political powers. In addition, they were responsible for drafting
new laws and making proposals for the senior administrative posts. Thirteen out
oI Lhe IourLeen were youngIsh cIvIIIun LechnocruLs, Lhe soIe exceLIon GeneruI
Jama Ali Korshel, vice president of the SRC, was given the internal affairs
orLIoIIo. However, 'vIgIIunL` mIIILury oIficers were posted to ministries for
monitoring.
Having accomplished the task of power monopolisation, the SRC established
proper systems of censorship for any Kacaandiidnimo (counter-revolutionary)
and Afmiisharnimo (rumour-mongering) activities. The National Security
Services (NSS) was created and Colonel Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla, a member of
Lhe SRC und Burre`s son-in-law, was appointed as its head. With enormous
ower, Lhe orgunIsuLIon wus resonsIbIe Ior Lhe regIme`s securILy, esecIuIIy
uncovering possible counter revolution plots and preventing the emergence of
opposition groups. The NSS established an extensive network of informers
throughout the country and all levels of society. The National Security Court
(NSC) was also formed to replace the Supreme Court and to supplement the
activities of the NSS. The court immediately started dealing with a wide range of
oIILIcuI oIIences, IncIudIng Lhe Iuck oI revoIuLIonury zeuI und Lreuson (ewIs,
2002).
Previously, the country was administered through a regional system. The SRC
re-organised the 8 regions and 40 districts by setting up revolutionary councils
as an organisational tool at local levels. Here all previous civilian district and
provincial governors were replaced by army and police officers and chairmen of
the local revolutionary councils. They were expected to execute the decisions
and policies of the SRC at the local levels.
n u ubIIc seech on Lhe occusIon oI Lhe revoIuLIon`s IIrsL unnIversury, OcL. z1
1q;o, Burre decIured LhuL In order Lo realise the interest of the Somali people,
their achievement of better life, the full development of their potentialities and
the fulfilment of their aspirations, we solemnly declare Somalia to be a socialist
SLuLe.
However, as Peztalozza (1974) mentioned, the official decision was not
unexpected. Stellc d'Dttobere, un oIIIcIuI duIIy uer, sLressed LhuL IL wus wILh
the objective of socialist development that the revolution took its first steps in
Lhe IIrsL yeur oI ILs IIIe, by IIsLIng u whoIe runge of activities done during the
yeur, und Lhen Lhe uer wenL on by wrILIng LhuL uII meusures und rovIsIons
taken in this first yearhad had the concrete aim of creating healthy basic
condILIons on whIch Lo buIId Lhe new SomuII socIuIIsL socIeLy
93


Pestalozza (1974) believes that, by their assumption of the power, most of the
SRC Ieuders were convInced oI Lhe suremucy oI scIenLIIIc socIuIIsm und Lhe
muIn reuson Ior Lhe deIuy wus Lo wuIL unLII Burre`s wIng hud eIImInuLed Lhe ro-
Western wing of the SRC, i.e., when the revolutionary struggle was sufficiently
mature.
Burre underIIned LhuL |I|or us, socIuIIsm Is sImIy deIIned; IL Is u sysLem In
which the state takes the primary responsibility for the political, social and
economIc deveIomenL oI Lhe nuLIon (Custagno, 1971). He also stated that their
choice of the scientific socialism is to mobilise the people and direct their
energies to achieving the real goals of the society: reducing poverty, illiteracy
and disease.
According to Pestalozza (1974), scientific socialism for Barre and his supporters
in the SRC was the following: a method to overcome nationalism without
principles, which may give a role to the conservative elements; a way to reject
deficient forms of socialism such as Islamic socialism, African socialism, Arab
socialism; a method of class struggle that can be used to eliminate economic
dependency for exploited societies; and a strategic method for economic
development.
According to Ahmed Samatar (1988), the SRC leadership that to achieve their
revolutionary goals firm theoretical guidelines are needed and they believed that
socialism could provide the required organisational tools. He thus noted that
scientific socialism meant a method of organising the Somali society to:
1. Bring the most important parts of the economy into the realm of the
state;
2. Improve the capacity of local resources;
3. Reduce income inequality in society;
4. Encourage people to participate in the decision making processes;
5. Establish an official script for the Somali language;
6. Reduce the trade deficit of the economy;
7. Reduce foreign dependence, particularly on the West;
8. Restore original positive non-alignment in the sphere of international
politics.
However, Lewis (1982) indicated that military leaders pursued scientific
socialism to legitimise their rule, simply because it distinguishes the regime not
only from the previous regimes but the western camp as well.
My thesis at this point is that, although the relevance of this arguments are not
eusIIy dIsmIssIbIe, Lhe SRC Ieuders` uduLation of scientific socialism was
intended to legitimise their rule in the eyes of the Soviet leaders more than it
was directed towards Somali people. In that way, I come into agreement with
Laitin and S. Samatar (1984), who believe that, by choosing scientific socialism,
intended to please Soviet advisers who, according to them, helped to make the
military coup a success. My argument is based on the following points:
94


First, Barre and other top SRC leaders were never imbued with the principles of
socialism. He personally knew virtually nothing about Marxism-Leninism
before the coup (Laitin and S. Samatar, 1984). Barre often used what Lewis
(zooz) cuIIed Siccdised Sociclism, which was full of contradictions and the
soIe urumeLer IL hud wus Burre`s oIILIcal interest. Abdirizak Mohamud
Abokor, a member of the SRC and the minister of education, explained that
state ideology has three main components (ACR, 1972/73):
1. Burre`s Ideus oI communILy deveIomenL,
2. Scientific socialism, and
3. Islam.
The first component, Burre`s Ideus oI communILy deveIomenL, hud u
reconciliatory effect on the conflict between scientific socialism and Islam
42
, on
Lhe one hund, und u IegILImIsIng eIIecL on Lhe SRC`s conLrudIcLIon wILh Lhe
principles of scientific socialism, on the other.
In November, 1971, Stellc d'Dttobere wroLe In ILs edILorIuI Lhe SovIeL UnIon,
Lhe worId`s IIrsL socIuIIsL sLuLe, Is Lhe modeI socIuIIsL socIeLy Ior our counLry,
whIch Is onIy begInnIng Lo buIId socIuIIsm (Gorodnov und KosukhIn, 1q;z). n
December, 1971, Burre hImseII wus quoLed us suyIng LhuL we beIIeve Lhere Is
onIy one Iorm oI socIuIIsm. There Is no such LhIng us AIrIcun, WesLern, or
SovIeL socIuIIsm. There Is onIy scIenLIIIc socIuIIsm (CusLugno, 1q;1). ThIs wus,
however, after Moscow supported him in stopping the military coup, of May
that year, against him. Later on, after hosting the OAU summit of the heads of
Lhe sLuLes und becomIng ILs chuIrmun, Burre`s osILIon wus LhuL u SovIeL
socialist cannot tell me about Somalian problems, which must be put in an
AIrIcun conLexL (uILIn, 1q;q). n uddILIon, deveIoIng socIuIIsm us un IdeoIogy
hud u secondury rIorILy uccordIng Lo Burre`s objecLIves und whenever he IeIL ILs
threat he was prepared to keep it with its limits. According to Laitin (1976),
Burre seemed Lo be oIIerIng hIs eoIe Lhe romIsed Iund ruLher Lhun socIuIIsm,
and it is therefore no surprise that he has had to purge from the revolution a
number of doctrinaire socialists who were the source of his original
rogrumme. urLhermore, as we will see later on in this chapter, there was a
huge gap between the rhetoric and economic practice of the socialism in
Somalia. All this confirms that it was not socialism as a principle that mattered
to Barre.
Secondly, if the Somali public, rather than the Soviet Union, would have been
the main target of the regimes socialist orientation, Islamic socialism would
have been the best option for the SRC, not scientific socialism. This would have
mitigated the conflict between Islamic values and socialism, since Islam was the
main source of rejection of socialism by the Somalis. And as we will see, Barre
was fully aware of that, and that is why he was tirelessly trying to reconcile
between the two. However, Barre rejected Islamic socialism and according to
Pestalozza (1974), scientific socialism is nothing but Marxism-Leninism.

42
See the next chapter for the impact of this conflict.
95


Thirdly, Moscow justified its support for the revolution on ideological bases,
ruLher Lhun SomuIIu`s geooIILIcuI vuIue. SInce Lhe 1q6q revoIuLIon, Lhe SovIeL-
Somali relations have entered a new stage. The USSR has been giving the
Somali Democratic Republic all-round assistance to help it achieve its aims -
the establishment of society free from social inequality, exploitation and
oppression, and restructuring life along socialist IInes (SoIInsky, 1q;q).
InuIIy, Moscow devoLed ILseII Lo suorLIng Lhe regIme In generuI und Burre`s
wing of the SRC in particular in cases of clashes among the SRC leadership. On
the first level, the Soviet Union supported the regime to build a strong security
system. The NSS was built up with Soviet assistance. Yuri Andropov, head of
Lhe KGB, mude u IILLIe ubIIcIsed vIsIL Lo MogudIshu Lo ensure LhuL Lhe NSS wus
on Lhe rIghL IInes und IuLer on SuIeImun, Lhe heud oI Lhe NSS, hImseII Lurned
up in Moscow Lo sLudy Lhe oeruLIons oI hIs orgunIsuLIon`s IncubuLor, Lhe KGB
(Cozier, 1975). On the other level, Moscow supported Barre in squashing several
attempted coups against his rule in 1970 and 1971. These coups were allegedly
from within the top SRC leadership and Moscow was happy that its support
heIed Lhe young nuLIonuI sLuLe. Lo more eIIecLIveIy resIsL Lhe InLernuI
reucLIonury Iorces (SoIInsky, 1q;q).
CIeurIy, Lhe SRC`s choIce oI scIenLIIIc socIuIIsm wus rImurIIy moLIvuLed by
pleasing the Kremlin. However, Barre also wanted to legitimise his rule in the
minds of the Somali: his second principal. Here, by stressing the two common
national goals, socioeconomic development and unification, his main strategy
was to show that he is performing well. Another strategy was to root out the clan
system in Somalia; the prime instrument for potential political rivals and a
decisive factor against the national goals. Thus, in addition to his direct survival,
Barre also wanted Soviet support to deal with these issues.
In early 1971 several factors helped the Soviet Union drift towards Somalia
(Makinda, 1987). First, the death of Nasser and the rise of Sadat in Egypt in
1q;o InILIuIIy cooIed Moscow`s reIuLIonshI wILh CuIro und IuLer on cuused un
expulsion of the Russians from Cairo. This made Somalia a useful alternative to
Moscow. Another factor was the deterioration of the Soviet relationship with
Sudan in 1971, after a short-lived coup against President G. Numeiri.
Consequently, in this period Moscow had two main objectives in Somalia:
firstly, it wanted to safeguard its strategic interests in the region, or in other
words it wanted to improve its position vis--vis Washington and it wanted to
maintain that position; and secondly, in the long run, it also wanted to
transform Somalia - politically, socially, culturally and economically - into a
reuI socIuIIsL sLuLe. ThIs, us we wIII see, wus evIdenL In Lhe SovIeL`s InvoIvemenL
in Somalia.
For several reasons the Soviets concluded that Barre was their man both in
Somalia and in the SRC. First, in the period after the coup, Moscow was pleased
by Lhe wuy Lhe mIIILury regIme hundIed Lhe counLry`s muIn Issues und Lhe
SovIeLs ruIsed Lhe SomuII governmenL usherIng In un eru oI roIound
transformation in social, economic and oIILIcuI sheres oI socIeLy (PuLmun,
1990).
96


Secondly, Barre was ready to grant the required military facilities to the Soviets.
WILh LhIs Moscow wus convInced LhuL oIILIcuI condILIons In SomuIIu were
favourable to the establishment of a military presence (MukIndu, 1q8;).
Accordingly, Somalia, in the hands of Barre, became the right place to look after
the regional geopolitical ambitions of the Soviets (Makinda, 1987).
Thirdly, five months before Barre came to power, General Gaafar Numeiri had
overthrown a civilian government in Sudan. Moscow initially supported
NumeIr`s governmenL. However, In JuIy 1q;1, un unsuccessIuI cou brIeIIy
removed Numeiri from power, and Moscow welcomed the move undertaken by
local communists. Within three days a counter-coup supported by Egypt and
Libya brought Numeiri back to power. As a result the relationship between
Moscow and Khartoum became seriously strained. Understandably, the Soviets,
cuuLIous oI reeuLIng sImIIur mIsLukes In SomuIIu, suorLed Burre`s wIng oI Lhe
SRC.
Finally, although there were a number of indoctrinated individuals and a few
socialist organisations emerged in Somalia before the coup, they were weaker
and too unorganised to be a better alternative for Moscow.
Having succeeded to bring the SovieLs Lo hIs sIde, Burre`s second Lusk wus Lo
bring the Somalis on board. But before considering his strategy towards the
Somali public, let me first deal with his political opponents and the ways he
dealt with them.
Burre`s ImmedIuLe oIILIcuI LhreuL wus Irom within the SRC. Though he led the
coup and was superior to any one else in the group, being the commander of the
Somali National Army, some in the SRC leadership believed that he was not the
right man. Pestalozza (1974) identified sub-groups in the SRC that belonged to
un oosILIon cuLegory uguInsL Burre`s wIng, whIch uccordIng Lo PesLuIozzu
(1q;q) were men oI more dedIcuLed IeILIsL IeunIngs. He beIIeves LhuL Lhe IIrsL
group was a pro-western wing led by the former police chief and first vice
president of the SRC, General J. A. Korshel; while the second group was purely
nationalist, the Nasser type pan-Arabists. This group was spearheaded by the
minister of defence General Salad Gaveire and the second vice president
General Mohamed Ainanshe. Samatar (1988), on the other hand, believes that
the conflict was a struggle for power, rather than ideological differences. This is
more credIbIe Lhen PesLuIozzu`s hyoLhesIs.
Burre`s resonse Lo LhIs IronL wus swIIL und hursh. BoLh sub-groups were
eliminated after two alleged attempted coups. Korshel was accused of
organising a counter-revolutionary plot, which aimed to stop the process of
buIIdIng u socIeLy bused on scIenLIIIc socIuIIsm. AILer Lhe so cuIIed ArII-May
crIses, whIch IInuIIy Ied Lo GeneruI KorsheI`s imprisonment, Barre noted that,
DeIendIng Lhe nuLIon . does noL meun goIng Lo Lhe IronLIers Lo sLrIke uL Lhe
enemy; Lhere Is much Lo deIend InsIde Lhe reubIIc (PesLuIozzu, 1q;q). or
Barre, defending his rule was defending the nation and his opponents were seen
as enemies of the nation.
97


A year later, on 4 May 1971, after reports of clashes between the SRC, both
Gaveire and Ainanshe, along with other officers and civilians were arrested.
Accused of plotting to overthrow the government, the two generals and colonel
AbdIkudIr DeI were ubIIcIy execuLed on JuIy 1q;z. oIIowIng Burre`s usuuI
IIne RudIo MogudIshu, commenLIng on Lhe execuLIon, suId LhIs Is u cIeur
warning to all those who might have an intention of keeping self-interest before
the supreme weIIure oI Lhe nuLIon (ACR, 1q;zJ;).
However, in a public meeting in June 1971, after the aborted coup, Mohamed Ali
Samatar, secretary of defence and member of the SRC, acknowledged that the
issue is a matter of a power struggle within the SRC. He mentioned that the
coup was intended to set sections of the army against each other and to
assassinate some members of the SRC. He also claimed that general Gaveire had
on several occasions, since July 1970, attempted to stage a coup. Samatar
underlined that SRC, beIng uwure oI Lhe generuI`s InLenLIon, Look u more
conciliatory approach by trying to dissuade him. However, Samatar added,
GuveIre uId no heed Lo Lhe IrIendIy udvIce oI Lhe SRC members buL
concentrated his efforts on securing an opposition group within Lhe SRC (ACR,
1q;1Jz). SumuLur uIso menLIoned LhuL AInunshe wus romIsed Lhe osL oI
PresIdency (ACR, 1q;1Jz).
Another general, Ahmed Mohamud Adde, former mayor of Mogadishu, was
expelled from the SRC on corruption charges. With these four senior generals
eliminated, in December 1971, the SRC membership was reduced to 21. Barre
took this opportunity to promote ally figures in the SRC, who were relatively
more junior, and gave them sensitive positions. Lt Col Samatar was promoted
Brig-gen. and the first vice president of the SRC. He was also appointed as the
secretary of defence. Brig. Gen. Hussein Kulmie Afrah became the second vice
president and the secretary of interior affairs. Col. Ismail Ali Abokor was
appointed third vice president and given the post of the secretary for
information and national guidance. Four other SRC members assumed
ministerial posts in the government. It is interesting to note that now seven out
of eighteen of the ministers were from the SRC, compared to an earlier
proportion of one out of fourteen.
AnoLher IronL uguInsL Burre`s ruIe wus Irom Lhe mIIILury, buL ouLsIde Lhe SRC.
These were mainly military officers who, for one reason or another, did not
participate in the October coup but wished that the highest positions of the
government would be filled by themselves. They, in addition, believed that they
could mobilise enough resources to secure that vision. Col. Abdulahi Yusuf
Ahmed and Col. Mohamed Farah Aidid were prominent figures in this group.
Barre used a variety of incentives and punishments to dissuade these potentially
dangerous military officers from taking action against him. A common strategy
was appointing such a leader as a head of a public enterprise with resounding
prestige, but without real power, or into a harmless diplomatic post overseas to
enjoy all the perks of the position. However, by choosing not to abstain from
causing trouble to the regime, SRC leaders had no choice but to put such a
leader behind bars. I will come back to this group later on.
98


A third group were the civilian leaders. However, the strict coercive measures
introduced by the military rule and the detention of most of the leaders in this
category rendered the remaining civilian leaders no option but to abstain from
the business of politics and to involve themselves in other business. A
significant number of this group moved into the private sector and established
companies, mainly in the agricultural sector. As a result this group was not an
immediate threat to the regime.
4.4. Legitimising the Military Regime
Acknowledging their illegitimate seizure of power, the SRC harried to legitimise
their rule. They firstly directed a relentless stream of attacks against the civilian
regime that they had replaced. In justifying his actions Barre, on many
occasions, had a whole list of weaknesses regarding the civilian government:
The civilian government proved their inability to move the nation in the
direction of prosperity; they made no effort to tap the potential of the people;
political leaders exploited tribal feelings to secure political and economic
interests; and foreign powers had a disproportionate degree of influence on the
government (Castagno, 1971).
The regIme muInLuIned LhuL Indeendence und re-unification in 1960 heralded
a decade of successive reactionary civilian regimes and recalcitrant politicians.
The chains of neo-colonialism were spread. Even those citizens with the best of
intentions found themselves inadvertently propelled into a vortex of corruption,
nepotism, tribalism and personal interests. The more one tried to keep oneself
out of this socio-political quagmire, the deeper one sank into it. The Somali
people were truly disillusioned, their hopes and aspirations became like an ever-
receding mirage. Their long struggle for freedom connoted an exercise in
futility. The nationalistic movements, thoughts and actions were abhorred.
Individualistic and tribalistic interests were admired and pampered. The policy
oI DIvIde und RuIe wus exerLIy execuLed. The economy oI Lhe counLry wenL
into a limbo. Magnificent paper plans that never took off the ground appeared
in quick succession. The International press derisively referred to Somalia as the
gruveyurd oI IoreIgn uId (SomuIIu, 1q;q).
However, discrediting the civilian regime was not a difficult task since, as we
have seen, people were already fed up with the behaviour of previous politicians.
Secondly, the new government stressed that, despite their usurpation of power,
they came to restore Somali nationhood and claimed that their move was to save
Lhe counLry Irom unurchy. Burre noLed, |w|e soIdIers recognIze LhuL we ure noL
good oIILIcIuns buL Lhere wus ubsoIuLeIy no choIce. The ussussInuLIon oI
President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was the culminating point of the vast
corruption and moral degeneracy that had penetrated the fabric of government
. There wus no Ionger u sense oI conIIdence In Lhe nuLIonuI wIII, noL even u
minimum bases for national cooperation was established and there was a high
degree oI moruI decuy. . We sImIy hud to put an end to all these developments
und reusserL our nuLIonuI rIde und dIgnILy (CusLugno, 1q;1).
99


Thirdly, they boldly projected the goal of the new regime as the establishment
of, through a participatory approach, a respected and prosperous Somali nation.
Finally and more importantly, as far as state-society relations were concerned,
Burre oInLed ouL LhuL |w|e ure devoLIng uII our energIes Lowurd desLroyIng uII
forms of national disunity, including tribalism and elitism. For example, civil
servants no longer act as if the people are their servants, but realize that they are
Lhe servunLs oI Lhe eoIe (CusLugno, 1q;1).
On 22 October 1969, the second day of its life, the regime pronounced the basic
framework of its governance agenda, the so called Lhe IIrsL churLer oI Lhe
revoIuLIon. The IIrsL urL oI Lhe churLer, Lhe InLernuI oIIcy, wus us IoIIows:
1. To constitute a society based on the right of work and on the principle of
social justice considering the environments and social life of the Somali
people.
2. To prepare and orientate the development of economic, social and
cultural programmes to reach rapid progress in the country.
3. Liquidation of illiteracy and to develop an enlightened patrimonial and
cultural heritage of the Somali people.
4. To constitute with appropriate and adequate measures the basic
development of the writing of the Somali language.
5. Liquidation of all kinds of corruption, all forms of anarchy, the malicious
system of tribalism in every form and every other phenomena of bad
customs in state activities.
6. To abolish all political parties.
7. To conduct at appropriate time free and impartial election.
Soon the coup was promoted as a political revolution undertaken by an angry
society led by its army. And the regime started instilling the supremacy of the
ideals of socialism, by not directly mentioning socialism, among the Somalis
during the first year of its existence. They did this by arguing that it was not the
behaviour of the previous political leaders alone that failed them. The liberal
democratic system itself, as was told the public, had the prime responsibility of
the national failure, because liberal democracy and capitalism are instruments
of subordination used by the West for its neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism
agendas. For that Pestalozza (1974) was right by arguing that the decision in
Iuvour oI socIuIIsm wus noL unexecLed. As noLed ubove, Lhe regIme`s decIsIon
about scientific socialism was conveyed to the public in October 1970. In his
first anniversary speech, Barre promoted socIuIIsm us Lhe mosL humune
IdeoIogy In keeIng wILh mun`s needs und In urLIcuIurIy us Lhe soIe
alternative possible to achieve a rapid economic and social start-u Ior u nuLIon
like Somalia (Pestalozza, 1974). And in the climax of that speech Barre declared
LhuL In order Lo reuIIze Lhe InLeresLs oI Lhe SomuII eoIe, LheIr uchIevemenL oI
a better life, the full development of their potentialities and the fulfilment of
LheIr usIruLIons, we soIemnIy decIure SomuIIu Lo be u socIuIIsL sLuLe (uILIn,
1979). This is why some scholars concluded that military leaders pursued
scientific socialism to legitimise their rule or used it as theoretical guidelines to
achieve revolutionary goals.
100


However, as noted above, the Soviet Union was the main source for the choice of
scientific socialism, while Somalis were manipulated and brought on board. The
SRC`s jusLIIIcuLIon wus sImIe: revIous regImes IuIIed Lhe nuLIon becuuse oI
wrong strategies and bad policies and we are here to rescue our country. The
best way for rapid transformation is the path of scientific socialism. In other
words, Barre expertly manipulated the Somali public to some how accept his
version of socialism as the best political framework that can be used by
impoverished nations, such as Somali, to overcome previous impediments and
gain development objectives. The same ideology that Moscow was expecting the
regime to indocrinate the Somali people with became the guiding principle for
prosperity for the Somali public. In that way, Barre successfully managed to
unify the main objectives of his two principals: the Soviet Union and the Somali
citizens.
To transform these policies and programmes into practice, several institutions
and organisations were created. The public Relations Office commonly known
as the PRO was established by the SRC in every sphere of life to politically
indoctrinate the Somali society and mobilise them and to implement the new
regIme`s rogrummes. n Lhe IIrsL yeurs oI Lhe revoIuLIon Lhe PRO worked In Lhe
capital. In 1973 the PRO was transformed into the National Political Office
(NPO) and expanded into a national organisation. Branches were established in
all villages, districts and provinces. Local committees were formed and
entrusted to undertake revolutionary programmes. Goleyaasha hanuunita
(Orientation Centres) were established in every permanent settlement of any
size and used as local premises and local residents were expected to visit the
centres and attend lectures to study the revolutionary aims and methods. The
walls of centres were decorated with the pictures of the jaalle Marx, jaalle Lenin
and jaalle Siyad (Barre).
The SRC also constructed the Guulwadeyaal (Victory Pioneers), an elite group
of young vigilantes involved in all sectors of society. Their main tasks were
drummIng u suorL Ior Lhe regIme`s rogrummes und mobIIIsIng eoIe Lo
come and participate in the activities of the goleyaasha hanuuninta and to
discourage dissidence against the regime. The organisation was involved in two
essential tasks: the regime`s securILy und sreudIng socIuIIsL IdeoIogy. ThereIore,
Soviet involvement in this organisation was both necessary and well known.
However, scholars disagree on which Soviet organisation the group is modeled
after. According to Patman (1990) the group was the Komsomol, a soviet
communist organisation, of Somalia. Crozy (1975), on the other hand, believes
that the group is in line with Druzhinniki, a soviet auxiliary police organisation
of young people. Anyway, the guulwadeyaal impressed the Soviet writers who
vIsILed SomuIIu. AccordIng Lo Sherr (1q;q) Lhey were very ucLIve In heIIng Lhe
new regIme Lo consoIIduLe und suIeguurd Lhe guIns oI Lhe evoIuLIon . Lhey weur
green shirts and red ties, which, the leaders of the organization told us,
symbolise loyalLy Lo enInIsL rIncIIes.
101


4.5. Socioeconomic Development
There is a consensus among the existing studies that in the first years of the
revoIuLIon, unLII ubouL 1q;, Lhe mIIILury regIme`s record wus osILIve und
confirmatory. In 1971, based on the first charter of the revolution, the
government drafted a three-year development plan (see Table 4.1.). The main
objectives of the plan were: to overcome the budgetary gap, which had been a
serious problem ever since independence; in the livestock sector, the largest
sector in the Somali economy, higher priority was given to marketing, water
spreading and range management; in agriculture, which received a lions share
In Lhe Iunned InvesLmenL, wILh Lhe InLenLIon beIng Lo move Lowurds nuLIonuI
self-suIIIcIency In Iood grains; in the modern sector, the intention was to
establish a number of manufacturing plants in certain high priority areas; and
creating a suitable physical infrastructure and an appropriate communications
system gained significant priority.
In 1973 a subsequent five year plan, 1974-78, with an estimated cost of 3863.4
million Somali shillings, was approved by the SRC. As Table 4.2 indicates,
priorities were similar to the preceding plan. However, the share of the
agriculture substantially increased, now 29.1 percent, compared with the
previous 14.1 percent, of the total amount. Transportation and communication
received 24.5 percent were industry and livestock received 15.2 and 4.2
respectively.
102


Table 4.1 Investment in the Three-Year Development Programme, 1971-3, By Sector
(Million Somali Shillings)
Sector Investment % of total
Rural
Livestock 51 7.8
Forestry & Ranges 5.0 0.8
Agriculture & Irrigation 83.2 12.7
Fishery 4.5 0.7
Rural Water Supply 64.2 9.7
Sub-total 208.0 31.7
Industry 117.5 17.8
Services 331.4 50.5
Total 656.9 100.0
Source: Samatar (1988).

Table 4.2 Investment in the Five-Year Development Programme, 1974-8, By Sector (Million
Somali Shillings)
Sector Investment % of total
1. Livestock 162.1 4.2
2. Agriculture 1124.5 29.1
3. Forestry 51.1 1.3
4. Fishery 78.0 2.0
5. Water Resources 139.5 3.6
6. Mining 45.7 1.2
7. Electricity & Power 136.5 3.5
8. Industry 588.3 15.2
9. Transport &
Communication 944.7 24.5
10. Education 191.1 4.9
11. Health 77.7 2.0
12. Housing 157.0 4.1
13. Labour 11.3 0.3
14. Statistics & Cartography 106.1 2.8
15. Tourism 12.6 0.3
16. Information 37.1 1.0
Total 3863.4 100
Source: ACR (1974/5).
Regarding these plans two observations are worth mentioning: one is that the
Somali contribution of the development budget increased, 20.2
43
percent in the
1971-73 plan and 32.6 in the 1974-78 plan. Another is that the external source of
the development budget now shifted to the East and the Arab countries (UAE,
KSA, Kuwait and Libya), as major contributors, the US for instance, pulled out.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, remained the largest single contributor.

43
Different figures exist to those in Table 4.3.
103


Table 4.3 Proportion of Development Funds from Local versus Foreign Sources
Development Plan Period
Local Revenues Foreign Contribution
Million So.
Sh.
% of
Total
Million So.
Sh.
% of
Total
1963-69 289.5 14.9
44
1,619.5 85.1
1971-73 118.9 16.2
45
615.8 83.8
1974-78 1,260.3 32.6 2,602.9 67.4
Source: Abdi Samatar (1989), Ozay (1971).
The reader should remember that my analysis in this chapter concerns the first
phase of the military regime, 1969-75. The main reason for this time frame, as
we wIII see In Lhe IoIIowIng chuLers, Is LhuL Lhe regIme`s IncenLIve sLrucLure was
changed. Another reason, as we will see later in this chapter, is that the 1974-78
development plan had been held up due to the drought of 1974-5, since
resources had been diverted to the relief programmes.
The SRC, in the first year of its rule, nationalized various sectors of the
economy: in the financial sector all branches of foreign banks - the Italian
Banco di Roma and Banco di Napoli, the British National and Grindlays Bank
and the Egyptian Bank- were take over by the state; oil distributing companies,
Agip and Shell were nationalized; the Italian-Somali sugar industry (SNAI) and
Italian-Somali Electric Society (SEIS) were among those affected by the
nuLIonuIIsuLIon ucL. The ucL wus In IIne wILh Lhe regIme`s uIm oI brIngIng Lhe
commanding height of the economy under its control. In addition, national
agencies, such as National Trading Corporation (ENC) and Agricultural
Development Corporation (ADC), were created and given monopoly control
over import, purchase and sale of their respective products. Stellc d'Dttobre
wroLe LhuL Lhe deveIomenL oI Lhe sLuLe secLor wouId be u buses Ior
industrialization, the cornerstone of an independent economy in developing
countries, and would lead to the emergence of a working class as a conscious
social force (VIkLrov 1q;o)
DesILe Lhe regIme`s socIuIIsL orIenLuLIon und nuLIonuIIzuLIon ucL, Lhe SRC
decIded Lo muInLuIn SomuIIu`s LrudILIonuI mIxed economy. On severuI occusIons
Burre LoId Lhe ubIIc LhuL he wunLs Lo sLress LhuL socIuIIsm In SomuIIu does noL
aim at the elimination of all private property. Private enterprises and foreign
InvesLmenLs ure uIwuys weIcome . We huve no InLenLIon, on Lhe Iower
economic scale, of confiscating the livestock of the Somali pastoralists or the
privately owned Somali farms, nor do we intend to confiscate the Italian
plantations ... We have rejected the old order because it failed to establish
rational plans and to use the natural and human resources of the country
eIIecLIveIy (AR, 1q;1).

44
Abdi Samatar found that local contribution was zero in the 1963-67 plan, whereas others
argued that the local contributions were not actually available during the implementations.
45
A detailed sectoral breakdown shows that the local contribution was over 20 percent in the
1971-73 plan (ACR, 71/2).
104


Consequently not only the private sector survIved under scIenLIIIc socIuIIsm,
buL Lhe IIvesLock und bununu secLors, Lhe Lwo muInsLuys oI Lhe SomuIIu`s exorL,
remained in private hands. Furthermore, the military regime encouraged
private investment. National banks were authorized to grant credit facilities to
business entrepreneurs. At the same time Barre reminded the businessmen that
LhIs Is noL wILhouL IImILuLIons, rIvuLe ownershI Is uIIowed In scIenLIIIc
socialism in Somalia, provided that such wealth is not used against the interests
oI Lhe SomuII eoIe, oIILIcuIIy or economIcuIIy . Lhen revoIuLIon hus no cuuse
Lo InLervene. (PuLmun 1qqo)
Now IeL us consIder Lhe regIme`s socIo-economic performance in the period
under consideration, 1969-1975, in the light of the two plans. Tables 4.4 and 4.5
summarise the economic performance of the regime until 1976 by comparing
with the previous civilian regime. Indeed, figures do not corroborate the
regIme`s execLuLIons und romIses, buL IndIcuLed LhuL Lhe mIIILury governmenL
performed better than its predecessor. They also show that the modern sector,
industry and services, significantly improved while agriculture gained little. In
addition it illustrates that the service sector, including defence, become the
dominant sector in the Somali economy.
Table 4.4 Growth of Production
Average Annual Growth Rates (percent)
GDP Agriculture Industry Services
1960-
70
1970-
76
1960-
70
1970-
76
1960-
70
1970-
76
1960-
70
1970-
76
1.0 2.1 -1.5 -1.2 3.3 10.3 2.1 8.0
Source: World Bank, WDR (1978).
Table 4.5 Structure of Production
Distribution of Gross Domestic Product
(percent)
Agriculture Industry Services
1960 1976 1960 1976 1960 1976
45 31 17 8 38 61
Source: World Bank, WDR (1978).
Table 4.6 depicLs SomuIIu`s currenL budgeL boLh In re-revolution and post-
revolution years. The data indicates that, while the revolutionary objectives are
not attained, the post-revolution era was better than the pre-revolution period.
105


Table 4.6 Current Budget (Million Somali Shillings)
Revenues 1968e 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Direct Taxes 16.7 20.1 26.2 34.5 42.7 43.6
Indirect Taxes 218.3 231.3 239.1 270.2 297.9 308.0
Other Receipts (Including
Sales of goods and
services)
24.6 20.9 22.5 32.0 65.4 91.7
Foreign Grants 22.0 15.5 18.0 13.7 13.9 13.7
Total 286.1 287.8 305.8 350.4 419.9 457.0
Expenditure 1968e 1969e 1970 1971 1972 1973
General Administration
and Defence
229.0 241.1 251 247.9 299.4 328.8
Education 18.5 20.4 20.2 20.2 19.9 27.9
Health 21.8 23.8 24.1 21.7 24.5 28.9
Agriculture, Livestock and
Rural Development
11.5 16.2 14.0 10.0 14.2 7.8
46

Other Social and
Community Services
- - - - 1.0 1.3
Total 281.6 301.5 309.3 299.8 352.6 396.1
Net Total 4.5 -13.7 -3.5 50.6 67.3 60.9
Source: UN Economic Commission for Africa, see ACR (1973/4) and ASS (1977).
In the livestock sector, the most important sector in the Somali economy,
intensification of marketed output was the main objective of the regime in this
erIod. However, Lhe secLor`s erIormunce wus encouruging. As Table 4.7
shows, the export earning of the livestock sector increased dramatically. This
was as a result of an enormous price change, which partially was a consequence
of international price change and, most probably, was partially due to improved
quality, health or otherwise, of the exported animals and improved marketing
system. Observers who disagree argue that the nomadic population were not
beneficiaries of the accrued profits; rather, the windfall of the harvest went to
the major livestock dealers and the state (Ahmed Samatar, 1988).

46
Agriculture alone.

T
a
b
l
e

4
.
7

E
x
p
o
r
t
s

o
f

L
i
v
e

A
n
i
m
a
l
s

f
r
o
m

S
o
m
a
l
i
a
,

1
9
7
0
-
1
9
7
5

Y
e
a
r


C
a
t
t
l
e


C
a
m
e
l
s


S
h
e
e
p

a
n
d

G
o
a
t
s



N
o
.

(
0
0
0
)

P
r
i
c
e

(
P
e
r

H
e
a
d
)

V
a
l
u
e

(
M
i
l
l
i
o
n

S
o
.

S
h
.
)


N
o
.

(
0
0
0
)

P
r
i
c
e

(
P
e
r

H
e
a
d
)

V
a
l
u
e

(
M
i
l
l
i
o
n

S
o
.

S
h
.
)


N
o
.

(
0
0
0
)

P
r
i
c
e

(
P
e
r

H
e
a
d
)

V
a
l
u
e

(
M
i
l
l
i
o
n

S
o
.

S
h
.
)

1
9
7
0



4
5
.
4

3
4
1

1
5
.
5


2
5
.
5

7
4
5

1
9
.
0


1
1
5
0
.
9

7
4

8
4
.
9

1
9
7
1


5
6
.
1

3
3
0

1
8
.
5


2
3
.
7

7
0
0

1
6
.
6


1
1
8
4
.
6

7
4

8
8
.
2

1
9
7
2


7
7
.
1

2
8
9

2
2
.
3


2
1
.
2

6
9
4

1
4
.
7


1
6
1
7
.
2

7
6

1
2
3
.
5

1
9
7
3


6
9
.
6

5
0
4

3
5
.
1


2
7
.
9

8
3
5

2
3
.
3


1
3
2
2
.
7

1
0
5

1
3
8
.
3

1
9
7
4


2
7
.
4

7
8
8

2
1
.
6


2
3
.
7

1
2
7
5

3
0
.
2


1
2
1
1
.
2

1
4
1

1
7
0
.
6

1
9
7
5



3
8
.
7

8
6
6

3
3
.
5


3
3
.
4

1
4
2
1

4
7
.
4


2
3
0
4
.
4

1
3
1

3
0
1
.
1

S
o
u
r
c
e
:

J
a
m
i
l

(
1
9
8
3
)
.

106
107


However, it is not easy to accept such conclusions for the following reasons:
firstly, although it is true that traders and the state were getting a considerable
share of the livestock export earnings, this, as Samatar himself recognises to
some extent, actually happened in the late 1970s and 1980s rather than early
1970s; secondly, Jamal (1983) found that, because of the export boom, the
IInuncIuI osILIon oI Lhe nomuds sIgnIIIcunLIy Imroved In Lhe 1q;os, LhIs hus
brought a substantial amount of cash into the hands of the pastoralists,
increasing their purchasing power and their terms of trade vis--vis the rest of
the rural, us weII us Lhe urbun, secLor (JumuI, 1q8). As TubIe q.8 IIIusLruLes, he
found that between 1970 and 1978 the total income in their hands increased
fivefold. Finally, in the early 1970s the rise of livestock prices was not unique in
the export oriented sub-sector of the economy. As Table 4.9 shows, the prices of
three of the main products of the livestock sector more than doubled in three
years alone in the local markets. In the local markets, like the Wardiglei market
in Mogadishu, a nomad was able to sell his products on the market directly
47
.

Table 4.8 Producer Income, 1970 & 1978
Sources of
Income 1970 1978
Total % Total %
Export Sales 61.4 55.1 365.9 64.1
Meat Factory 6.5 5.8 - -
Internal Sales 38.1 34.2 182.0 31.9
Hides 5.4 4.8 23.0 4.0
Total 111.4 100 570.9 100
Source: Central Statistical Department, State Planning Commission (See Jamil, 1983).
Table 4.9 Price Index of Livestock Sold in Wardiglei Market, Mogadishu
Year 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Camels 100 112.45 108.71 111.20 108.30 1170.12 119.50 234.02
Oxen 100 126.83 144.72 141.46 115.45 1000.00 147.97 290.24
Goats 100 87.18 92.31 89.74 92.31 1179.49 202.56 192.31
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulleting of the Somali Republic (See Laitin, 1976).
In agriculture, the aim was to move the country towards national self-sufficiency
in food production. In addition, for the banana sub-secLor, Lhe counLry`s second
largest exported item, the goal was to make Somali bananas competitive in
international markets. The figures in Table 4.10 are not in line with the regimes
objectives, as food imports did not decrease in value terms. However, one could
infer that the price of the imported rice was the main factor that was
undermining any measure taken by the government in the food sector. As the
data show, from 1971 to 1972 and to 1973 - pre-drought years - the value of the

47
This was very significant, if one considers the variance between the price indexes. Taking 1970
as base year of 100, by 1978 the livestock prices index rose to 451, while the general consumer
price index rose to 205.
108


imported cereals without rice decreased from 68.1 to 32.2 to 17.4 million Somali
shillings respectively. In 1973, the value of imported rice was 40.1 million
Somali shillings, compared to 24.3 millions in 1972. Furthermore, the problem
was a dramatic rise of rice prices in the international markets, rather than an
increase of the imported volume of rice. Between January and March of 1973
alone, the price of rice increased about 30 percent in the international markets
48

(Africa, 1974).
Table 4.10 Food Imports (Million Somali Shillings)
Imports 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
49
1972 1973
Cereals 35.4 35.2 48.8 50.5 104.8 56.5 57.5
Rice 20.6 19.9 26.3 26.5 36.7 24.3 40.1
Cereals (without rice) 14.7 15.3 22.5 24.0 68.1 32.2 17.4
Source: UN Economic Commission for Africa, see ASS (1977) and (Laitin, 1976)
or LhuL Lhe governmenL`s oIIcy oI subsIdIsIng busIc Iood sLuII ImorLs
negatively affected food imports, particularly of rice, which was increasingly
becoming a favourite food for the Somalis compared with the locally produced
cereals. In 1974, the secretary for interior trade disclosed that rice alone cost 20
out of the 34 million Somali shillings the government expended in order to keep
down the cost of basic food stuff for the Somali consumer (ACR, 1974/5).
Table 4.11 demonstrates the quantity and value of bananas exported. The
quantity, though increased, had no regular trend. And in value terms, though
improved, the effect of the international prices was not as favourable as that of
the livestock sector
50
. However, in the banana sub-secLor, Lhe regIme`s
performance is not as bad as it superficially appears, if compared with the pre-
revolution periods. In terms of export value, the downward trend of the pre-
revolution period was reversed to an upward trend from 1970.


