Somali State Failure
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147
5.4. Burre`s Personul Rule und the Re-birth of the Tribalism
In the last chapter, we saw that the SRC officially banned and symbolically
buried tribalism in Somalia. Here the intention, mainly, was to undercut lineage
loyalty and thus to weaken the main source of legitimacy for potential
oonenLs. uIso noLed LhuL by 1q; Burre`s confidence, at least in the near
future, was apparent. However, little success was gained on this front. By the
mid-1970s, the resilience on tribalism in Somali politics was observable. There
are two main speculations about the phenomenon. One suggestion is that Barre,
though he had formally denounced tribalism, was carefully using clan balance as
a mechanism for control. Lewis (2002) argues that clan representation was a
busIc rIncIIe In Burre`s oIILIcuI gume even In Lhe begInnIng. uILIn und
Samatar (198;) urgue LhuL |I|rom Lhe eurIy erIod oI Lhe revoIuLIon, SIyud
[Barre] exhibited what some would call paranoia ... of the Majerten clan. The
Majertens were the clan that held the key to power throughout most of the
civilian era ... [Barre] made allusions to his enemies among the Majertens in
many of his early remarks. To confront his enemies directly, [Barre] found
himself identifying them on the bases of their clan membership. In doing so,
[Barre](perhaps inadvertently) re-legitimated the language of tribe in Somali
oIILIcs. Here Lhe urgumenL Is oILen eIevuLed us IoIIows: Burre us Marehan
clansman believed that those clans that played a dominant role in Somali
politics during the civilian regime, Majerten, Habar-Gedir, Abgal
62
and Isak,
may not admit to his leadership. According to Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed, former
president of the Transitional Federal Government, and long-time rival of Barre,
Mohamed Siyad Barre, in planning the October coup of 1969, approached him
and proposed his participation in the forthcoming coup but Abdullahi declined
Lhe oIIer. Burre, commenLIng on YussuI`s decIsIon suId you, Majerten clansmen,
are not willing to accept any one else to assume the top office in the country. If
conIIrmed, Lhe sLory IIIusLruLes Burre`s susIcIons uguInsL certain clans in the
country, which is not something unusual in Somali politics. The result was, the
argument concludes, that Barre overreacted by selectively punishing certain
clans and rewarding others.
The other speculation is that, elements in the leadership of these clans were
playing the clan card. By bringing up the prominent role played by leaders from
these clans in the pre-coup governments, these leaders were trying to de-
IegILImIse Burre`s ruIe uL IeusL In Lhe eyes oI LheIr cIunsmen. AILhough the former
argument is not totally excludable, the later has more credence for the following
reasons: firstly, in Chapter 4, we saw that whenever a politician gains
prominence in a national position his political opponents exploit his clan
identity in order to mitigate his appeal. Unfortunately, as I noted, Somalis
responded to such exploitations sympathetically. Castagno (1964) noted, I re-
quoLe, whuLever nuLIonuI conIIdence he muy huve guIned muy be LrunsIormed
into widespread mistrust based on ethnic provIncIuIIsm. And Burre`s cuse Is noL
an exception;
62
Some put Hawiye in general, rather than Habar-Gedir and Abgal alone, on the stage. Both are clans of the
Hawiye clan-family. These observers believe that the execution of Gaveire, Ainanshe and Del in 1971 was
due to Barre seeing the aborted coup as a rebellion from three opposition clans (Laitin and Samatar, 1987).
148
secondly, we have seen how the last government of the civilian era, from 1967-9,
weakened the post colonial state and undermined state institutions in Somalia.
However, when that government was elected, Ahmed Ismail Dirie (Qasim), a
well known poet, said:
Nabad iyo Naq roob baa beddelay Nayla-Jaliyiiye
Nacabkii Ilaah naga kaxee naaqiska ahaaye
Nasiib baannu leenahay haddaan Aadan soo noqonne
.
Noolaatay yidi-diiladii Naxashka saarrayde
Mar haddii ninkii geyey kursiga nabadgelyuu fuulay
Nimcadiyo sow mahad-naq uun lagu negaan mayo
Here, Qasim is celebrating the defeat of President Aden in the elections of
March 1968. And by characterising the President as malevolent and feeble, he
expresses how he was pleased with the election results. The election, as we have
seen, brought President Shermake and Premier Egal into power. The main
jusLIIIcuLIon oI QusIm`s suLIsIucLIon wus LhuL u IeIIow cIunsmun, Lhe new
Premier, assumed a higher office. In a similar vein, in 1974, in denouncing
Burre`s ruIe QusIm suId:
Seeddiyo boqnaha hay jareen sab iyo laangaabe
Sanqadhyari ha ii dilo Tumaal siiqya looshadaye
Sanka hayga mudo inangumeed loo sarrayn jiraye
Sawaab iyo Midgaan Guulwadii ha i sudhnaadeene
.
Anagiyo Saleebaanadii waa na sidataaye
Seeftii Abgaal bay agtaal saawirta ahayde
Habar Gidir sinsaarada ku timi sigay Ugaaskiiye
Sixilluu kacaankani u galay Saca raggiisiiye
.
Soomaalidii waxa ka nool saaka madaxgaabe
Wax Siyaasaddii loo egmadey silic ku nooshiiye
Here his main argument against the regime was that its leadership is not from
politically significant clans. In the first paragraph he stresses the leading role
played by men from socially minor clans. The Sab, Laangaab, Tumaal,
149
Inangumeed, Midgaan, all indicate inferiority in the Somali traditional social
structure. He then comes to what he regards as a humiliating role, under the
military regime, for the clans that were politically dominant previously. Qasim
then concluded that the inferior races alone were prospering in Somalia during
the military regime. For him, Somali politics is entrusted to the deeply
distressed clans.
Finally, as I mentioned earlier it was political suicide for the SRC leaders to
bring the clan system back into Somali politics.
The two speculations disagree on which of the two parts, Barre or his
opponents, initiated the using of tribalism for political ends, but agree that it
was the political leadership, rather than the clans as organisations with
objectives, that saw the clan factor in politics would serve their interests. The
Party was the starting point of re-tribalising the state. As I noted earlier during
the Party formation congress, the delegates were selectively chosen on clan and
loyalty basis. According to Weyrah (2009) those posted to the regions and
national organisations as Party representatives were selected disproportionately
Irom Lhe PresIdenL`s cIun.
5.5. The Ogaden War and the Somali State Failure
Events which took place between 1974 and 1977 reshaped the Horn of Africa
and its international relations. Firstly, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, a
prominent ally of the US, was ousted by a military junta, known as the Dergue.
Secondly, the leaders of the Dergue established a relationship, and they finally
signed a friendship treaty
63
, with Moscow. Secondly, SRC considered the Soviet
relation with Ethiopia as violation of the 1974 treaty. Thirdly, Moscow was
unhuy wILh SomuIIu`s socIuIIsL orIenLuLIon und ILs growIng reIuLIons wILh
reucLIonury Arub sLuLes. InuIIy, Lhe Dergue`s exulsion of Americans and
relations with Moscow created geopolitical unbalance, giving Washington and
its allies an inferior position. The US, on its part, mobilised its Arab and other
non-Arab Muslim allies, such as Iran, to bring the Somalis into their camp.
In April 1977, the US was expelled from Addis Ababa and the USSR completely
replaced the US in Ethiopia. On 6 April, US Vice President Walter Mandale was
usked by hIs boss, PresIdenL JImmy CurLer, wunL you Lo LeII Cy
64
[Vance] and
Zbig
65
that I want them to move in every possible way to get Somalia to be our
IrIend. .`ve LoId Cy LhuL beIore (TIme, ArII 18, 1q;;). On Lhe sume duy, Burre
was assured that he would get a considerable amount of aid, $300-350 million,
including arms from the West (Patman, 1990).
On 11 June, CurLer, In hIs IoreIgn oIIcy sLuLemenL, suId |m|y own IncIInuLIon,
though, is to aggressively challenge, in a peaceful way of course, the Soviet
63
Is similar to the Somali-Soviet treaty.
64
Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State.
65
ZbIgnIew BrzezInskI, CurLer`s NuLIonuI SecurILy AdvIser.
150
Union and others for influence in areas of the world that we feel are crucial to us
now or oLenLIuIIy crucIuI IIILeen Lo LwenLy yeurs Irom now on, und menLIoned
SomuIIu umong oLher counLrIes. He uIso wenL on by suyIng LhuL he wus quILe
concerned ubouL Lhe Horn oI AIrIcu`s robIem. He uIso sLressed hIs
udmInIsLruLIon`s udherence Lo umIcubIe relations with Mogadishu. Fred
HuIIIduy, commenLIng on LhuL seech, suId CurLer`s oIIcy Lowurd Lhe SovIeL
UnIon Is In some resecL u more uggressIve one . und Lhe cumuIgn Lo wIn over
SomuIIu IoIIows IogIcuIIy Irom LhIs (HuIIIduy, 1q;;). A Iew duys IuLer, Dr Kevin
Cahill, long time friend and personal physician of Barre, arrived in Mogadishu.
Dr. CuhIII, JIm PuuI (1q;;) noLed, Is un exerIenced roIessIonuI In Lhe worId oI
politics and diplomacy and has devoted his entire career to using medicine as an
oenIng wedge Ior hIgh oIILIcuI ucLIon. The Newsweek suId LhuL Lhe DocLor Is
no sLrunger Lo Lhe worId oI secreL dIIomucy (MerI, No.6z, 1q;;). n hIs
meeLIng wILh Burre, Dr CuhIII conveyed Lwo messuges by suyIng LhuL (u) Lhe
USA would not resupply Ethiopia in the event of a Somalia invasion of Ogaden;
(b) the USA would not look askance at a Somali request for arms, and was not
LoLuIIy oosed Lo such u venLure In Oguden (HuIIIduy, 1q;;).
Barre ordered his ambassador in Washington, Mr. Abdullahi A. Addou, to
submit a formal arms request to the US administration (Patman, 1990). On 1
JuIy, Mr. Vunce, seukIng ubouL Lhe LensIon In Lhe Horn, sLressed LhuL uII sIdes
should be aware that when outside powers pour substantial quantities of arms
and military personal in to Africa, it greatly enhances the danger that disputes
wIII be resoIved mIIILurIIy . ThIs dunger Is urLIcuIurIy greuL In Lhe Horn, where
Lhere hus been un escuIuLIon oI urms LrunsIer Irom Lhe ouLsIde. We wIII
consider sympathetically appeals for assistance from states which are
threatened by a buildup of foreign military equipment and advisors on their
borders, In Lhe Horn und eIsewhere In AIrIcu (DSB, AugusL 8, 1q;;).
Probably, the central mission of all this assurance and manipulations was
SomuIIu`s LoLuI breuk wILh Moscow, und SomuIIu IInuIIy ubroguLed LheIr LreuLy
wILh Lhe SovIeLs, und consequenLIy Moscow vowed Lo Leuch Lhe SomuIIs u
Iesson Lhey wIII never IorgeL und usserLed LhuL Lhey wIII brIng Lhem Lo LheIr
knees (Newsweek, eb. 1, 1978). However, before Mogadishu expelled the
Soviets and their allies, the SNA launched a massive military campaign against
ELhIoIu. SureIy wILhouL US encourugemenL oI SIud |Burre| In Muy-Jun 1977 it
is inconceivable that the Somalis would have invaded Oguden (HuIIIduy, 1q;;).
On 27 July 1977, the SRC rolled tanks and troops, supported by aircraft, into the
Ogaden against Ethiopia and captured most of the disputed territory within
several weeks. The battle was over by March 1978, with a total defeat of the
Somalia National Army (SNA) and some local liberation groups, by Ethiopians
backed up by the Soviets and Cubans. Both the human and physical cost of the
war was awesome and tragic, however, the most devastating consequence of the
war, was that it abruptly terminated the social contract between the state and
society. Somali public, unaware
66
, about the final mission of the war, realised its
66
This lack of information was also common among senior military officers. Some rumours
revealed that the final objective was to destroy the mighty power of the SNA.
151
devastating outcome. Another effect was that the defeated and humiliated Barre
did not anymore monopolise violence. Longtime dormant contenders got an
opportunity to compete. Barre, on his part, decided to survive at any cost.
As the war began, 11,000 Cuban troops supported by 1,500 Soviet advisors -
which were manly transferred directly from Somali and took all the necessary
information about the war with them. These troops were using, beside
Ethiopian military hardware, an estimated 1.5 billion of military equipment
supplied by Moscow, which involved a huge sealift and 225 planes, about 12
percent of the entire Soviet transport fleet. Senior Soviet and Cuban officials,
including First Deputy Commander-in-chief and Cuban Foreign Minister and
IdeI CusLro`s broLher RuouI CusLro urrIved In ELhIoIu Lo suervIse und
coordinate the war.
Indeed, Moscow was true to its word and Lhe scuIe oI oeruLIon served noLIce
LhuL Lhe SovIeL UnIon wouId noL uIIow SomuIIu`s deIecLIon Lo go ununIshed
(Mayall, 1978). About 25000 Somalis lost their life in the war, and more than
three-quaters of Somali aircraft were either destroyed or put out of commission.
The direct economic consequences were also enormous. About one million
refugees finally crossed the border of Somalia.
The frustrated Somali people, due to their tribal differences and thus suffering
from a collective action problem, were not able to voice against Barre and his
ruling party. A large part of the citizens, realised that the state was not doing a
good job and not working for their wellbeing, and ceased trusting the state and
thus chose to exit. This was the end of the Somali social contract and this is
what we mean by Somali state failure. However, Somalis did not try to search
for a new form of social contract to heal the injury. Instead the process of state
collapse took its shape. Only a month after the Ogaden War an abortive coup
wus mounLed uguInsL Burre, on q ArII. ThIs wus Lhe begInnIng oI Burre`s
predation and the Somali Civil War.
5.6. Conclusion: State as the Instrument of the Ruling Elite
In this chapter, we saw that the military regime, although it assumed power
through extralegal means, a military coup, served to some extent in the
developmental interest of the citizens and consequently characterised the
regIme us un ugenL oI ILs cILIzens. The muIn IncenLIve oI Lhe regIme`s
involvement in the socioeconomic development of society was simply because
the Soviet Union saw its interest as to reform Somali society. In other words,
there was a coincidence of interest between the two principals.
However, Lhe SovIeL UnIon, unhuy wILh Lhe regIme`s erIormunce on Lhe
reform process, took measures that diverged its interests with that of the
Somalis. It decided to dramatically increase its presence in Somalia and to do so
it shifted its focus from social reform to the Greater Somalia issue and therefore
encouraged the war between Somalia and Ethiopia. Moscow also put great
pressure on the regime to establish a vanguard socialist party. That made Barre
152
worry for his future and he started to act before it was too late. In the mid-
1970s the geopolitical setup of the region changed as well. A military junta took
the power in Ethiopia and the Soviets decided to align its interest with Ethiopia
sacrificing its role in Somalia. Understandably, this time, they not only
abandoned the Greater Somalia issue but opposed any aggression against
Ethiopia. This further aggravated its relation with the military leadership in
SomuIIu. The UnILed SLuLes Look Lhe oorLunILy und sLurLed wooIng Burre`s
regime from the Soviet camp. To do so Washington encouraged the war between
Somalia and Ethiopia. The Somali leaders believed that Washington was
offering a more rewarding alternative, and expelled the Soviets from Somalia
and abrogated the relationship treaty with the Soviet Union. This marked the
loss of the main principal for Barre, the Soviet Union. The regIme`s
abandonment of the socio-economic development and defeat in the Ogaden War
marked the end of the social contract between the regime and society. Somalis
as citizens realised that the government failed to achieve either of the two main
goals: socio-economic development and unification. The Somali state failed.
After the departure of the Soviets from Somalia and the Ogaden defeat of the
Somalis, the regime was in trouble. Many wondered how Barre survived. Lewis
(1q8z) suys LhuL L`s quILe umuzIng LhuL SIud wusn`L unseuLed uL LhuL oInL. He
had been very concerned about destabilization inside Somalia at the time of the
SovIeL wILhdruwuI . Once Lhe whoIe Oguden venLure coIIused und IL becume
uurenL LhuL Lhe AmerIcun suer ower wusn`L goIng Lo replace the Russians
uuLomuLIcuIIy, Lhen Lhe sILuuLIon becume even gruver. UsIng Lhe LheoreLIcuI
logic of chapter two, the Somali state was without a principal and thus had no
social contract at all.
Barre, on the other hand, decided to survive at any cost and formed a
patrimonial network for control. He employed the well-known divide-and-rule
policy based on clan manipulation. By doing so Barre abandoned his interest
with Somalis as citizens and relied on particular client groups and in short, the
military regime became an instrument of a ruling elite. To maintain his power
and carry out his policies Barre sought to bring Washington on to his side.
Economic predation and social antagonism was the order of the day. This is the
subject of the next chapter.
153
6 SOMALI STATE COLLAPSE
6.1. Introduction
In the first phase of his rule Barre, as the leader of the SRC, successfully brought
Moscow to his side. Through the vision of building a socialist Somalia, Barre
secured Moscow`s suorL Lo muInLuIn hIs ruIe und Ior Lhe economic
development of the country. In addition, he mobilised society to rally behind
hIm Lhrough Lhe vIsIon oI resLorIng eoIe`s dIgnILy, guIdIng Lhem Lo LheIr Lrue
Somali characteristics and creating a nationalism of oneness. Furthermore, the
regime sought to improve the welfare of society. Consequently, the regime
secured the support and the backing of major influential urban groups: solders,
students, religious leaders, poets etc. Moreover, the regime not only used the
support of these groups to maintain his rule, but also as a useful resource for
socioeconomic development.
As we have seen in the last chapter, the regime, by concentrating on external
relations, devoted little effort to the socio-economic development aspect of the
country during the second half of the 1970s. I also mentioned that by the mid-
1970s, resilience of the clan factor in Somali politics was observable.
This chapter addresses the process of disintegration of the post-colonial state of
Somalia. The chapter firstly addresses the political difficulties that the regime
faced after the Ogaden War and the political aspects of the dissolution of the
formal political system. But the chapter mainly deals with economic strategies
that the regime formulated to maintain its power. It will show how the heartless
actions of power-seekIng oosILIon Ieuders, Lhe regIme`s mercIIess reucLIons
und WushIngLon`s cuIIous oIIcIes shuLLered Lhe enLIre counLry und wrecked ILs
state institutions.
6.2. The State Collapse
As menLIoned eurIIer, SomuIIu`s wur with Ethiopia and the ultimate defeat of
the SNA resulted in a number of devastating consequences at the national level.
n uddILIon, u number oI unIuvourubIe ImucLs, us Iur us Burre`s survIvuI Is
concerned, were the products of the Ogaden War. Firstly, as Laitin (1979)
argued, Barre as the President of the republic, the Secretary -General of the
SRSP, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, unlike Sayid Mohamed
67
, hus
not come out of defeat as hero. The greatness of Siyaad [Barre] has been
questioned rather Lhun reuIIIrmed by Ioss. As roIessed by uILIn, Lhe deIeuL
mitigated his internal authority and since then, as people lost confidence in him,
it was increasingly difficult for him to mobilise the Somalis as citizens. The
second was the loss of the superpower patron, as the Soviet Union was useful for
Barre mainly for his own survival. Now the Soviets were sent out and the other
67
Mohamed Abdulla Hassan, a Somali nationalist leader who lost his war with colonial powers
after the British Royal Air Force ruthlessly destroyed his main fort at Taleex in 1920. But
uccordIng Lo uILIn, mIIILury defeat did not spoil the lustre oI LhIs hero`s IeuLs.
154
superpower, the US, was not prepared to completely fill the vacuum created by
Lhe SovIeLs` deurLure und her suorL und objecLives were carefully limited in a
particular form of partnership. Thirdly, the military became weaker both
technically and morally. Finally, and more importantly, after the war a large
part of the citizens realised that the state was not doing a good job and was not
working for their wellbeing, and decided not to trust the state anymore.
