73 and 74 Amend-Ignou Superb

UNIT 13
FEATURES OF 73rd AND 74th

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Structure
13.0 Learning Outcome
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Initiatives towards Constitutional Status to Local Governance
13.2.1 Features of 73rd Constitutional Amendment
13.2.2 Features of 74th Constitutional Amendment
13.2.3 Decentralised Planning in Context of 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act
13.3 Initiatives after Economic Reforms

13.4 Functioning of PRIs in Various States after 73rd Amendment
13.5 Functioning of Local Governance after 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment:
Observations
13.6 Conclusion
13.7 Key Concepts
13.8 References and Further Reading
13.9 Activities
13.0 LEARNING OUTCOME

After studying this Unit you should be able to:
Identify the background of revitalisation of local governance;
Understand the features of 73rd and 74th constitutional amendment;
Discuss the initiatives after economic reforms; and
Outlines the functioning of local governance in various states after the amendment.
13.1 INTRODUCTION
The revitalization of Panchayati Raj manifested through the 73rd Constitutional Amendment
owes its origin to the dynamic leadership of Rajiv Gandhi. In his address to the 5th
Workshop on Responsive Administration held at Coimbatore in June, 1988, he said that
If our district administration is not sufficiently responsive, the basic reason is that
it is not only sufficiently representative. With the decay of Panchayati Raj Institutions,
the administration has got isolated from the people thus dulling its sensitivity to the
needs of the people. With events moving at a faster pace, Panchayati Raj emerged as
a major institutional channel of such administration.
Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment
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The Constitution 73rd Amendment Act, 1992 came into effect from 24th April 1993. No
one disputes that it is a historic legislation. The basic question arises as to what was the
basic sprit behind this legislation? Was it limited to the passing of conformity acts and
endowing panchayats with some administrative and financial powers or to make them
genuine institutions for participatory self-government? The emphasis has been so far on the
former, which has made panchayats mere implementing agencies of central and state
schemes, passed on to them, with funds. The basic objective of the democratic
decentralization through reactivation of the Panchayati Raj system was to realize Gandhijis
concept of Swarajya(Ibid.). In this Unit we will be discussing the various features of
the 73rd and the 74th amendments.
13.2 INITIATIVES TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS

TO LOCAL GOVERNANCE
As is known, both the amendment bills (64th and 65th) could not sail through the
Parliament because of opposition from the Rajya Sabha. Allegedly and arguably, they put
local governance under direct control of the Centre, which was resented by the states.
However, these two bills provided enough opportunity for a national debate as to whether
the PRIs should be given constitutional status. The bills also helped the members of the
Parliament to go into the details, as and when opportunity came, through more suitable
amendments. By the time the mid-term Lok Sabha assembled, the consensus emerged
that PRIs be given Constitutional status and suitable provisions be made so as to enable
these institutions to function as an agent of change and development at the local level.
After coming to power in 1991, the Congress Government gave top priority to the PRIs
and brought out the Constitutional 72nd Amendment Bill, 1991. The Bill was passed by
the Parliament on Dec22, 1992 and is now known as the Constitution 73rd Amendment
Act, 1992.
The institutionalisation of democratic decentralisation in the form of statutory PRIs thus
opened a new chapter in the history in India and gave a new turn to the evolution of
rural local self- government institutions. The term institutions of self-government have been
interpreted in two ways; firstly, the constitution says that the Panchayats are institutions
of self-governance, implying that they must have autonomy and the power to govern in
an exclusive area of jurisdiction. In its essential element, the 73rd Constitutional Amendment
gives Panchayat this distinct status. Therefore, it is the de facto third tier of governance.
Secondly, it strengthens administrative federalism. Professor S. Guhan argues that the
provisions of 73rd Amendment strengthen administrative federalism in order to facilitate and
encourage delegation of administrative and financial powers from the states to the local
bodies. Their administrative powers and to discharge their responsibilities, are entirely
derived from legislation that will have to passed by the states.
13.2.1
1)
Features of 73rd Constitutional Amendment
Part IX has been inserted immediately after Part VIII of the Constitution and after
the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, Eleventh Schedule has been added
(Article 243G) which gives the detail list of functions to be performed by PRIs.
Panchayats shall be constituted in every state at the village, intermediate and district
levels, thus bringing about uniformity in the PR structure. However, the states having
a population not exceeding 20 lakh have been given the option of not having any
Panchayat at the intermediate level.