48
Consequently, in the same year the regime decided to start an experimental project for rice
and sunflower seed production in Somalia.
49
In 1971, a drought, though less severe than the 1974/5 Dabodheer in scale, hit Somalia.
50
A main reason was that the major market for the Somali banana was Italy, whereas Saudi
Arabia was the main market for the Somali livestock.
T
a
b
l
e

4
.
1
1
,

B
a
n
a
n
a

E
x
p
o
r
t
s

E
x
p
o
r
t
s

1
9
6
7

1
9
6
8

1
9
6
9

1
9
7
0

1
9
7
1

1
9
7
2

1
9
7
3

1
9
7
4

V
a
l
u
e

(
M
i
l
l
i
o
n

S
o
m
a
l
i

S
h
i
l
l
i
n
g
s
)

6
8
,
3
7
0

5
9
,
6
8
4

5
5
,
7
2
3

6
2
,
8
1
3

6
3
,
8
2
7

-

6
7
,
5
6
4

7
9
,
8
3
7

V
o
l
u
m
e

(
M
e
t
r
i
c

T
o
n
s
)

7
0
,
4
5
0

8
6
,
0
7
3

9
1
,
4
9
1

9
9
,
6
5
9

1
0
3
,
6
7
3

1
1
6
,
4
9
7

1
0
2
,
2
2
5

9
6
,
9
5
0

S
o
u
r
c
e
:

C
e
n
t
r
a
l

S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l

D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t

(
M
O
P
&
C
)

a
n
d

U
N

Y
e
a
r
b
o
o
k
s

o
f

I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l

T
r
a
d
e

(
s
e
e

A
S
S
,

1
9
7
3

&

1
9
7
7
;

L
a
i
t
i
n

a
n
d

S
a
m
a
t
a
r
,

1
9
8
4
)
.

109
110




In the communications and transportation sector significant work was carried
out: with airports (such as Kismayo airport) and ports (Mogadishu port) being
either built or modernised; and the telecommunication system was upgraded.
Regarding road construction, the work was enormous: the total of asphalted
roads in the country increased ten times within two years from 100 km in 1969
to 1,000 km in 1971, and latter in the decade the figure again more than doubled
(Ahmed Samatar, 1988). In the industry sector the regime reorganised some
factories, such as the milk factory in Mogadishu and textile factory in Balad; the
regime also founded new factories, a tomato canning factory in Afgoe, a
cigarette and match factory, a wheat and pasta factory and a petroleum refinery
in Mogadishu and a packing plant making cardboard boxes and polythene bags
in Jammame; in addition, the regime put some factories into operation, with the
meat processing plant in Kismayo and fish processing plant in Lasqorey for
instance, and expanded the operations of others, such as Jowhar sugar factory
(Laitin and S. Samatar, 1984).
An ureu LhuL receIved Lhe revoIuLIonury regIme`s uLLenLIon wus esLubIIshIng
industries that use locally available raw materials, primarily aimed at import
substitution. However, export oriented projects using livestock products were
the most successful programmes. Almost one half of the development fund for
the livestock sector of the 1974-78 plan, 80.4 out of 162.1 million Somali
shillings, was channelled into a single project, the Trans-Juba Livestock Project.
The aim was improving meat exports. Consequently, the exports of canned meat
increased from less than three million Somali shillings to over 35 million Somali
shillings during the 1971-; Iun. n sum, SomuIIu`s munuIucLurIng sector, as
Laitin and S. Samatar (1984) noted, was negligible in 1969, but by the early
1q;os ubouL zo ercenL oI Lhe counLry`s exorLs wus munuIucLured goods.
However, Lhe regIme`s greuL success IIes somewhere eIse. Two muIn LurgeLs oI
the regime, as shown in its first charter, were to liquidate illiteracy and to create
a written form of the Somali language.
51
Moreover, according to the President,
educuLIon Is u LooI Ior concreLe soIuLIons, roducIng cILIzens Lo enguge In
revolutionary transformation of the counLry (ACR, 1q;1Jz). Soon uILer IL cume
to power, the revolutionary government started to attack the education
problems from two fronts: by creating educational opportunities for the Somali
children, a insignificant number of whom were receiving formal education; and
establishing a written form for the Somali language. Concerning the latter, the
government constituted a committee and in 1972 the committee proposed the
Romun uIhubeL us Lhe oIIIcIuI scrIL Ior Lhe SomuII Iunguuge. n Lhe revoIuLIon`s
anniversury oI LhuL yeur, Burre sLuLed LhuL Lhe scrIL we shuII use wIII be Lhe
Latin script, because it is the only script which can be easily used to write the
moLher Longue (ACR, 1q;zJ). Thus SomuII becume Lhe soIe oIIIcIuI Iunguuge In
the country, replacing English, Italian and Arabic. This was consensually
recorded as a historic achievement for the regime.

51
See point 4 of the first charter.
111


Former official languages were to be used for another three years at all levels of
education, but the time given to the civil servants to master the new script was
only three months, after which no foreign language would be permitted for
official work, except for certain specific areas. Extensive literacy campaigns
followed the introduction of the script. In March, 1973, the President announced
two main huses Ior Lhe unLI-IIIILerucy cumuIgn wILh Lhe uIm oI LrunsIormIng
Lhe vIsIon und beIIeI one hud oI SomuIIu where IIIILerucy Is over qo%, us LhIs
percentage will soon be replaced by another which is diametrically opposed to
IL und Lwo yeurs wus gIven Ior LhIs LurgeL Lo be uchIeved. n Lhe IIrsL yeur Lhe
PresIdenL udded our muIn Lusk wIII be dIrecLed Lowurds Lhe cILIes, dIsLrIcLs und
villages; in the second, we will take with us water containers, and go to the
nomuds . cun onIy LeII you uII u your socks, und good Iuck (ACR, 1q;Jq).
In 1973, a highly successful literacy campaign was undertaken, were all public
centres were used as schools for learning the new alphabet. In July 1974, the
second phase of the campaign, the Rural Prosperity Campaign, started. A huge
task force of over 25 ooo eoIe, vIrLuuIIy uII oI Lhe counLry`s secondury schooI
students and teachers supported by veterinary and medical personnel, was
dIsuLched InLo Lhe counLrysIde wILh Lhe uIm, us Burre noLed, Lo educuLe LheIr
brothers and to learn more about the Somali people and country in order to
reure LhemseIves Lo run Lhe counLry In IuLure (ACR, 1q;qJ). The LurgeL wus
to bring 60 to 70 percent of the nomads into the framework of development and
progress. So, as Lewis (2002) noted, the task was not to teach nomads how to
read and write alone, but to also to give them a basic education about hygiene,
modern animal husbandry and the aims of socialism. For that the campaign was
enLILIed Lhe RuruI ProserILy CumuIgn, ruLher Lhun Lhe RuruI ILerucy
CumuIgn us IL Is commonIy known. EquIed wILh bIunkeL, u IoIdIng
blackboard, and water-bottle, and drawing a daily allowance of two Somali
shillings (approximately 15 English new pence), these privileged urban students
were to share the fruits of the revolution with their neglected nomadic
comrades, staying as guests with nomadic family groups and teaching their
hosts to read and write. The guiding slogan, supplied by the President, was the
same as that for the earlier urban muss IILerucy cumuIgn: I you know Leuch; II
you don`L Ieurn (ewIs, zooz). UnIorLunuLeIy, one oI Lhe worsL droughLs In Lhe
history of Somalia halted this great national project, dabodheer. In the face of
this unexpected disaster, the Rural Prosperity Campaign was soon renamed as
the Rural Development Campaign, which I will discuss in some detail later, and
the education project automatically turned into a lifesaving project.
Concerning formal education, the military government pushed hard to give
educational opportunity to the Somali youngsters in the urban centres. In
October 1972, the regime nationalised all schools and the President commenting
on LhIs suId our uIm behInd LhIs . Is Lo gIve Lo our eoIe orIenLuLIon Lowurds
justice, unity, freedom, equality, and progress, as well as to teach them a sense
of responsibility which will enable them to play their role in the leadership of
Lhe counLry boLh now und In Lhe IuLure (ACR, 1q;zJ). n uddILIon, u unIIIed
system of education was announced, which necessitated a smooth transition
process from primary and secondary classes. Here the intention was to increase
efficiency and reduce dropout rates (ACR, 1973/4). Furthermore, significant
112


number of classes and schools were constructed. Consequently, as Figure 4.1
illustrates, the total enrolment dramatically increased.


4.6. State as an Agent of its Citizens
Basil Davidson, based on class realities, divided Somalis of the day in to four
groups, two in the urban - small proto-bourgeois and relatively large petit
bourgeois - and two in the rural areas - nomads (about 60 percent of the total
population) and peasant cultivators (about 20-25 percent) (Davidson, 1975a).
As we have seen, Somalis, in general, spontaneously welcomed the military
coupe of 1969. The main reason for that was that the disappointed Somalis
expected that the change would improve the deteriorating condition of the
country. In addition, Barre initially secured the support and the backing of
major influential urban groups: solders, students, religious leaders, poets etc.
Furthermore, Barre took two bold steps. Firstly, he tried to revive Somali
nationalism, badly damaged during the previous regimes. A few days after he
came to ower, Burre LoId Lhe buckbone oI hIs ower, Lhe urmed Iorces, LhuL Lhe
purpose of the revolution is to guide us back to our true Somali characteristics;
to clearly understand what we are, and what we stand for, and to work for our
people in sincerity and devoLIon . We huve Lo emburk uon Lhe Lusk oI creuLIng
a nationalism that will not detrimentally differentiate the rich from the poor,
and the educated from the illiterate, the urban from the nomad, and the high
from the low. In sum, what we are striving Lo creuLe Is u nuLIonuIIsm oI oneness
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
65 70 75
S
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
:

P
r
i
m
a
r
y
-
S
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y

(
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
)



Figure 4.1, Social Progress: School Enrolment
Source: Adapted from Laitin and Samatar (1987)

Years
113


(Laitin, 1976). In comparative perspective, David Laitin maintained that civilian
leaders not only exploited clan divisions in order to survive from any threat to
their power, but also constrained political participation and thus, by
disregarding the rural population, kept some 86 percent of the Somalis out of
Lhe oIILIcuI gume. n conLrusL, rejecLIng LhuL sLruLegy, Burre wunLed
nationalism with realisable goals based on the dignity, not the subservience, of
the peopIe (uILIn, 1q;6). Here Burre`s sLruLegy wus inter alia to remove the
constraints on political participation and to reach the nomads (Laitin, 1976).
Believing that if revolution was to mean anything real and lasting, the regime
has to win the active participation of the ordinary people, Basil Davidson in 1975
confirmed that, the regime had initiated a programme of political action and
explanation and one could see throughout the country, especially in towns,
districts and villages, that a great deal of achievements were secured towards
Lhe orgunIsuLIon oI muss urLIcIuLIon. DuvIdson (1q;u) sLuLes, Thousunds oI
Somali men and women who had never before possessed the least right to any
part in government were actively using their spare time to discuss their local
InLeresLs und decIde LheIr IocuI robIems. AccordIng Lo SumuLur (1q88), SomuII
nationalism was reactivated to inspire and mobilise the general population.
The second step was trying to eliminate tribalism. This was a mission for the
regime ever since it constituted its first charter. Indeed, the cost of tribalism to
the modern state of Somalia was a matter of concern to every one. As Samatar
(1q88) IndIcuLed Lhe Issue weIghLed so heuvIIy on Lhe mInds oI Lhe new
leadership that no speech of the President or his associates failed to underline
Lhe evIIs oI LrIbuIIsm. ConLrury Lo Lhe cIvIIIun regIme`s cIun buIunce docLrIne
Burre`s IIrsL cubIneL, Lhe councII oI secreLurIes, wus cIeurIy seIecLed on merIL
rather than their clan affiliations. In early 1971 a strong campaign against
tribalism was launched. Government used the press and radio to inform the
public about the unparalleled harm caused by tribalism and asked the public to
IIghL uguInsL IL. n uddILIon, Lhe regIme Look severuI ucLIons Lo diminish the
InsLILuLIons und rucLIce LhuL hus susLuIned IL (SumuLur, 1q88); Lhe osILIons oI
the tribal chiefs, which both colonial governments and civilian regimes
legitimised and gave stipends to; the traditional practice of diya paying (blood
compensation for harm) was abolished; attempts were made to contain inter-
clan conflicts, wedding ceremonies and burial activities were transferred from
clan to the neighbourhoods. The public took the matter seriously. A Russian
vIsILor LoId Lhe worId LhuL one duy we saw an ugly horned figure which looked
like a fairy-tale forest spirit, being dragged along the road. We were told that it
was a symbol of tribalism. The people along the street threw stones and sticks at
Lhe eIIIgy, whIch wus Lhen burnL und Indeed such scenes may be observed all
over Lhe counLry. ThuL Is Lhe SomuII eoIe`s resonse Lo Lhe governmenL`s
ueuIs Lo uL un end Lo Lhe survIvuIs oI huLed LrIbuIIsm (Sherr, 1q;q).
Eliminating corruption was another strategy for the regime to maintain the
support of the masses. At its inception, the SRC launched a strong campaign
against corruption. This campaign against tribalism was a strategy to distance
itself from the wrongdoings of the civilian regime. Xisaabi xil maleh (no shame
with accounting) was the name chosen for the campaign. In the beginning the
114


campaign was targeted towards the politicians and bureaucrats of the civilian
government that the regime replaced. The wrong doings of the revolutionary
government become the next target. A member of the SRC, the former mayor of
Mogadishu General Ahmed M. Adde, was among the first casualties of the
campaign. To prove that there was no exception, Down, a state owned weakly
paper, published a letter from a Swiss bank offering the President a secret
accounL uIong wILh Burre`s reIy oI no Lhunk you (uILIn, 1q;6).
All this was done, by Barre, to improve his potential survival probability. It also
reversed the moral degradation of the society and restored the spirit of national
unity. Barre was right by suyIng LhuL on Lhe sIrILuuI sIde, beIIeve, we huve
resLored Lhe eoIe`s conIIdence In Lhe governmenL. Every one Is now uIIIng
LogeLher (CusLugno, 1q;1).
In order to maintain this mass support the regime had to satisfy the hopes of
large segments of the society: the nomads, peasants, soldiers, students and civil
servants, religious leaders etc. The Government attacked the problem from
several fronts. As we have seen, it tried to improve the socio-economic condition
of society in general, through the conventional planning system. At the end of
Lhe erIod under consIderuLIon, IL wus uurenL Lo uII LhuL Lhe sLundurd oI
living of the average Somali un-doubLedIy Increused . II uII usecLs oI IIIe ure
Luken InLo consIderuLIon (AC, 1q December 1q;q). Suorting that conclusion
uILIn (1q;q) sLuLed LhuL Ior boLh SomuIIs und IoreIgners who huve seen
SomuIIu beIore und uILer Lhe revoIuLIon, Lhe rogress Is usLoundIng . Even u
well-LruIned eye Is IIkeIy Lo be uguze ubouL Lhe rogress.
The regime increased the share of development funds that went to the rural
sector. As Table 4.12 illustrates, the government, through its development
budget, allocated more funds to the rural sector. In the civilian era about one
third more investment went to industry compared to the rural sector. In the
1971-73 plan the money that went to the rural sector dramatically increased. As
Table 4.2 shows, about 40 percent of the 1974-8 development budget was
allocated for the rural sector, whereas the share of the industry was little over 15
ercenL. AII LhIs IndIcuLes Lhe regIme`s commILmenL Lo ImrovIng Lhe IIves oI Lhe
large segments of the society.
Table 4.12, Non-recurrent Government Expenditure in Development Programs, (Million
Somali Shillings)
Area of Investment 1963-1967 1971-1973
Industry 214 87.8
Rural Sector (Agriculture, Fishers,
Forestry, Animal Husbandry, and
Irrigation)
142 220.3
Source: Laitin and Samatar (1987)
Regarding the social inequality, the regime initiated important steps such as
reducing the gap between the lives of the nomads and that of urban dwellers;
115


improving education; improving gender equality in the work place etc.
CommenLIng on LhuL, uILIn noLed LhuL Lhe InsLILuLIonuI Iorms oI democrucy In
the early independence years were coincided with the erosion of social equality
In SomuIIu. The new regIme hus ucLed Lo resLore socIuI equuIILy Lo SomuIIu
(Laitin, 1979). A significant number of the society was definitely benefiting from
these measures (see Laitin, 1979 for more details).
An important concept materialised by the regime was the issue of Iskaa Wax u
Qabso (self-help) that became the synergy between the state and society on the
one hand and a resource for the development programme on the other.
Energised by the speeches of the regime, this period witnessed genuine
community participation in the execution of development projects. Here, the
state supplied food and other materials while the community volunteered their
labour and time. Somalis, in every corner of the country, willingly contributed
their sweat and skills to community development. The motto, Iskaa Wax u
Qabso, ILseII wus InvenLed Lo cuLure Lhe revuIIIng uLmoshere oI coIIecLIve
resonse Lo IocuI robIems (SumuLur, 1q88). Through Lhe sIrIL oI Iskaa Wax u
Qabso schools, hospitals, roads, clubs, dams, bridges etc. were built. Again
Sherr (1q;q), shures hIs exerIence wILh us by sLuLIng LhuL bunLer und sIngIng
resound at the busy construction sites. Girls dextrously load baskets with slabs
of building limestone and tall muscular young men deILIy wIeId sudes . AILer u
hurd duy`s work, men und women reLurned Lo LheIr consLrucLIon sILes under Lhe
self-heI rogrummes und worked Lhere LIreIessIy wILhouL uy.
Indeed, Iskaa wax u Qabso, in those days, became an important contribution to
the Somali planned development programmes. However, the President and his
colleagues used it to tackle even exogenous disasters. One that attracted the eyes
of all was the Mashruuca Bacaad Celinta Shalaanbood (Shalaanbood sand-
dune stabilisation project). Launched by Barre in July 1973, the project aimed to
stop shifting sand dunes along the southern coastal belt of the Indian Ocean.
The sand, propelled by the wind from the Indian Ocean and thus travelling at
high speed, threatened fertile land and a main highway that connects
Mogadishu to the south of the country, including Kismayo. The government
recruited a permanent workforce for the task and asked the Somali community
to help out on Fridays, the Somali holiday. The community responded well and
tracks carried thousands of volunteers to Shalaanbood about 100 km to the
souLh oI Lhe cuILuI. AguIn uILIn (1q;q) wroLe LhuL Lhe rojecL cuughL Lhe
ImugInuLIon oI urbun 'comrudors,` und observers couId see SomuIIs, Irom Lhe
President, to bureaucrat, to nomads, tool in hand, shovelling sand. A truly
cIussIess socIeLy wus LogeLher doIng buLLIe wILh Lhe nuLure.
Another project, worth mentioning here, is the relief operation of the
Dabodheer drought. A severe drought hit some parts of Africa in the first half of
the 1970s. In Somalia, according to Basil Davidson, the drought was even more
severe than elsewhere. Neighbouring Ethiopia was also among those hit hard.
The experience of Somalia and Ethiopia can offer many lessons. In Ethiopia,
lessons are all negative. Because of indifference, corruption, mismanagement,
irresponsible autocratic behaviour, cover ups etc. a huge number of Ethiopians
died when the rains failed (Davidson, 1975b).
116


In Somalia, when the proportion of the drought became clear, in late 1974, a
central committee headed by Major General Hussein Kulmie Afrah, the vice
President and the secretary of the interior, was established. A state of
emergency was declared, the rural literacy campaign was transferred into
becoming a relief operation, all those engaged with the literacy campaign were
asked to involve themselves with relief operations, and every Somali individual
was asked to take extra responsibility to save fellow Somalis and appeals were
made to the international community for relief supplies. All Somalis, including
those in the diaspora, responded in a brotherly way and the international
community contributed generously, with the Soviet Union playing an
extraordinary role.
Estimated figures reveal the devastating nature of the Dabodheer. About one
third of the population was affected and by the end of Dabodheer, data reveals a
human loss of 18 thousand people. In livestock terms, estimates indicate the
death of 5.75 million sheep and goats, one million cattle, and half a million
camels. In the south, the home of the Somali agricultural sector, the devastation
was less severe. However, crop production was seriously reduced by the drought
and when the rains fell, by the end of the drought, unusually heavy floods
devastated some areas in the south and increased food shortages. The long time
impact of Dabodheed wus cIeur, Lhe hoes oI Lhe seII-sufficiency in the near
IuLure were dushed . SuIIes oI IIvesLock und meuL roducLs, Lhe counLry`s
chIeI exorL, drIed u (ACR, 1q;qJ & ACR 1q;J6).
In the emergency programme, according to Davidson, little could be done to
save the livestock as the drought affected a vast area of the country, over one
huII oI Lhe reubIIc`s LerrILory, over oo Lhousund squure kIIomeLres. On Lhe
human side much could be done and, Davidson confirms, was done. Most of
those that died in the relief camps were children who arrived to the camps in a
condition beyond which they could be saved. Over one third of those that lost
their lives, died before they reached the camps or the relief could reach them
52
.
Indeed, that number is, sadly, a big one. But most of those familiar with the
sILuuLIon ugreed LhuL wILhouL Lhe SomuII governmenL`s eIIIcIenL cumuIgn Lhe
IIgure wouId huve been hundreds oI Lhousunds, Lhus SomuIIu`s Iessons were uII
posILIve. DuvIdson (1q;b) sLuLes LhuL |u|II condILIons were resenL Ior
irrecoverable disaster on a nation-wide scale. Courage, honesty, and sound
oIIcy sLoed LhuL dIsusLer Irom LukIng shue.
By the second half of 1975, Dabodheer ended, but work remained to be done.
The most immediate task was solving the problem of the huge number of
nomads that had lost all, or almost all, of their livestock. In the relief camps the
Government started a sedentarisation programme for the nomads. Here the aim
was to re-establish those nomads either as cultivators on the fertile land of the
south or as coastal fishing communities
53
. Nomadic families were grouped into

52
Over 100,000 from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia were among those that came to the relief
camps, and a similar number settled near the Somali border to benefit from the Somali relief
operations (ACR, 1974/5).
53
This was one of the long term objectives for the SRC, even before the drought (Lewis, 2002).
117


villages, 100 families each. Schools were opened for the children and farming
technique training for the adults initiated. In July a massive re-settlement
operation started. With the help of 16 transport aircraft and 160 lorries loaned
by the Soviet Union, the life of about 140 thousand people had been established
mainly in new agricultural communities at Dujuma, Sablaale and
Kurtunwaarey. Another 25 thousand people, who decided to become fishermen,
settled along the Indian Ocean coast. The rest either followed their colleagues
later on, as they initially hesitated to do so, or preferred to go back to their
nomadic life (ACR, 1975/76).
With all these, one could conclude that the SRC leadership tried to show
Somalis that, contrary to their civilian predecessors, they are there for the
people by improving the socio-economic wellbeing of society. Consequently, the
President was inaugurated as Aabihii Ummadda (the father of the nation).
4.7. Conclusion: Constituting New Social Contract
In the theory part (Chapter 1) we saw that in the common agency setting there
are two possibilities: one is that the principals cooperate and the other is that
they compete. I also mentioned that in general, principals are better off if they
co-operate and also maintained that under co-operative behaviour, in all
aspects, the game resembles the simple moral hazard problem (Macho-Stadler
and Perez-Castrillo, 1997). The situation in Somalia during the first half of the
decade I spelled out in Chapter 4 is in parallel with the situation of common
ugency robIem where Lhe rIncIIes decIded Lo cooeruLe. The SovIeL UnIon`s
decision to reform Somali society and thus to support the development aspects
oI Lhe counLry coIncIded wILh Lhe InLeresL oI Lhe SomuIIs us cILIzen`s. ThereIore,
the regime was mainly to involve a single task which was socio-economic
development. In other words, the situation was more like the game presented in
Figure 1.1. Here B is a composition of Somali citizens and the Soviet Union,
rather than a single principal, and the agent is the military regime in Somalia.
AssumIng Lhe ower, Lhrough u mIIILury cou d`eLuL, Burre overLhrew the elected
governmenL, ubroguLed SomuIIu`s IormuI democruLIc ruIe, nuIIIIIed Lhe
parliamentary system of governance, and undermined civil liberties. Given his
potential survival probability, he successfully brought Moscow onto his side,
eliminated political opponents and established his authoritarian rule. However,
as assessed in the previous two sections, he mobilised the society to rally behind
hIm Lhrough Lhe vIsIon oI resLorIng eoIe`s dIgnILy, guIdIng Lhem Lo LheIr Lrue
Somali characteristics and creating a nationalism of oneness. Furthermore, the
regime sought to improve the welfare of the society. In light of this, the military
rule, in its first phase, could be characterised as an agent of its citizens.
By adapting scientific socialism to build new socialist Somalia and granting
requIred mIIILury IucIIILIes Lo Lhe SovIeLs, Burre secured Moscow`s oIILIcuI,
economic and military support. On the other hand, the SRC convinced Somalis
LhuL Lhey huve chosen ScIenLIIIc SocIuIIsm becuuse IL Is Lhe only way for the
rapid transformation of the country into a developed and economically
118


udvunced nuLIon. n LhuL wuy Burre unIIIed Lhe Lwo objecLIves oI hIs Lwo
principals: the Somali citizens and the Soviet Union. As a response to the failure
of the civilian governments, Somalis welcomed the military coup with dozens of
celebratory poems, songs, and traditional dances, and the smooth transition of
ower wus cIeur evIdence oI eoIe`s erceLIon. Burre, on Lhe oLher hund, LrIed
hard to improve the welfare of society. The vast majority of society voluntarily
supported the regime and had many reasons to do so, after a century of colonial
humiliations followed by nine years of political, social and economic chaos.
Hugunku waa, hugunku waa, hayaankii bulshada cusub
Xoogsatada is haysatee horukac tiigsanaysee
Hantiwadaaga Soomaliyeed
Hawsha waw hogaansanahay
Himilada Kacaanka waw hanuunsanahay
Hir caleen leh iyo doog ayaannu hiigsanaa
.
.

Na hogaami Siyaad (Barre)

The regIme`s uchIevemenLs In Lhe eurIy 1q;os, prompted President Julius
Nyerere, un uuLhorILy on AIrIcun socIuIIsm, Lo remurk In 1q;q LhuL |L|he
SomuIIs ure rucLIcIng whuL we In TunzunIu reuch (PuLmun, 1qqo). n shorL,
Lhough Burre`s seIzure oI ower wus noL Lhrough u IegILImuLe rocess, bused on
Lhe recedIng urugruhs, Lhe IIrsL huse oI Burre`s ruIe wus u unIque eru when
post-colonial Somalia witnessed one form of social contract between the state
and society.

119


5 SOMALI STATE FAILURE
5.1. Introduction
In Chapter four we saw that the military regime in Somalia did well as far as the
developmental aspect of the country is concerned. The regime did so because
the interests of the Soviet Union coincided with that of the Somalis as citizens.
The regime also took the opportunity to legitimise its rule through aligning its
policies with the wellbeing of the society in general. However, the same military
regime, as we will see in Chapter 6, eventually led the country into total collapse
and complete anarchy.
My intention in the present chapter is to show the mIIILury regIme`s
transformation from being an agent of its citizens to a predatory state advancing
the interests of a small ruling clique while undermining the interests of society
at large. So the main concern of the chapter is the political factors that were
responsible for such a transformation and the process of transformation.
Chapter 6 will give more attention to the economic behaviour of the regime, in
the last phase of the regime. Before doing so I will summarise the performance
of the formal economy in the 1980s.
5.2. Economic Development
In January 1979, the Somali government adapted a new national Three-Year
Development Plan. The plan envisaged over seven billion Somali shillings of
total expenditure for 1979-81. Agriculture received special attention, over one
billion Somali Shillings of the total expenditure was allocated to it. Almost half
of that sum went to the Bardera Dam Project, which according to the plan was
robubIy Lhe mosL ImorLunL rojecL Lo deveIo Lhe counLry`s economy LhuL Lhe
governmenL hus ever InILIuLed (ACR, 1q;qJ8o). The muIn gouIs oI Lhe rojecL
was to irrigate more than 200,000 hectares of agricultural land and to generate
115m kWh of hydroelectric power for urban, rural, industrial and agricultural
use. Another sector that gained from the plan was infrastructure. It was
specified over 2 billion Somali shillings. The main target was to close major gaps
in the road network and thus highway development became the most important
component in this sector (ACR, 1979/80).
A Five-Year Development Plan for 1982-86 followed the previous three year
plan (see Table 5.1). Here the total investment required was 16.3 billion Somali
shillings. In this period the Somali government stated that it had three main
long-term objectives:
1. To raise the standard of living of the Somali people to a high level.
2. To provide employment opportunities to the entire labour force.
3. To eradicate all forms of exploitations.

120


Table 5.1 Investment for the Five-Year Development Program, 1982-6, By Sector (Million
Somali Shillings)
Sector Investment %
1. Livestock and Forestry 2435.7 14.9
2. Agriculture and Irrigation 4742.8 29.1
3. Fishery 458.8 2.8
4. Water Resources 1628.6 10
5. Mining 557.2 3.4
6. Electricity & Power 685.0 4.2
7. Industry 2080.3 12.8
8. Transport &
Communication 732.1 4.5
9. Tourism 257.2 1.6
10. Commerce 457.2 2.8
11. Forestry & Wild Life 57.6 0.4
12. Education and Sports 1090 6.7
13. Labor and Employment 34.1 0.2
14. Health 337.2 2
15. Rural Develp. & Regional
Plans 701.9 4.3
16. Information & Statistics 47.8 0.3
Total 16300.8 100
Source: Somalia (1983).

Productive sectors, i.e. agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fisheries were given
high priority in the development strategies. Developing basic infrastructure and
the social sector was


S
o
u
r
c
e
:

W
o
r
l
d

B
a
n
k

(
1
9
8
9
)

T
a
b
l
e

5
.
2

O
f
f
i
c
i
a
l

d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t

a
s
s
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
:

r
e
c
e
i
p
t

(
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d

A
f
r
i
c
a
n

c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
)




N
e
t

d
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
m
e
n
t

o
f

O
D
A

f
r
o
m

a
l
l

s
o
u
r
c
e
s












P
e
r

c
a
p
i
t
a


%

o
f









M
i
l
l
i
o
n
s

o
f

d
o
l
l
a
r
s









(
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
)



G
N
P



1
9
8
1




1
9
8
2




1
9
8
3




1
9
8
4




1
9
8
5




1
9
8
6




1
9
8
7




1
9
8
7




1
9
8
7




S
o
m
a
l
i
a




3
7
4




4
6
2




3
4
3




3
5
0




3
5
3




5
1
1




5
8
0




1
0
1
.
6




5
7
.
0




S
e
n
e
g
a
l




3
9
8




2
8
5




3
2
3




3
6
8




2
9
5




5
6
7




6
4
2




9
2
.
4




1
3
.
6




Z
a
m
b
i
a




2
3
2




3
1
7




2
1
7




2
3
9




3
2
8




4
6
4




4
2
9




5
9
.
5




2
1
.
1




M
o
z
a
m
b
i
q
u
e




1
4
4




2
0
8




2
1
1




2
5
9




3
0
0




4
2
2




6
4
9




4
4
.
6




4
0
.
9




S
u
d
a
n




6
3
2




7
4
0




9
6
2




6
2
2




1
,
1
2
8




9
4
5




9
0
2




3
9
.
0




1
0
.
5




T
a
n
z
a
n
i
a




7
0
3




6
8
4




5
9
4




5
5
8




4
8
7




6
8
1




8
8
2




3
6
.
9




2
5
.
2




K
e
n
y
a




4
4
9




4
8
5




4
0
0




4
1
1




4
3
8




4
5
5




5
6
5




2
5
.
6




7
.
0




Z
a
i
r
e




3
9
4




3
4
8




3
1
5




3
1
2




3
2
5




4
4
8




6
2
1




1
9
.
0




1
0
.
7




E
t
h
i
o
p
i
a




2
4
5




2
0
0




3
3
9




3
6
4




7
1
5




6
3
6




6
3
5




1
4
.
3




1
1
.
8



121
122


among the high priority sectors in the plans. Commenting on the 1982-86 plan,
Lhe governmenL suId LhuL Lhe rogrum wIII ussIsL Lhe counLry In breukIng ouL oI
the present vicious cycle of stagnation and decline caused by the fact that major
natural disasters have been superimposed on structurally weak, less developed
economy (SomuIIu, 1q81).
In the livestock sector and agriculture, the aim was to raise production and
export, and to reduce economic wastages. Import substitution was another goal
of the plan, to bring about a more viable balance of payment. In the industry
sector, the government wished to rehabilitate existing factories and to introduce
modern management systems, as well as establish new ones mainly using local
raw materials for import substitution, and promote exports. Another objective
was to encourage private entrepreneurs to participate in the sector; since the
nationalisation act of 1970 the sector was mainly in the hands of the
government.
Growth targets were set up in the plan. It was hoped GNP (excluding
agriculture) would grow at 4.7 percent, agriculture 2.3 percent, population 2.8
percent, gross fixed capital 5 percent, export 2.8 percent and import 4.5 percent
per year.
As far as sources of finances were concerned, the plan was not much different
than previous plans. As Table 5.3 indicates, about 32 percent of the plan was
expected to come from internal sources. However, over two-thirds were
expected to come from external sources. It is interesting to note that Somalia, in
the period under consideration, received an exceptional amount of aid. As Table
5.2 tells us, in 1987, for instance, Somalia received an official development
ussIsLunce whIch wus ; ercenL oI Lhe counLry`s GNP, Lhe highest in the world
and aid per capita of US$ 101.6, the second highest in Africa, after Botswana.
The military government of Somalia indicated four major constraints to its
development objectives:
1. Lack of financial resources for development.
2. Lack of trained and skilled manpower in all sectors.
3. Lack of foreign exchange.
4. Limited absorptive capacity of the economy.
The last development plan published by the military government was the 1987-
91 Five-Year Plan. Here
54
goals similar to those mentioned earlier are outlined
as follows: a higher standard of living; full employment; reducing the resource
gap as a percentage of the GDP and inflation; increasing domestic savings and
self-reliance; and popular participation in development.
An annual growth rate of 5 percent in real GDP was planned and it was expected
that achieving that target would permit a modest improvement in per capita

54
The broad objectives were expected to remain the same for the 1990s. Priorities, however,
were expected to change depending on the performance.
123


income. The percentage contribution of livestock to the total GDP was expected
to decrease. Due to limited availability of a suitable range, a further increase of
livestock was not sought. Increased production, improved marketing and export
competitiveness of the Somali animals in international markets were the main
targets. In the crop production, the hope was to reduce the dependence on food
imports and to obtain the highest level of self-sufficiency. Banana production
was intended to be expanded and production of other commodities, such as
grapefruits and dates, were to increase for domestic demand and their export
potential was to be pursued. Cotton, sugar cane, etc. were to increase in order to
meet the needs of the manufacturing sector.
In the manufacturing sector the government sought to rehabilitate public
enterprises, both their obsolete equipment and managerial competence.
However, the plan was to pave the way for private entrepreneurs to assume a
greater role in the sector. Later on we will see the role of the structural
udjusLmenL rogrummes on Lhe governmenL`s oIIcIes und sLruLegIes.
In the social sector, more cooperation between the government and the rural
communILIes Lo enhunce Lhe IuLLer`s weIIbeIng wus envIsuged. mrovIng socIo-
economic conditions of women and youth was also documented. Improving the
effectiveness of formal education, vocational training and literacy programmes,
health services and population planning were also in the plan.
It was hoped that all other production sectors, such as manufacturing, would
grow at a rate greater than the average.
Table 5.3 Financial Requirement for the 1982-6 Plan: Local versus Foreign Sources,
(Million Somali Shillings)
Source of Investment %
Local Resources
Foreign Resources
Total
31.9
68.1
100.0
Source: Somalia (1981)

Another feature of the economy in this period reflected by the plans, especially
the 1987-91 plan, is the role of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP)
advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As we have seen in the
previous chapter, the economy was hit by the Dabodheer drought. That was
followed by a costly 1977/8 war with Ethiopia. I will deal with the war issue later
In LhIs chuLer. One oI Lhe ImucLs oI Lhe wur wus LhuL IL LermInuLed SomuIIu`s
relationship with the Soviet Union. The Somali economy until the war, as we
have seen, was heavily dependent on Moscow, which was a major source of aid.
Thus the economy was experiencing worsening difficulties in the late 1970s (See
124


Somalia, 1981). Consequently, Somalia became one of the first African nations
Lo ucceL Lhe M`s udjusLmenL rogrummes.
SAPs are conditional lending programmes built on the principle that a recipient
country must accept certain changes to its economic policy and these changes
musL be mude, or uL IeusL Lhe gIven governmenL`s behuvIour Lowurds Lhese
changes must be acceptable against certain criteria, for further loans
55
. The
muIn objecLIves oI Lhe SAP`s, us DuvId PIunk descrIbed IL, ure Lo seek Lo resLore
buIunce Lo u governmenL`s domesLIc und InLernuLIonuI uccounLs, und Lhereby uL
deveIomenL on u susLuInubIe IooLIng (PIunk, 1qq).
The main elements in the adjustment programmes centered on the following
goals
a) strengthening the balance of payments position;
b) reduction in domestic financial imbalances, including less financing of
government deficit;
c) elimination of price distortions in various sectors of the economy;
d) promotion of domestic savings in public and private sectors;
e) increasing trade liberalisation;
f) revival of orderly relationships with trading partners and creditors;
g) mobilisation of additional external resources.
Tarp (1993), argues that to achieve these immediate objectives, the following
specific policy instruments have been generally implemented:
a) credit ceilings and control of money supply;
b) exchange rate adjustment, mainly devaluation;
c) interest rate policy;
d) deregulation of prices of goods, services and factor inputs;
e) fiscal policy, including measures for resource mobilisation as well as the
reduction of public expenditure;
f) trade and payments liberalisation entailing, for example, the removal of
import quotas;
g) institutional reforms with an emphasis on increased capacity to
implement public investments and privatisation;
h) debt rescheduling.
In February 1980, the Somali government signed a stand-by credit agreement of
USD 14 million with the IMF. Here the intention was to stabilise the balance of
payment deficit which had increased over 75% since the war. However, the
agreement was not implemented. A new stand-by agreement was signed by the
two parts in July 1981. Here the IMF granted USD 46.6 million in support of a
new fiscal policy where a two-tier exchange rate was to be introduced (It was

55
The instruments, combined in policy packages, have basically served as the basis for criteria
uguInsL whIch u gIven counLry`s erIormunce hus been ussessed.


