Special Assessment - A real property tax proportionately levied on homeowners and landowners to cover the

costs of improvements that will be for the benefit of all upon whom it is imposed.
For example, a special assessment might be made to pay for sidewalks or sewer connections.
Special Assessments - The first definition refers to fees that Homeowners Associations will charge to
owners to cover the costs of building repair that exceed the amount in the current budget. Upcoming
special assessments are required to be included in the CC&Rs for a condo building, so read them
carefully to make sure you understand what you could pay for if you decide to buy a unit. Buyers
receive the CC&Rs within a week after submitting an offer on a unit in the building.
-

special assessments refers to dues that the local city government charges on homeowners for
utilities, road maintenance, and other services like fire protection and street lighting.

a tax levied by a local government on private property to pay the costof local public improvements, as s
idewalk construction or sewagedisposal, that are of general benefit to the property taxed.

P/CPL. GUILLERMO SARABIA, PNP, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 142024, July 20, 2001
This is a petition for review of the decision, dated October 29, 1999, and resolution, dated March 6,
2000, of the Court of Appeals[1] affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 48,
which affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Tagbilaran, finding petitioner Guillermo
Sarabia guilty of grave coercion, and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The facts are as follows:
On June 23, 1991, at around 8 oclock in the evening, complainant Josephine Picos-Mapalad and
her then boyfriend, complainant Anastacio Mapalad (now the formers husband), were dating at one of
the grandstands inside the Garcia Sports Complex in Tagabilaran City.[2] Petitioner Sarabia, then a
member of the city police force, on that particular evening was passing by the Garcia Sports Complex
on his way to his house. He was carrying with him his service gun and flashlight. He saw the two
lovers and focused his flashlight on them.[3]
According to the prosecution, petitioner, with intimidation, pointed his gun at the two lovers and
forced them to perform sexual acts against their will. Petitioner then extorted P100.00 from
them. Petitioner made complainant Anastacio Mapalad buy him a cigarette outside the complex, and,
while he was gone, petitioner forced complainant Picos-Mapalad to masturbate his
penis.[4] Afterwards, petitioner allowed complainants to leave with the threat that he would kill them if
they reported the incident to anyone. The following morning, complainants went to Panglao and
stayed there for several days to recuperate and to decide what action they would take. With the help of
their relatives, they reported the matter to the police. As a result, three informations for grave coercion
were filed against petitioner.[5]
Petitioner denied the allegations against him. He claimed that he merely confronted complainants
and directed them to go home as the place was dangerous. At this point, complainant Picos-Mapalad
allegedly screamed at him and told him that he had no business telling them what to do, as they were
in a public place and they could do whatever they wanted. Petitioner repeated his warning that he
would take them to the municipal hall if they did not leave. Still, complainants refused to leave and
continued calling him names. To avoid any altercation with them, petitioner left and headed
home.[6] Petitioner vehemently denied the accusations leveled against him by complainants.
Three criminal informations against petitioner for grave coercion were filed in the Municipal Trial
Court of Tagbilaran City, which resulted in the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 4399, 4400, and 4401 in that
court. On November 27, 1996, the Municipal Trial Court, Branch I, Tagbilaran City, rendered a
decision convicting petitioner. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
one crime of Grave Coercion in the three above-entitled cases and therefore hereby CONVICTS him
and sentences him to the penalty of SIX MONTHS of Arresto Mayor and a FINE of P500.00; to pay the
offended parties the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and to pay the costs.[7]
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, the three criminal cases were raffled to two salas of
the court. Criminal Case Nos. 4399 and 4400 (re-docketed as RTC Criminal Cases No. 9729 and 9731)
were assigned to Branch 1, while Criminal Case No. 4401 (re-docketed as RTC Criminal Case No. 9730)
was assigned to Branch 47.[8]
In an Omnibus Decision,[9] dated June 17, 1997, Branch 1 of the RTC of Bohol affirmed the decision
of the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 4399 and 4400. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration questioning the said decision. On the other hand, Branch 47 of the RTC of Bohol
ordered the transfer of the records of Criminal Case No. 9730 to Branch I of the same court to be
consolidated with Criminal Case No. 9729 and 9731. However, on December 29, 1997, the judge of
Branch I inhibited himself from hearing the three consolidated cases without resolving petitioners
Omnibus Motion in Criminal Case Nos. 9729 and 9731 and without rendering a decision on Criminal
Case No. 9730. The three cases were finally raffled off to Branch 48 of the RTC.
In an Omnibus Decision, dated August 3, 1998, Branch 48 of the RTC of Bohol affirmed in toto the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court. In its Omnibus Order, dated August 28, 1998, it likewise denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

As stated at the beginning, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed in
toto the decision of the lower court. It subsequently denied reconsideration of its decision. Hence this
petition.
First. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals decision, affirming the decisions of the lower
courts, and its resolution, denying his motion for reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion because the conclusions of law drawn therefrom vis--vis the facts clearly established during
the trial on the merits are gravely erroneous. He insists that when he saw complainants in the sports
complex, he merely directed them to go home. When they refused, he proceeded home.[10]
Petitioner also claims that complainants testimonies are replete with contradictions which put
their credibility in serious doubt. According to petitioner, complainant Picos-Mapalad testified in court
that the day after the incident in question, she went with Anastacio Mapalad to Panglao and stayed
there for three days, but Anastacio Mapalad testified that they stayed in Panglao for one week before
coming back to Tagbilaran City. Complainant Picos-Mapalad also testified that Anastacio Mapalad
had an erection when they were having sex upon petitioners demand and that he ejaculated during
their intercourse. Anastacio Mapalad, on the other hand, denied having had an erection or ejaculating
during the incident.
Petitioner claims that both complainants repeatedly contradicted what they stated in their
respective affidavits and testimonies. It is alleged that complainant Picos-Mapalad variously testified
that she was already married to Anastacio Mapalad on the night of the incident; but later admitted that
they were just sweethearts when the incident happened; and that she executed her affidavit three days
after June 23, 1991, while records showed that it was executed more than a week after said
date. Complainant Anastacio Mapalad likewise testified that he executed his affidavit on June 30, 1991,
when in fact he executed it on July 2, 1991. He also stated in his affidavit that Josephine PicosMapalads relatives reported the incident to the authorities, but testified later on in court that it was he
and Josephine who really reported the incident. He also contradicted his affidavit, wherein he stated
that he and Josephine Picos-Mapalad had been sweethearts for two years before the incident, when he
testified that they had been together for four years, which he subsequently changed to three years.
It is contended that under the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, inasmuch as the
complainants lied and contradicted their statements many times, it is safe to conclude that they also
lied about their other statements to the prejudice of petitioner.
Petitioner belabors the fact that complainants did not report what happened to the authorities right
away when they had every opportunity to do so. Petitioner insists that it was surprising why
complainant Mapalad did not report the matter to the police when he could have done so when he was
ordered by petitioner to buy cigarettes. It was equally surprising, according to petitioner, why both
complainants stayed in Plaza Rizal after the incident, instead of reporting what happened to the police
station, when the station was only a stones throw away from the Plaza. Private complainants spent a
week in Panglao after the incident. Petitioner asks why they did not report what happened to anyone,
but instead waited until after returning to Tagbilaran before approaching the police. It is also puzzling
how complainant Picos-Mapalad could have gotten pregnant as a result of the sexual intercourse she
had with Anastacio Mapalad on the night of the incident when, according to the latter, he neither had
an erection nor ejaculated that night when they were having sexual intercourse.
Given all the above contradictions and variances between private complainants testimonies and
affidavits, petitioner would have this Court believe that the entire incident, upon which the charges of
grave coercion are based, has been entirely fabricated by complainants so that petitioner would pay for
having investigated Josephine Picos-Mapalads brother in an earlier criminal case.
We do not agree.
The basic issue presented in this case centers on the credibility of complainants. It is settled that
when a conviction hinges on the credibility of witnesses, the assessment of the trial court is accorded
the highest degree of respect. Absent any compelling reason to depart from this established rule,
factual conclusions reached by the lower court, which had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the
demeanor of the witnesses while on the witness stand, should not be disturbed.[11]
Petitioner was apparently trying his best to pick out each and every trivial inconsistency which he
could find in the complainants testimonies in an attempt to discredit them. Such a move betrays
desperation in argument. An erroneous reckoning or misestimation of time, such as that which
complainants committed by giving different time periods as to how long they stayed in Panglao or
varying estimation of the length of time that they had been sweethearts prior to the incident in
question, is too trivial and immaterial to discredit their testimonies, especially in this case where time is

not an essential element or has no bearing on the fact of the commission of the crime. [12] As aptly stated
by the Solicitor General:
. . . Josephine Mapalads claim on the length of time she and Anastacio Mapalad had spent at Panglao
after the incident may be at variance with the time asserted by Anastacio Mapalad; but this is a
collateral matter and did not detract from the fact that they did go to Panglao after the
incident. Josephine Mapalads claim that Anastacio Mapalad had an erection and ejaculated when they
were forced by petitioner to copulate may be at variance with Anastacio Mapalads claim on the same
matter; but this contradiction did not detract from the material fact that they were indeed forced by
petitioner to copulate. Inconsistencies on minor or collateral matters in the testimony of prosecution
eyewitnesses regarding the same event(s) do not affect their credibility; but rather are
strong indicia that their testimon[ies] are unrehearsed and indeed true (Cortez v. Court of Appeals, 245
SCRA 198, 204-205 [1995]).[13]
The same applies to the other inconsistencies in complainants testimonies pointed out by
petitioner. These inconsistencies can hardly affect complainants credibility. They refer to matters of
minor detail or to the precise sequence of events that do not detract from the central fact that petitioner
compelled complainants to perform sexual acts at gunpoint against their will, on which the latter had
consistently and candidly testified. The testimonial discrepancies could have been caused by the
natural fickleness of human memory, which tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they
erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.[14] When complainants testified, more than four years had
elapsed from the time the incident in question took place. Considering this fact, it would have been
doubtful if complainants had been able to pinpoint or describe with precision the exact sequence of
events. Josephine and Anastacio Mapalads conflicting statements in respect of the details occurring
immediately after the crime may have resulted from the length and tedium of their cross-examination
at the hands of petitioners counsel. In this connection, the Municipal Trial Court aptly observed:
It is true that under rigid cross-examination by defense counsel, private complainants blundered and
gave somewhat contradictory and inconsistent statements. But these seeming inconsistencies are
hallmarks of sincerity. Sense and experience of men tell us that honest and truthful witnesses do not
coincide in the narration of events swiftly occurring before them, especially trifling details. Such minor
contradictions do not affect their credibilities and even strengthen the probative value of their
testimonies. (Flavio de Leon, et al., vs. People of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 66020, June 22,
1992).[15]
Equally without merit is petitioners assertion that the discrepancy between the complainants
affidavits and testimonies in court affects their credibility. While there may exist a variance between
some statements of complainants in their affidavits and their testimonies in open court, the alleged
inconsistencies are more apparent than real. It is to be expected that complainants would give a more
detailed narration in their testimony before the trial court of how petitioner forced them at gunpoint to
have sexual intercourse. Such fact, it is evident, does not necessarily signify that their open court
testimonies conflict with their affidavits.
The contradiction between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness may be explained by the
fact that an affidavit will not always disclose all the facts and will oftentimes and without design
incorrectly describe, without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated. As an
affidavit is taken ex-parte, it is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestions, and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the
witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of
the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject. It
has thus been held that affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations
because the former are often executed when the affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as to
afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Moreover,
affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind because they are generally
prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read
to him.[16]
The defense makes much of the fact that complainant failed to report the incident to anyone until
several days after the commission of the crime. We do not believe that an adverse implication can be
drawn from such failure. The non-disclosure by witnesses to police officers of petitioners identity
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not necessarily against human experience. [17] The
natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors,
as in the case of Josephine Picos-Mapalad and petitioner, is a matter of judicial notice.[18] As the trial
court said, complainants cannot be faulted for this considering that their tormentor was no ordinary

delinquent but a city policeman. He threatened complainants at gunpoint that he would harm them if
they reported the matter to anyone. Complainants are both unschooled. At the time of the commission
of the crime, Josephine Picos-Mapalad was a 17-hear old laundry woman, while Anastacio Mapalad
was a simple grocery bagger. It needs no stretch of the imagination that when petitioner threatened to
kill them if they reported the matter to the authorities, they believed entirely and utterly that he could
and would make good on his threat.
Second. Finally, petitioner raises the plea of double jeopardy. He contends the incident which gave
rise to this case is also the subject of a criminal case for robbery with violence against or intimidation of
person wherein he was convicted, and which is now on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
There is no merit to this contention.
To raise the defense of double or second jeopardy, the following elements must be present: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
With respect to the third element, under Rule 117, 7 of the Rules of Court, the test is whether one
offense is identical with the other or whether it is an attempt or frustration of the other or whether one
offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. On the other hand, Rule 120, 5
provides:
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes that
which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in
the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.
The third requisite, identity of offenses, is absent in this case. The crime for which petitioner now
stands charged is not the same as the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of person
for which he was convicted. Neither is the former an attempt to commit the latter or a frustration
thereof. And the former crime does not necessarily include, and is not necessarily included in, the first
crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
October 29, 1999, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139857

September 15, 2006

LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221,
affirming with modification the April 15, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa
through falsification of commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999 Resolution3 denying the motion
for reconsideration.
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its
Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits
from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans
were discovered.4
Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against
Batulanon, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 3625
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused being then the
manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing
the aff[a]irs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out
loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the
cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document,
namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao by then and there
making an entry therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine
Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing
that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan and
received the amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was never granted a loan,
never received the same, and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in
furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and
there release to herself the same and received the loan of P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and
convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,160,
Philippine Currency.5
Criminal Case No. 3626
That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused being
then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of
managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying
out loans to members taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the
cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document,
namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and there
making an entry therein that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00 and by
signals on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion showing that she received
the loan, thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan, received the loan
of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a loan, never received the same,
and never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal
intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the
same and received the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use
and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the
damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 3453

That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being
then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of
managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of the same and paying
out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the
cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document,
namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and
there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed
deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of P3,500.00, thus making it
appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by
the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and was never granted
loan and after the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there
again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the
signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan of
P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never received the loan, and
in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and
there release to herself the same, and received the amount of P3,500, and thereafter, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit
the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage
and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P3,500, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 3627
That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being
then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the duty of
managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of, the same and paying
out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the
cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document,
namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and
there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis Batulanon had a
fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 thus
making it appear that the said person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was granted a
loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never
granted loan and offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and
there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon by
signing therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it appear that the said Dennis
Batulanon received the loan of P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon never
received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said
accused did then and there release to herself the same and receive the loan of P5,000, and thereafter,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own
personal use and benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands, refused and still refuses to restitute
the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P5,000, Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.
Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as
witnesses.
Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash
vouchers9 testified that on certain dates in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing
varying amounts to four different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 30A10 for
P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 237A11 for
P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda12 Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher No. 276A13 was released

to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis
Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A.14
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan
because they were not bona fide members of the cooperative.15 Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was a
member of the cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for a loan with PCCI in 1982. She
subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983.16 Medallo stated that pursuant to the cooperative's
by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans.17
Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their
respective cash vouchers and made it appear in the records that they were payees and recipients of the
amount stated therein.18 As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared that
the same was actually the handwriting of appellant.19
Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since 1979. He
corroborated Medallo's testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not
members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanon's sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her
son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to
minors.20
Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its Chairman in
1982 until 1983. He testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon
did not pass through the cooperative's Credit Committee and PCCI's Board of Directors for screening
purposes. He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is Batulanon's
handwriting.21 Jayoma also testified that among the four loans taken, only that in Arroyo's name was
settled.22
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was presented as a hostile
witness and Batulanon.
Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to bring with her
the PCCI General Journal for the year 1982. After certifying that the said document reflected all the
financial transactions of the cooperative for that year, she was asked to identify the entries in the
Journal with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify only Cash Voucher No.
237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other vouchers because the Journal
had missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the entries.23
Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the
names of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in her
presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the money to them;24 that the three were
members of the cooperative as shown by their individual deposits and the ledger; that the board of
directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the correctness of the entries
in the vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release loans and
dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence;25 that she signed the loan application
and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified that she asked
Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of irregularity;26 that contrary to
the testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative provided they are
children of regular members.
Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name because she is no longer qualified for
another loan as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying off her son's loan
but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after the cases were filed in court.27 She also
declared that one automatically becomes a member when he deposits money with the
cooperative.28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative did not have
by-laws yet.29
On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the cooperative had
been registered since 1967.30
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in all the above-entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4 months of ARRESTO
MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum
of P16,660.00 with legal interest from the institution of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.31
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA BATULANON is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayormaximum, AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify
the Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred sixty (P13,160.00),
plus legal interests from the filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature was
allegedly forged, thus the prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion
and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an unreliable and biased witness such as
Medallo.33 She avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an element prejudice
to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions because these
loans are accounts receivable by the cooperative.34
The petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial
document, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private document under the well-settled rule
that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the
technical name given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v. People,35 we held:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. x x x That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else,
should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in
the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real and important question to him is, "Did you
perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not, "Did you commit a crime named murder?" If he
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and
fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he
ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those
acts constitute.
The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 236 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7,
Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the
falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause
such damage.37
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act38 of falsification falls under paragraph 2 of
Article 171,i.e., causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in
Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee of the amounts appearing in the
corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they obtained a loan and received its
proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash
vouchers.

The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the name
of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a loan from
the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the former is a member, she did
not apply for a loan with the cooperative.
Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in
the vouchers and made it appear that the amounts stated therein were actually received by these
persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallo's credible testimony and her familiarity with the
handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the name of Arroyo.
Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the persons whose
signatures were forged as Medallo's eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence showing that
Medallo was prompted by any ill motive.
The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an admission of
guilt is untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases, except
those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan
transactions are reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only
grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not
members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in Ferlyn
Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to avoid legal
prosecution with the understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the money is collected
from Batulanon.39
The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not
commercial documents because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote
or facilitate trade or credit transactions41 nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce
or other commercial law.42Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined as deeds or
instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of other person
legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. 43
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime
charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime
necessarily included therein.44 The prosecution in this case was able to discharge its burden completely.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document,45 it is important to
ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa.
If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to
be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a
document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,46 the accused made it
appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days
during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the
offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused
misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of
falsification of private document.
In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn
ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the
falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article
pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,48 the accused
presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of
P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in
obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private document.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.
Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty should
be imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to
four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, Batulanon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the
range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.49 Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626
and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, which is within the
range of the allowed imposable penalty.
Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she shall suffer the
aforementioned penalties for each count of the offense charged. She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI
the amount of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of the 3 loans without deducting the
amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as the same was settled with the understanding
that PCCI will reimburse the former once the money is recovered. The amount shall earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality of this
judgment. From the time the decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per
annum until its satisfaction.
However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not falsification.
Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification are the following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact
made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such
original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original;
or;
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis
Batulanon's signature in the cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the name of
her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner
Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by: lbatulanon" to indicate
that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the
modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used
the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from
PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not
attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI
is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error
for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of falsification of private document
with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the cash voucher of Dennis.50
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code are:
(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return, the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial
on his part of such receipt;

(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;

(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element is not
necessary when there is evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)51
Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,52 the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The
latter, a treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds of the
company and used it for personal purposes. He replaced said cash with his personal check of the same
amount drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to his cashier not to deposit the
same in the current account of the Manila Rail Road Company until the end of the month. When an
audit was conducted, the check of appellant was discovered to have been carried in the accounts as
part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his account,
although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with the PNB sufficient sum to
cover the check. In handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary element
of the form of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion of
trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious:
Grave as the offense is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the intention of
defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the
defalcation is discovered. x x x
Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the necessary elements of
estafa x x x. That the money for which the appellant's checks were substituted was received by him for
safe-keeping or administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was the responsible financial
officer of the corporation and as such had immediate control of the current funds for the purposes of
safe-keeping and was charged with the custody of the same. That he, in the exercise of such control and
custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates,
the cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted on his own responsibility, might also have
misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty of estafa.
Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds entrusted to
him for safekeeping and substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks
were to be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the
funds for that period. The checks did not constitute cash and as long as they were retained by the
appellant or remained under his personal control they were of no value to the corporation; he might as
well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to retain them.
But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to permanently
misappropriate the funds to himself. As we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of
this nature and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of the crime. Though authorities have
been cited who, at first sight, appear to hold that misappropriation of trust funds for short periods does
not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this interpretation of the law to cases where
officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their own use, especially where, as in this case, the
corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and makes no distinction between
permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no reason in the present case why it
should not be applied in its literal sense.
The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury to another. The appellant's
counsel argues that the only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the Railroad Company
during the period the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is, however, well settled by former
adjudications of this court that the disturbance in property rights caused by the misappropriation,
though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of paragraph 5,
supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.)53
In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for
administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she
fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her
misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted
receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is reflected in the
records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum
misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other

productive undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaono's
misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Article 315.
Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable provision is
paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period toprision correccional in its minimum period, where the amount defrauded is over
P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There being no modifying circumstances, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period. With the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is
entitled to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three counts of
falsification of private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, for each
count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the amount of
P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this
judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its
satisfaction; and
(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative
Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994
until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this
judgment until its satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
Batulanon vs people of the Philippines502 scra 35 september 15, 2006
Crime: falsification of private document (estafa)
Facts: This petition assails the October 30,1998 decision of the ca in ca-gr no.1524,affirming with
modification the april 15, 1993 decision of the rtc of generalsantos city, convicting leonila batulanon
of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The complainant Polomok Credit cooperative
incorporated(PCCI) employed batulanon as its cashier/manager from may 1980 up to December11,
1982. she was incharge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to themember of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certainirregularities concerning the release of loans were
discovered. Thereafter, four informations of estafa thru falsifications was filed.
Issue: Does the crime of falsification of private documents require as an element prejudice to a third
person
Ruling: There is no merit in batulanons assertion that pcci has not been prejudiced because the loan
transaction are reflected in its books as accounts receivable therefore, there exists prejudice in the
amount which pcci would have received but was unable to because of batulanons actions.

MARISSA CENIZA-MANANTAN,
- versus THE PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 156248

August 28, 2007

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner
Marissa Ceniza-Manantan prays for the reversal of the Decision,[2]dated 29 August 2001, and
Resolution,[3] dated 26 November 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23676, affirming
with modification the Decision,[4] dated 30 July 1999, of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. Q-97-72787, finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa as defined
and penalized under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 1 August 1997, petitioner Marissa Ceniza-Manantan (Manantan) and her sister-in-law,
Regina Manantan-Vizconde (Vizconde), were indicted in an Information[5] forestafa under paragraph
1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the period comprised from July 15, 1994 to September 3, 1994,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
one ALBERTO CARILLA, in the following manner to wit: the said accused, pursuant to their
conspiracy, received in trust from said complainant several pieces of jewelry
worth P1,079,000.00, Philippine Currency, for the purpose of selling the same on commission
basis under the express obligation on the part of the said accused of turning over the proceeds
of the sale to said Alberto Carilla, if sold, or of returning the same if unsold to said complainant,
but the said accused, once in possession of the said items, far from complying with their
obligations as aforesaid, with intent to defraud, unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence,
failed and refused and still fails and refuses to fulfill their aforesaid obligation despite repeated
demands made upon them to do so, and instead misapplied, misappropriated and converted
the same or the value thereof, to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said Alberto Carilla, in the aforesaid amount of P1,079,000.00, Philippine Currency.
On 2 December 1998, Manantan was arrested whereas Vizconde remained at large. When
arraigned on 5 March 1999, Manantan pleaded Not Guilty to the charge.[6] Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are summarized in the Comment dated 4 July 2003 of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), to wit:
Herein private complainant, Alberto Carilla, is a jeweler whose office is located
at Aurora
Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.
Sisters-in-law
Regina Manantan-Vizconde and
Marissa Ceniza-Manantan entered into an agreement with Carilla that they would act as the
latters agent in selling the pieces of jewelry worth P1,079,000.00. They received the jewelry in
trust with the obligation to sell them within two (2) weeks and remit the proceeds to private
complainant within another two (2) weeks or to return them within the same period if they
were unable to sell. The sisters-in-law would earn any amount that they would add to the
selling price.
After the lapse of the above-mentioned period, accused sisters-in-law failed to remit the
purchase price or return the pieces of jewelry. As such, Carilla made verbal demands for their
return or the proceeds of the sale. After several verbal demands, the sisters-in-law issued
several checks. Regina Manantan-Vizconde issued thirteen (13) postdated checks, while
MarissaCeniza-Manantan issued four (4) postdated checks.
Upon maturity of the checks, Carilla deposited the checks to his bank account. But to his
dismay, the checks were dishonored for the reason that the account from which the checks were
drawn had been closed. The checks that were still to fall due were stamped on their face
account closed.

Carilla thus sought the help of a lawyer who made out a written demand upon the
accused through their counsel. But despite this, the two accused still refused to pay.
Hence, Carilla was constrained to file a criminal complaint.[7]
Manantan denied the foregoing accusations. In her Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss
dated July 1996,[8] Manantan alleged that Carillas filing of estafa case against her was a mere
harassment suit as Carilla desperately tried but failed to recover from her the jewelries allegedly
entrusted to her and to Vizconde; that Vizconde borrowed several checks from her after Vizconde ran
out of her own checks; that Vizconde told her that the borrowed checks will only be shown to
the formers customers or other persons from whom she received jewelries so as to convince them that
she had collections; and that Vizconde promised to return the checks. During her direct examination
before the RTC,[9] Manantan denied that she had any business transaction with Carilla. Manantan also
disclaimed any knowledge as to how the four dishonored checks in her name came into the possession
of Carilla.
On 30 July 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting Manantan of estafa under paragraph
1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused MARISSA CENIZA-MANANTAN, GUILTY of
the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under par.1 (b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of, there being no mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TWELVE (12)
YEARS, andONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, and EIGHT (8) MONTHS,
as maximum, of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period.
Further, the award of civil liability is appropriate as the preponderance of evidence
sanctioned by the Rules has been satisfied, the accused Marissa Ceniza-Manantan is ordered to
payP1,079,000.00 as actual damages.[10]
Aggrieved, Manantan filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On 29 August 2001, the
appellate court promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the assailed RTC Decision. The
modification pertains to Manantans period of imprisonment as provided under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. The decretal portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. Q-97-72787 is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification that accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.[11]
Manantan filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit by the
appellate court in its Resolution dated 26 November 2002.
Hence, Manantan filed the instant Petition. In our Resolution dated 10 March 2003,[12] we denied
the Petition due to Manantans (a) failure to state the material dates showing when the notice of the
assailed decision and resolution were received and when the motion for reconsideration was filed
thereby violating Sections 4(b) and 5 of Rule 45, in relation to Sec. 5(d) of Rule 56; and (b) failure to
indicate in the Petition the counsels roll number as required in Bar Matter 1132. Manantan filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which we subsequently granted in our Resolution dated 7 May
2003.[13] The petition was then reinstated.
Manantan proffered the following issues[14] for our consideration:
I.
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH FINDINGS THE COURT
OF APPEALS AFFIRMED, THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, CONSIDERING INTER ALIA THAT
NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE CHARGED, SPECIFICALLY
CONSPIRACY AND THE ALLEGED CONTRACTUAL RELATION (i.e., THE RECEIPT IN
TRUST BY PETITIONER OF CERTAIN PIECES OF JEWELRY FROM PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT), WERE ESTABLISHED.