Three unfortunate events followed the military defeat of the Somali army. First,
in Hargeissa soon after the withdrawal of the Somali army from Ethiopia, Barre
ordered the execution of a number of military officers. The order was preceded
by a heated discussions and criticism of the war and the way it was conducted.
However, Africa Confidential maintained that the criticism of both how the
regime carried out the war together with its diplomatic performance during the
war centered on Barre with an over reliance on particular clan groups: The
Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante (AC, Dec. 15, 1978). According to some
observers the executed individuals were among the most critical elements in the
group (Ahmed Samatar, 1988).
Secondly, a month after Somalia withdrew its army from Ethiopia, an abortive
coup was launched against Barre on 9 April 1978. The fact was that after the
war, in the military circles, a regime change was not a strange idea. According to
General Ali Ismail
68
, three out of the four main brigades of the army were
stationed in the North West of the country, and among the military leaders in
the three Brigades in the North-WesL, Lhe IuLure oI Burre`s governmenL wus,
secretly of course, debated and most of them welcomed the idea of a regime
change. One aspect of the coup was that it was mainly led by officers from
Majerten, one of the clans that Barre was suspicious of. Moreover, the coup was
masterminded by Colonel Abdulahi Yusssuf Ahmed. Colonel Yussuf was, like
General Mohamed F. Aidid, a long time opponent of Barre. In the period
between late 1968 and October 1969, before the military coup that brought
Barre to power, there were rumours that military groups were planning a coup
against the civilian government. Aidid and Yussuf were among the leading
figures and were believed by many to be the brains behind the predicted
potential coup. According to many, Aidid and Yussuf with others were partners
in planning the coup (Kimiko, 2008; Mohamed, 2008). In 1993 at an informal
meeting held in Bosasso, a North Eastern city, Yussuf stated that in 1968 he and
other officers approached General Mohamed Abshir, former chief of the Somali
Police, and asked him to lead the coup that they intended to carry out and
urgued LhuL AbshIr`s reIusuI uved u wuy Ior Burre`s successIuI cou. GeneruI
AbshIr, who wus uIso resenL uL Lhe meeLIng, conIIrmed YussuI`s urgumenL, buL
maintained that he declined to lead the coup simply because he believed that
every mIIILury cou In SomuIIu wouId end u In Lhe sume wuy LhuL Burre`s
regime ended (Weyrah, 2009).
As to the April coup, army units loyal to Barre crushed the revolt and Barre
IormuIIy cIuImed LhuL Lhe cou Ieuders were urmy dIssIdenLs LhuL uImed to
hund over Lhe counLry Lo coIonIuIIsm und bIow Lhe nuLIon`s sLubIIILy sky-hIgh
68
Commander of the third brigade based in Burao in the Northwest.
155
(ARB, Apr. 1-30, 1978). However, Barre put Majerten as a clan at the center of
the blame and, therefore, held them accountable for what he believed to be the
cIun`s ucLIons. Most informed non-Majerten military officers maintained that
Majerten as a clan had nothing to do with the coup. According to an army
officer, non-Majerten himself, who was in DolowBay with Abdullahi Yussuf,
argued that Majerten officers who were in Dolow with him become aware of the
coup event after Yussuf crossed the border to the Kenyan side. He maintained
that on the day of the coup Abdulaahi Yussuf took Majerten figures, with other
officers in Dolow to the Kenyan border for what Yussuf described as military
inspection in the border area and there Yussuf informed them about the aborted
coup. He told them his intention of defection and that those who wanted to join
him were welcome to do so. He also warned that those who decided to remain in
the country were subjecL Lo Burre`s unIshmenL. CoIoneI YussuI moved Lo
Ethiopia and formed the first armed opposition group against the military
regime in Mogadishu.
With a very narrow social base now and eager to survive, Barre established a
strong network of clientlism. Being an expert of the Somali social structure, he
employed well designed divide-and-rule strategies. He used clan loyalties and
created economic incentives for capable allies, mainly his immediate clan and
all other clans whose political opportunists understood the rules of the game or
in other words could read the signs of the times correctly, and were ready to
jum on Burre`s bundwugon. MosL oI Lhe Marehan elite naturally fell into this
category. Leaders from the Ogaden and Dolbahante, all from the Darod clan-
IumIIy, und some oLher unLhreuLenIng neuLruI grous muInIy mude u Lhe resL.
These leaders reaped the fruits of economic predation. Most senior positions,
both civil and military, were given to those who could bring their clan on board.
National agencies became clan agencies.
Barre also employed coercive force as a means of governance. After the Ogaden
War, Barre restructured the SNA. Since the early 1980s, maintaining internal
security was its main preoccupation. Most of the influential command positions
were put under the control of reliable officers. Clans played a decisive role here.
The military leadership was mainly drawn from loyal clans. For instance, in
1986, 34 out of 47 army brigades were commanded by officers from three clans
- Marehan, Ogaden and Dolbahante (AC Oct, 1986).
Other clans, particularly Majerten, Isaq and Habargidir, were, as we have seen,
considered threatening clans. Barre in general prevented members of these
clans from becoming powerful politically, but dividing them provided some
leaders from these clans lucrative offices. Enemy clans, as Barre considered,
where significant numbers of the members were manipulated by faction leaders,
were collectively punished militarily and economically. Majerten was the first
clan to fall into this category after the April coup and the subsequent formation
of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Isaq, after the Somali
National Movement (SNM) was established in 1981, became the second. A
significant number of Habargidir, though they did not establish a separate
movement, also joined the SSDF and SNM. I will later on consider how Barre
used the clan patronage system for his survival.
156
In addition, the regime distributed arms to some of the clans at the border with
Ethiopia to fight against Ethiopia-based antigovernment armed guerrilla groups
(Mohamed, 2008). By 1983 tribal wars aroused the border areas from the
North-Western to the Central regions (AC, July, 1983).
After the defeat of the Ogaden War, in addition to the unpleasant situation of
the army, there was pervasive though poorly articulated and unorganised
demand for regime change among ordinary citizens. To address, in his own way
of course, some of the social discontent, but also to please the Western leaders
including the U.S. administration, Barre established a constitution, formed a
national assembly in 1979 and held elections. The constitution appeared to
guarantee some civil rights for citizens but in reality most of these rights were
overwritten by contradictory articles. Furthermore, the constitution not only
approved the extraordinary political power that Barre was already enjoying but
also gave an opportunity to further undermine the SRSP and SRC. In the
constitution an article regarding the extraordinary powers of the President, for
instance, stated that the President, after consulting with the National Defence
Council, had the right to impose emergency rule and to take proper measures
Ior Lhe counLry us whoIe or urL oI IL. The NDC ILseII wus u creuLure oI Lhe
PresIdenL und domInuLed Lhem (Ahmed SumuLur, 1q88). urLhermore, Lhe
members of the parliament were nominated by the SRSP. Barre, taking these
advantages, not only suspended the activities of the Parliament and the SRSP
when needed, but also sometimes ordered the confiscation and takeover of
properties of civilian people in some regions by the military (NYT, Aug. 16,
1982).
AILer Lhe wur, Burre uIso InILIuLed u cumuIgn Lo cIeunse Lhe SRSP`s CenLruI
Committee and the SRC of unfriendly elements. By 1982 influential figures of
the socialist ideology were either behind bars or went into exile. Key SRC
elements such as Ismail Ali Abokor were put under detention.
n Lhe IIrsL huII oI Lhe 1q8os mosL oI Lhe regIme`s energIes und eIIorLs were
exhausted by military suppression of the armed opposition, punishing target
clans and providing opportunities for the client elements. However, an
unIorLunuLe evenL In 1q86 hIL Burre`s uLrImonIuI sysLem rIghL uL Lhe heurL. The
President was seriously injured in a car accident on 23 May 1986 outside of
Mogadishu. Well over seventy, Barre was ill - he had i.e. liver and heart
diseases, throat cancer, depression - even before the car crash (Show, 1985). In
the accident he received, among other injuries, three broken ribs, sustained a
rigorous blow to the head as well as heavy abdominal bruising and a severe
nervous shock.
Barre, before the accident, relied on his personal quality, as a hard worker and
master manipulator, to maintain his leadership. The accident weakened his
health and he lost most of these qualities. In contrast to his usual midnight
work, he was able to stay in office for only a few hours each day, and was able to
give only short impaired speeches. In all circles it was quite apparent that he
was not able to maintain his extensive informal networks.
157
The day after the accident Barre was taken off to a military hospital in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia. The questions, of who would succeed him and on what condition,
would it be a smooth or violent transition, dominated peoIe`s mInds ruLher
than his safe return.
The uccIdenL budIy IrugmenLed Burre`s InLernuI couIILIon Ior survIvuI. Soon uILer
the accident the situation became tense and an internal power struggle for
succession broke out in the presidential palace. A fierce competition between
two main groups became apparent and dominated the struggle. After the
PresIdenL wus IIown Lo RIyudh, CoIoneI MusIuh M. SIyud, Burre`s eIdesL son
moved to the palace, Villa Somalia, and took all necessary means to keep his
IuLher`s oIIIce under hIs commund. MusIeh`s grou IncIuded hIs owerIuI
mother, mama Khadiija
69
, and his uncle Abdirahman J. Barre, the foreign
minister. Mohamed Ali Samatar, the second man to Barre in the formal
hierarchy - first vice President, second man in the Politburo and the minister of
defence - declared a first degree alert for the armed forces and he himself went
Lo occuy Lhe PresIdenL`s oIIIce
70
. The move discouraged the Maslah group from
taking the capital in what resembled a military coup. Soon Samatar called a
meeting of the senior army officers and managed to attain almost unanimous
endorsement for his constitutional rights: as the First Vice-President, the
constitution gave him the right to be the interim president. Therefore this group
is often labelled the Constitutionalist.
n resonse Lo Lhe ConsLILuLIonuIIsL`s ucLIons, cIose reIuLIves oI Burre, joIned by
some senior Marehan figures, went to Riyadh in the first week of June and held
u meeLIng. TheIr muIn concern wus whuL wouId huen II Burre dIed (AC,
June 1986). The later is labelled as the Dynastyst.
After six weeks of hospitalisation in Riyadh, the President returned to
Mogadishu in early July and a month later he formally resumed his power from
Samatar. In his returning and resuming power each of the two groups hoped
that their position would be supported by the President. However, Barre chose
to side with his family against his friends. Many believe that the weakened Barre
had no choice and fell under the complete manipulation of his first wife, first
son and brother. After his arrival, the increasing alienation of the Constitutional
group and an extensive scramble for influence by the Dynastyst group was
apparent.
Consequently, non Marehan military officers including SRC members, shocked
by Lhe PresIdenL`s reIIunce on hIs IumIIy, reuIIsed LhuL Lhey were noL unymore
what they were supposed to be and that family bonds outweighed political
uIIIunce. ThIs however broke down Burre`s uLronuge sysLem und hIs survIvuI
appeared to rely on Marehan. A new survival strategy had to be found. On
69
She was believed to be the brains behind the group and that she owned an effective political
network including an intelligence unit. However, her political role emerged after Barre was
weakened by the car accident.
70
According to senior civilian figure Samatar initially hesitated in challenging the Maslah group
and it was non-Marehan Barre supporters that encouraged him to move to Villa Somalia
(Warsame, 2008).
158
January 1987, when 22 military colonels were promoted to the rank of general,
including nine Marehan. Most of these were appointedto sensitive command
positions. For instance, at the time the Somali state collapsed the Minister of
DeIence consIsLed oI GeneruI Morgun, Burre`s son-in-law, the Army Chief-of
Staff was Maslah, and four out of the six main military components - sectors 26
(Hargeissa), 60 (Baydabo), 77 (Magadishu) and 43 (Kismayo) - were
commanded by Marehan officers. Furthermore, Marehan officers held the
critical first artillery brigade, the second tank brigade and Unit 99, the military
police unit, in Mogadishu. These were outside the normal structure of the
military establishment and they were under direct control of the presidential
palace.
However, later on, many non-family Marehan figures decided not to support the
Maslahisation process. A significant number of the latter group preferred
General Omar Hagi over Maslah. This further narrowed the power base of the
regime. Furthermore, neither Maslah nor Abdirahman, like the ailing President,
was an effective manipulator. Africa Confidential was soon to point out the
oLenLIuI dIIemmu us LIrIng eusIIy he|Burre| hus been Iorced Lo gIve u mosL oI
his day-to-day involvement in the Party and the political affairs ... one sign that
he is failing has been his apparently increasing reliance upon his brother,
Foreign Minister Abdirahman Jama Barre, and his son Brigadier-General
Maslah. This is something new, as are the presidential efforts to push Maslah
InLo greuLer romInence und concIuded LhuL SomuIIu Is now reuIng Lhe
harvest of the policy of divide-and-rule which President Siad Barre has wielded
so effectively for a decade or more. But it is a policy that depends upon the skills
of the individual at the top. Without Barre, or a figure of comparable talents, it
Is u oIIcy whIch muy be very hurd Lo curry ouL (AC, JuIy 1q8;).
Although the President relied on his relatives, they were even unable to keep the
family together. Far worse, Maslah and Abdirahman were not in complete
agreement on what position each would hold after Barre vacated his office. It
was believed that Abdirahman was very active in building his own power base.
Some of the promoted generals who had been given influential positions became
unconLroIIubIe. So by eurIy 1q88 Lhe counLry`s IeudershI wus In LoLuI dIsurruy.
Junior military generals led by Maslah dominated the military wing of the
leadership and relied purely on coercion rather than political manipulations.
Later on, despite their weak base, the group itself was fragmented by internal
conflict and struggle (AC, Nov 1989). For instance, General Aden Nur Gabyow,
the minister of defence, one of the closest allies of Maslah was initially demoted
and finally jailed in July 1989. By all means the power base of the regime
IncreusIngIy conLrucLed. The ower sLruggIe reuched u oInL where Burre`s Lwo
wives and their respective family members clashed. However, the Mama
Khadiija group prevailed where Maslah and General Mohamed Said Morgan,
her son In Iuw, emerged us Lhe governmenL`s sLrongmun (SImons, 1qq).
As we will see later on, the US changed its approach towards the Mogadishu
regime during the second half of the 1980s. But the car accident encouraged
Washington to rethink its position in Somalia. According to the Africa
Confidential (JuIy, 1q8;), one eIIecL oI Lhe Muy uuLomobIIe crush wus decIInIng
159
UnILed SLuLes InLeresL In Lhe Burre governmenL. WushIngLon beIIeved LhuL u
firm alignment with Barre would merely prejudice its relations with his
successors. Thus it started to distance itself from the Mogadishu regime. In
oLher words, Lhe US udmInIsLruLIon wus convInced LhuL Burre`s ruIe wouId noL
last long and decided to abandon its role of keeping Barre in power and
therefore, started to reduce all of its commitments to Mogadishu. As Table 7.1
illustrates, US military aid was only a small fraction of the $47million originally
requested in 1987 (AC, July 1987). Perhaps, the internal fierce struggle among
Lhe ruIIng grou In Lhe IuLe 1q8os Increused WushIngLon`s unhuIness wILh Lhe
regime further. And both military and economic aid decreased substantially
uILer 1q8;. So Burre`s InubIIILy, cuused by Lhe cur crush, weukened hIs sources oI
leadership survival. As a result of the accident the informal alliance system
erIshed. AmerIcu`s InLeresL In Lhe SomuII regIme vunIshed. However,
WushIngLon`s new osILIon hud Lo do muInIy wILh Lhe new huse oI Lhe CoId
World in the second half of the 1980s. Washington would have been forced to
search out or even create an alternative to the ailing administration of Barre had
Moscow maintained the role it once had in world affairs.
6.3. The Armed Opposition Movements
The regIme`s negIIgence oI Lhe socIo-economic development during the second
huII oI Lhe 1q;os creuLed dIssuLIsIucLIon umong socIeLy und Lhe regIme`s IuIIed
Ogaden venture convinced the Somali people that the state was not working for
their interest and, therefore, there was no reason to support it anymore. The
existing social cleavages, however, prevented them from forming a united front
uguInsL Burre`s unvIubIe regIme. PoIILIcuI oorLunIsLs, esecIuIIy Iong-time
dormant contenders, materialised this social frustration and started to take all
necessury sLes Lo ousL Burre`s regIme. The 1q;8 cou wus Lhe IIrsL oI such
attempts. However, the heartless response off the military regime - 17 officers
of the ring leaders of the coup were executed after the plot was suppressed -
reminded opponents of how dangerous such a project might be. It was realised
that armed struggle through an opposition faction to weaken the regime would
be more appropriate at this stage.
After the coup failed Yussuf fled to Kenya and joined the Somali Democratic
Action Front (SODAF). In February 1979 the SODAF was transformed into the
Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF). Within months Yussuf assumed the
chairmanship of the organisation. The SOSAF started an armed struggle against
government forces in the border areas, guerrilla operations in the central
regions and it carried out bombings in the capital. These marked the beginning
of the civil war in Somalia. In October 1981 the SOSAF amalgamated with two
small organisations based in Aden, Yemen and formed the Somali Salvation
Democratic Front (SSDF). These two organisations, the Democratic Front for
IberuLIon oI SomuIIu und Lhe SomuII Workers` PurLy, were Iounded muInIy by
members of pro-Soviet socialist ideologues who had defected from the
Mogadishu regime. Again, Col. Yussuf became the chairman of the SSDF.
160
In April that year the Somali National Movement (SNM) was also founded in
London and soon moved its headquarters to Ethiopia. Ahmed Mohamed Guleid
and Ahmed Ismail Abdi (Duksi) were respectively elected chairman and
secretary-general of the SNM. Hassan Aden Waddadi became the spokesman.
The two organisations were the two main opposition movements until 1989
when the United Somali Congress (USC) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
were created. These new organisations, like the former two, participated in the
military struggle against the Mogadishu regime.
A number of weaknesses that were handicapping these organisations were
mentioned here and there. The most serious ones were i.e. multiple and
contradictory ideological orientations within each organisation, lack of a
comprehensive political programme, dictatorial tendencies among the
leadership
71
, lack of popular support, identification with the historical enemy -
Ethiopia, and tribal organisations.
The role of these armed groups in the destruction of the post-colonial state in
Somalia deserves extensive research attention. However, a basic fact is that
these organisations were creatures of power-seeking political elites. Almost all
major opposition groups were formed by civilian political elites that lost their
power during the military takeover in 1969 supported by politicians who
deIecLed Irom Burre`s ruIe uILer Lhey were demoLed. or exumIe, Lhe SSD wus
InILIuIIy Iormed by cIvIIIun Ieuders who IeIL Lhe counLry uILer Burre`s military
coup. The top leaders of the SODAF, latter became the SSDF, such as Osman
Nur Ali (Qonof) former minister and Omar Hassan Mohamud (Isterlin) who
was the mayor of Mogadishu during the civilian era. Both the first chairman,
Guleid, and secretary-general, Duksi, of the SNM were political figures in the
civilian regime. For the USC, its founder, Ismail Jimale Ossoble, and chairman,
Ali M. Ossoble (Wardhigley), were former minsters in the civilian governments.
The SPM was initially established by army officers loyal to the demoted and
jailed minister of defence, Gabyow
72
. However, former civilian figures, such as
Omar Moalin, joined the group.