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Types of Local Governance
2)
While the elections in respect of all the members to Panchayats at the level will be
direct, the election in respect of the post of the Chairman at the intermediate and
district level will be indirect. The mode of election of Chairman to the village level
has been left to the State Government to decide. All members including the
chairperson shall have the right to vote.
3)
Reservation of seats for SC/STs has been provided in proportion to their population
at each level. Not less than one-third of the total membership has been reserved for
women (in both reserved and general category) and these seats may be allotted by
rotation to different constituencies in a Panchayat. Similar reservations have been
made in respect of the office of the chairperson also.
4)
panchayat
constituted upon
dissolution may
continue for the
remainder period
A uniform term of five years has been provided for the PRIs and in the event of
dissolution or super session, election to constitute the body should be completed
before the expiry of six months from the date of dissolution. It the remainder period
is less than six months, fresh elections may not be necessary. Panchayat constituted
upon dissolution may continue for the remainder of the period (Bajpai and Verma,
1995).
5)
With a view to ensuring continuity, it has been provided in the Act that all the
Panchayats existing immediately before the commencement of this Amendment Act
will continue till the expiry of their duration unless dissolved by a resolution to that
effect passed by the State Legislatures concerned or any law relating to the
panchayats which before the amendment came into force, not inconsistent with its
provisions shall continue, unless amended or repealed.
6)
There shall be an Election Commission for the conduct of all elections to the
panchayats consisting of a State Election Commissioner to be appointed by the State
Government. It shall also be in charge of superintendence, direction and control of
the preparation of electoral rolls.
7)
The State Legislature have been given the power to authorise the Panchayats to levy,
collect and appropriate suitable local taxes and also provide for making grants-in-aid
to the Panchayats from the consolidated fund of the concerned state.
8)
A State Finance Commission has to be constituted once in every five years to review
the financial position of the Panchayat and to make suitable recommendations to the
Governor as to the principles which should govern the distribution between the state
and the panchayats of revenue, whether net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls, and
fees leviable by the state or grants in aid and recommend measures to strengthen the
financial position of the panchayat bodies and deliberate on any other matter referred
to it by the Governor. The Constitution 73 rd amendment act adds a sub clause (bb)
to Article 280 of the Constitution. According to this sub clause, the Central Finance
Commission, in addition to other stipulated duties, shall also make recommendations
to the President regarding the measures needed to augment the then Consolidated
Fund of a State to supplement the resources of the Panchayats in the State on the
basis of the recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State (Bajpai
and Verma, 1995).
9)
The State Legislatures should bring in necessary amendments to their Panchayat Acts
within a maximum period of one year from the Commencement of this Amendment
Act so as to conform to the provision contained in the Constitution
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Observations on the 73rd Amendment Act

The 73rd Amendment Act, 1992, has only provided the general guidance for the effective
and efficient working of panchayat raj institutions (PRIs) in India. It has granted the PRIs
Constitutional status and some sort of uniformity by making three-tier system a permanent
feature; regularity, by making election an imperative after the termination of the PRIs after
every five years and provision of the State Election Commission to conduct and supervise
the election; and more financial autonomy with the constitution of the State Finance
Commission, to outline its major contributions.
Firstly, the most debated problem till recently was giving constitutional recognition to the
PRIs. It was often observed by the scholars that the founding fathers of the Constitution
gave only lip service to democratic decentralisation by mentioning it in Article 40 of the
Constitution in (Part IV) the Directive Principles of State Policy. But after the 73rd
Constitutional Amendment Act, the PRIs have got constitutional legitimacy. Indian federalism
has moved a step further in that up till now there had been two tiers of governance;
henceforth, there would be three acknowledged tiers of governance. However, there is a
strong body of opinion that in order to give an air of finality to the scheme, a separate
list, namely the panchayat list could have been included in the seventh schedule, which
lists subjects for legislation into the Union, the State List and the Concurrent List.
Secondly, the present amendment does address the issue of uniformity of structure across
the country but leaves certain important matters, such as size of a panchayat at a level,
to the discretion of the state governments.
Thirdly, PRIs by and large, had failed because of irregular elections and frequent
suppression and suspension. The chronic problem was rightly been taken care of by the
recent amendment. However not all states have been dutiful in complying with the
provisions. Court intervention has been necessary, as for example, in the case of Orissa
and Uttar Pradesh to secure compliance (Chaudhrai, 2003). Courts also had to intervene
to ensure compliance with the reservation clause in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.