125


abolished a year later). In July 1982, the agreement was completed and a further
stand-by ugreemenL wus sIgned by Lhe M und Lhe governmenL. SomuIIu`s
reIuLIonshI wILh Lhe M wus noL u smooLh one. The governmenL`s reIuctance
to fully undertake IMF sponsored reforms caused considerable disputes and
disagreements during the decade. In March 1984, for instance, the government
agreed the terms of a new credit of USD183 million with the IMF. However, In
April 1984, Somalia abandoned its reform programmes and its negotiations
with the IMF broke down. In September 1984, the government agreed to
implement reform policies. Overall, from 1981 to 1990 five IMF stand-by
agreements had been accepted by the Somalia government.
As a result, in the early 1980s, reform programmes were part of the Somali
economIc oIIcIes. n 1q81 Lhe mIIILury (socIuIIsL) governmenL sLuLed LhuL Lhe
long-term objectives of development envisage a definite role for the private
sector and foreign investment in Somalia and in fact in some sectors an
IncreusIng roIe Ior such InvesLmenL Is Ioreseen (SomuIIu, 1q81). The
government also acknowledged that the private sector dominates agriculture,
livestock and small-scale industries and that the sector provides some 80-90
percent of the employment in the economy. In addition, the government
realised that in some large-scale sectors, such as oil prospecting and
development, uranium production and the use of large fishing boats, the
participation of foreign capital and expertise were needed (Somalia, 1981).
M`s reIorm rogrumme hud Lhree muIn objecLIves In SomuIIu: InIIuLIon;
export; and economic growth (Jamal, 1988). By the late 1980s the Somali
government had announced its implementation of most of those IMF
encouraged structural adjustment policies. In the macroeconomic aspect the
government indicated that it took several measures, mainly to improve
revenues, to tackle the fiscal deficit problems, for example: eliminate tariff
exemptions for government agencies; imposition of new taxes on certain
activities; increase of penalties and taxes on other activities; implementing
severe measures to control for smuggling and tax evasion; and increasing
remuneration for tax officials. To improve the trade balance certain measures
including elimination of some state agencies that formerly controlled trade of
certain commodities and acts enabling the private sector to participate in
banking, insurance and shipping were implemented. Following, are some
specific activities intended for reforming the economy:
The Government accepted to reduce its personnel and terminated its
policy of acting as the last-resort employer of all secondary school
graduates
The State monopoly of some sectors, i.e. grain marketing, was abolished
and state trading companies were dissolved
In the financial sector, the government formally permitted foreign banks
to operate in the country and to abolish state monopoly of insurance
The Somali shilling was frequently devaluated and two-tier exchange
rates and an auction system, to determine the value of the shillings, were
occasionally introduced
126


Price control by the state was reduced
The import/export sector was agreed to be liberalised
The Somali government was also expected to increase its revenue and
reduce the expenditure
Before I summarize the economic achievements of the decade let us briefly
consider the impact of the IMF and its SAPs on the process of state failure.
ndeed, Lhe M`s reIuLIonshI wILh SomuIIu, IIke oLher deveIoIng counLrIes,
could be characterised as principal-agent relationship. The fund imposed strict
macroeconomic conditions in which the military government in Somalia was to
ucceL und ImIemenL In order guIn uccess Ior Lhe und`s IendIng rogrummes.
Four months after the financial crises struck Asia in July 1997, Jeffery Sachs
wroLe un urLIcIe In The InuncIuI TImes enLILIed The M s u Power UnLo
LseII, were he emhusIzed LhuL Lhe reuI robIem wILh Lhe und wus Lhe
disparity between the unrestrained power delegated to it and its actual capacity.
Suchs (1qq;) noLed LhuL The M Lhrew LogeLher u druconIun rogrumme Ior
some counLrIes wILh In shorL noLIce wILhouL dee knowIedge oI Lhe counLry's
financial system and without any subtlety as to how to approach the
robIems.This criticism was obviously accurate in the case of Somalia. This,
rather than improving the economic conditions of the country, contributed the
decay of the state institutions in 1980s. This was mainly for two reasons.
Firstly, the lack of profound knowledge of the structure of the Somali economy
not only undercut the main objectives of the SAPs, but also threatened the
already weakened foundations of the state. According to Jamal (1988), failing to
understand the exceptionality of the Somali economy, mainly the nature of the
IIvesLock secLor und Lhe economy`s deendence on remILLunce Irom SomuIIs
working in abroad, the SAPs had little impact on any of its main targets because
the measures undertaken were marginal to the functioning of the Somali
economy. Fur worse, uII In uII, Lhe secLucIe Is one oI Lhe M LryIng Lo Imose
the trappings of a free market economy on Somalia when one exists in all but
name. In some respects - e.g. restricting the importation of consumer goods -
the measures have in fact milILuLed uguInsL Lhe exIgencIes oI u Iree murkeL
(Jamal, 1988).
Secondly, the SAPs contributed to the conditions of political instability. As we
have seen in chapter one, some economic factors, such as declining national
income and economic inequality, were considered as main causes of the social
conflict. According to Chossudovsky (1997), the SAPs imposed by the IMF in
SomuIIu uggruvuLe Lhe IIvIng condILIon oI Lhe socIeLy, urbun urchusIng ower
declined dramatically, government extension programmes were curtailed,
infrastructure collapsed, the deregulation of the grain market and the influx of
food aid led to the impoverishment of farming communities ... the entire fabric
oI Lhe usLoruIIsL economy wus undone.
Thirdly, as we have seen in the previous chapter, in 1970s people relied on the
state for the provision of certain public goods. Although the military
127


government abandoned these activities before the intervention of the IMF in
1980s the SAPs exacerbated the problem further. For instance, as noted earlier
the regime had pushed hard to give educational opportunity to the Somali
children in the urban centres. As Figure 6.1 illustrates the share of social service,
including education, decreased dramatically since mid 1970s. However, the
World Bank data noted that the share of education in the recurrent expenditure
declined from about $82 per annum in 1982 to about $4. According to
Chossudovsky (1997) the reform programmes of the 1980s is to be blamed with
this breakup, at least partially. Similar fragmentation happened in all other
secLors oI Lhe economy und LhIs In Lurn undermIned IurLher Lhe ouIuLIon`s
limited confidence in the government.
Finally, the regime, due to the extreme need for financial resource and its
predatory nature of the 1980s, although it formally accepted conditions and
pretended implementing required policies, formulated escapist strategies to
gain financial access and reformulated required measures to fit its patrimonial
rucLIces. wIII deuI Lhese In Lhe nexL chuLer. However, more generally, the
adjustment programmes undermine patronage within the state, which weakens
oIILIcuI cohesIon. (Crumer und Weeks, zooz) On Lhe oLher hund Lhe regImes
escapist strategy, as we will see latter, worsened the situation further.
Now it Is LIme Lo evuIuuLe Lhe counLry`s economIc erIormunce oI Lhe 1q8os.
DesILe Lhe governmenL`s Iuns und rogrummes und desILe exceLIonuI
support from the donor community, the Somali economy was in serious
disarray.

Source: World Bank (1995)
Let us summarise the macroeconomic performance of the economy in the
1980s. The Somali military government stated that the annual real growth rate
Figure 5.1, Percapita GNP
128


of the GDP at market price was 0.9 percent between 1979-1988. In the same
period the GDP per capita decreased 19.4 percent in real terms (Somalia, 1990).
The balance of payments situation worsened. As Table 5.4 illustrates, the export
sector severely deteriorated. In 1989 the revenue from export was only one-
third of its 1980 figure and the cost of import was over 8 times higher than the
revenue from export.


T
a
b
l
e

5
.
4

B
a
l
a
n
c
e

o
f

P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s

(
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
s

o
f

U
S

d
o
l
l
a
r
s
)





Y
e
a
r

1
9
8
0

1
9
8
1

1
9
8
2

1
9
8
3

1
9
8
4

1
9
8
5

1
9
8
6

1
9
8
7

1
9
8
8

1
9
8
9

E
x
p
o
r
t

2
0
4
.
5
0

2
5
5
.
4
4

2
5
6
.
1
4

1
7
7
.
2
0

1
0
6
.
7
4

1
2
7
.
6
0

9
4
.
6
9

9
4
.
0
0

5
8
.
4
0

6
7
.
7
0

I
m
p
o
r
t

-5
4
0
.
5
6

-
5
1
9
.
4
6

-6
1
0
.
2
8

-4
8
6
.
0
8

-6
0
2
.
8
0

-
4
5
4
.
1
4

-5
3
0
.
6
0

-
4
3
8
.
2
1

-3
8
0
.
5
9

-
5
5
2
.
7
1

B
a
l
a
n
c
e

-3
3
6
.
0
6

-2
6
4
.
0
2

-
3
5
4
.
1
4

-3
0
8
.
8
8

-4
9
6
.
0
6

-3
2
6
.
5
4

-
4
3
5
.
9
1

-
3
4
4
.
2
1

-
3
2
2
.
1
9

-
4
8
5
.
0
1

S
o
u
r
c
e
:

W
o
r
l
d

B
a
n
k

(
1
9
9
5
)

129
130



According to government figures, the ordinary budget balance deteriorated over
time, from a surplus equivalent to an average of 1.2 percent of the GDP in the
early 1970s to a deficit equal to 6.5 percent of the GDP in late 1987. As Table 5.5
deIcLs, In 1q8; Lhe revenue wus Iess Lhun huII oI Lhe governmenL`s exendILure,
or in other words the deficit was larger than the revenue.
Table 5.5 Central Government's Current Budget

Average Average
1984 1985 1986 1987 1970-75 1981-83

(million Somali
Shillings)

Revenues 521 2994 3774 5220 9595 10018
Expenditure -476 -4086 -6663 -7910 -12765 -21021
Balance 36 -1092 -2889 -2690 -3170 -11003

(% of GDP)
Revenues 16.1 10.4 6.1 6.0 8.0 5.9
Expenditure 14.9 -14.2 -10.7 -9.1 -10.7 -12.4
Balance 1.2 -3.8 -4.6 -3.1 -2.7 -6.4
Source: Somalia (1990)
Sky-rocketing inflation, unbearable successive devaluations of the Somali
shilling and a soaring consumer price index were the main features of the
Somali economy in the 1980s. The productive sectors were not doing well
either
56
.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the military government tried hard,
with some success, to improve the living standards of society in the first half of
the 1970s; and beyond that, as I noted earlier, in that period the regime had the
character of being as an agent of its citizens. However, in the mid-1980s it was
clear that the regime was failing society and the Somali economy in the late
1980s was approaching a complete collapse. In the rest of this chapter I will
detail one of the reasons for these changes of behaviour: Why the military
regime moved from being an agent of its citizens to a predatory regime. I will
give more attention to the process of the transformation that happened during
the second half of the 1970s.
Waddadii caddayd, cagta saarnayoo, Ku carraabisee,
Cimrigii jiriyoow, Jiriyoow jiriyoow, caynaanka hay

56
I will deal more with these in the next chapter.
131


Weligaa hay.
Caqli toosanoo, Caafimaad qabaad, Nagu caymisee,
Cududoo midiyo, Caanaha wadaag, waa caadilnimee,
Cimrigii jiriyoow, jiriyoow jiriyoow, caynaanka hay,
Weligaa hay.
Abdi Muhumad Amin (1971)

Waddadii caddayd, Cidhif dhaaftayoo, cayn kale u rogtee,
Cimrigii dhacyoow, caynaanka daa, Noo sii daa.
Cududdaan midayn, Caanaan dhansiin, Nagu cidhib jartee,
Cimrigii dhacyoow, dhacyoow dhacyoow, Caynaanka daa,
Noo sii daa.
Ciilbaan qabnaa, Keligii cunoow, Ciiddaad geliye,
Cimrigii dhacyoow, Caynaanka daa
Abdi Muhumad Amin (1981)
5.3. Abrogating the Social Contract
5.3.1. External Reconstruction
As noted in the previous chapter, in the first years of its rule the military regime
in Somalia concentrated on the local problems, namely consolidation of power
and socioeconomic reconstruction, and pursued a low profile approach in
external affairs. According to Lewis (2002), due to the dramatic progress
achieved by the SRC on local development and the consolidation of its authority,
the Somali government initiated an aggressive policy, which focused more on
external affairs. Perhaps a series of events that provided Somalia an opportunity
to play international/regional roles, in 1971-2, influenced further the Somali
governmenL`s vIew on exLernuI uIIuIrs. n one yeur, SomuIIu dId Lhe IoIIowIng:
became a member of the UN Security Council; assumed the chairmanship of the
Council in the first session of 1972 and the chairmanship of the UN Apartheid
Committee; secured the chairmanship of the OAU Ministerial Committee; and
hosted for the first time the Summit meeting of the East and Central African
Region. Somalia, as a natural bridge between Africa and the Arab and Muslim
132


World
57
and being the closest ally for the Soviet Union in Africa, had a
comparative advantage within Africa.
Consequently, by 1972 it was very clear that the government was upgrading
SomuIIu`s exLernuI sLundIng. nILIuIIy, Lhe governmenL sLurLed IuyIng u
prominent role in African affairs. Three main strategies towards Africa could be
figured out. Firstly, the Somali government played the role of peacemaker
beLween AIrIcun sLuLes. BoLh Burre und Omur ArLeh GhuIIb, SomuIIu`s IoreIgn
minister, pressed hard to peacefully settle a military conflict between Uganda
and Tanzania, the main problem to confront East Africa in 1971-2. Secondly,
Somalia extended support, mainly political, for the African liberation
movements. Particular attention was given forces against the South African
apartheid regime as well as the Portuguese and French colonies. Mogadishu
collaborated with Cuba in the training of forces for the African Liberation
movemenLs (ewIs, zooz). Burre`s governmenL noL onIy suorLed Lhe
movements against these colonial governments, but also directly confronted
these states. For instance, when the President of the Ivory Coast, Felix
Houphouet-Biogny, presented a dialogue with South Africa, Barre took a
leading role within the OAU in opposing that proposal, by saying that he feared
that such an issue would divide Africa and preferred that courageous leaders
like President Houphouet-BIogny exercIse LheIr couruge In more osILIve
usecLs oI our sLrIvIng (ACR, 1q;1J;z). The SomuII governmenL wus umong Lhe
first African countries to threaten withdrawal from the Olympic Games in
Munich, had the Rhodesian team been allowed to take part. Finally, Somalia
sLurLed IuyIng u IeudershI roIe regurdIng AIrIcu`s InLeresLs InLernuLIonuIIy. n
early 1972, as chairman of the Security Council, Somalia pressed hard in
persuading the UN Security Council to hold its February meeting in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, the first-ever meeLIng In AIrIcu by Lhe CouncII. SomuIIu`s roIe
In AIrIcun AIIuIrs euked In 1q;q uILer hosLIng Lhe OAU summIL und Burre`s
assumption of the chairmanship of the organisation. He also sought the role of
OAU`s secreLury generuI Ior hIs IoreIgn mInIsLer, Mr. GhuIIb.
During the same period Somalia successfully tried to improve its relationship
with the Arab World. In November 1971, on his way home from Moscow, Barre
vIsILed SuudI ArubIu, EgyL, ruq und SyrIu und ussured LhuL Lhe vIsIL wus very
IruILIuI. Al-Jamhuria, the main Iraqi newspaper, described the Somali
revoIuLIon us Lhe udvunce IronL Ior Lhe Arub nuLIon In AIrIcu (ACR, 1q;1J;z).
Earlier, Mogadishu reaffirmed its total support for Egypt in the Middle East
dispute and declared that it would give unqualified support to the Palestinians
(ACR, 1971/72). By the end of 1972, Somalia significantly improved its relation
with Arab states, no matter what their ideological orientation was. In 1973,
SomuIIu`s concern over ILs border dIsuLe wILh ELhIoIu Increused, und
consequently Somalia started identifying itself even more with the Arab cause
during the October War. In September, Somalia exressed ILs suorL Ior Lhe
sLruggIe oI Arub eoIe Lo recover LheIr Iund und reguIn LheIr rIghLs. DurIng Lhe
war Mogadishu, to help Arab states overcome shortages, offered to send its
entire supplies of meat, preserved fish and livestock to Egypt and Syria. It

57
It contested on this role with Sudan (Lewis 2002)
133


initiated anti-Israel moves in the OAU and the UN. In March 1974, Mogadishu
proposed for an emergency conference of the Red Sea Arab States to discuss the
danger of an Israeli presence in the region and pledged to host the conference.
During that the year, Somalia also deepened its relations with other Arab states,
such as the Gulf states, North African states, Sudan and South Yemen (ACR,
1973/74).
All this paved a way for Somalia, the first non-Arabic speaking country, to gain
membership to the Arab League in 1974. The Somali government claimed that
LhIs wus done becuuse oI SomuIIu`s hIsLorIc LIes wILh Lhe Arub worId, Lhe
legitimacy of the Arab cause and the indispensability of Afro-Arab unity.
However, most observers believe that economic interest was the driving force
behind Somalia taking such steps (Ahmed Samatar, 1988). An important factor
Ior MogudIshu`s InvoIvemenL on Lhe Arub Issue wus ILs InLenLIon Lo guIn Arub
support for its reunification agenda, especially its dispute with Ethiopia.
However, there is no doubt that economic interest superseded any other interest
and within a year Mogadishu reaped the fruits.
oIIowIng udmIssIon Lo Lhe Arub Ieugue, SomuIIu seL ouL Lo uLLrucL IoreIgn uId
from the Arab states. A number of delegations toured the Arab world during the
yeur . ruq ugreed Lo consLrucL un oII reIInery, und Lo suIy crude oII; IL uIso
provided a three-yeur Ioun Lo cover SomuIIu`s o ercenL oI Lhe cosL. The
Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development gave a loan of US$7.3 m. In
September, following a tour by Osman Mohamed Gelle to Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, the Yemen Arab Republic and
Egypt, grants totaling Sh234 m were announced, mainly from Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Fund also agreed to finance the construction of a new
power station in Mogadishu in December at a cost of over Sh140 m. Livestock
agreements were made with the UAE and Qatar; air and communications
agreements with Sudan and Saudi Arabia; and economic and trade co-operation
agreements were reached with most of the Arab states. Other agreements
involved Iraqi assistance in improving the Somali insurance system, through a
special company; The Saudis provided finance for the Maqdis dam on the
Shabelle river, which will cost Sh.55 m; finance from Abu Dhabi for an abattoir,
canning factory and irrigation scheme at Berbera, worth 28 m. Following a
vIsIL by Ibyu`s PresIdenL GhudduII In ebruury, ugreemenLs were sIgned on
shIIng und ugrIcuILure; joInLIy owned comunIes were seL u (ACR, 1974/75).
Though the EEC and Italy continued their aid programmes in Somalia,
MogudIshu`s reIuLIon wILh Lhe WesL hud remuIned cooI sInce Lhe mIIILury cou,
while its relations improved significantly with the East. Somalia maintained a
good relationship with the Peoples Republic of China. This relationship with
China provided significant economic aid, mainly by constructing highways and
contributing to the health and agricultural sectors. However, China did not want
to intervene in Somali internal affairs and its disputes with the neighbouring
counLrIes. SomuIIu`s reIuLIons wILh eusL Euroeun counLrIes were deLermIned by
its relations with Moscow.
134


5.3.2. The Soviet Union: An Unhappy Principal
In the previous chapter we saw that the Soviet Union at least facilitated, if not
directly encouraged, the smooth implementation of the military takeover. We
also saw how Moscow devoted itself to supporting the regime in general and
Burre`s wIng oI Lhe SRC In urLIcuIur, In Lhe cuse oI u dIsuLe umong Lhe SRC
leadership. In addition, Moscow supplied substantial amounts of economic and
military aid to Somalia.
However, after the first several years of its relationship with the regime, the
Soviet Union started to reconsider its position. It realised that the regime was
not properly addressing its long run objectives, in particular the fact that the
vision of constructing a new Somalia based on scientific socialism was not on
Lhe rIghL Lruck. SeveruI IucLors romLed Moscow`s concIusIon.
Firstly, the deep presence of Islum In Lhe SomuII socIuI IubrIc und Lhe regIme`s
reluctance to aggressively address this issue was the main source of Soviet
disappointment. By choosing socialism as a way of life for Somalis, the regime
put itself into an unfavourable position as far as religion was concerned: Firstly,
Moscow wanted to see a new Somalia based on Marxist-Leninist principles, free
from religious influence. Secondly, the Somali people, on the other hand,
believed that Islam had an indispensable role in their political, social and
economic spheres of life and could not be excluded from it. Previously, Somalis,
led by the religious leaders, resisted even modernising the educational system.
Thirdly, some Somali socialist ideologues, particularly young Marxists, like
Soviets, wanted Somalia as an ideal secular socialist state. And finally, Marxist-
Leninists ideas about religion provided ample opportunity for political
opponents. Here, besides the clan factor, religion could be used as an
instrument for mobilisation.
Barre formulated his strategy for each of those issues. For the Somali public
Barre maintained his rejection of the idea that Islam was the opium of the
eoIe und urgued LhuL Lhe Korun Is Lhe IounduLIon oI our moruI und eLhIcuI
system and the government has the responsibility of supporting and advancing
IL und InsIsLed hIs weII known non-conLrudIcLIon urouch. AccordIng Lo hIm
Lhere Is no conIIIcL beLween sIum und socIuIIsm, us Lhey boLh enshrIne Lhe
principles of human dignity, mutual respect, cooperation, progress, justice and
weIIbeIng Ior uII (CusLungo, 1q;1). ReuIIsIng Lhe dunger und LryIng Lo gIve room
Ior hIs socIuIIsL Ideus In SomuIIu`s sIum, he urLIcuIuLed LhuL hIsLorIcuIIy, our
people, strongly believing in Islam, have unanimously fought all threats against
their faith and their country. Today their faith is stronger then ever. As far as
socialism is concerned, it is not a heavenly message like Islam but a mere
system for regulating the relations between man and his utilisation of the means
of the production in this world. If we decide to regulate our national wealth, it is
noL uguInsL Lhe essence oI sIum (PuLmun, 1qqo). He wus quoLed us suyIng LhuL
our sIum Leuches us LhuL ILs InherenL vuIues ure erennIuI und conLInuuIIy
evolving as people progress. These basic tenets of our religion cannot be
interpreted in a static sense, but rather as dynamic force, as a source of
InsIruLIon Ior conLInuous udvuncemenL (uILIn, 1q;6). n uddILIon, he LrIed,
135


with some success, to bring the religious leaders on board und urgued Lhe need
for our religious leaders to probe within the social reality of our people, and
wrest from our religion its practical teachings, thus making available its ideas
and actions in the interest of general progress. Among our people, religious
leaders must play a galvanising role to activate a society advancing towards the
high values of Islam, which have always been the foundation of our social and
oIILIcuI orgunIsuLIon und, wILh hIs usuuI Lone, concIuded LhuL Lhe SomuII
Democratic RepubIIc wIII sure no eIIorL Lo IoIIow Lhe uLh Lo roserILy . ThIs
uLh Is IuId ouL by sIum (uILIn, 1q;6). ReIIgIous Ieuders were uIso LruIned Lo
cuLch u und muny oI Lhem uroved Burre`s socIuIIsL rogrumme und ruyed
consLunLIy Ior Lhe revoIuLIon. Farther more, reliable religious figures, such as
SheIkh AbduIqunI SheIkh Ahmed, who noL onIy uroved Burre`s non-
contradictory thesis but argued that spreading false rumours, that socialism
conIIIcLs wILh sIum, Is conLrury Lo Lhe rIncIIes oI sIum, were put in charge
oI Lhe counLry`s reIIgIous uIIuIrs (ACR, 1q;zJ, 1q;Jq). The sLuLe medIu, boLh
the press and radio, pressed to spread the non-contradictory message.
or Lhe rudIcuI socIuIIsL SomuIIs, Burre`s mussuge wus sImIy LhuL Lhe Iounders
of Scientific Socialism were not against a religion in particular but they exposed
and disproved the reactionary elements of religion that dominate [the] sound
reusonIng oI munkInd und hence hInder |Lhe| rogress oI socIeLy (ewIs,
2002). As we have seen in the previous chapter, the socialist ideologues, who
approved the regimes policies, were welcomed and given certain positions in the
government and those who tried to resist these policies, naturally including
those unhappy with the presence of Islam, were expelled from the
administration or even jailed.
For the religious leaders who resisted the regime on religious grounds and
political opponents who tried to take advantage of religion, the response was
even hursher. The reucLIonurIes, Burre underIIned, wanted to create a rift
beLween socIuIIsm und sIum becuuse socIuIIsm Is noL LheIr InLeresL. So Ior
Burre even Lhose MusIIm LheoIogIuns, who oosed Lhe regIme`s oIIcy mereIy
on a given policy contradicting with Islamic teachings, belonged to the
reactionaries who either wanted to use religion for their selfish interests or were
Wadaad Xumeyaal (the pseudo-religious men), as he used to call them, while,
as he argued, he personally understood the essence of Islam better than they
did. A testing moment happened In 1q;, durIng Women`s nLernuLIonuI Yeur,
when the SRC approved a family law which, directly contradicting the Koran,
entitles an equal share in the inheritance between the boys and girls. Soon after
Burre uncovered Lhe decIsIon, Lhe mosL exIosIve conIronLuLIon beLween sIum
and socialism occurred. Religious leaders took the mosques by strongly
denouncing the act with the intention of discrediting it. They emphasised that
un ucL IIke LhIs noL onIy shows Lhe regIme`s dIsresecL Lo sIum, buL uIso ILs
InLenLIon Lo eIImInuLe sIum und secuIurIse Lhe socIeLy. However, Lhe regIme`s
reaction raised many eyebrows
58
. Ten theologians were executed and many

58
Exploiting religion to undermine and weaken the powers of the state is punishable by death
penalty, according to the law of twenty-six articles, as it was called, promulgated in September,
1970.
136


others given long-Lerm ImrIsonmenL. n hIs usuuI IIne Burre commenLed: I
both Islam and socialism advocuLe jusLIce, equuIILy und ImrovemenL oI eoIe`s
lives, who can tell me where they differ? Where do they contradict one another?
What harm is there in having the faith of Islam, and at the same time applying
socialism as an economic and political system through which our country can
muke rogress? wouId suy none (Ahmed SumuLur, 1q88).
The regime succeeded in convincing Moscow that the situation was more
dangerous and required long-term social transformation rather than direct
conflict with society, which may have given ample opportunity for reactionary
forces. According to Pestalozza (1974), the Gaveire group, by seeking Islamic
Socialism, belonged to this category. Perhaps, that is why Moscow sought their
execution. Moscow sent a delegation to supporL Burre`s own RussIun udvIser
who strongly advised that an example should be made and, according to Africa
Confidential, the decision was apparently based on that advice (AC July 6,
1q;). However, uILer severuI yeurs Moscow`s convIcLIon LhuL socIuIIsm would
udvunce uL Lhe exense oI sIum wILhered uwuy und Lhe regIme`s reIucLunce Lo
rule out Islam become apparent. By 1973, Somali officials openly admitted that
socialism in Somalia included a large dose of pragmatism and that practical
needs dictated by local conditions, rather than dogma, take first priority, and
Lhus Lhe MusIIm reIIgIon Is vIgorousIy uheId In ubIIc IIIe und Lhe dIIemmu
osed by Lhe uLheIsm oI dIuIecLIc muLerIuIIsm Is sLudIousIy shunned (AC
Dec.1q, 1q;). Burre`s InLenLIon becume cIeur in 1976 after he was convinced, as
we will see later, that there are better alternative than Moscow. He informed the
RussIuns LhuL Lo uLLuIn our sLruLegIc gouI . we musL Luke uccounL oI Lhe
reuIILIes . n our counLry reIIgIon Is noL jusL u muLLer oI IuILh: it is inherent in
our cuILure und hus ILs own socIuI sLrucLure . we decIded LhuL In our counLry
Lhere shouId be no sLruggIe beLween reIIgIon und socIuIIsm. CommenLIng on
LhIs PuLmun (1qqo) suId LhuL SIud |Burre| wus suyIng LhuL sIum - a serious
problem in Soviet eyes - wus here Lo sLuy.
Secondly, Moscow was, beyond the presence of Islam, unhappy with
MogudIshu`s IdeoIogIcuI orIenLuLIons. n Lhe ervIous chuLer Louched uon
Lhe umbIguILy oI Burre`s versIon oI scIenLIIIc socIuIIsm. One oI Lhe robIems here
was the economic aspect of the future New Socialist Somalia. The regime,
though it nationalised some sectors of the economy, left other sectors, including
Lhe IIvesLock und bununu IunLuLIon, Lhe counLry`s muIn exorL ILems, In rIvuLe
hands. Thus the mixed economy was maintained. The Russians initially
assumed that Somalia as an African country transforming itself into socialism
should adopt a mixed economy as a necessary transitional step. However, as we
noLed eurIIer, Burre muInLuIned LhuL rIvate ownership is allowed in scientific
socIuIIsm In SomuIIu (PuLmun, 1qq1). And In 1q;z, uL HuIune NuLIonuI
Orientation Centre, he reminded new trainees about narrow-minded orthodox
MurxIsLs by suyIng LhuL Comrude V. . enIn conIIscuLed such und such
property after the Great October Revolution, or in [the] 1940s Comrade Mao
Tse-Tung did this and that in his country against the reactionary forces. These
people are totally ignoring the historical context of the teachings of the great
socialist thinkers. They recite quotations from the founders of the scientific
socIuIIsm ouL oI LheIr roer conLexL (ewIs, zooz).
137


Furthermore, the military government actively encouraged the private sector.
One of its policies to improve the agricultural sector was to create investment
incentives for the private owners intending to modernise their production.
Thus, the government authorised the national banks to grant credit facilities to
these farmers.
uLer on Lhe SovIeLs exressed LheIr dIsconLenL wILh Lhe regIme`s economic
oIIcIes. G. V. Kuzukov commenLIng on Lhe SomuII GovernmenL`s rIvuLe secLor
encourugemenLs noLed noLwILhsLundIng Lhe ImIemenLuLIon In 1q;o oI urLIuI
nationalisation the activity of the private sector did not lessen. The financing by
the banks of the activity of the private sector at the beginning of 1971 exceeds its
deposits in the bank by 49% [sic]. This is the characteristic feature, indicating
Lhe ucLIvILy buL noL u reducLIon oI 'ucLIvILIes` oI Lhe rIvuLe secLor In SomuIIu
after the revolutionary overLhrow oI 1q6q (PuLmun, 1qqo).
5.3.2.1. From Development to Unification
To escape from these dilemmas, Moscow started two main approaches so as to
institutionalise itself in Somalia. The first method was to seek a formal treaty of
friendship with Somalia. The SRC came to power fully understanding the
SomuII ubIIc`s reIerences und us we huve seen decIded Lo deuI wILh Lhe socIo-
economic problems. When it come to the issue of Greater Somalia the regime
decIded Lo LeII SomuIIs und Lhe worId LhuL Lhe mIssIng LerrILorIes wIII noL be
neglected, but diplomatic channels will be pursued rather than military.
AddressIng Lhe nuLIon, on 1 JuIy 1q;o Burre suId |w|e In Lhe SomuII DemocruLIc
Republic do not intend to kindle the fire of destruction in the Horn of Africa. We
have heard, and some of us have seen the effects and repercussions of war,
which twice struck this world and left behind untold sorrow and suffering. What
we intend to do is to press for a peaceful and amicable settlement of all disputes
which engulf us and our neighbors, and which sow the seeds of suspicion and
hatred between the peoples and governments of our part of the world. If these
perennial and thorny problems are to be solved, the efforts of all States
concerned will be concentrated on the eradication of the arch enemies of
mankind - disease, ignorance, and poverty, and on economic and social
beLLermenL oI our eoIes (SDR, 1q;q).
Considerable diplomatic effort had been devoted to the issue by Barre and his
Foreign Secretary Mr. Omar Arteh Ghalib, until 1974. Three years later, Barre
told Emperor Haile Selassie
59
LhuL beIng uwure oI humun IruIILy und vunILy oI
man which may some times hold the tongues of brave men and there by prevent
them from taking actions dictated by the realities of a situation, I have decided
not to be persuaded by such vain considerations for I am convinced that there is
no bruver ucL nor Is Lhere u rouder sLund Lhun Lo seek euce und revenL wur
(SDR, 1974).

59
Emperor of Ethiopia
138


However, Ior Moscow, Burre`s urouch Lo IInd u euceIuI soIution on the
border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, was unfavourable to its objective
of furthering its influence on the military regime in Somalia. In early 1972 the
Soviet leadership realised that President Anwar Sadat, frustrated that the USSR
was not providing Egypt with enough weapons, may break diplomatic ties with
Moscow. For that reason, and possibly reinforced by a pro-communist abortive
cou In Sudun whIch severeIy dumuged Sudun`s reIuLIons wILh Moscow, SomuIIu
received the status of viable alternative. Accordingly, Soviet politicians started
recruiting Somali leaders. However, SRC leaders seemed reluctant to play the
role.
Probably, the best strategy to manipulate Somalis for greater Soviet presence,
both militarily and politically, was to reshue Lhe SRC`s oIIcy Lowurd mIssIng
LerrILorIes. One oI Lhe muIn Lusks Ior MurshuI A. Grechko`s, Lhe SovIeL DeIence
Minister, four days visit to Mogadishu in February 1972 was to encourage Barre
and his military regime to understand the situation. That and numerous
following delegations travelling between Moscow and Mogadishu, discussed the
issue. Public statements were made for military cooperation between the two
und SomuIIs were remInded LhuL Lhe USSR consIsLenLIy suorLed und does
support peoples fighting for their liberation, national independence and social
rogress (PuLmun, 1qqo). However, Lhe Issue wus much deeer Lhun Lhese
carefully designed public statements. According to General Mohamed Nor Galal,
on the underground level talks, Moscow confirmed to Somalis that it was
prepared to support Somalia, if the latter were ready to take the opportunity
60
.
To further their mission Russians sought a treaty of friendship with Mogadishu,
however, as speculated, the SRC declined to sign that treaty (Makinda, 1987; see
Bell, 1975).
Exactly two years after Sadat asked, in July 1972, the Soviet military advisers in
Egypt to leave the country, Moscow achieved its objective. On July 1974,
Somalia and the USSR signed the well known treaty of friendship and
cooperuLIon, |L|he IIrsL oI ILs kInd beLween USSR und u bIuck AIrIcun sLuLe
whIch murked 1q;q us u momenLous yeur In Lhe Horn oI AIrIcu und
LrunsIormed IILLIe SomuIIu InLo Lhe IourLh IurgesL mosL heuvIIy urmed sLuLe In
bIuck AIrIcu, . |und| In 1q;6 SomuIIa had probably the strongest air-strike
cuucILy In bIuck AIrIcu (PuLmun, 1qqo). WIIIIum ZurLmun descrIbed Lhe LreuLy
us un InsLILuLIonuIIzed hIgh oInL oI reIuLIons (MukIndu, 1q8;). SInce Lhen Lhe
SRC`s sLruLegy, concernIng GreuLer SomuIIu, wus reIormed and a year latter in
1975 Mogadishu started supporting local, armed independence movements in
Oguden. ThIs wus Lhe InILIuI sLe Ior SomuIIu`s mIIILury conIronLuLIon wILh
Ethiopia - a step towards the Ogaden War.
5.3.2.2. Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
The other approach was to encourage the SRC to establish a vanguard Marxist-
Leninist party, which is essential for a socialist country to perform effectively.

60
See e.g. the BBC interview with General M. N. Galal.
139


By 1971 it was apparent to the Soviets that Somalia needed to reform itself on
the bases of a political party and other public organisations. Such a party was
requIred Lo orgunIse Lhe musses In order Lo urLIcIuLe In Lhe counLry`s decIsIon
making process and Somalia still lacked one, and by 1972 the Soviets believed
that Somali officials acknowledged the advantages of creating a political party.
As we saw in Chapter five the Soviets believed that Barre was their man both in
Somalia and in the SRC and they relied on him in person rather than through
firm institutional arrangements. However, Moscow, with the experience it
gained from its former friends in developing countries, including Egypt, was
aware that military aid did not guarantee a permanent foothold in an African
counLry. PuLmun (1qqo) sLuLes n SomuIIu, LhereIore, Lhe SovIeLs soughL Lo
institutionuIIse ILs osILIon Lhrough Lhe esLubIIshmenL oI urLy Lo urL reIuLIons.
ThereIore, Moscow`s muIn gouI on urLy buIIdIng In SomuIIu wus Lo Iree ILseII
from dependence on Barre personally. Such a party would provide an
institutional commitment between two socialist organisations and the hope was
LhuL when such u urLy esLubIIshes ILseII, SIyud |Burre| hImseII muy no Ionger
be IndIsensubIe Lo Lhe RussIuns (CrozIer, 1q;). n shorL, Moscow wus
formulating a better alternative in Somalia.
The Soviet Union`s oInL wus suorLed by eoIe`s growIng desIre Lo
urLIcIuLe In LheIr IuLure desLIny, wILh Sherr noLIng LhuL |d|urIng Lhe Lours
around the country one repeatedly heard, sometimes from the leaders,
sometimes from the rank and file workers, regrets in the Republic concerning
Lhe ucuLeIy IeIL Iuck oI u urLy und ILs guIdIng InIIuence (PuLmun, 1qqo).
As I noted earlier, before the coup there were several socialist parties in
Somalia: The Greater Somalia League (the Great); Somali Democratic Union
(SDU); and Hawl & Hantiwadaag (Labour & Socialism). These Parties,
particularly the SDU, with the help of the Italian Communist parties,
established relationships with the European and Soviet communist parties. The
SDU was, reputedly, financially supported by the Soviet Bloc countries
(Castagno, 1964) and gained educational training in these countries for its
supporters.
After the coup, most of these leftist groups sough to closely identify themselves
with the regime. They warmly welcomed the military move, supported it and in
some ways became informal pressure groups and advocates for socialism. The
SRC on the other hand used these groups to its advantage as intellectuals and as
an instrument for mobilisation. In 1970, these groups, with other intellectuals
who were critical of the civilian regime, was consulted by the SRC and were
among those who recommended that socialism is the best choice for Somalia.
And the leaders of the PRO/NPO were mainly recruited from these groups. The
NPO maintained the relationship between the system and the communist
parties in the Soviet Bloc and pursued sending trainees to these countries. These
IeILIsL grous, robubIy uwure oI Moscow`s InLenLIon Ior Lhe oIILIcuI urLy,
pressed for the formation of a party. The main figures of these groups believed
that under a socialist party they would be the ideal candidates for top national
offices and thus would accrue significant power and influence in the regime.
Most probably, these were the leaders advocating for the formation of the
140


political party mentioned by Sherr (above). However, Barre was aware of this
danger.
In 1972, preparations for the political party proceeded in Somalia i.e. the SRC
tried to devolve power to local authorities, it initiated a process of establishing
trade unions, the public Relations Office (PRO) was expanded and branches
were established in all villages, districts and provinces and later on, in 1973, it
was transformed into the National Political Office (NPO) which became the
foundation stone for the projected socialist party. On 21 October 1973, on the
fourth anniversary of the revolution, Barre announced that a political party was
Lo be Iormed In Lhe counLry soon by sLuLIng LhuL SomuIIs were rIe oI oIILIcs
und reudy Lo Iorm LheIr own oIILIcuI urLy (ACR, 1q73/74).
However, it took three more years for the party to be formally established. The
delay was assumed to be caused by disagreement within the leadership about
the need and timing of setting up the political party. Barre, with other SRC
members, was worried that their power base would be weakened if an ideal
Marxist party was established. Several particular dangers could be figured out.
Firstly, the party if properly formed, would not only give the masses an
opportunity to participate in the decision making process but may also change
the direction of their decisions. Local councils, for instance, were formally
appointed by the President, but if a party were established, people expected that
that approach would be reversed. As the chairman of the Hiiraan regional
councII exIuIned Lo Lhe eoIe, In Lhe IuLure when we wunL Lo huve eIecLIons,
the villages will elect their representatives to the district congress (as will the
various quarters of the towns); the district congress will elect the regional, and
Lhe regIonuI Lhe nuLIonuI congress (ACR, 1q;qJ;).
Secondly, the abolishing of the SRC and the formation of a political party would
possibly give opportunities to political contenders, including young radical
Marxists. Some groups were expecting that the party formation would provide a
mass base for mobilisation and were eager to see the new Party established.
Indicating the government caution and reminding the people of their experience
with political parties during the civilian regimes, Ismail Ali Abokor, Minister of
nIormuLIon, noLed LhuL |w|e musL be cureIuI noL Lo reeuL Lhe Iormer mIsLukes
. The new urLy, whIch wIII be u socIuIIsL urLy, musL be roerIy reured
(ACR, 1974/75).
Thirdly, the party, if properly established, would be a source of power
independent from the army. This, however, would be to the advantage of
socialist intellectuals, such as M. A. Sheikh, Weyrah, and Omar Salad over
military officers, such as Barre. Following this logic Barre and other SRC
members would loose the advantage given them by the military coup. Finally,
Burre knew LhuL he muy no Ionger be Moscow`s mun In MogudIshu II u IIrm
Leninist-Marxist political party would be established.
Consequently, Barre decided to act before it was too late. The regime decided to
create its own cadres for the projected party. Since the former socialist
ideologues in the system were seen as a threat, independent sources for reliable
141


cadres were needed by the SRC. Training courses for ministries and state
ugencIes` workers In trade unionism was established, the NPO was directed to
exLend ILs neLwork oI IocuI oIIIces Lo uImosL uII ermunenL seLLIemenLs In order
Lo educuLe Lhe necessury cudres Ior Lhe urLy (ACR, 1q;qJ) und Lhe nsLILuLe oI
PoIILIcuI ScIence wus InILIuLed. The institute orientates, develops and prepares
cadres for the party, social organizations and academic clubs. It is the only
cenLre LhuL couId orgunIze urLy educuLIon und oIILIcuI orIenLuLIon (XHKS,
1976).
In the regions, a massive re-organisation of local government was implemented:
major old regions were split up, for instance Benadir and Upper Jubba were
divided into three regions each; and new regions were formed. A number of
revolutionary council chairmen, both at the regional and district levels, were
removed from their positions in the North-Western and North-Eastern
regions
61
. At the national level, the SRC started to clean the system from
potentially hostile elements, so that their elimination would not create
immediate turmoil. In 1975 a series of mass-dismissals were undisclosed
throughout the year. Some one hundred senior officials, including a significant
number of director-generals and ambassadors, were chased out from the
governmenL. TheIr uIIeged crIme wus LhuL Lhey couId noL comIy wILh Lhe
rIncIuIs oI Lhe revoIuLIon (ACR, 1q;J6).
On the one hand, the party was promoted as the highest political institution in
the country; it would replace the SRC. All other institutions, state and social,
were brought under the party and they were regarded as parasites that could not
live without the party. As was noted in the political programme of the Party
|L|he urLy musL guIde Lhe ucLIvILIes oI boLh sLuLe uuruLus und socIuI
organizations. Without the political leadership of the party, its ideas and
organization, or if the party fails to fulfil its obligations, these institutions will go
astray, and will be in danger for the principles and policies of the imperialism,
they will loose the revolutionary awareness and become prone to be
intermingled by enemIes (XHKS, 1q;6). urLhermore, uILhough Burre wus Lhe
chairman of the Council of Ministries, the Ministries were regrouped into
functional areas and every set of industries were put under one of eleven
Hogaans (bureaux) of the Party. So the Ministries were accountable to both
Barre and one of the party bureaux. In addition, national social organisations,
the Federation of Somali Trade Unions (SHASOMA), Lhe SomuII Women`s
Democratic Organization, and the Somali Revolutionary Youth Organization,
were IormuIuLed us creuLures oI Lhe PurLy. As Igure .z shows, Lhe mInIsLry
and social organisations were monitored by a party representative and each
autonomous unit in the ministry was stationed a party representative. Almost
every major public building hosted Xafiiska Wakiilka Xisibiga (the Party
Representative Office). In this regard the party became the supreme institution
in the country, and all other institutions were subject to its command.