However, these organisations, with the exception of the SNM
73
, fell into the
hands of military officers, such as Yussuf, Aidid, and Col. Ahmed O. Jess, who
were long-time rivals of Barre. Therefore, another fact was that the main goal of
the leaders of these factions was to depose Barre, with each intending to
personally replace the dictator. For this reason, the opposition leaders pursuing
their principal goal used clan manipulation not only against the regime but
wILhIn LheIr orgunIsuLIons. GeneruI AIdId`s IuII scuIe mobIIIsuLIon oI Habar-
Gedir against Abgal, (both clans belong to the Hawiye clan-family which
supported the USC), after Ali M. Mohamed, an Abgal, proclaimed the interim
Presidency in the early 1990s is known to all those familiar with the Somali Civil
War. Another aspect of the opposition factions is that their leaders relied on
71
ThIs In conLrudIcLIon Lo Lhe muILI-party democracy based on true representation and full
urLIcIuLIon oI Lhe eoIe oI SomuIIu LhuL Lhey cIuImed udvocuLIng. (BongurLz 1qq1)
72
Colonel BushIr AII BIIIIIqo, Guboyo`s son In-law, established the group
73
161
foreign patronage. Several former SSDF that I met during my field survey in
2008 acknowledged the negative impact of the Libyan involvement. That was
made very clear in April 1985 when the Libyan leader withdrew his financial
support, after reaching an agreement with Barre, from Col. Yussuf and
consequenLIy Lhe IuLLer`s osILIon becume uncerLuIn. n Muy Lhe ELhIoIun
Ieuder, MengIsLu, unhuy wILh Lhe coIoneI`s erIormunce noL onIy wILhdruw
his support but sent him, with some leading figures of the SSDF, to an Ethiopian
prison, where he senL IIve yeurs. ThereIore, YussuI`s oIILIcuI survIvuI wus In
the hands of leaders of other countries and the members of the SSDF had little
influence on their leadership. In short the same informal institutions - identity
based leadership, tribalism, and foreign intervention - that decayed the post-
colonial state in Somalia were paralysing these opposition forces as well
74
.
L Is worLh menLIonIng here LhuL Lhe SNM`s erIormunce wus somewhuL
exceptional compared to the other functions. The SNM`s uchIevemenLs oI ILs
main goals were apparent and, unlike other armed opposition factions, most of
its members were pleased with the performance. This does not mean that the
SNM was without problems. In fact, most of the dilemmas - power struggles,
factionalism, clan mobilisation within the organisation, etc. - that weakened
other factions were present in the SNM as well (Lewis, 1994; AC, Nov 1983).
However, Lhe SNM`s reIuLIve success wus muInIy due Lo Lwo InLerreIuLed IucLors.
The first factor was the lack of a master-manipulator leader. Among the
comeLIng eIemenLs In Lhe orgunIsuLIon`s IeudershI no one wus owerIuI
enough, in terms of clan manipulation and implementing divide-and-rule
strategies that Somali leadership usually relies on, to dominate the others
75
.
AccordIng Lo Lhe Iormer ChuIrmun oI Lhe SNM`s CenLruI CommILLee, bruhIm
Megug SumuLer (1qq;), Lhe Iuck oI churIsmuLIc Ieuders ... Is one oI Lhe wuys In
which it [SNM] avoided the build-u oI dIcLuLorIuI LendencIes wILhIn ILseII. The
second factor was its reliance on its own resources rather than foreign patrons.
And therefore its supporters were to a greater extent the sole principal for its
IeudershI. SumuLer wroLe LhuL II one were Lo sIngIe ouL u henomenon In
which the SNM is unique among the liberation movements, past and present, it
is the extent of its self-reliance ... Financial assistance from Ethiopia was next to
nothing and even the ammunition and fuel were a token contribution ... In that
Ethiopia was the only source of external assistance, the movement had to
provide its own resources or perish. There was, of course, no lack of potential
helpers. But the premium put on independence was such that the movement
chose to eschew any and all aid that seriously affected its independence
decision-making ... This choice of self-reliance by the SNM paid its dividends ...
The eoIe huve Lo own LheIr movemenL (SumuLer, 1qq;). However, IL wus
pointed out that helpers were in abundance as Samater claimed. According to
Adam (1995), Colonel QadhuII oI Ibyu, Lhe muIn IInuncIer Ior YussuI`s SSD,
dIsIIked SNM Ieuders und so wouId noL IInunce LheIr movemenL buL Adum
74
After I presented the principal-agency theory of state failure in a public lecture in Garowe,
SomuIIu, u Iormer member oI Lhe SSD`s execuLIve commILLee commenLed by suyIng LhuL ugency
relations between leaders and foreign governments is what they were witnessing while in
opposition.
75
This was the case at least until President Egal came to power in 1993.
162
ugreed wILh SumuLer LhuL Lhe seII reIIunce enhunced uccounLubIIILywILhIn Lhe
organisation. Therefore, the lack of a master manipulator through the clan
system and the absence of a foreign patron led the SNM to pursue its goals in its
own way. The nonexistence of a foreign patron is the factor behind these since
the existence of an able foreign patron to a great extent would have created a
dominant figure among the competing elite in and possibly from outside of the
organisation.
6.4. USA: a Reluctant Principal
After the Ogaden War, with the expulsion of the Soviets from Somalia, the US
became the sole superpower available for Somali leadership to seek support
Irom. However, unIIke Lhe SovIeLs, AmerIcu`s InLeresL In SomuIIu wus ureIy
military, access to Somali facilities, and limited in time perspective. Many
AmerIcun oIIcymukers beIIeved LhuL ELhIoIu meunL much more Lo Lhe UnILed
States than did Somalia and a military relationship with Somalia would finish
uny chunce oI resumIng cIoser LIes wILh ELhIoIu (PeLLerson, 1q8; see uIso
Schraeder, 1994).
To begIn wILh, Lhe UnILed SLuLes` sLruLegIc InLeresL wILh MogudIshu In Lhe 1q8os
couId be summurIsed us IoIIows: IIrsLIy, WushIngLon`s muIn InLeresL In SomuIIu
was to have access to Somali naval bases and airfields for military purposes.
Berbera was the main target for the Pentagon. Due to its strategic location, the
Soviet Union built an extensive naval facility and an airfield that was able to
handle the largest bombers and transport airplanes. According to an American
congressmun who vIsILed Lhe IucIIILy In 1q;, Berberu wus Lhe mosL
comprehensive naval support facility available to the Soviets anywhere outside
Lhe SovIeL homeIund IncIudIng Cubu. However, Lhe IucIIILy hud IosL some oI
these features as the Soviets tried to dismantle it after they were expelled from
Somalia in 1977 (ACR, 1979/80). The facility attracted special attention from
Washington after the Iranian Revolution and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Secondly, Washington in order to secure its presence in Somalia had to make
sure that a reliable ally was in power in the country. For Washington, Barre was
not the man of their choice. According to a former US ambassador to Somalia
DonuId K. PeLLerson (1q8), Burre`s usL reIuLIonshI wILh Lhe SovIeL UnIon, hIs
hosLIIe uLLILude Lowurds Lhe US, hIs reuLuLIon Ior devIousness, und hIs
dishonest assertions about his involvement in Ogaden made him a man that
Washington could not sincerely rely on. However, as Petterson (1985) stated
Lhere Is unoLher sIde Lo SIud |Burre| us Iur us WushIngLon`s InLeresL In SomuIIu
Is consIdered. Burre, uccordIng Lo umbussudor PeLLerson, hus strengths as a
leader which have enabled him to stay in power for fourteen years. As any
Somali knows, he is a shrewd and extremely capable politician. He does, as he
suys, know hIs eoIe . DurIng Lhe Iour yeurs wus In SomuIIu, heurd muny
predictions oI SIud`s ImmInenL oIILIcuI demIse. These Ignored hIs sLrengLhs, Lhe
lack of cohesion among his opponents, and the fact that within Somalia in
recenL yeurs no erson or IucLIon hud emerged us u reuIIsLIc uILernuLIve Lo hIm
(Petterson, 1985). Therefore, although Barre was not an ideal leader for
163
Washington, the US policymakers realised that they had to deal with him, with
caution of course, at least for the time being.
Thirdly, as I mentioned, the US believed that Ethiopia rather than Somalia was
the perIecL urLner Ior ILs sLruLegIc InLeresL In Lhe regIon. Thus, WushIngLon`s
relationship with Somalia in this period was restrictive on the condition that it
shouId noL jeourdIse Lhe Iormer`s IuLure reIuLIonshI wILh ELhIoIu
76
. US
policymakers, for instance, made sure that any assistance from the US to
Somalia would not hurt Ethiopia. As a former CIA official noted, America in
order Lo Iuy Lhe SomuII curd decIded Lo gIve Burre onIy deIensIve equImenL
and formally put on notice that any conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia in
Ogaden would terminate the US relationship with Somalia (Oudes, 1980).
WushIngLon, soon uILer SomuIIu`s deIeuL und subsequenL wILhdruwuI Irom
Ogaden, sent the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Moose, to Mogadishu in
April 1978 to discuss a possible relationship for the two countries. However,
between 1978 and 1979 US policy put strong pressure on Barre to abandon his
previous policies towards Ethiopia and Kenya as well. President Carter, for
instance, made clear in March 1978 thuL Burre musL rovIde u renewed
commitment not to dishonor the international boundaries of either Ethiopia or
Kenya before we would be willing to discuss with them [the Somalis] economic
uId or deIensIve urms suIIes (Murder, 1q8;).
In late 1979, two major evenLs uILered WushIngLon`s urouch Lowurds Lhe
Horn. On 4 November 1979 forces loyal to the Iranian Revolution took control
of the US Embassy in Tehran which led to a hostage crisis and then exhausted
the foreign policy agenda of the Carter administration. And on 25 December,
over 100,000 Soviet troops invaded Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. These
events put Washington in a condition of uncertainty over the extremely
important region of the Persian Gulf. In December 1979 the US sent a
delegation to investigate military facilities in Somalia, particularly the Berbera
naval facilities (Schraeder, 1994). In addition, in a tripartite defense pact
established in early August 1981, Libya and Marxist South Yemen with Ethiopia
angered the Somali government, as Barre saw it, by providing military and
economic support to the Somali opposition group based in Ethiopia, as a direct
LhreuL Lo hIs ruIe. n resonse Burre exeIIed Ibyu`s dIIomuLs In MogudIshu
and closed down their Embassy. Furthermore, in the West the pact raised some
eyebrows. n Lerms oI EusL-WesL rIvuIry us one WesLern dIIomuL noLed Lhe
idea seems to be to replace Siad Barre with a president who would prevent the
AmerIcuns Irom usIng Berberu (CoweII, 1q81).
Barre, in trying to manipulate the situation, forwarded an offer of military
facilities to the US and in return asked for US $2 billion in military and
economic assistance. However, Barre finally accepted military aid totaling $65
million over three years and the formal access agreement was signed in August
1980. The Reagan administration came to the White House in a period when the
76
Throughout the decade the US tried hard to reestablish its close relationship with Ethiopia.
See Schraeder, 1994.
164
US was expected to implement its security commitment in Somalia (Schraeder,
1994). Nevertheless, Washington, although it gained formal access to the Somali
facilities, delayed time and again the supply of military equipment to
Mogadishu. At the end of June and in early July of 1982 a military campaign
spearheaded by a Somali opposition group supported by the Ethiopian army
captured two Somali settlements and tried to occupy the principal highway
linking the Central and Northern parts of the country to the Southern part and
consequently cut the country in two halves. The United States rushed
emergency military aid to Barre by airlifting some equipment and thereafter
started implementing its security commitment in Somalia (ACR, 1982/3).
According to Radio Kulmis, voice of the Ethiopian-supported Somali Salvation
DemocruLIc ronL, Lhe U.S. hus now oenIy InLervened In un InLernuI SomuII
war but nothing will save the Barre regime and the arms will end up in the
hunds oI our IIghLers, husLenIng Burre's InevILubIe deIeuL. SInce Lhen
Washington, to keep Barre in power, involved itself in a decade long civil
conflict in Somalia. Table 7.1 demonstrates US military and economic aid to
Somalia.
Globally, the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev marked the beginning of the end of the
Cold War. Regionally, the Soviet interest in Ethiopia dramatically contracted
after Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and the Russians started to reduce their
assistance, and in particular military aid. In July 1988, Gorbachev told the
Ethiopian leader that his administration was unwilling to increase the military
assistance to Ethiopia. Latter on Moscow refused to reschedule its debt to
Ethiopia and even initially declined to indicate whether it would renew the arms
agreement after the one in force expired. Finally, Moscow refused to conclude
any new arms agreement with the military regime in Addis Ababa. Furthermore,
the Kremlin expressed its support for the peace talks between the Mengistu
regime and Ethiopian armed opposition groups sponsored by the former US
President Jimmy Carter and supported by the US administration in 1989
(Ofcansky and Berry, 1991).
Therefore, in the later half of the 1980s the US leaders started to reconsider
their position. Barre was severely injured in a car accident in 1986 and this, as
we have seen, raised the issue of who would succeed the ailing dictator, created
mounting tension and wiped out the already fragile cohesion among loyal
groups of Barre. This coincided with decreased tension related to the Cold War
struggle. And, thus, Somalia started to lose its geopolitical value. As Table 6.1
shows, since 1986 both economic and military assistance to Somalia decreased
dramatically. Furthermore, by 1988 it was quite clear that Washington had lost
its interest in Somalia. In mid-1989 Carter initiated a peace deal between
Mengistu and opposition groups and after meeting with Mengistu in Ethiopia
expressed his hope that the 28-year-old civil war would end. And two months
later he hosted peace talks between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean
faction in Atlanta. Mengistu too, in realising that he was losing his superpower
patron, conveyed his desire for a better relationship with Washington. The US
took the opportunity not only to bring an old ally back again but more
importantly to prevent Ethiopia from collapsing.
165
In late 1980s and early 1990s both countries, Somalia and Ethiopia, were both
on the verge of collapse. Unfortunately, Washington ignoring its role in the
Somali conflict abandoned Somalia while paying all means necessary to bring
the warring Ethiopian factions together to solve their differences at the
negotiating table rather than splintering the country. The final result was the
peaceful departure of Mengistu and political stabilisation of Ethiopia. In
Somalia the worst scenario prevailed. Howard Wolpe, Congressman and former
roIessor oI AIrIcun PoIILIcs, observed LhuL |w|huL you ure seeIng |he wus
taking about the consequences of the Somali civil War of the early 1990s], ... is
u generuI IndIIIerence Lo u dIsusLer LhuL we Iuyed u roIe In creuLIng (quoLed In
Zunes, zooz). S. Zunes noLed LhuL |L|here Is wIdesreud ugreemenL umong
those familiar with Somalia that had the U.S. government not supported the
Barre regime with large amounts of military aid, he would have been forced to
sLe down Iong beIore hIs mIsruIe sIInLered Lhe counLry (Zunes, zooz).
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167
6.5. Political Economy of Predation
Clearly by the late 1970s Barre had mobilised all means under his command to
centralise state power in his hands in order to penetrate all aspects of society.
However, his efforts met with catastrophic results in the economic realm. As we
have seen, as soon as it came to power the military regime brought a large part
of the economy into the hands of the state. But after the formation of the SRSP
the economy was in the hands of the President. Previously, the main objective
for the state control of the economy was to develop a base for economic
development, reduce inequality and establish an independent economy for the
counLry. AILer Lhe wur, Burre`s IIrsL und IoremosL gouI wus Lo survIve oIILIcuIIy
and every aspect of the national economy was formulated to meet that end. The
main strategy was to create economic incentives for capable allies. Under the
uLrImonIuI dImensIon deveIoed under SIud Burre's regIme . EmbezzIemenL
of public funds, corruption of ministers and civil servants in connection with
public markets and development projects, baksheeshes at all levels of the
bureaucracy, illegal trafficking by relatives or friends of the president - all these
were LIghLIy IInked Lo u dIrecL uccess Lo sLuLe ower und consequenLIy, on Lhe
one hund u sLruLum oI weuILhy und corruL busInessmen (muny of whom were
ennIIess In Lhe eurIy 1q;os) urose Irom uII Lhe cIuns (Comugnon, 1qqz).
However, the national economy completely collapsed due to Barre mobilising it
to ensure the survival of the military regime. In addition, to finance the war
against armed opposition groups, national resources were channelled for
military use.
Long ago researchers, Bates (1981) and Lal (1983), identified the instruments
used by predatory governments to extract rents. A range of instruments utilised
by the predatory state were found (Azam, et.al., 2005): exchange rate change;
obstructing access to key markets; and playing with prices in factor markets and
the goods they sell. Blomqvist and Lundahl (2002) documented a more
comprehensive list of such instruments: taxation, particularly tariffs and trade
duties; trade barriers and granting monopolies for clients; government
appointment; printing money; foreign debt; development assistance and direct
confiscations. In the following pages I will try to some extent spell out the
exploitation techniques employed by the military regime and consequently
explain the collapse of the formal economy in Somalia
77
.
6.5.1. Political Economy of Public Employment
The first strategy of formulating a patrimonial system related to the recruitment
and promoLIon rocesses InLo Lhe ubIIc oIIIces. n Lhe IuLer urL oI Burre`s ruIe,
assignments of almost all levels of government offices, both civil service and
military, were directly (by giving a post to an influential friend or foe who could
contribute to Lhe survIvuI oI Lhe regIme) or IndIrecLIy (emIoyIng someone who`s
employment would please a powerful friend) based on the logic of patrimonial
77
As the formal economy was falling into complete disintegration a parallel or informal
economy, which finally replaced the formal economy, was emerging slowly.
168
relationship. Through that process the public institutions became clan
institutions; the top level positions, ministers, deputy ministers, permanent
secretaries of all ministries for instance, were given to influential figures and
their appointments were exclusively made in the presidential palace. Occupants
of the second category of the hierarchy, the heads of departments, were mainly
appointed by superiors of the institution in question with the acceptance of the
presidential palace of course. The appointment of the lower level positions, the
heads of units and individual civil servants, were made exclusively by the top
leaders of the institution. However, leaders of any public institution, when
making employment decisions, were to make sure that the decision should
contribute to their survival in particular and that of the regime in general. The
best strategy for a superior to distribute allocations of public positions under his
control was to give a potential office, as much as he could, to his fellow
clansman. This would serve two main objectives: one is that, everything else
being equal, a clan member is more reliable than a member of another clan, so it
assures the loyalty of the subordinate; the other, the political entrepreneur, the
superior, should gain an opportunity to convince his clan that he is there for
their cause, which may influence the clan to rally behind him. In other words,
the clan is firstly expected not to support a rival faction and to be ready to
support
78
the regime when needed. In the late 1980s it was common knowledge
that almost every public institution was incorporated with clan identity. The
clan of a minister of a given ministry or a general manager of a given public
agency disproportionately occupied the offices of the organisations in question.
Nothing was wrong with an unemployed youngster being informed by
colleagues thatAdeerlcc sou uclcclcd heblc mc hcsto (Your uncle,
meaning your fellow clansman, have got agency X!
79
).
The chIeI oI ProLocoI In Lhe oreIgn MInIsLry suId Lhe oreIgn MInIsLry dId noL
apply a Foreign Service Law, neither did it have rules, procedures and norms for
posting of officials to Somali Diplomatic Missions abroad. The Minister enjoyed
almost unfettered power and privilege in assigning officials to whatever posting
he deemed them competent for ... the Ministry became the property of
privileged persons. The children of influential people, who were recommended
for foreign service posts did not work at the Ministry for even a short period to
Lry und Ieurn someLhIng beIore beIng osLed ubroud. Some oI Lhe PresIdenL`s
nominees did not even know the location of the Ministry until it was time to
collect their diplomatic passports and tickets. Otherwise, perhaps children of
the new elite, and already benefitting from state scholarships to foreign
universities, were directly absorbed into the Somali Embassy of the country
where Lhey were IIvIng, wILhouL even reLurnIng home IIrsL (Omur, 1qqz).
78
The regime might need to arm the clan in order to fight another clan which is hostile to the
government.
79
The sentence shows ownership of the public agency by its leader.
169
Table 6.2, Exchange rate between US$ and So. Sh.(selling rate)
Year Month So Sh to 1US$ Year Date So Sh to 1US$
1985 Jan 36,3600 1988 Jun 181,8000
Feb 36,8550 Aug 224,2200
Mar 37,3700 Sep 249,4700
Apr 37,8750 Oct 263,6100
May 40,5094 Nov 259,5700
Jun 41,0144 Dec 273,7100
Nov 42,9250 1989 Jan 270,2700
1986 Jan 55,0450 Feb 305,9100
Mar 59,0850 Mar 336,6000
Apr 63,1250 Apr 380,1600
May 67,1650 May 440,5500
Jun 71,2050 Jun 482,5300
Jul 75,2450 Jul 497,9700
Aug 79,2850 Aug 542,5200
Sep 83,3250 Sep 576,1800
1987 Jul 116,0252 Oct 611,8200
Aug 140,6784 Nov 672,2100
Sep 153,4998 Dec 920,2100
Oct 101,0000
Source: Somalia (1990)
Secondly, as Table 6.2 demonstrates, the Somali government extensively
devaluated the Somali Shilling. Before July 1981 the exchange rate in Somalia
was So.Sh. 6.23 to $1. However, in December 1989 the rate was So.Sh. 920.21 to
$1. Consequently employment remuneration severely deteriorated in the 1980s.