Fourthly, the Gram Sabha is an institution, which provides an opportunity to participate
meaningfully in governance, to all the people willing and capable of participating in the
development process. The 73rd Constitutional Amendment makes the establishment of
Gram Sabha mandatory. It however, leaves it to the State Governments to spell out its
jurisdictions and powers. Most state legislation assign to Gram Sabha a ceremonial,
tokenistic role, e.g., endorsing proposals, making recommendations, considering annual
accounts, reviewing development plans, scrutinising completed works. Other functions
entrusted to Gram Sabha include those like promoting harmony and unity in the village,
mobilising voluntary labour and contributions in cash or kind, rendering assistance in
implementation of development schemes, and promoting programmes for adult education
and family welfare (Sharma, 2004). Moreover scepticism has been expressed regarding
direct election for the village panchayat, as arguably it would make him a first among
equals relegation other participants to a less significant position. Besides, the presence of
MPs and MLAs in local bodies might overwhelm local leaders (Chaudhari, 2003).
Fifthly, yet another problem relating to the functioning of the local bodies has been the
love-hate relationship between the local level bureaucracies and the elected representatives
of PRIs. Due to the lack of defined roles for the two, both have had a contentious
working relationship rather than displaying the required harmony. This has been one of the
practical and the more important reasons for the failure of PRIs. The cooperation of the
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bureaucracy would be vital in working out the details of devolution of powers and
functions, as stipulated by the act, in each case, for instance. If such cooperation were
not forthcoming, implementation of programmes and policies would run into roadblocks,
making the ideal of local self-governance more a chimera. If the bureaucracy continues to
be unenthusiastic about local self-governance, as it has been in the past, for rationales of
its own, most initiative for empowerment of local self-governance and the ideal of
participatory democracy itself would be lost. Hence the chief but unrecognised player in
the venture is the bureaucracy. Much would depend on the way it perceives this change
and vouches or otherwise for it. It would help to inquire in to the rationales for which
local government has been considered unfit to shoulder the responsibility for development
on the part of the responsible administrators and redeeming the same. Cooperation and
commitment the part of the bureaucracy would be crucial in bringing about the desired
state of affairs with respect to local governance and administration. Significantly, devolution
is an executive process, which means that the statutory provisions need detailing in terms
of administrative rules and procedures-procurement rules, reporting structures, compensation
schemes, accounting systems etc. without which the statutory provision is a mere skeletal
framework without much substance to it. This is necessary if the 11th and 12 schedules
are not to get reduced to being mere shopping lists (GOI, 2001, WB, 2000, in
Chaudhari, 2003).
And finally, other problems related to PRIs, during the last three decades have been the
status of Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads, the inadequacy of finances and lack of
involvement of PRIs in rural development planning. The amendment has tried to take care
of all of these problems by bringing them into the statute book. However, certain
problems have persisted. There has been a general reluctance to concede political space
to the underprivileged in panchayats. As aforesaid, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh reportedly
have not been dutiful in implanting the reservation provision of the act. Hence, could it
be claimed with any degree of confidence that the backward sections would be articulate
and effective or rather, and more realistically, they would get overwhelmed, as is feared,
by the power elite? Would the state bureaucracy, affect a change in stance and work in
cooperation with the local government? Or would a stint with a panchayat, harm the
individual career prospects of bureaucrats? Would devolution of powers and functions, in
fact, take place in practice as it is stipulated on paper? Would increase in private and
foreign stake in urban development skew the balance against the urban poor in plan
priorities? These and others would be some of the pertinent questions that would need
to be continually monitored by means of empirical research and rectified by policy in this
regard, on course.
As per Palanithurai and Raghupathi, democratise decentralisation follows the new public
management principle in that the intent is to improve service delivery by invoking demand
through institutions like the District Planning Committee and the Gram Sabha and
adjusting/modifying supply accordingly. There is a paradigm shift from macro to micro
concerns in planning. Development paradigm suffered hitherto due to an overemphasis on
macro concerns. Democratic decentralisation would counter this tendency by encouraging
interest articulation on the part of the underprivileged, and the unequally placed at the
local level. Also, in view of the expansion of the market and shrinking of the state sector,
democratic decentralisation is the counterfoil, the state has attempted by enlarging the
arena of choice available to the people by providing for multiple service delivery and self
help options as against the monopoly of the state which had created a climate of
corruption and inefficiency. In this way the state has attempted to discharge its constitutional
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obligations in the changed dispensation, towards the people of the country, given the
imperatives/constraints of globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation. By institutionalising
peoples participation in administration, the state has created an alternate service delivery
mechanism to the bureaucracy, which is set to further shrink in the coming days as
liberalisation gathers momentum. As per Chaudharai (2003), the timing of 1991 trade and
industrial policy reforms coincides roughly with the initiative for democratic decentralisation.