61
Local council chairmen are appointed by the President. However, as we will see, they will
select the local delegations for the congress and members of the forthcoming party. For that
their loyalty must be re-assured.
142


On the other hand, when the Party was created Barre became like an
unchallengeable monster at the top of the supreme organisation. In the creation
process, Barre mobilised all means under his command to bring the party under
his full control. In June 1976, 3000 delegates attended the national congress in
Mogadishu. The delegates from the regions and villages were selected by the
chairmen of the local Revolutionary Councils. At the national level, the head of
the NPO, Abdulqadir Haji Mohamed, an unswerving and loyal supporter of the
President, was responsible for screening the delegates from state institutions
und socIuI orgunIsuLIons. However, uII cundIduLes were subjecL Lo Lhe PresIdenL`s
IInuI urovuI. The cIun buIunce und Lhe cundIduLe`s IoyuILy Lo Lhe revoIuLIon`s
policies were the main criteria for the selection process. The congress convened
the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRSP) with the 3000 participants as
founders of the party. A Central Committee of 73 members was also formed. A
Political Bureau of five leading SRC figures was created consisting of the
following: Barre; the three Vice-Presidents (Mohamed A. Samatar, Hussein K.
AIruh., smuII A. Abokor); und Lhe heud oI Lhe NSS und Lhe PresIdenL`s son-in
law Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla. Barre assumed the role of the Sectary-General for
the SRSP. In the eIecLIon oI Lhe CenLruI CommILLee, Burre`s urovuI oI Lhe
candidate and his confirmation was necessary. Eleven Hogaans (bureaux) with
administrative responsibility were also created. Barre, as the Secretary-General,
had the right to appoint the heads of the SRSP Hogaans, the members of the
council of the ministries, and the heads of the national social organisations. In
addition, as Figure 6.2 illustrates, the armed forces and security apparatus (NSS
und NSC) were under Burre`s conLroI. The urLy uL greuL emphasis on the
securILy orgunIsuLIons, wILh Lhe PurLy consLunLIy engug|Ing| ILseII Lo deIend und
safeguard the fruits and the gains of the revolution from both the internal and
exLernuI reucLIonurIes us weII us unLIrevoIuLIonury eIemenLs und LhIs couId be
done by sLrengLhenIng Lhe sLuLe securILy orgunIsuLIons, Lhe oIIce und Lhe
victory pioneers. That could be achieved by improving their technical
capabilities and developing the political awareness of the staff and, beyond that,
these organizations must blindly recruit those individuals that have proven
themselves to be the most lovers and believers of the revolution among the
workIng cIuss (XHKS, 1q;6). urLhermore, uILer reshuIIIIng Lhe governmenL In
December 1974, the Ministry of Planning and Co-ordination was brought under
Lhe PresIdenL`s OIIIce und ILs MInIsLer, bruhIm Megug SumuLur, wus senL
somewhere else. The reason was, as elsewhere in Africa, that the Planning
Ministry had the responsibility to receive and disburse foreign aid, and by
controlling it, the president controlled the most important source of foreign
exchange. So both the means of coercion and those of prosperity, using Robert
BuLes` LermInoIogy, were now under IuII conLroI oI Lhe PresIdenL (BuLes, zoo8).
Many stressed the necessity of a political party and propagated for its formation,
however, a series of unfavourable consequences appeared soon after its
formation:
1. Barre dominated Somali politics even before the party and no one,
whether from the SRC or otherwise, dared to challenge Barre after 1971.
However, the coup gave the SRC members a say in the future of the
counLry und ILs members Iuyed u IeudIng roIe In Lhe counLry`s uIIuIrs. n
143


an informal discussion with Ismail Ali Abokor, a member of the
politburo, in the summer of 2007, he maintained that before the SRSP
the leaders used to behave like a team, the President being team leader,
but after the Party was founded, that approach was not practiced
anymore. The autocratic character of Barre significantly increased after
the formation of the SRSP.
2. Ncjtccdc cccnu lhctcr eline mcrlccn cinqilccblc lu
dhcqccqnc si ccnu ucdcnlc u bcdbccdino (By getting involved in the
coup, to rescue the country, we put ourselves in great danger). These
words were often heard from the SRC members. Here they were
establishing the legitimacy of their rule (Shuuke, 2008). The SRC was
dissolved soon after the Party was formed. In the Party the admittance of
the SRC members both into the Party membership and the Central
Committee was automatic. However, as individuals in a committee of 73
members, were decisions were made by majority vote, they felt that their
power base had deteriorated. Neither former SRC members nor the new
members of the Central Committee had the same incentives as those the
SRC once had to safeguard national interests in order to secure their own
interests.
3. Socialist ideologues were hoping that the situation would improve to
their advantage, however, they now realised that their hopes were
dashed. They were expecting that members of the new party would be
recruited from the supporters of socialism
4. in Somalia. After the SRSP was established they claimed that the Party
was a tool for Barre to undermine adversaries. As Markakis (1987) noted,
they discerned that the Party was designed to be an instrument for the
mIIILury ruIe und Burre`s uuLhorILurIunIsm. Weyruh, u romInenL IIgure
umong Lhe grou, ugrees wILh LhuL. AccordIng Lo hIm Lhe rogressIve
Iorces encouruged Lhe PurLy Lo be esLubIIshed, however when esLubIIshed
they realized that they became very disappointed. By appointing Barre
and another four generals as the politburo for the Party, the new Party
jusL rovIded Burre und oLher generuIs cIvIIIun unIIorms (Weyruh,
2009).
5. Moscow, of course, was among those unhappy with the outcome
6. A fierce power struggle at all levels of the government, mainly caused by
the overlapping roles, started. Pleasing Barre was gradually replacing any
other achievement by the state officials. In every ministry the minister,
deputy-minister, permanent secretary, director generals and Party
representative directly reported to the President.


P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t

o
f

t
h
e

S
D
R

S
e
c
r
e
t
a
r
y

G
e
n
e
r
a
l

f
o
r

t
h
e

S
R
S
P

C
h
a
i
r
m
a
n

o
f

t
h
e

C
o
u
n
c
i
l

o
f

t
h
e

M
i
n
i
s
t
r
i
e
s

C
h
a
i
r
m
a
n

o
f

t
h
e

N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l

D
e
f
e
n
s
e

C
o
u
n
c
i
l

C
o
m
m
a
n
d
e
r

i
n

C
h
i
e
f

o
f

t
h
e

A
r
m
e
d

F
o
r
c
e
s

S
e
c
r
e
t
a
r
y

G
e
n
e
r
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

S
R
S
P

S
o
m
a
l
i

R
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
y

S
o
c
i
a
l
i
s
t

P
a
r
t
y

(
S
R
S
P
)

C
o
u
n
c
i
l

o
f

M
i
n
i
s
t
r
i
e
s

N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l

S
o
c
i
a
l

O
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s

N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l

S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y

c
o
u
r
t

N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l

S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y

S
e
r
v
i
c
e

F
i
r
s
t

V
i
c
e

P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t

S
e
c
o
n
d

V
i
c
e

P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t

T
h
i
r
d

V
i
c
e

P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t

F
i
g
u
r
e

5
.
2

F
o
r
m
a
l

A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y

S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

i
n

1
9
7
6










S
o
u
r
c
e
:

A
d
a
p
t
e
d

f
r
o
m

A
h
m
e
d

S
a
m
a
t
a
r

(
1
9
8
8
)

144


S
R
S
P

B
u
r
e
a
u

o
f

S
o
c
i
a
l

A
f
f
a
i
r
s

B
u
r
e
a
u

M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y

X

M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y

o
f

C
u
l
t
u
r
e

&

H
i
g
h
e
r

E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n

U
n
i
t

X

T
h
e

N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l

U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

S
o
m
a
l
i
a

T
h
e

S
R
S
P

R
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
v
e
s

T
h
e

S
R
S
P

R
e
p
.

f
o
r

t
h
e


M
o
C
&
H
E

T
h
e

S
R
S
P

R
e
p
.

f
o
r

t
h
e

N
U
S


U
n
i
t

Y

M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y

Y

F
i
g
u
r
e

5
.
3

T
h
e

S
R
S
P

A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y

S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

(
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
)











S
o
u
r
c
e
:

A
u
t
h
o
r
`
s

i
e
l
d

n
o
t
e

B
u
r
e
a
u

145



F
i
g
u
r
e

5
.
4
,

t
h
e

S
R
S
P

A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y

S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

(
L
o
c
a
l
)











S
o
u
r
c
e
:

A
u
t
h
o
r
`
s

i
e
l
d

n
o
t
e

S
R
S
P

B
u
r
e
a
u

o
f

X
X

M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y

o
f

I
n
t
e
r
i
o
r

R
e
g
i
o
n

X

T
h
e

S
R
S
P

R
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
v
e
s

T
h
e

S
R
S
P

R
e
p
.

f
o
r

t
h
e


M
o
I

T
h
e

S
R
S
P

R
e
p
.

f
o
r

r
e
g
i
o
n

Y

R
e
g
i
o
n

Y

D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t

X

D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t

Y

P
r
o
v
i
n
c
e

X

P
r
o
v
i
n
c
e

Y

T
h
e

S
R
S
P

R
e
p
.

f
o
r

d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t

Y

T
h
e

S
R
S
P

R
e
p
.

f
o
r

p
r
o
v
i
n
c
e

Y

146
147


5.4. Burre`s Personul Rule und the Re-birth of the Tribalism
In the last chapter, we saw that the SRC officially banned and symbolically
buried tribalism in Somalia. Here the intention, mainly, was to undercut lineage
loyalty and thus to weaken the main source of legitimacy for potential
oonenLs. uIso noLed LhuL by 1q; Burre`s confidence, at least in the near
future, was apparent. However, little success was gained on this front. By the
mid-1970s, the resilience on tribalism in Somali politics was observable. There
are two main speculations about the phenomenon. One suggestion is that Barre,
though he had formally denounced tribalism, was carefully using clan balance as
a mechanism for control. Lewis (2002) argues that clan representation was a
busIc rIncIIe In Burre`s oIILIcuI gume even In Lhe begInnIng. uILIn und
Samatar (198;) urgue LhuL |I|rom Lhe eurIy erIod oI Lhe revoIuLIon, SIyud
[Barre] exhibited what some would call paranoia ... of the Majerten clan. The
Majertens were the clan that held the key to power throughout most of the
civilian era ... [Barre] made allusions to his enemies among the Majertens in
many of his early remarks. To confront his enemies directly, [Barre] found
himself identifying them on the bases of their clan membership. In doing so,
[Barre](perhaps inadvertently) re-legitimated the language of tribe in Somali
oIILIcs. Here Lhe urgumenL Is oILen eIevuLed us IoIIows: Burre us Marehan
clansman believed that those clans that played a dominant role in Somali
politics during the civilian regime, Majerten, Habar-Gedir, Abgal
62
and Isak,
may not admit to his leadership. According to Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed, former
president of the Transitional Federal Government, and long-time rival of Barre,
Mohamed Siyad Barre, in planning the October coup of 1969, approached him
and proposed his participation in the forthcoming coup but Abdullahi declined
Lhe oIIer. Burre, commenLIng on YussuI`s decIsIon suId you, Majerten clansmen,
are not willing to accept any one else to assume the top office in the country. If
conIIrmed, Lhe sLory IIIusLruLes Burre`s susIcIons uguInsL certain clans in the
country, which is not something unusual in Somali politics. The result was, the
argument concludes, that Barre overreacted by selectively punishing certain
clans and rewarding others.
The other speculation is that, elements in the leadership of these clans were
playing the clan card. By bringing up the prominent role played by leaders from
these clans in the pre-coup governments, these leaders were trying to de-
IegILImIse Burre`s ruIe uL IeusL In Lhe eyes oI LheIr cIunsmen. AILhough the former
argument is not totally excludable, the later has more credence for the following
reasons: firstly, in Chapter 4, we saw that whenever a politician gains
prominence in a national position his political opponents exploit his clan
identity in order to mitigate his appeal. Unfortunately, as I noted, Somalis
responded to such exploitations sympathetically. Castagno (1964) noted, I re-
quoLe, whuLever nuLIonuI conIIdence he muy huve guIned muy be LrunsIormed
into widespread mistrust based on ethnic provIncIuIIsm. And Burre`s cuse Is noL
an exception;

62
Some put Hawiye in general, rather than Habar-Gedir and Abgal alone, on the stage. Both are clans of the
Hawiye clan-family. These observers believe that the execution of Gaveire, Ainanshe and Del in 1971 was
due to Barre seeing the aborted coup as a rebellion from three opposition clans (Laitin and Samatar, 1987).
148


secondly, we have seen how the last government of the civilian era, from 1967-9,
weakened the post colonial state and undermined state institutions in Somalia.
However, when that government was elected, Ahmed Ismail Dirie (Qasim), a
well known poet, said:
Nabad iyo Naq roob baa beddelay Nayla-Jaliyiiye
Nacabkii Ilaah naga kaxee naaqiska ahaaye
Nasiib baannu leenahay haddaan Aadan soo noqonne
.
Noolaatay yidi-diiladii Naxashka saarrayde
Mar haddii ninkii geyey kursiga nabadgelyuu fuulay
Nimcadiyo sow mahad-naq uun lagu negaan mayo
Here, Qasim is celebrating the defeat of President Aden in the elections of
March 1968. And by characterising the President as malevolent and feeble, he
expresses how he was pleased with the election results. The election, as we have
seen, brought President Shermake and Premier Egal into power. The main
jusLIIIcuLIon oI QusIm`s suLIsIucLIon wus LhuL u IeIIow cIunsmun, Lhe new
Premier, assumed a higher office. In a similar vein, in 1974, in denouncing
Burre`s ruIe QusIm suId:
Seeddiyo boqnaha hay jareen sab iyo laangaabe
Sanqadhyari ha ii dilo Tumaal siiqya looshadaye
Sanka hayga mudo inangumeed loo sarrayn jiraye
Sawaab iyo Midgaan Guulwadii ha i sudhnaadeene
.
Anagiyo Saleebaanadii waa na sidataaye
Seeftii Abgaal bay agtaal saawirta ahayde
Habar Gidir sinsaarada ku timi sigay Ugaaskiiye
Sixilluu kacaankani u galay Saca raggiisiiye
.
Soomaalidii waxa ka nool saaka madaxgaabe
Wax Siyaasaddii loo egmadey silic ku nooshiiye
Here his main argument against the regime was that its leadership is not from
politically significant clans. In the first paragraph he stresses the leading role
played by men from socially minor clans. The Sab, Laangaab, Tumaal,
149


Inangumeed, Midgaan, all indicate inferiority in the Somali traditional social
structure. He then comes to what he regards as a humiliating role, under the
military regime, for the clans that were politically dominant previously. Qasim
then concluded that the inferior races alone were prospering in Somalia during
the military regime. For him, Somali politics is entrusted to the deeply
distressed clans.
Finally, as I mentioned earlier it was political suicide for the SRC leaders to
bring the clan system back into Somali politics.
The two speculations disagree on which of the two parts, Barre or his
opponents, initiated the using of tribalism for political ends, but agree that it
was the political leadership, rather than the clans as organisations with
objectives, that saw the clan factor in politics would serve their interests. The
Party was the starting point of re-tribalising the state. As I noted earlier during
the Party formation congress, the delegates were selectively chosen on clan and
loyalty basis. According to Weyrah (2009) those posted to the regions and
national organisations as Party representatives were selected disproportionately
Irom Lhe PresIdenL`s cIun.
5.5. The Ogaden War and the Somali State Failure
Events which took place between 1974 and 1977 reshaped the Horn of Africa
and its international relations. Firstly, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, a
prominent ally of the US, was ousted by a military junta, known as the Dergue.
Secondly, the leaders of the Dergue established a relationship, and they finally
signed a friendship treaty
63
, with Moscow. Secondly, SRC considered the Soviet
relation with Ethiopia as violation of the 1974 treaty. Thirdly, Moscow was
unhuy wILh SomuIIu`s socIuIIsL orIenLuLIon und ILs growIng reIuLIons wILh
reucLIonury Arub sLuLes. InuIIy, Lhe Dergue`s exulsion of Americans and
relations with Moscow created geopolitical unbalance, giving Washington and
its allies an inferior position. The US, on its part, mobilised its Arab and other
non-Arab Muslim allies, such as Iran, to bring the Somalis into their camp.
In April 1977, the US was expelled from Addis Ababa and the USSR completely
replaced the US in Ethiopia. On 6 April, US Vice President Walter Mandale was
usked by hIs boss, PresIdenL JImmy CurLer, wunL you Lo LeII Cy
64
[Vance] and
Zbig
65
that I want them to move in every possible way to get Somalia to be our
IrIend. .`ve LoId Cy LhuL beIore (TIme, ArII 18, 1q;;). On Lhe sume duy, Burre
was assured that he would get a considerable amount of aid, $300-350 million,
including arms from the West (Patman, 1990).
On 11 June, CurLer, In hIs IoreIgn oIIcy sLuLemenL, suId |m|y own IncIInuLIon,
though, is to aggressively challenge, in a peaceful way of course, the Soviet

63
Is similar to the Somali-Soviet treaty.
64
Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State.
65
ZbIgnIew BrzezInskI, CurLer`s NuLIonuI SecurILy AdvIser.
150


Union and others for influence in areas of the world that we feel are crucial to us
now or oLenLIuIIy crucIuI IIILeen Lo LwenLy yeurs Irom now on, und menLIoned
SomuIIu umong oLher counLrIes. He uIso wenL on by suyIng LhuL he wus quILe
concerned ubouL Lhe Horn oI AIrIcu`s robIem. He uIso sLressed hIs
udmInIsLruLIon`s udherence Lo umIcubIe relations with Mogadishu. Fred
HuIIIduy, commenLIng on LhuL seech, suId CurLer`s oIIcy Lowurd Lhe SovIeL
UnIon Is In some resecL u more uggressIve one . und Lhe cumuIgn Lo wIn over
SomuIIu IoIIows IogIcuIIy Irom LhIs (HuIIIduy, 1q;;). A Iew duys IuLer, Dr Kevin
Cahill, long time friend and personal physician of Barre, arrived in Mogadishu.
Dr. CuhIII, JIm PuuI (1q;;) noLed, Is un exerIenced roIessIonuI In Lhe worId oI
politics and diplomacy and has devoted his entire career to using medicine as an
oenIng wedge Ior hIgh oIILIcuI ucLIon. The Newsweek suId LhuL Lhe DocLor Is
no sLrunger Lo Lhe worId oI secreL dIIomucy (MerI, No.6z, 1q;;). n hIs
meeLIng wILh Burre, Dr CuhIII conveyed Lwo messuges by suyIng LhuL (u) Lhe
USA would not resupply Ethiopia in the event of a Somalia invasion of Ogaden;
(b) the USA would not look askance at a Somali request for arms, and was not
LoLuIIy oosed Lo such u venLure In Oguden (HuIIIduy, 1q;;).
Barre ordered his ambassador in Washington, Mr. Abdullahi A. Addou, to
submit a formal arms request to the US administration (Patman, 1990). On 1
JuIy, Mr. Vunce, seukIng ubouL Lhe LensIon In Lhe Horn, sLressed LhuL uII sIdes
should be aware that when outside powers pour substantial quantities of arms
and military personal in to Africa, it greatly enhances the danger that disputes
wIII be resoIved mIIILurIIy . ThIs dunger Is urLIcuIurIy greuL In Lhe Horn, where
Lhere hus been un escuIuLIon oI urms LrunsIer Irom Lhe ouLsIde. We wIII
consider sympathetically appeals for assistance from states which are
threatened by a buildup of foreign military equipment and advisors on their
borders, In Lhe Horn und eIsewhere In AIrIcu (DSB, AugusL 8, 1q;;).
Probably, the central mission of all this assurance and manipulations was
SomuIIu`s LoLuI breuk wILh Moscow, und SomuIIu IInuIIy ubroguLed LheIr LreuLy
wILh Lhe SovIeLs, und consequenLIy Moscow vowed Lo Leuch Lhe SomuIIs u
Iesson Lhey wIII never IorgeL und usserLed LhuL Lhey wIII brIng Lhem Lo LheIr
knees (Newsweek, eb. 1, 1978). However, before Mogadishu expelled the
Soviets and their allies, the SNA launched a massive military campaign against
ELhIoIu. SureIy wILhouL US encourugemenL oI SIud |Burre| In Muy-Jun 1977 it
is inconceivable that the Somalis would have invaded Oguden (HuIIIduy, 1q;;).
On 27 July 1977, the SRC rolled tanks and troops, supported by aircraft, into the
Ogaden against Ethiopia and captured most of the disputed territory within
several weeks. The battle was over by March 1978, with a total defeat of the
Somalia National Army (SNA) and some local liberation groups, by Ethiopians
backed up by the Soviets and Cubans. Both the human and physical cost of the
war was awesome and tragic, however, the most devastating consequence of the
war, was that it abruptly terminated the social contract between the state and
society. Somali public, unaware
66
, about the final mission of the war, realised its

66
This lack of information was also common among senior military officers. Some rumours
revealed that the final objective was to destroy the mighty power of the SNA.
151


devastating outcome. Another effect was that the defeated and humiliated Barre
did not anymore monopolise violence. Longtime dormant contenders got an
opportunity to compete. Barre, on his part, decided to survive at any cost.
As the war began, 11,000 Cuban troops supported by 1,500 Soviet advisors -
which were manly transferred directly from Somali and took all the necessary
information about the war with them. These troops were using, beside
Ethiopian military hardware, an estimated 1.5 billion of military equipment
supplied by Moscow, which involved a huge sealift and 225 planes, about 12
percent of the entire Soviet transport fleet. Senior Soviet and Cuban officials,
including First Deputy Commander-in-chief and Cuban Foreign Minister and
IdeI CusLro`s broLher RuouI CusLro urrIved In ELhIoIu Lo suervIse und
coordinate the war.
Indeed, Moscow was true to its word and Lhe scuIe oI oeruLIon served noLIce
LhuL Lhe SovIeL UnIon wouId noL uIIow SomuIIu`s deIecLIon Lo go ununIshed
(Mayall, 1978). About 25000 Somalis lost their life in the war, and more than
three-quaters of Somali aircraft were either destroyed or put out of commission.
The direct economic consequences were also enormous. About one million
refugees finally crossed the border of Somalia.
The frustrated Somali people, due to their tribal differences and thus suffering
from a collective action problem, were not able to voice against Barre and his
ruling party. A large part of the citizens, realised that the state was not doing a
good job and not working for their wellbeing, and ceased trusting the state and
thus chose to exit. This was the end of the Somali social contract and this is
what we mean by Somali state failure. However, Somalis did not try to search
for a new form of social contract to heal the injury. Instead the process of state
collapse took its shape. Only a month after the Ogaden War an abortive coup
wus mounLed uguInsL Burre, on q ArII. ThIs wus Lhe begInnIng oI Burre`s
predation and the Somali Civil War.
5.6. Conclusion: State as the Instrument of the Ruling Elite
In this chapter, we saw that the military regime, although it assumed power
through extralegal means, a military coup, served to some extent in the
developmental interest of the citizens and consequently characterised the
regIme us un ugenL oI ILs cILIzens. The muIn IncenLIve oI Lhe regIme`s
involvement in the socioeconomic development of society was simply because
the Soviet Union saw its interest as to reform Somali society. In other words,
there was a coincidence of interest between the two principals.
However, Lhe SovIeL UnIon, unhuy wILh Lhe regIme`s erIormunce on Lhe
reform process, took measures that diverged its interests with that of the
Somalis. It decided to dramatically increase its presence in Somalia and to do so
it shifted its focus from social reform to the Greater Somalia issue and therefore
encouraged the war between Somalia and Ethiopia. Moscow also put great
pressure on the regime to establish a vanguard socialist party. That made Barre
152


worry for his future and he started to act before it was too late. In the mid-
1970s the geopolitical setup of the region changed as well. A military junta took
the power in Ethiopia and the Soviets decided to align its interest with Ethiopia
sacrificing its role in Somalia. Understandably, this time, they not only
abandoned the Greater Somalia issue but opposed any aggression against
Ethiopia. This further aggravated its relation with the military leadership in
SomuIIu. The UnILed SLuLes Look Lhe oorLunILy und sLurLed wooIng Burre`s
regime from the Soviet camp. To do so Washington encouraged the war between
Somalia and Ethiopia. The Somali leaders believed that Washington was
offering a more rewarding alternative, and expelled the Soviets from Somalia
and abrogated the relationship treaty with the Soviet Union. This marked the
loss of the main principal for Barre, the Soviet Union. The regIme`s
abandonment of the socio-economic development and defeat in the Ogaden War
marked the end of the social contract between the regime and society. Somalis
as citizens realised that the government failed to achieve either of the two main
goals: socio-economic development and unification. The Somali state failed.
After the departure of the Soviets from Somalia and the Ogaden defeat of the
Somalis, the regime was in trouble. Many wondered how Barre survived. Lewis
(1q8z) suys LhuL L`s quILe umuzIng LhuL SIud wusn`L unseuLed uL LhuL oInL. He
had been very concerned about destabilization inside Somalia at the time of the
SovIeL wILhdruwuI . Once Lhe whoIe Oguden venLure coIIused und IL becume
uurenL LhuL Lhe AmerIcun suer ower wusn`L goIng Lo replace the Russians
uuLomuLIcuIIy, Lhen Lhe sILuuLIon becume even gruver. UsIng Lhe LheoreLIcuI
logic of chapter two, the Somali state was without a principal and thus had no
social contract at all.
Barre, on the other hand, decided to survive at any cost and formed a
patrimonial network for control. He employed the well-known divide-and-rule
policy based on clan manipulation. By doing so Barre abandoned his interest
with Somalis as citizens and relied on particular client groups and in short, the
military regime became an instrument of a ruling elite. To maintain his power
and carry out his policies Barre sought to bring Washington on to his side.
Economic predation and social antagonism was the order of the day. This is the
subject of the next chapter.
153


6 SOMALI STATE COLLAPSE
6.1. Introduction
In the first phase of his rule Barre, as the leader of the SRC, successfully brought
Moscow to his side. Through the vision of building a socialist Somalia, Barre
secured Moscow`s suorL Lo muInLuIn hIs ruIe und Ior Lhe economic
development of the country. In addition, he mobilised society to rally behind
hIm Lhrough Lhe vIsIon oI resLorIng eoIe`s dIgnILy, guIdIng Lhem Lo LheIr Lrue
Somali characteristics and creating a nationalism of oneness. Furthermore, the
regime sought to improve the welfare of society. Consequently, the regime
secured the support and the backing of major influential urban groups: solders,
students, religious leaders, poets etc. Moreover, the regime not only used the
support of these groups to maintain his rule, but also as a useful resource for
socioeconomic development.
As we have seen in the last chapter, the regime, by concentrating on external
relations, devoted little effort to the socio-economic development aspect of the
country during the second half of the 1970s. I also mentioned that by the mid-
1970s, resilience of the clan factor in Somali politics was observable.
This chapter addresses the process of disintegration of the post-colonial state of
Somalia. The chapter firstly addresses the political difficulties that the regime
faced after the Ogaden War and the political aspects of the dissolution of the
formal political system. But the chapter mainly deals with economic strategies
that the regime formulated to maintain its power. It will show how the heartless
actions of power-seekIng oosILIon Ieuders, Lhe regIme`s mercIIess reucLIons
und WushIngLon`s cuIIous oIIcIes shuLLered Lhe enLIre counLry und wrecked ILs
state institutions.
6.2. The State Collapse
As menLIoned eurIIer, SomuIIu`s wur with Ethiopia and the ultimate defeat of
the SNA resulted in a number of devastating consequences at the national level.
n uddILIon, u number oI unIuvourubIe ImucLs, us Iur us Burre`s survIvuI Is
concerned, were the products of the Ogaden War. Firstly, as Laitin (1979)
argued, Barre as the President of the republic, the Secretary -General of the
SRSP, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, unlike Sayid Mohamed
67
, hus
not come out of defeat as hero. The greatness of Siyaad [Barre] has been
questioned rather Lhun reuIIIrmed by Ioss. As roIessed by uILIn, Lhe deIeuL
mitigated his internal authority and since then, as people lost confidence in him,
it was increasingly difficult for him to mobilise the Somalis as citizens. The
second was the loss of the superpower patron, as the Soviet Union was useful for
Barre mainly for his own survival. Now the Soviets were sent out and the other

67
Mohamed Abdulla Hassan, a Somali nationalist leader who lost his war with colonial powers
after the British Royal Air Force ruthlessly destroyed his main fort at Taleex in 1920. But
uccordIng Lo uILIn, mIIILury defeat did not spoil the lustre oI LhIs hero`s IeuLs.
154


superpower, the US, was not prepared to completely fill the vacuum created by
Lhe SovIeLs` deurLure und her suorL und objecLives were carefully limited in a
particular form of partnership. Thirdly, the military became weaker both
technically and morally. Finally, and more importantly, after the war a large
part of the citizens realised that the state was not doing a good job and was not
working for their wellbeing, and decided not to trust the state anymore.
Three unfortunate events followed the military defeat of the Somali army. First,
in Hargeissa soon after the withdrawal of the Somali army from Ethiopia, Barre
ordered the execution of a number of military officers. The order was preceded
by a heated discussions and criticism of the war and the way it was conducted.
However, Africa Confidential maintained that the criticism of both how the
regime carried out the war together with its diplomatic performance during the
war centered on Barre with an over reliance on particular clan groups: The
Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante (AC, Dec. 15, 1978). According to some
observers the executed individuals were among the most critical elements in the
group (Ahmed Samatar, 1988).
Secondly, a month after Somalia withdrew its army from Ethiopia, an abortive
coup was launched against Barre on 9 April 1978. The fact was that after the
war, in the military circles, a regime change was not a strange idea. According to
General Ali Ismail
68
, three out of the four main brigades of the army were
stationed in the North West of the country, and among the military leaders in
the three Brigades in the North-WesL, Lhe IuLure oI Burre`s governmenL wus,
secretly of course, debated and most of them welcomed the idea of a regime
change. One aspect of the coup was that it was mainly led by officers from
Majerten, one of the clans that Barre was suspicious of. Moreover, the coup was
masterminded by Colonel Abdulahi Yusssuf Ahmed. Colonel Yussuf was, like
General Mohamed F. Aidid, a long time opponent of Barre. In the period
between late 1968 and October 1969, before the military coup that brought
Barre to power, there were rumours that military groups were planning a coup
against the civilian government. Aidid and Yussuf were among the leading
figures and were believed by many to be the brains behind the predicted
potential coup. According to many, Aidid and Yussuf with others were partners
in planning the coup (Kimiko, 2008; Mohamed, 2008). In 1993 at an informal
meeting held in Bosasso, a North Eastern city, Yussuf stated that in 1968 he and
other officers approached General Mohamed Abshir, former chief of the Somali
Police, and asked him to lead the coup that they intended to carry out and
urgued LhuL AbshIr`s reIusuI uved u wuy Ior Burre`s successIuI cou. GeneruI
AbshIr, who wus uIso resenL uL Lhe meeLIng, conIIrmed YussuI`s urgumenL, buL
maintained that he declined to lead the coup simply because he believed that
every mIIILury cou In SomuIIu wouId end u In Lhe sume wuy LhuL Burre`s
regime ended (Weyrah, 2009).
As to the April coup, army units loyal to Barre crushed the revolt and Barre
IormuIIy cIuImed LhuL Lhe cou Ieuders were urmy dIssIdenLs LhuL uImed to
hund over Lhe counLry Lo coIonIuIIsm und bIow Lhe nuLIon`s sLubIIILy sky-hIgh

68
Commander of the third brigade based in Burao in the Northwest.
155


(ARB, Apr. 1-30, 1978). However, Barre put Majerten as a clan at the center of
the blame and, therefore, held them accountable for what he believed to be the
cIun`s ucLIons. Most informed non-Majerten military officers maintained that
Majerten as a clan had nothing to do with the coup. According to an army
officer, non-Majerten himself, who was in DolowBay with Abdullahi Yussuf,
argued that Majerten officers who were in Dolow with him become aware of the
coup event after Yussuf crossed the border to the Kenyan side. He maintained
that on the day of the coup Abdulaahi Yussuf took Majerten figures, with other
officers in Dolow to the Kenyan border for what Yussuf described as military
inspection in the border area and there Yussuf informed them about the aborted
coup. He told them his intention of defection and that those who wanted to join
him were welcome to do so. He also warned that those who decided to remain in
the country were subjecL Lo Burre`s unIshmenL. CoIoneI YussuI moved Lo
Ethiopia and formed the first armed opposition group against the military
regime in Mogadishu.
With a very narrow social base now and eager to survive, Barre established a
strong network of clientlism. Being an expert of the Somali social structure, he
employed well designed divide-and-rule strategies. He used clan loyalties and
created economic incentives for capable allies, mainly his immediate clan and
all other clans whose political opportunists understood the rules of the game or
in other words could read the signs of the times correctly, and were ready to
jum on Burre`s bundwugon. MosL oI Lhe Marehan elite naturally fell into this
category. Leaders from the Ogaden and Dolbahante, all from the Darod clan-
IumIIy, und some oLher unLhreuLenIng neuLruI grous muInIy mude u Lhe resL.
These leaders reaped the fruits of economic predation. Most senior positions,
both civil and military, were given to those who could bring their clan on board.
National agencies became clan agencies.
Barre also employed coercive force as a means of governance. After the Ogaden
War, Barre restructured the SNA. Since the early 1980s, maintaining internal
security was its main preoccupation. Most of the influential command positions
were put under the control of reliable officers. Clans played a decisive role here.
The military leadership was mainly drawn from loyal clans. For instance, in
1986, 34 out of 47 army brigades were commanded by officers from three clans
- Marehan, Ogaden and Dolbahante (AC Oct, 1986).
Other clans, particularly Majerten, Isaq and Habargidir, were, as we have seen,
considered threatening clans. Barre in general prevented members of these
clans from becoming powerful politically, but dividing them provided some
leaders from these clans lucrative offices. Enemy clans, as Barre considered,
where significant numbers of the members were manipulated by faction leaders,
were collectively punished militarily and economically. Majerten was the first
clan to fall into this category after the April coup and the subsequent formation
of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Isaq, after the Somali
National Movement (SNM) was established in 1981, became the second. A
significant number of Habargidir, though they did not establish a separate
movement, also joined the SSDF and SNM. I will later on consider how Barre
used the clan patronage system for his survival.
156


In addition, the regime distributed arms to some of the clans at the border with
Ethiopia to fight against Ethiopia-based antigovernment armed guerrilla groups
(Mohamed, 2008). By 1983 tribal wars aroused the border areas from the
North-Western to the Central regions (AC, July, 1983).
After the defeat of the Ogaden War, in addition to the unpleasant situation of
the army, there was pervasive though poorly articulated and unorganised
demand for regime change among ordinary citizens. To address, in his own way
of course, some of the social discontent, but also to please the Western leaders
including the U.S. administration, Barre established a constitution, formed a
national assembly in 1979 and held elections. The constitution appeared to
guarantee some civil rights for citizens but in reality most of these rights were
overwritten by contradictory articles. Furthermore, the constitution not only
approved the extraordinary political power that Barre was already enjoying but
also gave an opportunity to further undermine the SRSP and SRC. In the
constitution an article regarding the extraordinary powers of the President, for
instance, stated that the President, after consulting with the National Defence
Council, had the right to impose emergency rule and to take proper measures
Ior Lhe counLry us whoIe or urL oI IL. The NDC ILseII wus u creuLure oI Lhe
PresIdenL und domInuLed Lhem (Ahmed SumuLur, 1q88). urLhermore, Lhe
members of the parliament were nominated by the SRSP. Barre, taking these
advantages, not only suspended the activities of the Parliament and the SRSP
when needed, but also sometimes ordered the confiscation and takeover of
properties of civilian people in some regions by the military (NYT, Aug. 16,
1982).
AILer Lhe wur, Burre uIso InILIuLed u cumuIgn Lo cIeunse Lhe SRSP`s CenLruI
Committee and the SRC of unfriendly elements. By 1982 influential figures of
the socialist ideology were either behind bars or went into exile. Key SRC
elements such as Ismail Ali Abokor were put under detention.
n Lhe IIrsL huII oI Lhe 1q8os mosL oI Lhe regIme`s energIes und eIIorLs were
exhausted by military suppression of the armed opposition, punishing target
clans and providing opportunities for the client elements. However, an
unIorLunuLe evenL In 1q86 hIL Burre`s uLrImonIuI sysLem rIghL uL Lhe heurL. The
President was seriously injured in a car accident on 23 May 1986 outside of
Mogadishu. Well over seventy, Barre was ill - he had i.e. liver and heart
diseases, throat cancer, depression - even before the car crash (Show, 1985). In
the accident he received, among other injuries, three broken ribs, sustained a
rigorous blow to the head as well as heavy abdominal bruising and a severe
nervous shock.
Barre, before the accident, relied on his personal quality, as a hard worker and
master manipulator, to maintain his leadership. The accident weakened his
health and he lost most of these qualities. In contrast to his usual midnight
work, he was able to stay in office for only a few hours each day, and was able to
give only short impaired speeches. In all circles it was quite apparent that he
was not able to maintain his extensive informal networks.
157


The day after the accident Barre was taken off to a military hospital in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia. The questions, of who would succeed him and on what condition,
would it be a smooth or violent transition, dominated peoIe`s mInds ruLher
than his safe return.
The uccIdenL budIy IrugmenLed Burre`s InLernuI couIILIon Ior survIvuI. Soon uILer
the accident the situation became tense and an internal power struggle for
succession broke out in the presidential palace. A fierce competition between
two main groups became apparent and dominated the struggle. After the
PresIdenL wus IIown Lo RIyudh, CoIoneI MusIuh M. SIyud, Burre`s eIdesL son
moved to the palace, Villa Somalia, and took all necessary means to keep his
IuLher`s oIIIce under hIs commund. MusIeh`s grou IncIuded hIs owerIuI
mother, mama Khadiija
69
, and his uncle Abdirahman J. Barre, the foreign
minister. Mohamed Ali Samatar, the second man to Barre in the formal
hierarchy - first vice President, second man in the Politburo and the minister of
defence - declared a first degree alert for the armed forces and he himself went
Lo occuy Lhe PresIdenL`s oIIIce
70
. The move discouraged the Maslah group from
taking the capital in what resembled a military coup. Soon Samatar called a
meeting of the senior army officers and managed to attain almost unanimous
endorsement for his constitutional rights: as the First Vice-President, the
constitution gave him the right to be the interim president. Therefore this group
is often labelled the Constitutionalist.
n resonse Lo Lhe ConsLILuLIonuIIsL`s ucLIons, cIose reIuLIves oI Burre, joIned by
some senior Marehan figures, went to Riyadh in the first week of June and held
u meeLIng. TheIr muIn concern wus whuL wouId huen II Burre dIed (AC,
June 1986). The later is labelled as the Dynastyst.
After six weeks of hospitalisation in Riyadh, the President returned to
Mogadishu in early July and a month later he formally resumed his power from
Samatar. In his returning and resuming power each of the two groups hoped
that their position would be supported by the President. However, Barre chose
to side with his family against his friends. Many believe that the weakened Barre
had no choice and fell under the complete manipulation of his first wife, first
son and brother. After his arrival, the increasing alienation of the Constitutional
group and an extensive scramble for influence by the Dynastyst group was
apparent.
Consequently, non Marehan military officers including SRC members, shocked
by Lhe PresIdenL`s reIIunce on hIs IumIIy, reuIIsed LhuL Lhey were noL unymore
what they were supposed to be and that family bonds outweighed political
uIIIunce. ThIs however broke down Burre`s uLronuge sysLem und hIs survIvuI
appeared to rely on Marehan. A new survival strategy had to be found. On

69
She was believed to be the brains behind the group and that she owned an effective political
network including an intelligence unit. However, her political role emerged after Barre was
weakened by the car accident.
70
According to senior civilian figure Samatar initially hesitated in challenging the Maslah group
and it was non-Marehan Barre supporters that encouraged him to move to Villa Somalia
(Warsame, 2008).
158


January 1987, when 22 military colonels were promoted to the rank of general,
including nine Marehan. Most of these were appointedto sensitive command
positions. For instance, at the time the Somali state collapsed the Minister of
DeIence consIsLed oI GeneruI Morgun, Burre`s son-in-law, the Army Chief-of
Staff was Maslah, and four out of the six main military components - sectors 26
(Hargeissa), 60 (Baydabo), 77 (Magadishu) and 43 (Kismayo) - were
commanded by Marehan officers. Furthermore, Marehan officers held the
critical first artillery brigade, the second tank brigade and Unit 99, the military
police unit, in Mogadishu. These were outside the normal structure of the
military establishment and they were under direct control of the presidential
palace.
However, later on, many non-family Marehan figures decided not to support the
Maslahisation process. A significant number of the latter group preferred
General Omar Hagi over Maslah. This further narrowed the power base of the
regime. Furthermore, neither Maslah nor Abdirahman, like the ailing President,
was an effective manipulator. Africa Confidential was soon to point out the
oLenLIuI dIIemmu us LIrIng eusIIy he|Burre| hus been Iorced Lo gIve u mosL oI
his day-to-day involvement in the Party and the political affairs ... one sign that
he is failing has been his apparently increasing reliance upon his brother,
Foreign Minister Abdirahman Jama Barre, and his son Brigadier-General
Maslah. This is something new, as are the presidential efforts to push Maslah
InLo greuLer romInence und concIuded LhuL SomuIIu Is now reuIng Lhe
harvest of the policy of divide-and-rule which President Siad Barre has wielded
so effectively for a decade or more. But it is a policy that depends upon the skills
of the individual at the top. Without Barre, or a figure of comparable talents, it
Is u oIIcy whIch muy be very hurd Lo curry ouL (AC, JuIy 1q8;).
Although the President relied on his relatives, they were even unable to keep the
family together. Far worse, Maslah and Abdirahman were not in complete
agreement on what position each would hold after Barre vacated his office. It
was believed that Abdirahman was very active in building his own power base.
Some of the promoted generals who had been given influential positions became
unconLroIIubIe. So by eurIy 1q88 Lhe counLry`s IeudershI wus In LoLuI dIsurruy.
Junior military generals led by Maslah dominated the military wing of the
leadership and relied purely on coercion rather than political manipulations.
Later on, despite their weak base, the group itself was fragmented by internal
conflict and struggle (AC, Nov 1989). For instance, General Aden Nur Gabyow,
the minister of defence, one of the closest allies of Maslah was initially demoted
and finally jailed in July 1989. By all means the power base of the regime
IncreusIngIy conLrucLed. The ower sLruggIe reuched u oInL where Burre`s Lwo
wives and their respective family members clashed. However, the Mama
Khadiija group prevailed where Maslah and General Mohamed Said Morgan,
her son In Iuw, emerged us Lhe governmenL`s sLrongmun (SImons, 1qq).
As we will see later on, the US changed its approach towards the Mogadishu
regime during the second half of the 1980s. But the car accident encouraged
Washington to rethink its position in Somalia. According to the Africa
Confidential (JuIy, 1q8;), one eIIecL oI Lhe Muy uuLomobIIe crush wus decIInIng
159