Table 7.3 indicates the salary structure, including cost-of-living supplements, of
the civil service employees and shows that in real terms the salaries of public
employees in 1989 were only between 2.7 to 4.3 percent of their respective
salaries in 1975
80
. Although since 1975 the government had made periodical
adjustment of the cost-of-living of its employees in the form of allowances and
the fact that there were extra allowances that accrue to individuals occupying
certain positions, this did not address the ever worsening erosion of the real
value of the employment remuneration caused by inflation.
80
An exception of this worsening formal remuneration was some payments in kind given to
senior officers. Ministers and some top administrators were eligible for housing with utilities,
cars with fuel, staff etc. The value of these remunerations was very large compared with formal
salary. For a good summary of the government employment in Somalia see Gregory (1994).
T
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171
172
According to Gregory (1994) the official exchange rate was So.Sh. 1000 to $ 1
and the professional allowance and the largest responsibility allowance
amounted to only 70 cents and 2 dollars a month respectively. Therefore, the
public sector remuneration was extremely poor and the state authority was not
prepared to address that. In addition, the World Bank estimated that almost
over half of public sector staff was excessive and rather than decreasing the real
salary of the public sector by reducing the redundant employees, the Somali
government kept increasing the staff in the public institutions. Figure 6.1shows
that, except 1986 and 1987, government employment increased dramatically
compared to the second half of the 1970s. Furthermore, although the
expenditure budget in Table 6.4 indicates that total government expenditure on
employees decreased about 34 percent between 1975 and 1989, the expenditure
per employee on the contrary decreased significantly.
Table 6.4, Central Government non-defense Expenditure, (per
Employee, Somalia, Selected Years, 1975-89)
Expenditure Expenditure per
year (millions) Employment employee
1975 476,00 20 600,00 23 107,00
1979 700,00 35 000,00 19 971,00
1981 269,00 40 000,00 6 721,00
1989 314,00 56 500,00 5 558,00
Source: Gregory (1994)
The LubIe oInLs ouL LhuL Lhe cenLruI governmenL`s exendILure er emIoyee
decreased from over 23 thousands shillings in 1975 to only a little over 5.5
thousands shillings in 1989 which is about 76 percent. All these indicate that the
government was intentionally ignoring the deteriorating situation of the public
employment sector.
ThIrdIy, us we wIII see IuLer, Burre`s governmenL guve Lhe green IIghL Lo ILs
clients to use public offices to remunerate themselves. Controlling all forms of
rent-seeking was implicitly lifted, except for unsympathetic elements. Almost
everyone in the system was using the office he occupied, at least partially, to
compensate himself. According to the former Director-General (interior) of the
Somali Bank of Commerce and Savings (SBCS), the intentional negligence by
the highest figures of the government and the leaders of the institutions
responsible to protect the property of both people and government, such us the
Auditor-General, Chief Justice, Central Bank
81
and relevant security forces,
resuILed In eoIe`s deosILs In Lhe SBCS beIng Iundered by sLuLe oIIIcIuIs und
cronies (Amiin, 2004).
This dreadful situation forced the sector to decline and finally to collapse. Waves
of former public sector employees migrated to the oil rich states in the Middle
East for better wages. Others sought to involve themselves in Public Investment
81
The central bank had the responsibility of safeguarding the deposits of the clients and
administrative efficiency of all banks in the country.
173
Projects (PIP), that were financed by donor countries and organisations, during
their implementation period. In this phase the PIP were mainly administered by
expatriate managers and foreign firms and local staff were paid well. To avoid
working for the government, when the project was completed and handed over
to the government they quit and looked for another PIP project which was still
in its implementation phase. Most of those who left public sector employment
for the Middle East or to PIP were, relatively, the best qualified Somalis
(Mubarak, 1996). Others went into the private sector for self-employment or a
better wage.
Those who remained in the sector had two options. Firstly, those who were
unable to milk their office were forced, despite formally staying in the office, to
look for extra money from outside their offices. Civil servant absenteeism was a
common practice In Lhe 1q8os und some oIIIcIuIs showed u In Lhe mornIng Lo
sign the attendance register and left. They went downtown in search of part-
LIme work or busIness, Lo muke u IILLIe more money (Omur, 1qqz).
Secondly, those who were willing to generate illicit rents preferred to stay. Here
a public employee was in office mainly to support his living by demanding
unofficial fees. However, in some cases, by raising large amounts of money
through illicit revenue they were paying themselves much higher than the fair
salary they would have obtained in an efficient market. In the 1980s several
subsections of Mogadishu, with a concentration of luxurious villas, were
increasingly becoming very different from the rest of the city. Boolli Qaran was
the largest and most well known one of these. Almost all of these buildings were
owned by government officials and cronies, at the time when the salary of a
minister was 4000 Somali shillings (about $ 4 in Dec. 1990).
Government officials who were to deal with the private sector realised that the
more they created obstructions against private firms, the more rent money they
would gain. So due to irregular regulations and informal embarrassments
private business became a soft target for the rent seeking government officials.
However, ordinary individuals seeking normal public services were not spared
from the burden of corruption. Let me share with you some of my experiences of
corruption in Somalia. At the end of December 1990, I was one of those students
who completed their four year studies in economics at the Somali National
University. After graduation some of my classmates went to the office that was
responsible for issuing the certificates to graduated students. Most of us were
expecting to collect our certificates as soon as possible since the civil war that
ravaged most of the country was closely approaching the capital. My colleagues
came back and informed us that they were told that the rector, who was to sign
the certificate, had allocated only one day a month of his schedule to sign the
certificates, and unfortunately, the bulk of certificates that would exhaust his
allocated time for at least the next six month were already on his table. Later on
we realised that those who were willing to pay 50 thousand shillings
(approximately 50 dollars) would get their certificates quickly.
Consequently, anyone in the public sector who once committed themselves to
taking a bribe or to other illegal activities felt that it was in his interest to protect
174
the regime, either to defend his economic interest or to escape from justifiable
punishment, as he were vulnerable to prosecution forever. Barre used this as a
method to control the public sector (Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman, 1997). So in
the 1980s the common way to resign from a public office, especially a high level
one, was to go into exile.
The immediate economic impact of such behaviour was loss of efficiency in the
ubIIc secLor. As sIgnIIIcunL number oI educuLed SomuIIs IeIL Lhe counLry`s
government institutions in search of a better life, their offices were occupied by
reIuLIveIy unquuIIIIed emIoyees. AccordIng Lo weII InIormed observers new
projects flush with foreign aid and projects which are popular with the
government can offer better terms than the projects which have exhausted their
foreign aid or lost favour. As a consequence, the best staff leave the ministries,
und IeuIroggIng Irom one rojecL Lo unoLher Is common (CILed In Menkhuus,
1989).
This was observable in some of the most important offices; the accountant-
generuI`s oIIIce IuIIed Lo IuIIII ILs resonsIbIIILIes urLIuIIy becuuse oI decIInIng
skIIIs und Iow moruIe (UN, 1qq1). The wIdesreud ubsenLeeIsm menLIoned
earlier undoubtedly had its impact, but even those who stayed in office used
most of their time on tasks which were not their formal assignments i.e. forging
or preparing fake documents, informal bargaining about how much a client
would pay, involvment in political tasks asked by their patrons. Another
phenomenon was a lack of discipline and a weakened formal hierarchy in the
public sector. Everyone believed that he was there because of his political
identity, not because of his performance. So it was not very difficult for
subordinates to ignore the orders of their superiors.
6.5.2. Political Economy of Financial Management
The budget processes of any country should at least fulfill two main purposes:
first, it should mobilise and allocates resources. Here the budget process
determines the distribution of limited resources; secondly, the budget should
also provide financial management and accountability. Therefore, the budget is
inherently correlated with the political process. In this section, to draw attention
Lo Lhe roIe oI Burre`s oIILIcuI uLronuge In Lhe ubIIc IInuncIuI munugemenL
which ultimately rendered the national economy into a complete collapse, the
study considers both the revenue and expenditure sides of the public budget. At
the expenditure side, it will be concentrated on three main stages: formulation
of the budget, its execution or implementation, and the control of the budget.
The Ministry of Finance assumed most of the budget related activities: The
Ordinary Budget Department and the Treasury Department used to develop
recurrent expenditures and revenue budgets respectively. The Domestic
Development Department under the Ministry of National Planning had the
responsibility for developing the Domestic Development Budget. These
departments, though dealing with the national budget, lacked any cooperation
for their activities. Even at the ministry level the lack of cooperation was quite
175
apparent except at the highest level of government and, according to Ekstrom
(1qq), Lhere Is umIe evIdence IndIcuLIng LhuL u conscIous sLruLegy oI
purposeful fragmentation of budgetary and financial management activities
existed in order to insure some form of top level control over governmental
IInunces.
In the formulation process the Ministry of Finance, after relevant organisations
submitted their estimates about revenues and expenditures, prepared the
annual ordinary budget. It was approved firstly by the cabinet, then by the
National Assembly and finally by the President.
To start with, there were serious deficiencies in the process of budget
formulation: in the process of formulating expenditure-revenue estimates, there
was a lack of basic information required to prepare reliable estimates of things
like GDP growth rate, inflation and exchange rates, and government
emIoymenL oIIcy. Thus Lhe esLImuLes were muInIy bused on guesswork;
equally serious problems that resulted from the lack of information, and lack of
macroeconomic forecasts, hampered the formulation of fiscal policy. Regarding
revenues, the lack of such information was particularly serious where no
information was given on the inflation rate or the growth of imports and exports
(UN, 1990).
However, most deficiencies in the formulation stage occurred in the process of
deciding expenditure targets and it is hard to believe that these deficiencies
were unintentional. Table 6.5 illustrates the recurrent expenditure budget
between 1984 and 1988 and shows that the meager national resources were
poured into the unproductive sphere of so-called general services; in 1988,
94.45 percent went to the general service alone. About half of the total
expenditure was devoted to finance and central services including the
presidency. The economically productive spheres gained only 2.39 percent of
the total expenditure. Social services, education, health and labour gained 3.12
percent of the total.
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177
178
This does not show the unfortunate situation of the economic and social spheres
alone but illustrates that most of the symptoms of economic mismanagement
were present in Somalia. For instance, a severe decline in education and health
expenditure as a share of the recurrent expenditure budget was apparent. Figure
6.1 shows LhuL Lhe shure oI economIc servIces oI Lhe governmenL`s exenditure
budget declined from about 22 percent in 1975 to about 3 percent in 1988 and
that the share of the social services declined from about 26 percent to 4 percent
in the same period. In addition, deteriorating economic and physical
infrastructure was also visible around the country in the period under review. As
one Iormer SomuII oIIIcer noLed, our governmenLs never ossessed
maintenance mentality. They used a building until it collapsed for lack of
maintenance and care, and then just moved to another one (Omur, 1qqz).
Furthermore, the increasing share of the unproductive spheres of the
expenditure budget alone would have been enough to illustrate the level of
financial disarray of the economy. However, as Ekstrom (1993) noted, a large
portion of the expenditure budget, especially this that concerns the
unreasonable share under the control of the Minister of Finance, were
urorIuLed us Ium sum LoLuIs. AccordIng Lo hIm, Lhe neL eIIecL oI LhIs Ium
sum appropriation was that 75.9 percent of the appropriations in the 1990
ordinary budget were made without detailed justification and for unspecified
uroses und he goes on by rIghLIy suyIng LhuL Lhe Ium sum LucLIcs were used
to mask the real intent of spending plans and to provide for centralized control
of this spending since the Minister of Finance controlled most of the lump sum
urorIuLIons.
179
In Somalia revenue comprised tax, which was classified into direct (i.e. net
income and property taxes) and indirect, and non-tax, including receipts from
property income, administrative fees and charges, fines and forfeits, cash
operating surpluses and amounts due from public enterprises. The component
of the indirect taxes, the largest source of the ordinary budget, were taxes on
goods and services and taxes on international trade, mainly import and export
duties. The responsibility for revenue collection and administration was
concentrated in the Ministry of Finance (UN, 1991).
The economic mismanagement was evident everywhere at the revenue
collection stations and in many cases there was lack of information about the
revenue collection (UN, 1991). Customs duties on imports were a source of
uImosL huII oI Lhe cenLruI governmenL`s revenues und IL wus here were mosL oI
the mismanagement and tax evasions were taking place outside the Minister of
Finance. Those who were able to gain letters of credit or permission for
import/export business were the same people who were able to secure tax
exemptions for their business in order to escape from the burden of the tax.
This, however, crippled the revenue base of the government. Figure 6.2, shows
that the tax revenue severely declined from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. And
it is interesting to note that this occurred while the import as a share of GDP, in
the same period, substantially increased (Mubarak, 1996). The leaders of the
state and their cronies were the main players in the import sector. Major
General Mohamed Sheik Oman, the minister of finance and a long time ally of
the president who transformed himself from an ordinary army officer to one of
the wealthiest men in Somalia, was a main figure in this business. A popular
joke in Somalia in the late 1980s was that on many occasions when General
Osman came across beautiful luxury buildings in the capital, he would inform
his assistant that he, the Minister, wants this building to be his own. Most of the
LIme Lhe reIIes oI Lhe ussIsLunL were Lhe sume Mr. MInIsLer, Lhe buIIdIng Is
uIreudy yours. urLhermore, uILhough Iruud und corruLIon wus u common
practice at the collection posts for some time, in the late 1980s there was tax
evasion on a massive scale in the Treasury Department of the Ministry of
Finance itself, and by all means effective revenue collections had broken down
(Ekstrom, 1993).
There were also significant deficiencies in the process of budget control. The
problem of information loomed large in the process of control. For example, the
Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance was not able to control the
expenditure of any particular head after budget implementations were approved
in the beginning of the fiscal year. The lack of information of the cash flows
partially prevented the department from exercising its control over the
expenditure as the year proceeded and the meager information available was
not always analysed properly nor was it readily usable for management
purposes. In addition, the definitions of procedures used for controlling the
budget, for instance, were less clear and the responsibility for their application
was fragmented. These made the judgments of how appropriate these
procedures were very arduous. Furthermore, the institutions responsible for the
accuracy of the budget outcomes and for identifying inconsistencies, such as the
Accountant-General, the Magistrate of Accounts and audits, were either
180
ineffective or payed little attention to the purposes of budget review and control.
Moreover, the government had for a long time ignored to review the financial
Iuws und LhereIore Lhe reguIuLIons Ior exendILure conLroI Lherefore contained
loopholes, and overlapping procedural requirements. Often it [was] easy to
uvoId or cIrcumvenL Lhe rocedures und muke Lhe conLroI IneIIecLIve (UN,
1991). However, the highest leadership of the government should be blamed
since, as we saw earlier, it intentionally fragmented the budget and financial
management activities in order to assume extended control over government
finance.
In addition to the lump sum budgeting and information gaps, mentioned
previously, Ekstrom
82
(1993) noted other factors indicating the degree of
disintegration that the official budgetary and financial management Somalia
wus exerIencIng beIore Lhe coIIuse oI Lhe sLuLe. One oI Lhese IndIcuLors oI
uncerLuInLy Is repetitive budgeting. Repetitive revision of budget decisions
throughout the fiscal period is believed to be a sign that the country in question
is experiencing extreme uncertainty of whether or not the allocation decisions
can achieve acceptable resolution. The phenomena has been visible in Somalia
at least since the mid-1980s and in most of the cases the divergence between the
actual and revised figures were abnormally large, which indicated that
formulating the budget with realistic figures was not easy, even in the revision
phases (UN, 1991). In 1990 the national budget had been revised four times
where the original Ordinary Budget had been increased by 78.9 percent, while
the increase of the Domestic Development Budget and Debt Service was about
30 percent each (Ekstrom, 1993).
82
Carl D. Ekstrom was among the very few qualified non-Somalis who witnessed the collapse of
the Somali economy before the collapse of the state itself in the early 1990s.
181
6.5.3. Political Economy of Non-Financial Public Enterprises
Another sector under state control was the industrial sector of which the
government owned over 80 percent in the 1980s. The GDP contribution of the
manufacturing sector was around 5 percent in the mid-1980s. However, it
absorbed a large share of the development expenditures. As we saw, the
regIme`s objecLIve oI deveIoIng Lhe sLuLe secLor wus Lo esLubIIsh u busIs Ior
industrialisation, which was considered as a cornerstone of an independent
economy. Hence the regime reorganised some factories, founded new factories
and put some others into operation. However, the manufacturing sector was far
from playing its role in the 1980s. The sector suffered a negative annual average
growth rate of 3.4 percent during 1980-86. Table 6.6 summurIses Lhe secLor`s
capacity utilisation in the early 1980s and shows that the production capacity of
the sector was thoroughly underutilised. The overall capacity utilisation of the
sector declined from a low level of 39 percent in 1982 to a lower level of 26
percent in 1986. A study carried out by the World Bank in late 1987 found that
40 percent of the enterprises showed negative value added (UNIDO, 1988). This
reveals that despite the enormous amount of public funds spent on both human
and physical capital the production per employee in the manufacturing sector
declined and efficiency deteriorated (Mubarak, 1996).
Table 6.6, Utilisation of Installed Capacity in Selected Industrial Enterprises, 1982-6
(percentage)
Enterprise 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Juba Sugar Complex 35 40,1 38,4 55,9 38,6
SNAI Sugar Complex, Jowhar 29,8 6,9 1,7 6,8 8,3
Edible Oil Mill, Mogadishu 1,7 1,1 0 0 0
Wheat, Flour and Pasta Factory, Mogadishu 12,9 54,1 77,4 56,5 61,4
Meat Factory, Kismayo 6,2 0 0 0 19,5
ITOP Afgoi (Fruit Canning) 3 4,3 2,1 9,1 12,5
Milk Factory, Mogadishu 18,3 6,7 0 0 0
National Bottling Co. (Private) 66 55 45 16 7,8
Cigarette and Match Factory 51,1 35,2 27 25,9 31
Somaltex, Balad 47,6 30,2 23,1 15,6 27,5
Tannery Km 7 Mogadishu (hides only) 0 8,5 45 48 63
Incas Packing 16,7 18,3 21,1 24 33
Somali Chemical Industry (private) 21,2 12,9 15,3 4,8 4,6
Urea Plant, Mogadishu 4,2 2
Petrolium Refinary, Mogadishu 47,8 43,9 31,1 36,5 27
Foundry and Mechanical Workshop 33,3 21,8 17,2 14 14
Aluminium Utensils 45 24,8 34,2 15 12,5
Somali Marine Products 15 2 20
Weighted Average for the Manufacturing 39 33 26 28 26
Source UNIDO (1988)
182
Several factors were found to bear the prime responsibility for this
disappointing performance: (UNIDO, 1988; Mubarak 1996; and Samatar 1987).
1. Agriculture as the supplier of the raw materials of most of the
industries failed to keep pace. So lack of raw materials hampered the
sector.
2. Lack of hard currency to buy spare parts, imported raw materials and
regular maintenance. The governmenL`s rIce oIIcy und unbeurubIe
taxes impoverished the manufacturing sector. Domestic prices of the
secLor`s ouLuL were noL uIIowed Lo IIucLuuLe wILh Lhe murkeL demund
and, in addition, the sector was expected to provide contributions to
the GovernmenL`s budgeL. ThereIore, ubIIc IndusLrIes were unubIe Lo
generate the required foreign exchange in order to buy imported
machineries, materials, etc.
3. Shortage of required skilled manpower because of insufficient
remuneration and increasingly corrupt management practices.