II.
MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT
MISERABLY FAILED AND/OR REFUSED TO DISCHARGE HIS BOUNDEN DUTY TO HIS
CLIENT. STATED DIFFERENTLY, SAID COUNSELS INCOMPETENCE WAS SO GREAT
AND SO EXECRABLE THAT, IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, AT LEAST A
NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE ORDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IF ONLY TO AFFORD
PETITIONER THE CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND
HERSELF WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL OF HER
OWN CHOICE. THE AFORESAID FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL OF HER COUNSEL WERE
A VIRTUAL GIVEAWAY TO THE PROSECUTION TO SEND HER TO THE GALLOWS. THE
CONSEQUENCE WAS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
Anent the first issue, Manantan alleged that the RTC conducted only one hearing where the
prosecution presented only one witness, which was Carilla himself, and thereafter rested its case; that
the said lone hearing was abbreviated at the expense of the rights and liberty of Manantan; that the
direct testimony of Carilla, upon which the RTC based its conviction of Manantan, consisted only of
five double-spaced pages as shown in the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN); and
that Manantans guilt cannot be proven on the basis of the few questions propounded by the private
prosecutor on Carilla and Manantan.[15]
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
The prosecution presented the lone court testimony of Carilla as its testimonial
evidence. Carilla testified that Manantan and Vizconde agreed to be his agents in selling jewelries;
that Manantan and Vizconde received from him in trust jewelries with the obligation to sell them
within two weeks from receipt thereof, and to remit the proceeds to him within two weeks after the
sale or to return the jewelries in case they were not sold; that Manantan and Vizconde would earn from
any amount that they would add to the original sale price of the jewelries fixed by him; that after the
expiration of the stipulated period, Manantan and Vizconde failed to remit to him the proceeds of the
sale of the jewelries or return the unsold jewelries themselves; that he made several verbal demands
on Manantan and Vizconde to remit the proceeds of the sale of the jewelries or return the unsold
jewelries; that Manantan and Vizconde issued to him postdated checks as supposed payment of the
sales proceeds of the jewelries; that these checks were dishonored by reason of Account Closed;
that Manantan and Vizconde failed to make good the value of the dishonored checks despite his
repeated demands for them to do so; and that by reason of the foregoing, he instituted the instant case
against Manantan and Vizconde.
The prosecution also offered documentary evidence to buttress Carillas court testimony. It
introduced Carillas Complaint-Affidavit
dated 11
March
1996 which
recounts
how Manantan and Vizconde had swindled Carilla of the jewelries.[16] This Complaint-Affidavit was
admitted as part of Carillas direct testimony.[17] It also submitted the dishonored checks issued
by Manantan[18] to prove that the jewelries were still unpaid for, and the demand-letters[19] sent
by Carilla to Manantan, to substantiate the latters persistent failure to comply therewith.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
On the other hand, the defense presented Manantan as its sole witness. No documentary
evidence was utilized.[20]
Manantan conjured denials and alibi in support of her contentions. Manantan denied having
any transaction with Carilla. She claims that she lent the dishonored checks toVizconde as the latter
was running out of checks; that she had no idea as to how the dishonored checks came into the
possession of Carilla; and that Carilla had an ill motive to accuse her of a crime since Carilla failed to
recover from her the alleged entrusted jewelries.
The threshold issue is, whose evidence is credible?
It is axiomatic that truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their
testimonies.[21] In the determination of the sufficiency of evidence, what matters is not the number of
witnesses but their credibility and the nature and quality of their testimonies.[22] The testimony of a

lone witness, if found positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction
especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity. While the number of
witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
not necessarily with the greatest number.[23]
Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered; hence, it is not at all uncommon to reach a
conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. Conviction of the accused may still
be had on the basis of the positive and credible testimony of a single witness.[24]
Verily, the prosecution presented only one witness, who was Carilla himself as the
complainant. However, we find the latters testimony consistent with his Complaint-Affidavit dated 11
March 1996, which was positive and categorical. The RTC and the Court of Appeals both
found Carillas testimony credible and truthful.[25]
More telling are the documentary evidences consisting of various checks issued
by Manantan which later bounced and the demand letters of Carilla addressed to Manantan. Although
the admissibility of these checks was objected to by Manantan during the trial, the RTC, nevertheless,
admitted them as part of the testimony of Carilla.
The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.[26] This is more true if such findings
were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.[27]
In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense consists mainly of denials. Manantan denied
having transacted with Carilla. Beyond her bare denials, however, she has not presented any plausible
proof to successfully rebut the evidence for the prosecution.
It is jurisprudentially settled that as between bare denials and positive testimony on affirmative
matters, the latter is accorded greater evidentiary weight.[28]
The next question now crops up were the elements of estafa for which Manantan is
charged proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1.

With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any

other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
The elements[29]of estafa in the above provision are as follows:
a) That money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of
or to return the same;
b) That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt; and
c) That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.
The essence of estafa under this paragraph is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received, to the prejudice of the owner thereof. It takes place when a person actually
appropriates the property of another for his own benefit, use and enjoyment.[30] In a prosecution
for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion; and
failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation.[31]

All of the foregoing enumerated elements of estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, are duly established herein.
First, Manantan received in trust the jewelries from Carilla for the purpose of selling them
within two weeks from receipt thereof; and to remit the proceeds to Carillawithin two weeks after the
sale or to return the jewelries in case they were not sold. It was also agreed that Manantan will earn
from any amount that she would add to the original sale price of the jewelries fixed by Carilla. This, in
effect, created a fiduciary relationship between Carilla and Manantan.
The absence of a written document showing receipt of jewelries or other property in trust does
not necessarily mean that no such contract exists between the parties. Contracts can be made verbally
for as long as there is a meeting of the minds of the parties thereto.[32] Carilla positively and
categorically testified on the transaction that transpired between him and Manantan.
Second, there is misappropriation or conversion by Manantan of the jewelries or the proceeds of
the sale thereof, as well as a denial on her part of receipt of the jewelries.
The words misappropriate and convert as used in the said provision of law connote an act
of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.[33]
In an agency for the sale of jewelries, as in the present case, it is the agents duty to return the
jewelry upon demand of the owner and failure to do so is evidence of conversion of the property by the
agent. In other words, the demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the
accused to account for it are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. However, this presumption
is rebuttable. If the accused is able to satisfactorily explain his failure to produce the thing delivered in
trust or to account for the money, he may not be held liable for estafa.[34]
Manantan misappropriated Carillas properties, which she held in trust, by failing to remit the
sale price of the jewelries or return the same to Carilla upon the expiration of the stipulated period,
despite repeated demands by the latter. Manantan issued checks to Carilla as supposed payment of the
sales proceeds of the jewelries but these checks were dishonored. Carilla hired a lawyer and sent a
demand-letter to Manantan but the latter still failed to turn over the jewelries or the sale prices
thereof.[35]
As already heretofore pointed out, failure to account upon demand for the return of the thing
delivered in trust raises a presumption of misappropriation. Manantans bare denials are not sufficient
to overcome such presumption.
Estafa may also be committed by denying untruthfully that the thing was
received.[36] Manantan denied having received jewelries from Carilla. However, as we have already
determined, such denial is unsubstantiated and therefore cannot prevail over the categorical
declarations
of Carilla that
the
jewelries
were
turned
over
in
trust
toManantan. Hence, Manantans denial of the receipt of jewelries also constitutes estafa.
Finally, Manantans failure or refusal to account for or return the jewelries to Carilla had
evidently prejudiced the rights and interests of the latter. Not only did Carilla fail to recover his
investment, but he also lost the opportunity to realize profits from the sales of the
jewelries. Carilla further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the present case.[37]
Apropos the second assignment of error, Manantan seeks a new trial because her former counsel,
Atty. Donato A. Mallabo (Atty. Mallabo) of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), was incompetent and
had failed to discharge his duty as her defense counsel resulting in a denial of due process to her. She
claims that Atty. Mallabo asked Carilla only a few questions during the latters cross-examination and
did not conduct a re-cross examination; that after the prosecution had rested its case, the RTC Presiding
Judge inquired from Atty. Mallabo if he would file a motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence, which
was already a hint of the weakness of the prosecutions evidence, but Atty. Mallaboignored the
question and presented, instead, Manantan as sole witness for the defense; and after a few perfunctory
questions to Manantan, already rested the case for the defense.[38]
Settled is the rule that mistake and negligence of a counsel bind his client. The basis is the tenet
that an act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as
an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of a counsel may result in the rendition of
an unfavorable judgment against his client.[39]

A contrary view would be inimical to the greater interest of dispensing justice. For all that a
losing party will do is to invoke the mistake or negligence of his counsel as a ground for reversing or
setting aside a judgment adverse to him, thereby putting no end to litigation.[40] To allow this
obnoxious practice would be to put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by
accused persons and their counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction.[41]
Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or
irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof; and failure to introduce
certain evidence, to summon witness and to argue the case are not proper grounds for a new
trial.[42] Error of the defense counsel in the conduct of the trial is neither an error of law nor an
irregularity upon which a motion for new trial may be presented.[43]
Concededly, the foregoing rule admits of exceptions. Hence, in cases where (1) the counsels
mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) the
counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the clients deprivation of liberty or property without
due process of law, the client is not bound by his counsels mistakes, and a new trial may be
conducted.[44]
Tested against these guidelines, we find that Manantans case falls within the general rule
rather than the exceptions.
It is true that Atty. Mallabo asked only few questions during the cross-examination
of Carilla. Quoted hereunder is Atty. Mallabos cross-examination of Carilla:
Court:
Cross.
Atty. Mallabo:
With the permission of this Honorable Court.
Court:
Proceed.
Atty. Mallabo:
Q:
You are a jeweler, sir?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Where is your office?
A:
876-C Aurora Blvd., sir.
Q:
Is it a single proprietor or a corporation?
A:
I am only an agent, sir.
Q:
You are only an agent, you do not actually own it?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
And therefore, you do not own that jewelry and you are not the owner of those jewelry, is that correct?
A:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Mallabo: That will be all for the witness, Your Honor.[45]
It appears from the foregoing that Atty. Mallabos questions were aimed at proving
that Carilla was not the owner of the subject jewelries. It can be reasonably deduced from the questions
that Atty. Mallabos strategy in securing petitioners acquittal was to display the absence of the element
of prejudice or damage on the part of Carilla. Notably, however, the questions were confined to the
issue of the ownership of jewelries.
Despite the preceding, Atty. Mallabo cross-examined Carilla and conducted a direct
examination of Manantan. Atty. Mallabo also interposed several objections during the re-direct
examination of Carilla and challenged the admissibility of the dishonored checks as evidence for the
prosecution.[46] Atty. Mallabo even moved for the dismissal of the charge against Manantan.[47]
Admittedly, Atty. Mallabo committed mistakes and shortcomings in conducting examinations
on Carilla and Manantan and in assessing the proper and sufficient evidence for the
defense. Nonetheless, such cannot be considered as recklessness or gross negligence on his part,
because there was neither a total abandonment nor a disregard ofManantans cause or a showing of
conscious indifference to or disregard of consequences.[48] If at all, the mistakes and omissions of
Atty. Mallabo may only be considered as simple negligence or a slight want of care that circumstances
reasonably impose.
As regards the prison term of Manantan, a perusal of the pertinent provision of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code is in order:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of two, not three, periods, in which case,
Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal
portions of time included in the penalty imposed forming one period of each of the three
portions.[49] Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the
penalty given are:
Maximum 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium 5 years, 5 months, 11 days, to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days
In the present case, since the amount involved is P1,079,000.00, which exceeds P22,000.00, the
penalty imposable should be the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
of prision mayor. Article 315 further states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for
every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess ofP22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty
which may be imposed exceed 20 years. The amount swindled from Carilla greatly exceeds the
amount of P22,000.00 which, when translated to the additional penalty of one year for every P10,000.00
defrauded, goes beyond 20 years. Under the law, the maximum penalty to be imposed in the present
case should be 20 years of reclusion temporal.[50]
We now apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law in computing the proper penalty. Since the
penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against Manantan is prisioncorrecional maximum
to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum to
medium periods. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months, while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be 20 years.[51]
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing a prison term of 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
We also sustain the indemnification of actual damages in favor of Carilla in the sum
of P1,079,000.00 made by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals as this is supported by the
records[52] of the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 29 August 2001 and
Resolution dated 26 November 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23676 are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs. SO ORDERED.

JOY LEE RECUERDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 133036, January 22, 2003
Before us for review is the July 16, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 20577
affirming that rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City which in turn
affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67 convicting Joy Lee
Recuerdo (petitioner) for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on 5 counts.
From the evidence of the prosecution, the following facts are established:
Sometime in the first week of December 1993, Yolanda Floro (Yolanda) who is engaged in jewelry
business sold a 3-karat loose diamond stone valued at P420,000.00 to petitioner who gave a
downpayment of P40,000.00. In settlement of the balance of the purchase price, petitioner issued 9
postdated checks, 8 of which in the amount of P40,000.00, and 1 in the amount of P20,000.00, all drawn
against her account at the Prudential Bank.[1]
When Yolanda deposited 8 of the 10 checks to her depository bank, Liberty Savings and Loan
Association, only 3, those dated December 25, 1993, January 25, 1994, and February 25, 1994, were
cleared. The remaining 5 were dishonored due to the closure of petitioners account.[2]
Yolanda thus went to petitioners dental clinic and advised her to change the dishonored checks to
cash. Petitioner promised alright but she welshed on it.[3]
A demand letter[4] was thereupon sent to petitioner for her to settle her obligation but she failed to
heed the same,[5] hence, the filing of 5 informations[6] against her for violation of B. P. 22 at the Makati
MeTC, the accusatory portion of the first of which reads:
That sometime in the first week of December, 1993, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, drawn (sic) and issue to YOLANDA G.
FLORO to apply on account or for value the check described below:
Check No.
Drawn Against
In the Amount of
Postdated/dated
Payable to

- 008789
- Prudential Bank
- P40,000.00
- July 25, 1994
- Cash

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said account did not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or
to make arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
Except for the check numbers and dates of maturity, the four other informations are similarly
worded.
After trial, Branch 67 of the Makati MeTC convicted petitioner in a Joint Decision [7] the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on five (5) counts and therefore sentences the accused to suffer
an imprisonment of 30 days for each count and to restitute the amount of P 200,000.00 to Miss Yolanda
G. Floro, which is the total amount of the five (5) checks, and to pay her also the amount of P20,000.00
as damages to compensate the payment of attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[8]
As stated early on, the RTC, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the MeTC.[9] And the Court of
Appeals[10] affirmed that of the RTC.
In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioner proffers as follows:
1. Petitioner was convicted by an invalid law which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for being an
unconstitutional law.

2. Petitioner was denied her constitutional right to due process for failure of the courts a quo to uphold
her presumption of innocence and for convicting her even if the prosecution evidence does not prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The findings of fact of the courts a quo, primarily the Court of Appeals, are based on surmises,
conjectures and speculations.
4. The Court of Appeals was biased against petitioner when it denied the petition moto propio (sic)
without the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.[11]
Petitioner contends that since banks are not damaged by the presentment of dishonored checks as
they impose a penalty for each, only creditors/payees are unduly favored by the law; that the law is
in essence a resurrected form of 19th century imprisonment for debt since the drawer is coerced to
pay his debt on threat of imprisonment even if his failure to pay does not arise from malice or fraud or
from any criminal intent to cause damage;[12] and that the law is a bill of attainder[13] as it does not
leave much room for judicial determination, the guilt of the accused having already been decided by
the legislature.[14]
These matters subject of petitioners contention have long been settled in the landmark case
of Lozano v. Martinez[15] where this Court upheld the constitutionality of B. P. 22:
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
The contention that B. P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflicts punishment without trial and
the essence of which is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt,[17] fails. For
under B. P. 22, every element of the crime is still to be proven before the trial court to warrant a
conviction for violation thereof.
Reinforcing her thesis, petitioner cites the speech made by now Vice-President Teofisto Guingona
delivered before the Philippine Bar Association wherein he stressed the need to review the law since it
has not prevented the proliferation of bouncing checks.[18]
As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, however, while due deference is given to the opinion
of the Vice-President, the same should properly be addressed to the legislature which is in a better
position to review the effectiveness and usefulness of the law.[19] As held in the case of Lozano,[20] it is
not for the Court to question the wisdom or policy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus
exists between the means and the end.
Petitioner further claims that the dishonored checks were not issued for deposit and
encashment,[21] nor was there consideration therefor, in support of which she cites her alleged
agreement with Yolanda that she could have the stone appraised to determine the purchase
price,[22] and since she found out that it is only worth P160,000.00,[23] there was no longer any need to
fund the remaining checks which should be returned to her.[24] Yolanda, however, so petitioner adds,
could no longer be reached.[25] Petitioner thus concludes that she had already paid in full the purchase
price of the stone, she having paid P40,000.00 cash plus the P120,000.00 proceeds of the three cleared
checks.[26]
Petitioners submission does not lie. Such alleged agreement does not inspire belief. The terms
and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are irrelevant.[27]
A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended for encashment, has the same effect like
any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.P. 22, which is explicit that any person who makes
or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x which check is subsequently
dishonored x x x shall be punished by imprisonment.[28] (Emphasis supplied.)
BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties,
its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being
virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the

reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an
appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
Additionally, petitioner argues that as no bank representative testified as to whether the
questioned checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds (sic), such element was not clearly
and convincingly proven,[30] hence, the trial court failed to uphold her right to presumption of
innocence when she was convicted based on the sole testimony of Yolanda.
Whether the checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, or Account Closed as alleged
in the informations and testified on by Yolanda,[31] petitioners argument is untenable.
It is not required much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee banks
representative as a witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks because of insufficiency of
funds. The prosecution may present, as it did in this case, only complainant as a witness to prove all
the elements of the offense charged. She is competent and qualified witness to testify that she
deposited the checks to her account in a bank; that she subsequently received from the bank the checks
returned unpaid with a notation drawn against insufficient funds stamped or written on the dorsal
side of the checks themselves, or in a notice attached to the dishonored checks duly given to the
complainant, and that petitioner failed to pay complainant the value of the checks or make
arrangements for their payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Yolandas testimony that when she deposited the checks to her depository bank they were
dishonored due to Account Closed[33] thus sufficed. In fact, even petitioners counsel during trial
admitted the dishonor, and on that ground.[34]
Finally, petitioner imputes bias on the part of the appellate court when it decided her petition for
review without the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.
The rendition of the decision by the appellate court without the comment of the People-Appellee is
not by itself proof of bias. In any event, the Office of the Solicitor General gave its comment on
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts decision.
In fine, the affirmance of petitioners conviction is in order.
Under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, imprisonment need not be imposed on those found
guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 issued on February 14, 2001 vests in
the courts the discretion to determine, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each
case, whether the imposition of fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether
forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on
the social order, or otherwise contrary to the imperatives of justice.[35]
In the case at bar, this Court notes that no proof, nay allegation, was proffered that petitioner was
not a first time offender. Considering this and the correctness of the case, it would best serve the
interests of justice if petitioner is just fined to enable her to continue her dental practice so as not to
deprive her of her income, thus insuring the early settlement of the civil aspect of the case, not to
mention the FINE.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision
JOY LEE RECUERDO guilty of violating
MODIFICATION.

of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is AFFIRMED with

In lieu of imprisonment, accused-herein petitioner JOY LEE RECUERDO, is ordered to pay a FINE
equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the five cases at bar. And she is
also ordered to pay private complainant, Yolanda Floro, the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos representing the total amount of the dishonored checks.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus JUAN CABBAB, JR.,

G.R. No. 173479

July 12, 2007

Before the Court on automatic review is the decision[1] dated February 22, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968 which affirmed, with modification, an earlier decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 687, finding appellant
Juan Cabbab, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
Attempted Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo[2] which modified the provisions of the Rules of
Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was
earlier[3] referred to the CA, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01978, for appropriate
action and disposition.
The Case
In the court of origin, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., along with his cousin-in-law Segundino Calpito,
was charged with the crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery in an
Information[4] alleging, as follows:
That on or about April 22, 1988, in Sitio Kayawkaw, Barangay Kimmalasag, Municipality of San
Isidro, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with the intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, while armed with a firearm
(not-recover), conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shot from ambush WINNER AGBULOS and
EDDIE QUINDASAN, consequently inflicting thereby multiple gunshot wounds on the different parts
of their bodies, killing Winner Agbulos on the spot and causing the death of Eddie Quindasan shortly
thereafter, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, shot William Belmes,
said accused having commenced the execution of Murder by overt acts but were unable to perform all
the acts of execution, which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence thereof, due
to alertness of victim William Belmes to roll and poor marksmanship of the accused thus prevented his
death, then and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously, with the intent of gain, take, steal and
carry away the money of Winner Agbulos in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00),
Philippine currency..
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstance of: (1) uninhabited place.
On arraignment, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and accused Segundino Calpito separately entered
their pleas of Not Guilty to the crimes charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, in the course of
which the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of M/Sgt. Godofredo Tubadeza, a police
investigator at Camp Villamor, Bangued, Abra; PO William Belmes, a member of the Integrated
National Police at the Villaviciosa Police Station; Vidal Agbulos, father of the victim Winner Agbulos;
Dra. Leona Garcia-Beroa, medico-legal officer who conducted an autopsy on the body of Winner
Agbulos; and Dr. Godofreco Gasa, a physician at the Abra Provincial Hospital.
For its part, the defense presented the appellant himself; accused Segundino Calpito; and George
de Lara, a Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The Evidence
The Peoples version of the incident is succinctly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in its Appellees Brief,[5] to wit:
In the morning of 22 April 1988, father and son Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together
with Eddie Quindasan, Felipe Abad and Police Officer (PO) William Belmes, went to Barangay
Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra to attend a fiesta celebration. Upon arrival in the area, they found out
that the fiesta celebration was already over, thus, they decided to go home in Villaviciosa, Abra. Since it
was already lunchtime, the group took their lunch at Sitio Turod, located in the same area of Barangay
Kimmalasag. After taking their lunch and on their way home, they were met by accused-appellant Juan

Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino Calpito who invited them to play pepito, a local version of the game of
russian poker.
Only Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan played pepito with the group of accusedappellant. Winner Agbulos played the dealer/banker in the game while accused-appellant and
Segundino Calpito acted as players therein. Around 3:00 oclock p.m., PO William Belmes told Winner
Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan that they should be going home after three (3) more deals. About 3:30
p.m., Winner Agbuloss group wrapped-up the game and were set for home together with his
group. Winner Agbulos won the game.
While walking on their way home from Sitio Turod, PO William Belmes, who was behind
Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan picking-up guava fruits from a tree, saw accused-appellant,
accused Segundino Calpito and a companion running up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw
Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, who were then walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire.
By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a canal to save himself from the continuous gunfire of
accused-appellant. PO William Belmes ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad, who were walking
behind the group, and informed the two that Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were ambushed
by accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito. The three (3) proceeded to the crime scene where they
saw the dead body of Winner Agbulos together with Eddie Quindasan whom they mistook for dead.
The three sought help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and returned to the scene of the crime
where they found Eddie Quindasan who was still alive and who narrated that it was Juan Cabbab, Jr.
and Segundino Calpito who ambused them and took the money, estimated at P12,000.00, of Winner
Agbulos which he won in the card game. Eddie Quindasan was brought to
the Abra Provincial Hospital but died the following day.
Postmortem examination of Winner Agbulos showed that the cause of his death was cardio
respiratory arrest secondary to hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds. On the other hand,
Eddie Quindasans cause of death was cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock due
to multiple gunshot wounds.
For the defense, appellant himself took the witness stand claiming that in the morning of April 22,
1988, he went to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends Romeo, Demetrio and Restituto, all
surnamed Borreta. He stayed there almost the entire day and left only at around 5:00 p.m. He arrived
home in Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra at around 5:30 p.m. He declared that his co-accused Calpito was
not with him that day. He likewise averred that he did not know prosecution witnesses PO William
Belmes and Vidal Agbulos nor did he know of any motive for them to testify against him.
Appellants co-accused Calpito denied having committed the crimes charged. He testified that at
around 8:30 a.m. of April 22, 1988, he went fishing at Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra until 4:00 a.m. of
the following day.
George de Lara, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, testified that he conducted an examination on the
paraffin cast taken from appellant to determine the presence of gunpowder residue or nitrates on
appellants hands. The results of the said examination showed that appellant was negative of nitrates.
He opined that certain factors may affect the result of the test such as perspiration, wind velocity,
humidity or the type of gun used. He also theorized that a paraffin test would yield a negative result if
fertilizers or cosmetics are applied to the hands before the cast is taken.
The Trial Courts Decision
In a decision[6] dated August 26, 1997, the trial court acquitted Segundino Calpito but found
appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty of two crimes, i.e. (1) robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted
murder. Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
double murder with robbery or better put, robbery with double homicide and attempted murder as
defined in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 294 of the same Code or robbery with
double homicide defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Same Code with
aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place with no mitigating circumstances and sentences him
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the killing of Winner Agbulos and for robbing the said
victim after killing him and for the killing of Eddie Quindasan. The court likewise finds the accused
Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the attempted murder defined and penalized in

Art. 48 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. These offenses attended by the aggravating
circumstance of uninhabited place with no mitigating circumstances and sentence him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to FOUR
(4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum.
He is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims P50,000.00 for each of them plus P20,000.00
also for each of them as actual expenses and finally, the amount of P100,000.00 also for each of them as
moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
Accused Segundino Calpito is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
The records of the case were then transmitted to this Court on automatic review. As stated at the
onset hereof, the Court, in its Resolution[7] of January 17, 2006 and pursuant to its ruling in People v.
Mateo,[8] referred the case and its records to the CA for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968.
In a decision dated February 22, 2006, the CA modified the trial courts decision and found
appellant guilty of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and imposed upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA also affirmed appellants conviction, as well as the penalty
imposed, for the separate crime of attempted murder.
From the CA, the case was then elevated to this Court for automatic review. In its
Resolution[9] of September 20, 2006, the Court resolved to require the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs.
In a Manifestation dated November 16, 2006, the OSG, in behalf of appellee People, informed the
Court that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief and was merely adopting its appellees brief before
the CA as its supplemental brief.
Appellant, on the other hand, filed on December 18, 2006 his supplemental brief on the lone
assigned error, that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE
OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
VERSION IS MORE CREDIBLE AND SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
Insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant pleads
for acquittal. He avers that the witnesses for the prosecution failed to positively identify him as the
perpetrator of the crime as they did not actually see him shoot the victims. Appellant also relies on the
results of the paraffin test showing that he was negative of gunpowder nitrates.
The appeal must fail.
Appellants contention that the witnesses for the prosecution failed to identify him as the
perpetrator of the crime is belied by the testimony of PO William Belmes, who was with the victims
when the incident happened. We quote from the transcripts of the stenographic notes:
William Belmes on Re-direct Examination
FISCAL FLORES:
Q.

Mr. Witness, when you gave your statement on April 30, 1988, exactly eight (8)
days after the incident when the incident wherein you were investigated upon
still very very fresh in your mind (sic). Now, in your statement which you gave
to the investigator, Pat. Tubadeza, you stated that you saw the persons shot at
Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan and after the two (2) had fell down then
you also likewise saw them shot at you at the time you were rolling to the
ground. Do you affirm and confirm this statement of yours which you
subscribed before Fiscal Ricarte Valera?

ATTY. YANURIA:
Your Honor, it is misleading, we object, in so far as the shooting of Eddie
Quindasan and Winner Agbulos was not seen. He only saw the persons who
were firing at him namely: Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito.
COURT:
In his testimony before the court he testified before the court that he saw Juan
Cabbab and Segundino Calpito shot at Eddie Quindasan and Winner
Agbulos. Reform the question.
FISCAL FLORES:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

However, you saw these two (2) accused, Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito
shoot at you?
Yes, sir.
Will you tell the court if how far were these two (2) accused when they were
firing at you?
Eight (8) meters, sir.
And therefore what time is it when they were firing at you?
If Im not mistaken it was 4:00 oclock in the afternoon.[10]
William Belmes on cross-examination

ATTY. YANURIA:
Q.
A.

In other words, it was you being shot out by Segundino Calpito and Juan Cabbab
but you did not see them shoot at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan?
I saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino fire at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan
(the witness using the word banat) and when they already fell down, they
continued firing attempt and in my case I rolled and they also fired at me.[11]

The above testimony adequately showed that Belmes was able to look at and see appellant at the
time he perpetrated the crime. To our mind, Belmes could not have made a mistake with respect to
appellants identity, what with the fact that just a few hours before the incident, it was even appellant
himself who invited Belmes and his group to play poker. For sure, Belmes had a face-to-face encounter
with appellant before the assault and thus would be able to unmistakably recognize him especially
because at the time of the attack, Belmes was just eight (8) meters away from appellant and conditions
of visibility were very good at the time of the incident as it was only around 4:00 in the afternoon.
Jurisprudence recognizes that it is the most natural reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the
appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in which the crime was
committed.[12]
Belmes testimony was corroborated by that of Vidal Agbulos who was also with the group
when the robbery and shooting took place. Again, we quote from the transcripts of stenographic notes:
Vidal Agbulos on direct examination
FISCAL FLORES:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

What did you do next when Felipe Abad informed you again that your son was
already killed and Eddie Quindasan was injured?
Even if he told me about that I just went ahead.
What happened next when he told you that?
When I went ahead I saw Juan Cabbab took the wallet from my son.

COURT:
Q.
A.

At that time, Winner Agbulos was already prostrate on the ground?