UnILed SLuLes InLeresL In Lhe Burre governmenL. WushIngLon beIIeved LhuL u
firm alignment with Barre would merely prejudice its relations with his
successors. Thus it started to distance itself from the Mogadishu regime. In
oLher words, Lhe US udmInIsLruLIon wus convInced LhuL Burre`s ruIe wouId noL
last long and decided to abandon its role of keeping Barre in power and
therefore, started to reduce all of its commitments to Mogadishu. As Table 7.1
illustrates, US military aid was only a small fraction of the $47million originally
requested in 1987 (AC, July 1987). Perhaps, the internal fierce struggle among
Lhe ruIIng grou In Lhe IuLe 1q8os Increused WushIngLon`s unhuIness wILh Lhe
regime further. And both military and economic aid decreased substantially
uILer 1q8;. So Burre`s InubIIILy, cuused by Lhe cur crush, weukened hIs sources oI
leadership survival. As a result of the accident the informal alliance system
erIshed. AmerIcu`s InLeresL In Lhe SomuII regIme vunIshed. However,
WushIngLon`s new osILIon hud Lo do muInIy wILh Lhe new huse oI Lhe CoId
World in the second half of the 1980s. Washington would have been forced to
search out or even create an alternative to the ailing administration of Barre had
Moscow maintained the role it once had in world affairs.
6.3. The Armed Opposition Movements
The regIme`s negIIgence oI Lhe socIo-economic development during the second
huII oI Lhe 1q;os creuLed dIssuLIsIucLIon umong socIeLy und Lhe regIme`s IuIIed
Ogaden venture convinced the Somali people that the state was not working for
their interest and, therefore, there was no reason to support it anymore. The
existing social cleavages, however, prevented them from forming a united front
uguInsL Burre`s unvIubIe regIme. PoIILIcuI oorLunIsLs, esecIuIIy Iong-time
dormant contenders, materialised this social frustration and started to take all
necessury sLes Lo ousL Burre`s regIme. The 1q;8 cou wus Lhe IIrsL oI such
attempts. However, the heartless response off the military regime - 17 officers
of the ring leaders of the coup were executed after the plot was suppressed -
reminded opponents of how dangerous such a project might be. It was realised
that armed struggle through an opposition faction to weaken the regime would
be more appropriate at this stage.
After the coup failed Yussuf fled to Kenya and joined the Somali Democratic
Action Front (SODAF). In February 1979 the SODAF was transformed into the
Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF). Within months Yussuf assumed the
chairmanship of the organisation. The SOSAF started an armed struggle against
government forces in the border areas, guerrilla operations in the central
regions and it carried out bombings in the capital. These marked the beginning
of the civil war in Somalia. In October 1981 the SOSAF amalgamated with two
small organisations based in Aden, Yemen and formed the Somali Salvation
Democratic Front (SSDF). These two organisations, the Democratic Front for
IberuLIon oI SomuIIu und Lhe SomuII Workers` PurLy, were Iounded muInIy by
members of pro-Soviet socialist ideologues who had defected from the
Mogadishu regime. Again, Col. Yussuf became the chairman of the SSDF.
160


In April that year the Somali National Movement (SNM) was also founded in
London and soon moved its headquarters to Ethiopia. Ahmed Mohamed Guleid
and Ahmed Ismail Abdi (Duksi) were respectively elected chairman and
secretary-general of the SNM. Hassan Aden Waddadi became the spokesman.
The two organisations were the two main opposition movements until 1989
when the United Somali Congress (USC) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
were created. These new organisations, like the former two, participated in the
military struggle against the Mogadishu regime.
A number of weaknesses that were handicapping these organisations were
mentioned here and there. The most serious ones were i.e. multiple and
contradictory ideological orientations within each organisation, lack of a
comprehensive political programme, dictatorial tendencies among the
leadership
71
, lack of popular support, identification with the historical enemy -
Ethiopia, and tribal organisations.
The role of these armed groups in the destruction of the post-colonial state in
Somalia deserves extensive research attention. However, a basic fact is that
these organisations were creatures of power-seeking political elites. Almost all
major opposition groups were formed by civilian political elites that lost their
power during the military takeover in 1969 supported by politicians who
deIecLed Irom Burre`s ruIe uILer Lhey were demoLed. or exumIe, Lhe SSD wus
InILIuIIy Iormed by cIvIIIun Ieuders who IeIL Lhe counLry uILer Burre`s military
coup. The top leaders of the SODAF, latter became the SSDF, such as Osman
Nur Ali (Qonof) former minister and Omar Hassan Mohamud (Isterlin) who
was the mayor of Mogadishu during the civilian era. Both the first chairman,
Guleid, and secretary-general, Duksi, of the SNM were political figures in the
civilian regime. For the USC, its founder, Ismail Jimale Ossoble, and chairman,
Ali M. Ossoble (Wardhigley), were former minsters in the civilian governments.
The SPM was initially established by army officers loyal to the demoted and
jailed minister of defence, Gabyow
72
. However, former civilian figures, such as
Omar Moalin, joined the group.
However, these organisations, with the exception of the SNM
73
, fell into the
hands of military officers, such as Yussuf, Aidid, and Col. Ahmed O. Jess, who
were long-time rivals of Barre. Therefore, another fact was that the main goal of
the leaders of these factions was to depose Barre, with each intending to
personally replace the dictator. For this reason, the opposition leaders pursuing
their principal goal used clan manipulation not only against the regime but
wILhIn LheIr orgunIsuLIons. GeneruI AIdId`s IuII scuIe mobIIIsuLIon oI Habar-
Gedir against Abgal, (both clans belong to the Hawiye clan-family which
supported the USC), after Ali M. Mohamed, an Abgal, proclaimed the interim
Presidency in the early 1990s is known to all those familiar with the Somali Civil
War. Another aspect of the opposition factions is that their leaders relied on

71
ThIs In conLrudIcLIon Lo Lhe muILI-party democracy based on true representation and full
urLIcIuLIon oI Lhe eoIe oI SomuIIu LhuL Lhey cIuImed udvocuLIng. (BongurLz 1qq1)
72
Colonel BushIr AII BIIIIIqo, Guboyo`s son In-law, established the group
73

161


foreign patronage. Several former SSDF that I met during my field survey in
2008 acknowledged the negative impact of the Libyan involvement. That was
made very clear in April 1985 when the Libyan leader withdrew his financial
support, after reaching an agreement with Barre, from Col. Yussuf and
consequenLIy Lhe IuLLer`s osILIon becume uncerLuIn. n Muy Lhe ELhIoIun
Ieuder, MengIsLu, unhuy wILh Lhe coIoneI`s erIormunce noL onIy wILhdruw
his support but sent him, with some leading figures of the SSDF, to an Ethiopian
prison, where he senL IIve yeurs. ThereIore, YussuI`s oIILIcuI survIvuI wus In
the hands of leaders of other countries and the members of the SSDF had little
influence on their leadership. In short the same informal institutions - identity
based leadership, tribalism, and foreign intervention - that decayed the post-
colonial state in Somalia were paralysing these opposition forces as well
74
.
L Is worLh menLIonIng here LhuL Lhe SNM`s erIormunce wus somewhuL
exceptional compared to the other functions. The SNM`s uchIevemenLs oI ILs
main goals were apparent and, unlike other armed opposition factions, most of
its members were pleased with the performance. This does not mean that the
SNM was without problems. In fact, most of the dilemmas - power struggles,
factionalism, clan mobilisation within the organisation, etc. - that weakened
other factions were present in the SNM as well (Lewis, 1994; AC, Nov 1983).
However, Lhe SNM`s reIuLIve success wus muInIy due Lo Lwo InLerreIuLed IucLors.
The first factor was the lack of a master-manipulator leader. Among the
comeLIng eIemenLs In Lhe orgunIsuLIon`s IeudershI no one wus owerIuI
enough, in terms of clan manipulation and implementing divide-and-rule
strategies that Somali leadership usually relies on, to dominate the others
75
.
AccordIng Lo Lhe Iormer ChuIrmun oI Lhe SNM`s CenLruI CommILLee, bruhIm
Megug SumuLer (1qq;), Lhe Iuck oI churIsmuLIc Ieuders ... Is one oI Lhe wuys In
which it [SNM] avoided the build-u oI dIcLuLorIuI LendencIes wILhIn ILseII. The
second factor was its reliance on its own resources rather than foreign patrons.
And therefore its supporters were to a greater extent the sole principal for its
IeudershI. SumuLer wroLe LhuL II one were Lo sIngIe ouL u henomenon In
which the SNM is unique among the liberation movements, past and present, it
is the extent of its self-reliance ... Financial assistance from Ethiopia was next to
nothing and even the ammunition and fuel were a token contribution ... In that
Ethiopia was the only source of external assistance, the movement had to
provide its own resources or perish. There was, of course, no lack of potential
helpers. But the premium put on independence was such that the movement
chose to eschew any and all aid that seriously affected its independence
decision-making ... This choice of self-reliance by the SNM paid its dividends ...
The eoIe huve Lo own LheIr movemenL (SumuLer, 1qq;). However, IL wus
pointed out that helpers were in abundance as Samater claimed. According to
Adam (1995), Colonel QadhuII oI Ibyu, Lhe muIn IInuncIer Ior YussuI`s SSD,
dIsIIked SNM Ieuders und so wouId noL IInunce LheIr movemenL buL Adum

74
After I presented the principal-agency theory of state failure in a public lecture in Garowe,
SomuIIu, u Iormer member oI Lhe SSD`s execuLIve commILLee commenLed by suyIng LhuL ugency
relations between leaders and foreign governments is what they were witnessing while in
opposition.
75
This was the case at least until President Egal came to power in 1993.
162


ugreed wILh SumuLer LhuL Lhe seII reIIunce enhunced uccounLubIIILywILhIn Lhe
organisation. Therefore, the lack of a master manipulator through the clan
system and the absence of a foreign patron led the SNM to pursue its goals in its
own way. The nonexistence of a foreign patron is the factor behind these since
the existence of an able foreign patron to a great extent would have created a
dominant figure among the competing elite in and possibly from outside of the
organisation.
6.4. USA: a Reluctant Principal
After the Ogaden War, with the expulsion of the Soviets from Somalia, the US
became the sole superpower available for Somali leadership to seek support
Irom. However, unIIke Lhe SovIeLs, AmerIcu`s InLeresL In SomuIIu wus ureIy
military, access to Somali facilities, and limited in time perspective. Many
AmerIcun oIIcymukers beIIeved LhuL ELhIoIu meunL much more Lo Lhe UnILed
States than did Somalia and a military relationship with Somalia would finish
uny chunce oI resumIng cIoser LIes wILh ELhIoIu (PeLLerson, 1q8; see uIso
Schraeder, 1994).
To begIn wILh, Lhe UnILed SLuLes` sLruLegIc InLeresL wILh MogudIshu In Lhe 1q8os
couId be summurIsed us IoIIows: IIrsLIy, WushIngLon`s muIn InLeresL In SomuIIu
was to have access to Somali naval bases and airfields for military purposes.
Berbera was the main target for the Pentagon. Due to its strategic location, the
Soviet Union built an extensive naval facility and an airfield that was able to
handle the largest bombers and transport airplanes. According to an American
congressmun who vIsILed Lhe IucIIILy In 1q;, Berberu wus Lhe mosL
comprehensive naval support facility available to the Soviets anywhere outside
Lhe SovIeL homeIund IncIudIng Cubu. However, Lhe IucIIILy hud IosL some oI
these features as the Soviets tried to dismantle it after they were expelled from
Somalia in 1977 (ACR, 1979/80). The facility attracted special attention from
Washington after the Iranian Revolution and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Secondly, Washington in order to secure its presence in Somalia had to make
sure that a reliable ally was in power in the country. For Washington, Barre was
not the man of their choice. According to a former US ambassador to Somalia
DonuId K. PeLLerson (1q8), Burre`s usL reIuLIonshI wILh Lhe SovIeL UnIon, hIs
hosLIIe uLLILude Lowurds Lhe US, hIs reuLuLIon Ior devIousness, und hIs
dishonest assertions about his involvement in Ogaden made him a man that
Washington could not sincerely rely on. However, as Petterson (1985) stated
Lhere Is unoLher sIde Lo SIud |Burre| us Iur us WushIngLon`s InLeresL In SomuIIu
Is consIdered. Burre, uccordIng Lo umbussudor PeLLerson, hus strengths as a
leader which have enabled him to stay in power for fourteen years. As any
Somali knows, he is a shrewd and extremely capable politician. He does, as he
suys, know hIs eoIe . DurIng Lhe Iour yeurs wus In SomuIIu, heurd muny
predictions oI SIud`s ImmInenL oIILIcuI demIse. These Ignored hIs sLrengLhs, Lhe
lack of cohesion among his opponents, and the fact that within Somalia in
recenL yeurs no erson or IucLIon hud emerged us u reuIIsLIc uILernuLIve Lo hIm
(Petterson, 1985). Therefore, although Barre was not an ideal leader for
163


Washington, the US policymakers realised that they had to deal with him, with
caution of course, at least for the time being.
Thirdly, as I mentioned, the US believed that Ethiopia rather than Somalia was
the perIecL urLner Ior ILs sLruLegIc InLeresL In Lhe regIon. Thus, WushIngLon`s
relationship with Somalia in this period was restrictive on the condition that it
shouId noL jeourdIse Lhe Iormer`s IuLure reIuLIonshI wILh ELhIoIu
76
. US
policymakers, for instance, made sure that any assistance from the US to
Somalia would not hurt Ethiopia. As a former CIA official noted, America in
order Lo Iuy Lhe SomuII curd decIded Lo gIve Burre onIy deIensIve equImenL
and formally put on notice that any conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia in
Ogaden would terminate the US relationship with Somalia (Oudes, 1980).
WushIngLon, soon uILer SomuIIu`s deIeuL und subsequenL wILhdruwuI Irom
Ogaden, sent the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Moose, to Mogadishu in
April 1978 to discuss a possible relationship for the two countries. However,
between 1978 and 1979 US policy put strong pressure on Barre to abandon his
previous policies towards Ethiopia and Kenya as well. President Carter, for
instance, made clear in March 1978 thuL Burre musL rovIde u renewed
commitment not to dishonor the international boundaries of either Ethiopia or
Kenya before we would be willing to discuss with them [the Somalis] economic
uId or deIensIve urms suIIes (Murder, 1q8;).
In late 1979, two major evenLs uILered WushIngLon`s urouch Lowurds Lhe
Horn. On 4 November 1979 forces loyal to the Iranian Revolution took control
of the US Embassy in Tehran which led to a hostage crisis and then exhausted
the foreign policy agenda of the Carter administration. And on 25 December,
over 100,000 Soviet troops invaded Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. These
events put Washington in a condition of uncertainty over the extremely
important region of the Persian Gulf. In December 1979 the US sent a
delegation to investigate military facilities in Somalia, particularly the Berbera
naval facilities (Schraeder, 1994). In addition, in a tripartite defense pact
established in early August 1981, Libya and Marxist South Yemen with Ethiopia
angered the Somali government, as Barre saw it, by providing military and
economic support to the Somali opposition group based in Ethiopia, as a direct
LhreuL Lo hIs ruIe. n resonse Burre exeIIed Ibyu`s dIIomuLs In MogudIshu
and closed down their Embassy. Furthermore, in the West the pact raised some
eyebrows. n Lerms oI EusL-WesL rIvuIry us one WesLern dIIomuL noLed Lhe
idea seems to be to replace Siad Barre with a president who would prevent the
AmerIcuns Irom usIng Berberu (CoweII, 1q81).
Barre, in trying to manipulate the situation, forwarded an offer of military
facilities to the US and in return asked for US $2 billion in military and
economic assistance. However, Barre finally accepted military aid totaling $65
million over three years and the formal access agreement was signed in August
1980. The Reagan administration came to the White House in a period when the

76
Throughout the decade the US tried hard to reestablish its close relationship with Ethiopia.
See Schraeder, 1994.
164


US was expected to implement its security commitment in Somalia (Schraeder,
1994). Nevertheless, Washington, although it gained formal access to the Somali
facilities, delayed time and again the supply of military equipment to
Mogadishu. At the end of June and in early July of 1982 a military campaign
spearheaded by a Somali opposition group supported by the Ethiopian army
captured two Somali settlements and tried to occupy the principal highway
linking the Central and Northern parts of the country to the Southern part and
consequently cut the country in two halves. The United States rushed
emergency military aid to Barre by airlifting some equipment and thereafter
started implementing its security commitment in Somalia (ACR, 1982/3).
According to Radio Kulmis, voice of the Ethiopian-supported Somali Salvation
DemocruLIc ronL, Lhe U.S. hus now oenIy InLervened In un InLernuI SomuII
war but nothing will save the Barre regime and the arms will end up in the
hunds oI our IIghLers, husLenIng Burre's InevILubIe deIeuL. SInce Lhen
Washington, to keep Barre in power, involved itself in a decade long civil
conflict in Somalia. Table 7.1 demonstrates US military and economic aid to
Somalia.
Globally, the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev marked the beginning of the end of the
Cold War. Regionally, the Soviet interest in Ethiopia dramatically contracted
after Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and the Russians started to reduce their
assistance, and in particular military aid. In July 1988, Gorbachev told the
Ethiopian leader that his administration was unwilling to increase the military
assistance to Ethiopia. Latter on Moscow refused to reschedule its debt to
Ethiopia and even initially declined to indicate whether it would renew the arms
agreement after the one in force expired. Finally, Moscow refused to conclude
any new arms agreement with the military regime in Addis Ababa. Furthermore,
the Kremlin expressed its support for the peace talks between the Mengistu
regime and Ethiopian armed opposition groups sponsored by the former US
President Jimmy Carter and supported by the US administration in 1989
(Ofcansky and Berry, 1991).
Therefore, in the later half of the 1980s the US leaders started to reconsider
their position. Barre was severely injured in a car accident in 1986 and this, as
we have seen, raised the issue of who would succeed the ailing dictator, created
mounting tension and wiped out the already fragile cohesion among loyal
groups of Barre. This coincided with decreased tension related to the Cold War
struggle. And, thus, Somalia started to lose its geopolitical value. As Table 6.1
shows, since 1986 both economic and military assistance to Somalia decreased
dramatically. Furthermore, by 1988 it was quite clear that Washington had lost
its interest in Somalia. In mid-1989 Carter initiated a peace deal between
Mengistu and opposition groups and after meeting with Mengistu in Ethiopia
expressed his hope that the 28-year-old civil war would end. And two months
later he hosted peace talks between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean
faction in Atlanta. Mengistu too, in realising that he was losing his superpower
patron, conveyed his desire for a better relationship with Washington. The US
took the opportunity not only to bring an old ally back again but more
importantly to prevent Ethiopia from collapsing.
165


In late 1980s and early 1990s both countries, Somalia and Ethiopia, were both
on the verge of collapse. Unfortunately, Washington ignoring its role in the
Somali conflict abandoned Somalia while paying all means necessary to bring
the warring Ethiopian factions together to solve their differences at the
negotiating table rather than splintering the country. The final result was the
peaceful departure of Mengistu and political stabilisation of Ethiopia. In
Somalia the worst scenario prevailed. Howard Wolpe, Congressman and former
roIessor oI AIrIcun PoIILIcs, observed LhuL |w|huL you ure seeIng |he wus
taking about the consequences of the Somali civil War of the early 1990s], ... is
u generuI IndIIIerence Lo u dIsusLer LhuL we Iuyed u roIe In creuLIng (quoLed In
Zunes, zooz). S. Zunes noLed LhuL |L|here Is wIdesreud ugreemenL umong
those familiar with Somalia that had the U.S. government not supported the
Barre regime with large amounts of military aid, he would have been forced to
sLe down Iong beIore hIs mIsruIe sIInLered Lhe counLry (Zunes, zooz).



T
a
b
l
e

6
.
1

U
S

E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c

a
n
d

M
i
l
i
t
a
r
y

A
i
d

t
o

S
o
m
a
l
i
a
,

1
9
8
0
-
9
0

(
B
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l

L
o
a
n
s

a
n
d

G
r
a
n
t
s
,

M
i
l
l
i
o
n
s

o
f

D
o
l
l
a
r
s
)








P
r
o
g
r
a
m


1
9
8
0

1
9
8
1

1
9
8
2

1
9
8
3

1
9
8
4

1
9
8
5

1
9
8
6

1
9
8
7

1
9
8
8

1
9
8
9

1
9
9
0

1
9
9
1

I
.

T
o
t
a
l

E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c

A
i
d

6
2
,
3

5
7

3
5
,
8

4
8
,
7

4
6
,
7

5
2
,
6

4
6
,
9

3
7
,
5

1
8
,
2

1
2
,
6

5
,
8

3
,
7

A
.

A
i
d

&

P
r
e
d
e
c
e
s
s
o
r
s

1
2
,
3

1
2
,
1

1
4
,
4

2
6
,
9

1
5
,
6

2
1

2
2
,
5

1
8
,
5

6
,
1

5
,
2

0
.
8

0
,
6

B
.

F
o
o
d

f
o
r

P
e
a
c
e

5
0

4
4
,
9

2
1
,
4

2
1
,
8

3
1
,
1

3
1
,
7

2
4
,
4

1
9

1
2
,
1

7
,
4

4
,
8

3
,
1

I
I
.

T
o
t
a
l

M
i
l
i
t
a
r
y

A
i
d

2
0

2
0
,
4

2
5
,
4

3
0
,
6

3
3

3
4
,
1

2
0
,
2

8
,
2

6
,
5

0
,
9

0
,
8

0

I
I
I
.

E
S
F

5

0

2
0

2
1

3
5

3
0

2
2

1
7
,
1

4

8

0

0

I
V
.

G
r
a
n
d

T
o
t
a
l

8
7
,
3

7
7
,
4

8
1
,
2

1
0
0
,
3

1
1
4
,
7

1
1
6
,
7

8
9
,
1

6
2
,
8

2
8
,
7

2
1
,
5

6
,
6

3
,
7

L
o
a
n

3
7
,
7

3
5

2
4
,
5

2
5

1
6

2
0

1
6
,
5

1
,
1

0

0

0

0

G
r
a
n
t
s

4
9
,
6

4
2
,
4

5
6
,
7

7
5
,
3

9
8
,
6

9
6
,
8

7
2
,
6

6
1
,
6

2
8
,
7

2
1
,
5

6
,
6

3
,
7

S
o
u
r
c
e
:

S
c
h
r
a
e
d
e
r

(
1
9
9
4
)













166
167


6.5. Political Economy of Predation
Clearly by the late 1970s Barre had mobilised all means under his command to
centralise state power in his hands in order to penetrate all aspects of society.
However, his efforts met with catastrophic results in the economic realm. As we
have seen, as soon as it came to power the military regime brought a large part
of the economy into the hands of the state. But after the formation of the SRSP
the economy was in the hands of the President. Previously, the main objective
for the state control of the economy was to develop a base for economic
development, reduce inequality and establish an independent economy for the
counLry. AILer Lhe wur, Burre`s IIrsL und IoremosL gouI wus Lo survIve oIILIcuIIy
and every aspect of the national economy was formulated to meet that end. The
main strategy was to create economic incentives for capable allies. Under the
uLrImonIuI dImensIon deveIoed under SIud Burre's regIme . EmbezzIemenL
of public funds, corruption of ministers and civil servants in connection with
public markets and development projects, baksheeshes at all levels of the
bureaucracy, illegal trafficking by relatives or friends of the president - all these
were LIghLIy IInked Lo u dIrecL uccess Lo sLuLe ower und consequenLIy, on Lhe
one hund u sLruLum oI weuILhy und corruL busInessmen (muny of whom were
ennIIess In Lhe eurIy 1q;os) urose Irom uII Lhe cIuns (Comugnon, 1qqz).
However, the national economy completely collapsed due to Barre mobilising it
to ensure the survival of the military regime. In addition, to finance the war
against armed opposition groups, national resources were channelled for
military use.
Long ago researchers, Bates (1981) and Lal (1983), identified the instruments
used by predatory governments to extract rents. A range of instruments utilised
by the predatory state were found (Azam, et.al., 2005): exchange rate change;
obstructing access to key markets; and playing with prices in factor markets and
the goods they sell. Blomqvist and Lundahl (2002) documented a more
comprehensive list of such instruments: taxation, particularly tariffs and trade
duties; trade barriers and granting monopolies for clients; government
appointment; printing money; foreign debt; development assistance and direct
confiscations. In the following pages I will try to some extent spell out the
exploitation techniques employed by the military regime and consequently
explain the collapse of the formal economy in Somalia
77
.
6.5.1. Political Economy of Public Employment
The first strategy of formulating a patrimonial system related to the recruitment
and promoLIon rocesses InLo Lhe ubIIc oIIIces. n Lhe IuLer urL oI Burre`s ruIe,
assignments of almost all levels of government offices, both civil service and
military, were directly (by giving a post to an influential friend or foe who could
contribute to Lhe survIvuI oI Lhe regIme) or IndIrecLIy (emIoyIng someone who`s
employment would please a powerful friend) based on the logic of patrimonial

77
As the formal economy was falling into complete disintegration a parallel or informal
economy, which finally replaced the formal economy, was emerging slowly.
168


relationship. Through that process the public institutions became clan
institutions; the top level positions, ministers, deputy ministers, permanent
secretaries of all ministries for instance, were given to influential figures and
their appointments were exclusively made in the presidential palace. Occupants
of the second category of the hierarchy, the heads of departments, were mainly
appointed by superiors of the institution in question with the acceptance of the
presidential palace of course. The appointment of the lower level positions, the
heads of units and individual civil servants, were made exclusively by the top
leaders of the institution. However, leaders of any public institution, when
making employment decisions, were to make sure that the decision should
contribute to their survival in particular and that of the regime in general. The
best strategy for a superior to distribute allocations of public positions under his
control was to give a potential office, as much as he could, to his fellow
clansman. This would serve two main objectives: one is that, everything else
being equal, a clan member is more reliable than a member of another clan, so it
assures the loyalty of the subordinate; the other, the political entrepreneur, the
superior, should gain an opportunity to convince his clan that he is there for
their cause, which may influence the clan to rally behind him. In other words,
the clan is firstly expected not to support a rival faction and to be ready to
support
78
the regime when needed. In the late 1980s it was common knowledge
that almost every public institution was incorporated with clan identity. The
clan of a minister of a given ministry or a general manager of a given public
agency disproportionately occupied the offices of the organisations in question.
Nothing was wrong with an unemployed youngster being informed by
colleagues thatAdeerlcc sou uclcclcd heblc mc hcsto (Your uncle,
meaning your fellow clansman, have got agency X!
79
).
The chIeI oI ProLocoI In Lhe oreIgn MInIsLry suId Lhe oreIgn MInIsLry dId noL
apply a Foreign Service Law, neither did it have rules, procedures and norms for
posting of officials to Somali Diplomatic Missions abroad. The Minister enjoyed
almost unfettered power and privilege in assigning officials to whatever posting
he deemed them competent for ... the Ministry became the property of
privileged persons. The children of influential people, who were recommended
for foreign service posts did not work at the Ministry for even a short period to
Lry und Ieurn someLhIng beIore beIng osLed ubroud. Some oI Lhe PresIdenL`s
nominees did not even know the location of the Ministry until it was time to
collect their diplomatic passports and tickets. Otherwise, perhaps children of
the new elite, and already benefitting from state scholarships to foreign
universities, were directly absorbed into the Somali Embassy of the country
where Lhey were IIvIng, wILhouL even reLurnIng home IIrsL (Omur, 1qqz).

78
The regime might need to arm the clan in order to fight another clan which is hostile to the
government.
79
The sentence shows ownership of the public agency by its leader.
169



Table 6.2, Exchange rate between US$ and So. Sh.(selling rate)
Year Month So Sh to 1US$ Year Date So Sh to 1US$
1985 Jan 36,3600 1988 Jun 181,8000
Feb 36,8550 Aug 224,2200
Mar 37,3700 Sep 249,4700
Apr 37,8750 Oct 263,6100
May 40,5094 Nov 259,5700
Jun 41,0144 Dec 273,7100
Nov 42,9250 1989 Jan 270,2700
1986 Jan 55,0450 Feb 305,9100
Mar 59,0850 Mar 336,6000
Apr 63,1250 Apr 380,1600
May 67,1650 May 440,5500
Jun 71,2050 Jun 482,5300
Jul 75,2450 Jul 497,9700
Aug 79,2850 Aug 542,5200
Sep 83,3250 Sep 576,1800
1987 Jul 116,0252 Oct 611,8200
Aug 140,6784 Nov 672,2100
Sep 153,4998 Dec 920,2100
Oct 101,0000
Source: Somalia (1990)
Secondly, as Table 6.2 demonstrates, the Somali government extensively
devaluated the Somali Shilling. Before July 1981 the exchange rate in Somalia
was So.Sh. 6.23 to $1. However, in December 1989 the rate was So.Sh. 920.21 to
$1. Consequently employment remuneration severely deteriorated in the 1980s.
Table 7.3 indicates the salary structure, including cost-of-living supplements, of
the civil service employees and shows that in real terms the salaries of public
employees in 1989 were only between 2.7 to 4.3 percent of their respective
salaries in 1975
80
. Although since 1975 the government had made periodical
adjustment of the cost-of-living of its employees in the form of allowances and
the fact that there were extra allowances that accrue to individuals occupying
certain positions, this did not address the ever worsening erosion of the real
value of the employment remuneration caused by inflation.

80
An exception of this worsening formal remuneration was some payments in kind given to
senior officers. Ministers and some top administrators were eligible for housing with utilities,
cars with fuel, staff etc. The value of these remunerations was very large compared with formal
salary. For a good summary of the government employment in Somalia see Gregory (1994).


T
a
b
l
e

6
.
3
,

C
i
v
i
l

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

s
a
l
a
r
y

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
,

S
o
m
a
l
i
a

1
9
7
5

a
n
d

1
9
8
9




S
a
l
a
r
i
e
s

i
n

R
e
a
l

S
a
l
a
r
i
e
s

1
9
8
9

a
s

a



S
a
l
a
r
i
e
s

1
9
8
9

i
n

1
9
8
9

p
e
c
e
n
t
a
g
e

G
r
a
d
e

S
t
e
p

i
n

1
9
7
5

(
C
u
r
r
e
n
t

S
h
i
l
l
i
n
g
s
)

(
1
9
7
5

S
h
i
l
l
i
n
g
s
)

o
f

1
9
7
5

A
p
p
r
e
n
t
i
c
e


1
3
2
,
0
0

6
6
5
,
0
0

6
,
0
0

4
,
3
0

D
1
4

1

2
2
0
,
0
0

1

1
0
9
,
0
0

1
0
,
0
0

4
,
3
0


5

2
6
4
,
0
0

1

2
9
4
,
0
0

1
1
,
0
0

4
,
2
0

D
1
3

1

2
7
5
,
0
0

1

3
4
8
,
0
0

1
2
,
0
0

4
,
2
0


5

3
1
9
,
0
0

1

5
6
3
,
0
0

1
3
,
0
0

4
,
2
0

D
1
2

1

3
3
0
,
0
0

1

6
1
7
,
0
0

1
4
,
0
0

4
,
2
0


5

3
7
4
,
0
0

1

7
8
0
,
0
0

1
5
,
0
0

4
,
1
0

D
1
1
/
C
1
1
/
X
4

1

3
7
5
,
0
0

1

8
3
3
,
0
0

1
6
,
0
0

4
,
2
0


5

4
5
2
,
0
0

2

1
8
5
,
0
0

1
9
,
0
0

4
,
2
0

C
1
0
/
B
1
0
/
X
4

1

4
7
3
,
0
0

2

1
9
5
,
0
0

1
9
,
0
0

4
,
0
0


5

5
5
7
,
0
0

2

5
0
1
,
0
0

2
1
,
0
0

3
,
9
0

C
9
/
B
9
/
A
8
/
X
2
/
F
3

1

6
3
0
,
0
0

2

8
3
1
,
0
0

2
4
,
0
0

3
,
9
0


5

7
2
0
,
0
0

3

1
9
2
,
0
0

2
7
,
0
0

3
,
8
0

C
8
/
B
8
/
A
7
/
X
1
/
F
2
/
A
Y
3

1

8
0
0
,
0
0

3

5
4
6
,
0
0

3
0
,
0
0

3
,
8
0


5

9
2
0
,
0
0

3

7
3
2
,
0
0

3
2
,
0
0

3
,
5
0

A
6
/
F
1
/
A
Y
2
-
1

1

1

0
0
0
,
0
0

3

7
7
1
,
0
0

3
2
,
0
0

3
,
2
0


3

1

0
6
0
,
0
0

3

9
1
8
,
0
0

3
4
,
0
0

3
,
2
0

A
5

1

1

0
9
0
,
0
0

4

0
2
9
,
0
0

3
5
,
0
0

3
,
2
0


4

1

1
5
0
,
0
0

4

2
5
0
,
0
0

3
6
,
0
0

3
,
1
0

A
4


1

1
6
0
,
0
0

4

2
8
7
,
0
0

3
7
,
0
0

3
,
2
0

A
3
/
A
Y
1

1

1

2
0
0
,
0
0

4

4
3
5
,
0
0

3
8
,
0
0

3
,
2
0


3

1

3
0
0
,
0
0

4

8
0
5
,
0
0

4
1
,
0
0

3
,
2
0

A
2
/
A
Y
1

1

1

4
0
0
,
0
0

5

1
7
4
,
0
0

4
4
,
0
0

3
,
2
0

170



3

1

6
0
0
,
0
0

5

7
8
7
,
0
0

5
0
,
0
0

3
,
1
0

A
1

1

1

8
0
0
,
0
0

6

0
3
5
,
0
0

5
2
,
0
0

2
,
9
0



2

2

0
0
1
,
0
0

6

3
3
9
,
0
0

5
4
,
0
0

2
,
7
0

S
o
u
r
c
e
:

G
r
e
g
o
r
y

(
1
9
9
4
)

171
172


According to Gregory (1994) the official exchange rate was So.Sh. 1000 to $ 1
and the professional allowance and the largest responsibility allowance
amounted to only 70 cents and 2 dollars a month respectively. Therefore, the
public sector remuneration was extremely poor and the state authority was not
prepared to address that. In addition, the World Bank estimated that almost
over half of public sector staff was excessive and rather than decreasing the real
salary of the public sector by reducing the redundant employees, the Somali
government kept increasing the staff in the public institutions. Figure 6.1shows
that, except 1986 and 1987, government employment increased dramatically
compared to the second half of the 1970s. Furthermore, although the
expenditure budget in Table 6.4 indicates that total government expenditure on
employees decreased about 34 percent between 1975 and 1989, the expenditure
per employee on the contrary decreased significantly.
Table 6.4, Central Government non-defense Expenditure, (per
Employee, Somalia, Selected Years, 1975-89)
Expenditure Expenditure per
year (millions) Employment employee
1975 476,00 20 600,00 23 107,00
1979 700,00 35 000,00 19 971,00
1981 269,00 40 000,00 6 721,00
1989 314,00 56 500,00 5 558,00
Source: Gregory (1994)
The LubIe oInLs ouL LhuL Lhe cenLruI governmenL`s exendILure er emIoyee
decreased from over 23 thousands shillings in 1975 to only a little over 5.5
thousands shillings in 1989 which is about 76 percent. All these indicate that the
government was intentionally ignoring the deteriorating situation of the public
employment sector.
ThIrdIy, us we wIII see IuLer, Burre`s governmenL guve Lhe green IIghL Lo ILs
clients to use public offices to remunerate themselves. Controlling all forms of
rent-seeking was implicitly lifted, except for unsympathetic elements. Almost
everyone in the system was using the office he occupied, at least partially, to
compensate himself. According to the former Director-General (interior) of the
Somali Bank of Commerce and Savings (SBCS), the intentional negligence by
the highest figures of the government and the leaders of the institutions
responsible to protect the property of both people and government, such us the
Auditor-General, Chief Justice, Central Bank
81
and relevant security forces,
resuILed In eoIe`s deosILs In Lhe SBCS beIng Iundered by sLuLe oIIIcIuIs und
cronies (Amiin, 2004).
This dreadful situation forced the sector to decline and finally to collapse. Waves
of former public sector employees migrated to the oil rich states in the Middle
East for better wages. Others sought to involve themselves in Public Investment

81
The central bank had the responsibility of safeguarding the deposits of the clients and
administrative efficiency of all banks in the country.
173


Projects (PIP), that were financed by donor countries and organisations, during
their implementation period. In this phase the PIP were mainly administered by
expatriate managers and foreign firms and local staff were paid well. To avoid
working for the government, when the project was completed and handed over
to the government they quit and looked for another PIP project which was still
in its implementation phase. Most of those who left public sector employment
for the Middle East or to PIP were, relatively, the best qualified Somalis
(Mubarak, 1996). Others went into the private sector for self-employment or a
better wage.
Those who remained in the sector had two options. Firstly, those who were
unable to milk their office were forced, despite formally staying in the office, to
look for extra money from outside their offices. Civil servant absenteeism was a
common practice In Lhe 1q8os und some oIIIcIuIs showed u In Lhe mornIng Lo
sign the attendance register and left. They went downtown in search of part-
LIme work or busIness, Lo muke u IILLIe more money (Omur, 1qqz).
Secondly, those who were willing to generate illicit rents preferred to stay. Here
a public employee was in office mainly to support his living by demanding
unofficial fees. However, in some cases, by raising large amounts of money
through illicit revenue they were paying themselves much higher than the fair
salary they would have obtained in an efficient market. In the 1980s several
subsections of Mogadishu, with a concentration of luxurious villas, were
increasingly becoming very different from the rest of the city. Boolli Qaran was
the largest and most well known one of these. Almost all of these buildings were
owned by government officials and cronies, at the time when the salary of a
minister was 4000 Somali shillings (about $ 4 in Dec. 1990).
Government officials who were to deal with the private sector realised that the
more they created obstructions against private firms, the more rent money they
would gain. So due to irregular regulations and informal embarrassments
private business became a soft target for the rent seeking government officials.
However, ordinary individuals seeking normal public services were not spared
from the burden of corruption. Let me share with you some of my experiences of
corruption in Somalia. At the end of December 1990, I was one of those students
who completed their four year studies in economics at the Somali National
University. After graduation some of my classmates went to the office that was
responsible for issuing the certificates to graduated students. Most of us were
expecting to collect our certificates as soon as possible since the civil war that
ravaged most of the country was closely approaching the capital. My colleagues
came back and informed us that they were told that the rector, who was to sign
the certificate, had allocated only one day a month of his schedule to sign the
certificates, and unfortunately, the bulk of certificates that would exhaust his
allocated time for at least the next six month were already on his table. Later on
we realised that those who were willing to pay 50 thousand shillings
(approximately 50 dollars) would get their certificates quickly.
Consequently, anyone in the public sector who once committed themselves to
taking a bribe or to other illegal activities felt that it was in his interest to protect
174


the regime, either to defend his economic interest or to escape from justifiable
punishment, as he were vulnerable to prosecution forever. Barre used this as a
method to control the public sector (Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman, 1997). So in
the 1980s the common way to resign from a public office, especially a high level
one, was to go into exile.
The immediate economic impact of such behaviour was loss of efficiency in the
ubIIc secLor. As sIgnIIIcunL number oI educuLed SomuIIs IeIL Lhe counLry`s
government institutions in search of a better life, their offices were occupied by
reIuLIveIy unquuIIIIed emIoyees. AccordIng Lo weII InIormed observers new
projects flush with foreign aid and projects which are popular with the
government can offer better terms than the projects which have exhausted their
foreign aid or lost favour. As a consequence, the best staff leave the ministries,
und IeuIroggIng Irom one rojecL Lo unoLher Is common (CILed In Menkhuus,
1989).
This was observable in some of the most important offices; the accountant-
generuI`s oIIIce IuIIed Lo IuIIII ILs resonsIbIIILIes urLIuIIy becuuse oI decIInIng
skIIIs und Iow moruIe (UN, 1qq1). The wIdesreud ubsenLeeIsm menLIoned
earlier undoubtedly had its impact, but even those who stayed in office used
most of their time on tasks which were not their formal assignments i.e. forging
or preparing fake documents, informal bargaining about how much a client
would pay, involvment in political tasks asked by their patrons. Another
phenomenon was a lack of discipline and a weakened formal hierarchy in the
public sector. Everyone believed that he was there because of his political
identity, not because of his performance. So it was not very difficult for
subordinates to ignore the orders of their superiors.
6.5.2. Political Economy of Financial Management
The budget processes of any country should at least fulfill two main purposes:
first, it should mobilise and allocates resources. Here the budget process
determines the distribution of limited resources; secondly, the budget should
also provide financial management and accountability. Therefore, the budget is
inherently correlated with the political process. In this section, to draw attention
Lo Lhe roIe oI Burre`s oIILIcuI uLronuge In Lhe ubIIc IInuncIuI munugemenL
which ultimately rendered the national economy into a complete collapse, the
study considers both the revenue and expenditure sides of the public budget. At
the expenditure side, it will be concentrated on three main stages: formulation
of the budget, its execution or implementation, and the control of the budget.
The Ministry of Finance assumed most of the budget related activities: The
Ordinary Budget Department and the Treasury Department used to develop
recurrent expenditures and revenue budgets respectively. The Domestic
Development Department under the Ministry of National Planning had the
responsibility for developing the Domestic Development Budget. These
departments, though dealing with the national budget, lacked any cooperation
for their activities. Even at the ministry level the lack of cooperation was quite
175


apparent except at the highest level of government and, according to Ekstrom
(1qq), Lhere Is umIe evIdence IndIcuLIng LhuL u conscIous sLruLegy oI
purposeful fragmentation of budgetary and financial management activities
existed in order to insure some form of top level control over governmental
IInunces.
In the formulation process the Ministry of Finance, after relevant organisations
submitted their estimates about revenues and expenditures, prepared the
annual ordinary budget. It was approved firstly by the cabinet, then by the
National Assembly and finally by the President.
To start with, there were serious deficiencies in the process of budget
formulation: in the process of formulating expenditure-revenue estimates, there
was a lack of basic information required to prepare reliable estimates of things
like GDP growth rate, inflation and exchange rates, and government
emIoymenL oIIcy. Thus Lhe esLImuLes were muInIy bused on guesswork;
equally serious problems that resulted from the lack of information, and lack of
macroeconomic forecasts, hampered the formulation of fiscal policy. Regarding
revenues, the lack of such information was particularly serious where no
information was given on the inflation rate or the growth of imports and exports
(UN, 1990).
However, most deficiencies in the formulation stage occurred in the process of
deciding expenditure targets and it is hard to believe that these deficiencies
were unintentional. Table 6.5 illustrates the recurrent expenditure budget
between 1984 and 1988 and shows that the meager national resources were
poured into the unproductive sphere of so-called general services; in 1988,
94.45 percent went to the general service alone. About half of the total
expenditure was devoted to finance and central services including the
presidency. The economically productive spheres gained only 2.39 percent of
the total expenditure. Social services, education, health and labour gained 3.12
percent of the total.