Since coming to power, the military regime used public enterprises as an
InsLrumenL Ior oIILIcuI survIvuI. n Lhe eurIy 1q;os Lhe regIme`s mIsbehuvIour
was limited to appointing potential rival military officers to some lucrative
public enterprises to discourage them from pursuing their unfavourable
political ambitions. General Mohamed F. Aidid became the General-Manager of
ASPIMA, a firm importing and distributing drugs, while Colonel Abdulahi
Yususf became General-Manager of FIAT Somalia.
However, in the 1980s political patronage became just as chronic in this sector
as in other sectors of the economy. Almost all enterprises were run by the
loyalist of the regime. These loyalists for their part recruited their loyal
clansmen, family friends, etc. A former director general of a factory told me that
to meet unqualified job seekers with a placement paper, for non-vacant
positions, from national political leaders was not unusual. So overstaffing was
common in the public enterprises, particularly places with expectedly sizable
illicit rents. Senior political figures were also asking financial contributions from
the subordinate managers of the respective enterprises. A minister for instance
may expect from a manager, of a given enterprise under the ministry in
question, financial contributions for his private use no matter what the financial
situation of the enterprise was. So the enterprise had to meet not with the illegal
income needs of its staff alone but also the expectations of economic rents of the
senior national figures (Aden, 2008).
Another way of swindling public enterprises, by the political leaders, was
misappropriating some of the money allocated for their entity, ministry for
instance, and transferring the burden to a public enterprise as a form of non-
payment of payable bills. About 48 percent of the power generated by ENEE,
National Electric Authority, was used by the Government. However, the
government failed to pay about 75 percent of the bills (Ekstrom, 1993).
In addition, powerful politicians were authorising their cronies in the business
sector to generate huge profits by manipulating the production process of the
183
public enterprises, without any regard for the implications of such acts on the
enLerrIses` erIormunce. Giving output of a factory to a businessman, who was
an associate to the top political leader at a substantially low price who in return
sells the products at the much higher market prices, was a common practice in
the 1980s. According to UNIDO (1988), the Union of Somali Co-operatives
bought the unsuccessful ITOP (state owned fruit and vegetable processing
factory) from its former owner, the Somali Development Bank, and installed a
team of young and dynamic managers in 1984. Consequently, recovery started
in the following year. According to one of these new managers, the former
Managing-Director of ITOP, the Somali Bank of Commerce and Savings was
expected to meet the financial requirement of the factory, especially for
overcoming the liquidity problem. However, Lhe Bunk`s uIIocuLIons were muInIy
based on political relationships rather than the economic efficiency of the
allocations and ITOP management were not able to secure the required
investment from the Bank. They, instead, approached the clients and made a
deal with them: after jointly estimating the required investments of the
production process and the acceptable price of the produced goods, clients
agreed to pay the financial requirements of the factory in advance and the
management, accordingly, hud Lo meeL Lhe cIIenL`s demunds on Lhe Lerms
ugreed. However, u common robIem, he udded, wus Lo meeL oLher buyers`
holding letters from political figures asking for the factory output to be sold to
these businessmen (Aden, 2008).
Furthermore, the Government was using the enterprises to finance the
expensive defense sector to overcome growing internal uncertainty. This was
urLIcuIurIy so In Lhe IuLe 1q8os, und reIIecLed Lhe GovernmenL`s resonse Lo Lhe
InLernuLIonuI donors` ressure on Lhe GovernmenL Lo reduce its defense
expenses to ease the budget deficit. However, the military government
channeled a large part of its defense expenses through public enterprises to
conceal it from the official reports. This strategy affected all public enterprises
und Lhe government owned pasta factory typically ordered large quantities of
wheat much of which was then sold to the military at prices substantially below
market rates, providing a hidden subsidy to the military in the form of a loss to a
government owned enterrIse (EksLrom, 1qq).
n Lhe IuLe 1q8os, Lo meeL M`s condILIons Ior IurLher Iouns, Lhrough Lhe IogIc
of privatising state enterprises, the Somali Government started distributing
public enterprises, including the most efficient ones, to allied figures and
sometimes to foes. I will consider this issue shortly.
6.5.4. Political Economy of Agriculture
As we have seen, agriculture including livestock was given high priority in the
development strategies in the 1980s. Between one-third and one-half of the
planned expenditures were given in this sector, and the hope was to increase
production, improve marketing and export competitiveness of Somali animals
in the international markets. In crop production, reducing the dependence on
food imports and obtaining the highest level of self-sufficiency was planned.
184
Banana production and export were to expand. However, as we have seen,
neither of these objectives was secured.
Agriculture became a primary target of development for the military regime in
Somalia in the 1970s, and in the 1980s the sector emerged as a soft target for the
regIme`s exIoILuLIon. SeveruI meusures Luken durIng Lhe 1q;os IucIIILuLed Lhe
secLor Lo emerge us eusy rey Ior Lhe regIme`s reduLIon. The Lwo mosL
appealing of these actions were the creation of a state agency that monopolised
the grain businesses and the Agricultural Land Law.
In 1971 the military government created the Agricultural Development
Corporation (ADC) and became the sole trader and distributor of grain.
According to the government, the Corporation was formed to protect the
interest of both the farmers and urban households and by law no other
organisation was permitted to purchase, store, sell, or distribute grain. The
Corporation purchased the maize and sorghum from the farmers during harvest
time and then used to sell the locally produced grain plus the imported crops to
the urban consumers (Yassin, 1989).
ProbubIy, Lhe regIme`s muIn urose Ior monooIIsIng Lhe gruIn murkeL und
fixing its prices was to provide affordable staple food for urban households.
However, unintended consequences, according to the economists, resulted from
Lhe governmenL`s IIxed rIce oIIcy. The urgumenL wus LhuL Lhe Iow rIces oI Lhe
ADC LrImed down Lhe Iurmers` IncenLIves Lo roduce. AccordIng Lo some
observers wILh sourIng rIces oI oLher InuLs, reuI roducer rIces oI mujor
cros huve been decIInIng . ThIs decIIne In Lhe reuI roducer rIces hus creuLed
u greuL Iuck oI IncenLIve wILhIn Lhe IurmIng IumIIIes. And uccordIng Lo Lhe
commenLuLors Iurmers reduced their efforts and work volume to a level which
sImIy guurunLeed subsIsLence. ThIs Is Lhe umounL uIIowed uny Iurmer Lo use
for his own consumption (cited in Menkhaus, 1989).
AccordIng Lo oLhers, Lhe ADC`s IIxed rIces, Lhough Lhey Iuyed u roIe, were not
the primary cause of the agrarian crises in the 1970s. Menkhaus (1989), for
instance, argued that farmers involved themselves in the parallel market rather
than abstaining from production. He noted that peasant farmers estimated that
they were selling about half of their harvest on the illegal black market. Had
ADC`s Iow rIces been Lhe reuI robIem In Lhe 1q;os, he urgued, we wouId huve
witnessed i.e. decreased grain import; a significant increase of the total area
cultivated; and enhanced economic security for the peasants, after prices were
IIberuIIsed In Lhe 1q8os. NeILher oI Lhese hus huened und Lhe vIIIuge
economIes sLeudIIy deLerIoruLed Lhrough Lhe 1q8os (Menkhuus, 1q8q).
Nevertheless, the ADC in the 1980s, in many ways, became an instrument of
ubuse Ior Lhe regIme`s suorLers, Lo be used uguInsL Lhe eusunL Iurmers.
Indeed, the parallel market provided farmers an escape from the official rate,
but on the other hand it also provided government officials an opportunity to
ask for bribes or even to confiscate any grain found in the underground market
with the excuse that the product was under illegal operations. By prohibiting the
farmers to save over one hundred kg of grain per season, they were forced to
185
either use illegal hoarding which was prone to confiscation or to end up in the
refugee camps especially in the seasons when there was a bad harvest (Gunn,
1987). In addition, ADC officers, using their presence in the area and official
power were among those who, exploiting the agricultural land law, spearheaded
the loot like land grabbing activities of the 1980s. Here, the fertile lands of the
eusunL Iurmers were ouLrugeousIy grused In u mussIve wuy by Lhe regIme`s
supporters. Furthermore, ADC officers were enriching themselves by reselling
the grain collected for the ADC on the illegal market at higher prices. Sometimes
these officials were hording the grain until there was a local shortage which
forced local farmers, who produced this grain and received low rates from the
ADC, to buy it back at illegally inflated prices (Besteman, 1999).
In 1975 the Somali government decided to nationalise all land and hence since
then controlled all land resources. The Agricultural Land Law (No. 73) had two
main objectives: political and economic. The economic objective of the reform
wus Lo LrunsIorm whuL hus been erceIved Lo be us un urchuIc sysLem,
communal tenure and nomadic pastorialism, with one more economically
roducLIve und Iess desLrucLIve oI Lhe Iund . The consensus umong Iunners
has been that Somalia is vulnerable to drought largely because it is locked to
subsistence economy driving from these traditional patterns. And without an
ugrIcuILuruI surIus Lhe economy cun never hoe Lo suorL u modern sLuLe
(Gunn, 1987).
As to the political aspect, the regime since it came to power wanted to eliminate
the tribal basis of the society, which it perceived as an enemy of the regime, and,
as we saw in Chapter 4, the Dabodheer drought of the mid-1970s gave the
regime an opportunity to implement its policy of settling at least part of the
nomudIc ouIuLIon InLo Lhe ugrIcuILuruI ureus us Iumers. Here mIxIng In Lhe
resettlement areas of refugees from different places and descent groups is seen
by the Government as essential to its campaign to eliminate clan loyalties in
Iuvor oI nuLIonuIIsm (ACR, 1q;J6).
Under the Law, farmers were permitted to keep a predetermine size of land for a
specified period of time and following certain rules of succession. The state was,
on the other hand, given the right to exrorIuLe or reossess u gIven Iurmer`s
land if the conditions were not met. By denying pastoralists, about 60 percent of
the society, to any land right unless they join the Government sponsored
cooperatives and allowing agriculturists to register their limited land right on an
individual bases, and favouring modern sector and large-scheme projects the
uw wus crILIcIsed us beIng modernIsL, sLuLIsL und non-socIuIIsL (Hoben,
1988).
However, in the beginning farmers were reluctant to register their land for
several reasons: the registration law was not regularly enforced; the registration
process was procedurally very complex to understand, and very expensive and
time consuming for peasant farmers (Hoben, 1988). Another factor that
supported the previous one was that agriculture was a relatively un-rewarding
industry in the 1970s and thus very few outsiders were trying to obtain farmland
(Menkhaus, 1989). Furthermore, farmers considered the act as unjust state
186
interference in their affairs and became reluctant to register their lands
(Besteman, 1999).
The Iuw IormuIIy broughL Lhe Iund under sLuLe conLroI und Lhe Iurmers`
reluctance to register their land made their property legally insecure and prone
to confiscation.
Due Lo severuI IucLors, eoIe`s uLLItude towards farmland dramatically changed
in the early 1980s. This was due to factors such as: the sky rocketing inflation of
Lhe 1qo8s; SuudI ArubIu`s, vIrLuuIIy Lhe soIe ImorLer oI SomuIIu`s IIvesLock,
astonishing ban on Somali livestock; the GovernmenL`s IIberuIIsuLIon oI Lhe
grain prices in 1984; high donor interest in agricultural development; a
wealthier class seeking someplace to invest their wealth emerged in the 1980s;
Increused need Ior vegeLubIes und gruIns Ior urbun househoIds; und Lhe regIme`s
udvocucy oI ugrIcuILure, und ugrIcuILuruI Iund becume u durubIe usseL, us un
InvesLmenL, und us un objecL oI resLIge (BesLemun, 1qqq).
The und ReIorm AcL oI 1q;, suorLed by Lhe eoIe`s new erceLIon on
agricultural land, became another important instrument for Barre to reward his
allies and their associates in the 1980s. Consequently, explosive politicised land
concentration, expropriation and grabbing started in the 1980s. In the
beginning, the regime started carefully distributing unallocated farmlands to its
supporters. However, later on, the political leaders started to scramble for the
lands allocated for public use. State farms, cooperative land and refugee
settlements were among the victims of this process. For example, in 1986, 4000
hectares of land in the Jubba valley was specified for the resettlement of
thirteen thousand refugees, which had been caused by the development project,
the Baardheere dam. However, the entire zone, 4000 hectares, was given to the
brother of the Director-General of the Ministry of Agriculture and his business
associates (Menkhaus, 1989). In addition, the government leaders
83
, both
mIIILury und cIvIIIuns, und LheIr ussocIuLes, by munIuIuLIng Lhe Iurmer`s
ignorance, weakness and reluctance to register their land, expropriated the
Iunds oI Lhe eusunL Iurmers, urbun-based bureaucrats, politicians, and
businessmen, and the modern sector organizations in which they are active, are
manipulating the land registration system to gain leasehold control over large
amounts oI ugrIcuILuruI Iund . und regIsLruLIon und dIsuLe seLLIemenL
processes work to the advantage of elite with access to bureaucratic channels
und oIILIcuI ower (Hoben, 1q88). Worse yeL, In Lhe IuLe 1q8os, Lhe Iurmers
who did register their land received no sLuLe roLecLIon und uILImuLeIy Lhe Iece
of paper giving evidence to registered title to land does not necessarily afford
any tenure security at all; what determines land title in Somalia is political
ower (Menkhuus, 1q8q).
The Land Reform Act of 1975 and the politicised land grabbing of the 1980s
seriously jeopardised the economic base of the peasant farmers. Moreover, it
weakened the agricultural productivity of the country. The main reason was that
83
Local regIonuI suorLers, who emerged us bIg men, where umong Lhose munIuIuLIng Lhe
registration process to participate in the land scramble (Besteman, 1999).
187
those who grabbed the agriculturally fertile lands were not mainly interested in
crop production and their main purpose of land grabbing was profiting from
land banking, securing donor funding and financial loans (Besteman, 1999;
Menkhaus, 1989)
84
.
6.5.5. Political Economy of the Financial System
The financial system of Somalia was comprised of the Central Bank of Somalia
(CBS), the Commercial and Saving Bank of Somalia (CSBS) and the Somali
Development Bank (SDB). All these banks were publicly owned institutions. The
functions of the CBS were mainly to establish monetary policy, issuing currency
and acting as a cash resort for the national government. The CBS also enjoyed
the power of controlling other banks in the country and supervising gold and
foreign monetary reserves. The Somali banking system was operational in the
1980s mainly because of lines of credit from the international financial
institutions in order to support the productive sector, particularly agriculture
and industry, by providing financial loans. However, the system was grossly
misused and, for instance, the money was distributed through the patronage
sysLem und once u Ioun wus receIved by un uIIcunL Lhey were never execLed
Lo reuy IL (CooIIdge und Rose-Ackerman, 1997).
The SDB`s muIn IuncLIon wus, gIven Lhe counLry`s development programmes
and priorities, to provide financial assistance to the enterprises in the
productive sector. The main sources of the SDB were foreign currency
borrowings from overseas, lending institutions and local currency borrowings
from the Somali Government and the CBS (UNIDO, 1988). In the 1980s the
bunk`s IendIng sysLem wus used by Lhe GovernmenL Lo enrIch ILs uIIIes. The IIrsL
method was to channel funds to the deeply troubled public enterprise to remain
in operation. However, in the second half of the 1980s it was very clear that
most of the public enterprises were in a hopeless situation and the main
purpose of the loans, in which the expectation of its repayment was virtually
zero, were Lo creuLe economIc oorLunILIes Ior Lhe regIme`s Ioyal elements and
their associates. The largest share of such loans was accrued by the politically
powerful elements who were involving themselves in the land grabbing
activities. Table 6.7 provides information on total loans approved, by region, by
the SDB In 1q86. The LubIe shows LhuL over ;z ercenL oI Lhe SDB`s Ioun wenL Lo
the agricultural sector
85
und LhuL over huII oI Lhe ugrIcuILure`s shure wenL Lo Lhe
Lower Shabelle region alone. The secret was that Lower Shabelle, due to its rich
agricultural land and proximity to the capital, attracted the heaviest
concentration of the land grabbing activities and those who expropriated the
IurgesL orLIons oI Lhe regIon`s ugrIcuILuruI Iunds were some oI Lhe mosL
84
Moreover, in the pastoral sector the impact was enormous; declining production, increased
land degradation, and conflict and weakened traditional regulations of the land use. See Unruh
(1995), Gunn (1987).
85
Some International lending institutions specified the loans they gave to be used for
agricultural adjustment programmes.
188
powerful elements in the country
86
. Only a meager share of this loan was
actually used to invest in agriculture. Most of it ended up in private foreign
accounts or import/export activities as the security environment needed for
longtime investment was not there in the late 1980s. And by 1989 the SDB, due
to grave erosion of its capital, was on the verge of collapse unable to provide any
loans to its clients (Mubarak, 1996).
Table 6.7 Total Loans Approved by SDB by Region, 1986 (Sh.So.
000)
Region Agriculture Industry Services Total
Benadir 56 271 1 500 57 771
Middle Jubba 5 605 5 605
Lower Jubba 15 076 1 876 16 952
Gedo 8 088 8 088
Hiran 505 505
Eastern 2 456 2 456
North Western 21 054 16 000 37 054
Awdal 1 813 1 813
Sanaag 2 429 2 429
Togdher 3 367 1 500 4 867
Middle Shabelle 36 864 36 864
Lower Shabelle 107 334
107
334
Total 204 591 75 647 1 500
281
738
Source: UNIDO (1988)
The CSBS was established to support business activities of private and public
enLerrIses. The bunk`s muIn ucLIvILIes were ruIsIng Iunds by coIIecLIng deosits
from businesses and consumers and receiving loans from the CBS to provide
loans to productive enterprises. However, as other organisations in the sector,
the CSBS become a victim of the political patronage of the 1980s. Its activities
were heavily politicised and its capital promiscuously looted
87
by the
government and bank leaders and their associates. State agencies and some
private companies were receiving huge amounts of loans from the bank which
later on, if necessary, were written off by the President himself. According to a
former Director-General of the CSBS, the bank filed a case of long time due
loans to a national court against Impresco, a private company owned by Somali
and Italian entrepreneurs. The court decided on the confiscation and selling of
heavy machinery in Golweyn, owned by Impresco, for repayment. However, the
President intervened by ordering the Court to take back the decision and the
86
One was required to present the documents of a land written in their name and which they
want to invest. This also formally served as a guarantee for the loan.
87
Looting, rather than corruption, may be the right term (Abdirahman, 2000).
189
CSBS officials to terminate the case. The main reason for this, according to the
Director-General, was that one of the owners of the company was the
PresIdenL`s broLher-in-law (Amiin, 2004).
As Table 6.8 shows, the total credit increased more than ten times in five years,
1984 to 1989. The credits to the private sectors showed the wildest increase,
about 14 times in the previous three years. In 1988 international auditors
investigating the CSBS stated that 83 percent of the loans issued by the bank
were non-performing loans. After that, as the table clarifies
88
, the financial
mismanagement reached unimaginable proportion. Even the heads of small
branches of the bank, let alone the highest officials of the bank and the national
leaders, were issuing huge and unauthorised loans to their clients (Amiin,
2004).
Table 6.8 Total credits 1981 - 1989 (In millions of So.Sh.)
Credits to Credits to Credits to Total
Year government
public
enterprices
Private
sector
1981 2 249,60 1 721,40 574,60 4 545,60
1982 2 100,00 1 300,00 1 623,80 5 023,80
1983 1 805,00 1 163,00 2 292,80 5 260,80
1984 4 378,10 1 511,20 3 726,90 9 616,20
1985 5 421,70 2 071,20 4 023,90 11 516,80
1986 6 077,20 3 730,40 4 094,80 13 902,40
1987 14 254,10 6 408,80 13 926,90 34 589,80
1988 20 118,70 11 845,50 19 102,40 51 066,60
1989 14 065,60 28 803,80 56 061,90 98 931,30
Source: Abdirahman (2000)
In fact, the CSBS was actually creating money. In the late 1980s abuses,
irregularities and corruption, reached unimaginable proportions. The CSBS,
after exhausting its reserves of a legal tender, started issuing uncovered circular
checks
89
on a massive scale. Most of these checks were cashed by the importers
at a huge discount, 20-40 percent, who mainly used them for the purchase of
foreign exchange in the auction system. This exacerbated the exhaustion of
reserves from the central bank which finally led to an acute shortage of
banknotes and hard currency in the country. Therefore, as the former Director-
GeneruI oI Lhe CBS uccuruLeIy urgued Lhe cIrcuIur checks hud roven Lo be un
uncontrollable source of monetary creation by the Commercial and Savings
88
No data is available for 1990, but given the situation, the growth rate must have been higher
than that of 1989.