Yes, sir, my son was lying on the ground facing down.[13]

Clearly, then, Vidal Agbulos positively identified appellant as the person who robbed his son,
Winner, of his winnings. Just like Belmes, Agbulos could also not have been mistaken as to appellants
identity considering that it was appellant who personally approached Agbulos group and invited
them to play poker just a few hours prior to the commission of the crime. Further, Agbulos testified
that he was familiar with appellant as he would often see him in a cockpit in San Isidro, Abra.
To be sure, the trial court which had the unique opportunity to observe at first hand the
demeanor of witnesses Belmes and Agbulos and asses whether they are telling the truth or not, gave
full faith and credence to their testimonies. Finding no facts and circumstances of weight and substance
that would otherwise warrant a different conclusion, the Court accords the highest respect to the trial
courts evaluation of the credibility of these witnesses.
Appellant likewise capitalizes on the results of the paraffin test showing that both his hands
yielded no trace of gunpowder residue. Unfortunately for appellant, the results of the paraffin test
would not exculpate him. The negative findings of said test do not conclusively show that a person did
not discharge a firearm at the time the crime was committed. This Court has observed that it is quite
possible for a person to discharge a firearm and yet exhibit no trace of nitrates: when, e.g., the assailant
fired the weapon while wearing gloves or where the assailant thoroughly washes his hands
thereafter.[14] As George de Lara of the NBI stated in his testimony before the trial court, if a person
applies cosmetics on his hands before the cast is taken, gunpowder residue would not be found in that
persons hands. He also testified that certain factors could contribute to the negative result of a paraffin
test such as perspiration, humidity or the type of firearm used. In fine, a finding that the paraffin test
on the person of the appellant yielded negative results is not conclusive evidence to show that he
indeed had not fired a gun.
Too, appellant has not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part of prosecution
witnesses Belmes and Agbulos that would have driven them to falsely testify against him. In fact,
appellant himself declared that he did not know of any reason why Belmes and Agbulos would
implicate him in the crime. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the
solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence.[15]
Interjected as a defense is alibi, appellant claiming that he went to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra
to visit his friends in the morning of April 22, 1988 and returned home only at around 5:30 p.m. For
alibi to prosper, however, the hornbook rule requires a showing that the accused was at another place
at the time of the perpetration of the offense and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[16] Where there is even the least chance for the accused
to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water.[17]
Here, the evidence shows that Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra where appellant allegedly visited
his friends was only 30 minutes drive from Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra where the crime
was committed. In short, appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the physical
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime on the date and time of its commission.
The weakness of appellants alibi is heavily underscored by the fact that appellant was positively
identified by witnesses Belmes and Agbulos who were with the victims at the time of the incident. For
sure, appellants positive identification as the perpetrator of the crime renders his defense of alibi
unworthy of credit.[18]
The crime committed by appellant was correctly characterized by the appellate court as Robbery
with Homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) which reads:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against any person shall suffer:
1.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall
have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution is burdened to
prove the confluence of the following elements:
(1)

the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

(2)
(3)
(4)

the property taken belongs to another;

the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and
by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.[19]

In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or
that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed.
Once a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is
the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.[20]
Here, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, having lost to
Winner Agbulos in the game of poker, intended to divest Agbulos of his winnings amounting
to P20,000.00. In pursuit of his plan to rob Agbulos of his winnings, appellant shot and killed him as
well as his companion, Eddie Quindasan.
The prescribed penalty for Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the RPC, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law), is reclusion perpetua to death. In the application of a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, like that for Robbery with Homicide, Article 63 of the RPC
provides that when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance,
the greater penalty shall be applied. In this case, the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended
the commission of the crime, as appellants attack on the victims who were then unsuspectingly
walking on their way home was sudden and done without any provocation, thus giving them no real
chance to defend themselves.
However, considering that the crime was committed in 1988 or prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
the trial court and the CA correctly imposed upon appellant the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
7659,[21]

The Court feels, however, that the two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate
crime of attempted murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or attempted
murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of
Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same
regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery.[22]
We now come to the award of damages.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan are
each entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00,[23] to moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00,[24] and to exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000.00.[25]
With respect to actual damages, Winners father, Vidal Agbulos, testified that he spent a total of P50,000.00
as burial expenses but he failed to present receipts therefor. InPeople v. Abrazaldo,[26] we laid down the doctrine
that where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined because of the absence of
receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be awarded in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus, in lieu of actual
damages, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 must be awarded to the heirs of Winner because
although the exact amount was not proved with certainty, it was reasonable to expect that they incurred expenses
for the coffin and burial of the victim. We, however, cannot grant the same to the heirs of Eddie Quindasan for
their failure to testify on the matter. Finally, appellant is obliged to return to the heirs of Winner Agbulos the
amount of P20,000.00 he had taken from Winner.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 22, 2006 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1.
2.

3.
4.

Appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant is hereby ordered to return to the heirs of Winner Agbulos the amount of P20,000.00
representing the amount stolen from him. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Winner
Agbulos the following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages,
(c) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Eddie Quindasan P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
another P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
For reasons herein stated, appellant is ACQUITTED of the separate crime of attempted murder
against the person of PO William Belmes.
Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 173479, JULY 12, 2007, PER GARCIA

Can there be a separate crime of attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during
Robbery? Answer: None. Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the
occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a
special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or
injuries committed in connection with the robbery. (Citing People v. Cabilto, G.R. Nos. 128816 & 13997980, August 8, 2001, 362 SCRA 325.)
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery.It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the
victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. (Citing People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, 429
SCRA 384.)
If actual burial expenses were not proven, can the court still award the same to the
heirs? Answer: Yes. With respect to actual damages, Winners father, Vidal Agbulos, testified that he
spent a total ofP50,000.00 as burial expenses but he failed to present receipts therefor.In People v.
Abrazaldo, (G.R. No. 124392, February 6, 2003, 397 SCRA 137) we laid down the doctrine that where the
amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts
to prove them, temperate damages may be awarded in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus, in lieu of actual
damages, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 must be awarded to the heirs of Winner
because although the exact amount was not proved with certainty, it was reasonable to expect that they
incurred expenses for the coffin and burial of the victim.

People v. Suyu G.R. No. 170191, August 16, 2006

FACTS: Clarissa Angeles was with her boyfriend William Ferrer, eating snacks inside a pick-up truck
parked in a vacant lot near the Office of the CoA and DepEd in Cagayan. They were then held up by
four men, later identified as Willy Suyu, his half-brother Rodolfo, Rommel Macarubbo and Francis
Cainglet.
William as able to escape and he immediately went to the police station to report the incident.
Clarissa was dragged to a hilly place. Rodolfo Suyu started embracing and kissing Clarissa and fondled
her breast. Rodolfo passed her to Cainglet. She was cursed anew.
Willy and Macarubbo served as lookouts.
Rodolfo then tried to insert his fully erect penis inside her vagina but the girl kicked him.
Cainglet on the other hand was able to insert half an inch of his penis into her vagina.
After pleading for mercy and promising not to report them to authorities, she was allowed by the
culprits to leave.
At the police station, authorities asked her if she had been sexually abused. She declared that there was
merely an attempt to rape her.
Later on, Clarissa filed a criminal complaint for robbery and rape against the accused.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the testimony of Clarissa should be given full weight and credence despite assertion
of the accused in the inconsistency of her statement.
2. Whether or not the crime of rape is committed with the slight penetration or entry of the penis into
the lips of the vagina
HELD:
1. Yes. While it is true that the victim initially did not reveal to the authorities the fact that she was
raped after the robbery, this does not cast doubt on her testimony for it is not uncommon for a rape
victim right after her ordeal too remain mum of what really transpired. Oftentimes, victims would
rather bear the ignominy and the pain in private than reveal their shame to the world.
2. Yes. Hymenal lacerations which are usually inflicted when there is complete penetration are not
essential in establishing the crime of rape as it is enough that a slight penetration or entry of the penis
into the lips of the vagina takes place. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration; the
rape is consummated in either case.
*Accused were convicted of robbery with rape*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE, JR. @ Jun
Mantika of Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan and VICTOR ACUYAN y OCHOVILLOS @ Vic Arroyo of
Sto. Nio, Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003
Robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously. The
Supreme Court of Spain so ruled. So does the Court rule in this case, as it had done for decades.
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision[1] of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 443-M-97 convicting accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and
Victor Acuyan of the complex crime of robbery with homicide, meting on each of them the supreme
penalty of death, and ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the total
amount of P300,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and to pay to Five Star Bus, Inc., the
amount of P6,000.00 by way of actual damages.
The Facts
The antecedent facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star
Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. ABS-793, drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its
destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo Digap, the regular conductor of the
bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers boarded the bus, including
Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were wearing maong pants, rubber shoes, hats and
jackets.[2] Juan seated himself on the third seat near the aisle, in the middle row of the passengers seats,
while Victor stood by the door in the mid-portion of the bus beside Romulo. Another passenger, SPO1
Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City, was seated at the rear portion of the bus on his way home
to Angeles City. Tucked on his waist was his service gun bearing Serial Number 769806. Every now
and then, Rodolfo looked at the side view mirror as well as the rear view and center mirrors installed
atop the drivers seat to monitor any incoming and overtaking vehicles and to observe the passengers
of the bus.
The lights of the bus were on even as some of the passengers slept. When the bus was travelling
along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped out their
handguns and announced a holdup. Petrified, Rodolfo glanced at the center mirror towards the
passengers seat and saw Juan and Victor armed with handguns. Juan fired his gun upward to awaken
and scare off the passengers. Victor followed suit and fired his gun upward. Juan and Victor then
accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and valuables. Juan divested Romulo of the
fares he had collected from the passengers. The felons then went to the place Manio, Jr. was seated and
demanded that he show them his identification card and wallet. Manio, Jr. brought out his
identification card bearing No. 00898.[3] Juan and Victor took the identification card of the police officer
as well as his service gun and told him: Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin and papatay
sa iyo. The police officer pleaded for mercy: Pare maawa ka sa akin. May pamilya ako. However,
Victor and Juan ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and
right side of his body. Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. He fell to the floor of the bus. Victor
and Juan then moved towards the driver Rodolfo, seated themselves beside him and ordered the latter
to maintain the speed of the bus. Rodolfo heard one of the felons saying: Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng
tao. Parang pumapatay ng manok. The other said: Ayos na naman tayo pare. Malaki-laki ito. Victor and
Juan further told Rodolfo that after they (Victor and Juan) shall have alighted from the bus, he
(Rodolfo) should continue driving the bus and not report the incident along the way. The robbers
assured Rodolfo that if the latter will follow their instructions, he will not be harmed. Victor and Juan
ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus along the overpass in Mexico, Pampanga where they alighted from the
bus. The robbery was over in 25 minutes.
When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo and Romulo forthwith reported the
incident to the police authorities. The cadaver of SPO1 Manio, Jr. was brought to the funeral parlor
where Dr. Alejandro D. Tolentino, the Municipal Health Officer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, performed
an autopsy on the cadaver of the police officer. The doctor prepared and signed an autopsy report
detailing the wounds sustained by the police officer and the cause of his death:
Body still flaccid (not in rigor mortis) bathed with his own blood. There were 6 entrance wounds and
6 exit wounds. All the entrance were located on his right side. An entrance (0.5 cm x 0.5 cm.) located
infront of the right ear exited at the left side just below the ear lobe. Another entrance through the
mouth exited at the back of the head fracturing the occiput with an opening of (1.5 cm x 2 cm). Blood
CSF and brain tissues came out. Another fatal bullet entered at the upper right cornea of the sternum,
entered the chest cavity pierced the heart and left lung and exited at the left axillary line. Severe

hemorrhage in the chest cavity came from the heart and left lung. The other 3 bullets entered the right
side and exited on the same side. One entrance at the top of the right shoulder exited at the medial side
of the right arm. The other entered above the right breast and exited at the right lateral abdominal wall
travelling below muscles and subcutaneous tissues without entering the cavities. Lastly another bullet
entered above the right iliac crest travelled superficially and exited above the right inguinal line.
Cause of Death:
Shock, massive internal and external hemorrhage, complete brain destruction and injury to the heart
and left lung caused by multiple gunshot wounds.[4]
Rodolfo and Romulo proceeded to the police station of Plaridel, Bulacan where they reported the
robbery and gave their respective sworn statements.[5] SPO1 Manio, Jr. was survived by his wife
Rosario Manio and their four young children. Rosario spent P20,000.00 for the coffin and P10,000.00 for
the burial lot of the slain police officer.[6] Manio, Jr. was 38 years old when he died and had a gross
salary of P8,085.00 a month.[7]
Barely a month thereafter, or on October 25, 1996, at about midnight, SPO3 Romeo Meneses, the
team leader of Alert Team No. 1 of Tarlac Police Station, and PO3 Florante S. Ferrer were at the police
checkpoint along the national highway in Tarlac, Tarlac. At the time, the Bambang-Concepcion bridge
was closed to traffic and the police officers were tasked to divert traffic to the Sta. Rosa
road. Momentarily, a white colored taxi cab without any plate number on its front fender came to
view. Meneses stopped the cab and asked the driver, who turned out to be the accused Juan Gonzales
Escote, Jr., for his identification card. Juan told Meneses that he was a policeman and handed over to
Meneses the identification card of SPO1 Manio, Jr. and the money which Juan and Victor took from
Manio, Jr. during the heist on September 28, 1996.[8] Meneses became suspicious when he noted that the
identification card had already expired on March 16, 1995. He asked Juan if the latter had a new pay
slip. Juan could not produce any. He finally confessed to Meneses that he was not a
policeman. Meneses brought Juan to the police station. When police officers frisked Juan for any
deadly weapon, they found five live bullets of a 9 millimeter firearm in his pocket. The police officers
confiscated the ammunition. In the course of the investigation, Juan admitted to the police investigators
that he and Victor, alias Victor Arroyo, staged the robbery on board Five Star Bus and are responsible
for the death of SPO1 Manio, Jr. in Plaridel, Bulacan. Meneses and Ferrer executed their joint affiavit of
arrest of Juan.[9] Juan was subsequently turned over to the Plaridel Police Station where Romulo
identified him through the latters picture as one of those who robbed the passengers of the Five Star
Bus with Plate No. ABS-793 and killed SPO1 Manio, Jr. on September 28, 1996. In the course of their
investigation, the Plaridel Police Station Investigators learned that Victor was a native of Laoang,
Northern Samar.[10] On April 4, 1997, an Information charging Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor
Acuyan with robbery with homicide was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The
Information reads:
That on or about the 28th day of September 1996, in the municipality of Plaridel, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with firearms, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, take, rob and carry away with one (1) necklace and cash in [the] undetermine[d] amount
of one SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said
undetermine[d] amount; that simultaneously or on the occassion (sic) of said robbery, said accused by
means of violence and intimidation and in furtherance of their conspiracy attack, assault and shoot
with the service firearm of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., thereby inflicting serious physical injuries
which resulted (sic) the death of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr.
Contrary to law.[11]
On the strength of a warrant of arrest, the police officers arrested Victor in Laoang, Northern
Samar and had him incarcerated in the Bulacan Provincial Jail. Assisted by Atty. Ramiro Osorio, their
counsel de parte, Juan and Victor were duly arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty to the
charge. Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case on August 26, 1998, Juan
escaped from the provincial jail.[12] The trial court issued a bench warrant on September 22, 1998 for the
arrest of said accused-appellant.[13] In the meantime, Victor adduced his evidence.
Victor denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that in 1996, he worked
as a tire man in the vulcanizing shop located in Banga I, Plaridel, Bulacan owned by Tony Boy
Negro. On one occasion, Ilarde Victorino, a customer of Tony Boy Negro, ordered Victor to sell a

tire. Victor sold the tire but did not turn over the proceeds of the sale to Ilarde. The latter hated Victor
for his misdeed. The shop was later demolished and after two months of employment, Victor returned
to Barangay Muwal-Buwal, Laoang, Northern Samar. On September 26, 1996, at 9:30 p.m., Victor was
at the town fiesta in Laoang. Victor and his friends, Joseph Iringco and Rickey Lorcio were having a
drinking spree in the house of Barangay Captain Ike Baluya. At 11:30 p.m., the three left the house of
the barangay captain and attended the public dance at the town auditorium. Victor and his friends left
the auditorium at 5:30 a.m. of September 27, 1996. Victor likewise testified that he never met Juan until
his arrest and detention at the Bulacan Provincial Jail. One of the inmates in said provincial jail was
Ilarde Victorino. Victor learned that Ilarde implicated him for the robbery of the Five Star Bus and the
killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr. to hit back at him for his failure to turn over to Ilarde the proceeds of the sale
of the latters tire.
On January 14, 1999, Juan was rearrested in Daet, Camarines Norte.[14] However, he no longer
adduced any evidence in his behalf.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
On March 11, 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision judgment finding Juan and Victor guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, meted on each of them the penalty of death and
ordered them to pay P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages to the heirs of the victim and to pay the
Five Star Bus Company the amount of P6,000.00 as actual damages. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused, Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide as penalized under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended and hereby sentences both to suffer the supreme penalty of Death and to indemnify
the heirs of the late SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the amount of P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages
and to pay the Five Star Bus P6,000.00 as actual damage.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Assignment of Errors
Juan and Victor assail the Decision of the trial court and contend that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RODOLFO CACATIAN AND ROMULO DIGAP,
DRIVER AND CONDUCTOR OF THE FIVE STAR BUS, RESPECTIVELY, WERE ABLE TO
POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE TWO (2) MEN WHO HELD-UP THEIR BUS AND KILLED ONE
PASSENGER THEREOF AT AROUND 3:00 OCLOCK IN THE EARLY MORNING OF SEPTEMBER
28, 1996.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO (2) ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.[16]
The Courts Verdict
Anent the first assignment of error, Juan and Victor contend that the trial court committed a
reversible error in relying on the testimony of Rodolfo, the bus conductor, for convicting them of the
crime charged. They aver that although their counsel was able to initially cross-examine Rodolfo, the
former failed to continue with and terminate his cross-examination of the said witness through no fault
of his as the witness failed to appear in subsequent proceedings. They assert that even if the
testimonies of Rodolfo and Romulo were to be considered, the two witnesses were so petrified during
the robbery that they were not able to look at the felons and hence could not positively identify
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. They argue that the police investigators never
conducted a police line-up for the identification of the authors of the crime.
The contentions of Juan and Victor are not meritorious. There is no factual and legal basis for their
claim that they were illegally deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to fully cross-examine
Rodolfo. The Court agrees that the right to cross-examine is a constitutional right anchored on due
process.[17] It is a statutory right found in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that the accused has the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses

against him at the trial. However, the right has always been understood as requiring not necessarily an
actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if
desired.[18] What is proscribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept is the absence of the
opportunity to cross-examine.[19] The right is a personal one and may be waived expressly or
impliedly. There is an implied waiver when the party was given the opportunity to confront and crossexamine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself
alone.[20] If by his actuations, the accused lost his opportunity to cross-examine wholly or in part the
witnesses against him, his right to cross-examine is impliedly waived.[21] The testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.[22]
In this case, the original records show that after several resettings, the initial trial for the
presentation by the prosecution of its evidence-in-chief was set on November 18, 1997 and December 5,
1997, both at 9:00 a.m.[23] Rodolfo testified on direct examination on November 18, 1997. The counsel of
Juan and Victor forthwith commenced his cross-examination of the witness but because of the
manifestation of said counsel that he cannot finish his cross-examination, the court ordered the
continuation thereof to December 5, 1997.[24] On December 5, 1997, Rodolfo did not appear before the
court for the continuation of his cross-examination but Rosemarie Manio, the widow of the victim
did. The prosecution presented her as witness. Her testimony was terminated. The court ordered the
continuation of the trial for the cross-examination of Rodolfo on January 20, 1998 at 8:30 a.m.[25] During
the trial on January 20, 1998, Rodolfo was present but accused-appellants counsel was absent. The
court issued an order declaring that for failure of said counsel to appear before the court for his crossexamination of Rodolfo, Victor and Juan waived their right to continue with the cross-examination of
said witness.[26] During the trial set for February 3, 1998, the counsel of Juan and Victor appeared but
did not move for a reconsideration of the courts order dated January 20, 1998 and for the recall of
Rodolfo Cacatian for further cross-examination. It behooved counsel for Juan and Victor to file said
motion and pray that the trial court order the recall of Rodolfo on the witness stand. Juan and Victor
cannot just fold their arms and supinely wait for the prosecution or for the trial court to initiate the
recall of said witness. Indeed, the Court held in Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, et al:
The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party who wishes to
exercise said right. This is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize it
must be expressed. Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof. Thus, it
should be the counsel for the opposing party who should move to cross-examine plaintiffs
witnesses. It is absurd for the plaintiff himself to ask the court to schedule the cross-examination of his
own witnesses because it is not his obligation to ensure that his deponents are cross-examined. Having
presented his witnesses, the burden shifts to his opponent who must now make the appropriate
move. Indeed, the rule of placing the burden of the case on plaintiffs shoulders can be construed to
extremes as what happened in the instant proceedings. [27]
The trial was reset to March 31, April 17 and 24, 1998, all at 8:30 a.m. because of the nonavailability of the other witnesses of the prosecution.[28] On March 31, 1998, the prosecution presented
Dr. Alejandro Tolentino, PO2 Rene de la Cruz and Romulo Digap. During the trial on April 17, 1998,
the counsel of Juan and Victor failed to appear. The trial was reset to June 3, 19 and 26, 1998.[29] The
trial scheduled on June 3, 1998 was cancelled due to the absence of the counsel of Juan and Victor. The
court issued an order appointing Atty. Roberto Ramirez as counsel for accused-appellants.[30]
During the trial on August 26, 1998, Atty. Ramirez appeared in behalf of Juan and Victor. The
prosecution rested its case after the presentation of SPO2 Romeo Meneses and formally offered its
documentary evidence. The next trial was set on September 23, 1998 at 8:30 a.m.[31] On November 11,
1998, Juan and Victor commenced the presentation of their evidence with the testimony of
Victor.[32] They rested their case on January 27, 1999 without any evidence adduced by Juan.
Juan and Victor did not even file any motion to reopen the case before the trial court rendered its
decision to allow them to cross-examine Rodolfo. They remained mute after judgment was rendered
against them by the trial court. Neither did they file any petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals for the nullification of the Order of the trial court dated January 20, 1998 declaring that they
had waived their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It was only on appeal to this Court that Juan and
Victor averred for the first time that they were deprived of their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It is
now too late in the day for Juan and Victor to do so. The doctrine of estoppel states that if one
maintains silence when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in
conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be heard
to speak when he should be silent.[33]
The contention of accused-appellants Juan and Victor that Rodolfo and Romulo failed to identify
them as the perpetrators of the crime charged is disbelieved by the trial court, thus:

As can be gathered from the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, on September 28, 1996,
the accused boarded at around 3:00 a.m. a Five Star Bus driven by Rodolfo Cacatian, bound to
Pangasinan, in Camachile, Balintawak, Quezon City. Twenty (20) minutes or so later, when the bus
reached the vicinity of Nabuag, Plaridel, Bulacan, along the North Espressway, the accused with guns
in hand suddenly stood up and announced a hold-up. Simultaneously with the announcement of a
hold-up, Escote fired his gun upwards. Acuyan, meanwhile, took the gun of a man seated at the
back. Both then went on to take the money and valuables of the passengers, including the bus
conductors collections in the amount of P6,000.00. Thereafter, the duo approached the man at the back
telling him in the vernacular Pasensiya ka na pare, papatayin ka namin. Baril mo rin ang papatay sa
iyo. They pointed their guns at him and fired several shots oblivious of the plea for mercy of their
victim. After the shooting, the latter collapsed on the floor. The two (2) then went back at the front
portion of the bus behind the drivers seat and were overheard by the bus driver, Cacatian, talking how
easy it was to kill a man. The robbery and the killing were over in 25 minutes. Upon reaching the
Mexico overpass of the Expressway in Pampanga, the two (2) got off the bus. The driver drove the bus
to the Mabalacat Police Station and reported the incident. During the investigation conducted by the
police, it was found out that the slain passenger was a policeman, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. of the
Caloocan City Police Department.
The above version came from Rodolfo Cacatian and Romulo Digap, bus driver and conductor,
respectively, of the ill-fated Five Star Bus.[34]
The Court agrees with the trial court. It may be true that Romulo was frightened when Juan and
Victor suddenly announced a holdup and fired their guns upward, but it does not follow that he and
Rodolfo failed to have a good look at Juan and Victor during the entire time the robbery was taking
place. The Court has held in a catena of cases that it is the most natural reaction of victims of violence
to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in which the
crime was committed.[35] Rodolfo and Romulo had a good look at both Juan and Victor before, during
and after they staged the robbery and before they alighted from the bus. The evidence on record shows
that when Juan and Victor boarded the bus and while the said vehicle was on its way to its destination,
Romulo stationed himself by the door of the bus located in the mid-section of the vehicle. The lights
inside the bus were on. Juan seated himself in the middle row of the passengers seat near the center
aisle while Victor stood near the door of the bus about a meter or so from Romulo.[36] Romulo, Juan and
Victor were near each other. Moreover, Juan divested Romulo of his collection of the fares from the
passengers.[37] Romulo thus had a face-to-face encounter with Juan. After shooting SPO1 Manio, Jr. at
the rear portion of the bus, Juan and Victor passed by where Romulo was standing and gave their
instructions to him. Considering all the facts and circumstances, there is no iota of doubt that Romulo
saw and recognized Juan and Victor before, during and after the heist. [38] Rodolfo looked many times
on the rear, side and center view mirrors to observe the center and rear portions of the bus before and
during the robbery. Rodolfo thus saw Juan and Victor stage the robbery and kill SPO1 Manio, Jr. with
impunity:
xxx
Q So, the announcement of hold-up was ahead of the firing of the gun?
A

Yes, sir.

Q And before the actual firing of the gun it was even still said bad words before saying the
hold-up?
A

After they fired the gun they uttered bad words, sir.

Q Mr. Witness before the announcement of the hold-up you do not have any idea that you
will encounter that nature which took place, is that correct?
A

None, sir.

Q Within the two (2) year[s] period that you are plying the route of Manila to Bolinao that
was your first experience of hold-up?
A

Yes, sir.

Q And the speed of above 70 kilometers per hour your total attention is focus in front of the
road, correct, Mr. witness?
A

Once in a while the driver look at the side mirror and the rear view mirror, sir.

Q Before the announcement there was no reason for you to look at any at the rear mirror,
correct, Mr. witness?
Court:
Every now and then they usually look at the side mirror and on the rear, that was his
statement.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q I am asking him if there was no reason for him....
Fiscal:
Before the announcement of hold-up, there was no mention.
Court:
Every now and then.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q When you said every now and then, how often is it, Mr. witness?
A

I cannot tell how often but I used to look at the mirror once in a while, sir.

Q How many mirror do you have, Mr. witness?

A

Four (4), sir.

Q Where are these located?

A

Two (2) on the side mirror, center mirror and rear view mirror, sir.

Q The two side mirror protruding outside the bus?

A

Yes, sir, they are in the side of the bus, sir.

Q One of them is located on the left and the other on the right, correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q You only look at the side mirror when you are going to over take, Mr. witness?
A

No, sir.

Q Where is this center mirror located, Mr. witness?

A

In the center, sir.

Q What is the purpose of that?

A

So that I can see the passengers if they are already settled so that I can start the engine, sir.

Q What about the remaining mirror?

A

Rear view mirror, sir.

Q What is the purpose and where is it located?

A

The rear view is located just above my head just to check the passengers, sir.

Q So that the center mirror and the rear view mirror has the same purpose?
A

They are different, sir.

Q How do you differentiate of (sic) one from the other?

A

The center mirror is used to check the center aisle while the rear mirror is for the whole
view of the passengers, sir.

Q If you are going to look at any of your side mirrors, you will never see any passengers,
correct, Mr. witness?
A

None, sir.

Q If you will look at your center mirror you will only see the aisle and you will never see any
portion of the body of your passengers?
A

Yes, sir.

Q Seated passengers?
A

It is only focus (sic) on the middle aisle sir.

Q If you look at your rear mirror, you will only see the top portion of the head of your
passengers, correct?
A

Only the portion of their head because they have different hight (sic), sir.

Q You will never see any head of your passengers if they were seated from the rear mirror
portion, correct, Mr. witness?
A

Yes, sir.

Q Before the announcement of hold-up, all of your passengers were actually sleeping?
A

Some of my passengers were sleeping, some were not, sir.

Q But you will agree Mr. witness that when you said every now and then you are using your
mirror? It is only a glance, correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q And by mere glancing, Mr. witness you were not able to identify any person on the basis
of any of your mirror, correct?
A

If only a glance but when I look at him I can recognize him, sir.