T
a
b
l
e

6
.
5


O
r
d
i
n
a
r
y

E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
,

1
9
8
4
-
8
8







%

o
f

t
h
e

t
o
t
a
l

E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e

1
9
8
4

1
9
8
5

1
9
8
6

1
9
8
7

1
9
8
8

1
9
8
8

F
i
n
a
n
c
e

a
n
d

c
e
n
t
r
a
l

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

2

1
0
2
,
4
0

4

1
1
8
,
3
0

7

6
3
1
,
8
0

1
4

1
2
7
,
1
0

1
2

5
1
5
,
6
0

4
9
,
8
0

D
e
f
e
n
c
e

1

7
8
5
,
8
0

1

7
5
0
,
9
0

2

5
1
1
,
0
0

2

9
9
9
,
7
0

7

9
1
7
,
6
0

3
1
,
5
0

I
n
t
e
r
i
o
r

a
n
d

p
o
l
i
c
e

2
2
3
,
6
0

3
0
7
,
8
0

4
4
3
,
4
0

5
6
0
,
7
0

7
1
5
,
4
0

2
,
8
5

F
o
r
e
i
g
n

a
f
f
a
i
r
s

2
1
9
,
9
0

4
2
7
,
2
0

6
3
2
,
2
0

1

4
1
3
,
9
0

2

1
5
3
,
1
0

8
,
5
7

J
u
s
t
i
c
e

a
n
d

r
e
l
i
g
i
o
n

a
f
f
a
i
r
s

1
4
1
,
2
0

1
5
8
,
4
0

2
4
4
,
6
0

2
9
0
,
2
0

4
4
6
,
9
0

1
,
7
8

T
o
t
a
l

g
e
n
e
r
a
l

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

4

4
7
2
,
9
0

6

7
6
2
,
6
0

1
1

4
6
3
,
0
0

1
9

3
9
1
,
6
0

2
3

7
4
8
,
6
0

9
4
,
4
9








T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

5
3
,
1
0

5
5
,
9
0

6
0
,
7
0

8
7
,
5
0

9
4
,
5
0

0
,
3
8

P
o
s
t

a
n
d

t
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s

5
4
,
1
0

6
5
,
7
0

5
8
,
7
0

7
6
,
7
0

7
5
,
6
0

0
,
3
0

P
u
b
l
i
c

W
o
r
k
s

3
8
,
8
0

4
7
,
6
0

4
8
,
9
0

5
7
,
5
0

6
9
,
8
0

0
,
2
8

A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e

9
6
,
2
0

5
6
,
3
0

4
5
,
4
0

5
9
,
5
0

5
5
,
3
0

0
,
2
2

L
i
v
e
s
t
o
c
k

a
n
d

F
o
r
e
s
t
r
y

5
6
,
4
0

7
4
,
8
0

8
3
,
2
0

8
9
,
5
0

1
0
9
,
9
0

0
,
4
4

M
i
n
i
r
a
l
s

a
n
d

W
a
t
e
r

R
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s

5
3
,
4
0

7
5
,
4
0

6
0
,
6
0

8
5
,
2
0

9
3
,
1
0

0
,
3
7

I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y

7
,
1
0

7
,
0
0

1
0
,
9
0

4
5
,
1
0

4
3
,
9
0

0
,
1
7

C
o
m
m
e
r
c
e

4
,
4
0

5
,
8
0

1
1
,
0
0

n
a

n
a


F
i
s
h
e
r
i
e
s

2
8
,
2
0

3
0
,
0
0

3
3
,
9
0

4
5
,
4
0

5
8
,
2
0

0
,
2
3

T
o
u
r
i
s
m

3
,
8
0

4
,
3
0

4
,
3
0

1
0
,
2
0

n
a


T
o
t
a
l

E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c

S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

3
9
5
,
5
0

4
2
2
,
8
0

4
1
7
,
6
0

5
5
6
,
6
0

6
0
0
,
3
0

2
,
3
9








E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n

3
2
7
,
3
0

3
1
4
,
4
0

3
3
0
,
4
0

4
0
3
,
0
0

4
7
8
,
1
0

1
,
9
0

176


H
e
a
l
t
h

1
3
8
,
4
0

1
5
3
,
9
0

1
6
5
,
6
0

2
0
3
,
5
0

2
5
5
,
1
0

1
,
0
1

L
a
b
o
u
r

2
2
,
7
0

2
1
,
3
0

1
7
,
1
0

2
1
,
1
0

5
1
,
8
0

0
,
2
1

T
o
t
a
l

S
o
c
i
a
l

S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

4
8
8
,
4
0

4
8
9
,
6
0

5
1
3
,
1
0

6
2
7
,
6
0

7
8
5
,
0
0

3
,
1
2

T
o
t
a
l

E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e

5

3
5
6
,
8
0

7

6
7
5
,
0
0

1
2

3
9
3
,
7
0

2
0

5
7
5
,
8
0

2
5

1
3
3
,
9
0

1
0
0
,
0
0

S
o
u
r
c
e
:

S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
s
c
h
h
e
s

B
u
n
d
e
s
a
m
t

(
1
9
9
1
)
.
177
178


This does not show the unfortunate situation of the economic and social spheres
alone but illustrates that most of the symptoms of economic mismanagement
were present in Somalia. For instance, a severe decline in education and health
expenditure as a share of the recurrent expenditure budget was apparent. Figure
6.1 shows LhuL Lhe shure oI economIc servIces oI Lhe governmenL`s exenditure
budget declined from about 22 percent in 1975 to about 3 percent in 1988 and
that the share of the social services declined from about 26 percent to 4 percent
in the same period. In addition, deteriorating economic and physical
infrastructure was also visible around the country in the period under review. As
one Iormer SomuII oIIIcer noLed, our governmenLs never ossessed
maintenance mentality. They used a building until it collapsed for lack of
maintenance and care, and then just moved to another one (Omur, 1qqz).



Furthermore, the increasing share of the unproductive spheres of the
expenditure budget alone would have been enough to illustrate the level of
financial disarray of the economy. However, as Ekstrom (1993) noted, a large
portion of the expenditure budget, especially this that concerns the
unreasonable share under the control of the Minister of Finance, were
urorIuLed us Ium sum LoLuIs. AccordIng Lo hIm, Lhe neL eIIecL oI LhIs Ium
sum appropriation was that 75.9 percent of the appropriations in the 1990
ordinary budget were made without detailed justification and for unspecified
uroses und he goes on by rIghLIy suyIng LhuL Lhe Ium sum LucLIcs were used
to mask the real intent of spending plans and to provide for centralized control
of this spending since the Minister of Finance controlled most of the lump sum
urorIuLIons.
179


In Somalia revenue comprised tax, which was classified into direct (i.e. net
income and property taxes) and indirect, and non-tax, including receipts from
property income, administrative fees and charges, fines and forfeits, cash
operating surpluses and amounts due from public enterprises. The component
of the indirect taxes, the largest source of the ordinary budget, were taxes on
goods and services and taxes on international trade, mainly import and export
duties. The responsibility for revenue collection and administration was
concentrated in the Ministry of Finance (UN, 1991).
The economic mismanagement was evident everywhere at the revenue
collection stations and in many cases there was lack of information about the
revenue collection (UN, 1991). Customs duties on imports were a source of
uImosL huII oI Lhe cenLruI governmenL`s revenues und IL wus here were mosL oI
the mismanagement and tax evasions were taking place outside the Minister of
Finance. Those who were able to gain letters of credit or permission for
import/export business were the same people who were able to secure tax
exemptions for their business in order to escape from the burden of the tax.
This, however, crippled the revenue base of the government. Figure 6.2, shows
that the tax revenue severely declined from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. And
it is interesting to note that this occurred while the import as a share of GDP, in
the same period, substantially increased (Mubarak, 1996). The leaders of the
state and their cronies were the main players in the import sector. Major
General Mohamed Sheik Oman, the minister of finance and a long time ally of
the president who transformed himself from an ordinary army officer to one of
the wealthiest men in Somalia, was a main figure in this business. A popular
joke in Somalia in the late 1980s was that on many occasions when General
Osman came across beautiful luxury buildings in the capital, he would inform
his assistant that he, the Minister, wants this building to be his own. Most of the
LIme Lhe reIIes oI Lhe ussIsLunL were Lhe sume Mr. MInIsLer, Lhe buIIdIng Is
uIreudy yours. urLhermore, uILhough Iruud und corruLIon wus u common
practice at the collection posts for some time, in the late 1980s there was tax
evasion on a massive scale in the Treasury Department of the Ministry of
Finance itself, and by all means effective revenue collections had broken down
(Ekstrom, 1993).
There were also significant deficiencies in the process of budget control. The
problem of information loomed large in the process of control. For example, the
Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance was not able to control the
expenditure of any particular head after budget implementations were approved
in the beginning of the fiscal year. The lack of information of the cash flows
partially prevented the department from exercising its control over the
expenditure as the year proceeded and the meager information available was
not always analysed properly nor was it readily usable for management
purposes. In addition, the definitions of procedures used for controlling the
budget, for instance, were less clear and the responsibility for their application
was fragmented. These made the judgments of how appropriate these
procedures were very arduous. Furthermore, the institutions responsible for the
accuracy of the budget outcomes and for identifying inconsistencies, such as the
Accountant-General, the Magistrate of Accounts and audits, were either
180


ineffective or payed little attention to the purposes of budget review and control.
Moreover, the government had for a long time ignored to review the financial
Iuws und LhereIore Lhe reguIuLIons Ior exendILure conLroI Lherefore contained
loopholes, and overlapping procedural requirements. Often it [was] easy to
uvoId or cIrcumvenL Lhe rocedures und muke Lhe conLroI IneIIecLIve (UN,
1991). However, the highest leadership of the government should be blamed
since, as we saw earlier, it intentionally fragmented the budget and financial
management activities in order to assume extended control over government
finance.


In addition to the lump sum budgeting and information gaps, mentioned
previously, Ekstrom
82
(1993) noted other factors indicating the degree of
disintegration that the official budgetary and financial management Somalia
wus exerIencIng beIore Lhe coIIuse oI Lhe sLuLe. One oI Lhese IndIcuLors oI
uncerLuInLy Is repetitive budgeting. Repetitive revision of budget decisions
throughout the fiscal period is believed to be a sign that the country in question
is experiencing extreme uncertainty of whether or not the allocation decisions
can achieve acceptable resolution. The phenomena has been visible in Somalia
at least since the mid-1980s and in most of the cases the divergence between the
actual and revised figures were abnormally large, which indicated that
formulating the budget with realistic figures was not easy, even in the revision
phases (UN, 1991). In 1990 the national budget had been revised four times
where the original Ordinary Budget had been increased by 78.9 percent, while
the increase of the Domestic Development Budget and Debt Service was about
30 percent each (Ekstrom, 1993).

82
Carl D. Ekstrom was among the very few qualified non-Somalis who witnessed the collapse of
the Somali economy before the collapse of the state itself in the early 1990s.
181


6.5.3. Political Economy of Non-Financial Public Enterprises
Another sector under state control was the industrial sector of which the
government owned over 80 percent in the 1980s. The GDP contribution of the
manufacturing sector was around 5 percent in the mid-1980s. However, it
absorbed a large share of the development expenditures. As we saw, the
regIme`s objecLIve oI deveIoIng Lhe sLuLe secLor wus Lo esLubIIsh u busIs Ior
industrialisation, which was considered as a cornerstone of an independent
economy. Hence the regime reorganised some factories, founded new factories
and put some others into operation. However, the manufacturing sector was far
from playing its role in the 1980s. The sector suffered a negative annual average
growth rate of 3.4 percent during 1980-86. Table 6.6 summurIses Lhe secLor`s
capacity utilisation in the early 1980s and shows that the production capacity of
the sector was thoroughly underutilised. The overall capacity utilisation of the
sector declined from a low level of 39 percent in 1982 to a lower level of 26
percent in 1986. A study carried out by the World Bank in late 1987 found that
40 percent of the enterprises showed negative value added (UNIDO, 1988). This
reveals that despite the enormous amount of public funds spent on both human
and physical capital the production per employee in the manufacturing sector
declined and efficiency deteriorated (Mubarak, 1996).
Table 6.6, Utilisation of Installed Capacity in Selected Industrial Enterprises, 1982-6
(percentage)
Enterprise 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Juba Sugar Complex 35 40,1 38,4 55,9 38,6
SNAI Sugar Complex, Jowhar 29,8 6,9 1,7 6,8 8,3
Edible Oil Mill, Mogadishu 1,7 1,1 0 0 0
Wheat, Flour and Pasta Factory, Mogadishu 12,9 54,1 77,4 56,5 61,4
Meat Factory, Kismayo 6,2 0 0 0 19,5
ITOP Afgoi (Fruit Canning) 3 4,3 2,1 9,1 12,5
Milk Factory, Mogadishu 18,3 6,7 0 0 0
National Bottling Co. (Private) 66 55 45 16 7,8
Cigarette and Match Factory 51,1 35,2 27 25,9 31
Somaltex, Balad 47,6 30,2 23,1 15,6 27,5
Tannery Km 7 Mogadishu (hides only) 0 8,5 45 48 63
Incas Packing 16,7 18,3 21,1 24 33
Somali Chemical Industry (private) 21,2 12,9 15,3 4,8 4,6
Urea Plant, Mogadishu 4,2 2
Petrolium Refinary, Mogadishu 47,8 43,9 31,1 36,5 27
Foundry and Mechanical Workshop 33,3 21,8 17,2 14 14
Aluminium Utensils 45 24,8 34,2 15 12,5
Somali Marine Products 15 2 20
Weighted Average for the Manufacturing 39 33 26 28 26
Source UNIDO (1988)
182


Several factors were found to bear the prime responsibility for this
disappointing performance: (UNIDO, 1988; Mubarak 1996; and Samatar 1987).
1. Agriculture as the supplier of the raw materials of most of the
industries failed to keep pace. So lack of raw materials hampered the
sector.
2. Lack of hard currency to buy spare parts, imported raw materials and
regular maintenance. The governmenL`s rIce oIIcy und unbeurubIe
taxes impoverished the manufacturing sector. Domestic prices of the
secLor`s ouLuL were noL uIIowed Lo IIucLuuLe wILh Lhe murkeL demund
and, in addition, the sector was expected to provide contributions to
the GovernmenL`s budgeL. ThereIore, ubIIc IndusLrIes were unubIe Lo
generate the required foreign exchange in order to buy imported
machineries, materials, etc.
3. Shortage of required skilled manpower because of insufficient
remuneration and increasingly corrupt management practices.
Since coming to power, the military regime used public enterprises as an
InsLrumenL Ior oIILIcuI survIvuI. n Lhe eurIy 1q;os Lhe regIme`s mIsbehuvIour
was limited to appointing potential rival military officers to some lucrative
public enterprises to discourage them from pursuing their unfavourable
political ambitions. General Mohamed F. Aidid became the General-Manager of
ASPIMA, a firm importing and distributing drugs, while Colonel Abdulahi
Yususf became General-Manager of FIAT Somalia.
However, in the 1980s political patronage became just as chronic in this sector
as in other sectors of the economy. Almost all enterprises were run by the
loyalist of the regime. These loyalists for their part recruited their loyal
clansmen, family friends, etc. A former director general of a factory told me that
to meet unqualified job seekers with a placement paper, for non-vacant
positions, from national political leaders was not unusual. So overstaffing was
common in the public enterprises, particularly places with expectedly sizable
illicit rents. Senior political figures were also asking financial contributions from
the subordinate managers of the respective enterprises. A minister for instance
may expect from a manager, of a given enterprise under the ministry in
question, financial contributions for his private use no matter what the financial
situation of the enterprise was. So the enterprise had to meet not with the illegal
income needs of its staff alone but also the expectations of economic rents of the
senior national figures (Aden, 2008).
Another way of swindling public enterprises, by the political leaders, was
misappropriating some of the money allocated for their entity, ministry for
instance, and transferring the burden to a public enterprise as a form of non-
payment of payable bills. About 48 percent of the power generated by ENEE,
National Electric Authority, was used by the Government. However, the
government failed to pay about 75 percent of the bills (Ekstrom, 1993).
In addition, powerful politicians were authorising their cronies in the business
sector to generate huge profits by manipulating the production process of the
183


public enterprises, without any regard for the implications of such acts on the
enLerrIses` erIormunce. Giving output of a factory to a businessman, who was
an associate to the top political leader at a substantially low price who in return
sells the products at the much higher market prices, was a common practice in
the 1980s. According to UNIDO (1988), the Union of Somali Co-operatives
bought the unsuccessful ITOP (state owned fruit and vegetable processing
factory) from its former owner, the Somali Development Bank, and installed a
team of young and dynamic managers in 1984. Consequently, recovery started
in the following year. According to one of these new managers, the former
Managing-Director of ITOP, the Somali Bank of Commerce and Savings was
expected to meet the financial requirement of the factory, especially for
overcoming the liquidity problem. However, Lhe Bunk`s uIIocuLIons were muInIy
based on political relationships rather than the economic efficiency of the
allocations and ITOP management were not able to secure the required
investment from the Bank. They, instead, approached the clients and made a
deal with them: after jointly estimating the required investments of the
production process and the acceptable price of the produced goods, clients
agreed to pay the financial requirements of the factory in advance and the
management, accordingly, hud Lo meeL Lhe cIIenL`s demunds on Lhe Lerms
ugreed. However, u common robIem, he udded, wus Lo meeL oLher buyers`
holding letters from political figures asking for the factory output to be sold to
these businessmen (Aden, 2008).
Furthermore, the Government was using the enterprises to finance the
expensive defense sector to overcome growing internal uncertainty. This was
urLIcuIurIy so In Lhe IuLe 1q8os, und reIIecLed Lhe GovernmenL`s resonse Lo Lhe
InLernuLIonuI donors` ressure on Lhe GovernmenL Lo reduce its defense
expenses to ease the budget deficit. However, the military government
channeled a large part of its defense expenses through public enterprises to
conceal it from the official reports. This strategy affected all public enterprises
und Lhe government owned pasta factory typically ordered large quantities of
wheat much of which was then sold to the military at prices substantially below
market rates, providing a hidden subsidy to the military in the form of a loss to a
government owned enterrIse (EksLrom, 1qq).
n Lhe IuLe 1q8os, Lo meeL M`s condILIons Ior IurLher Iouns, Lhrough Lhe IogIc
of privatising state enterprises, the Somali Government started distributing
public enterprises, including the most efficient ones, to allied figures and
sometimes to foes. I will consider this issue shortly.
6.5.4. Political Economy of Agriculture
As we have seen, agriculture including livestock was given high priority in the
development strategies in the 1980s. Between one-third and one-half of the
planned expenditures were given in this sector, and the hope was to increase
production, improve marketing and export competitiveness of Somali animals
in the international markets. In crop production, reducing the dependence on
food imports and obtaining the highest level of self-sufficiency was planned.
184


Banana production and export were to expand. However, as we have seen,
neither of these objectives was secured.
Agriculture became a primary target of development for the military regime in
Somalia in the 1970s, and in the 1980s the sector emerged as a soft target for the
regIme`s exIoILuLIon. SeveruI meusures Luken durIng Lhe 1q;os IucIIILuLed Lhe
secLor Lo emerge us eusy rey Ior Lhe regIme`s reduLIon. The Lwo mosL
appealing of these actions were the creation of a state agency that monopolised
the grain businesses and the Agricultural Land Law.
In 1971 the military government created the Agricultural Development
Corporation (ADC) and became the sole trader and distributor of grain.
According to the government, the Corporation was formed to protect the
interest of both the farmers and urban households and by law no other
organisation was permitted to purchase, store, sell, or distribute grain. The
Corporation purchased the maize and sorghum from the farmers during harvest
time and then used to sell the locally produced grain plus the imported crops to
the urban consumers (Yassin, 1989).
ProbubIy, Lhe regIme`s muIn urose Ior monooIIsIng Lhe gruIn murkeL und
fixing its prices was to provide affordable staple food for urban households.
However, unintended consequences, according to the economists, resulted from
Lhe governmenL`s IIxed rIce oIIcy. The urgumenL wus LhuL Lhe Iow rIces oI Lhe
ADC LrImed down Lhe Iurmers` IncenLIves Lo roduce. AccordIng Lo some
observers wILh sourIng rIces oI oLher InuLs, reuI roducer rIces oI mujor
cros huve been decIInIng . ThIs decIIne In Lhe reuI roducer rIces hus creuLed
u greuL Iuck oI IncenLIve wILhIn Lhe IurmIng IumIIIes. And uccordIng Lo Lhe
commenLuLors Iurmers reduced their efforts and work volume to a level which
sImIy guurunLeed subsIsLence. ThIs Is Lhe umounL uIIowed uny Iurmer Lo use
for his own consumption (cited in Menkhaus, 1989).
AccordIng Lo oLhers, Lhe ADC`s IIxed rIces, Lhough Lhey Iuyed u roIe, were not
the primary cause of the agrarian crises in the 1970s. Menkhaus (1989), for
instance, argued that farmers involved themselves in the parallel market rather
than abstaining from production. He noted that peasant farmers estimated that
they were selling about half of their harvest on the illegal black market. Had
ADC`s Iow rIces been Lhe reuI robIem In Lhe 1q;os, he urgued, we wouId huve
witnessed i.e. decreased grain import; a significant increase of the total area
cultivated; and enhanced economic security for the peasants, after prices were
IIberuIIsed In Lhe 1q8os. NeILher oI Lhese hus huened und Lhe vIIIuge
economIes sLeudIIy deLerIoruLed Lhrough Lhe 1q8os (Menkhuus, 1q8q).
Nevertheless, the ADC in the 1980s, in many ways, became an instrument of
ubuse Ior Lhe regIme`s suorLers, Lo be used uguInsL Lhe eusunL Iurmers.
Indeed, the parallel market provided farmers an escape from the official rate,
but on the other hand it also provided government officials an opportunity to
ask for bribes or even to confiscate any grain found in the underground market
with the excuse that the product was under illegal operations. By prohibiting the
farmers to save over one hundred kg of grain per season, they were forced to
185


either use illegal hoarding which was prone to confiscation or to end up in the
refugee camps especially in the seasons when there was a bad harvest (Gunn,
1987). In addition, ADC officers, using their presence in the area and official
power were among those who, exploiting the agricultural land law, spearheaded
the loot like land grabbing activities of the 1980s. Here, the fertile lands of the
eusunL Iurmers were ouLrugeousIy grused In u mussIve wuy by Lhe regIme`s
supporters. Furthermore, ADC officers were enriching themselves by reselling
the grain collected for the ADC on the illegal market at higher prices. Sometimes
these officials were hording the grain until there was a local shortage which
forced local farmers, who produced this grain and received low rates from the
ADC, to buy it back at illegally inflated prices (Besteman, 1999).
In 1975 the Somali government decided to nationalise all land and hence since
then controlled all land resources. The Agricultural Land Law (No. 73) had two
main objectives: political and economic. The economic objective of the reform
wus Lo LrunsIorm whuL hus been erceIved Lo be us un urchuIc sysLem,
communal tenure and nomadic pastorialism, with one more economically
roducLIve und Iess desLrucLIve oI Lhe Iund . The consensus umong Iunners
has been that Somalia is vulnerable to drought largely because it is locked to
subsistence economy driving from these traditional patterns. And without an
ugrIcuILuruI surIus Lhe economy cun never hoe Lo suorL u modern sLuLe
(Gunn, 1987).
As to the political aspect, the regime since it came to power wanted to eliminate
the tribal basis of the society, which it perceived as an enemy of the regime, and,
as we saw in Chapter 4, the Dabodheer drought of the mid-1970s gave the
regime an opportunity to implement its policy of settling at least part of the
nomudIc ouIuLIon InLo Lhe ugrIcuILuruI ureus us Iumers. Here mIxIng In Lhe
resettlement areas of refugees from different places and descent groups is seen
by the Government as essential to its campaign to eliminate clan loyalties in
Iuvor oI nuLIonuIIsm (ACR, 1q;J6).
Under the Law, farmers were permitted to keep a predetermine size of land for a
specified period of time and following certain rules of succession. The state was,
on the other hand, given the right to exrorIuLe or reossess u gIven Iurmer`s
land if the conditions were not met. By denying pastoralists, about 60 percent of
the society, to any land right unless they join the Government sponsored
cooperatives and allowing agriculturists to register their limited land right on an
individual bases, and favouring modern sector and large-scheme projects the
uw wus crILIcIsed us beIng modernIsL, sLuLIsL und non-socIuIIsL (Hoben,
1988).
However, in the beginning farmers were reluctant to register their land for
several reasons: the registration law was not regularly enforced; the registration
process was procedurally very complex to understand, and very expensive and
time consuming for peasant farmers (Hoben, 1988). Another factor that
supported the previous one was that agriculture was a relatively un-rewarding
industry in the 1970s and thus very few outsiders were trying to obtain farmland
(Menkhaus, 1989). Furthermore, farmers considered the act as unjust state
186


interference in their affairs and became reluctant to register their lands
(Besteman, 1999).
The Iuw IormuIIy broughL Lhe Iund under sLuLe conLroI und Lhe Iurmers`
reluctance to register their land made their property legally insecure and prone
to confiscation.
Due Lo severuI IucLors, eoIe`s uLLItude towards farmland dramatically changed
in the early 1980s. This was due to factors such as: the sky rocketing inflation of
Lhe 1qo8s; SuudI ArubIu`s, vIrLuuIIy Lhe soIe ImorLer oI SomuIIu`s IIvesLock,
astonishing ban on Somali livestock; the GovernmenL`s IIberuIIsuLIon oI Lhe
grain prices in 1984; high donor interest in agricultural development; a
wealthier class seeking someplace to invest their wealth emerged in the 1980s;
Increused need Ior vegeLubIes und gruIns Ior urbun househoIds; und Lhe regIme`s
udvocucy oI ugrIcuILure, und ugrIcuILuruI Iund becume u durubIe usseL, us un
InvesLmenL, und us un objecL oI resLIge (BesLemun, 1qqq).
The und ReIorm AcL oI 1q;, suorLed by Lhe eoIe`s new erceLIon on
agricultural land, became another important instrument for Barre to reward his
allies and their associates in the 1980s. Consequently, explosive politicised land
concentration, expropriation and grabbing started in the 1980s. In the
beginning, the regime started carefully distributing unallocated farmlands to its
supporters. However, later on, the political leaders started to scramble for the
lands allocated for public use. State farms, cooperative land and refugee
settlements were among the victims of this process. For example, in 1986, 4000
hectares of land in the Jubba valley was specified for the resettlement of
thirteen thousand refugees, which had been caused by the development project,
the Baardheere dam. However, the entire zone, 4000 hectares, was given to the
brother of the Director-General of the Ministry of Agriculture and his business
associates (Menkhaus, 1989). In addition, the government leaders
83
, both
mIIILury und cIvIIIuns, und LheIr ussocIuLes, by munIuIuLIng Lhe Iurmer`s
ignorance, weakness and reluctance to register their land, expropriated the
Iunds oI Lhe eusunL Iurmers, urbun-based bureaucrats, politicians, and
businessmen, and the modern sector organizations in which they are active, are
manipulating the land registration system to gain leasehold control over large
amounts oI ugrIcuILuruI Iund . und regIsLruLIon und dIsuLe seLLIemenL
processes work to the advantage of elite with access to bureaucratic channels
und oIILIcuI ower (Hoben, 1q88). Worse yeL, In Lhe IuLe 1q8os, Lhe Iurmers
who did register their land received no sLuLe roLecLIon und uILImuLeIy Lhe Iece
of paper giving evidence to registered title to land does not necessarily afford
any tenure security at all; what determines land title in Somalia is political
ower (Menkhuus, 1q8q).
The Land Reform Act of 1975 and the politicised land grabbing of the 1980s
seriously jeopardised the economic base of the peasant farmers. Moreover, it
weakened the agricultural productivity of the country. The main reason was that

83
Local regIonuI suorLers, who emerged us bIg men, where umong Lhose munIuIuLIng Lhe
registration process to participate in the land scramble (Besteman, 1999).
187


those who grabbed the agriculturally fertile lands were not mainly interested in
crop production and their main purpose of land grabbing was profiting from
land banking, securing donor funding and financial loans (Besteman, 1999;
Menkhaus, 1989)
84
.
6.5.5. Political Economy of the Financial System
The financial system of Somalia was comprised of the Central Bank of Somalia
(CBS), the Commercial and Saving Bank of Somalia (CSBS) and the Somali
Development Bank (SDB). All these banks were publicly owned institutions. The
functions of the CBS were mainly to establish monetary policy, issuing currency
and acting as a cash resort for the national government. The CBS also enjoyed
the power of controlling other banks in the country and supervising gold and
foreign monetary reserves. The Somali banking system was operational in the
1980s mainly because of lines of credit from the international financial
institutions in order to support the productive sector, particularly agriculture
and industry, by providing financial loans. However, the system was grossly
misused and, for instance, the money was distributed through the patronage
sysLem und once u Ioun wus receIved by un uIIcunL Lhey were never execLed
Lo reuy IL (CooIIdge und Rose-Ackerman, 1997).
The SDB`s muIn IuncLIon wus, gIven Lhe counLry`s development programmes
and priorities, to provide financial assistance to the enterprises in the
productive sector. The main sources of the SDB were foreign currency
borrowings from overseas, lending institutions and local currency borrowings
from the Somali Government and the CBS (UNIDO, 1988). In the 1980s the
bunk`s IendIng sysLem wus used by Lhe GovernmenL Lo enrIch ILs uIIIes. The IIrsL
method was to channel funds to the deeply troubled public enterprise to remain
in operation. However, in the second half of the 1980s it was very clear that
most of the public enterprises were in a hopeless situation and the main
purpose of the loans, in which the expectation of its repayment was virtually
zero, were Lo creuLe economIc oorLunILIes Ior Lhe regIme`s Ioyal elements and
their associates. The largest share of such loans was accrued by the politically
powerful elements who were involving themselves in the land grabbing
activities. Table 6.7 provides information on total loans approved, by region, by
the SDB In 1q86. The LubIe shows LhuL over ;z ercenL oI Lhe SDB`s Ioun wenL Lo
the agricultural sector
85
und LhuL over huII oI Lhe ugrIcuILure`s shure wenL Lo Lhe
Lower Shabelle region alone. The secret was that Lower Shabelle, due to its rich
agricultural land and proximity to the capital, attracted the heaviest
concentration of the land grabbing activities and those who expropriated the
IurgesL orLIons oI Lhe regIon`s ugrIcuILuruI Iunds were some oI Lhe mosL

84
Moreover, in the pastoral sector the impact was enormous; declining production, increased
land degradation, and conflict and weakened traditional regulations of the land use. See Unruh
(1995), Gunn (1987).
85
Some International lending institutions specified the loans they gave to be used for
agricultural adjustment programmes.
188


powerful elements in the country
86
. Only a meager share of this loan was
actually used to invest in agriculture. Most of it ended up in private foreign
accounts or import/export activities as the security environment needed for
longtime investment was not there in the late 1980s. And by 1989 the SDB, due
to grave erosion of its capital, was on the verge of collapse unable to provide any
loans to its clients (Mubarak, 1996).
Table 6.7 Total Loans Approved by SDB by Region, 1986 (Sh.So.
000)
Region Agriculture Industry Services Total
Benadir 56 271 1 500 57 771
Middle Jubba 5 605 5 605
Lower Jubba 15 076 1 876 16 952
Gedo 8 088 8 088
Hiran 505 505
Eastern 2 456 2 456
North Western 21 054 16 000 37 054
Awdal 1 813 1 813
Sanaag 2 429 2 429
Togdher 3 367 1 500 4 867
Middle Shabelle 36 864 36 864
Lower Shabelle 107 334
107
334
Total 204 591 75 647 1 500
281
738
Source: UNIDO (1988)

The CSBS was established to support business activities of private and public
enLerrIses. The bunk`s muIn ucLIvILIes were ruIsIng Iunds by coIIecLIng deosits
from businesses and consumers and receiving loans from the CBS to provide
loans to productive enterprises. However, as other organisations in the sector,
the CSBS become a victim of the political patronage of the 1980s. Its activities
were heavily politicised and its capital promiscuously looted
87
by the
government and bank leaders and their associates. State agencies and some
private companies were receiving huge amounts of loans from the bank which
later on, if necessary, were written off by the President himself. According to a
former Director-General of the CSBS, the bank filed a case of long time due
loans to a national court against Impresco, a private company owned by Somali
and Italian entrepreneurs. The court decided on the confiscation and selling of
heavy machinery in Golweyn, owned by Impresco, for repayment. However, the
President intervened by ordering the Court to take back the decision and the

86
One was required to present the documents of a land written in their name and which they
want to invest. This also formally served as a guarantee for the loan.
87
Looting, rather than corruption, may be the right term (Abdirahman, 2000).
189


CSBS officials to terminate the case. The main reason for this, according to the
Director-General, was that one of the owners of the company was the
PresIdenL`s broLher-in-law (Amiin, 2004).
As Table 6.8 shows, the total credit increased more than ten times in five years,
1984 to 1989. The credits to the private sectors showed the wildest increase,
about 14 times in the previous three years. In 1988 international auditors
investigating the CSBS stated that 83 percent of the loans issued by the bank
were non-performing loans. After that, as the table clarifies
88
, the financial
mismanagement reached unimaginable proportion. Even the heads of small
branches of the bank, let alone the highest officials of the bank and the national
leaders, were issuing huge and unauthorised loans to their clients (Amiin,
2004).
Table 6.8 Total credits 1981 - 1989 (In millions of So.Sh.)
Credits to Credits to Credits to Total
Year government
public
enterprices
Private
sector

1981 2 249,60 1 721,40 574,60 4 545,60
1982 2 100,00 1 300,00 1 623,80 5 023,80
1983 1 805,00 1 163,00 2 292,80 5 260,80
1984 4 378,10 1 511,20 3 726,90 9 616,20
1985 5 421,70 2 071,20 4 023,90 11 516,80
1986 6 077,20 3 730,40 4 094,80 13 902,40
1987 14 254,10 6 408,80 13 926,90 34 589,80
1988 20 118,70 11 845,50 19 102,40 51 066,60
1989 14 065,60 28 803,80 56 061,90 98 931,30
Source: Abdirahman (2000)

In fact, the CSBS was actually creating money. In the late 1980s abuses,
irregularities and corruption, reached unimaginable proportions. The CSBS,
after exhausting its reserves of a legal tender, started issuing uncovered circular
checks
89
on a massive scale. Most of these checks were cashed by the importers
at a huge discount, 20-40 percent, who mainly used them for the purchase of
foreign exchange in the auction system. This exacerbated the exhaustion of
reserves from the central bank which finally led to an acute shortage of
banknotes and hard currency in the country. Therefore, as the former Director-
GeneruI oI Lhe CBS uccuruLeIy urgued Lhe cIrcuIur checks hud roven Lo be un
uncontrollable source of monetary creation by the Commercial and Savings

88
No data is available for 1990, but given the situation, the growth rate must have been higher
than that of 1989.
89
These ure bunker`s druILs orIgInuIIy InLended Ior smuII uymenLs und, over LIme, Lhey becume
a widespread and handy means for payments and settlements of big transactions (Abdirahman,
2000).
190


Bunk oI SomuIIu (Abdirahman, 2000). Unsurprisingly, by 1989, the SCBS was
declared bankrupt (Mubarak, 1996).
The CBS was also on the verge of collapse in late 1980s. However, the CBS
survived, due to extensive printing
90
of new Somali shilling notes and
borrowings from foreign institutions, until it was finally pillaged by the highest
officials of the Somali government in January 1991. Table 6.9 illustrates the
money supply, the currency in circulation and demand deposits
91
, in Somalia
between 1981 and 1989. The table shows that in five years the money supply
increased phenomenally from So.Sh. 5.0 billion in 1984 to So.Sh. 139.9 billion in
1989. The proportion of the problem could be simply detected by comparing the
money supply changes of the first half of the decade with that of the last half.
AccordIng Lo AbdIruhmun (zooo) IL Is worLh noLIng LhuL, onIy In one yeur 1q8q,
money suIy Increused by u sLuggerIng umounL oI |So.Sh. qq.q bIIIIon| . When
one considers that this explosive trend continued also in 1990, for which data
ure noL uvuIIubIe, one undersLunds how Iur LhIngs goL ouL oI hund. The
consequences of this reckless printing of money notes and issuing checks
rendered the CBS into a complete inability to print more notes, not because of
its negative impact on the economy but, because of the hyperinflation the face
value of almost all money notes was less than the cost of printing the notes
themselves. The Director-General of the CBS believes that by government
leaders pursuing their private interests created money at will which became the
root of the financial crisis in Somalia, and the collapse of the financial system
played a key role in contributing to the collapse of the state in Somalia
(Abdirahman, 2000).
Table 6.9, Money supply 1981 - 1989 (In millions of
So.Sh.)
Year
Currency in
Circulation
Demand
Deposits
Total
1981
1 890,9 1 783,2
3 674,1
1982
1 455,7 2 652,7
4 108,4
1983 1 355,5 2 953,8 4 309,3
1984
1 900,0 3 130,0
5 030,0
1985
3 787,4 5 986,7
9 774,1
1986
5 208,5 6 935,1
12 143,6
1987 12 326,9 17 718,9 30 045,8
1988
21 033,3 24 403,0
45 436,3
1989
70 900,0 68 961,8
139 861,8
Source: Abdirahman (2000)


90
PrInLIng new money wus Lhe mIIILury governmenL`s economIc IIIebouL In Lhe IusL yeurs oI ILs
rule.
91
Demand deposits consisted of current accounts and circular checks.
191


6.5.6. Political Economy of Foreign Aid and Refugees
We saw in Chapter 5 that Somalia was in a privileged position as far as its share
of foreign aid was concerned. It received the highest, as a percent of GNP,
official development assistance in the world and the second highest aid per
capita in Africa. In addition to the development aid, emergency aid became very
significant in the country. From 1978, after the war, a large number of refugees
arrived in Somalia. This attracted the eyes of the donor communities which
oured u subsLunLIuI umounL oI uId InLo Lhe counLry und uId becume Lhe bIggesL
nuLIonuI IndusLry (BesLemun, 1qqq). However, this relatively abundant aid
transferred to the military government in Somalia in the 1980s made the
survival of the great majority of Somalis woefully more difficult. It indeed
became a notorious industry for the ruling elite and Barre used it to buy internal
allies on the one hand and to empower his army to intimidate, harass or
eliminate opponents on the other (Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman, 1997).
Thus in the period under consideration it was apparent that the foreign aid was
negatively correlated with social welfare. Emphasising the socioeconomic
ImucL oI Lhe uId, Ruwson sLuLed LhuL deveIomenL rogrums becume chunneIs
for winning that struggle for power and perquisites, rather than investment in
SomuIIu`s weIIure und economIc IuLure . Irom the Central Bank, the
Commercial Bank, and the Ministry of Finance, counterpart currencies flowed
InLo rIvuLe hunds (Ruwson, 1qqq).
One oI Lhe muIn IucLors LhuL conLrIbuLed Lo Burre`s sIhonIng oII oI Lhe uId wus
that donors were, from the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, inspired by
primarily political, rather than economic, motives. As we saw in Chapter 5, in
the early 1970s the Soviets, through their development assistance, sought to
transform the socioeconomic development of the society. However, according to
Menkhaus by the late 1970s donors, both Western and Arab states, poured a
subsLunLIuI umounL oI IoreIgn uId InLo SomuIIu muInIy Lo weun Burre`s regIme
from the Soviet camp. Speaking about a donor financed project in Southern
Somalia, Menkhaus argued that since political motives were the main
determinants for the project approval by the donors, the normal process of
transparency and accountability were simply muffled for political reasons. And
he rightly mentioned this behaviour of the donors gave an opportunity to the
governmenL Ieuders Lo IushIon Lhe rojecLs In dIrecLIons whIch suILed LheIr own
personal interests, to the detriment of the local populace, and to the great
frustration of expatriate and Somali management attempting to implement
rojecL deveIomenL (Menkhuus, 1q8q).
Another factor that gave the regime the green light they needed was the
fraudulent behaviour of the leaders of the donor countries. Even in the mid-
1980s when some of the donors tried to reverse this trend and realised that their
direct involvement would not help the situation the problem persisted, though
in the beginning some relief was felt. The foreign aid received by Somalia could
be classified into two main categories: development aid and refugee aid. The
Public Investment Programs (PIP) was the largest type of aid received by
Somalia in the late 1980s, Italy being the largest contributor. (UNIDO, 1988). In
192


that period Italy supported a number of development projects, including the
following: the $600 million Bardhere Dam, $250 million Garoe-Bosaso road;
over $40 million hospital in Qoryoley; and a $95 million urea plant. The total
projects sponsored by Italy in the 1980s were 114 projects in which more than a
billion dollars were spent. However, the personal relationship and interests
between the leaders of the two countries, rather than socioeconomic
development of the host society, was said to be the main reason behind this
generous donation
92
. Wolfgang Achtner, in his famous article The Italian
Connection: How Rome Helped Ruin Somalia wroLe |w|ILh Iew exceLIons .
Lhe LuIIun venLures were ubsurd und wusLeIuI . BehInd Lhese mIsbegoLLen
projects lay old-fashioned corruption. The Italian construction and engineering
companies who were awarded lucrative contracts for the projects provided
kIckbucks Lo Lhe oIILIcuI cIuss In Rome und IocuI oIILIcIuns . The corruL
relationship between the Italians and Barre, which began in 1978, flourished
after 1983 when Craxi became prime minister. The Socialists flooded Somalia
wILh mIIIIons oI doIIurs In uId. . On Lhe SomuII sIde, uII Lhe money wus uIIegedIy
handled by Barre's eldest son, 48-year-old Colonel Hassan Mohammed Siad,
who had an apartment in the Hotel Raphael in Rome -- the same hotel where
Craxi had his permanent residence in the Italian capital. During these years,
muny members oI Lhe Burre IumIIy . ucquIred roerLy und bunk uccounLs In
Switzerland. On the Italian side, the list of beneficiaries reads like a who's who
of major construction, engineering and communicuLIons IIrms (AchLner, 1qq).
Another factor that exacerbated the problem further was the selection of the
projects to be implemented in Somalia. It was clear that the Somali government
was undertaking projects simply because there was a donor with funding
without any consideration about its relevance on the socioeconomic
development of the society. Worse yet, in some cases the feasibility of the
projects was not important. The urea plant mentioned above, illustrates the
gravity of the problem. The project was not feasible in any way - neither
economic nor technical. And the plant operated only for three years mainly with
the help of millions of dollars from Italy. UNIDO (1988) mentioned a host of
constraints the project was confronting and within a few years, according to
analysts, the sole option available for the Government was to get rid of the
whole project. Thus one could conclude that the economic rent that a given
project may potentially generate for the top officials was more important than
its feasibility let alone its contribution to the well-being of the host society.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the regime in Mogadishu accepted the
implementation of the economic reform programmes encouraged by the
international institutions. It did so simply to generate revenues. However, it was
clear that Barre was not happy with these programmes. Then the government
formulated a proper means of escape to avoid potentially threatening outcomes
incorporated in the reform programmes.