89
These ure bunker`s druILs orIgInuIIy InLended Ior smuII uymenLs und, over LIme, Lhey becume
a widespread and handy means for payments and settlements of big transactions (Abdirahman,
2000).
190
Bunk oI SomuIIu (Abdirahman, 2000). Unsurprisingly, by 1989, the SCBS was
declared bankrupt (Mubarak, 1996).
The CBS was also on the verge of collapse in late 1980s. However, the CBS
survived, due to extensive printing
90
of new Somali shilling notes and
borrowings from foreign institutions, until it was finally pillaged by the highest
officials of the Somali government in January 1991. Table 6.9 illustrates the
money supply, the currency in circulation and demand deposits
91
, in Somalia
between 1981 and 1989. The table shows that in five years the money supply
increased phenomenally from So.Sh. 5.0 billion in 1984 to So.Sh. 139.9 billion in
1989. The proportion of the problem could be simply detected by comparing the
money supply changes of the first half of the decade with that of the last half.
AccordIng Lo AbdIruhmun (zooo) IL Is worLh noLIng LhuL, onIy In one yeur 1q8q,
money suIy Increused by u sLuggerIng umounL oI |So.Sh. qq.q bIIIIon| . When
one considers that this explosive trend continued also in 1990, for which data
ure noL uvuIIubIe, one undersLunds how Iur LhIngs goL ouL oI hund. The
consequences of this reckless printing of money notes and issuing checks
rendered the CBS into a complete inability to print more notes, not because of
its negative impact on the economy but, because of the hyperinflation the face
value of almost all money notes was less than the cost of printing the notes
themselves. The Director-General of the CBS believes that by government
leaders pursuing their private interests created money at will which became the
root of the financial crisis in Somalia, and the collapse of the financial system
played a key role in contributing to the collapse of the state in Somalia
(Abdirahman, 2000).
Table 6.9, Money supply 1981 - 1989 (In millions of
So.Sh.)
Year
Currency in
Circulation
Demand
Deposits
Total
1981
1 890,9 1 783,2
3 674,1
1982
1 455,7 2 652,7
4 108,4
1983 1 355,5 2 953,8 4 309,3
1984
1 900,0 3 130,0
5 030,0
1985
3 787,4 5 986,7
9 774,1
1986
5 208,5 6 935,1
12 143,6
1987 12 326,9 17 718,9 30 045,8
1988
21 033,3 24 403,0
45 436,3
1989
70 900,0 68 961,8
139 861,8
Source: Abdirahman (2000)
90
PrInLIng new money wus Lhe mIIILury governmenL`s economIc IIIebouL In Lhe IusL yeurs oI ILs
rule.
91
Demand deposits consisted of current accounts and circular checks.
191
6.5.6. Political Economy of Foreign Aid and Refugees
We saw in Chapter 5 that Somalia was in a privileged position as far as its share
of foreign aid was concerned. It received the highest, as a percent of GNP,
official development assistance in the world and the second highest aid per
capita in Africa. In addition to the development aid, emergency aid became very
significant in the country. From 1978, after the war, a large number of refugees
arrived in Somalia. This attracted the eyes of the donor communities which
oured u subsLunLIuI umounL oI uId InLo Lhe counLry und uId becume Lhe bIggesL
nuLIonuI IndusLry (BesLemun, 1qqq). However, this relatively abundant aid
transferred to the military government in Somalia in the 1980s made the
survival of the great majority of Somalis woefully more difficult. It indeed
became a notorious industry for the ruling elite and Barre used it to buy internal
allies on the one hand and to empower his army to intimidate, harass or
eliminate opponents on the other (Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman, 1997).
Thus in the period under consideration it was apparent that the foreign aid was
negatively correlated with social welfare. Emphasising the socioeconomic
ImucL oI Lhe uId, Ruwson sLuLed LhuL deveIomenL rogrums becume chunneIs
for winning that struggle for power and perquisites, rather than investment in
SomuIIu`s weIIure und economIc IuLure . Irom the Central Bank, the
Commercial Bank, and the Ministry of Finance, counterpart currencies flowed
InLo rIvuLe hunds (Ruwson, 1qqq).
One oI Lhe muIn IucLors LhuL conLrIbuLed Lo Burre`s sIhonIng oII oI Lhe uId wus
that donors were, from the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, inspired by
primarily political, rather than economic, motives. As we saw in Chapter 5, in
the early 1970s the Soviets, through their development assistance, sought to
transform the socioeconomic development of the society. However, according to
Menkhaus by the late 1970s donors, both Western and Arab states, poured a
subsLunLIuI umounL oI IoreIgn uId InLo SomuIIu muInIy Lo weun Burre`s regIme
from the Soviet camp. Speaking about a donor financed project in Southern
Somalia, Menkhaus argued that since political motives were the main
determinants for the project approval by the donors, the normal process of
transparency and accountability were simply muffled for political reasons. And
he rightly mentioned this behaviour of the donors gave an opportunity to the
governmenL Ieuders Lo IushIon Lhe rojecLs In dIrecLIons whIch suILed LheIr own
personal interests, to the detriment of the local populace, and to the great
frustration of expatriate and Somali management attempting to implement
rojecL deveIomenL (Menkhuus, 1q8q).
Another factor that gave the regime the green light they needed was the
fraudulent behaviour of the leaders of the donor countries. Even in the mid-
1980s when some of the donors tried to reverse this trend and realised that their
direct involvement would not help the situation the problem persisted, though
in the beginning some relief was felt. The foreign aid received by Somalia could
be classified into two main categories: development aid and refugee aid. The
Public Investment Programs (PIP) was the largest type of aid received by
Somalia in the late 1980s, Italy being the largest contributor. (UNIDO, 1988). In
192
that period Italy supported a number of development projects, including the
following: the $600 million Bardhere Dam, $250 million Garoe-Bosaso road;
over $40 million hospital in Qoryoley; and a $95 million urea plant. The total
projects sponsored by Italy in the 1980s were 114 projects in which more than a
billion dollars were spent. However, the personal relationship and interests
between the leaders of the two countries, rather than socioeconomic
development of the host society, was said to be the main reason behind this
generous donation
92
. Wolfgang Achtner, in his famous article The Italian
Connection: How Rome Helped Ruin Somalia wroLe |w|ILh Iew exceLIons .
Lhe LuIIun venLures were ubsurd und wusLeIuI . BehInd Lhese mIsbegoLLen
projects lay old-fashioned corruption. The Italian construction and engineering
companies who were awarded lucrative contracts for the projects provided
kIckbucks Lo Lhe oIILIcuI cIuss In Rome und IocuI oIILIcIuns . The corruL
relationship between the Italians and Barre, which began in 1978, flourished
after 1983 when Craxi became prime minister. The Socialists flooded Somalia
wILh mIIIIons oI doIIurs In uId. . On Lhe SomuII sIde, uII Lhe money wus uIIegedIy
handled by Barre's eldest son, 48-year-old Colonel Hassan Mohammed Siad,
who had an apartment in the Hotel Raphael in Rome -- the same hotel where
Craxi had his permanent residence in the Italian capital. During these years,
muny members oI Lhe Burre IumIIy . ucquIred roerLy und bunk uccounLs In
Switzerland. On the Italian side, the list of beneficiaries reads like a who's who
of major construction, engineering and communicuLIons IIrms (AchLner, 1qq).
Another factor that exacerbated the problem further was the selection of the
projects to be implemented in Somalia. It was clear that the Somali government
was undertaking projects simply because there was a donor with funding
without any consideration about its relevance on the socioeconomic
development of the society. Worse yet, in some cases the feasibility of the
projects was not important. The urea plant mentioned above, illustrates the
gravity of the problem. The project was not feasible in any way - neither
economic nor technical. And the plant operated only for three years mainly with
the help of millions of dollars from Italy. UNIDO (1988) mentioned a host of
constraints the project was confronting and within a few years, according to
analysts, the sole option available for the Government was to get rid of the
whole project. Thus one could conclude that the economic rent that a given
project may potentially generate for the top officials was more important than
its feasibility let alone its contribution to the well-being of the host society.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the regime in Mogadishu accepted the
implementation of the economic reform programmes encouraged by the
international institutions. It did so simply to generate revenues. However, it was
clear that Barre was not happy with these programmes. Then the government
formulated a proper means of escape to avoid potentially threatening outcomes
incorporated in the reform programmes.
92
As the table shows, most of this aid was in a grant form rather than as a loan, which improved
the ratio of grants to loans in the 1980s (80/20) compared to the 1970s ratio (57/43). See UN
(1991).
193
For illustration purpose let us consider some of the main strategies used by the
government to avoid these restrictions. One of the main reform elements was to
reduce fiscal deficit, particularly the defense spending. To pretend that it was
actually committed to the policy the government reduced the share of the
budget allocated to the defense in the mid-1980s. However, as Figure 6.3
IIIusLruLe, enormous umounLs oI money wus uL under Lhe MInIsLer oI Inunce`s
control. Almost the total sum reduced from the defense category was brought
under the finance and general services category which was, most probably, used
for defense purposes. Other evidence supports this conclusion. In the
expenditure budget of 1990, for instance, about 62 percent of the non-salary
expense was appropriated InLo Lhe cuLegory oI Lhe so cuIIed oLher work. The
Somali government termed these funds as contingence expenses but according
to the World Bank these funds were, most probably, used to complement the
defense budget. In addition, the government channelled much of its defense
spending through public enterprises so as to become invisible in the officially
reported budget outlays and thus to disappear from the eyes of the oversight
bodies. The state-owned pasta factory, for instance, ordered a huge quantity of
wheat and the amount beyond its requirements was resold to the army at a
subsLunLIuIIy Iow rIce rovIdIng u hIdden subsIdy Lo Lhe mIIILury In Lhe Iorm oI
u Ioss Lo u governmenL owned enLerrIse (EksLrom, 1qq).
Other central objectives of the reform programme were to liberalise trade and to
alter key relative prices, and in particular the real exchange rate. Nonetheless,
high government officials and their associates were the main beneficiaries of
this process as they were commonly awarded with the letters of credit known as
LCs which were necessary for the import/export business. The LC was also an
important prerequisite for receiving foreign currency, which was distributed
194
through government controlled auctions or a two-tier exchange rate
93
, required
for importing food stuffs and other necessary commodities. Thus, government
mInIsLers, such us Mohumed Sh. Osmun, und Lhe regIme`s devoLed uIIIes, such
as Abdi Hosh, absolutely dominated the sector.
Privatisation of state-owned enterprises was another policy required in the
reform programme. The regime used the privatisation process to reward clients
and pay opponents. The production performance of ITOP improved from mid-
1984 and according to UNIDO (1988) the factory, provided that a financially
favourable environment for the private sector was in place, had a potential to
attract the private sector, which was not the case for many state owned
enterprises. Nevertheless, the factory was given to an influential political figure,
after a long-term detention. According to the former manager of the factory, the
transfer was like a gift (Aden, 2008). Other enterprises, such as Hotel Taleex,
were given to government leaders or members of their families.
Regarding the refugee issue, after the defeat of the Somali army in the Ogaden,
hundreds of thousands of war affected people sought refuge in Somalia. In the
very beginning the Somali government received the refugees warmly in a
brotherly way and supported them with the limited resources it had and
appealed for help from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and donor countries. Nevertheless, the regime realised that refugee
aid from the international community is a notorious industry with the
prospective of political rent. To exploit enough rents from the refugee aid the
regime inflated the number of refugee population. With the logic that an
increased refugee count generates more aid and more aid breeds more rent, the
regime unilaterally set the total number of refugees as 1.3 million, while
according to other stakeholders the estimate was between 300,000 and
600,000. The military government either completely rejected or sabotaged the
process of coming up with a reliable figure of the refugee population
94
. And
uccordIng Lo one commenLuLor word of the estimate incensed the Government
oI PresIdenL Mohummed SIud Burre und IuLer on, Lhe UnILed NuLIons decIded
on a planning figure of 650,000 (Cowell, 1981).
In addition, the regime preferred to maintain the status quo as far as the future
of the refugees was concerned. The government, to avert the number of refugees
to decrease, systematically discouraged any attempt to repatriate the refugees to
their homeland. The government also in many occasions rejected the idea of re-
settling the refugees in Somalia. (Frederick 1988)
93
In the dual exchange rate, a fixed rate was set for the import of food and other sensitive
commodities.
94
After a long dispute about the size of the population of refugees, the UNHCR decided to
resolve the question by undertaking an aerial photographic survey. The government rejected the
approach due to, according to the Government, national security concerns. Then the UNHCR
decided to carry out a census method throughout the refugee camps in the country. However,
although the government previously argued that the census is an appropriate method for
resolving the argument, Somali officials intervened by mobilising members of the refugees to
show up in counting stations on more than one occasion. Some of the refugees, allegedly, passed
the lines up to fifteen times (Frederick, 1988).
195
The main method for the government to generate rents from the refugee aid was
the diversion of the food aid. In the beginning of the refugee aid three national
orgunIsuLIons und Lhe U.N`s WorId ood Progrum Look Lhe resonsIbIIILy of
distributing the relief supplies. As I noted earlier the ADC and ENC as national
agencies were responsible for the nationwide distribution of locally produced
and imported foodstuffs intended for the ordinary population and, in the
refugee aid distribution, they were criticised for treating the relief supplies as
their ordinary commercial stocks. Remember that these organisations were
instruments of predation for the military regime (Frederick, 1988). So many
refugee supplies ended up in the local markets or Lhe mIIILury sLores und reIIeI
goods are diverted away from refugees and the visitor can see American wheat,
stacked for sale in tin-rooIed sLores (CoweII, 1q81).
Militarisation of refugees is another strategy utilised by the military regime in
the 1980s. As early as 1982, the Somali Government, compelled by a lack of
military personnel to prosecute its war, was accused of mobilising refugees to
fight for the host country (The Globe and Mail, 1982). In the late 1980s the
number of refugees drafted into the Somalia army was said to be as many as
50,000 refugees from camps in Somalia. The government, it was also argued,
had used vehicles and supplies sent by foreign donors (The Economist, 1989). It
is worth mentioning that the Somali National Army in the 1980s was fighting
against Somali armed opposition groups.
The muIn IucLor LhuL wus generuLIng Burre`s IncenLIve Lo exIoIL Lhe reIugee
issue was the known position of the US. In order to avoid confrontation with
the Mogadishu regime Washington, the main donor of refugee aid, was
reIucLunL Lo uL meunIngIuI ressure on Burre`s regIme. So once more, un
overriding strategic interest undermined developmental goals (Frederick, 1988).
6.6. The Death of the Post-Colonial State in Somalia
After the SNM moved to Ethiopia and started its military operations in 1982, the
NorLhern urL oI Lhe counLry wus IIke u wur zone und Lhe governmenL`s conLroI
oI Lhese regIons wus noL un eusy one Irom LhuL LIme on. However, uILer Burre`s
automobile crash in 1986, the SNM intensified its activities and the SSDF
resumed its operations after sometime of internal unrest. Officers from the
Hawiye clan-family with their supporters also increasingly infiltrated into these
opposition factions from 1986 onwards. The two organisations were conducting
joint operations, particularly in the central regions (AC, Sep. 1986).
As IL wus weukened, urLIuIIy by Burre`s InubIIILy und InLernuI ower sLruggIe
and partially by the US reduction of its financial, political
95
and military
support, the regime was unable to maintain its hegemony even in the capital,
and civil unrest started there. In August 1987, for the first time in the history of
95
oIIowIngs WushIngLon`s renewed osILIon, MogudIshu`s reIuLIon wILh oLher donor counLrIes
and international financial organizations became uneasy one. In May for in May 1987, for
InsLunce, ubIIshed u reorL crILIcIzIng Lo Lhe SomuII governmenL`s uId rojecLs. (SImon 1qq)
196
Lhe mIIILury regIme, ubIIc demonsLruLIons uguInsL Lhe governmenL`s behuvIour,
especially economic mismanagement, engulfed Mogadishu (Simon, 1995).
A series of secret meetings that had taken place since the mid-1980s
subsequently led Barre to reach an agreement with the Ethiopian leader,
Mengistu Haile Mariam in March 1988. The latter agreed to terminate his
support for Lhe SNM, IncIudIng Lhe end oI Lhe SNM`s resence In ELhIoIu. The
regime presumed that this may lead to the SNM dissolving. However, the SNM
carried out an all-out military offensive, which was suicidal in nature but
successful, against the regime in the main towns of the North, and thereafter it
secured its own zone in the North-Western parts of the country. After that the
civil unrest escalated in the South as well. The USC and SPM were established.
Unlike the factions that came into existence in the early 1980s, these
organisations, particularly the USC, generated favourable attention from the
high ranking figures within the Government. The main reason was that
everyone beIIeved LhuL Lhe regIme`s duys were numbered und one hud Lo IdenLIIy
his interest with the forthcoming government. Some government leaders,
including senior army generals, started to conduct activities advancing the cause
of the faction groups in order to show their sympathy to the latter.
oIIowIng WushIngLon`s renewed osILIon, MogudIshu`s reIuLIons wILh oLher
donor countries and international financial organisations became uneasy. In
May 1987, for instance, the World Bank published a report criticising to the
SomuII governmenL`s behuvIour Lowurds Lhe uId rojecLs. n early 1988 the IMF
decIured LhuL SomuIIu Is IneIIgIbIe Ior M`s IInuncIuI Iouns und WesLern
countries, including Italy, one of the main financial sources for the regime in
1980, responded by halting their aid to Somalia. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees followed the suit by announcing a phasing-out of its
refugee assistance (Simon, 1995). Formally, in 1989, Washington terminated its
aid to Somalia and in 1990 disclosed that the regime in Mogadishu defaulted on
loan repayments and, therefore, was ineligible to receive any further US aid.
Economic hardship of the decade deepened. As a result of the dried up external
support coinciding with the devastating civil war that now engulfed most of the
country, the economy deteriorated rapidly in 1989 and 1990, where the formal
economy completely collapsed.
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Mogadishu, Salvatore Colombo, was
assassinated on 9 July 1989. In response the Government detained three
prominent Imams on 13 July and the next day, after the Friday prayer, violent
anti-government riots broke out in Mogadishu in which, according to Africa
Confidential, resulted in about 400 deaths and over 2000 injuries. During the
nexL weekend, Lhe regIme mussucred q; cIvIIIuns on one oI MogudIshu`s
beaches. The regime was also challenged in Mogadishu in a nonviolent manner
and sometimes through its institutions. At a celebration for the National
Congress for Workers held in the National Theater, Abdi Muhumid Amin,
expressing the unhappiness of the labour force, performed his famous song
AnIgu MuuIuun Rubuu, MuuIo Mucuun Buun Rubuu, Muruquun uun ku
Dhuuqaan Rabaa - I demand bread, the delicious bread, I demand sauce to eat
IL wILh. Burre who wus uIso resenL uL Lhe ceIebruLIon Look Lhe mIcrohone und
197
angrily blamed Amin for asking for what his government could not afford
anymore
96
. In early 1990 Ogaal a paper owned by the ruling SRSP started
ubIIshIng urLIcIes uguInsL Lhe regIme`s behuvIour. AL LhuL LIme, MogudIshu
joined the rest of the country. For instance in May 1990 an open letter, known
as the Manifesto, signed by over hundred influential political figures, religious
leaders, businessmen, traditional leaders and intellectuals was forwarded to
Barre. The paper, after critically reviewing the dangerous situation of the
country, proposed a National Reconciliation and Salvation Conference. The
Manifesto alienated the regime further and opposition factions interpreted the
move as a political opportunity
97
. The regime responded by detaining some 40
members of the document signatories but soon released them all.