Q You agree a while ago by every now and then it is by glancing, as a driver, Mr. witness by
your side mirror?
A

Not all glancing, there are times when you want to recognize a person you look at him
intently, sir.

Q The purposes of your mirror inside your Bus is mainly of the safety of your passengers on
board, Mr. witness?
A

Yes, sir.

Q And as a driver, Mr. witness, you do not used (sic) your mirror to identify the person
particularly when you are crossing (sic) at a speed of 70 kilometers per hour?
A

I do that, sir.

Q How long Mr. witness can you focus your eyes on any of these mirror before getting back
your eyes into the main road?
A

Seconds only, sir.

Q When you said seconds, for how long the most Mr. witness that you can do to fix your
eyes on any of your mirrors and the return back of (sic) your eyes into the main road?
A

Two seconds, sir.

Q At that time Mr. witness, that you were travelling at about 70 kilometers you were
glancing every now and then on any of your mirrors at about two seconds, correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q And when you heard the announcement of hold-up your natural reaction is to look either
at the center mirror or rear mirror for two seconds, correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q And you were instructed Mr. witness to even accelerate your speed upon the
announcement of hold-up?
A

No sir, they just told me to continue my driving, sir.

Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular alalay ka lang, steady ka lang.

Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q Steady at what speed?
A

70 to 80, sir.

Q What is the minimum speed, Mr. witness for Buses along North Expressway?
A

60 kilometers, sir.

Q Are you sure of that 60 kilometers, minimum? Are you sure of that?
A

Yes, sir.

Q That is what you know within the two (2) years that you are driving? Along the North
Expressway?
A

Yes, sir.

Q And while you were at the precise moment, Mr. witness, you were being instructed to
continue driving, you were not looking to anybody except focus yours eyes in front of the
road?
Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular. Nakikiramdam ako.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q Thats what you are doing?
A

During the time they were gathering the money from my passengers, that is the time
when I look at them, sir.

Q For two seconds, correct?

A

Yes, sir.

Q Which of the four (4) mirrors that you are looking at within two seconds, Mr. witness you
said you are nakikiramdam?
A

The rear view mirror, sir.

Q The Bus that you were driving is not an air con bus?
A

Ordinary bus, sir.

Q And at what time your passengers, most of your passengers were already sleep (sic), Mr.
witness?
A

Most of my passengers, sir. Some of my passengers were still sleep (sic), sir.

Q And the lights inside the Bus are off, correct Mr. witness?
A

The lights were on, sir.

Q While the passengers were sleep (sic) the light was still on, Mr. witness, at the time of the
trip.?
A

Yes, sir.

Q Now, Mr. witness when the hold-up was announced and then when you look for two
seconds in the rear mirror you were not able to see any one, you were only sensing what
is happening inside your bus?
A

I saw something, sir.

Q You saw something in front of your Bus? You can only see inside when you are going to
look at the mirror?
A

Yes, sir.

Q That is the only thing that you see every now and then, you said you were looking at the
mirror?

Yes, sir.

Q How many times, Mr. witness did you look Mr. witness at the rear mirror during the
entire occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up?
A

There were many times, sir.

Q The most that you can remember, please inform the Honorable Court? During the
occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up, Mr. witness?
A

I cannot estimate, sir.

Q How long did the alleged hold-up took place?

A

More or less 25 minutes, sir.[39]

When Rodolfo gave his sworn statement to the police investigators in Plaridel, Bulacan after the
robbery, he described the felons. When asked by the police investigators if he could identify the
robbers if he see them again, Rodolfo declared that he would be able to identify them:
8. T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang itsura ng dalawang lalaki na nanghold-up sa minamaneho
mong bus?
S:
Halos magkasing taas, 54 o 55 katam-taman ang pangangatawan, parehong
nakapantalon ng maong naka-suot ng jacket na maong, parehong naka rubber shoes at pareho ring
naka sumbrero.
9. T:
S:

Kung sakali bang makikita mo pa ang mga ito ay makikilala mo pa sila?

Makikilala ko po sila.[40]

When asked to identify the robbers during the trial, Rodolfo spontaneously pointed to and
identified Juan and Victor:
QFiscal:
(to the witness)
xxx
Q Those two man (sic) who stated that it was a hold-up inside the bus and who fired the gun
are they inside the Court room (sic) today?
A

Yes, maam.

Q Point to us?
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a man wearing red T-shirt and when asked his name answered Victor
Acuyan and the man wearing green T-shirt and when asked his name answered Juan
Gonzales.[41]
For his part, Romulo likewise spontaneously pointed to and identified Juan and Victor as the
culprits when asked by the prosecutor to identify the robbers from among those in the courtroom:
xxx
Q You said that you were robbed inside the bus, how does (sic) the robbing took place?
A

They announced a hold up maam, afterwards, they confiscated the money of the
passengers including my collections.

Q You said they who announced the hold up, whose (sic) these they you are referring
to?
A

Those two (2), maam.

Interpreter:
Witness pointing to the two accused.
Public Pros.:
May we request that the accused be identified, Your Honor.
Court:

(to both accused)

What are your names?
A

Juan Escote, Your Honor. Victor Acuyan, Your Honor.

Public Pros.:
May we know from the accused if his name is Juan Escote Gonzales because he just said
Juan Escote. In the Information, it is one Juan Gonzales, Jr., so, we can change, Your
Honor.[42]
Moreover, when he was accosted by SPO3 Romeo Meneses on October 25, 1997 in Tarlac, Tarlac,
Juan was in possession of the identification card[43] of the slain police officer. Juan failed to explain to
the trial court how and under what circumstances he came into possession of said identification card.
Juan must necessarily be considered the author of the robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr.
In People v. Mantung,[44] we held:
xxx [T]he recovery of part of the loot from Mantung or the time of his arrest gave rise to a legal
presumption of his guilt. As this Court has held, [I]n the absence of an explanation of how one has
come into possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he must
necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of the said person and of the robbery
committed on him.
While police investigators did not place Juan and Victor in a police line-up for proper
identification by Rodolfo and Romulo, it cannot thereby be concluded that absent such line-up, their
identification by Romulo and Rodolfo as the authors of the robbery with homicide was
unreliable. There is no law or police regulation requiring a police line-up for proper identification in
every case. Even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper and reliable identification as
long as such identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the police. [45] In this case,
there is no evidence that the police officers had supplied or even suggested to Rodolfo and Romulo the
identities of Juan and Victor as the perpetrators of the robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr.
The Felony Committed by Juan and Victor
The Court finds that the trial court committed no error in convicting Juan and Victor of robbery
with homicide. Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659,
reads:
Art. 294. - Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. - Penalties. - Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.
To warrant the conviction of Juan and Victor for the said charge, the prosecution was burdened to
prove the confluence of the following essential elements:
xxx (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the
property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is
therein used in a generic sense, was committed. xxx[46]
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life.[47] In robbery with homicide, so long as the
intention of the felons was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. In People v.
Barut,[48] the Court held that:
In the controlling Spanish version of article 294, it is provided that there is robbery with homicide
cuando con motivo o con ocasin del robo resultare homicidio. Basta que entre aquel este exista
una relacin meramente ocasional. No se requiere que el homicidio se cometa como medio de
ejecucin del robo, ni que el culpable tenga intencin de matar, el delito existe segn constanta
jurisprudencia, aun cuando no concurra animo homicida. Incluso si la muerte sobreviniere por mero
accidente, siempre que el homicidio se produzca con motivo con ocasin del robo, siendo indiferente
que la muerte sea anterior, coetnea o posterior a ste (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 14th Ed. P.
872).

Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the homicide committed on the occasion of
or by reason of the robbery, nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide. All the crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and
integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. This was the ruling of the
Supreme Court of Spain on September 9, 1886, et sequitur cited by this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, et
al.[49]
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is
enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgos Penal Code,
p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the
circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would
supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July
14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch
as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes
or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration (Decision
of January 12, 1889 see Cuello Calons Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).
Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of
robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide.[50]
In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Juan and Victor conspired and
confabulated together in robbing the passengers of the Five Star Bus of their money and valuables and
Romulo of his collections of the fares of the passengers and in killing SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity on
the occasion of the robbery. Hence, both Juan and Victor are guilty as principals by direct participation
of the felony of robbery with homicide under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, punishable byreclusion perpetua to death.
The Proper Penalty
The trial court imposed the supreme penalty of death on Juan and Victor for robbery with
homicide, defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable withreclusion
perpetua. Under Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the felons should be meted the
supreme penalty of death when the crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance attendant in
the commission of the crime absent any mitigating circumstance. The trial court did not specify in the
decretal portion of its decision the aggravating circumstances attendant in the commission of the crime
mandating the imposition of the death penalty. However, it is evident from the findings of facts
contained in the body of the decision of the trial court that it imposed the death penalty on Juan and
Victor on its finding that they shot SPO1 Manio, Jr. treacherously on the occasion of or by reason of the
robbery:
The two (2) accused are incomparable in their ruthlessness and base regard for human life. After
stripping the passengers of their money and valuables, including the firearm of the victim, they came to
decide to execute the latter seemingly because he was a police officer. They lost no time pouncing him
at the rear section of the bus, aimed their firearms at him and, in a derisive and humiliating tone, told
him, before pulling the trigger, that they were rather sorry but they are going to kill him with his own
gun; and thereafter, they simultaneously fired point blank at the hapless policeman who was
practically on his knees begging for his life. Afterwhich, they calmly positioned themselves at the front
boasting for all to hear, that killing a man is like killing a chicken (Parang pumapatay ng manok).
Escote, in particular, is a class by himself in callousness. xxx.[51]
The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime.
There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.[52] The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving
the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of
himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life
where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.[53] In the
case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the
shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the
right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and

then shot him even as he pleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was
shot at close range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard
days work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for his untimely
demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.
The issues that now come to fore are (1) whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide; and if in the affirmative, (b) whether treachery may be
appreciated against Juan and Victor. On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. This Court has ruled
over the years[54] that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in the felony of robbery with
homicide, a special complex crime (un delito especial complejo) and at the same time a single and
indivisible offense (uno solo indivisible).[55] However, this Court in two cases has held that robbery with
homicide is a crime against property and hence treachery which is appreciated only to crimes against
persons should not be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.[56] It held in another case that
treachery is not appreciated in robbery with rape precisely because robbery with rape is a crime against
property.[57] These rulings of the Court find support in case law that in robbery with homicide or
robbery with rape, homicide or rape are merely incidents of the robbery, with robbery being the main
purpose and object of the criminal.[58] Indeed, in People vs. Cando,[59] two distinguished members of this
Court advocated a review of the doctrine that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in
robbery with homicide. They opined that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. After
all, in People vs. Bariquit,[60] this Court in a per curiam decision promulgated in year 2000 declared that
treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. However, this Court held in People vs.
Cando that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, citing its prior
rulings that in robbery with homicide, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance when the victim
of homicide is killed with treachery. This Court opted not to apply its ruling earlier that year in People
vs. Bariquit.
Legal Luminaries in criminal law and eminent commentators of the Revised Penal Code are not in
full accord either. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino (Retired) says that treachery is appreciated only in
crimes against persons as defined in Title 10, Book Two of the Code.[61] Chief Justice Luis B. Reyes
(Retired) also is of the opinion that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. [62] However,
Justice Florenz D. Regalado (Retired) is of a different view.[63] He says that treachery cannot be
considered in robbery but can be appreciated insofar as the killing is concerned, citing the decisions of
this Court in People vs. Balagtas[64] for the purpose of determining the penalty to be meted on the felon
when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery.
It must be recalled that by Royal Order of December 17, 1886 the 1850 Penal Code in force in Spain,
as amended by the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 was applied in the Philippines. The Penal Code of
1887 in the Philippines was amended by Act 3815, now known as the Revised Penal Code, which was
enacted and published in Spanish. In construing the Old Penal Code and the Revised Penal Code, this
Court had accorded respect and persuasive, if not conclusive effect to the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain interpreting and construing the 1850 Penal Code of Spain, as amended by Codigo Penal
Reformado de 1870.[65]
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. The following are aggravating circumstances:
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
The law was taken from Chapter IV, Article 10, paragraph 2 of the 1860 Penal Code and the Codigo
Penal Reformado de 1870 of Spain which reads:
Art. 10 ...2. Ejecutar el hecho con alevosia. Hay alevosia cuando el culpable comete cualquiera de los
delitos contra las personas empleando medios, modos o for mas en la ejecucion que tiendan directa y
especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para su persona, que proceda de la defensa que pudiera hacer el
ofendido. xxx
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code is a reproduction of the 1850 Penal Code of
Spain and the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 with a slight difference. In the latter law, the words las
personas (the persons) are used, whereas in Article 14, paragraph 6, of the Revised Penal Code, the
words the person are used.

Going by the letter of the law, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons as enumerated
in Title Eight, Chapters One and Two, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. However, the Supreme Court
of Spain has consistently applied treachery to robbery with homicide, classified as a crime against
property. Citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, Cuello Calon, a noted commentator of the
Spanish Penal Code says that despite the strict and express reference of the penal code to treachery
being applicable to persons, treachery also applies to other crimes such as robbery with homicide:[66]
Aun cuando el Codigo solo se refiere a los delitos contra las personas, cabe estimarla en los que no perteneciendo a
este titulo se determinan por muerte o lesiones, como, en el robo con homicidio, y en el homicidio del Jefe del
Estado que es un delito contra la seguridad interior del Estado, y no obstante la referencia estricta del
texto legal a los delitos contra las personas no es la alevosia aplicable a la mayoria de ellos, no lo es en
el homicidio, pues como su concurrencia lo cualifica lo transforma en delito distinto, en asesinato, ni en
el homicidio consentido (art. 409), ni en la ria tumultuaria (art. 408) ni en el infanticidio (art. 410).
xxx. [67]
Viada also says that treachery is appreciated in crimes against persons (delitos contra personas) and
also in robbery with homicide (robo con homicidio).[68]
Contra las personas. - Luego la circunstancia de alevosia solo puede apreciarse en los delitos provistos
desde el art. 417 al 447, y en algun otro, como el de robo con homicidio, atentario, a la vez que contra la
propriedad, contra la persona.
Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said
crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a
qualifying circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision dated
September 11, 1878, the word homicide is used in its broadest and most generic sense.[69]
Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the
penalty for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating
circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are
included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into
account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.[70] Under paragraph 2 of the law, the same rule shall
apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must
of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or
which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be
taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to
such a degree that it must be of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially
punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and
prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with
homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery
with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
In its Sentencia dated March 14, 1877, the Supreme Court of Spain declared that treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance not only in crimes against persons but also in robbery with
homicide. The high court of Spain applied Article 79 of the Spanish Penal Code (Article 62 of the
Revised Penal Code) and ruled that since treachery is not a constitutive element of the crime of robbery
with homicide nor is it inherent in said crime, without which it cannot be committed, treachery is an
aggravating circumstance to said crime. The high court of Spain was not impervious of the fact that
robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Indeed, it specifically declared that the
classification of robbery with homicide as a crime against property is irrelevant and inconsequential in
the application of treachery. It further declared that it would be futile to argue that in crimes against
property such as robbery with homicide, treachery would have no application. This is so, the high
tribunal ruled, because when robbery is coupled with crimes committed against persons, the crime is not only
an assault(ataca) on the property of the victims but also of the victims themselves (ofende):
xxx que la circunstancia agravante de alevosia ni es constitutiva del delito complejo de robo y
homicidio, ni de tal modo inherente que sin ella no pueda cometerse, sin que quepa arguir que en los

delitos contra la propiedad no debe aquella tener aplicacion, porque cuando estos son complejos de los que
se cometen contra las personas, no solo se ataca a la propiedad, sino que se ofende a estas. xxx[71]
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with
homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not
at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the
constituent crime of homicide and not to the constituent crime of robbery of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or
as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably
with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance.
In its Sentencia, dated July 9, 1877, the high tribunal of Spain also ruled that when the victim of
robbery is killed with treachery, the said circumstance should be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide:
xxx que si aparece probado que el procesado y su co-reo convinieron en matar a un conocido suyo,
compaero de viaje, para lo cual desviaron cautelosamente los carros que guiaban, en uno de los cuales
iba el interfecto, dirigiendolos por otro camino que conducia a un aljibon, y al llegar a este, valiendose
de engao para hacer bajar a dicho interfecto, se lanzaron de improviso sobre el, tirandolo en tierra,
robandole el dinero, la manta y los talegos que llevaba, y atandole al pie una piedra de mucho peso, le
arrojaron con ella a dicho aljibon, dados estos hechos, no cabe duda que constituyen el delito complejo del
art. 516, num. I, con la circunstancia agravante de alevosia, puesto que los medios, forma y modos empleados en
la ejecucion del crimen tendieron directa y especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para sus autores, procedente de la
defensa del ofendido.[72]
In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the
victim of homicide is killed by treachery.
On the second issue, we also rule in the affirmative. Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code which was taken from Article 80 of the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870,[73]provides that
circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to
accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had
knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein. The
circumstances attending the commission of a crime either relate to the persons participating in the
crime or into its manner of execution or to the means employed. The latter has a direct bearing upon
the criminal liability of all the accused who have knowledge thereof at the time of the commission of
the crime or of their cooperation thereon.[74] Accordingly, the Spanish Supreme Court held in
its Sentencia dated December 17, 1875 that where two or more persons perpetrate the crime of robbery
with homicide, the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery shall be appreciated against all of the
felons who had knowledge of the manner of the killing of victims of homicide, with the ratiocination
that:
xxx si por la Ley basta haberse ejecutado un homicidio simple con motivo ocasin del robo para la
imposicion de la pena del art. 516, num. I, no puede sere ni aun discutible que, concurriendo la
agravante de alevosia, se aumente la criminalidad de los delincuentes; siendo aplicable a todos los
autores del hecho indivisible, porque no es circunstancia que afecte a la personalidad del delincuente,
de las que habla el art. 80 del Codigo penal en su primera parte, sino que consiste en la ejecusion
material del hecho y en los medios empleados para llevarle a cabo, cuando de ellos tuvieron
conocimiento todos los participantes en el mismo por el concierto previo y con las condiciones
establecidad en la segunda parte del citado articulo.[75]
Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar
because the same was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedures which reads:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be
alleged in the Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because if it is
more favorable to the accused.[76] Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the information,
treachery cannot aggravate the penalty for the crime.
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony of robbery with
homicide, Juan and Victor should each be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liability of Juan and Victor
The trial court awarded the total amount of P300,000.00 to the heirs of SPO1 Manio, Jr. The court
did not specify whether the said amounts included civil indemnity for the death of the victim, moral
damages and the lost earnings of the victim as a police officer of the PNP. The Court shall thus modify
the awards granted by the trial court.
Since the penalty imposed on Juan and Victor is reclusion perpetua, the heirs of the victim are
entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. The heirs are also entitled to moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00, Rosemarie Manio having testified on the factual basis thereof.[77] Considering
that treachery aggravated the crime, the heirs are also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00. This Court held in People vs. Catubig[78] that the retroactive application of Section 8, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should not impair the right of the heirs to exemplary
damages which had already accrued when the crime was committed prior to the effectivity of the said
rule. Juan and Victor are also jointly and severally liable to the said heirs in the total amount
of P30,000.00 as actual damages, the prosecution having adduced evidence receipts for said amounts.
The heirs are not entitled to expenses allegedly incurred by them during the wake as such expenses are
not supported by receipts.[79] However, in lieu thereof, the heirs are entitled to temperate damages in
the amount of P20,000.00.[80] The service firearm of the victim was turned over to the Evidence
Custodian of the Caloocan City Police Station per order of the trial court on October 22, 1997.[81] The
prosecution failed to adduce documentary evidence to prove the claim of Five Star Bus, Inc. in the
amount of P6,000.00. Hence, the award should be deleted. However, in lieu of actual damages, the bus
company is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P3,000.00.[82]
The heirs are likewise entitled to damages for the lost earnings of the victim. The evidence on
record shows that SPO1 Manio, Jr. was born on August 25, 1958. He was killed on September 28, 1996
at the age of 38. He had a gross monthly salary as a member of the Philippine National Police
of P8,065.00 or a gross annual salary of P96,780.00. Hence, the heirs are entitled to the amount
of P1,354,920.00 by way of lost earnings of the victim computed, thus:
Age of the victim
= 38 years old
Life expectancy
= 2/3 x (80 age of the victim at the time of death)
= 2/3 x (80-38)
= 2/3 x 42
= 28 years
Gross Annual Income = gross monthly income x 12 months
= P8,065.00 x 12
= P96,780.00
Living Expenses
= 50% of Gross Annual Income
= P96,780.00 x 0.5
= P48,390.00
Lost Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual IncomeLiving expenses]
= 28 x [P96,780.00 P48,390.00]
= 28 x P48,390.00
= P1,354,920.00
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor
Acuyan are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery with homicide
defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances in the commission of the felony, hereby metes on each of them the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Said accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally
the heirs of the victim SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages, P1,349,920.00 for lost earnings,P30,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The award of P6,000.00 to the Five Star Bus, Inc. is deleted. However, the said
corporation is awarded the amount of P3,000.00 as temperate damages. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LARRY CONSEJERO y PASCUA and

ROMMEL MALAPIT (at large), accused. G.R. No. 118334, February 20, 2001
LARRY CONSEJERO y PASCUA, accused-appellant.
This is an appeal from the February 2, 1994 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. VI-619, convicting accused-appellant Larry Consejero y
Pascua of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The information against accused-appellant alleges:
That on or about May 25, 1989, in the municipality of Lal-lo, province of Cagayab (sic), and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused LARRY CONSAJERO (sic) and ROMMEL
MALAPIT, armed with an M-14, conspiring together and helping one another, with evident
premeditation, with intent to gain, and by use of violence against and intimidation of persons, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away against the will of the owner,
Jaime Israel, one motor engine, Briggs and Straton, worth THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX (P3,786.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency; and that on the same occassion (sic) of the
Robbery, and in furtherance of their criminal design, the said accused, LARRY CONSAJERO (sic) and
ROMMEL MALAPIT, armed with an M-14 and a deadly weapon, conspiring together and helping one
another with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stabbed one DESTO CASTILLO and one DIONISIO USIGAN inflicting upon them
several injuries in the different parts of their bodies which caused their death.
That the crime was committed in an inhabited place.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on April 30, 1991,[3] accused-appellant Larry Consejero entered a plea of not
guilty. His co-accused, Rommel Malapit was not arraigned, being still at large. At the trial, the
prosecution presented the following witnesses: Jaime Israel, Melchor Pulido, Romana Castillo, Zenaida
Usigan and Dr. Cesar R. Real.
The facts are as follows:
In the morning of May 26, 1989, two dead bodies were discovered not far from the river bank of
Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. Found lying on the ground, face down, drenched in his own
blood with hands tied at the back, was the lifeless body of Modesto Castillo. Twenty meters away lay
the dead body of Dionisio Usigan, who sustained thirty-one stab and hack wounds on the different
parts of his body.[4]
According to prosecution witness Jaime Israel, the victims were last seen alive in the afternoon of
May 25, 1989, when the two went out to fish at the Cagayan River using his motorized banca with
Briggs and Straton engine.[5]
Another prosecution witness, Melchor Pulido,[6] a resident of Maxingal, Lal-lo, Cagayan, testified
that in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, his neighbor, accused-appellant Larry Consejero, a CAFGU
member, invited him to gather fish caught in the Cagayan River. Melchor Pulido agreed, and, together
with accused-appellant, who was then carrying an M-14 armalite rifle, he rode a banca towards
Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. That was between the hours of 8:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock in
the evening of May 25, 1989. With them was accused Rommel Malapit, who was also armed with an
M-14 armalite rifle.
After emptying the contents of the fishnets, they noticed at a distance a motorized banca carrying
two persons. They paddled towards the motorized banca. When they got nearer, accused-appellant
asked the two persons in the boat, Were you not the ones who usually demand quota from Barangay Captain
Bacuyan? The two replied, No. Then, accused-appellant asked the two if there was a nearby
store. They answered in the affirmative, whereupon accused-appellant told them to accompany him
and his companions to the said store. The two bancas then proceeded to the river bank. Upon reaching
the bank, however, accused-appellant said that only one should accompany them. Thus, one of them,
who turned out to be Dionisio Usigan, went with accused-appellant Larry Consejero and accused
Rommel Malapit towards the northeast direction. Left behind were Melchor Pulido and Modesto
Castillo. After ten (10) minutes, accused-appellant and accused Rommel Malapit returned holding an
armalite rifle and a ten-inch bolo, respectively. Dionisio Usigan was not with them anymore.
Upon orders of accused-appellant, Rommel Malapit tied the hands of Modesto Castillo at his back
using a portion of a fishnet and, thereafter, they brought him to the same northeast direction where

Usigan was taken. Again, only Larry Consejero and Rommel Malapit came back; Modesto Castillo was
no longer with them.
Accused-appellant then detached the engine of the motorized banca ridden by Usigan and Castillo,
while Melchor Pulido was told to stand as look-out. After they loaded the engine in their banca, the
three of them headed home. On the way, the two accused told Melchor Pulido that the persons they
met were already dead. Accused-appellant threatened to kill Melchor Pulido and his family if Pulido
reveals what he knew. After they alighted from the banca, Pulido went straight home while accusedappellant and Rommel Malapit brought the engine of the motorized banca to a cogonal area.
The following morning, May 26, 1989, the lifeless body of Modesto Castillo and Dionisio Usigan
were found not far from the river bank of Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. The motorized
banca ridden by the two deceased was nowhere to be found.[7]
The postmortem examination of the two deceased, conducted at around 12:00 noon of May 26,
1989 by Dr. Cesar R. Real, Municipal Health Officer of Lal-lo, Cagayan, disclosed that Modesto Castillo
and Dionisio Usigan died approximately between 7:00 oclock p.m. to 12:00 oclock midnight of May
25, 1989. Modesto Castillo sustained eight (8) incised and stab wounds; while Dionisio Usigan
sustained a total of thirty-one (31) hack, stab, and incised wounds on the different parts of his body.[8]
Melchor Pulido explained that he executed a sworn statement only on September 12, 1990, because
he was afraid that accused-appellant would make good his threat to kill him and his family if he would
reveal what he knew. In fact, they had to move to the house of his parents-in-law in order to avoid
accused-appellant, who happened to be their neighbor. It was only when accused-appellant was no
longer a member of the CAFGU that he gathered enough courage to report to the authorities.[9]
The defense relied mainly on denial and alibi. Accused-appellant testified that he became a
CAFGU member sometime before May 25, 1989, and was accordingly issued an M-14 armalite rifle. He
recounted that in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, on his own initiative, he went to the Office of SPO3
Rogelio Constantino, PNP, Lal-lo, Police Station to ask permission to go to the then 117th Philippine
Constabulary Company at Barangay Punta, Aparri, Cagayan, to report the presence of some New
Peoples Army members along the other side of the Cagayan River at Sitio Sianig, Barangay Fabrica,
Lal-lo, Cagayan. Accused-appellant left his M-14 armalite rifle with one Rey Conseja, another CAFGU
member, before going to Aparri, Cagayan. He arrived there at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of
May 25, 1989, and immediately reported to SPO3 Edgardo Daniel.[10]
Accused-appellant further testified that on his way to get a ride home, he met two police officers in
the person of SPO1 Porfirio Divina and SPO3 Amante Gorospe, who invited him to have a drinking
spree inside the headquarters of the PNP of Aparri. They later transferred to the house of SPO1
Porfirio Divina where they resumed drinking. Accused-appellant spent the night in said house. The
following morning, May 26, 1989, at around 6:00 oclock, he left the house of SPO1 Divina, rode a
passenger jeepney and went straight home.[11] Accused-appellant claimed that he ceased to be a
member of the CAFGU and surrendered his M-14 armalite rifle on March 16, 1990. From then on, he
stayed most of the time in Aparri, Cagayan, for fear of the NPAs who were allegedly after him.[12]
The version of accused-appellant was corroborated by the testimony of SPO1 Porfirio Divina,
SPO3 Edgardo Daniel, SPO3 Rogelio Constantino and Patrolman Virgilio Camacam.
On February 2, 1994, the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction under review. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court, in the interest of justice, after trial on the merits of this
case, finds LARRY CONSEJERO y Pascua, one of the two (2) accused herein, Rommel Malapit, the
other of the two (2) accused herein, being still at-large, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principal,
of the crime of Robbery With Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 293 and 294, No. 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
and to indemnify the Heirs of DIONISIO USIGAN, one of the two (2) deceased victims herein, in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, as well as the Heirs of
MODESTO OR DESTO CASTILLO, the other of the two (2) deceased victims herein, in the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, and to pay the costs of suit.
The bail bond set for the provisional liberty of Larry Consejero, one of the two accused herein, is hereby
cancelled and, immediately after the promulgation of this Decision, the Officer-In-Charge of the
Provincial Jail of Cagayan at Aparri, Cagayan or his duly authorized representative, is hereby ordered
to immediately transmit his person for confinement at the Provincial Jail of Cagayan at Tuguegarao,

Cagayan, and, immediately thereafter, the Provincial Warden of Cagayan at Tuguegarao, Cagayan
shall transmit his person to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Hence, accused-appellant is before this Court, contending that:
I
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE EVENTS TESTIFIED TO BY
MELCHOR PULIDO AS CONSTITUTING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES FROM WHICH GUILT
COULD BE INFERRED; AND, IN CONSIDERING SAID FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES TO HAVE
BEEN CORROBORATED BY OTHER PROSECUTION EVIDENCE;
II
ASSUMING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT THE FIRST ERROR, IT
ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF MELCHOR PULIDO AS SAID
TESTIMONY IS FILLED WITH IMPROBABILITIES; AND, HE REVEALED TO THE AUTHORITIES
HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE ALLEGED CRIME ONLY AFTER MORE THAN A YEAR AND THREE
MONTHS FROM THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
III
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF
ALIBI.[14]
The appeal is without merit.
Like a tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, the circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, that the
appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the circumstances or a combination
thereof, should point to overt acts of the appellant that would logically usher to the conclusion and no
other that he is guilty of the crime charged.[15] Thus, Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
In the case at bar, the evidence presented by the prosecution established the following
circumstances pointing to the fact that accused-appellant was the author of the killing of the two
deceased and the unlawful taking of the engine of the motorized banca:
1) In the afternoon of May 25, 1989, the two deceased went out fishing at the Cagayan River using
Jaime Israels motorized banca with Briggs and Straton engine.
2) Between the hours of 8:00 and 9:00 oclock in the evening of May 25, 1989, prosecution witness
Melchor Pulido together with accused-appellant and accused Rommel Malapit, who were both armed
with M-14 armalite rifles, also went fishing at the Cagayan River, particularly in Barangay Jurisdiccion,
Lal-lo, Cagayan.
3) When the three were emptying the fish nets, they noticed a motorized banca carrying two persons
who turned out to be the two deceased. Accused-appellant asked the two persons on board the
motorized banca if they were the ones exacting quota from Barangay Captain Bacuyan, to which they
replied, No.