92
As the table shows, most of this aid was in a grant form rather than as a loan, which improved
the ratio of grants to loans in the 1980s (80/20) compared to the 1970s ratio (57/43). See UN
(1991).
193


For illustration purpose let us consider some of the main strategies used by the
government to avoid these restrictions. One of the main reform elements was to
reduce fiscal deficit, particularly the defense spending. To pretend that it was
actually committed to the policy the government reduced the share of the
budget allocated to the defense in the mid-1980s. However, as Figure 6.3
IIIusLruLe, enormous umounLs oI money wus uL under Lhe MInIsLer oI Inunce`s
control. Almost the total sum reduced from the defense category was brought
under the finance and general services category which was, most probably, used
for defense purposes. Other evidence supports this conclusion. In the
expenditure budget of 1990, for instance, about 62 percent of the non-salary
expense was appropriated InLo Lhe cuLegory oI Lhe so cuIIed oLher work. The
Somali government termed these funds as contingence expenses but according
to the World Bank these funds were, most probably, used to complement the
defense budget. In addition, the government channelled much of its defense
spending through public enterprises so as to become invisible in the officially
reported budget outlays and thus to disappear from the eyes of the oversight
bodies. The state-owned pasta factory, for instance, ordered a huge quantity of
wheat and the amount beyond its requirements was resold to the army at a
subsLunLIuIIy Iow rIce rovIdIng u hIdden subsIdy Lo Lhe mIIILury In Lhe Iorm oI
u Ioss Lo u governmenL owned enLerrIse (EksLrom, 1qq).

Other central objectives of the reform programme were to liberalise trade and to
alter key relative prices, and in particular the real exchange rate. Nonetheless,
high government officials and their associates were the main beneficiaries of
this process as they were commonly awarded with the letters of credit known as
LCs which were necessary for the import/export business. The LC was also an
important prerequisite for receiving foreign currency, which was distributed
194


through government controlled auctions or a two-tier exchange rate
93
, required
for importing food stuffs and other necessary commodities. Thus, government
mInIsLers, such us Mohumed Sh. Osmun, und Lhe regIme`s devoLed uIIIes, such
as Abdi Hosh, absolutely dominated the sector.
Privatisation of state-owned enterprises was another policy required in the
reform programme. The regime used the privatisation process to reward clients
and pay opponents. The production performance of ITOP improved from mid-
1984 and according to UNIDO (1988) the factory, provided that a financially
favourable environment for the private sector was in place, had a potential to
attract the private sector, which was not the case for many state owned
enterprises. Nevertheless, the factory was given to an influential political figure,
after a long-term detention. According to the former manager of the factory, the
transfer was like a gift (Aden, 2008). Other enterprises, such as Hotel Taleex,
were given to government leaders or members of their families.
Regarding the refugee issue, after the defeat of the Somali army in the Ogaden,
hundreds of thousands of war affected people sought refuge in Somalia. In the
very beginning the Somali government received the refugees warmly in a
brotherly way and supported them with the limited resources it had and
appealed for help from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and donor countries. Nevertheless, the regime realised that refugee
aid from the international community is a notorious industry with the
prospective of political rent. To exploit enough rents from the refugee aid the
regime inflated the number of refugee population. With the logic that an
increased refugee count generates more aid and more aid breeds more rent, the
regime unilaterally set the total number of refugees as 1.3 million, while
according to other stakeholders the estimate was between 300,000 and
600,000. The military government either completely rejected or sabotaged the
process of coming up with a reliable figure of the refugee population
94
. And
uccordIng Lo one commenLuLor word of the estimate incensed the Government
oI PresIdenL Mohummed SIud Burre und IuLer on, Lhe UnILed NuLIons decIded
on a planning figure of 650,000 (Cowell, 1981).
In addition, the regime preferred to maintain the status quo as far as the future
of the refugees was concerned. The government, to avert the number of refugees
to decrease, systematically discouraged any attempt to repatriate the refugees to
their homeland. The government also in many occasions rejected the idea of re-
settling the refugees in Somalia. (Frederick 1988)

93
In the dual exchange rate, a fixed rate was set for the import of food and other sensitive
commodities.
94
After a long dispute about the size of the population of refugees, the UNHCR decided to
resolve the question by undertaking an aerial photographic survey. The government rejected the
approach due to, according to the Government, national security concerns. Then the UNHCR
decided to carry out a census method throughout the refugee camps in the country. However,
although the government previously argued that the census is an appropriate method for
resolving the argument, Somali officials intervened by mobilising members of the refugees to
show up in counting stations on more than one occasion. Some of the refugees, allegedly, passed
the lines up to fifteen times (Frederick, 1988).
195


The main method for the government to generate rents from the refugee aid was
the diversion of the food aid. In the beginning of the refugee aid three national
orgunIsuLIons und Lhe U.N`s WorId ood Progrum Look Lhe resonsIbIIILy of
distributing the relief supplies. As I noted earlier the ADC and ENC as national
agencies were responsible for the nationwide distribution of locally produced
and imported foodstuffs intended for the ordinary population and, in the
refugee aid distribution, they were criticised for treating the relief supplies as
their ordinary commercial stocks. Remember that these organisations were
instruments of predation for the military regime (Frederick, 1988). So many
refugee supplies ended up in the local markets or Lhe mIIILury sLores und reIIeI
goods are diverted away from refugees and the visitor can see American wheat,
stacked for sale in tin-rooIed sLores (CoweII, 1q81).
Militarisation of refugees is another strategy utilised by the military regime in
the 1980s. As early as 1982, the Somali Government, compelled by a lack of
military personnel to prosecute its war, was accused of mobilising refugees to
fight for the host country (The Globe and Mail, 1982). In the late 1980s the
number of refugees drafted into the Somalia army was said to be as many as
50,000 refugees from camps in Somalia. The government, it was also argued,
had used vehicles and supplies sent by foreign donors (The Economist, 1989). It
is worth mentioning that the Somali National Army in the 1980s was fighting
against Somali armed opposition groups.
The muIn IucLor LhuL wus generuLIng Burre`s IncenLIve Lo exIoIL Lhe reIugee
issue was the known position of the US. In order to avoid confrontation with
the Mogadishu regime Washington, the main donor of refugee aid, was
reIucLunL Lo uL meunIngIuI ressure on Burre`s regIme. So once more, un
overriding strategic interest undermined developmental goals (Frederick, 1988).
6.6. The Death of the Post-Colonial State in Somalia
After the SNM moved to Ethiopia and started its military operations in 1982, the
NorLhern urL oI Lhe counLry wus IIke u wur zone und Lhe governmenL`s conLroI
oI Lhese regIons wus noL un eusy one Irom LhuL LIme on. However, uILer Burre`s
automobile crash in 1986, the SNM intensified its activities and the SSDF
resumed its operations after sometime of internal unrest. Officers from the
Hawiye clan-family with their supporters also increasingly infiltrated into these
opposition factions from 1986 onwards. The two organisations were conducting
joint operations, particularly in the central regions (AC, Sep. 1986).
As IL wus weukened, urLIuIIy by Burre`s InubIIILy und InLernuI ower sLruggIe
and partially by the US reduction of its financial, political
95
and military
support, the regime was unable to maintain its hegemony even in the capital,
and civil unrest started there. In August 1987, for the first time in the history of

95
oIIowIngs WushIngLon`s renewed osILIon, MogudIshu`s reIuLIon wILh oLher donor counLrIes
and international financial organizations became uneasy one. In May for in May 1987, for
InsLunce, ubIIshed u reorL crILIcIzIng Lo Lhe SomuII governmenL`s uId rojecLs. (SImon 1qq)
196


Lhe mIIILury regIme, ubIIc demonsLruLIons uguInsL Lhe governmenL`s behuvIour,
especially economic mismanagement, engulfed Mogadishu (Simon, 1995).
A series of secret meetings that had taken place since the mid-1980s
subsequently led Barre to reach an agreement with the Ethiopian leader,
Mengistu Haile Mariam in March 1988. The latter agreed to terminate his
support for Lhe SNM, IncIudIng Lhe end oI Lhe SNM`s resence In ELhIoIu. The
regime presumed that this may lead to the SNM dissolving. However, the SNM
carried out an all-out military offensive, which was suicidal in nature but
successful, against the regime in the main towns of the North, and thereafter it
secured its own zone in the North-Western parts of the country. After that the
civil unrest escalated in the South as well. The USC and SPM were established.
Unlike the factions that came into existence in the early 1980s, these
organisations, particularly the USC, generated favourable attention from the
high ranking figures within the Government. The main reason was that
everyone beIIeved LhuL Lhe regIme`s duys were numbered und one hud Lo IdenLIIy
his interest with the forthcoming government. Some government leaders,
including senior army generals, started to conduct activities advancing the cause
of the faction groups in order to show their sympathy to the latter.
oIIowIng WushIngLon`s renewed osILIon, MogudIshu`s reIuLIons wILh oLher
donor countries and international financial organisations became uneasy. In
May 1987, for instance, the World Bank published a report criticising to the
SomuII governmenL`s behuvIour Lowurds Lhe uId rojecLs. n early 1988 the IMF
decIured LhuL SomuIIu Is IneIIgIbIe Ior M`s IInuncIuI Iouns und WesLern
countries, including Italy, one of the main financial sources for the regime in
1980, responded by halting their aid to Somalia. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees followed the suit by announcing a phasing-out of its
refugee assistance (Simon, 1995). Formally, in 1989, Washington terminated its
aid to Somalia and in 1990 disclosed that the regime in Mogadishu defaulted on
loan repayments and, therefore, was ineligible to receive any further US aid.
Economic hardship of the decade deepened. As a result of the dried up external
support coinciding with the devastating civil war that now engulfed most of the
country, the economy deteriorated rapidly in 1989 and 1990, where the formal
economy completely collapsed.
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Mogadishu, Salvatore Colombo, was
assassinated on 9 July 1989. In response the Government detained three
prominent Imams on 13 July and the next day, after the Friday prayer, violent
anti-government riots broke out in Mogadishu in which, according to Africa
Confidential, resulted in about 400 deaths and over 2000 injuries. During the
nexL weekend, Lhe regIme mussucred q; cIvIIIuns on one oI MogudIshu`s
beaches. The regime was also challenged in Mogadishu in a nonviolent manner
and sometimes through its institutions. At a celebration for the National
Congress for Workers held in the National Theater, Abdi Muhumid Amin,
expressing the unhappiness of the labour force, performed his famous song
AnIgu MuuIuun Rubuu, MuuIo Mucuun Buun Rubuu, Muruquun uun ku
Dhuuqaan Rabaa - I demand bread, the delicious bread, I demand sauce to eat
IL wILh. Burre who wus uIso resenL uL Lhe ceIebruLIon Look Lhe mIcrohone und
197


angrily blamed Amin for asking for what his government could not afford
anymore
96
. In early 1990 Ogaal a paper owned by the ruling SRSP started
ubIIshIng urLIcIes uguInsL Lhe regIme`s behuvIour. AL LhuL LIme, MogudIshu
joined the rest of the country. For instance in May 1990 an open letter, known
as the Manifesto, signed by over hundred influential political figures, religious
leaders, businessmen, traditional leaders and intellectuals was forwarded to
Barre. The paper, after critically reviewing the dangerous situation of the
country, proposed a National Reconciliation and Salvation Conference. The
Manifesto alienated the regime further and opposition factions interpreted the
move as a political opportunity
97
. The regime responded by detaining some 40
members of the document signatories but soon released them all.
Since the summer of 1989 Mogadishu became the home for violence and
insecurity that already had devastated the rest of the country. The regime in its
death-throes tried to correct some of its mistakes and announced several
measures for reform. However, that was not well received by the opposition
factions who regarded that call as cosmetic. By late December 1990 full scale
civil war devastated most parts of Mogadishu. Barre departed from Mogadishu
in mid-January 1991 and his departure marked the end of the post-colonial state
in Somalia. The SNM stabilised the North-Western part of the country and
latter on, in May 1991, the region declared its independence from the rest of
Somalia. In the Capital and the south the faction groups, led by the USC, failed
Lo uchIeve unyLhIng more Lhun Lhe desLrucLIon oI Burre`s uIIIng regIme. The
endIess cIvII wur LhuL IoIIowed hIs deurLure resuILed In muny hoIng Ior Burre`s
reLurn. AbshIr Bu`udIe hud Lhe IoIIowIng Lo suy:
Waa loo Darsadey Daalinkii Dacayda Weynaaye
Ka daroo dibidhal baan aragnay iyo furuqyo daacuune,
Duqii doona ducana ugu dara waad na dubateene
We IeeI demeuned Ior Lhe ruIe oI Lhe hyenu IookIng ruckeLeer
WhuL we ure wILnessIng Is much worse Lhun hIs ruIe.
Find the old-mun (Burre) und comIemenL hIs ruIe wILh bIessIngs
6.7. Conclusion
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the military regime went into a
dilemma after departure of the Soviets and the failed Ogaden endeavour. Soon
after the Ogaden War longtime dormant contenders started to challenge the
regime. Armed groups were setup. However, Barre solved the dilemma by
imposing a patrimonial system of governance and by bringing Washington onto
his side. His main tasks during this period were to defend his rule from the

96
Jama (2008).
97
Some members of the Manifest group were supporters of the opposition factions.
198


warring opposition factions and to provide economic incentives for his
supporters. He mobilised all national resources, and reorganised national
institutions to meet that end. To generate enough resources for the two tasks he
provided military bases for the US Rapid Deployment Task Forces. The
American administration, unlike the Soviets, was a reluctant principal. It
limited its task to using the strategic bases in Somalia and preventing the regime
Irom IuIIIng. Burre`s reIuLIonshI wILh Lhe US uIso facilitated a somewhat more
cordial relationship with the other Western countries and international
organisations such as the United Nations, World Bank and IMF. So, until 1986,
the United States and its allies provided military and economic assistance that
enabled the regime to survive and consequently the regime provided the US the
chance to safeguard its interests in the region. The situation here resembles the
condition presented in Figure 1.4. The regime as an agent defended
WushIngLon`s InLeresLs In the region. This was so because all opposition factions
were hosted by socialist Ethiopia and mainly supported by Soviet allies, thus
making clear the direction these factions would take had they succeeded in
assuming power in Somalia. US, on the other hand, as principal rewarded its
agent economic and assistance needed for his survival.
Barre was severely injured in a car accident in 1986 and this raised the issue of
who would succeed the ailing dictator and created mounting tension and wiped
out the cohesion among the loyal groups of Barre supporters. This coincided
with the decreased tension over the Cold War. And, thus, Somalia started to lose
its geopolitical value. Washington, like its allies, withdrew its assistance from
the regime and opposition factions intensified their struggle and the regime
collapsed. The role of Somali society, as principal, broke down after the Ogaden
deIeuL und hus never recovered sInce. WushIngLon`s ubundonmenL murked, once
again, the failure of the principalship of the US to Barre. However, unlike the
departure of the Soviet Union, there was no superpower interested in salvaging
the regime. The military regime collapsed and the post-colonial state in Somalia
collapsed as well.








199


7 CONCLUSION
The state is needed by many. Citizens of a given polity need it because it is
expected to deliver political and public goods, i.e., security, law and order, social
and economic infrastructure. The political elite of a given society needs the state
because it generates for them economic and political opportunities. Other
countries, poor regional neighbours and distant sole superpowers alike, need
the state of a given society because the state is the main vehicle for other
countries to secure their security, and political and economic interests in the
country in question.
When the state of a given country collapses the consequences for the citizens,
leaders, and international community could be very severe. Insecurity and
hunger are obvious consequences for citizens of the collapsed state. Leaders of
the collapsed state not only lose their economic and political opportunities but
may also end up in misfortune. Mental disorder and public humiliation
98
is a
common robIem Ior muny SomuII Ieuders who escued Lo Lhe WesL. n Loduy`s
increasingly interconnected world, a collapsed state does not threaten the
security and interests of its neighbours alone but may pose an acute risk to
geographically distant and powerful nations. The U.S. National Security
SLruLegy oI zooz concIuded LhuL AmerIcu is now threatened less by conquering
sLuLes Lhun we ure by IuIIIng ones.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall the world has witnessed an unprecedented
frequency of the phenomenon of state failure and chaos that has resulted from
the disappearance of state institutions. Africa has accounted for an unfair share
of the failed states and this has led to some, such as Robert Bates (2008), to
concIude LhuL In IuLe-cenLury AIrIcu, LhIngs IeII uurL. The IIve Lo counLrIes In
the State Failure Index this year (2009) were from Africa and Somalia claimed
Lhe No. 1 sIoL on Lhe Index Ior u second yeur In u row (oreIgn PoIIcy, JuIyJAug
2009).
Somalia is commonly viewed as a symbol of the failed state because in this
unfortunate country the political mayhem coupled with the post-colonial state
in Africa has been exceptionally and deeply entrenched. Somalia has been
characterised as a unique case for complete collapse (Rothberg, 2002). A recent
report, after bringing up the problems associated with state failure and that it
needed Lo be uddressed, noLed LhuL no Iuce seems Lo uccenLuuLe Lhese worrIes
and validate the solution more than Somalia, the epitome of the failed state and
Lhe InsecurILy LhuL sLuLe IuIIure brIngs (HuIdn, zoo8). ConceIvubIy, SomuII
would have been viewed a particular cause for concern for all those interested in
the issue of state failure. However, the case of Somalia never attracted the
attention it deserved from the relevant actor and much less attention has been
paid to the case in academic debates and research.

98
His new neighbour on some occasions may be his former driver or body guard and the later
may be doing well socially and economically.
200


The main purpose of this research is to contribute to a better understanding of
the sources, processes, patterns, and actors of state failure, state collapse and
civil conflict. It does so by first providing a theoretical framework and then
analysing, with the logic of the theory, the root causes of the state collapse in
Somalia - the sole case of total collapse in our time.
This research departs from the assumption that the presence of the structural
factors, economic i.e. poverty and inequality, and (other) non-economic factors,
do not automatically drive violent clashes among the groups in a given polity.
Human motivation is assumed to play a central role in any conflict situation.
Previous studies that dealt with the human motives of civil war and state failure
could be grouped into two main categories: stateless approaches and predation
theories. The influential analyses of Collier and Hoeffler, cited in Chapter 1,
belong to the first group. The essence of statehood is missing from these
analyses. In the theory of economics, the state is either considered as a social
contract where the state is understood as an agent of the society as citizens or as
an instrument of exploitation for the elite where the state is viewed as an agent
of particular groups in the society. Neither society as citizens nor the state as a
political entity is given any meaningful consideration in these analyses. Collier
through his greed theory concentrated his attention on rebellion from some
small groups in the society that tend to gain from the lawlessness and social
dIsorder, uILhough socIeLIes us u whoIe suIIer economIcuIIy Irom cIvII wur, some
small identifiable groups do well out of it. They thus have an interest in the
initiation, perpetuation, and renewuI oI conIIIcL (CoIIIer, zooo). ThereIore, Lhe
presence of certain economic conditions in society - large natural resources,
high proportion of young men, and little education - generate a risk of civil war
and state failure. The role of the state as a provider of public goods such as
security or as a predator that generates violence or security for its own interest
is often missing from the analyses.
The shadow state theory initiated by William Reno, noted earlier, is the leading
version of the predation theories in conflict and state failure analyses,
particularly in Africa. This line of analysis departs from the assumption that the
state in Africa is predatory by nature. In other words, based on the `Qucsi Stctes'
notion of Robert Jackson, these theories assume that post-colonial states in
Africa where failed in nature and its leaders were like racketeers rather than
state leaders. Therefore, there are no analyses on the patterns that made the
state predatory. Furthermore, here the role of society as citizens is missing.
Political leaders are sole players of a one-sided game where there is no
bargaining power and retaliation from society. In other words, the country and
its resources are like a teashop owned by the political leaders. My argument
here is not to deny that political leaders, as far as national interests of their
countries are concerned, behaved like owners of a teashop. On the contrary,
these analyses make us understand to a great extent the essence of post-colonial
governance problems in Africa. My point is that it is useful to consider the
circumstances that provide these leaders such gigantic opportunities for
transforming the whole ownership of society into something like that owned by
a single person of group of individuals, before one considers the way they
behaved after they assumed power. The throne was not in their hands when
201


they born. Many of them were born and grew up in humbling circumstances.
The political power they assumed is in one way or another delegated to them by
their societies. Mohammed Siyad Barre, like Mobutu Sese Seko of the Congo,
did not make himself the Army Chief of Staff before he had overthrown the
elected regime. It was mainly through the established formal institutions in
society that in one way or another, made the delegation of such power
legitimate. Through these institutions Barre was appointed the Army Chief of
Staff. As the highest ranking officer in the national army the main purpose of
the delegation was to provide national security and prevent external
aggressions. But in order to fulfill such a huge task the most able institution of
violence in the society was brought under his command. The great danger of
delegation in any situation is that those to whom power is delegated may abuse
the power they receive and it is up to those who delegated their power to make
sure that their agents are effectively checked. The predation theories of conflict
put their emphasis on the way political leaders behave after they assume power.
Missing from the analysis, is that the process of assuming power is taken as
given and as such this is why society as delegator did not effectively control
those to which it delegated.
n hIs CuIro seech, oI June zooq, PresIdenL Buruk Obumu sLuLed LhuL In Lhe
middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a
democratically-eIecLed runIun governmenL. Muny InsLunces oI Lhe greuL
owers` InvoIvemenL In Lhe regIme chunge In AIrIcu`s IuIIed sLuLes ure weII-
known. PresIdenL EIsenhower`s uuLhorIsuLIon oI Lhe ussussination of the
democratically elected prime minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, in 1960
and the supporting of his subordinate, Mobutu, to assume and maintain power
is now well documented.
Futhermore, In the literature on state failure, the superpowers` susensIon oI
their support playing a major factor in this failure, and foreign aid and its effect
oI IeLLIng IncumbenL Ieuders enrIch LhemseIves und IurLher Ignore eoIe`s
demands are also noted. However, the role of foreign powers in conflict and
state failure deserves deeper attention. As the above passage reveals, foreign
countries, superpowers during the Cold War for instance, played a direct role in
the process of power appropriation in these societies. Furthermore, foreign
powers not only supported their allies to maintain power but also were asking
the regimes in question to perform certain tasks that might be detrimental to
the interests of their societies. Sometimes these tasks have strong implications
on state failure. Therefore, foreign powers` InvoIvemenL In Lhe conIIIcL needs Lo
be genuIneIy uddressed. RoLhberg (zooz) rIghLIy noLed LhuL desLrucLIve
decisions by individual leaders have almost always paved the way to state
IuIIure buL IL Is equuIIy Lrue LhuL some oI Lhe deudIIesL und mosL destructive
decisions originated in Washington, Moscow, and other big capitals of the
world.
This research, unlike the existing literature on the political economy of conflict,
departs from the social contract approach. Therefore, the state-society
relationship is analysed from the so-called principal-agent perspective. The
main argument here is that, people delegate their power to make political
202


decisions to state authorities. However, by manipulating the informational
advantage the state, as agent, possesses over the ordinary citizens, a given state
leader may turn the whole process to his advantage at the expense of the society
at large. To mitigate this problem, that of agency loss, citizens should be
prepared to incur further cost, agency cost. James Madison long ago recognised
Lhe robIem sLuLIng LhuL umbILIon musL be mude Lo counLerucL umbILIon. The
interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the
place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself,
but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external
nor internal controls on governmenL wouId be necessury (MudIson, 1;88).
Therefore, people as principals are required to be able to make sure that their
leaders are doing the right job. In other words they must keep their political
leaders accountable. In the democratic system formal political institutions, i.e.
election, separation, are mainly devised to do the job. In a non-democratic
format too there are some means for constraining the behaviour of the leaders,
such as revolutionary threats. The main argument here is that if society fails to
keep their leaders under effective check there is no guarantee that their leaders
are in offices for the advancement of the peace and prosperity of society. Thus,
the role and ability of the society is fundamental for the direction the conflict
over state control leads the country in general and the economy in particular.
In a situation were citizens are unable to control their leaders the political
leaders will choose actions that are beneficial to them even if these actions
undermine the welfare of the citizens. In incidents where leaders pursue actions
that are detrimental to the interest of the society in question the leaders are
predators rather than agents of their citizens. There might be situations where
citizens of a given polity are unable to keep their state leaders under control but
the leaders still behave in accordance with the interests of the society. However,
here other factors are replacing society to provide the required incentives for the
state to behave properly. Therefore, this research utilises predation theory, as
well as the social contract approach.
A fundamental query for development economics as a discipline is to find an
answer to why some countries achieve notable economic success while others
are relatively unsuccessful. One approach emphasises that the conflict over
control of the state is the critical factor that is responsible for the success and
strong economic performance of some countries and the relative failure or even
absolute decline of others. The argument is that the relative bargaining power of
rulers and society is essential in these results. The critical point here is who
determines the process of power appropriation and political survival: Is it the
society as citizens or sub-groups in the society who have the final say in this
respect? Therefore, the social contract approach of state failure is in line with
the wider subject matter of development economics. Factors that hinder or
enhance relative bargaining power of the citizens in its relation with the rulers
are mainly responsible for why some countries are rich while others remain
poor and why some states are strong while others failed or even collapsed.
203


Another advantage of this approach is that the roles of both the society and
foreign power could be brought into the analyses. A primary question in this
context is: Why do societies fail to keep their leaders under control? To answer
that question, the incentives available for each of the actors in the process
needed to be investigated. However, it is vital to pay careful attention to the
institutions that determine incentives and constrain the behaviours of these
actors. It is so, simply because actors respond to the incentives provided for
them and incentives are determined by the existing institutions.
This research considered three main informal institutions that determined the
behaviour of the actors that took part in the decay of the post-colonial state in
Somalia. These institutions were bad because they created incentives for
predators. These institutions rendered society in a very weak position in the
state-society relationship, where society became unable to mobilise any
mechanism, legal and extralegal, to control its leaders. The first of these
informal institutions is political tribalism that Somalia experienced throughout
its history as a modern state. The politicisation of the clan factor took its final
and mature form during the colonial period. Since then Somalis suffered a
severe collective action problem, and became a deeply divided society.
The Cold War is another informal institution in this analysis. During the Cold
War, African and Asian countries witnessed fierce competition for influence by
the United States and the Soviet Union. Based on how friendly or hostile local
political actors were to its own interests, each superpower developed its own
criteria for the Third World governments and movements. Undesired regimes
and groups were considered minority groups illegitimately imposing or
intending to impose its will on the majority, while friendly regimes and groups
were by default the legitimate forces representing the will of the majority of the
people in the concerned country. The attitude of the political leadership was
consIdered Lhe muIn deLermInunL oI u nuLIon`s wuy oI IIIe In Africa. Given the
state-society relationship the superpowers realised that the best strategy to
bring African nations on board was to help sympathetic political leaders. So
IeudershI chunge und survIvuI becume un ImorLunL Issue In Lhe suerowers`
involvement in these countries. Both sides were deeply involved in the internal
affairs of these nations by influencing leadership changes and survival, and
policy making-processes. By creating state dependence on foreign power, the
Cold War generated or encouraged conditions which were unfavourable to the
political and economic developments in these countries i.e. personal rule, neo-
patrimonial leadership, and divide-and-rule system. ThIs weukened socIeLy`s
bargaining power and, thus, its ability to control the behaviour of the elite.
Furthermore, each of the Cold War contenders encouraged policies and actions
which might be seen as strategic in its struggle, but had locally disastrous
impacts. Due to its geopolitical attraction, post-colonial Somalia became a
major hotspot of conflict between the Soviet Union and The United States. To
win this geopolitical struggle, both the US and the Soviet Union not only poured
substantial amounts of financial and military aid into Somalia, which became
another source of survival for political leaders, but participated in regime
changes and encouraged nationally disastrous policies and actions, such as the
formation of the SRSP and the Ogaden War.
204


Rather than strengthening formal political institutions, Somali political leaders,
as elsewhere in Africa, employed informal methods for power appropriation and
political survival. They employed a patrimonial system of leadership and, if
necessary, coercion. Together these two instruments form a divide-and-rule
strategy which enables leaders to maintain power while at the same time
pursuing policies costly to their societies. To remove an incompetent ruler from
power, people need to cooperate and overcome their collective action problems.
General Mohamed Siyad Barre, to remain in power, bribed segments of society
and selectively punished potential opponents and related groups. However,
social fragility was a precondition for this strategy to succeed. In Somalia the
politicised clan differences provided the opportunity for ambitious, political
entrepreneurs.
However, for leaders to carry out their divide-and-rule strategy an enormous
amount of resources are required; financial and military, for which the tax
revenues from the impoverished citizens is not sufficient. Alternatively, African
leaders exploited the natural resources of their countries and in addition
cultivated strategic alliances with the Cold War rivals, the superpowers. For
leaders of countries with limited resource endowment, such as Somalia, foreign
assistance was extremely important. Unpopular leaders established strategic
relationships with the US or USSR to defend their rule. In short, the road to
influence and power on the one hand depended upon the ability of the elite to
mobilise mass support where tribalism was a ready instrument to capitalise on
and the availability of a superpower patron for political, economic and military
suorL wus In some cuses eusIIy uvuIIubIe umong Lhe 'coId wurrIors`.
A word of caution is in order. My argument is not that this particular set of
informal institutions, tribalism or ethnicity, patrimonial style of leadership and
the Cold War, were responsible for the misery of all nations. On the contrary,
every society has its specific factors that limit its bargaining power against its
rulers. My oInL Is LhuL In every socIeLy Lhere Is un InsLILuLIonuI muLrIx LhuL
deIInes Lhe IncenLIve sLrucLure oI Lhe socIeLy und In socIeLIes LhuL IuIIed Lhe
dominant institutions are bad. A special feature of these bad institutions is that
they weaken the society and make it unable to keep its leaders under effective
check. Institutions with this quality are to some extent responsible for states to
fail and collapse. Furthermore, the same institutions may have different
attributes in different societies/times. Policies generated by the Cold War
struggle, for instance, positively influenced socioeconomic achievements of the
military government of Somalia in the early 1970s.
Therefore, before we look at the destructive policies and action of leaders and
other players in the failed states, it is very useful to understand the existing
institutions in the society in question and the incentive structure these
institutions generate.
205


7.1. Somalia failed and Botwsana Prospered
While Somalia is considered as a prime example of a collapsed state in the other
sIde oI AIrIcu`s deveIomenL secLrum Lhere Is BoLswunu, Lhe greuLesL economIc
success story in the continent. Here, for comparative perspective, the case of
Botswana is briefly considered. For about four decades Botswana achieved the
osILIon Lhe WorId`s IusLesL growIng economy und becume Lhe onIy muInIund
African state to have retained an unbroken record of liberal democracy since
Indeendence. (Thomson, zooo) However, when Lhe BrILIsh IeIL In 1q6 IL wus
one of the poorest countries in the world, i.e. this land locked Southern African
had per capita GNP less than US$100 dollars, there were only 12 kilometers of
paved road, 22 university graduates and 100 from secondary school. Why did
Botswana prosper? And why has Botswana been so successful? These are now
familiar research questions for political economists.
As Acemoglu et al. (2003) noted, there is almost complete consensus that
BoLswunu`s economIc success wus due Lo good oIIcIes. As u common erceLIon
in Africa is that good economics is often bad politics, this generates another
question: why did Botswana pursue good economic policies? Answering that
question these authors emphasize that Botswana was able to adopt sound
policies because it was the interest of the counLry`s oIILIcuI eIILes. ThereIore, Lhe
political elite, in contrast to their African counterparts, rather than undermining
formal institutions of governance, established good formal institutions,
particularly the institutions of property rights. And they dId so becuuse Lhey
inherited a set of institutional prerequisites that ensured that they would keep
their political power by pursuing good policies and placed restrictions on
InIIghLIng umong LhemseIves over oIILIcuI renLs.
Main institutions that Botswana inherited were good because they constrained
the behaviour of the political elite. Like Somalia, in pre-colonial Botswana there
were considerable incentive schemes for the political elite to be responsible.
Traditionally, the role and power of the chief were profoundly restricted.
AccordIng Lo eILh (zoo), Lo ersuude Lhe LrIbuI members Lo ucceL Lhe chIeI's
leadership for the common good an implicit bargain between the chief and his
people emerged. The chief provided leadership, but the people required
uccounLubIIILy. A romInenL unLhrooIogIcuI uccounL descrIbIng Lhe roIe oI Lhe
chIeI In Lhe LrIbuI socIeLy In BoLswunu noLed LhuL Lhe chIeI wus execLed Lo
watch over the interests of his subjects, and keep informed of tribal affairs
generally; he therefore spent much time daily at his kgotla (council place),
where anybody could approach him directly with news, petitions, and
complaints ... If his own conduct was unsatisfactory, he could be warned or
reprimanded by his advisers or at public assemblies; if he ruled despotically or
repeatedly neglected his duties, the people would begin to desert him, or a more
ouIur reIuLIve wouId Lry Lo ousL hIm by Iorce. (quoLed In eILh, zoo)
Fortunately, unlike Somalia, these institutions were not reversed during the
colonial administration in Botswana. The British Administration was very
modest and the continuity of traditional modes of leadership and accountability
were preserved. Both the Colonial Authorities and the chiefs were pleased by
206


this minimalist arrangement. The main duty for the Colonial Authority was to
protect the territory from external aggression and the chiefs were to govern
InLernuIIy In LheIr own IushIon (eILh, zoo). AnoLher ImorLunL resuIL oI LhIs
limited nature of the British administration was that, unlike other African
countries, indirect rule was not introduced in Botswana, and therefore, there
were no political elite with substantial power representing the British Empire.
(Acemoglu et al., 2003) In other words, the pre-colonial social contract between
the leaders and the society was conserved during the colonial rule. That social
contract was the foundations of the post-colonial governance in Botswana. And
IL Is obvIous LhuL BoLswunu`s economIc success und Lhe evoIuLIon oI ILs good
governance, to great extent, is a result of the continuation of these traditional
social institutions. (Leith, 2005, Acemoglu et al., 2003)
In addition, as noted earlier, in Somalia the social fragility created by the divide-
and-rule strategy employed by the colonial authorities was a precondition for
the patrimonial method used by the post-colonial Somali leaders to maintain
power while simultaneously pursuing policies costly to their society. In
Botswana colonial rule never employed a divide-and-rule strategy. Most
probably that method was not required since the relationship between
indigenous society with their leadership and the colonial administration was
relatively harmonious and consequently this allowed the persistence of the
culture of intertribal negotiations for dispute resolutions and cooperation
(Leith, 2005). Furthermore, post-colonial political elites in Botswana not only
kept away from employing divide-and-rule strategy but also have studiously
avoided exacerbating existing social fragility (Acemoglu et al., 2003).
Finally, it is obvious that the strategic competition between the United States
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War had no interference in the internal
uIIuIrs oI BoLswunu und Lhus noL obsLrucLed IuLLer`s oIILIcuI und economIc
development . Botswana remained pro-Western since its independence and its
relationship with Moscow was insignificant.
In sum, Botswana's exceptional success is explained in the first instance by the
economic policies that it pursued and these policies were fashioned by its post-
colonial leadership. On the one hand it was post-coIonIuI Ieuders` InLeresL Lo
pursue these pro-development policies and on the other hand efficient
IeudershI uccounLubIIILy wus In Iuce. The udvenL oI ndeendence In 1q66 dId
not halt the evolution of Botswana's politics and institutions; rather, with the
Constitution having set the "rules of the game," the political contest and the
institutional arrangements defining and constraining government now worked
within a new framework, uIbeIL one LhuL wus In keeIng wILh Tswunu LrudILIons.
(Leith, 2003)
The post-colonial Somali state, since its inception in 1960, was to achieve two
main goals: the socio-political unification of Somali peoples inhabiting the Horn
of Africa and socio-economic development. But neither of these goals were
secured by the civilian regimes that ruled Somalia between 1960-69. Post-
colonial Somali leaders rather than encouraging the formal institutions
formulated other strategies for survival. Scores of corruption and economic
207


mismanagement, and tribal manipulation by the political leaders were common
during the civilian rule. This unwise power struggle undermined the
governmenL`s erIormunce In uII secLors sInce Lhe IormuLIon oI Lhe reubIIc.
Somali society, although a democratic system of governance is formally
structured in Somalia, failed to utilise the basic instrumental objective of the
institutions of accountability, i.e. elections. Therefore, since there is no effective
system of accountability, the Somali electorate was unable to control their
leaders. Far worse, due to ethnic cleavages among the Somalis, they simply
became victims for political manipulations by the political elites.Prior to 1967,
in Somalia, the political struggle was mainly between Somali groups and
coalitions. However, since 1967, the superpowers played a crucial role in
determining the winning coalition among Somali groups. Washington, with the
intention oI reversIng Lhe SomuIIu`s IncreusIng LendencIes Lowurds Moscow,
involved itself in Lhe SomuIIu`s eIecLIon und oIIcy mukIng rocesses In 1q6;.
This involvement in the internal politics and leadership change worsened the
situation by contributing to the total erosion of Somali democracy, and enabled
a small group to monopolise political power and to install patrimonial rule in
the country. Consequently, the institutions of accountability were brought under
Lhe PrIme MInIsLer`s conLroI. The ruIIng urLy wus Lhe IIrsL vIcLIm oI Lhe
subordination, the parliament lost its role as an instrument of accountability,
and the Supreme Court was put under the control of an ally advocate. As
political institutions of democratic check and balances were undermined by the
state leaders, a system of personal rule established itself in Somalia, were almost
every state institution was abused.
After losing the election in June 1967 President Osman accepted the defeat and
gave up power in accordance with the formal political institution and became
the first African head of state to hand over power to a democratically elected
successor. But sadly in that election democracy was just on the surface, and
beneuLh IL WushIngLon`s Iong urm wus InIIuencIng Lhe emergIng wInnIng
coalition. Although there were many deficiencies in the governance system in
Somalia, institutions were not completely toothless and there were some
reformers, including Osman himself, in the political process. After the 1967
eIecLIon, und AmerIcu`s InLervenLIon, reIormers were undermIned und IormuI
institutions vanished. The Somali state was at the verge of collapse in 1969, and
for most of the Somalis and many well informed non-Somalis the military
intervention, no matter what the intention was of those involved, was perceived
as an act of salvaging the nation.
In October 1969, through a military cou d`eLuL, Burre overLhrew Lhe eIecLed
governmenL. By ussumIng ower, Lhe mIIILury regIme ubroguLed SomuIIu`s
formal democratic rule, nullified the parliamentary system of governance, and
undermined civil liberties. For its survival the regime successfully brought
Moscow to its side, eliminated political opponents and established authoritarian
rule. The Soviets, on the other hand, to build a socialist society decided to help
reform Somali society and thus supported the development aspects of the
country. n LhuL resecL Moscow`s objecLIves coIncIded wILh Lhe InLeresL oI Lhe
Somalis as citizens. Therefore the regime was mainly to pursue a single task
208


which was socio-economic development. In addition, the regime sought to
improve the welfare of society. Furthermore, the regime mobilised the society to
ruIIy behInd IL Lhrough Lhe vIsIon oI resLorIng eoIe`s dIgnILy, guIdIng Lhem Lo
their true Somali characteristics and creating a nationalism of oneness. As a
response to the failure of the civilian governments, Somalis welcomed the
military coup and the vast majority of the society voluntarily supported the
regime.
As a result, significant socio-economic development was accomplished during
Lhe IIrsL IIve yeurs oI Lhe regIme`s ruIe. Muny secLors oI Lhe economy
significantly improved. In the livestock sector, the most important sector in the
Somali economy, the export earning of the sector increased dramatically. The
manufacturing sector was negligible in 1969, but by the early 1970s about 20
percent of the counLry`s exorLs were munuIucLured goods. n Lhe
communications and transportation sector significant work was carried out. In
the social sector, two main targets of the regime were to liquidate illiteracy and
to create a written form of the Somali language. The latter was achieved in 1972
and in the same year Somali became the sole official language in the country. In
the following year, a successful literacy campaign was undertaken in the urban
centers. Furthermore, total school enrolment dramatically increased from less
than 50 thousand in 1971 to about 220 thousand pupils in 1975. Other notable
developmental programmes were also carried out during this period. In light of
this, the military rule, in its first phase, could be characterised as an agent of its
citizens. To a great extent the coincidence of interests between the Soviet Union
und SomuII socIeLy und Lhe socIeLy`s suorL Ior Lhe regIme wus resonsIbIe Ior
these achievements.
n Lhe 1q;os Lhe SovIeLs, unhuy wILh Lhe regIme`s erIormunce on Lhe reform
process, took two measures that alienated its interests from that of the Somalis.
Firstly, Moscow put great pressure on the regime to establish a vanguard
socialist party. That made Barre worry for his future because his power base
would be weakened if an ideal Marxist party was established and in response he
started several countermeasures in order to survive. In short, rather than
establishing a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party he formed a party of his own.
Secondly, Moscow decided to dramatically increase its presence in Somalia and
to do so it shifted its focus from social reform to the Greater Somalia issue and
therefore encouraged the war between Somalia and Ethiopia. However, it soon
ceased supporting the war between Somalia and Ethiopia because a pro-Soviet
military junta took the power in Ethiopia. This further aggravated its relations
with the military leadership in Somalia. The United States took the opportunity
und sLurLed wooIng Burre`s regIme Irom Lhe SovIeL cum. To do so WushIngLon
replaced Moscow by encouraging war between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somali
leaders believed that Washington was offering a more rewarding alternative,
expelled the Soviets from Somalia and abrogated the relationship treaty with the
Soviet Union. Consequently Somalia and Ethiopia clashed in a battle, with
Somalia being badly defeated.
209