Since the summer of 1989 Mogadishu became the home for violence and
insecurity that already had devastated the rest of the country. The regime in its
death-throes tried to correct some of its mistakes and announced several
measures for reform. However, that was not well received by the opposition
factions who regarded that call as cosmetic. By late December 1990 full scale
civil war devastated most parts of Mogadishu. Barre departed from Mogadishu
in mid-January 1991 and his departure marked the end of the post-colonial state
in Somalia. The SNM stabilised the North-Western part of the country and
latter on, in May 1991, the region declared its independence from the rest of
Somalia. In the Capital and the south the faction groups, led by the USC, failed
Lo uchIeve unyLhIng more Lhun Lhe desLrucLIon oI Burre`s uIIIng regIme. The
endIess cIvII wur LhuL IoIIowed hIs deurLure resuILed In muny hoIng Ior Burre`s
reLurn. AbshIr Bu`udIe hud Lhe IoIIowIng Lo suy:
Waa loo Darsadey Daalinkii Dacayda Weynaaye
Ka daroo dibidhal baan aragnay iyo furuqyo daacuune,
Duqii doona ducana ugu dara waad na dubateene
We IeeI demeuned Ior Lhe ruIe oI Lhe hyenu IookIng ruckeLeer
WhuL we ure wILnessIng Is much worse Lhun hIs ruIe.
Find the old-mun (Burre) und comIemenL hIs ruIe wILh bIessIngs
6.7. Conclusion
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the military regime went into a
dilemma after departure of the Soviets and the failed Ogaden endeavour. Soon
after the Ogaden War longtime dormant contenders started to challenge the
regime. Armed groups were setup. However, Barre solved the dilemma by
imposing a patrimonial system of governance and by bringing Washington onto
his side. His main tasks during this period were to defend his rule from the
96
Jama (2008).
97
Some members of the Manifest group were supporters of the opposition factions.
198
warring opposition factions and to provide economic incentives for his
supporters. He mobilised all national resources, and reorganised national
institutions to meet that end. To generate enough resources for the two tasks he
provided military bases for the US Rapid Deployment Task Forces. The
American administration, unlike the Soviets, was a reluctant principal. It
limited its task to using the strategic bases in Somalia and preventing the regime
Irom IuIIIng. Burre`s reIuLIonshI wILh Lhe US uIso facilitated a somewhat more
cordial relationship with the other Western countries and international
organisations such as the United Nations, World Bank and IMF. So, until 1986,
the United States and its allies provided military and economic assistance that
enabled the regime to survive and consequently the regime provided the US the
chance to safeguard its interests in the region. The situation here resembles the
condition presented in Figure 1.4. The regime as an agent defended
WushIngLon`s InLeresLs In the region. This was so because all opposition factions
were hosted by socialist Ethiopia and mainly supported by Soviet allies, thus
making clear the direction these factions would take had they succeeded in
assuming power in Somalia. US, on the other hand, as principal rewarded its
agent economic and assistance needed for his survival.
Barre was severely injured in a car accident in 1986 and this raised the issue of
who would succeed the ailing dictator and created mounting tension and wiped
out the cohesion among the loyal groups of Barre supporters. This coincided
with the decreased tension over the Cold War. And, thus, Somalia started to lose
its geopolitical value. Washington, like its allies, withdrew its assistance from
the regime and opposition factions intensified their struggle and the regime
collapsed. The role of Somali society, as principal, broke down after the Ogaden
deIeuL und hus never recovered sInce. WushIngLon`s ubundonmenL murked, once
again, the failure of the principalship of the US to Barre. However, unlike the
departure of the Soviet Union, there was no superpower interested in salvaging
the regime. The military regime collapsed and the post-colonial state in Somalia
collapsed as well.
199
7 CONCLUSION
The state is needed by many. Citizens of a given polity need it because it is
expected to deliver political and public goods, i.e., security, law and order, social
and economic infrastructure. The political elite of a given society needs the state
because it generates for them economic and political opportunities. Other
countries, poor regional neighbours and distant sole superpowers alike, need
the state of a given society because the state is the main vehicle for other
countries to secure their security, and political and economic interests in the
country in question.
When the state of a given country collapses the consequences for the citizens,
leaders, and international community could be very severe. Insecurity and
hunger are obvious consequences for citizens of the collapsed state. Leaders of
the collapsed state not only lose their economic and political opportunities but
may also end up in misfortune. Mental disorder and public humiliation
98
is a
common robIem Ior muny SomuII Ieuders who escued Lo Lhe WesL. n Loduy`s
increasingly interconnected world, a collapsed state does not threaten the
security and interests of its neighbours alone but may pose an acute risk to
geographically distant and powerful nations. The U.S. National Security
SLruLegy oI zooz concIuded LhuL AmerIcu is now threatened less by conquering
sLuLes Lhun we ure by IuIIIng ones.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall the world has witnessed an unprecedented
frequency of the phenomenon of state failure and chaos that has resulted from
the disappearance of state institutions. Africa has accounted for an unfair share
of the failed states and this has led to some, such as Robert Bates (2008), to
concIude LhuL In IuLe-cenLury AIrIcu, LhIngs IeII uurL. The IIve Lo counLrIes In
the State Failure Index this year (2009) were from Africa and Somalia claimed
Lhe No. 1 sIoL on Lhe Index Ior u second yeur In u row (oreIgn PoIIcy, JuIyJAug
2009).
Somalia is commonly viewed as a symbol of the failed state because in this
unfortunate country the political mayhem coupled with the post-colonial state
in Africa has been exceptionally and deeply entrenched. Somalia has been
characterised as a unique case for complete collapse (Rothberg, 2002). A recent
report, after bringing up the problems associated with state failure and that it
needed Lo be uddressed, noLed LhuL no Iuce seems Lo uccenLuuLe Lhese worrIes
and validate the solution more than Somalia, the epitome of the failed state and
Lhe InsecurILy LhuL sLuLe IuIIure brIngs (HuIdn, zoo8). ConceIvubIy, SomuII
would have been viewed a particular cause for concern for all those interested in
the issue of state failure. However, the case of Somalia never attracted the
attention it deserved from the relevant actor and much less attention has been
paid to the case in academic debates and research.
98
His new neighbour on some occasions may be his former driver or body guard and the later
may be doing well socially and economically.
200
The main purpose of this research is to contribute to a better understanding of
the sources, processes, patterns, and actors of state failure, state collapse and
civil conflict. It does so by first providing a theoretical framework and then
analysing, with the logic of the theory, the root causes of the state collapse in
Somalia - the sole case of total collapse in our time.
This research departs from the assumption that the presence of the structural
factors, economic i.e. poverty and inequality, and (other) non-economic factors,
do not automatically drive violent clashes among the groups in a given polity.
Human motivation is assumed to play a central role in any conflict situation.
Previous studies that dealt with the human motives of civil war and state failure
could be grouped into two main categories: stateless approaches and predation
theories. The influential analyses of Collier and Hoeffler, cited in Chapter 1,
belong to the first group. The essence of statehood is missing from these
analyses. In the theory of economics, the state is either considered as a social
contract where the state is understood as an agent of the society as citizens or as
an instrument of exploitation for the elite where the state is viewed as an agent
of particular groups in the society. Neither society as citizens nor the state as a
political entity is given any meaningful consideration in these analyses. Collier
through his greed theory concentrated his attention on rebellion from some
small groups in the society that tend to gain from the lawlessness and social
dIsorder, uILhough socIeLIes us u whoIe suIIer economIcuIIy Irom cIvII wur, some
small identifiable groups do well out of it. They thus have an interest in the
initiation, perpetuation, and renewuI oI conIIIcL (CoIIIer, zooo). ThereIore, Lhe
presence of certain economic conditions in society - large natural resources,
high proportion of young men, and little education - generate a risk of civil war
and state failure. The role of the state as a provider of public goods such as
security or as a predator that generates violence or security for its own interest
is often missing from the analyses.
The shadow state theory initiated by William Reno, noted earlier, is the leading
version of the predation theories in conflict and state failure analyses,
particularly in Africa. This line of analysis departs from the assumption that the
state in Africa is predatory by nature. In other words, based on the `Qucsi Stctes'
notion of Robert Jackson, these theories assume that post-colonial states in
Africa where failed in nature and its leaders were like racketeers rather than
state leaders. Therefore, there are no analyses on the patterns that made the
state predatory. Furthermore, here the role of society as citizens is missing.
Political leaders are sole players of a one-sided game where there is no
bargaining power and retaliation from society. In other words, the country and
its resources are like a teashop owned by the political leaders. My argument
here is not to deny that political leaders, as far as national interests of their
countries are concerned, behaved like owners of a teashop. On the contrary,
these analyses make us understand to a great extent the essence of post-colonial
governance problems in Africa. My point is that it is useful to consider the
circumstances that provide these leaders such gigantic opportunities for
transforming the whole ownership of society into something like that owned by
a single person of group of individuals, before one considers the way they
behaved after they assumed power. The throne was not in their hands when
201
they born. Many of them were born and grew up in humbling circumstances.
The political power they assumed is in one way or another delegated to them by
their societies. Mohammed Siyad Barre, like Mobutu Sese Seko of the Congo,
did not make himself the Army Chief of Staff before he had overthrown the
elected regime. It was mainly through the established formal institutions in
society that in one way or another, made the delegation of such power
legitimate. Through these institutions Barre was appointed the Army Chief of
Staff. As the highest ranking officer in the national army the main purpose of
the delegation was to provide national security and prevent external
aggressions. But in order to fulfill such a huge task the most able institution of
violence in the society was brought under his command. The great danger of
delegation in any situation is that those to whom power is delegated may abuse
the power they receive and it is up to those who delegated their power to make
sure that their agents are effectively checked. The predation theories of conflict
put their emphasis on the way political leaders behave after they assume power.
Missing from the analysis, is that the process of assuming power is taken as
given and as such this is why society as delegator did not effectively control
those to which it delegated.
n hIs CuIro seech, oI June zooq, PresIdenL Buruk Obumu sLuLed LhuL In Lhe
middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a
democratically-eIecLed runIun governmenL. Muny InsLunces oI Lhe greuL
owers` InvoIvemenL In Lhe regIme chunge In AIrIcu`s IuIIed sLuLes ure weII-
known. PresIdenL EIsenhower`s uuLhorIsuLIon oI Lhe ussussination of the
democratically elected prime minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, in 1960
and the supporting of his subordinate, Mobutu, to assume and maintain power
is now well documented.
Futhermore, In the literature on state failure, the superpowers` susensIon oI
their support playing a major factor in this failure, and foreign aid and its effect
oI IeLLIng IncumbenL Ieuders enrIch LhemseIves und IurLher Ignore eoIe`s
demands are also noted. However, the role of foreign powers in conflict and
state failure deserves deeper attention. As the above passage reveals, foreign
countries, superpowers during the Cold War for instance, played a direct role in
the process of power appropriation in these societies. Furthermore, foreign
powers not only supported their allies to maintain power but also were asking
the regimes in question to perform certain tasks that might be detrimental to
the interests of their societies. Sometimes these tasks have strong implications
on state failure. Therefore, foreign powers` InvoIvemenL In Lhe conIIIcL needs Lo
be genuIneIy uddressed. RoLhberg (zooz) rIghLIy noLed LhuL desLrucLIve
decisions by individual leaders have almost always paved the way to state
IuIIure buL IL Is equuIIy Lrue LhuL some oI Lhe deudIIesL und mosL destructive
decisions originated in Washington, Moscow, and other big capitals of the
world.
This research, unlike the existing literature on the political economy of conflict,
departs from the social contract approach. Therefore, the state-society
relationship is analysed from the so-called principal-agent perspective. The
main argument here is that, people delegate their power to make political
202
decisions to state authorities. However, by manipulating the informational
advantage the state, as agent, possesses over the ordinary citizens, a given state
leader may turn the whole process to his advantage at the expense of the society
at large. To mitigate this problem, that of agency loss, citizens should be
prepared to incur further cost, agency cost. James Madison long ago recognised
Lhe robIem sLuLIng LhuL umbILIon musL be mude Lo counLerucL umbILIon. The
interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the
place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself,
but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external
nor internal controls on governmenL wouId be necessury (MudIson, 1;88).
Therefore, people as principals are required to be able to make sure that their
leaders are doing the right job. In other words they must keep their political
leaders accountable. In the democratic system formal political institutions, i.e.
election, separation, are mainly devised to do the job. In a non-democratic
format too there are some means for constraining the behaviour of the leaders,
such as revolutionary threats. The main argument here is that if society fails to
keep their leaders under effective check there is no guarantee that their leaders
are in offices for the advancement of the peace and prosperity of society. Thus,
the role and ability of the society is fundamental for the direction the conflict
over state control leads the country in general and the economy in particular.
In a situation were citizens are unable to control their leaders the political
leaders will choose actions that are beneficial to them even if these actions
undermine the welfare of the citizens. In incidents where leaders pursue actions
that are detrimental to the interest of the society in question the leaders are
predators rather than agents of their citizens. There might be situations where
citizens of a given polity are unable to keep their state leaders under control but
the leaders still behave in accordance with the interests of the society. However,
here other factors are replacing society to provide the required incentives for the
state to behave properly. Therefore, this research utilises predation theory, as
well as the social contract approach.
A fundamental query for development economics as a discipline is to find an
answer to why some countries achieve notable economic success while others
are relatively unsuccessful. One approach emphasises that the conflict over
control of the state is the critical factor that is responsible for the success and
strong economic performance of some countries and the relative failure or even
absolute decline of others. The argument is that the relative bargaining power of
rulers and society is essential in these results. The critical point here is who
determines the process of power appropriation and political survival: Is it the
society as citizens or sub-groups in the society who have the final say in this
respect? Therefore, the social contract approach of state failure is in line with
the wider subject matter of development economics. Factors that hinder or
enhance relative bargaining power of the citizens in its relation with the rulers
are mainly responsible for why some countries are rich while others remain
poor and why some states are strong while others failed or even collapsed.
203
Another advantage of this approach is that the roles of both the society and
foreign power could be brought into the analyses. A primary question in this
context is: Why do societies fail to keep their leaders under control? To answer
that question, the incentives available for each of the actors in the process
needed to be investigated. However, it is vital to pay careful attention to the
institutions that determine incentives and constrain the behaviours of these
actors. It is so, simply because actors respond to the incentives provided for
them and incentives are determined by the existing institutions.
This research considered three main informal institutions that determined the
behaviour of the actors that took part in the decay of the post-colonial state in
Somalia. These institutions were bad because they created incentives for
predators. These institutions rendered society in a very weak position in the
state-society relationship, where society became unable to mobilise any
mechanism, legal and extralegal, to control its leaders. The first of these
informal institutions is political tribalism that Somalia experienced throughout
its history as a modern state. The politicisation of the clan factor took its final
and mature form during the colonial period. Since then Somalis suffered a
severe collective action problem, and became a deeply divided society.
The Cold War is another informal institution in this analysis. During the Cold
War, African and Asian countries witnessed fierce competition for influence by
the United States and the Soviet Union. Based on how friendly or hostile local
political actors were to its own interests, each superpower developed its own
criteria for the Third World governments and movements. Undesired regimes
and groups were considered minority groups illegitimately imposing or
intending to impose its will on the majority, while friendly regimes and groups
were by default the legitimate forces representing the will of the majority of the
people in the concerned country. The attitude of the political leadership was
consIdered Lhe muIn deLermInunL oI u nuLIon`s wuy oI IIIe In Africa. Given the
state-society relationship the superpowers realised that the best strategy to
bring African nations on board was to help sympathetic political leaders. So
IeudershI chunge und survIvuI becume un ImorLunL Issue In Lhe suerowers`
involvement in these countries. Both sides were deeply involved in the internal
affairs of these nations by influencing leadership changes and survival, and
policy making-processes. By creating state dependence on foreign power, the
Cold War generated or encouraged conditions which were unfavourable to the
political and economic developments in these countries i.e. personal rule, neo-
patrimonial leadership, and divide-and-rule system. ThIs weukened socIeLy`s
bargaining power and, thus, its ability to control the behaviour of the elite.
Furthermore, each of the Cold War contenders encouraged policies and actions
which might be seen as strategic in its struggle, but had locally disastrous
impacts. Due to its geopolitical attraction, post-colonial Somalia became a
major hotspot of conflict between the Soviet Union and The United States. To
win this geopolitical struggle, both the US and the Soviet Union not only poured
substantial amounts of financial and military aid into Somalia, which became
another source of survival for political leaders, but participated in regime
changes and encouraged nationally disastrous policies and actions, such as the
formation of the SRSP and the Ogaden War.
204
Rather than strengthening formal political institutions, Somali political leaders,
as elsewhere in Africa, employed informal methods for power appropriation and
political survival. They employed a patrimonial system of leadership and, if
necessary, coercion. Together these two instruments form a divide-and-rule
strategy which enables leaders to maintain power while at the same time
pursuing policies costly to their societies. To remove an incompetent ruler from
power, people need to cooperate and overcome their collective action problems.
General Mohamed Siyad Barre, to remain in power, bribed segments of society
and selectively punished potential opponents and related groups. However,
social fragility was a precondition for this strategy to succeed. In Somalia the
politicised clan differences provided the opportunity for ambitious, political
entrepreneurs.
However, for leaders to carry out their divide-and-rule strategy an enormous
amount of resources are required; financial and military, for which the tax
revenues from the impoverished citizens is not sufficient. Alternatively, African
leaders exploited the natural resources of their countries and in addition
cultivated strategic alliances with the Cold War rivals, the superpowers. For
leaders of countries with limited resource endowment, such as Somalia, foreign
assistance was extremely important. Unpopular leaders established strategic
relationships with the US or USSR to defend their rule. In short, the road to
influence and power on the one hand depended upon the ability of the elite to
mobilise mass support where tribalism was a ready instrument to capitalise on
and the availability of a superpower patron for political, economic and military
suorL wus In some cuses eusIIy uvuIIubIe umong Lhe 'coId wurrIors`.
A word of caution is in order. My argument is not that this particular set of
informal institutions, tribalism or ethnicity, patrimonial style of leadership and
the Cold War, were responsible for the misery of all nations. On the contrary,
every society has its specific factors that limit its bargaining power against its
rulers. My oInL Is LhuL In every socIeLy Lhere Is un InsLILuLIonuI muLrIx LhuL
deIInes Lhe IncenLIve sLrucLure oI Lhe socIeLy und In socIeLIes LhuL IuIIed Lhe
dominant institutions are bad. A special feature of these bad institutions is that
they weaken the society and make it unable to keep its leaders under effective
check. Institutions with this quality are to some extent responsible for states to
fail and collapse. Furthermore, the same institutions may have different
attributes in different societies/times. Policies generated by the Cold War
struggle, for instance, positively influenced socioeconomic achievements of the
military government of Somalia in the early 1970s.
Therefore, before we look at the destructive policies and action of leaders and
other players in the failed states, it is very useful to understand the existing
institutions in the society in question and the incentive structure these
institutions generate.
205
7.1. Somalia failed and Botwsana Prospered
While Somalia is considered as a prime example of a collapsed state in the other
sIde oI AIrIcu`s deveIomenL secLrum Lhere Is BoLswunu, Lhe greuLesL economIc
success story in the continent. Here, for comparative perspective, the case of
Botswana is briefly considered. For about four decades Botswana achieved the
osILIon Lhe WorId`s IusLesL growIng economy und becume Lhe onIy muInIund
African state to have retained an unbroken record of liberal democracy since
Indeendence. (Thomson, zooo) However, when Lhe BrILIsh IeIL In 1q6 IL wus
one of the poorest countries in the world, i.e. this land locked Southern African
had per capita GNP less than US$100 dollars, there were only 12 kilometers of
paved road, 22 university graduates and 100 from secondary school. Why did
Botswana prosper? And why has Botswana been so successful? These are now
familiar research questions for political economists.