4) Accused-appellant requested the two deceased to accompany them to a nearby store. When they
reached the river bank the two accused took along with them Dionisio Usigan and proceeded towards
the northeast direction; while Modesto Castillo was left on the river bank.
5) After ten minutes, accused-appellant, who was holding his armalite rifle, and Rommel Malapit, who
was clasping a 10-inch bolo in his hand, went back, but the deceased Dionisio Usigan was no longer
with them.
6) Accused-appellant ordered Rommel Malapit to tie the hands of Modesto Castillo, which he obeyed
using a portion of a fishnet. Thereafter, the two accused brought Modesto Castillo towards the same
northeast direction. That was the last time Castillo was seen alive.
7) The two accused detached the engine of the motorized banca and loaded it in their own banca while
Melchor Pulido was asked by accused-appellant to stand as look-out.
8) On their way home, the two accused told Melchor Pulido that the two persons they met were
already dead. Accused-appellant also threatened to kill Melchor Pulido and his family if Melchor
would reveal what he knew.
9) When they alighted from the banca, Melchor Pulido saw the two accused bring the engine to a
cogonal area.
10) In the morning of May 26, 1989, the dead body of Modesto Castillo, which sustained several stab
wounds and whose hands were tied at his back with a portion of a fishnet, was discovered not far from
the river bank of Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. Twenty meters away was located the dead
body of Dionisio Usigan with 31 stab wounds. The motorized banca of Jaime Israel was no longer
recovered.
11) The result of the postmortem examination of the two deceased shows that the approximate time of
death was between 7:00 oclock p.m. to 12:00 midnight of May 25, 1989.
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned unerringly that an unbroken chain of circumstances proven
by the prosecution clearly shows the guilt of accused-appellant. Unequivocally established is the fact
that the two deceased were last seen alive in the company of accused-appellant Larry Consejero and
accused Rommel Malapit. A combination of their concerted and complementary acts vividly manifest
a common criminal intent to kill the victims and to take the engine of the motorized banca. Thus, their
hostile approach towards the two deceased in inquiring if they were the ones exacting quota from the
barangay captain, their treacherous and intimidating scheme in cajoling the two deceased to moor their
banca, their strategic taking of the two deceased one after the other and the violent act of tying the
hands of Modesto Castillo, not to mention the ten-inch bolo clasped in the hands of Rommel Malapit,
all taken together with the circumstances that the dead bodies of the two deceased were found the next
morning in the same place where they were last seen alive, usher to the inevitable conclusion of
accused-appellants liability for the death of the two deceased. Likewise, the fact that the motorized
banca and the engine thereof were no longer found at the river bank where they were last seen, points
the liability for the loss of the engine to accused-appellant who was seen to have loaded said engine in
their banca on the night of May 25, 1989.
Similarly, in People v. Bionat,[16] the Court, based on circumstantial evidence, meted a judgment of
conviction on accused-appellant who, armed with a gun and together with others, tied the victim and
took him away from his house. The victim was last seen alive under such circumstances and found
dead the following day with stab wounds.
In the case at bar, the gamut of evidence upon which the trial court based its judgment of
conviction is anchored mainly on the testimony of prosecution witness Melchor Pulido. Expectedly,
attack on his credibility is proffered by the accused-appellant. The constant rule in our jurisdiction,
however, is that the Court will accord great respect to the factual conclusions drawn by the trial court,
particularly on the matter of credibility of a witnesses since the trial judge had the opportunity which
is denied to appellate courts to observe the behavior and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. The
trial judge is thus able to form at first hand a judgment as to whether particular witnesses are telling
the truth or not.[17]
Thus, the observation made by the trial court on the demeanor of Marcelo Pulido while testifying,
comes to the fore, to wit -

This Court, after observing the demeanor of ... Melchor Pulido ... has come to the belief that the same
was marked with spontaneity, clarity and candor, all of which were perceptible in the emphasis,
gesture and inflection of their voices, frankness of their countenances, simplicity of their languages and
total absence of artificiality in their whole manner. It has also come to the belief that, in conformity
with day-to-day common knowledge, observation and experience of ordinary man, both ... [his]
person[s] and ... [his] testimonies can undoubtedly pass the test of solidly and firmly set touchstones of
credibility, for the reason that, aside from demonstrating characters of truthfulness, both in ... [his]
person[s] and in ... [his] testimonies, ... Melchor Pulido ... [has] not been positively, clearly and
convincingly proven by the defense beyond reasonable doubt, or in any manner whatsoever, to have
been or to be nursing any bias or prejudice against the cause of the defense, particularly against that of
each of the two accused herein, Larry Consejero and Rommel Malapit, who is still at-large, and, more
particularly, against the former, and/or to have uttered prior or subsequent statements, which are
inconsistent with ... [his] testimonies in open court during the trial on the merits of this case, and/or to
have failed to perceive the facts testified to by ... [him]. Indeed, the credibility of ... [his] person[s] and
that of ... [his] testimonies ... [has] been greatly enhanced, inasmuch as the same ... [has] neither been
competently impeached nor sufficiently rebutted, in any manner whatsoever, by the defense![18]
As the trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimony of Melchor Pulido which this Court,
after a careful scrutiny thereof, found to be credible and worthy of belief, the affirmance of the decision
under review is in order.
The delay of almost sixteen months before Melchor Pulido executed a sworn statement does not in
any way diminish the value of his testimony. As adequately explained by him, the threat on his life
and that of his familys cowed him to silence. It was only when accused-appellant was no longer a
CAFGU member, and hence, no longer armed, that he gained the courage to reveal what he
knew. Verily, delay or vacillation in reporting a crime does not negate the credibility of a witness,
especially when the delay is satisfactorily explained.[19]
The alleged improbabilities pointed out by accused-appellant are too inconsequential to merit
attention. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, they refer merely to trivial matters which do
not alter the substance of Melchor Pulidos testimony positively identifying accused-appellant as one of
the culprits. Moreover, accused-appellant cannot successfully make an issue on the two deceaseds
alleged improbable obedience to the orders of accused-appellant as well as their failure to put up
resistance. The same is true with respect to the failure of Melchor Pulido to help the two
deceased. Suffice it to say, Melchor Pulido as well as the two deceased were understandably afraid to
antagonize the accused-appellant who was then a CAFGU member and armed with an M-14 armalite
rifle. Besides, no standard form of behavior may be expected of Melchor Pulido and the
victims. Persons do not necessarily react uniformly to a given situation, given that what may be
natural to one may be strange to another.[20]
Anent the defense of alibi theorized by accused-appellant, the Court is of the opinion, and so
holds, that the same cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused-appellant by Melchor
Pulido as one of the culprits. According to accused-appellant, he was in Aparri, Cagayan at around
3:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, until the following morning. As testified, however, by
Jaime Israel, he in fact met accused-appellant at around 4:30 in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, on his
way home from the Bureau of Posts of Lal-lo, Cagayan.[21] What is more, accused-appellant failed to
prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission
thereof. Settled is the rule that for alibi to prosper it is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[22]
The trial court found that the geographical distance between Barangay Minanga, Aparri, Cagayan,
and Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan is only twenty (20) kilometers, more or less, which could be
reached by traveling along the national highway by a motor vehicle for twenty-five (25) to thirty (30)
minutes more or less, or by motorized banca for one and a half (1 1/2) hours. [23] Thus, even assuming
that accused-appellant was indeed in Aparri, Cagayan, at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of May
25, 1989, the probability of his traveling back to Lal-lo, Cagayan, and his presence at the locus criminisat
the time of the commission of the crime, is not at all precluded. Hence, his defense of alibi must fail.
The crime committed by accused-appellant, however, could not be robbery with homicide. The
elements of said crime are as follows: a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; b) the property thus taken belongs to another; c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.[24]

In People v. Amania,[25] the Court had occasion to rule that in robbery with homicide, the killing
must have been directly connected with the robbery. It is necessary that there must have been an intent
on the part of the offenders to commit robbery from the outset and, on occasion or by reason thereof a
killing takes place. The original design must have been robbery, and the homicide, even if it precedes
or is subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct relation to, or must be perpetrated with a view to
consummate the robbery. The taking of the property should not be merely an afterthought which arose
subsequent to the killing.
In the present case, it does not appear that the primary purpose of accused-appellant in accosting
the two deceased was to rob the engine of the motorized banca. From all indications, accusedappellant, a CAFGU member, was primarily interested in taking the life of the two deceased whom he
suspected of exacting quota from the Barangay captain, and the taking of the subject engine was merely
an afterthought that arose subsequent to the killing of the victims.
Clearly therefore, the criminal acts of accused-appellant constitute not a complex crime of robbery
with homicide, but three separate offenses: two crimes for the killing of the two deceased, and one for
the taking of the Briggs and Straton engine of Jaime Israel.
With respect to Dionisio Usigan, the crime committed is homicide because the qualifying
circumstance of treachery alleged in the information cannot affect the liability of accusedappellant. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[26] Considering that no evidence on record showed that accused-appellant consciously and
purposely adopted means and methods that would make sure that the killing of Dionisio Usigan
would not cause any risk to himself, the crime committed is only homicide.
In the case of Modesto Castillo, the taking of his life was undoubtedly attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. In tying Modesto Castillos hand at his back, accused-appellant obviously
adopted a method that would insure the absence of any risk to himself which might arise from the
defense that may possibly be put up by Modesto Castillo. Hence, the crime committed by accusedappellant is murder.
In taking the Briggs and Straton engine of the motorized banca, the crime perpetrated was
theft. In People v. Basao,[27] the Court ruled that where the taking of the personal property was merely
an afterthought and was done after the culprit has successfully carried out his primary criminal intent
to kill the victim, and hence, the use of violence or force is no longer necessary, the crime committed is
theft. Conformably, since the taking of the engine in the present case was merely an afterthought, and
was perpetrated after accused-appellant had already accomplished his original criminal purpose of
killing the two deceased, the felony committed is theft.
Then too, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation in the unlawful taking of the
engine cannot be considered here. Though alleged in the information, the prosecution failed to
substantiate the attendance of the elements[28] thereof in the unlawful taking of the engine.
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the appropriate penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.[29] Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is entitled to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
At the time accused-appellant perpetrated the crime of murder, the same was punishable
by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since there was neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance attendant in its commission, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.[30]
As shown by the receipt presented by Jaime Israel, he purchased the Briggs and Straton engine for
P3,786.00.[31] Under Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, theft is punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods if the value of the property stolen is more than
P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. Absent aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the
unlawful taking of the engine, the penalty for theft must be imposed in its medium period.[32] With the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty, as reparation for the unrecovered
Briggs and Straton engine, is four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 86, in Criminal
Case No. VI-619, is SET ASIDE and another one is rendered, finding accused-appellant Larry Consejero
y Pascua, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the following crimes

1) Murder, for the killing of Modesto Castillo, for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua;
2) Homicide, for the death of Dionisio Usigan, for which he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
3) Theft, for the unlawful taking of the Briggs and Straton engine of the motorized banca owned by
Jaime Israel, for which he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Modesto Castillo and Dionisio Usigan
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each as indemnity ex delicto.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE vs. CONSEJERO G.R. No. 118334 February 20, 2011

FACTS: Morning of May 26, 1989, the dead bodies of Modesto Castillo and Dionisio Usigan were
found not far from the river bank of Brgy. Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. The two were killed by
allegedly killed by Larry Consejero, herein accused and Rommel Malapit (still at large).
According to the testimony of Melchor Pulido, He was invited by Consejero to gather fish caught in the
Cagayan River. Then he, together with Consejero and Malapit, who were both armed with M-14 rifle,
rode a banca towards Brgy. Jurisdiccion aound 8:00-9:00PM of May 25, 1989. After emptying the
contents of the fishnets, they saw motorized banca at a distance and they paddled towards the said
banca. The people riding on the said motorized banca were the victims, Castillo and Usigan. Consejero
then asked the two if they were the people who demand quota from Brgy. Capt. Bacuyan to which the
two replied No. Afterwards, Consejero asked the two if there is any store nearby which the two
affirms. Consejero then asked the two men to accompany them to the said store and so the two bancas
proceeded to the river bank.
Upon reaching the shore, Consejero said that only one man should accompany them, hence Usigan
went with them and they went to the northeast direction. After 10 minutes, Consejero and Malapit
retuned with armalite and bolo respectively but Usigan was no were in sight. Consejero then ordered
Malapit to tie the hands of Castillo and then they brought him to the same northeast direction. The two
returned without Castillo. Consejero then detached the engine of the motorized banca ridden by
Usigan and Castillo and told Pulido to stand as lookout. They then head home after loading the said
engine to their banca. On their way, Cansejero and Malapit told Pulido that Usigan and Castillo were
already dead and threatened him that they will kill him and his family if he reveals what he knew.
The following day, the lifeless bodies of Usigan and Castillo were found and the postmortem
examination reveals that the two died around 7:00PM-12:00MN of May 25, 1989.
The two accused, Consejero and Malapit were found guilty by the trial court of robbery with homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed was a special complex crime of robber with homicide.
RULING:
No. The SC believes that the crime committed were separate crime of robbery and
homicide based on the evidence and testimony presented.
The elements of Robbery with homicide are: a) taking of personal property with the use of violence, or
intimidation against a person; b) the property taken belongs to another; c) the taking is characterized
with intent to gain and d) on the occasion of robber, or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which
is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.
In the present case, the Court finds that it does not appear that the main purpose of Consejero in
accosting the two deceased was to rob the engine of the motorized banca. From all indications,
Consejero, a CAFGU member, was primarily interested in taking the life of the two deceased whom he
suspected to be the ones taking quota from the Brgy. Captain, and the taking of the engine of the banca
was merely an afterthought that arose subsequent to the killing of the victims.
Consejero was then charged of three different crimes, namely: murder for the killing of Castillo,
because the killing was undoubtedly attended by circumstance of treachery (by tying the victims
hand); homicide for the death of Usigan, because although treachery was alleged in the information,
the Court finds that there is no evidence showing that Consejero and Malapit adopted means and
methods that would make certain the killing of the victim would not cause risk to them; and theft for
taking the engine of the motorized banca ridden by the two deceased and owned by a certain Jaime
Israel.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO ESCARDA, JOSE VILLACASTIN

JR., HERNANI ALEGRE, and RODOLFO CAEDO,accused. G.R. No. 120548, October 26,
2001
On appeal is the decision dated September 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City,
Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 586-S, finding accused Joselito Escarda and Jose Villacastin Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law. In its decision, the trial court
decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing circumstances, this Court finds both accused JOSELITO
ESCARDA and JOSE VILLACASTIN, JR., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Viol. of P.D.
533 (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law), and there being the presence of three generic aggravating
circumstances of [r]ecidivism, nighttime and unlawful entry, with no mitigating circumstances to offset
the same, as such, the accused are each sentenced to suffer, considering the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the imprisonment of EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as the
minimum to RECLUSION PERPETUA as the maximum, together with all the accessory penalties
imposed by law and to indemnify the offended party, Joel Barrieses, in the amount of P5,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The accused being detained, are hereby entitled to the full credit of their preventive imprisonment as
provided for under R.A. 6127.
Costs against both accused.
SO ORDERED.[1]
In an information dated April 18, 1988, Provincial Fiscal Othello Villanueva charged accused with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, as
follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses JOSELITO ESCARDA, JOSE VILLACASTIN, JR., HERNANI
ALEGRE (at-large) and RODOLFO CAEDO (at-large) of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree
No. 533, (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of July, 1987, in the Municipality of Sagay, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the first two (2) abovenamed accused, in company of their two (2) other co-accused, namely: Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo
Caedo, who are both still-at-large, conspiring, confederating and mutually help[ing] one another, with
intent of gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away two
(2) female carabaos, valued in the total amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), Philippine
Currency, belonging to JOEL BARIESES, without the consent of the latter, to the damage and prejudice
of the said owner in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment, accused Escarda and Villacastin, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts as presented by the prosecution and summarized by the trial court are as follows:
[Dionesio Himaya] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 oclock in the morning in [Hacienda]
Ricky, Jose Villacastin, Jr. and his group passed by his house. [He] was still awake at that time because
he was watching over his cornfield and while doing so, he saw the two accused remove the cyclone
wire which was used as the corral for the two (2) carabaos of Rosalina Plaza. He was able to see Jose
Villacastin, Jr. cut the cyclone wire because he was just four (4) arms length away from them and after
Jose Villacastin cut the wire, they swept it aside and untied the two (2) carabaos. After untying the
carabaos, they rode on it and proceeded to the canefields. [He] saw two (2) persons riding on the
carabao whom he identified as Jose Villacastin, Jr. together with Joselito Escarda. He awakened
Rosalina Plaza who thereafter went to Joel Barrieses, owner of the carabaos, to inform the latter that his
carabaos were stolen.
[Rosalina Plaza] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 oclock in the morning, in the residence of
Joel Barrieses, Dionesio Himaya called her and informed her that the carabaos were stolen and when

asked who stole the carabaos, Dionesio Himaya only mentioned Jose Villacastin, Jr. Before the incident
of July 29, 1987, she already knew the person of Jose Villacastin, Jr., because the latter always passed by
their house. After she was informed of the stealing of the carabaos, she went to the corral to check
whether the carabaos were there but discovered that the beasts were no longer there and the cyclone
wire was destroyed. She informed Joel Barrieses, that Jose Villacastin, Jr., stole the carabaos and she
went to the 334th PC Company and reported the incident.[3]
In their defense, Escarda and Villacastin denied the charges. Escarda claimed that he was sleeping
in the house of Gilda Labrador during the incident while Villacastin declared that he too was sleeping
in his house at that time.[4] The defense version of the incident was summarized by the trial court as
follows:
Joselito Escarda testified that he did not know his co-accused in this case, specifically, Jose
Villacastin, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Caedo. Neither did he know of somebody by the name of
Dionesio Himaya although he knew somebody by the name of Gilda Labrador. In the early morning of
July 29, 1987, he was working as cane cutter and hauler in the hacienda of Javelosa located in Barrio
Malubon, Sagay, Negros Occidental which is fifteen (15) kilometers away from the house of his mother
where he was residing. On July 29, 1987, he started working at 8:00 oclock in the morning and ended
at 11:00. After he finished working in the field, he went to the house of his mother where he ate lunch
and rested until 3:00 oclock in the afternoon. In the evening of July 29, 1987, he slept at the house of
Gilda Labrador starting at 7:00 oclock in the evening and woke up at 6:00 oclock in the morning of
July 30, 1987. Sometime on August 29, 1987, he left alone for the dance hall located at Hda. Ricky to
attend a dance held there because there was a fiesta at that time. While he was at the dance hall, he
was arrested by the PC elements and brought to the 334th PC Company where he was maltreated. He
was asked whether or not he stole the carabaos at Hda. Ricky but he denied the commission of the
crime and again, he was maltreated. He suffered injuries when they maltreated him so he made a
confession before them but did not sign the same. His injuries were not treated by a physician because
the PC would not let him go out of the jail, so, his injuries healed while he was in jail. He did not know
the names of the PC who maltreated him and forced him to admit the loss of the carabaos at Hda. Ricky
because the maltreatment happened in the evening. Furthermore, he did not know the complainant in
this case, i.e. Joel Barrieses.
[Jose Villacastin, Jr. testified] that on or before July 29, 1987, he did not know the accused Joselito
Escarda, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Caedo because in the early morning of July 29, 1987, at more or
less 2:00 oclock to 3:00 oclock, he had not gone with Joselito Escarda, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo
Caedo because he was sleeping in his house which is located in Sitio Candiis. He started sleeping at
8:00 oclock in the evening of July 28, 1987 and woke up the next day, July 29, 1987 at 7:00 in the
morning. On August 29, 1987 at 10:00 oclock in the evening, he was attending a dance at Hda. Ricky
and while watching the dance, he was arrested and brought to the 334th PC Headquarters in Tan-ao,
Sagay, Negros Occidental. When they arrived at the PC Headquarters, they were investigated about
the stealing of the carabaos and the PC elements wanted them to admit it. He denied what they were
accusing him of because he has not committed the crime. He does not know of anybody by the name
of Joel Barrieses. When he denied the commission of the crime, he was maltreated and was forced to
admit it and to make a confession. They were detained for about a month at the 334th PC
Headquarters and they were transferred to the Municipal Jail of Sagay, Negros Occidental and there
was no lawyer present during his refusal to admit the stealing of the carabaos.[5]
The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible, while it disbelieved the
defense of denial and alibi of accused Escarda and Villacastin. They were found guilty as
charged. However, the charge against accused Rodolfo Caedo was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. Earlier, the charge against co-accused Hernani Alegre was dismissed on motion by the
prosecution, for lack of evidence.
Insisting on their innocence, Escarda and Villacastin filed their notice of appeal. In their
assignment of error, they alleged that the trial court erred in convicting them of the crime charged.[6]
On November 27, 1995, we required the trial court to order the commitment of Escarda and
Villacastin to the Bureau of Corrections or the nearest national penal institution. However, Executive
Judge Renato Muez requested that their commitment to the Bureau of Corrections be deferred until
the termination of the other criminal case[7] against them pending before the said trial court. Further,
Captain Eduardo Legaspi, Acting Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, also requested to hold in
abeyance the commitment of Escarda and Villacastin in view of their pending criminal cases before the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City.[8] Accordingly, we granted the aforesaid request for

deferment.[9] On August 12, 1998, they were eventually committed to the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City.[10]
On October 12, 1998, Escarda sought the approval of this Court to withdraw his appeal.[11] We
required the Director of the New Bilibid Prison to confirm the voluntariness of said withdrawal. [12] In
his certification dated July 15, 1999, Atty. Roberto Sangalang, who personally examined Escarda,
attested that Escarda executed his urgent motion to withdraw appeal on his own free will and fully
understood the consequences of the same. On August 9, 1999, we granted Escardas motion to
withdraw appeal.[13]
Accordingly, we are now concerned only with the appeal of the remaining appellant, Jose
Villacastin, Jr. In his brief, he assigns only one error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME
CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant contends that the element of taking away of carabaos by any means, method or scheme
without the consent of the owner was not proven by the prosecution. He also alleges that his identity
was not established beyond reasonable doubt, thus, he should be acquitted. He adds that the
prosecution failed to prove ownership of the stolen carabaos by presenting the certificate of
ownership,[14] as required by the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law.
Cattle rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the consent of the
owner or raiser of cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass, or other domesticated member of the bovine family,
whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or
intimidation of any person or force upon things. Cattle rustling includes the killing of large cattle, or
taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser.[15]
In this case, the overt act which gives rise to the crime of cattle rustling is the taking away of the
carabaos by the accused without the consent of the caretaker. Dionisio Himaya testified that he saw
appellant cut the cyclone wire used as corral for the carabaos. Afterwards, appellant untied the two
carabaos. Then, appellant rode on one carabao while co-accused Escarda rode on the other and
immediately proceeded to the canefield.[16] The taking was confirmed by Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker
of the carabaos, who declared that after she was informed by Himaya about the incident, she went
right away to the corral and discovered that indeed the two carabaos were missing.
Appellants assertion that his identity was not positively established deserves no serious
consideration. Prosecution witness Dionisio Himaya identified appellant and Escarda as the
rustlers. In his testimony, Himaya said he was awake at that time as he was watching over his
cornfield nearby, and there was enough illumination from the moon. [17] He was just four arms length
away. He saw appellant and Escarda unleash the two carabaos. He stated that appellant rode on one
carabao while Escarda rode on the other, and both immediately went away. He said he easily
recognized appellant as he knew him long before the incident. According to the witness, appellant was
the nephew of his wife and used to visit them before. During the trial, the witness positively identified
appellant as the same person who stole the carabaos. Appellants contention concerning lack of proper
identification is, in our view, baseless and unmeritorious.
Similarly, appellants assertion, that the prosecution should have first presented the certificate of
ownership of the stolen carabaos to warrant his conviction, is untenable. It is to be noted that
thegravamen in the crime of cattle-rustling is the taking or killing of large cattle or taking its meat
or hide without the consent of the owner. The owner includes the herdsman, caretaker, employee or
tenant of any firm or entity engaged in the raising of large cattle or other persons in lawful possession
of such large cattle. In this case Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker of the carabaos, did not consent to the
taking away of the carabaos. She immediately informed Joel Barrieses, the owner, that the carabaos
were stolen and reported the incident to the police. Note that the carabaos ownership was never put
in issue during the trial in the lower court and is now raised belatedly. It is settled that, generally,
questions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.[18]
Appellants alibi must likewise fail. He insists that he was sleeping in his house at the time the
crime occurred. He slept at 8:00 P.M., July 28, 1987 and woke up the next day, July 29, 1987 at 7:00
A.M. As the trial court noted, it is difficult to believe appellants claim that he slept for eleven hours
straight just like Escarda. Besides, the rule is settled that alibi cannot prosper unless it is proven that
during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was committed.[19] In this case, appellant failed to
demonstrate satisfactorily that it was physically impossible for him to be in the crime scene at the time

of the incident. Admittedly, the scene of the crime was only a fifteen-minute walk from appellants
house.
We note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, unlawful
entry and recidivism, without any mitigating circumstance. The prosecution, however, failed to specify
these circumstances in the charge filed before the trial court, as now required expressly by the Code of
Criminal Procedure effective December 1, 2000 but applicable retroactively for being procedural
and pro reo.[20]
Moreover, we find that the trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Code. In its decision,
the trial court merely mentioned that appellant was convicted for cattle rustling under Criminal Case
No. 627-S on February 8, 1993, at the time when the case at bar was being tried. It did not state that
said conviction was already final. Even the records did not show that appellant admitted his previous
conviction. As we had held before, there can be no recidivism without final judgment. [21] The best
evidence of a prior conviction is a certified copy of the original judgment of conviction, and such
evidence is always admissible and conclusive unless the accused himself denies his identity with the
person convicted at the former trial.[22]
P.D. 533 does not supersede the crime of qualified theft of large cattle under Articles 309 [23] and
under the Revised Penal Code. It merely modified the penalties provided for qualified theft of
large cattle under Article 310 by imposing stiffer penalties thereon under special
circumstances.[25] Under Section 8[26] of P.D. 533, any person convicted of cattle rustling shall,
irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished by prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
310[24]