The regIme`s ubundonmenL oI socIo-economic development and the defeat in
the war marked the end of the social contract between the regime and society.
Somalis as citizens realised that the government failed to achieve either of the
two main goals: socio-economic development and unification. Soon after the
Ogaden War and the Soviet departure, longtime dormant contenders started to
challenge the regime. Unsuccessful military coupes were staged and armed
opposition groups were setup.
Barre, on the other hand, decided to survive at any cost and formed a
patrimonial network for control. He employed the well-known divide-and-rule
policy based on clan manipulation. By doing so Barre abandoned his interest
with Somalis as citizens and relied on particular client groups and in short, the
military regime became an instrument of a ruling elite. To maintain his power
and carry out his policies Barre sought to bring Washington to his side.
Economic predation and social antagonism was the order of the day.
The American administration, unlike the Soviets, was not concerned about the
socioeconomic wellbeing of the societies. It limited its task, by using the
strategic bases in Somalia, and preventing the regime from falling. Using its
good offices it also facilitated a friendly relationship between the regime and the
other Western countries and international organisations such as the United
Nations, World Bank and IMF. Until 1986, the United States and its allies
provided military and economic assistance that enabled the regime to survive
and the regime provided the US military bases it needed to safeguard its interest
in the region.
The rise of Gorbachev and the introduction of glasnost and perestroika marked
the beginning of the end of the Cold War with decreased tension between the
two superpowers. Consequently, Somalia started to lose its geopolitical value.
Washington, like its allies, withdrew its assistance from the regime.
Coincidently, Barre was severely injured in a car accident in 1986 and this raised
the issue of who would succeed the ailing dictator, and created mounting
tension and wiped out the cohesion among loyal groups of Barre. In addition,
opposition factions intensified their struggle. The role of Somali society, as
principal, broke down after the Ogaden defeat and never recovered.
WushIngLon`s ubundonmenL murked, IIke Lhe revIous deurLure by Lhe SovIeLs,
the failure of the principalship of the US to Barre. However, unlike the
departure of the Soviet Union, in this period there was no superpower
interested in salvaging the regime. The military regime collapsed and the post-
colonial state in Somalia collapsed as well.
In short, due to the incentive structure generated by the informal institutions,
the formal state institutions fell apart. The formal economy and its institutions
were among those that collapsed rapidly. Here the way the players acted, in
interaction with the prevailing institutions, led to the deterioration of the
economy and the income bases of the players. This unfortunate outcome led
players to further their economic predation, which again weakened the income
opportunities available to all, and led the players to further intensify their
predation, and so on. Hence, a kind of vicious circle emerged; for instance, state
210


leaders pursued bad economic policies. In order to enrich themselves, Somali
leaders provided economic opportunities for their clients, and/or financed the
war against opposition groups by employing destructive strategies that led to
the deterioration of the economy. This in turn weakened the income bases for
both the elite and the ordinary citizens as state employers, farmers,
entrepreneurs, etc. The state leaders then had to find new objects and strategies
for predation. On their part, the ordinary employers, soldiers, farmers, etc.
followed suit by delving deeper into corruption and other economic
mismanagement or by leaving their professional occupations. These further
weakened the economy and consequently generated more predation, and so on.
This process persisted until the formal economy collapsed completely.
Political tribalism or ethnic politics extends the tenure of the incumbent if
employed by the incumbent leaders and increases the probability of gaining
office if used by the opposition. In this sense clan politics rewards pro-
failure/antidevelopment policies and actions, but gives no reward for pro-
development behaviour. However, it increases the probability of conflict if
simultaneously used by the incumbent and opposition. In this sense clan politics
provides incentives for state collapse. However, presence of ethnic/clan fragility
in the societies made ethnic/clan politics attractive for ambitious political
entrepreneurs. Informal rules or norms of struggle during the Cold War led the
superpowers to reward pro-failure/antidevelopment policies and actions in
Africa and Asia. States fail and collapse because of the destructive policies and
actions of their leaders. Leaders pursue destructive decisions simply because
they are responding to pro-failure incentives and constraints offered by a set
of dominant (in)formal institutions. These institutions are pro-failure/
antidevelopment institutions because they provide the highest payoffs to the
destructive policies and actions by political leaders.



211


REFERENCES
Abdurahman Mohamed D. 2005, Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies 1960-2001,
AuthorHouse.
AC (Africa Confidential), 1973-1990.
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A. & Verdier, T. 2003, Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A
Model of Personal Rule, Paper presented as the Marshall Lecture at the
Euroeun EconomIc AssocIuLIon`s AnnuuI meeLIngsIn SLockhoIm, AugusL, zqLh,
2003 edn.
AcemogIu, D. & Johnson, SImon & RobInson, Jumes A. zoo, An AIrIcun Success
Story: BoLswunu, In DunI RodrIk ed. In Search of Prosperity: Analytic
Narratives on Economic Growth, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Achtner, W. January 24,1993, The Italian Connection: How Rome Helped Ruin
Somalia, Sunday, Final Edition edn.
ACR (Africa Contemporary Record), 1968/69-1987/88.
Adam, H.M. 1997, "Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Ibn Khaldun, and Reflections on the
Catastrophe in Somalia" in Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali
Communities in the 21
st
Century, ed. Hussein M. Adam and Richard Ford, Red
Sea Press, Lawrenceville N.J, pp. 265-271.
Adam, H.M. 1995, "Clan conflicts and democratization in Somalia" in Ethnic conflict
and democratization in Africa, ed. H. Glickman, African Studies Association
Press, Atlanta, Ga., pp. 197-226.
Adam, H.M. 1qq, "SomuIIu: A TerrIbIe BeuuLy BeIng Born? " In Collapsed States: The
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William
Zartman, L. Rienner Publishers, Colorado and London, pp. 69-89.
Aden, Hassan (Director general, ITOP), 2008, Interview, Somalia.
Adibe, C., Potgieter, J.W. & United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 1995,
Managing arms in peace processes : Disarmament and Conflict Resolution
Project. Somalia, United Nations, New York N.Y.
ADP (Academy for Peace and Development) 2002, The Role of the Media in Political
Reconstruction, Unpublished manuscript edn, Hargeysa, Somaliland.
Ali, Aden Sheikhdon (Former secretary of finance, SSDF) 2008, Interview, Somalia.
212


Amiin, M.X. 2004, Taariikhda Bangiyada Soomaaliyeed, Amazong Printing Press,
Sharjah, UAE.
AR (African Recorder)1962-1978.
ARB (Africa Research Bulletin) Various Issues.
Auvinen, Juha and E. Wayne Nafziger 1999, "The Sources of Humanitarian
Emergencies", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 267-290.
Azam, J., Bates, R.H. & Biais, B., 2005, Political Predation and Economic
Development, CEPR Discussion Papers.
Baker, P.H. & J. A. Ausink Spring 1996, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a
Predictive Model", Parameters, , pp. 19-31.
Bates, R.H. 2005; 1981, Markets and states in tropical Africa : the political basis of
agricultural policies, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Bates, R.H. 1995, "Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals: An assessment of the
new institutionalism" in The new institutional economics and Third World
development, eds. John Harriss, Janet Hunter & Colin M. Lewis, 1995th edn,
Routledge, London, pp. 27-48.
Bates, R.H. 1998, Analytic narratives, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
Bates, R.H. 2001, Prosperity and violence : the political economy of development, W.
W. Norton, New York.
Bates, R.H. 2008, When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-century Africa,
Cambridge University Press, New York.
Becker, G.S. & G. J. Stigler 1974, "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance an Compensation of
Enforcer", Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1-18.
Bell, B. 1975, "Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Somalia", Orbis, vol. 19,
no. 2, pp. 402-414.
Berdal, M.R., Malone, D. & International Peace Academy 2000, Greed & grievance :
economic agendas in civil wars, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo.
Bernheim, B.D. & M.D. Whinston 1986, "Common Agency", Econometrica, vol. 54, no.
4, pp. 923-42.
Besteman, C. 1999, Unraveling Somalia : race, violence, and the legacy of slavery,
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, Pa.
213


Besteman, C.L. & Cassanelli, L.V. 2000, The struggle for land in Southern Somalia :
the war behind the war, Rev edn, Haan, London.
Blomqvist, H.C. & Lundahl, M. 2002, The distorted economy, Palgrave, Houndmills,
Balsingstoke, Hampshire ; New York.
Bongartz, M. 1991, The civil war in Somalia : its genesis and dynamics, Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala.
Brind, H. Winter 1983, "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa", International Affairs
(London), vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 75-95.
Carment, D. 2003, "Assessing state failure: implications for theory and policy", Third
World Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 407-427.
Cartwright, J. 1983, Political Leadership in Africa, Croom Helm, SL. MurLIn`s.
Cassanelli, L.V. 1982, The shaping of Somali society : reconstructing the history of a
pastoral people, 1600-1900, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia PA.
Castagno, A.A. Dec. 1971, "Mohamed Siad Barre: Somalia's President: An Interview",
Africa Report, , pp. 23-25.
Castagno, A.A., Jr. Feb. 1970, "Somalia Goes Military", Africa Report, , pp. 25-27.
Castagno, A.A., Jr. 1964, "Somali Republic" in Political Parties and National
Integration in Tropical Africa, ed. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg,
University of California Press, Berkeley, pp. 512-59.
Chaliland, G. 1978, "The Horn of Africa's Dilemma", Foreign Policy, vol. 10, no. Spring,
pp. 116-131.
Chossudovsky, M. 1997, The Globalization of Poverty, London: Zed Books.
Clapham, C. 2000, Failed States and and Non-States in the International Order,
presented in "Failed States III: Globalization and The Failed State" in April 7-10,
2000 in Florance, Prudue University edn.
Clapham, C. 1972, "Ethiopia and Somalia" in
Conflicts in Africa International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, pp. 1-23.
Collier, P. 2007, The bottom billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what
can be done about it, Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York.
CoIIIer, P. zooq, The PoIILIcuI Economy oI SLuLe uIIure, Oxford Review of Economic
Policy, 25 (2) 219-240.
214


Collier, P. 2000, "Doing Well Out of War" in
In Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, ed. Mats Berdal and
David M. Malone, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO., pp. 91-111.
Collier, P. & Anke Hoeffler 2004, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", Oxford
Economic Papers, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 563-595.
Collier, P. & Anke Hoeffler 1999, Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War, Paper
presented at the World Bank Conference on Civil War, Crime and Violanece.
Washington, DC edn.
Compagnon, D. 1992, "Political Decay in Somalia: From Personal Rule to Warlordism",
Refuge, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 8-13.
Coolidge, J. & Susan Rose-Ackerman 1997, High-level rent seeking and corruption in
African regimes : theory and cases , World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Coquery-Vidrovitch, Chatherine (Translated by David Maisel) 1988(1992), Africa:
Endurance and Change South of the Sahara, REPRINT edn, University of
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California.
Cowell, A. 1981, Qaddafi is New Chip in Horn of Africa Poker Game, Late Edition (East
Coast) edn, New York Times, New York.
Crumer, C. und J. Weeks zooz, MucroeconomIc sLubIIIsuLIon und sLrucLuruI
udjusLmenL, In W. NuIzIger und R.Vuyrynen, eds. The Prevention of
Humanitarian Emergencies, UNU/WIDER.
Crocker, C. 1985, "U.S. Interests in Regional Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," address
before the Washington World Affairs Council, Washington, DC, November 13,
1985.
Crozier, B. 1975, The soviet presence in Somalia, Institute for the Study of Conflict,
London.
David, S. 1979, "Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage", International
Security, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 69-90.
Davidson, B. 1975, Somalia Beats the Drought, Afrimedia International Limited, UK.
Davidson, D. 1975, "Somalia: Towards Socialism", Race & Class, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 19-
37.
Davidson, B. 1985, "Somalia in 1975: some notes and impressions", Issue: Quarterly
Journal of Opinion, vol. 5, no. Spring, pp. 19-26.
215


de Soysa, I. & N.P.Gleditsch 1999, To cultivate peace: agriculture in a world of
conflict, Report of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
Dixit, A.K. 1996, The making of economic policy : a transaction-cost politics
perspective, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Dixit, A.K. 2003, "Some Lessons from Transaction-Cost Politics for Less-Developed
Countries", Economics & Politics, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 107-133.
Doornbos, M. 2001, "Good governance: the rise and decline of a policy metaphor", The
Journal of Development Studies, vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 93-108.
Doornbos M. & J. Markakis 1994, "Society and state in crises: What went Wrong in
Somalia?" in Crises Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia,
ed. Salih, M. A. Mohamed and Lennart Wohlgemuth, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet,
Uppsala.
DoS, US Departmet of State Various Issues, Department of State Bulletin, Office of
Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.
Ekeh, P. 1990, "Social anthropology and two contrasting uses of tribalism in Africa",
Comparative Study in Society and History, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 660-700.
Ekstrom, C.D. 1993, "Budgetary chaos and evasion: the case of Somalia", International
Journal of Public Administration, vol. 16, no. 7, pp. 1053-1070.
Elliott, C. 1975, Patterns of Poverty in the Third World: A Study of Social and
Economic Stratification Praeger Publishers, Newy York.
Emeh, O. March 30, 2004, Africa and the Crisis of Instability, Vanguard Media Ltd.
Fearon, J.D. 1999, "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting
Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance" in Democracy,
Accountability, and Representation, eds. Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski &
Susan Stokes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 55-97.
Frederick, M.J. 1988, The Politics of Protracted Displacement: A Case Study of the
Ogaden Somali Refugees, Ph.D. edn, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
Geldenhuys, D. 1998, Foreign political engagement : remaking states in the post-Cold
War world, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Geshekter, C. 1985, "Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation: The Eastern Horn of Africa
Before 1950", International Journal of African Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 1-32.
216


Gorodnov, V. & N. Kosukhin 1972, In the Somali Democratic Republic, East View
Publications.
Gregory, P. 1994, "Diagnosis With Limited Information - Government Pay and
Employment Reform in Somalia" in Rehabilitating Government: Pay and
Employment Reform in Africa , eds. David L. Lindauer & Barbara Nunberg,
World Bank, Washington, DC, pp. 33-61.
Gros, J. 1996, "Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the New World Order: decaying
Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti", Third World Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3, pp.
455-472.
Grossman, G.M. & Elhanan Helpman 2001, Special Interest Politics, The MIT Press,
Cambridge and London:.
Grossman, H.C. 2000, "State: Agent or Proprietor?", Economics of Governance, vol. 1,
no. 1, pp. 3-11.
Gunn, S. 1987, "Somalia, in The peasant betrayed: Agriculture and land reform in the
Third World " in , ed. John P. Powelson and Richard Stock, Oelgeschlager, Gunn
& Hain in association with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Boston, MA, pp.
109-124.
Haldn, P. 2008, Somalia: Failed State or Nascent States-System?, FOI (Swedish
Defence Research Agency), Stockholm.
Halliday, F. 1977, "US Policy in the Horn of Africa: 'Aboulia' or Proxy Intervention",
The Review of African Political Economy, vol. 4, no. 10, pp. 8-32.
Herbst, J.I. 2000, States and power in Africa: comparative lessons in authority and
control, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
Herbst, J.I. 2004, "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice: Implications
for Policy" in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert Rotberg,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., pp. 302-318.
Hess, R.L. 1966, Italian colonialism in Somalia, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Hoben, A. 1988, "Political Economy of Land Tenure in Somalia" in Land Society in
Contemporary Africa, eds. R. E. Downs & S.P. Reyna, University Press of New
England, Hanover, New Hampshire, pp. 192-220.
Holmstrom, B. 1982, "Moral Hazard in Teams", Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 13, no.
2, pp. 324-340.
Holmstrom, B. & Paul Milgrom 1991, "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, vol. 7, no. Special Issue, pp. 24-52.
217


Horowitz, D.L. 1985, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press,
Berkeley.
Ignatieff, M. July 28, 2002, Nation-Building Lite, New York Times Magazine.
International Monetary Fund. 1969, Surveys of African Economies : Vol. 2, Kenya,
Tanzania, Uganda and Somalia, International Monetary Fund, Washington
D.C.
Jackson, R.H. 1990, Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations, and the Third
World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge England ; New York.
Jackson, R.H. & Rosberg, C.G. 1982, Personal rule in Black Africa: prince, autocrat,
prophet, tyrant, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Jama, Ahmed Sh. (Senior officer, Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party) 2008,
Interview, Somalia.
Jamal, V. 1983, "Nomads and Farmers: Income and Poverty in Rural Somalia" in
Agrarian Policies and Rural Poverty in Africa, eds. D. Ghai & S. Radwan, ILO,
Geneva, pp. 281-311.
Jamal, V. 1988, "Somalia: Survival in a 'Doomed' Economy", International Labour
Review, vol. 127, no. 6, pp. 783-812.
Kapteijns, L. 1994, "Women and the crisis of communal identity: the cultural
construction of gender in Somalia history" in The Somali challenge: from
catastrophe to renewal? , ed. Ahmed I. Samatar, L. Rienner Publishers,
Boulder, pp. 211-232.
Kiewiet, D.R. & Mathew D. McCubbins 1991, The logic of delegation : congressional
parties and the appropriations process, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Kimiko, Mohamed Warasme Ali (Former minister of trade, Somalia) 2008, Interview,
Somalia.
Kivimki, T. 2001, Explaining violence in Somalia, CTS-conflict Transformation
Service, Helsinki.
Kivimki, Timo and liisa laakso (ed) 2000, Greed, grievance and weak states :
overview of African conflicts , Helsinki University Press, Helsinki.
Kiwanuka, S. 1975, "The Three Traditional Foundations of African Nationalism" in
Politics and Leadership in Africa, eds. A. Ojuka & W. Ochieng, EALB, Nairobi,
pp. 37-62.
Laffont, j. 2001, Incentives and Political Economy, Oxford University Press, USA.
218


Laitin, D.D. 1975, "Revolutionary Change in Somalia", MERIP Report, vol. 62, pp. 6-18.
Laitin, D.D. 1976, "The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia", Journal of
Modem African Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 449-468.
Laitin, D.D. 1979, "The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad's Role in Somali
History", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 95-115.
Laitin, D.D. 1993, "The economy" in Somalia: A Country Study, ed. Helen C. Metz,
Library of Congress, Washington, DC, pp. 119-149.Laitin, D.D. & Said S.Samatar
1984, "Somalia and the World Economy ", Review of African Political Economy,
vol. 11, no. 30, pp. 58-72.
Laitin, D.D. & Samatar, S.S. 1987, Somalia: nation in search of a state, Westview Press,
Boulder, CO.
Lal, D. 1983, The Poverty of Development Economics, Institute of Economic Affairs,
London.
Lapidus, I.M. 1988, A History of Islamic Societies, First edition edn, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Leith, C. J. (2005). Why Botswana Prospered, Montreal: McGill University Press.
evI, M. zoo, An AnuIyLIc NurruLIve Arouch Lo PuzzIes und ProbIems.,
Estudio/Working Paper 2003/192.
Lewis, I.M. 1961, A Pastoral Democracy: A study of pastoralism and politics among
the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa, Oxford University Press, London.
Lewis, I.M. 1965, The modern history of Somaliland: from nation to state, Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, London.
Lewis, I.M. 1967, "Integration in the Somali Republic" in African Integration and
Disintegration, ed. Arthur Hazel- wood, Oxford University Press, London, pp.
251-284.
Lewis, I.M. 1972, "The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup", Journal of Modern African
Studies, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 383-408.
Lewis, I.M. 1980, A modern history of Somalia: nation and state in the Horn of Africa,
Longman, London.
Lewis, I.M. 1982, "Somalia: "Nationalism Turned Inside Out"", MERIP Report, vol.
106, pp. 16-21.
219


Lewis, I.M. 1994, Blood and bone: the call of kinship in Somali society, Red Sea Press,
Lawrenceville, NJ.
Lewis, I.M. 2002, A modern history of the Somali: nation and state in the Horn of
Africa, 4th edn, James Currey; Ohio University Press, Oxford; Athens.
Lind, J., Sturman, K., African Centre for Technology Studies & Institute for Security
Studies 2002, Scarcity and surfeit: the ecology of Africa's conflicts, Institute for
Security Studies, Pretoria.
Lipset, S.M. 1959, Political Man the Social Bases of Politics, Revised edition, 1981 edn,
The Johns Hopkins University press, Baltmore, Maryland.
Little, P.D. 2003, Somalia: economy without state, International African Institute in
association with James Currey; Indiana University Press, Oxford; Bloomington.
Luling, V. 1997, "Come back Somalia?: questioning a collapsed state" in .
Lundahl, M. 2000, "Haiti: Towards the Abyss? Poverty, Dependence, and Resource
depletion" in War, Hunger, and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian
Emergencies, eds. E.W. Nafziger, Frances Stewart & Raimo Vyrynen, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, pp. 333-364.
Lupia, A. 2001, "Delegation of Power: Agency Theory" in International Encyclopedia of
the Social and Behavioral Sciences 5, eds. Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes,
Elsevier Science Limited, Oxford, UK, pp. 3375-3377.
Lupia, A. & Mathew D. McCubbins 2000, "Representation or Abdication? How Citizens
Use Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed", European Journal of Political
Research, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 291-308.
Macho-Stadler, Ines and David Perez-Castrillo 2001, An Introduction to the Economics
of Information: Incentives and Contracts, Second Edition edn, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, New York.
Madison, J. 1788[1961], The federalist, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Makinda, S.M. 1982, "Conflict and Superpowers in the Horn of Africa", Third World
Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 93-103.
Makinda, S.M. 1987, Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa, St. Martin's Press,
New York.
Maren, M. 1997, The road to hell: the ravaging effects of foreign aid and international
charity, Free Press, New York N.Y.
220


Mayall, J. 1978, "The Battle for the Horn: Somali Irredentism and International
Diplomacy", World Today, vol. 34, no. 9, pp. 336-43.
McCubbins, M. 1999, "Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the
Delegation Dilemma", Regulation, vol. 2, no. 30, pp. 37.
Mehmet, O. 1971, "Effectiveness of foreign aid: The case of Somalia", Journal of
Modem African Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 31-47.
Meierhenrich, J. 2004, "Forming states after failure" in When States Fail: Causes and
Consequences, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,
pp. 153-169.
Menkhaus, K. 1989, Rural transformation and the roots of underdevelopment in
Somclic's Louer 1ubbc Vclle, Ph.D. edn, University of South Carolina.
Metz, H.C. 1993, Somalia, a country study, 4th edn, Library of Congress. Federal
Research Division, Washington, D.C.
Milliken, J. & Keith Krause 2003, "State Failure, State Collapse and State
Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies" in State Failure, Collapse
and Reconstruction, ed. Jennifer Milliken, Blackwell, Malden, MA and Oxford,
pp. 1-21.
Milliken, J. 2003, State failure, collapse and reconstruction, Blackwell, Malden, Mass.
Mohamed, Ali Ismail (General, Somali National Army) 2008, Interview, Somalia.
Morris, R. & Richard Mauzy 1976, "Following the Scenarios" in The CIA File, ed. Robert
L. Borosage and John Marks, Grossman Publishers, New York, pp. 3-38.
Mubarak, J.A. 1996, From bad policy to chaos : how economy fell apart, Praeger,
Westort, CT.
Nafziger, E.W., Stewart, F. & Vyrynen, R. 2000, War, hunger and displacement: the
origins of humanitarian emergencies, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Nielson, D.L. & Michael J. Tierney 2003, "Delegation to International Organizations:
Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform", International
Organization, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 241-276.
North, D.C. 1997, The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics to an
Understanding of the Transition Problem, UNU/WIDER, Helsinki, Finland.
North, D.C. 1981, Structure and change in economic history, 1st edn, Norton, New
York.
221


North, D.C. 1990, Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New York.
North, D.C. 1997, "The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development" in
The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, eds. John
Harriss, Janet Hunter & Colin M. Lewis, Routledge, London, pp. 17-26.
NYT (New York Times), various issues.
Ochieng, W.R. 1975, "Tribalism and National Unity: the Kenya case" in Politics and
Leadership in Africa, eds. A. Ojuka & W. Ochieng, EALB, Nairobi, Kenya, pp.
254-271.
Ofcansky, T.P. & LaVerle Berry (eds) 1991, Ethiopia: A Country Study, GPO for the
Library of Congress, Washington.
Olson, M. 2000, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist
Dictatorships, Basic Books, New York.
Olson, M. 1965(1971), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Omar, M.O. 1992, The road to zero: Somalia's self-destruction: personal
reminiscences, HAAN Associates, London.
Padr-i-Miquel, G. 2004, The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of
Fear, Manuscript edn, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Patman, R.G. 1990, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of
Intervention and Disengagement Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Paul, J. 1977, "Kevin M. Cahil, M.D. - A Medical Machiavelli", MERIP Report, vol. 62,
pp. 16.
Payton, G.D. 1980, "The Somali Coup of 1969: The Case for Soviet Complicity", Journal
of Modern African Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 493-508.
Pestalozza, Luigi (Trans., Peter Clendening.) 1974, Editions Afrique, Asie, Amrique
Latine, Paris.
Petterson, D.K. 1985, "Somalia and the United States, 1977-83: the new relationship" in
African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, eds. Gerald Bender, James
Coleman & Richard Sklar, University of California Press, Berkeley, pp. 194-204.
Plank, D. 1993, "Aid, Debt and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its Donors",
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 407-430.
222


Porter, B.D. 1984, The USSR in Third World Conflicts, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Porto, J.G. 2002, "Contemporary Conflict Analysis in Perspective" in Scarcity and
Surjeit:The Ecolo oj Ajricc's Conjlicts , eds. Jeremy Lind & Kathryn Sturman,
African Centre for Technology Studies and Institute for Security Studies,
Pretoria, pp. 6-16.
Reno, W. 2000, Economic Motivations of Warfare in Collapsed States, National
Strategy Forum.
Reno, W. 2000, "Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Competition for Patronage in Resource-
Rich Economies" in War, Hunger, and Displacement: The Origins of
Humanitarian Emergencies, eds. E.W.Nafziger, F. Stewart & R. Vyrynen,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 231-259.
Reno, W. 2000, "Shadow State and the Political Economy of Civil War" in Greed and
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, ed. Berdal Mats and David M.
Malone, Lynne Rienner Pubisher, Boulder, pp. 43-68.
Reno, W. 2004, The Empirical Challenge to Economic Analyses of Conflicts,
conference paper presented at The Economic Analysis of Conflict: Problems and
Prospects edn, Washington DC, April 19-20.
Roamer, M. & Steven C. Radelet 1991, "Macroeconomic Reform in Developing
Countries" in The Reform of Economic Systems in Developing Countries, eds.
Dwight H. Perkins & Michael Roemer, Harvard Institute for International
Development, Cambridge.
Rodrik, D. 2001, "Development Strategies for the 21st Century", Annual World Bank
Conference on Development Economics 2000, eds. Boris Pleskovic & Nicholas
Stern, The World Bank and Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 85.
Rotberg, R.I. 2002, Failed States in a World of Terror, Council on Foreign Relations,
US.
Rotberg, R.I. 2002, "Nature of Nation-State Failure", The Washington Quarterly, vol.
25, no. 3, pp. 85-96.
Rotberg, R.I. 2003, State failure and state weakness in a time of terror, World Peace
Foundation; Brookings Institution Press, Cambridge, Mass.; Washington, D.C.
Rotberg, R.I. 2004, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown,
Prevention, and Repair" in Why States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed.
Robert I. Rotberg, Princiton University Press, Princiton, pp. 1-45.
Suchs, JeIIery, 1qq;, M Is u Power unLo LseII, Financial Times, December 11.
223


Salih, M.A.R.M. & Wohlgemuth, L. 1995, Crisis management and the politics of
reconciliation in Somalia: statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17-19 January
1994, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala.
Samatar, Abdi I. 1989, The state and rural transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884-
1986, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison,Wisc.
Samatar, Abdi I. 1997, "Ethnicity and leadership in the making of African state
models: Botswana versus Somalia", Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 4, pp.
687-708.
Samatar, Abdi I. & Ahmed I. Samatar 2002, "Somalis as Africa's First Democrats:
Premier Abdirazak H. Hussein and President Aden A. Osman", Bildhaan: An
International Journal of Somali Studies, vol. 2, pp. 1-64.
Samatar, Ahmed I. 1994, "The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the Collapse
of the State in Somalia" in The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to
Renewal, ed. Ahmed I. Samatar, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Col., pp.
95-146.
SumuLur, Ahmed . 1q8;, "SomuIIu`s musse: SLuLe Power and Dissident Politics",
Third World Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 871-890.
Samatar, Ahmed I. 1988, Socialist Somalia: rhetoric and reality, Institute for African
Alternatives: Zed Books, London ; Atlantic Highlands N.J.
Samatar, Ahmed I. 1994, "Introduction and overview" in Somali challenge: from
catastrophe to renewal?, ed. Ahmed I. Samatar, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, pp. 1-
16.
Samatar, S.S. 1993, "Historical Setting " in Somalia: A Country Study, ed. Helen C.
Metz, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, pp. 119-149.
Samater, I.M. 1997, "Light at the End of the Tunnel: Some Reflections on the Struggle
of the Somali National Movement" in Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for
Somali Communities in the 21
st
Century, eds. Hussein M. Adam & Richard Ford,
Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville N.J, pp. 21-33.
Sambanis, N. 2001, "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Conflicts Have the Same Causes?",
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 259-282.
Schraeder, P.J. 1994, United States foreign policy toward Africa : incrementalism,
crisis and change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Selassie, B.H. 1980, Conflict and intervention in the Horn of Africa, New York.
Shaw, A. 1985, "Barre's balancing act", Africa Report, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 26-29.
224


Sherr, E. 1974, Somalia: Socialist Orientation, East View Publications.
Shuuke, Abdulrahman A. Osman, (Former minister of education, Somalia), 2008,
Interview, Somalia.
Simons, A. 1995, Networks of dissolution: Somalia undone, Westview, Boulder.
Siqueira K., T. Sandler 2004, "Collective Goods, Common Agency, and Third-Part
Intervention", Bulletin of Economic Research, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 200.
Snyder, J. 1993, "Nationalism and the crisis of the post-Soviet state", Survival, vol. 35,
no. 1, pp. 5-26.
Sofinsky, V. 1974, Somalia on the Path of Progress, East View Publications.
Somalia 1974, Revolutionary Somalia in the eyes of the world : a real assessment of
our revolutionary actions, Ministry of Information and National Guidance,
Mogadishu.
Somalia 1979, The Constitution : Somali Democratic Republic, Peoples Assembly,
Mogadishu.
Somalia, (G.o.S.) 1981, "Summary of the Country Presentation for Somalia", First
United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Paris, 1
September 1981, ed. Conference Secretariat, United Nations General Assembly, ,
pp. 1
Somalia 1988, Statistical Abstract 1983, Ministry of National Planning and Jubba
Valey Development, Mogadishu, Somalia.
Somalia, (G.o.S.) 1990, "Country presentation: Somalia", Second United Nations
Conference on the Least Developed Countries, ed. Conference Secretariat,
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Paris, France, pp. 1.
Statistisches Bundesamt 1991, Lnderbericht - Somalia 1991, J. B. Metzler/C. E.
Poeschel, Germany.
Stedman, S. 1996, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa" in International
Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael Brown, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Press, Cambridge, pp. 235-265.
Strm, K. 2003, "Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation" in Delegation and
Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, eds. Kaare Strm, Wolfgang C.
Muller & Torbjorn Bergman, Oxford University Press, USA, pp. 50-106.
225


Tarp, F. 1993, Stabilization and structural adjustment: Macroeconomic frameworks
for analysing the crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, Routledge, London and New
York.
The Economist, January 28, 1989, Refugees; The money in numbers.
The Globe and Mail (Canada), August 28, 1982, Refugees drafted into the army by
Somalia?
Thomson, A. 2000, An Introduction to African Politics, London: Routledge.
Thurston, R.L. 1978, "The United States, Somalia and the Crisis in the Horn," Horn of
Africa, vol. 1, no. 2 (1978), 11-20.
Thurston, R.L. 1969, "Detente in the Horn", Africa Report, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 6-13.
The Times, various issues.
Tilly, Charles 1990, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
UNIDO 1988, Somalia: industrial revitalization through privatization, Regional and
Country Studies Branch, Vienna.
United Nations 1991, "Government financial management in" in Government financial
management in least developed countries, ed. United Nations, Department of
Technical Co-operation for Development, United Nations, New York, pp. 212-
228.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 1990, Country presentation.
Somalia 1990, Unctad, Geneva.
United Nations, Department of Technical Co-operation for Development 1991,
Government financial management in least developed countries, United
Nations, New York N.Y.
Viktorov, G. 1970, Somalia Towards PROGRESS, East View Publications.
Viktorov, G. 1970, Somalia, The Coup: Causes and Consequences, East View
Publications.
Washington Post, various issues.
Weyrah, Mohamed Yussuf (Minister of Finance) 2009, Interview, Somalia.
226


World Bank 1995, World Tables, Johns Hopkins University press, Baltimore,
Maryland.
World Bank 1978-2000/01, World Development Report, Oxford University Press, New
York.
XHKS (Xisbiga Hantiwadaagga Kacaanka Soomaaliyeed) 1976, Barnaamijka Xisbiga,
Document edn, Mogadishu, Somalia.
Yassin, A.S. 1989, The effects of government price policies on rural goods :--a case
study Somalia, Ph.D. edn, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Zartman, I.W. 1995, Collapsed states : the disintegration and restoration of legitimate
authority, L. Rienner Publishers, Boulder.
Zunes, S. 2002, 17 January 2002-last update, The Long and Hidden History of the U.S
in Somalia . Available:
http://www.alternet.org/story/12253/the_long_and_hidden_history_of_the_u
.s_in_somalia/ [2009, 15 September 2009] .

EKONOMI OCH SAMHLLE
Skrifter utgivna vid Svenska handelshgskolan
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY
Publications of the Hanken School of Economics
178. OANA VELCU: Drivers of ERP Systems Business Value. Helsinki 2008.
179. SOFIE KULP-TG: Modeling Nonlinearities and Asymmetries in Asset Pricing.
Helsinki 2008.
180. NIKOLAS ROKKANEN: Corporate Funding on the European Debt Capital Market.
Helsinki 2008.
181. OMAR FAROOQ: Financial Crisis and Performance of Analysts Recommen-
dations. Evidence from Asian Emerging Markets. Helsinki 2008.
182. GUY AHONEN (Ed.): Inspired by Knowledge in Organisations. Essays in Honor of
Professor Karl-Erik Sveiby on his 60
th
Birthday 29
th
June 2008. Helsinki 2008.
183. NATAA GOLIK KLANAC: Customer Value of Website Communication in
Business-to-Business Relationships. Helsinki 2008.
184. ANNIKA SANDSTRM: Political Risk in Credit Evaluation. Empirical Studies and
Survey Results. Helsinki 2008.
185. MARIA SUOKANNAS: Den anonyma seniorkonsumenten identifieras. Om
identitetsskapande processer i en marknadsfringskontext. Helsingfors 2008.
186. RIIKKA SARALA: The Impact of Cultural Factors on Post-Acquisition Integration.
Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions of Finnish Companies in 1993-2004. Helsinki
2008.
187. INGMAR BJRKMAN et al. (Eds.): Innovation, Leadership, and Entrepreneurship.
A Festschrift in Honour of Professor Martin Lindell on his 60
th
Birthday. Helsinki
2008.
188. JOACIM TG: Essays on Platforms. Business Strategies, Regulation and Policy in
Telecommunications, Media and Technology Industries. Helsinki 2008.
189. HENRIK TTTERMAN: From Creative Ideas to New Emerging Ventures.
Entrepreneurial Processes Among Finnish Design Entrepreneurs. Helsinki 2008.
190. ANNIKA RAVALD: Hur uppkommer vrde fr kunden? Helsingfors 2008.
191. TOM LAHTI: Angel Investing in Finland: An Analysis Based on Agency Theory and
the Incomplete Contracting Theory. Helsinki 2008.
192. SYED MUJAHID HUSSAIN: Intraday Dynamics of International Equity Markets.
Helsinki 2009.
193. TEEMU TALLBERG: The Gendered Social Organisation of Defence. Two Ethno-
graphic Case Studies in the Finnish Defence Forces. Helsinki 2009.
194. JONAS HOLMQVIST: Language Influence in Services. Perceived Importance of
Native Language Use in Service Encounters. Helsinki 2009.
195. ENSIO ER-ESKO: Beskattningsrtt och skattskyldighet fr kyrkan i Finland.
Steuerrecht und Versteuerung der Kirche in Finnland. Mit einer deutschen
Zusammenfassung. Helsingfors 2009.
196. PIA BJRKWALL: Nyttighetsmodeller: ett ndamlsenligt innovationsskydd?
Helsingfors 2009.
197. ARTO THURLIN: Essays on Market Microstructure: Price Discovery and Informed
Trading. Helsinki 2009.
198. PETER NYBERG: Essays on Risk and Return. Helsinki 2009.
199. YANQING JIANG: Growth and Convergence: The Case of China. Helsinki 2009.
200. HANNA WESTMAN: Corporate Governance in European Banks. Essays on Bank
Ownership. Helsinki 2009.
201. CATHARINA von KOSKULL: Use of Customer Information. An Ethnography in
Service Development. Helsinki 2009.
202. RITVA HYKINPURO: Service Firms Action upon Negative Incidents in High
Touch Services: A Narrative Study. Helsinki 2009.
203. SUVI NENONEN: Customer Asset Management in Action. Using Customer
Portfolios for Allocating Resources Across Business-to-Business Relationships for
Improved Shareholder Value. Helsinki 2009.
204. CAMILLA STEINBY: Multidimensionality of Actors in Business Networks. The
Influence of Social Action in Pharmacy Networks in Finland. Helsinki 2009.
205. JENNIE SUMELIUS: Developing and Integrating HRM Practices in MNC
Subsidiaries in China. Helsinki 2009.
206. SHERAZ AHMED: Essays on Corporate Governance and the Quality of Disclosed
Earnings Across Transitional Europe. Helsinki 2009.
207. ANNE HOLMA: Adaptation in Triadic Business Relationship Settings. A Study in
Corporate Travel Management. Helsinki 2009.
208. MICHAL KEMPA: Monetary Policy Implementation in the Interbank Market.
Helsinki 2009.
209. SUSANNA SLOTTE-KOCK: Multiple Perspectives on Networks. Conceptual
Development, Application and Integration in an Entrepreneurial Context. Helsinki
2009.
210. ANNA TALASMKI: The Evolving Roles of the Human Resource Function.
Understanding Role Changes in the Context of Large-Scale Mergers. Helsinki 2009.
211. MIKAEL M. VAINIONP: Tiering Effects in Third Party Logistics: A First-Tier
Buyer Perspective. Helsinki 2010.