As Acemoglu et al. (2003) noted, there is almost complete consensus that
BoLswunu`s economIc success wus due Lo good oIIcIes. As u common erceLIon
in Africa is that good economics is often bad politics, this generates another
question: why did Botswana pursue good economic policies? Answering that
question these authors emphasize that Botswana was able to adopt sound
policies because it was the interest of the counLry`s oIILIcuI eIILes. ThereIore, Lhe
political elite, in contrast to their African counterparts, rather than undermining
formal institutions of governance, established good formal institutions,
particularly the institutions of property rights. And they dId so becuuse Lhey
inherited a set of institutional prerequisites that ensured that they would keep
their political power by pursuing good policies and placed restrictions on
InIIghLIng umong LhemseIves over oIILIcuI renLs.
Main institutions that Botswana inherited were good because they constrained
the behaviour of the political elite. Like Somalia, in pre-colonial Botswana there
were considerable incentive schemes for the political elite to be responsible.
Traditionally, the role and power of the chief were profoundly restricted.
AccordIng Lo eILh (zoo), Lo ersuude Lhe LrIbuI members Lo ucceL Lhe chIeI's
leadership for the common good an implicit bargain between the chief and his
people emerged. The chief provided leadership, but the people required
uccounLubIIILy. A romInenL unLhrooIogIcuI uccounL descrIbIng Lhe roIe oI Lhe
chIeI In Lhe LrIbuI socIeLy In BoLswunu noLed LhuL Lhe chIeI wus execLed Lo
watch over the interests of his subjects, and keep informed of tribal affairs
generally; he therefore spent much time daily at his kgotla (council place),
where anybody could approach him directly with news, petitions, and
complaints ... If his own conduct was unsatisfactory, he could be warned or
reprimanded by his advisers or at public assemblies; if he ruled despotically or
repeatedly neglected his duties, the people would begin to desert him, or a more
ouIur reIuLIve wouId Lry Lo ousL hIm by Iorce. (quoLed In eILh, zoo)
Fortunately, unlike Somalia, these institutions were not reversed during the
colonial administration in Botswana. The British Administration was very
modest and the continuity of traditional modes of leadership and accountability
were preserved. Both the Colonial Authorities and the chiefs were pleased by
206
this minimalist arrangement. The main duty for the Colonial Authority was to
protect the territory from external aggression and the chiefs were to govern
InLernuIIy In LheIr own IushIon (eILh, zoo). AnoLher ImorLunL resuIL oI LhIs
limited nature of the British administration was that, unlike other African
countries, indirect rule was not introduced in Botswana, and therefore, there
were no political elite with substantial power representing the British Empire.
(Acemoglu et al., 2003) In other words, the pre-colonial social contract between
the leaders and the society was conserved during the colonial rule. That social
contract was the foundations of the post-colonial governance in Botswana. And
IL Is obvIous LhuL BoLswunu`s economIc success und Lhe evoIuLIon oI ILs good
governance, to great extent, is a result of the continuation of these traditional
social institutions. (Leith, 2005, Acemoglu et al., 2003)
In addition, as noted earlier, in Somalia the social fragility created by the divide-
and-rule strategy employed by the colonial authorities was a precondition for
the patrimonial method used by the post-colonial Somali leaders to maintain
power while simultaneously pursuing policies costly to their society. In
Botswana colonial rule never employed a divide-and-rule strategy. Most
probably that method was not required since the relationship between
indigenous society with their leadership and the colonial administration was
relatively harmonious and consequently this allowed the persistence of the
culture of intertribal negotiations for dispute resolutions and cooperation
(Leith, 2005). Furthermore, post-colonial political elites in Botswana not only
kept away from employing divide-and-rule strategy but also have studiously
avoided exacerbating existing social fragility (Acemoglu et al., 2003).
Finally, it is obvious that the strategic competition between the United States
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War had no interference in the internal
uIIuIrs oI BoLswunu und Lhus noL obsLrucLed IuLLer`s oIILIcuI und economIc
development . Botswana remained pro-Western since its independence and its
relationship with Moscow was insignificant.
In sum, Botswana's exceptional success is explained in the first instance by the
economic policies that it pursued and these policies were fashioned by its post-
colonial leadership. On the one hand it was post-coIonIuI Ieuders` InLeresL Lo
pursue these pro-development policies and on the other hand efficient
IeudershI uccounLubIIILy wus In Iuce. The udvenL oI ndeendence In 1q66 dId
not halt the evolution of Botswana's politics and institutions; rather, with the
Constitution having set the "rules of the game," the political contest and the
institutional arrangements defining and constraining government now worked
within a new framework, uIbeIL one LhuL wus In keeIng wILh Tswunu LrudILIons.
(Leith, 2003)
The post-colonial Somali state, since its inception in 1960, was to achieve two
main goals: the socio-political unification of Somali peoples inhabiting the Horn
of Africa and socio-economic development. But neither of these goals were
secured by the civilian regimes that ruled Somalia between 1960-69. Post-
colonial Somali leaders rather than encouraging the formal institutions
formulated other strategies for survival. Scores of corruption and economic
207
mismanagement, and tribal manipulation by the political leaders were common
during the civilian rule. This unwise power struggle undermined the
governmenL`s erIormunce In uII secLors sInce Lhe IormuLIon oI Lhe reubIIc.
Somali society, although a democratic system of governance is formally
structured in Somalia, failed to utilise the basic instrumental objective of the
institutions of accountability, i.e. elections. Therefore, since there is no effective
system of accountability, the Somali electorate was unable to control their
leaders. Far worse, due to ethnic cleavages among the Somalis, they simply
became victims for political manipulations by the political elites.Prior to 1967,
in Somalia, the political struggle was mainly between Somali groups and
coalitions. However, since 1967, the superpowers played a crucial role in
determining the winning coalition among Somali groups. Washington, with the
intention oI reversIng Lhe SomuIIu`s IncreusIng LendencIes Lowurds Moscow,
involved itself in Lhe SomuIIu`s eIecLIon und oIIcy mukIng rocesses In 1q6;.
This involvement in the internal politics and leadership change worsened the
situation by contributing to the total erosion of Somali democracy, and enabled
a small group to monopolise political power and to install patrimonial rule in
the country. Consequently, the institutions of accountability were brought under
Lhe PrIme MInIsLer`s conLroI. The ruIIng urLy wus Lhe IIrsL vIcLIm oI Lhe
subordination, the parliament lost its role as an instrument of accountability,
and the Supreme Court was put under the control of an ally advocate. As
political institutions of democratic check and balances were undermined by the
state leaders, a system of personal rule established itself in Somalia, were almost
every state institution was abused.
After losing the election in June 1967 President Osman accepted the defeat and
gave up power in accordance with the formal political institution and became
the first African head of state to hand over power to a democratically elected
successor. But sadly in that election democracy was just on the surface, and
beneuLh IL WushIngLon`s Iong urm wus InIIuencIng Lhe emergIng wInnIng
coalition. Although there were many deficiencies in the governance system in
Somalia, institutions were not completely toothless and there were some
reformers, including Osman himself, in the political process. After the 1967
eIecLIon, und AmerIcu`s InLervenLIon, reIormers were undermIned und IormuI
institutions vanished. The Somali state was at the verge of collapse in 1969, and
for most of the Somalis and many well informed non-Somalis the military
intervention, no matter what the intention was of those involved, was perceived
as an act of salvaging the nation.
In October 1969, through a military cou d`eLuL, Burre overLhrew Lhe eIecLed
governmenL. By ussumIng ower, Lhe mIIILury regIme ubroguLed SomuIIu`s
formal democratic rule, nullified the parliamentary system of governance, and
undermined civil liberties. For its survival the regime successfully brought
Moscow to its side, eliminated political opponents and established authoritarian
rule. The Soviets, on the other hand, to build a socialist society decided to help
reform Somali society and thus supported the development aspects of the
country. n LhuL resecL Moscow`s objecLIves coIncIded wILh Lhe InLeresL oI Lhe
Somalis as citizens. Therefore the regime was mainly to pursue a single task
208
which was socio-economic development. In addition, the regime sought to
improve the welfare of society. Furthermore, the regime mobilised the society to
ruIIy behInd IL Lhrough Lhe vIsIon oI resLorIng eoIe`s dIgnILy, guIdIng Lhem Lo
their true Somali characteristics and creating a nationalism of oneness. As a
response to the failure of the civilian governments, Somalis welcomed the
military coup and the vast majority of the society voluntarily supported the
regime.
As a result, significant socio-economic development was accomplished during
Lhe IIrsL IIve yeurs oI Lhe regIme`s ruIe. Muny secLors oI Lhe economy
significantly improved. In the livestock sector, the most important sector in the
Somali economy, the export earning of the sector increased dramatically. The
manufacturing sector was negligible in 1969, but by the early 1970s about 20
percent of the counLry`s exorLs were munuIucLured goods. n Lhe
communications and transportation sector significant work was carried out. In
the social sector, two main targets of the regime were to liquidate illiteracy and
to create a written form of the Somali language. The latter was achieved in 1972
and in the same year Somali became the sole official language in the country. In
the following year, a successful literacy campaign was undertaken in the urban
centers. Furthermore, total school enrolment dramatically increased from less
than 50 thousand in 1971 to about 220 thousand pupils in 1975. Other notable
developmental programmes were also carried out during this period. In light of
this, the military rule, in its first phase, could be characterised as an agent of its
citizens. To a great extent the coincidence of interests between the Soviet Union
und SomuII socIeLy und Lhe socIeLy`s suorL Ior Lhe regIme wus resonsIbIe Ior
these achievements.
n Lhe 1q;os Lhe SovIeLs, unhuy wILh Lhe regIme`s erIormunce on Lhe reform
process, took two measures that alienated its interests from that of the Somalis.
Firstly, Moscow put great pressure on the regime to establish a vanguard
socialist party. That made Barre worry for his future because his power base
would be weakened if an ideal Marxist party was established and in response he
started several countermeasures in order to survive. In short, rather than
establishing a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party he formed a party of his own.
Secondly, Moscow decided to dramatically increase its presence in Somalia and
to do so it shifted its focus from social reform to the Greater Somalia issue and
therefore encouraged the war between Somalia and Ethiopia. However, it soon
ceased supporting the war between Somalia and Ethiopia because a pro-Soviet
military junta took the power in Ethiopia. This further aggravated its relations
with the military leadership in Somalia. The United States took the opportunity
und sLurLed wooIng Burre`s regIme Irom Lhe SovIeL cum. To do so WushIngLon
replaced Moscow by encouraging war between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somali
leaders believed that Washington was offering a more rewarding alternative,
expelled the Soviets from Somalia and abrogated the relationship treaty with the
Soviet Union. Consequently Somalia and Ethiopia clashed in a battle, with
Somalia being badly defeated.
209
The regIme`s ubundonmenL oI socIo-economic development and the defeat in
the war marked the end of the social contract between the regime and society.
Somalis as citizens realised that the government failed to achieve either of the
two main goals: socio-economic development and unification. Soon after the
Ogaden War and the Soviet departure, longtime dormant contenders started to
challenge the regime. Unsuccessful military coupes were staged and armed
opposition groups were setup.
Barre, on the other hand, decided to survive at any cost and formed a
patrimonial network for control. He employed the well-known divide-and-rule
policy based on clan manipulation. By doing so Barre abandoned his interest
with Somalis as citizens and relied on particular client groups and in short, the
military regime became an instrument of a ruling elite. To maintain his power
and carry out his policies Barre sought to bring Washington to his side.
Economic predation and social antagonism was the order of the day.
The American administration, unlike the Soviets, was not concerned about the
socioeconomic wellbeing of the societies. It limited its task, by using the
strategic bases in Somalia, and preventing the regime from falling. Using its
good offices it also facilitated a friendly relationship between the regime and the
other Western countries and international organisations such as the United
Nations, World Bank and IMF. Until 1986, the United States and its allies
provided military and economic assistance that enabled the regime to survive
and the regime provided the US military bases it needed to safeguard its interest
in the region.
The rise of Gorbachev and the introduction of glasnost and perestroika marked
the beginning of the end of the Cold War with decreased tension between the
two superpowers. Consequently, Somalia started to lose its geopolitical value.
Washington, like its allies, withdrew its assistance from the regime.
Coincidently, Barre was severely injured in a car accident in 1986 and this raised
the issue of who would succeed the ailing dictator, and created mounting
tension and wiped out the cohesion among loyal groups of Barre. In addition,
opposition factions intensified their struggle. The role of Somali society, as
principal, broke down after the Ogaden defeat and never recovered.
WushIngLon`s ubundonmenL murked, IIke Lhe revIous deurLure by Lhe SovIeLs,
the failure of the principalship of the US to Barre. However, unlike the
departure of the Soviet Union, in this period there was no superpower
interested in salvaging the regime. The military regime collapsed and the post-
colonial state in Somalia collapsed as well.
In short, due to the incentive structure generated by the informal institutions,
the formal state institutions fell apart. The formal economy and its institutions
were among those that collapsed rapidly. Here the way the players acted, in
interaction with the prevailing institutions, led to the deterioration of the
economy and the income bases of the players. This unfortunate outcome led
players to further their economic predation, which again weakened the income
opportunities available to all, and led the players to further intensify their
predation, and so on. Hence, a kind of vicious circle emerged; for instance, state
210
leaders pursued bad economic policies. In order to enrich themselves, Somali
leaders provided economic opportunities for their clients, and/or financed the
war against opposition groups by employing destructive strategies that led to
the deterioration of the economy. This in turn weakened the income bases for
both the elite and the ordinary citizens as state employers, farmers,
entrepreneurs, etc. The state leaders then had to find new objects and strategies
for predation. On their part, the ordinary employers, soldiers, farmers, etc.
followed suit by delving deeper into corruption and other economic
mismanagement or by leaving their professional occupations. These further
weakened the economy and consequently generated more predation, and so on.
This process persisted until the formal economy collapsed completely.
Political tribalism or ethnic politics extends the tenure of the incumbent if
employed by the incumbent leaders and increases the probability of gaining
office if used by the opposition. In this sense clan politics rewards pro-
failure/antidevelopment policies and actions, but gives no reward for pro-
development behaviour. However, it increases the probability of conflict if
simultaneously used by the incumbent and opposition. In this sense clan politics
provides incentives for state collapse. However, presence of ethnic/clan fragility
in the societies made ethnic/clan politics attractive for ambitious political
entrepreneurs. Informal rules or norms of struggle during the Cold War led the
superpowers to reward pro-failure/antidevelopment policies and actions in
Africa and Asia. States fail and collapse because of the destructive policies and
actions of their leaders. Leaders pursue destructive decisions simply because
they are responding to pro-failure incentives and constraints offered by a set
of dominant (in)formal institutions. These institutions are pro-failure/
antidevelopment institutions because they provide the highest payoffs to the
destructive policies and actions by political leaders.
211
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EKONOMI OCH SAMHLLE
Skrifter utgivna vid Svenska handelshgskolan
ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY
Publications of the Hanken School of Economics
178. OANA VELCU: Drivers of ERP Systems Business Value. Helsinki 2008.
179. SOFIE KULP-TG: Modeling Nonlinearities and Asymmetries in Asset Pricing.
Helsinki 2008.
180. NIKOLAS ROKKANEN: Corporate Funding on the European Debt Capital Market.
Helsinki 2008.
181. OMAR FAROOQ: Financial Crisis and Performance of Analysts Recommen-
dations. Evidence from Asian Emerging Markets. Helsinki 2008.
182. GUY AHONEN (Ed.): Inspired by Knowledge in Organisations. Essays in Honor of
Professor Karl-Erik Sveiby on his 60
th
Birthday 29
th
June 2008. Helsinki 2008.
183. NATAA GOLIK KLANAC: Customer Value of Website Communication in
Business-to-Business Relationships. Helsinki 2008.
184. ANNIKA SANDSTRM: Political Risk in Credit Evaluation. Empirical Studies and
Survey Results. Helsinki 2008.
185. MARIA SUOKANNAS: Den anonyma seniorkonsumenten identifieras. Om
identitetsskapande processer i en marknadsfringskontext. Helsingfors 2008.
186. RIIKKA SARALA: The Impact of Cultural Factors on Post-Acquisition Integration.
Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions of Finnish Companies in 1993-2004. Helsinki
2008.
187. INGMAR BJRKMAN et al. (Eds.): Innovation, Leadership, and Entrepreneurship.
A Festschrift in Honour of Professor Martin Lindell on his 60
th
Birthday. Helsinki
2008.
188. JOACIM TG: Essays on Platforms. Business Strategies, Regulation and Policy in
Telecommunications, Media and Technology Industries. Helsinki 2008.
189. HENRIK TTTERMAN: From Creative Ideas to New Emerging Ventures.
Entrepreneurial Processes Among Finnish Design Entrepreneurs. Helsinki 2008.
190. ANNIKA RAVALD: Hur uppkommer vrde fr kunden? Helsingfors 2008.
191. TOM LAHTI: Angel Investing in Finland: An Analysis Based on Agency Theory and
the Incomplete Contracting Theory. Helsinki 2008.
192. SYED MUJAHID HUSSAIN: Intraday Dynamics of International Equity Markets.
Helsinki 2009.
193. TEEMU TALLBERG: The Gendered Social Organisation of Defence. Two Ethno-
graphic Case Studies in the Finnish Defence Forces. Helsinki 2009.
194. JONAS HOLMQVIST: Language Influence in Services. Perceived Importance of
Native Language Use in Service Encounters. Helsinki 2009.
195. ENSIO ER-ESKO: Beskattningsrtt och skattskyldighet fr kyrkan i Finland.
Steuerrecht und Versteuerung der Kirche in Finnland. Mit einer deutschen
Zusammenfassung. Helsingfors 2009.
196. PIA BJRKWALL: Nyttighetsmodeller: ett ndamlsenligt innovationsskydd?
Helsingfors 2009.
197. ARTO THURLIN: Essays on Market Microstructure: Price Discovery and Informed
Trading. Helsinki 2009.
198. PETER NYBERG: Essays on Risk and Return. Helsinki 2009.
199. YANQING JIANG: Growth and Convergence: The Case of China. Helsinki 2009.
200. HANNA WESTMAN: Corporate Governance in European Banks. Essays on Bank
Ownership. Helsinki 2009.
201. CATHARINA von KOSKULL: Use of Customer Information. An Ethnography in
Service Development. Helsinki 2009.
202. RITVA HYKINPURO: Service Firms Action upon Negative Incidents in High
Touch Services: A Narrative Study. Helsinki 2009.
203. SUVI NENONEN: Customer Asset Management in Action. Using Customer
Portfolios for Allocating Resources Across Business-to-Business Relationships for
Improved Shareholder Value. Helsinki 2009.
204. CAMILLA STEINBY: Multidimensionality of Actors in Business Networks. The
Influence of Social Action in Pharmacy Networks in Finland. Helsinki 2009.
205. JENNIE SUMELIUS: Developing and Integrating HRM Practices in MNC
Subsidiaries in China. Helsinki 2009.
206. SHERAZ AHMED: Essays on Corporate Governance and the Quality of Disclosed
Earnings Across Transitional Europe. Helsinki 2009.
207. ANNE HOLMA: Adaptation in Triadic Business Relationship Settings. A Study in
Corporate Travel Management. Helsinki 2009.
208. MICHAL KEMPA: Monetary Policy Implementation in the Interbank Market.
Helsinki 2009.
209. SUSANNA SLOTTE-KOCK: Multiple Perspectives on Networks. Conceptual
Development, Application and Integration in an Entrepreneurial Context. Helsinki
2009.
210. ANNA TALASMKI: The Evolving Roles of the Human Resource Function.
Understanding Role Changes in the Context of Large-Scale Mergers. Helsinki 2009.
211. MIKAEL M. VAINIONP: Tiering Effects in Third Party Logistics: A First-Tier
Buyer Perspective. Helsinki 2010.