In the instant case, the offense was committed with force upon things as the perpetrators had to cut
through the cyclone wire fence to gain entrance into the corral and take away the two carabaos
therefrom. Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable on appellant is
only prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period as
maximum. Thus, it is proper to impose on appellant only the indefinite prison term of ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one
(21) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of
Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 586-S, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
Jose Villacastin, Jr., is declared guilty of violating the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law (P.D. 533) and sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to
fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to
indemnify offended party Joel Barrieses the amount of P5,000, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PABLO GRIFFITH, Defendant and Respondent
This is an appeal by the People (Pen. Code, 1238, subd. (a)(7)) from an order dismissing an information which
charged defendant with possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code 11530), following the granting of
defendant's motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5).
Officer Dukeslaw of the Los Angeles Police Department and his partner were on patrol in a black and white
police car at about 4:35 p.m., August 19, 1970. Dukeslaw, who was driving south on Valencia, observed defendant
driving a 1958 Chevrolet north on Valencia in a lawful manner. The lower two-thirds of the right windwing of the
Chevrolet was broken. The opening was large enough to admit a hand. Dukeslaw's partner ran a check of the
license number of the Chevrolet. It came back "no want." Dukeslaw nevertheless stopped defendant's car to
investigate the possibility that it was stolen. Upon approaching the car, Dukeslaw observed dismantled
phonograph parts and numerous tools, primarily pliers and screwdrivers, on the back seat, the front seat and the
floor. These objects led Dukeslaw to suspect the possibility that defendant might be a burglar. Dukeslaw asked
defendant to get out of the car. The officer conducted a patdown search for offensive weapons. He felt a long hard
object in defendant's left front pocket which he believed to be a pocket knife or other weapon. Dukeslaw asked
defendant what the object was; defendant said, "nothing." Dukeslaw then reached his hand halfway into
defendant's pocket and retrieved the object which turned out to be a screwdriver. As Dukeslaw withdrew the
screwdriver, he also, unintentionally, removed a small conical-shaped spring along with it. Inside the spring was
a hand rolled marijuana cigarette which formed the basis for the instant prosecution.
[1a] The trial court, in granting defendant's motion to suppress, indicated it believed the officer's testimony as set
forth above. The threshold question on this appeal is, of course, whether the officer was justified initially in
stopping defendant's car.
[2] While it is well established that circumstances short of probable cause for making an arrest may warrant a
temporary detention for purposes of investigation (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868];
People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658]), before such a detention may be undertaken
there must be an objectively reasonable suspicion that something out of the ordinary has taken place, that the
activity is related to a crime, and that defendant is connected to the activity. (Irwin v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d
423, 427 [82 Cal. Rptr. 484, 462 P.2d 12]; People v. Henze, 253 Cal. App. 2d 986, 988 [61 Cal.Rptr. 545].) In People v.
Adam, 1 Cal.App. 3d 486, 489 [81 Cal.Rptr. [19 Cal. App. 3d 951] 738], we approved a stop where, in addition to
the fact that the defendant had a broken left windwing and fit a rather generalized description of a burglar who
had been active in the immediate area, he was driving in a sufficiently erratic manner to lead to the objectively
reasonable suspicion that he might be intoxicated. It was this factor which led us to conclude that his initial
detention was lawful. (People v. Adam, supra, 1 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 488-489.)
[1b] By contrast the only unusual circumstance noted by the officer in the instant case was the broken windwing.
This was a fact equally reconcilable with an innocent explanation as with a guilty one, especially in view of the
negative report the officer received on the license plate. The Constitution does not permit an officer to stop a
motorist in broad daylight merely because he observes some damage, of undetermined age and origin, which
does not constitute a violation of the Vehicle Code.
Although the court below speculated that it could probably judicially note that vehicles are frequently stolen by
thieves who gain entry to them through a windwing, the court did not comply with the notice requirements of
section 455, subdivision (a) of the Evidence Code which would have enabled it to take judicial notice of such a
matter. In view of the court's ruling in defendant's favor immediately after commenting upon the possibility of
taking judicial notice, defendant cannot be deemed to have waived compliance with section 455, subdivision (a).
This court has not been asked to take judicial notice (Evid. Code, 459) of the frequency with which auto thefts
are accomplished by means of forced entry through a windwing, and more particularly by breaking out a portion
of the windwing. Nor do we believe that such grounds for judicial notice exist. It is just as reasonable to infer
from the existence of a broken windwing that it was broken for the purpose of stealing some object from the
vehicle as that it was broken for the purpose of stealing the vehicle itself. Accidental damage and vandalism are
other equally reasonable explanations for the condition of the windwing.
[1c] In any event, we need nor really decide whether the stop was constitutionally authorized. If we were correct
in People v. Adam, 1 Cal. App. 3d 486 [81 Cal.Rptr. 738] in holding that the facts disclosed by the record in that
case did not authorize a patdown, we must necessarily reach the same conclusion here. Tested against the
objective standard demanded by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905-906, 88 S.Ct. 1868], we can
see no justification for intruding this far on defendant's privacy. The instant confrontation involved two armed
officers and a citizen seated behind the wheel of a car. The officers for no apparent reason, ordered him out of the
car. Dukeslaw testified that this put defendant "in a [19 Cal. App. 3d 952]more strategic or offensive type position
than he would if he were still sitting in the car." Of course, that was entirely due to the uncalled for order. Besides,
it amply appears from the record that the officer patted defendant down because there was a confrontation, not
because he really felt that there were "specific and articulable facts" (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 21 [20
L.Ed.2d at p. 905]) warranting the intrusion. Asked for such facts he replied: "As far as I am concerned, anybody I
stop could possibly have a weapon on them."
The order dismissing the information is affirmed.

G.R. No. 142641

July 17, 2006

PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 28, 1999 decision1 and March 27, 2000
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 affirming the trial courts judgment
finding petitioner Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22, otherwise
known as the "Bouncing Checks Law."
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals follow.
On March 14, 1991, [petitioner], obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino Cenizal [] in the
amount ofP100,000.00. Several weeks thereafter, [petitioner] obtained an additional loan of P50,000.00
from [Cenizal]. [Petitioner] then issued in favor of Cenizal, Bank of the Philippine Islands [(BPI)] Check
No. 163255, postdated August 4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at Cenizals house located at 70 Panay Avenue,
Quezon City. When August 4, 1991 came, [Cenizal] did not deposit the check immediately because
[petitioner] promised [] that he would replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally
seven (7) times. When his patience ran out, [Cenizal] brought the check to the bank for encashment.
The head office of the Bank of the Philippine Islands through a letter dated December 5, 1991, informed
[Cenizal] that the check bounced because of insufficient funds.
Thereafter, [Cenizal] went to the house of [petitioner] to inform him of the dishonor of the check but
[Cenizal] found out that [petitioner] had left the place. So, [Cenizal] referred the matter to a lawyer who
wrote a letter giving [petitioner] three days from receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check.
[Petitioner] still failed to make good the amount of the check. As a consequence, [Cenizal] executed on
January 20, 1992 before the office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and submitted
documents in support of his complaint for [e]stafa and [v]iolation of [BP 22] against [petitioner]. After
due investigation, this case for [v]iolation of [BP 22] was filed against [petitioner] on March 27, 1992.
The check in question and the return slip were however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire that
occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992. [Cenizal] executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding
the loss of the check in question and the return slip.3
After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. Aggrieved, he appealed to the Court of Appeals.
However, on April 28, 1999, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the failure of the
prosecution to present the dishonored check during the trial. He also contends that he should not be
held liable for the dishonor of the check because it was presented beyond the 90-day period provided
under the law. Petitioner further questions his conviction since the notice requirement was not
complied with and he was given only three days to pay, not five banking days as required by law.
Finally, petitioner asserts that he had already paid his obligation to Cenizal.
Petitioners contentions have no merit.
Significance of the 90-day Period
For Presentment of the Check
Petitioner asserts that there was no violation of BP 22 because the check was presented to the drawee
bank only on December 5, 1991 or 120 days from the date thereof (August 4, 1991). He argues that this
was beyond the 90-day period provided under the law in connection with the presentment of the
check. We disagree.
Section 1 of BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year
or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no

case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
In Wong v. Court of Appeals,4 the Court ruled that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an
element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in
the account within a reasonable time from the date indicated in the check. According to current
banking practice, the reasonable period within which to present a check to the drawee bank is six
months. Thereafter, the check becomes stale and the drawer is discharged from liability thereon to the
extent of the loss caused by the delay.
Thus, Cenizals presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 days (four months) after its issue was
still within the allowable period. Petitioner was freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient
funds in his account nor from liability resulting from the dishonor of the check.
Applicability of the Best Evidence Rule
Petitioners insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for
conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of
Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However, the rule applies only where the content of
the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the
document or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.5
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check.6 Hence, the subject of
the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its content.
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established. Cenizal testified that
he presented the originals of the check, the return slip and other pertinent documents before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his complaint-affidavit during the preliminary
investigation. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and
filed the corresponding information based on the documents. Although the check and the return slip
were among the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16,
1992, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due execution, existence and loss of the check
and the return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.
Moreover, petitioner himself admited that he issued the check. He never denied that the check was
presented for payment to the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds.
Presence of the Elements of the Offense
Based on the allegations in the information,7 petitioner was charged for violating the first paragraph of
BP 22. The elements of the offense are:
1. the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value;
2. knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
3. subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.8

All these elements are present in this case.

Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioner issued BPI check no. 163255 postdated August
4, 1991 in the amount of P150,000 in consideration of a loan which he obtained from Cenizal. When the
check was deposited, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn against insufficient
funds. There was sufficient evidence on record that petitioner knew of the insufficiency of his funds in
the drawee bank at the time of the issuance of the check. In fact, this was why, on maturity date, he
requested the payee not to encash it with the promise that he would replace it with cash. He made this
request and assurance seven times but repeatedly failed to make good on his promises despite the
repeated accommodation granted him by the payee, Cenizal.
Notice of Dishonor to PetitionerAnd Payment of the Obligation
The trial court found that, contrary to petitioners claim, Cenizals counsel had informed petitioner in
writing of the checks dishonor and demanded payment of the value of the check. Despite receipt of the
notice of dishonor and demand for payment, petitioner still failed to pay the amount of the check.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the period of five banking days from receipt of notice
of dishonor within which to pay the amount of the check.9 While petitioner may have been given only
three days to pay the value of the check, the trial court found that the amount due thereon remained
unpaid even after five banking days from his receipt of the notice of dishonor. This negated his claim
that he had already paid Cenizal and should therefore be relieved of any liability.
Moreover, petitioners claim of payment was nothing more than a mere allegation. He presented no
proof to support it. If indeed there was payment, petitioner should have redeemed or taken the check
back in the ordinary course of business.10 Instead, the check remained in the possession of the payee
who demanded the satisfaction of petitioners obligation when the check became due as well as when
the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.
These findings (due notice to petitioner and nonpayment of the obligation) were confirmed by the
appellate court. This Court has no reason to rule otherwise. Well-settled is the rule that the factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are not to be disturbed.11
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 28, 1999 decision and March 27, 2000
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 are AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.
Pacifico Arceo obtained a loan from Josefino Cenizal. He then issued a check in favor of Cenizal, in
which he promised verbally seven times that he would replace it with cash. After not replacing the
check, he encashed the check but was dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Cenizal went to Arceo's house to inform him of the dishonor but he was not around anymore so he
went to Arceo's lawyer and gave him a letter giving him three days to pay the check. When Arceo
failed, Cenizal charged him in violation of BP 22.
The lower court found him guilty.
Arceo contends that he should not be held liable because it was presented beyond the 90-day period
provided under the law; that he only given three days to pay and not five banking days as per law; and
that he paid his obligation.
ISSUE: Whether Arceo is guilty.
RULING: The SC denied Arceo's petition. The SC held that the life of a check is six months. Cenizal
presented the check within four months of issuance. The 90-day period in the law is not an element of
the offense. Arceo cannot claim that he was not given five banking days (the rule is three), because he
still remained unpaid after five days of his receipt of dishonor. Lastly, his claim that he paid the
obligation was only mere allegation as there was no proof of his payment and that the check still
remained on Arceo.

[G.R. NO. 139292. December 5, 2000]

JOSEPHINE DOMAGSANG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 139292, December 5, 2000
Petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 63, of having violated Batas
Pambansa ("B.P.") Blg. 22 (Anti-Bouncing Check Law), on eighteen (18) counts, and sentenced to "suffer
the penalty of One (1) Year imprisonment for each count (eighteen [18] counts)." Petitioner was
likewise ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P573,800.00.[1] The judgment, when
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 18497), was affirmed in toto by the appellate court.
It would appear that petitioner approached complainant Ignacio Garcia, an Assistant Vice
President of METROBANK, to ask for financial assistance. Garcia accommodated petitioner and gave
the latter a loan in the sum of P573,800.00. In exchange, petitioner issued and delivered to the
complainant 18 postdated checks for the repayment of the loan. When the checks were, in time,
deposited, the instruments were all dishonored by the drawee bank for this reason: Account closed.
The complainant demanded payment allegedly by calling up petitioner at her office. Failing to receive
any payment for the value of the dishonored checks, the complainant referred the matter to his lawyer
who supposedly wrote petitioner a letter of demand but that the latter ignored the demand.
On 08 May 1992, Criminal Case No. 92-4465 was lodged against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC") of Makati. The Information read:
"That on or about the 24th day of June, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and issue to complainant Ignacio H. Garcia, Jr., to
apply on account or for value the dated check/described below:
"Check No.
Drawn Against
In the Amount of
Dated/Postdated
Payable to

:
:
:
:

149900
Traders Royal Bank
P50,000.00
June 24, 1991
:
Ignacio H. Garcia, Jr.

"said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, she did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason `ACCOUNT CLOSED' and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or
to make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
Subsequent Informations, docketed Criminal Cases No. 92-4466 to No. 92-4482, inclusive, similarly
worded as in Criminal Case No. 92-4465 except as to the dates, the number, and the amounts of the
checks hereunder itemized "Check Number
TRB No. 161181
TRB No. 149906
No. 182074
No. 182084
No. 182078
No. 161183
No. 161177
No. 182085
No. 182079
No. 182086
No. 182080
No. 182087
No. 182081
No. 182082
No. 182088

Dated/Postdated
July 18, 1991
July 24, 1991
July 30, 1991
August 30, 1991
September 15, 1991
September 18, 1991
September 18, 1991
September 30, 1991
October 15, 1991
October 30, 1991
November 15, 1991
November 30, 1991
December 15, 1991
December 15, 1991
December 30, 1991

Amount
P6,000.00
3,000.00
29,700.00
9,300.00
6,000.00
6,000.00
100,000.00
9,000.00
6,000.00
10,500.00
6,000.00
11,400.00
6,000.00
100,000.00
12,000.00

No. 182089
No. 182090

December 30, 1991

December 30, 1991

100,000.00
100,000.00"[3]

were also filed against petitioner. The cases were later consolidated and jointly tried following the "not
guilty" plea of petitioner when arraigned on 02 November 1992.
On 07 September 1993, petitioner filed a demurrer to the evidence, with leave of court, premised
on the absence of a demand letter and that the checks were not issued as payment but as evidence of
indebtedness of petitioner or as collaterals of the loans obtained by petitioner. Opposed by the
prosecution, the demurrer was denied by the trial court. In the hearing of 17 February 1994, petitioner,
through counsel, waived her right to present evidence in her defense. Relying solely then on the
evidence submitted by the prosecution, the lower court rendered judgment convicting petitioner. The
decision, as heretofore stated, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of 15 February
1999. Reconsideration was also denied in the resolution, dated 09 July 1999, of the appellate court.
Hence, the instant petition where petitioner raised the following issues for resolution by the Court
"1. Whether or not an alleged verbal demand to pay sufficient to convict herein petitioner for the crime
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22;
"2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it affirmed the
judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court, on the ground that a written notice of dishonor is
not necessary in a prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, contrary to the pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in the case of Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572; (and)
"3. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering the alleged written demand
letter, despite failure of the prosecution to formally offer the same."[4]
The pertinent provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 "Bouncing Checks Law," provide:
"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check
to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check
is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year
or by fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
"Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
"SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
"SEC. 3. Duty of drawee; rules of evidence. It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check, when
refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon presentment, to cause to be written, printed or
stamped in plain language thereon, or attached thereto, the reason for drawee's dishonor or refusal to
pay the same: Provided, That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank,
such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under
this Act, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal
to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall
be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee

for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason
written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.
"Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee shall state in the notice that there
were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of such check, if such be the
fact."[5] (Underscoring supplied.)
The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[6]
There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or
issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the dishonored
check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay
thereon or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose. The statute has created
the prima facie presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves a state of mind would be
difficult to establish.[7] The presumption does not hold, however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of
the check pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by
the drawee bank of such checkwithin 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee bank.
In Lao vs. Court of Appeals,[8] this Court explained:
x x x. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of
drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the
amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check.
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator `a compromise by
allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to
perform it the action is abated. This was also compared `to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of
firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government,
without incurring any criminal liability. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the
check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a `complete defense. The absence of a notice
of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require
that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert
prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.[9]
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals predicated the conviction of petitioner on the
supposed fact that petitioner was informed of the dishonor of the checks through verbal notice when
the complainant had called her up by telephone informing her of the dishonor of the checks and
demanding payment therefor. The appellate court said:
"The maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of his
check (People vs. Laggui, 171 Phil. 305). The law does not require a written notice of the dishonor of
such check.
"In the instant case, appellant had knowledge that her checks were dishonored by the bank when
complainant Garcia made several oral demands upon her to pay the value of the checks in the amount
of P573,800.00. Despite said demands, appellant failed and refused to pay the same. Moreover,
complaining witness further testified that his lawyer made a written demand upon appellant but the
latter ignored said demand (tsn., May 27, 1993, pp. 13-14). In this connection, appellant waived her
right to present evidence or rebut complainant's testimony that he made oral demands upon appellant
to make good the dishonored checks and his lawyer wrote her a demand letter.
"Likewise, appellant did not object to the admission of the complainant's testimony with regard to the
written demand by moving that it be stricken off the record for being hearsay, hence, the same is
admissible evidence. In the case of People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440, the Supreme court ruled:

"`x x x (It) must be noted that neither the defendant nor his counsel below objected to the admission of
the testimonies which are now being assailed as hearsay. This is fatal to defendant-appellant's present
posture since the failure to object to hearsay evidence constitutes a waiver of the x x right to crossexamine the actual witness to the occurrence, rendering the evidence admissible.'"[10]
Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. The Court agrees.
While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing,
taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds
in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of
dishonor or refusal,"[11] a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for
conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks
Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that
is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of
dishonor.[12] The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused.[13]
Evidently, the appellate court did not give weight and credence to the assertion that a demand
letter was sent by a counsel of the complainant because of the failure of the prosecution to formally
offer it in evidence. Courts are bound to consider as part of the evidence only those which are formally
offered[14]for judges must base their findings strictly on the evidence submitted by the parties at the
trial.[15] Without the written notice of dishonor, there can be no basis, considering what has heretofore
been said, for establishing the presence of "actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds."[16]
The prosecution may have failed to sufficiently establish a case to warrant conviction, however, it
has clearly proved petitioner's failure to pay a just debt owing to the private complainant. The total
face value of the dishonored checks, to witCheck Number
TRB No. 149900
TRB No. 161181
TRB No. 149906
No. 182074
No. 182084
No. 182078
No. 161183
No. 161171
No. 182085
No. 182079
No. 182086
No. 182080
No. 182087
No. 182081
No. 182082
No. 182088
No. 182089
No. 182090

Dated/Postdated
June 24, 1991
July 18, 1991
July 24, 1991
July 30, 1991
August 30, 1991
September 15, 1991
September 18, 1991
September 18, 1991
September 30, 1991
October 15, 1991
October 30, 1991
November 15, 1991
November 30, 1991
December 15, 1991
December 15, 1991
December 30, 1991
December 30, 1991
December 30, 1991

Amount
P50,000.00
6,000.00
3,000.00
29,700.00
1,300.00
6,000.00
6,000.00
100,000.00
9,900.00
6,000.00
10,500.00
6,000.00
11,400.00
6,000.00
100,000.00
12,000.00
100,000.00
100,000.00"[17]

or the sum of P563,800, has yet to be made good by petitioner. This amount, with 12% legal interest per
annum from the filing of the information until the finality of this decision, must be forthwith settled.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Petitioner Josephine
Domagsang is acquitted of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. She is ordered, however, to pay to
the offended party the face value of the checks in the total amount of P563,800.00 with 12% legal
interest, per annum, from the filing of the informations until the finality of this decision, the sum of
which, inclusive of the interest, shall be subject thereafter to 12%, per annum, interest until the due
amount is paid. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

People Vs. Ceballos

Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Don Ceballos (Defendant), was convicted by a jury of assault
with a deadly weapon, when the victim, who was trying to break into the Defendants premises, was
hit by a trap gun mounted in the defendants garage.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A person is not justified in using deadly force to protect his property from
burglary.
Facts. The Defendant lived alone in a home. After some tools had been stolen from his home, the
Defendant mounted a .22 caliber pistol in his garage. The pistol was aimed at the center of the garage
door and was designed to discharge if the door was opened several inches. On the day in question, two
boys, age 15 and 16, attempted to break into the Defendants home. Upon opening the garage door, one
of the boys was shot in the face by the gun.
Issue. Is a person entitled to use deadly force to prevent a burglary that did not threaten death or
serious bodily harm?

Held. No. Mechanical devices are without mercy or discretion. Therefore, while a person who is
present may use deadly force under certain circumstances, a deadly mechanical device is unacceptable,
especially where, as here, the burglars were unarmed.
Discussion. Mechanical devices may never be used for the protection of property.
People v. Ceballos
12 Cal. 3d 470
SYNOPSIS: Defendant appealed his conviction by the Superior Court of Marin County (California) for
assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Cal. Penal Code 245.
FACTS:
-Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Cal. Penal Code 245 when
a trap gun mounted in his garage discharged a bullet and hit a teenager in the face.
-Defendant contended that the teen was a burglar and he was lawfully defending his property.
-He further contended that he had the right to do indirectly what he could have done directly.
HOLDING:
The appellate court affirmed his conviction holding that the character and manner of the alleged
burglary did not reasonably create a fear of great bodily harm and therefore there was no cause for the
use of deadly force.
ANALYSIS:
-Deadly force could not be used solely for the protection of property.
-The court discouraged defendant's use of a trap gun to protect his property saying that deadly
mechanical devices are without mercy and discretion.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed defendant's conviction for assault with a deadly weapon holding that
the character and manner of the alleged burglary did not reasonably create a fear of great bodily harm
and therefore there was no cause for the use of deadly force.

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IRENEO
MARCELINO, accused-appellant. G.R. Nos. 135452-53, October 5, 2001

ALCOREZA

Barely in their teens, MARY JOY MANILA and ESTRELLA MANILA experienced repeated
sexual molestation in the hands of their stepfather --- the man who was supposed to secure their future
and protect them from harm. They bore their sufferings in silence. After agonizing for several years
over the unceasing sexual assaults, the girls finally found the courage to reveal their sad fate to their
mother who merely turned a deaf ear and a blind eye.
Accused IRENEO ALCOREZA y MARCELINO was charged with rape by his 14-year old
stepdaughter ESTRELLA MANILA and two (2) counts of statutory rape by his 11-year old
stepdaughterMARY JOY MANILA.
He was charged in an Information in Criminal Case No. 388-M-98,[1] thus:
That on or about the 28th day of October, 1996, in the municipality of Sta. Maria, province of Bulacan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and with lewd design
have carnal knowledge of his stepdaughter, Estrella Manila, 14 years of age, against her will and
without her consent.
Contrary to law.
Except for the date, the two (2) Informations[2] for statutory rape (Criminal Case No. 401-M-98 and
Criminal Case No. 402-M-98) similarly charged the accused, thus:
That on or about the 21st (and 27th) day of September, 1997, in the municipality of Sta. Maria, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and with
lewd design have carnal knowledge of his stepdaughter, Mary Joy Manila, 11 years of age, against
her will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.
The prosecution evidence disclose that MELITA GONZALES y ALCOREZA bore five children in
her marriage to Benito Manila, Sr., namely: Fernanda, Estrella, Elena, Mary Joy and Benito, Jr. After her
husband died, Melita married accused IRENEO ALCOREZA.
On September 21, 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., 11-year old MARY JOY was left in their house with the
accused. Her siblings were then in church. The accused called Mary Joy into the bedroom. When she
entered, accused wasted no time and forcibly took off her shorts and panty. He then removed his
shorts. He pushed Mary Joy on the bed and mounted her. He kissed and embraced her and inserted
his penis into her organ. She wriggled in pain. She desperately tried to extricate herself from
underneath the accused but could not resist his lecherous advances as his heavy weight pinned her on
the bed. She could not shout as the accused threatened to kill her if she did. All she could do was
cry. After satisfying his lust, the accused removed his penis. Mary Joy felt a mucus-like, slippery
substance come out of the accuseds organ.[3]
Barely a week later, on September 27, 1997, at about noon, Mary Joy again found herself alone in
the house with the accused. Her siblings attended a funeral, while her mother was in
the poblacionworking as a manicurist. The accused called Mary Joy into the bedroom. When she
entered the room, the accused approached her and took off her shorts and panty. He laid her down,
hurriedly took off his clothes and kissed her. When the accused mounted her, his penis touched her
organ but he failed to insert it as he heard her 8-year old brother, Benito, arrive. The accused
immediately pushed her away and put on his clothing. Benito, however, still saw Mary Joy naked on
the bed. Appalled, Benito immediately ran away. Mary Joy could only cry while putting back her
undies. Before the accused left, he warned her that if anyone should ask, she should never reveal what
he did to her.
The following day, September 28, 1997, after the accused left their house, Mary Joy sought the
assistance of her sister Fernanda and revealed to her the sexual ordeal she suffered in the hands of the
accused. Fernanda then accompanied Mary Joy to the house of their grandfather BENITO
GONZALES. Benito proceeded to Mary Joys house to confront the accused but the latter was
nowhere to be found. Benito accompanied Mary Joy to the police station where they executed their
statement. The next day, September 29, 1997, they were referred to the provincial hospital for physical

examination. Benito then assisted Mary Joy in filing his complaint with the MTC of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan.[4]
When they returned to the house, Benito learned that the accused had also been molesting his
other granddaughter ESTRELLA MANILA since the latter was eight years old. Her story of sexual
abuse: On October 28, 1996, at about 10:00 p.m., Estrella was sleeping in their bedroom together with
her 3 siblings: Benito, Jr. (then 8 yrs. old), Elena (15 years old) and Mary Joy. They kept their bedroom
door open as the accused forbade them to lock it. Suddenly, Estrella sensed the presence of the accused
in their room when he laid down beside her. She was then an arms length away from her siblings who
were also sleeping. Fear swept her body. She tried to tinker with the door to call the attention of
Melita, her mother, who was sleeping in the next room. This angered the accused. He kicked Estrella
and warned her not to make a noise. The accused then repeatedly tried to remove her shirt and lower
her shorts but she resisted. The movement awakened Melita who was sleeping in the other
room. Sensing that he might be caught, the accused hurriedly stood up. Melita then entered the
bedroom and asked the accused what he was doing there. The accused got mad and they
quarrelled. In the heat of their argument, Melita threatened to sue the accused. When Estrella
revealed to Melita that the accused had been molesting her since she was eight, Melita refused to
believe her. Instead, Melita directed Estrella not to tell her siblings about her ordeal.
Estrella turned to her grandfather Benito for help as Melita did not make good her threat to report
the rape incidents to the police authorities. Estrella also learned that the accused was also raping her
younger sister Mary Joy.[5] Benito assisted Estrella in filing a complaint for rape and accompanied her
to the hospital for medical examination.
As per the letter-request of the Sta. Maria police station, DR. MANUEL AVES, the medico-legal
officer of the Bulacan Provincial Hospital, conducted a gynecological examination of Mary Joy and
Estrella. His examination revealed that both Mary Joy and Estrella were in a non-virgin state. Mary
Joy had a healed laceration and abrasion on her hymen while Estrellas hymen sustained 4 healed
lacerations.[6]
The accused, a 49-year old jeepney dispatcher, simply denied the rape charges of Estrella. He
claimed that on October 28, 1996, at about 10:00 p.m., he was sleeping with his wife in their house,
while Estrella and her siblings were sleeping in the other room. Nothing unusual happened that
night.[7] He claimed that the alleged victims could have filed the cases against him as he would spank
them once in a while. He theorized that Benito Gonzales, Melitas father, could have also plotted
against him and used his granddaughters to file trump up charges of rape. He alleged that Benito was
opposed to his marriage to Melita as he was poor. It could also be that Benito harbored ill-feelings
against him when he ceased to give him financial support.
As to the rape charge of Mary Joy, the accused proferred an alibi. He claimed that on September
21, 1997, he was out of the house collecting funeral contributions from the jeepney drivers to be given
to one of their members.[8]
The defense presented the accuseds wife, MELITA GONZALES y ALCOREZA, to the stand. She
disclaimed knowledge about the sexual assaults on Mary Joy as she was not in their house on those
two dates. Mary Joy did not approach her or ask her help in filing the case. She came to know about
Mary Joys rape charges only after the complaint was filed in court. However, Estrella confided to her
that the accused had been molesting her. She was shocked by the revelation. Her daughters then
sought the assistance of her father Benito in filing the complaint. She did not intervene and left the
matter to her parents. Neither did she try to dissuade her daughters from filing the cases. She did
not talk to her husband or do anything to help him after he was incarcerated. She could not think of
any reason that could have motivated her daughters to file the rape charges against the accused.[9]
After the trial, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty only of attempted
rape in the case of Estrella and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty. However, on the two
counts of statutory rape filed by Mary Joy, the accused was found guilty and sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of death. The dispositive portion reads:[10]
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, in Criminal Case No. 388-M-98, the Court resolves that the
prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of accused Ireneo Alcoreza Y Marcelino for
consummated Rape. He is, however, found Guilty of Attempted Rape. With the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term
of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal/medium.

Inasmuch as the civil aspect of this case is deemed to be instituted in this case, the accused is further
directed to indemnify the complainant Estrella Manila in the amount of P25,000.00 as moral damages.
In both Criminal Cases Nos. 401-M-98 and 402-M-98, the Court resolves that the prosecution has
successfully undertaken its burden to prove the guilt of accused Ireneo Alcoreza Y Marcelino beyond
reasonable doubt. For having violated Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 7659 with the attendant circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is x x x stepfather, x x x or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, the
accused Ireneo Alcoreza Y Marcelino is hereby found guilty of the crime of Statutory Rape as
charged. By virtue hereof, in both these cases, he is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of
Death by lethal injection.
In line with established jurisprudence, the said accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the offended
party Mary Joy Manila in the sums of P50,000.00 for moral damages in each of the two cases.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[11] (emphasis supplied)
On automatic appeal, the appellant assigns the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF
STATUTORY RAPE IN CRIMINAL CASES NO. 401-M-98 AND 402-M-98 AND ATTEMPTED RAPE
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 388-M-98 DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO WARRANT
CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY DESPITE THE
ERRONEOUS ALLEGATION OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP IN THE
INFORMATION.
We shall discuss the two issues jointly.
On the charge of statutory rape committed on September 21, 1997 (Criminal Case No. 401-M-98),
appellant contends that Mary Joys testimony is far from credible. He points out that during her direct
testimony, Mary Joy declared that the accused forced her to lie down on the floor but changed her story
on cross-examination and said she was made to lie down on the bed. Appellant also charges that her
testimony regarding the rape incident on said date was sketchy as she merely declared that the accused
tried to push inside my private part his penis.
We disagree. The alleged inconsistency in the testimony of Mary Joy regarding the September 21,
1997 rape incident is too flimsy and trivial to merit serious consideration. Indeed, it is not unnatural to
find minor discrepancies in the testimony of a rape victim, especially that of a child. She cannot be
expected to remember every minute detail of her ordeal. Going over the records, we find her recount
of the sexual assault clear, brief and convincing. It had a ring of truth that can come only from the lips
of an innocent child victim. Thus:
Q. On September 21, 1997, between 7:00 and 8:00 A.M., do you remember your whereabouts?
A. I was at home, sir.
Q. Did you have companions in your house at that time?
A. None, I was alone with my stepfather, sir.
Q. Can you tell us why your stepfather was there? Was he not working at that time?
A. No, sir.
Q. While you were alone together with your stepfather on that date and time in your house in Parada, was
there any unusual incident that happened?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was the unusual incident that happened?
A. He called me and told me to undress, sir.
Q. Were you not in school on that date?
A. It was a Saturday, sir.
Q. Who called you and told you to undress?
A. My stepfather, sir.
Q. And did you oblige?
A. No, he forced me, sir.
Q. How did your stepfather force you?

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
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A.
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A.
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Q.
A.

He was the one who removed my dress, sir.

What were you wearing that time?
I was wearing shorts and t-shirt, sir.
Did you have panty (sic) at that time?
Yes, sir.
How about bra?
Only sando, sir.
What were the apparel removed from you?
My shorts and panty, sir.
So your sando remained (sic) with you?
Yes, sir.
Where were you at that time when your stepfather removed your shorts and panty?
Inside the bedroom, sir.
You said that it was a Saturday, where were your other siblings?
They went to church, sir.
How about your mother?
My siblings attended a funeral while my mother is in Poblacion, sir.
After your stepfather removed your shorts and panty, what did he do?
He went on top of me and kissed me, sir.
How about your stepfather, what was he wearing at that time?
None, sir.
In (sic) what moment did he remove his clothes?
After undressing me, he removed his clothings, sir.
What was he wearing at that time before he removed his clothes?
He was wearing only shorts, sir.
After your stepfather lie (sic) on top of your (sic), what did he do?
He inserted his penis inside my private part, sir.
What did he do after inserting his penis into your private part?
He was kissing me, sir.
How long did your stepfather insert his private organ into yours?
I dont know, sir.
Could it be an hour?
No, sir.
How did the accused cease from abusing you that morning?
He removed his penis, sir.
Did you feel anything coming out from his private organ?
Yes, sir.
Will you please describe that thing that you felt which came from his private organ?
At (sic) appeared like mucus and it is (sic) slippery (madulas), sir.[12]

The above-quoted testimony, coupled with the medical findings, prove beyond doubt that the
appellant was able to consummate the sexual assault of his hapless victim Mary Joy. We thus find no
reason to disturb the trial courts assessment of her credibility.
In stark contrast, appellants alibi that at the time of the incident he was out of the house collecting
funeral contributions is vague, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated. First, he failed to mention what
time he left the house that fateful day. Second, he did not present any witness to corroborate his
alleged whereabouts on said date. Third, even assuming the truth of his allegation, appellant himself
admitted that he was a mere three kilometers away from his house. Due to his proximity, he could
have easily left his collection chores, return to his house and perpetrate the sexual assault on Mary
Joy. Clearly, it was not impossible for him to have been in the locus criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.[13] Neither did the testimony of Melita help his cause. It only made clear the
fact that she did nothing to assist her daughters in vindicating their honor and she left the matter
completely to her parents. Neither did she lift a finger to help her husband, the appellant, during his
incarceration.
Be that as it may, the accused can be convicted only of simple statutory rape and, accordingly,
the penalty of death imposed against him should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The Information
alleged that the appellant raped his 11-year old stepdaughter Mary Joy. The qualifying circumstance of
minority of Mary Joy was proved beyond reasonable doubt by the presentation of her birth
certificate. However, the relationship between the appellant and Mary Joy was not established with the
same degree of proof. Although the prosecution established that Mary Joy was the daughter of Melita,
it failed to offer the marriage contract of the appellant and Melita which would establish that Mary Joy
is the stepdaughter of the appellant. The testimony of Melita and even the admission of the appellant

regarding their marriage do not meet the required standard of proof.[14] The Court cannot rely on the
disputable presumption that when a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, they are
presumed to be married. Relationship as a qualifying circumstance in rape must not only be alleged
clearly. It must also be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just as the crime itself. [15]Neither can it be
argued that without the marriage contract, a common-law relationship between the appellant and
Melita was still proved and this should qualify the crime at bar. To be sure, what the Information
alleged is that the appellant is the stepfather of Mary Joy. It made no mention of a common-law
relationship between the appellant and Melita. Hence, to convict appellant with qualified rape on the
basis of the common-law relationship is to violate his right to be properly informed of the accusation
against him.
As to the second count of statutory rape allegedly committed on September 27, 1997 against Mary
Joy (Criminal Case No. 402-M-98), we find that the trial court erred in convicting the appellant of
consummated rape. Mary Joys account of what transpired on said date clearly reveals that the
appellant failed to insert his penis in her organ, thus:
Q. After undressing you, what did the accused do?
A. He laid me down.
Q. After you were laid down by your stepfather, what did he do?
A. He went on top of me.
Q. After the accused laid on top of you, what did he do?
A. He kissed me.
Q. Was he wearing anything at that time when he placed himself on top of you?
A. None, sir.
Q. At what moment did he remove his clothings?
A. After he undress (sic) me.
Q. After the accused had laid (sic) on top of you, what did he do next?
A. He was inserting his penis.
Q. Did he succeed in inserting his penis in your private parts (sic)?
A. No, sir.
Q. How did it happen that the accused failed to insert his penis in your private organs (sic)?
A. Because my brother arrived.
Q. You said that the accused failed to insert, did he attempt to insert his penis in your private organ?
A. No, sir.
Q. What did the accused do in (sic) his penis in trying (sic) to insert his penis into your private organ?
A. It touched my private organ.[16]
The aforequoted testimony shows that the appellant failed to consummate the crime of rape as his
penis merely touched Mary Joys organ. In People vs. Campuhan,[17] the Court clarified that mere
touching of the private organ of the victim should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the
penis into the labias of the femal organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or pudendum. x x
x Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking
or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims
vagina, or the mons pubis x x x. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed
touched the labias or slid into the female organ and not merely stroked the external surface
thereof for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias are required to be
touched by the penis, which are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the
vaginal surface, to touch with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface,
hence the conclusion that touching the labia majora or minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated
rape.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code,[18] the appellant can only be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced the commission of
rape by removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and lying on top of her. However, he
failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause
other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of the victims brother. Thus, his
penis merely touched Mary Joys private organ. Accordingly, as the crime committed by the appellant
is attempted rape, the penalty to be imposed on him should be an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum.
As to the rape charge of Estrella (Criminal Case No. 388-M-98), the appellant argues that the trial
court erred in convicting him of attempted rape as the evidence failed to establish the elements of the
crime. Appellant contends that, as per the testimony of Estrella, the appellant only got as far as raising
her shirt up to her abdomen for Estrella resisted his advances and caused Melita to awaken and enter
the room. As Estrellas account of the incident showed that there was no real and immediate threat to

her womanhood up to the time the appellant desisted from consummating the rape, he could not be
found guilty of attempted rape.
We agree. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the prosecution evidence failed to prove
that rape, at whatever stage, was committed. As recounted by Estrella, the appellant surreptitiously
entered her bedroom and laid down beside her. He repeatedly tried to pull down her shorts and panty
but he failed as she resisted. He also tried to remove her shirt but he was able to lift it only up to her
abdomen as she would lower it again. The appellant touched her private parts. These acts, as
described by Estrella, are insufficient to prove that the appellant intended to have carnal knowledge
of Estrella. He did not lie on top of Estrella or even made the motion of removing his underwear. In
fact, he kept his clothes on during the entire time that he was in the bedroom. Neither does it appear
that he tried to insert his finger or any object into the genital or anal orifice of Estrella. All that the
appellant was able to do was touch her private parts.[19] From the circumstances thus proved, the
appellant can only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness.
On a last note, appellants theory that Mary Joy, Estrella and Benito were motivated by ill-feelings
in filing the rape charges against him does not merit serious consideration. His claim that the filing of
the cases is an act of vengeance on the part of the children as he used to spank them once in a while is
not persuasive. Parental punishment is never a valid reason for a victim to cry rape against the man in
the house who she looks up to as her father,[20] especially where, as in this case, the victims were
children who had not been exposed to worldly ways. We also find it hard to believe that Benito will
utilize his grandchildren to hit back at the appellant for ceasing to give him financial support. No
grandfather would expose his grandchildren to shame and humiliation were it not for the purpose of
vindicating the wrong committed on them. Moreover, as explained by Benito on rebuttal, the appellant
was so poor he could not have been in a position to provide him financial assistance. The appellant did
not earn enough. It was Benito who even assisted the appellant in looking for jeepneys he could drive
for his livelihood. Benito merely intervened in filing the rape charges as his granddaughters ran to him
for assistance.[21]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned Decision is modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 388-M-98, appellant IRENEO ALCOREZA y MARCELINO is adjudged
guilty of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby sentenced
with the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision
correccional as maximum, and to indemnify the victim Estrella Manila in the amount of five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) as exemplary damages;
In Criminal Case No. 401-M-98, the appellant is found guilty of simple statutory rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the complainant Mary Joy Manila the
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) by way of indemnity, the additional sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages; and
In Criminal Case No. 402-M-98, the appellant is found guilty of attempted rape. He is sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify Mary Joy Manila the sum of twenty-five thousand
pesos (P25,000.00) as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

February 28, 1957

G.R. Nos. L-8922-24
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENTINO ENGUERO, JOSE TARIMAN, NAZARIO NARVARTE and DIONISIO
BUENO, defendant-appellants.
Manuel Bilog for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
Florentino Enguero, Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and Dionisio Bueno were charged with the crime
of robbery in band in three separate informations and after a joint trial the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur found them guilty as charged and sentenced them as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 2714, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty which
shall not be less than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor nor more than 14 years, 10 months and 21
days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an
indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 4 years and 2 months of prison correccional nor more
than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor; and all of them to indemnify Florentina Ogarte de Binaday in
the amount of P36.75 and to pay the costs;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 2715, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty which
shall not be less than 8 years and 21 days of prisons mayor nor more than 14 years, 10 months and 21
days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an
indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 4 years and 2 months of prison correccional or more
than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor; and all of them to indemnity Creseciano Magistrado and Juan
Margarte in the amount of P38.88 and P17.80 respectively, and to pay the cost; and
(c) In Criminal Case No. 2716, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
which shall not be less than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor nor more than 14 years, 10 months and
21 days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an
indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 4 years and 2 months of prison correccional nor more
than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor; and all of them to indemnify Anatolia Bragais in the amount
of P3 and to pay the cost. In the three cases, they shall not suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency on account of the nature of the principal penalty.
The one bottle of Siutong wine, Exh. B, shall be returned to Cresenciano Magistrado; the pair of red
leather shoes; Exh. H; the Jacket, Exh. G; the blue pant, Exh. H; and the hammer, Exh. I to Anatolia
Bragais; and the birthstone ring, Exh. E, to Juan Margarte. The balisong, Exh. M, and the bolo, Exh. C,
and its scabbard Exh. C-1, are confiscated. The Pistol, Cal. 45, W/SM-394701, by decision of this court
in Criminal Case No. 2729, is already confiscated. The gray skin suit marked Exhs. K and K-1; the pair
of tennis shoes Exh. D; the raincoat, Exh. L; and the flashlight, Exh. N, shall be refused to Florentino
Enguero. The towel, Exh. O; the skin pant Exh. P; and the pair of shoes, black and white, Exh. Q, shall
be returned to Nazario Narvarte.
They appealed. Jose Tariman withdrew his appeal. As no question of fact is raised, the only error
assigned to have been committed by the trial court being the conviction and sentence of the defendants
for three robberies in band instead of only one, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court.
The trial court found the following:
At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 9, 1952 the four defendants met at Yabo River, Lupi,
Camarines Sur, after Florentino Enguero had previously provided himself with a pistol. From the river
they went to the house of Enguero where they took their supper. After eating Enguero issued to
Nazario Narvarte a bolo, to Jose Tariman a balisong and to Dionisio Bueno, a piece of hardwood, while
he himself had the pistol. Thus armed sagan, Lupi, but before reaching the barrio itself, they passed at
the house of Teodulo Banta where Enguero ordered him and his brother-in-law, Francisco Bugagao, at
the point of his pistol to guide them to the barrio. At the instance of Eugenio, their hands were tied
behind their backs. With the two as guides, the group proceeded towards the barrio, and on the way
they met Pedro Bragais by the stairs of his house. Pointing his pistol at him, Enguero had his hands tied
behind his back and ordered him to go with them. They continued on their way and later they met
again one Ernesto Belgado whose hands they also tied behind his back. They took him along with them
too. They arrived in the barrio at about 8:00 in the evening and went directly to the store of Cresenciano
Magistrado which adjoins his house. They made the four tied men sit on the ground in front of the
store guarded by Narvarte who had the bolo in his hand, while Enguero entered the store. Pointing his

pistol at Magistrado, Enguero demanded money from him. Fearing for his life, Magistrado ordered his
wife who was in the house to give their money to them. Enguero, Bueno and Tariman then went up the
house and took P4.80 from Magistrado's wife. And upon finding Juan Margarte, the barrio school
teacher who was lodging with the Magistrados, in one of the rooms of the house, Bueno, who had the
open balisong in his hand brought him down to the ground and there tied his hands behind his back.
Upon seeing a birthstone ring in Margarte's finger, Bueno forcibly took it away from him. After a while
Enguero and Tariman went down to the store and told Magistrado to give them wine which they
drank. After drinking Enguero took the goods displayed in the store and passed them on to Bueno and
Tariman who piled them on the ground in front of the store. The goods consisted of one dozen bottles
of Coca-Cola worth P1,20; one dozen cans of Sardines worth P7.20; one dozen bottles of wine, Hoctung,
worth P3; one dozen Sardine at P4.80; one dozen bottles Pomade worth P4.80; two pairs of gold earrings worth P10; one dozen cartons Purico, valued at P3; and one package of Matches worth P0.33. The
total value of these articles together with the sum of P4.80 taken from the wife of Magistrado amounts
to P39.13. The defendants also carried away the following articles belonging to Juan Margate; one
birthstone ring worth P70; one pair of tennis shoes worth P5.50; one pair of sock worth P2; one cake of
soap worth P.30; a medal and a crucifix worth P10, all with total value of P87.80.
After having committed the acts narrated above and when it was about 10:00 in the evening, the four
defendants, together with Magistrado, Margate whose hands were still tied behind his back and the
four other tied individuals, all of whom they forced to go with them, went to the nearby house of
Victorino Togno about 14 meters from the house of Magistrado (See Exh. R). Upon arriving Florentino
Enguero, Jose Tariman and Clementino Carulla (this last one was originally accused with the four
defendants, but the case against him was later dismissed upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal) went up
the house. while their abovenamed companions remained on the ground guarded by Bueno and
Narvarte. Anatolia Bragais, wife of Victorino Togno, and her son were in the house. Pointing at the
neck of Anatolia a sharp instrument, Enguero demanded money from her. Carulla opened a trunk and
took P3 from it. Enguero asked Anatolia where she kept the rest of her money, and to make her reveal
it, he threatened to cut her throat with the sharp instrument. She told him that she had no other money.
However, Enguero took and carried away from her house a pair of shoes worth P18, a jacket worth P12,
a blue pant worth P12 and a hammer. These articles including the P3 in cash have a total value of P45.
Then they left the house.
After committing the acts mentioned in the next proceeding paragraph, the four accused and Carulla,
together with Magistrado, Margate and the four tied men whom they again forced to go with them,
proceeded to the house of Florentina Ogarte, wife of Ireneo Binday, located about 54 meters from the
house of Cresenciano Magistrado (See sketch, Exh. R). The time was about 11:00 o'clock in the evening.
Upon arriving Enguero and Carulla went up the house while, Tariman, Narvate and Bueno again stood
as guard on the ground. Enguero pointed his pistol at Florentina and ordered her to produce her
money and jewels. She replied that she had none; but Enguero nonetheless searched her waistline. Not
having found anything, he began to hold her private parts, but she begged for pity and said they could
get instead the goods in her store. Enguero left her and took from the store 2 dozen cans of Sardine
worth P8.20; 15 tins of Salmon worth P11.15; 14 tins of tinapa worth P4.20; 2 dozen bottles of Hoctung
wine worth P8.40 besides money amounting to P4.80. He threw the goods to his co-defendants on the
ground through the door. The value of the goods and money taken makes a total of P36.75. Enguero
and Carulla then asked Florentina to provide them with empty sacks which she did. Bueno, Tariman
and Narvarte gathered the goods and put them inside the sacks. They then left the house after
cautioning Florentina not to report them to the authorities.
From this last house the four defendants, together with those whom they forced to follow them,
returned to the store of Magistrado. Upon arriving they gathered the other stolen goods and put them
inside the sacks. Then they looked for some one who could carry goods for them. They found Glicerio
Buensalida and Absalon Medrano, after which they untied the hands of Margate, Bragais, Belgado,
Banta and Bugagao. After warning them out to report to the authorities, the four defendants left and
went away with the stolen goods carried by Buensalida and Medrano.
After a few days the defendants were apprehended pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the Justice
of the Peace Court of Lupi on July 16, 1952. After their arrest Enguero and Tariman were investigated
by Capt. Dominador M. Gutierrez of the 1st Camarines Sur PC Company, and Narvarte and Bueno by
First Lieut. Jaope Nobleza of the same company. The investigation was made in question and answer
from and reduced to writing which later was subscribed and sworn to by the defendants before
Mamerto M. Bonot, Justice of the Peace of Lupi. Exhibit S is the sworn statement of Enguero, Exhibit T
of Bueno, Exhibit U of Narvarte and Exhibit V of Tariman. In there exhibits the four accused have

admitted and confessed among other statements, their respective participation in the three different
robberies, pointing to the investigators the whereabouts of some of the stolen articles.
Following the lead in the written confessions Sgt. Fernando Narvaes took the defendants to their
respective houses on July 22, 1952 and recovered from them some of the goods and arms used during
the robberies. From Florentino Enguero the following were recovered:
1 suit, skin, gray, Exhibits K and K-1
1 bottle of Siu Tung wine, Exhibit B
1 pair of Tennis shoes (Elpo), Exhibit D
1 raincoat, rubber, used during the robbery, Exhibit L
1 Knife (balisong) used during the robbery, Exhibit M
1 flashlight used during the robbery, Exhibit N
1 Pistol, Cal. 45 W/SN-394701 with one magazine and one ammunition used during the robbery.
From Nazario Narvarte, the following were recovered:
1 towel (white), Exhibit O
1 pant skin (Ceniza), Exhibit T
1 pair shoes, black and white, Exhibit Q
1 hammer (Steel) Exhibit I.
From Dionisio Bueno, the following were recovered:
1 ring, birthstone, Exhibit E.
1 pant skin (blue), Exhibit H
1 jacket, skin, light green, Exhibit G.
One pair of leather shoes (Red), Exhibit F, was recovered from Jose Tariman.
The above articles are listed in an inventory, Exhibit J, prepared by Sgt. Narvaez, in which all the four
defendants certified that the goods were taken from their custody. As evidence of this fact, each and
everyone of them signed Exhibit J below the articles recovered respectively from them (Exhibits J-1, J-2,
J-3 and J-4).
Counsel de oficio argues that the appellants are guilty of one crime only citing in support of his
contention the case of People vs. de Leon, 49 Phil., 437. The contention is without merit. In the case cited
by counsel the defendant entered the yard of a house where he found two fighting this case, after
committing the first crime of robbery in band the appellants went to another house where they
committed the second and after committing it they proceeded to another house where they committed
the third. Obviously, the rule in the case cited cannot be invoked and applied to the present.
The crime committed is robbery in band punished in articles 294, paragraph 5, of theRevised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18, in connection with article 295 of the same Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 373, with prison correccional in its maximum period to prison mayor in its medium
period. As the robbery was committed in band, the penalty to be imposed is the maximum period of
the proper penalty, which is prison mayor in its medium period, or from 3 years and 1 day to 10 years.
The second paragraph of article 295 of the Revised Penal Code which impose the penalty next higher in
degree upon the leader of the band has been left out by Republic Act No. 373, amending further article
295 of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed upon each of the appellants is
the next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, or 4 months and 1 day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, and 8 years and 1 day ofprison mayor, as maximum, in each of the three
crimes committed, and the accessories of the law.
Modified as to the penalty to be imposed upon each of the three appellants, the rest of the judgment
appealed from is affirmed, with proportionate costs in each case against the appellants.

G.R. Nos. 25375 and 25376

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTEDE LEON Y FLORA, defendant-appellant.
Modesto Reyes for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora entered the yard of Vicente Magat's
house on Domingo Santiago Street, Manila, and without violence or intimidation against persons nor
force upon things, took, with intent to gain, two game roosters which were in the yard, one with
colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to Diego Magat, and the other with white plumage and black
spots, valued at P10, belonging to Ignacio Nicolas.
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two crimes of theft, on the theft of
Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas'. Upon being arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and
was sentenced by the municipal court in each to suffer the penalty of three years, six months and one
day presidio correcional, to return the stolen roosters to their respective owners and to pay the costs in
both cases. The accused appealed from this judgment to the Court of First Instance, and, upon being
arraigned upon the same informations, pleaded not guilty in both cases, which were tried jointly by
agreement of the parties approved by the court.
In view of the evidence, the trial court found the accused guilty of one crime of theft, holding that the
theft of the two roosters constituted but one crime, and taking into consideration the circumstance that
the accused is an habitual delinquent sentenced him in said two cases to the penalty of three years, six
moths and one day presidio correccional and to pay the costs in case R. G. No. 25375, declaring the costs
in case No. 25376, de oficio without the obligation to indemnify, as the roosters were returned to their
respective owners. The accused appealed to this court and his counsel alleges that the trial court erred:
(a) In holding that the guilt of the accused was proven by his own admission; (b) in not giving him the
benefit of reasonable doubt, and (c) in sentencing instead of acquitting the accused, with the costs de
oficio.
We have reviewed the evidence and find no grounds to support the contention of the appellant. We are
of the opinion, and so hold, that the guilt of the accused in the present case is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The case falls under the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 518 of the Penal Code,
amended by section 1 of Act No. 3244, in connection with paragraph 3 of article 520 of the same Code.
The penalty provided in the law is that of presidio correcional in its full extent, and there having been
present the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the penalty must be imposed upon the accused in
its maximum degree, or four years, two moths and one day presidio correcional. The accused being an
habitual delinquent, under Act No. 3062 an additional penalty must be imposed upon him consisting of
half the penalty provided or the crime committed, or 2 years and 1 month presidio correcional.
(People vs. Aguinaldo, 47 Phil., 728; People vs. Espiritu, R. G. No. 24753[[1]]).
We could stop right here, but the Attorney-General raises a question in his brief which we believe it is
necessary for us to resolve now, due to the fact that it is not only important to our jurisprudence, but
also to the due prosecution of violators of the law. The Attorney-General urges that the penalty for two
crimes of theft be imposed upon the accused for each of the stolen roosters. The question, then, to
determine is whether or not the fact that the accused, with intent to gain, on the same occasion and in
the same place, took the two roosters, one belonging to Vicente Magat and the other to Ignacio Nicolas,
constitutes two crimes of theft.
It will be remembered that article 517 of the Penal Code contains three paragraphs enumerating the
acts which constitute the crime of theft. The first defines theft in general; the second declares a
particular act to be theft which is not included in the description in the first paragraph, and the third
also considers theft a series of acts with similar characteristics to the general type, with the exceptions
therein noted.
Article 517 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 517. The following are guilty of theft:
1. Any person who, with intent to gain, but without the use of violence or intimidation against any
person or the use of force upon anything, shall take anything which is the personal property of another
without the latter's consent.
2. Any person who, having found anything which has been lost, shall with knowledge of its ownership
appropriate the same with of gain.

3. Any person guilty of malicious damage who shall remove or make use of the things damaged,
subject to the exceptions established by paragraphs one two, and three of article five hundred and
ninety-two paragraph one of article five hundred and ninety-three; paragraph one of article five
hundred and ninety-five, and articles five hundred and ninety-six, five hundred and ninety-eight, and
six hundred and three.
As may be seen, the act taking another's property without violence or intimidation against persons, not
force upon things, with intent to gain and without the consent of its owner, is what constitutes the
crime of theft, as described in the first paragraph of article 517.
The crime of theft is an offense against personal property and what is punished is the alarm caused in
the community by the perpetration of the act which is violative of the individual rights guaranteed by
the law, as well as the damage that said act may occasion to the members of the community. Under
sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal
purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the accidental circumstance that the
article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts here for the
accomplishment of different purposes, but only one of which was consummated, and which
determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the
same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because
there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of July 13, 1894, said:
The act of unlawfully taking two colts, two cows and two calves on one night, belonging to four
owners, which livestock was found in various adjacent and open meadows, constitutes only one crime
of theft, because the fact that the persons injured by the taking of the cattle by the accused were several,
said accused knowing that the meadows in which this livestock was found were open and adjacent, it
being easy to pass from one to the other, does not authorize the legal conception that the said accused
committed four thefts on said night, but only one as found by the lower court, which did not commit
an error of law by holding that the acts were committed on a single occasion.
It is not an element of the crime of theft that the culprit know the owner of the thing stolen, the crime
being consummated provided that being stolen belongs to another and the same is taken with intent to
gain. (Decision of the supreme Court of Spain of November 22, 1898.) Neither is it necessary for the
existence of the crime of theft that it should appear in a specific manner who the owner is of the thing
stolen, because the law does not require it nor does it affect the criminal liability, but only the
restitution or indemnification of damages, which are merely of a civil nature. (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain, October 4, 1905.) What constitutes the crime of theft is the taking of another's property
with intent to gain, without the consent of the owner, so that after the unlawful act of taking another's
property is proven, it is evident that all the elements mentioned in the first paragraph of article 517 of
the Penal Code exist. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a thing
belonging to another on one occasion and in the same place, constitutes the commission of only one
crime of theft; and fact that the things taken belong to different persons does not produce a multiplicity
of crimes, which must be punished separately.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have not lost sight of the doctrine laid down in United States vs.
Balaba (37 Phil., 260), according to which, where the accused made no objection to the information on
the ground that it charged more than one offense, the prosecution properly submitted evidence as to
the commission of each and all of the offenses charged; and the trial court also properly entered
judgment of conviction of each and all of these offenses which were established by the introduction of
competent evidence at the trial and should, therefore, have imposed the prescribed penalties for each
and all of the offenses of which the accused was convicted in accordance with the provisions of article
87 of the Penal Code. This doctrine, however, is not applicable to the present case as two separate
complaints have been filed herein against the accused, but the trial court convicted the accused in the
two cases, considering the facts alleged in the said complaints as constituting but one crime.
In American cases the same doctrine is maintained as in Spanish decisions in regard to the question
which is here debated:
In Corpus Juris, vol. 36, page 799, it is said in regard to the taking of articles belonging to two different
owners at the same time and place: "In a few jurisdictions the rule obtains that if two or more articles
belonging to different are stolen at the same time and place, the theft of the property of each owner is a
separate crime and may be prosecuted as such." (U. S. vs. Beerman, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,560; 5 Cranch C.
C., 412; State vs. Thurston 27 S. C. L., 382; Morton vs. State, 1 Lea [Tenn.], 498.) In other jurisdiction it is

held that such a theft may be prosecuted, at the pleasure of the State, either as one offense or as several
distinct offenses. (Bushman vs. Com., 138 Mass., 507; Com. vs. Sullivan, 104 Mass., 552;
State vs. Douglas, 26 Nev., 196; 65 Pac., 802; 99 Am. St., 688; State vs. Lambert, 9 Nev., 321.) But the
prevailing rule is that if several articles, stored in the same place, are taken by a single larcenous act, the
mere fact that some of them belonged to one person and some to another does not dissolve the act into
separate crimes. (Ala.-Clemm vs. State, 154 Ala., 12; 45 So., 212; Am. St., 17; D. C.-Chanock vs. U. S., 50
App., 54; 267 Fed., 612; Holies vs. U. S., 10 D. C., 370; 36 Am. Rep., 106; Ga.-Lowe vs. State, 57 Ga., 171;
Dean vs. State, 9 Ga. A., 571; 71 South East, 932; III.-Peo. vs. Israel, 269 III., 284; 109 North East, 969; Ind.Furnace vs. State, 153 Ind.-93; 54 North East, 441; Bell vs. State 42 Ins., 335; Iowa-State vs. Sampson, 157
Iowa, 257; 138 North West, 473; 42 Law. Rep. An. [N. S.], 967; State vs. Congrove, 109 Iowa., 66; 80
North West, 227; State vs. Larson, 85 Iowa, 659; 52 North West, 539; Ky.-Nichols vs.Com., 78 Ky., 180;
Md.-State vs. Warren, 77 Md., 121; 26 Atl. Rep., 500; 39 Am. St., 401; Mich.-Peo. vs. Johnson, 81 Mich.,
573; 45 North West, 1119; Miss.-State vs. Quintini, 51 So., 276; Dalton vs. State, 91 Miss., 162; 44 So., 802;
124 Am. St., 637; Ward vs. State, 90 Miss., 249; 43 So., 466; Mo.-State vs. Morphin, 37 Mo., 373;
Lorton vs. State, 7 Mo., 55; 37 Am. Dec., 179; Mont.-State vs. Mjelde, 29 Mont., 490; 75 Pac., 87; N. H.State vs. Merril, 44 N. H., 624; N. M.-State vs. Klasner, 19 N. M., 474; 145 Pac., 679; Ann. Cas. 1917-D,
824; N. C.-State vs. Simons, 70 N. C., 336; Oh-State vs. Hennessey, 23 Oh. St., 339, 13 Am. Rep., 253;
State vs. Smith, 10 Oh. Dec. (Reprint), 682; 23 Cinc- LBul., 85; Or.-State vs. Clark, 46 Or., 140; 80 Pac., 101;
Pa.-Fulmer vs. Com., 97 Pa., 503; Com. vs. Lent, 15 Pa. Dist., 884; S. D.-State vs. Kieffer, 17 S. D., 67; 95
North West, 289; Tex.-Wilson vs. State, 45 Tex., 76; 23 Am. Rep., 602; Hudson vs. State, 9 Tex. A., 151, 35
Am. Rep., 732; Addison vs. State, 3 Tex. A., Utah-State vs. Mickel, 23 Utah, 507; 65 Pac., 484; Vt.State vs. Blay, 77 Vt., 56; 58 Atl. Rep., 794; State vs. Emery, 68 Vt., 109; 34 Atl. Rep., 432; 54 Am. St., 878;
State vs.Newton, 42 Vt., 537; Va.-Alexander vs. Com., 90 Va., 809; 20 South East, 782; Wash.State vs. Laws, 61 Wash., 533; 112 Pac., 488; State vs. Butts, 42 Wash., 455; 85 Pac., 33; Terr. vs. Heywood,
2 Wash., 180; 2 Pac., 189; Wyo.-Ackerman vs. State, 7 Wyo., 504; 54 Pac., 228; Eng.-Reg. vs. Bleasdale, 2
C. & K., 765; 61 Eng. C. L., 765.)
For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as is hereby, modified and the accused Vicente
de Leon y Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years and three months presidio mayor, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real., JJ., concur.
Johns, J., concurs in the result.

TITLE THREE
I. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

Article 134
REBELLION OR INSURRECTION

ELEMENTS:

1.
1.

That there be
public uprising and

2.
2.

taking arms against the government (force/violence)

That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either

1. to remove from the allegiance to said government or its laws

1.

i. the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or

ii. any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or

2 To deprive the chief executive or congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives

1.

Persons liable for rebellion

Any person who:

1. promotes
2. maintains, or
3. heads a rebellion or insurrection; or
2.

Any person who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein by:

1.
2.

engaging in war against the forces of the government

destroying property or committing serious violence

3.

exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated (Note: diverting public funds is
malversation absorbed in rebellion);

4.

Any person merely participating or executing the command of others in rebellion

Success is immaterial, purpose is always political

Rebellion used where the object of the movement is completely to overthrow and supersede the existing government
Insurrection refers to a movement which seeks merely to effect some change of minor importance to prevent the exercise of govt authority w/
respect to particular matters or subjects

Actual clash of arms w/ the forces of the govt, not necessary to convict the accused who is in conspiracy w/ others actually taking arms against the
govt

Purpose of the uprising must be shown but it is not necessary that it be accomplished
A change of government w/o external participation
RISING PUBLICLY and TAKING ARMS AGAINST GOVERNMENT actual participation. If there is no public uprising, the crime is of direct assault.
Mere giving of aid or comfort is not criminal in the case of rebellion. Merely sympathizing is not participation, there must be ACTUAL participation
Not necessary that there is killing, mere threat of removing Phil is sufficient
Rebellion cannot be complexed with any other crime. However, illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion is distinct from the crime of
rebellion. Furthermore, it is a continuing crime such along with the crime of conspiracy or proposal to commit such

A private crime may be committed during rebellion. Examples: killing, possessions of firearms, illegal association are absorbed. Rape, even if not in
furtherance of rebellion cannot be complexed

If killing, robbing were done for private purposes or for profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately be punished and
would not be embraced by rebellion (People v. Fernando)

Read People v. Hernandez and Enrile v. Salazar

1.

directed the others

2.
3.

spoke for them

signed receipts and other documents issued in their name

4.

performed similar acts on behalf of the rebels

Person deemed leader of rebellion in case he is unknown:

Any person who in fact:

Article 134-A
COUP D ETAT

1.

ELEMENTS:
Swift attack

2.
3.

Accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth

Directed against:

4.
5.

duly constituted authorities

any military camp or installation

6.

communication networks or public utilities

1.
other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power

7.

Singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines

1.
Committed by any person or persons belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or employment; with or without civilian

8.

support or participation
With or without civilian support or participation

9.

Purpose of seizing or diminishing state power

Crime may be committed by a single person, any government employee and even by civilian

Taking up of arms not even necessary, what is important is violence, threat, intimidation, strategy or stealth

Nature of
Crime

Treason (114)

Rebellion (134)

Coup detat
(134-A)

Sedition (139)

Crime against National

Security

Crime against Public

Order

Crime against
Public Order

Crime against Public Order

Taking up arms
against the govt

See article.

Rising publicly or
tumultuously (caused by
more than 3 armed men or
provided with means of
violence)

See article.

Seizing or
diminishing state
power.

See enumeration in article.

levying war against the

govt;
Public uprising

OR
AND
adherence and giving

Overt
Acts

aid or comfort to
enemies

Purpose of
objective

Deliver the govt to

enemy during war

Article 135
Penalties

1.

Who are liable?

Any person who:

1.
2.

Promotes
Maintains

3.
4.

heads a rebellion or insurrection

engaging in war against the forces of the govt

5.
6.

destroying property or committing serious violence

exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated

2.
3.

Any person who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein
Any person merely participating or executing the command of other in a rebellion.

In Government Service

Anyone who leads, directs, commands others to undertake a coup.

Not in Government Service

Anyone who participates or in an manner, supports, finances, abets,
aids in a coup.

Serious violence is that inflicted upon civilians, which may result in homicide. It is not limited to hostilities against the armed force.

1.
2.

Public officer must take active part because mere silence or omission not punishable in rebellion
It is not a defense in rebellion that the accused never took the oath of allegiance to, or that they never recognized the government

3.
4.

Rebellion cannot be complexed with murder and other common crimes committed in pursuance of the movement to overthrow the government
Killing, robbing etc for private persons or for profit, without any political motivation, would be separately punished and would not be absorbed in the

Diverting public funds is malversation absorbed in rebellion

rebellion.

Article 136
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT REBELLION OR INSURRECTION

ELEMENTS:

1.
2.

2 more persons come to an agreement to rise publicly and take arms against the government
For any of the purposes of rebellion

3.

They decide to commit it

PROPOSAL TO COMMIT REBELLION OR INSURRECTION (136)

ELEMENTS:

Conspiracy must be immediately prior to rebellion

1.

A person who has decided to rise publicly and take arms the government

2.
3.

For any of the purposes of rebellion

Proposes its execution to some other person/s

Organizing a group of soldiers, soliciting membership in, and soliciting funds for the organization show conspiracy to overthrow the govt
The mere fact of giving and rendering speeches favoring Communism would not make the accused guilty of conspiracy if theres no evidence that the
hearers then and there agreed to rise up in arms against the govt
If it is during the rebellion, then it is already taking part in it.

Article 137
DISLOYALTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

ELEMENTS:
Presupposes existence of rebellion
Must not be in conspiracy with rebels or coup plotters

If there are means to prevent the rebellion but did not resist it, then theres disloyalty. If there are no means, no fault

1.

Failing to resist rebellion by all the means in their power

2.

Continuing to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of rebels

3.

Accepting appointment to office under rebels

If position is accepted in order to protect the people, not covered by this

The collaborator must not have tried to impose the wishes of the rebels of the people.

Article 138
INCITING TO REBELLION OR INSURRECTION

ELEMENTS:

1.

That the offender does not take arms or is not in open hostility against the government

2.

That he incites others to the execution of any of the acts of rebellion

3.

That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other representations tending to the same end

Intentionally calculated to seduce others to rebellion

There must be uprising to take up arms and rise publicly for the purposes indicated in Art 134

Proposal to Commit Rebellion (136)

Inciting to Rebellion (138)

The person who proposes has decided to commit rebellion.

Not required that the offender has decided to commit

rebellion.

The person who proposes the execution of the crime uses

secret means.

The inciting is done publicly.

Article 139
SEDITION

ELEMENTS:

1.
1.

That the offenders rise

Publicly (if no public uprising = tumult and other disturbance of public order)

2.
3.

Tumultuously (vis--vis rebellion where there must be a taking of arms)

to prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular election

4.

to prevent the national government, or any provincial or municipal government, or any public thereof from freely exercising its or his functions, or
prevent the execution of any administrative order

5.
6.

to inflict any act or hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public officer or employee
to commit for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private persons or any social class (hence, even private persons may be

7.

offended parties)
to despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the national government of all its property or any part thereof

2.
3.

That they employ force, intimidation, or other means outside of legal methods
That the offenders employ any of those means to attain any of the following objects:

Sedition: raising of commotion or disturbances in the State. Its ultimate object is a violation of the public peace or at least such measures that
evidently engenders it.

Difference from rebellion object or purpose of the surprising. For sedition sufficient that uprising is tumultuous. In rebellion there must be taking
up of arms against the government.

Sedition purpose may be either political or social. In rebellion always political

1.
2.

leader of the sedition, and

other persons participating in the sedition

Tumultuous caused by more than 3 persons who are armed or provided with means of violence
Preventing public officers from freely exercising their functions
In sedition offender may be a private or public person (Ex. Soldier)
Public uprising and the object of sedition must concur
Q: Are common crimes absorbed in sedition? In P v. Umali, SC held that NO. Crimes committed in that case were independent of each other.
Preventing election through legal means NOT sedition
But when sugar farmers demonstrated and destroyed the properties of sugar barons sedition
Persons liable for sedition:

Article 142
INCITING TO SEDITION

ELEMENTS:

1.

That the offender does not take a direct part in the crime of sedition

2.
3.

That he incites others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition (134)
That the inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writing, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same
end (purpose: cause commotion not exactly against the government; actual disturbance not necessary)

Different acts of inciting to sedition:

1.
2.

Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems etc.
Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb the public peace or writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous [vulgar, mean, libelous]

3.

libels against the government or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, which tend to disturb the public peace
Knowingly concealing such evil practices

1.
2.

when they tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office; or
when they tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes

When punishable:

3.

when they suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; or

4.

when they lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
government

II. CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION

Article 143
ACTS TENDING TO PREVENT THE MEETING OF CONGRESS AND SIMILAR BODIES

ELEMENTS:

1.

That there be a projected or actual meeting of Congress or any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or
division thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board

2.

That the offender who may be any persons prevents such meeting by force or fraud

Chief of Police and mayor who prevented the meeting of the municipal council are liable under Art 143, when the defect of the meeting is not
manifest and requires an investigation before its existence can be determined.

Article 144
DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS

ELEMENTS:

1.

That there be a meeting of Congress or any of its committees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial
board or city or municipal council or board

2.

That the offender does any of the following acts

1.
he disturbs any of such meetings

Complaint must be filed by member of the Legislative body. Accused may also be punished for contempt.

2.

he behaves while in the presence of any such bodies in such a manner as to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due it

Article 145
VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY

1.

Acts punishable:
By using force, intimidation, threats, or frauds to prevent any member of Congress from

1.
2.

attending the meeting of the assembly or any of its committees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or from
expressing his opinions or

3.
2.

casting his vote

By arresting or searching any member thereof while Congress is in a regular or special session, except in case such member has committed a crime
punishable under the code by a penalty higher than prision mayor

Elements:
1.

That the offender is a public officer or employee

2.

That he arrests or searches any member of Congress

3.
4.

That Congress, at the time of arrest or search, is in a regular or special session

That the member searched has not committed a crime punishable under the code by a penalty higher than prision mayor (1987 constitution: privilege
from arrest while congress in session in all offenses punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment).

Article partly inoperative because of the 1987 Constitution

III. ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATIONS

Article 146
ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES

Two (2) Types of illegal assemblies:

a. Meeting of the first form

1.
2.

Meeting, gathering or group of persons whether in a fixed place or moving

purpose : to commit any of crimes punishable under the code

3.

meeting attended by armed persons

b. Meeting of the second form

1.

Meeting, gathering or group of persons whether in a fixed place or moving

2.

Audience whether armed or not, is incited to the commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or direct assault.

Not all the persons present at the meeting of the first form of illegal assembly must be armed

1.

the organizers or leaders of the meeting

2.
1.

persons merely present at the meeting (except when presence is out of curiosity not liable)
if they are not armed, penalty is arresto mayor

2.
1.

if they carry arms, like bolos or knives, or licensed firearms, penalty is prision correccional
purpose of the meeting is to commit acts punishable under the RPC

2.

considered as leader or organizer of the meeting

Persons liable for illegal assembly

Responsibility of persons merely present at the meeting
Presumptions if person present at the meeting carries an unlicensed firearm:

Article 147
ILLEGAL ASSOCIATIONS

ELEMENTS:

Persons liable:

1.
2.

Organized totally or partially for the purpose of committing any of the crimes in RPC
Or for some purpose contrary to public morals

1.

founders, directors and president of the association

2.

mere members of the association

Illegal Assembly (146)

Illegal Association (147)

Must be an actual meeting of armed persons to commit any of

the crimes punishable under the RPC, or of individuals who,
although not armed, are incited to the commission of treason,
rebellion, sedition or assault upon a person in authority of his
agent.

No need for such

It is the meeting and the attendance at such that are punished

Act of forming or organizing and membership in the

association

Persons liable: leaders and those present

Founders, directors, president and members

IV. ASSAULT, RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE

Article 148
DIRECT ASSAULT

ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST FORM OF DIRECT ASSAULT

1.

That the offender employs force or intimidation.

2.

That the aim of the offender is to attain any of the purposes of the crime of rebellion or any of the objects of the crimes of sedition. (victim need not
be person in authority)

3.

That there is no public uprising.

ELEMENTS OF THE 2ND FORM OF DIRECT ASSAULT:

1.
2.

That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3.

That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties (motive is not
essential), or that he is assaulted (b) by reason of the past performance of official duties (motive is essential).

4.

That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties (with intention to offend,
injure or assault).

5.

That there is no public uprising.

Always complexed with the material consequence of the act (e.g. direct assault with murder) except if resulting in a light felony, in which case, the
consequence is absorbed

Hitting the policeman on the chest with fist is not direct assault because if done against an agent of a person in authority, the force employed must
be of serious character

The force employed need not be serious when the offended party is a person in authority (ex. Laying of hands)
The intimidation or resistance must be serious whether the offended party is an agent only or a person in authority (ex. Pointing a gun)

Person in Authority

Agent

Force Employed

Intimidation/Resistance

Need not be serious

Serious

Must be of serious character

Serious

Person in authority: any person directly vested with jurisdiction (power or authority to govern and execute the laws) whether as an individual or as a
member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission

A barangay captain is a person in authority, so is a Division Superintendent of schools, President of Sanitary Division and a teacher
Agent: is one who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public
order and the protection and security of life and property. (Example. Barrio councilman and any person who comes to the aid of the person in
authority, policeman, municipal treasurer, postmaster, sheriff, agents of the BIR, Malacaang confidential agent)

Even when the person in authority or the agent agrees to fight, still direct assault.
When the person in authority or the agent provoked/attacked first, innocent party is entitled to defend himself and cannot be held liable for assault
or resistance nor for physical injuries, because he acts in legitimate self-defense

There can be no assault upon or disobedience to one authority by another when they both contend that they were in the exercise of their respective
duties.

When assault is made by reason of the performance of his duty there is no need for actual performance of his official duty when attacked

1.
2.

when the assault is committed with a weapon

when the offender is a public officer or employee

3.

when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority

Circumstances qualifying the offense (Qualified Assault):

Complex crime of direct assault with homicide or murder, or with serious physical injuries.
Direct assault cannot be committed during rebellion.

Article 149
INDIRECT ASSAULT

1.

ELEMENTS:
That a person in authority or his agent is the victim of any of the forms of direct assault defined in ART. 148.

2.

That a person comes to the aid of such authority or his agent.

3.

That the offender makes use of force or intimidation upon such person coming to the aid of the authority or his agent.

Indirect assault can be committed only when a direct assault is also committed
To be indirect assault, the person who should be aided is the agent (not the person in authority because it is already direct assault, the person
coming to the aid of the person in authority being considered as an agent and an attack on the latter is already direct assault). Example. Aiding a
policeman under attack.

Article 150
DISOBEDIENCE TO SUMMONS

Acts punishable:

1.

refusing without legal excuse to obey summons

2.

refusing to be sworn or placed under affirmation

3.

refusing to answer any legal inquiry to produce books, records etc.

4.

restraining another from attending as witness in such body

5.

inducing disobedience to a summons or refusal to be sworn

Article 151
RESISTANCE DISOBEDIENCE TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR THE AGENT OF SUCH PERSON (par. 1)

ELEMENTS:

1.

That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender.

2.

That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person in authority or his agent.

3.

That the act of the offender is not included in the provisions of arts. 148, 149 and 150.

SIMPLE DISOBEDIENCE (par. 2)

ELEMENTS:

1.
2.

That an agent of a person in authority is engaged in the performance of official duty gives a lawful order to the offender.
That the offender disobeys such agent of a person in authority.

3.

That such disobedience is not of a serious nature.

Resistant and Disobedience to a Person in Authority or

Direct Assault (148)

Agents of such Person (151)

PIA or his agent must be engaged in the performance of

official duties or that he is assaulted

PIA or his agent must be in the actual performance of his duties.

Direct assault is committed in 4 ways by attacking,

employing force, and seriously resisting a PIA or his agent.

Committed by resisting or seriously disobeying a PIA or his agent.

Use of force against an agent of PIA must be serious and

deliberate.

Use of force against an agent of a PIA is not so serious; no

manifest intention to defy the law and the officers enforcing it.

Article 152
PERSONS IN AUTHORITY/AGENTS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY:

Persons in Authority any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental

1.

corporation, board or commission.

Barangay captain

2.

Barangay chairman

3.

Teachers

4.
5.

Professors
Persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities

6.

Lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance

Agent of Person in Authority any person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with

1.

the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property.
Barrio councilman

2.
3.

Barrio policeman
Barangay leader

4.

Any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority

Section 388 of the Local Govt Code provides that for purposes of the RPC, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members and members of
the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members
who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and the security of life, property, or the
maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority shall be
deemed AGENT of persons in authority.

V. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC DISORDERS

Article 153

1.

TYPES OF TUMULTS AND OTHER DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC ORDER:

Causing any serious disturbance in a public place, office or establishment

2.

Interrupting or disturbing public performances, functions, gatherings or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in Art 131 and 132 (Public
Officers interrupting peaceful meetings or religious worship).

3.
4.

Making any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition in any meeting, association or public place
Displaying placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of public order in such place

5.

Burying with pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed.

If the act of disturbing or interrupting a meeting or religious ceremony is NOT committed by public officers, or if committed by public officers they
are not participants therein, this article applies. Art 131 and 132 punishes the same acts if committed by public officers who are NOT participants in
the meeting

The outcry is merely a public disorder if it is an unconscious outburst which, although rebellious or seditious in nature, is not intentionally calculated
to induce others to commit rebellion or sedition, otherwise, its inciting to rebellion or sedition.

Tumultuous if caused by more than 3 persons who are armed or provided with means of violence (circumstance qualifying the
disturbance/interruption) tumultuous in character

Article 154

TYPES OF UNLAWFUL USE OF MEANS OF PUBLICATION AND UNLAWFUL UTTERANCES:

1.

Publishing or causing to be published, by means of printing, lithography or any other means of publication as news any false news which may

2.

endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest or credit of the State.
Encouraging disobedience to the law or to the constituted authorities or by praising, justifying or extolling any act punished by law, by the same

3.

means or by words, utterances or speeches

Maliciously publishing or causing to be published any official resolution or document without proper authority, or before they have been published

4.

officially
Printing, publishing or distributing or (causing the same) books, pamphlets, periodicals or leaflets which do not bear the real printers name or which
are classified as anonymous.

Article 155

TYPES OF ALARMS AND SCANDALS:

1.

Discharging any firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other explosive within any town or public place, calculated to cause alarm or danger

2.
3.

Instigating or taking active part in any charivari or other disorderly meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public tranquility
Disturbing the public peace while wandering about at night or while engaged in any other nocturnal amusement

4.

Causing any disturbance or scandal in public places while intoxicated or otherwise, provided the act is not covered by Art 153 (tumult).

Charivari mock serenade or discordant noises made with kettles, tin horns etc, designed to deride, insult or annoy
Firearm must not be pointed at a person, otherwise, it is illegal discharge
What governs is the result, not the intent

CRIME

Nature of Crime

Who are Liable

Tumults and other Disturbances (153)

Crime against Public Order

Private persons, outsider

Alarms and Scandals (155)

Crime against Public Order

Private persons, outsider

Article 156

1.

ELEMENTS OF DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAILS:

That there is a person confined in a jail or penal establishment.

2.

That the offender removes therefor such person, or helps the escape of such person (if the escapee is serving final judgement, he is guilty of evasion
of sentence).

3.

Offender is a private individual

Prisoner may be detention prisoner or one sentenced by virtue of a final judgment

A policeman assigned to the city jail as guard who while off-duty released a prisoner is liable here
It may be committed through negligence
Circumstances qualifying the offense is committed by means of violence, intimidation or bribery.
Mitigating circumstance if it takes place outside the penal establishment by taking the guards by surprise

VI. EVASION OF SENTENCE OR SERVICE

Article 157

1.

ELEMENTS OF EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE:

That the offender is a convict by final judgment.

2.
3.

That he is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty (destierro included)
That he evades the service of his sentence by escaping during the term if his sentence. (fact of return immaterial).

A continuing offense.
Offenders not minor delinquents nor detention prisoners
If escaped within the 15 day appeal period no evasion
No applicable to deportation as the sentence
Flimsy excuse for violating destierro not acceptable

1.

Circumstances qualifying the offense (done thru):

unlawful entry (by scaling)

2.
3.

breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors

using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation

4.

connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution

Article 158

ELEMENTS OF EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE ON THE OCCASION OF DISORDERS, CONFLAGRATIONS, EARTHQUAKES OR OTHER CALAMITIES:

1.

That the offender is a convict by final judgement who is confined in a penal institution.

2.

That there is disorder, resulting from- 1. conflagration,

2. earthquake,
3. explosion, or
4. similar catastrophe, or
5. mutiny in which he has not participated.
1.

That the offender evades the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution where he is confined, on the occasion of such disorder or during
the mutiny.

2.

That the offender fails to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the insurance of a proclamation by the chief executive
announcing the passing away of such calamity.

Penalty: an increase by 1/5 of the time remaining to be served under the original sentence, in no case to exceed 6 months.
Offender must escape to be entitled to allowance
Mutiny organized unlawful resistance to a superior officer, a sedition, a revolt
Disarming the guards is not mutiny

Article 159
VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON

1.

ELEMENTS:
That the offender was a convict.

2.
3.

That he was granted a conditional pardon by the chief executive.

That he violated any of the conditions of such pardon.

Condition extends to special laws violation of illegal voting

Offender must have been found guilty of the subsequent offense before he can be prosecuted under this Article. But if under Revised Admin Code, no
conviction necessary. President has power to arrest, reincarnate offender without trial.

VIOLATION OF PARDON

Infringement of conditions/terms of President

ORDINARY EVASION
To evade the penalty given by the courts disturbs the public
order

Two penalties provided:

1.

prision correccional in its minimum period if the penalty remitted does not exceed 6 years

2.

the unexpired portion of his original sentence if the penalty remitted is higher than 6 years

VII. COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME

Article 160
COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE-PENALTY: (quasi-recidivism)

1.

ELEMENTS
That the offender was already convicted by final judgement of one offense.

2.

That he committed a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same.

Quasi-recidivism : a person after having been convicted by final judgement shall commit a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence, or
while serving the same.

Second crimes must belong to the RPC, not special laws. First crime may be either from the RPC or special laws

Quasi-Recidivism may be offset by a special privileged mitigating circumstance (ex. Minority)

Reiteracion: offender shall have served out his sentence for the prior offense
A quasi-recidivist may be pardoned at age 70. Except: Unworthy or Habitual Delinquent
If new felony is evasion of sentence offender is not a quasi-recidivist
Penalty: maximum period of the penalty for the new felony should be imposed (mitigating circumstance can only be appreciated if the maximum is
divisible)