Trade and industrial policy reforms were initiated due to the economic crisis owing
primarily to fiscal management; endemic inefficiency, corruption and waste on the part of
the State bureaucracy that had brought things to such a state, that nothing short of a
paradigm shift was called for to redeem the situation; nothing short of a system overhaul.
In 1991, consequently in the wake of a serious balance of payments crisis, the
government initiated a broad package of economic reforms, which is being followed and
furthered even today, irrespective of the party in power, involving dismantling of the
infamous industrial licensing regime, deregulation of domestic industry, trade liberalisation
measures, opening up of the economy to foreign direct investment and financial sector
reforms. Aim of all these measures put together is to cut on the non-performing state
apparatus and instead, yield functional space to the private and the civil society, typified
by the non- government sector in active cooperation with the state agency, who in turn
would henceforth, function more as facilitators and catalysts, rather than monopolists.
This would give the broad framework of reinventing government for the sake of good
governance (Osborne and Gaebler, 1991). Though the idea of local governance reform
was conceptualised sometime later, consensus emerged soon, as the failure of the Indian
developmental state in terms of human development and poverty alleviation was ubiquitous.
The aim, therefore, was to reconfigure the structure of government(Chaudhari, 2003).
Though inertia in the old order giving way to the new is expected, reform efforts would
need to be continued to remove roadblocks, whether structural or attitudinal, as and
when, any, is/are encountered. One indication all ready is the discretionary provisions; the
effort obviously has to been not to irk power centres at the sub- national level and secure
consensus for democratic decentralisation within the givens, which give to us the
environment of constraints in Simonian terms.
There are a few glaring limitations in the framework. The 29 subjects mentioned in the
11th schedule do not give power to legislate to the local bodies, only to take decisions.
The State Finance commissions recommendations are not mandatory in nature. It is
completely up to the State Governments to devolve/not to devolve, functions, functionaries
and resources on the local bodies as per the constitutional scheme. The 29 items are
handled by different ministries and are not in the hands of the Minster of Panchayati Raj
and Rural Development. Coordination and cooperation from these different ministries
would be needed to secure needed devolution, which could be brought about only by the
Chief Minister. He has to feel committed enough to the cause of Panchayati Raj. Rules
need to be evolved to guide Panchayat Raj administration that should be compiled in a
handbook and circulated in the regional language for the knowledge of everybody
concerned. Devolution of functions need to follow a set process. Activities need to be
mapped, requisite skills identified and developed at the local level, with the cooperation
of the bureaucracy; communications have to flow uninterrupted from the state officials to
the local functionaries. Leaving things to the sweet will of the State Government would
not help matters (Ministry of Rural Development Occasional paper 5 cited in Palanithurai
and Raghupathis). Unfortunately however, indications from various states in this regard,
except a few states, which have zealously followed the ideal of local self-governance, like
West Bengal, Karnataka and Gujarat and Maharashtra, have not been encouraging.
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Gujarat and Maharashtra passed legislation in the 1960s transferring many activities,
including primary health care and education to district panchayats. In both the states,
funds were devolved and as well as a separate administrative service-the panchayat
service in Gujarat and the Maharashtra Development Service in Maharashtra, were started
wherein state level bureaucrats could be sent on deputation to work with district
panchayats. In the mid-80s, Karnataka devolved many significant developmental functions
to the panchayats. The task of devolution is being attempted in a most perfunctory
manner. There is no systematic process in place. West Bengal has been another state,
where concerted efforts have been made to nurture local bodies as developmental outfits
by devolution of powers and functions (Chaudhari, 2003).
Discretionary Provisions
Discretionary provisions leave a lot to the free will of the State Governments. Besides
certain less significant issues like nomenclatures of panchayats, etc. some critical matters
have also, been made discretionary, like determination of size in terms of population and
area, mode of election of chairperson, the powers and functions of the Gram Sabha,
devolution of power and authority to institutions of self governance at the local level,
accounting and auditing at the local level, which if not attended or handed properly, in
right earnest, could dilute the expected outcomes considerably. Indications are already
there. Village Pnachayats in Kerela and West Bengal are considerably larger than in other
states. While it could be said that this has been rightly left to the historical legacy and
administrative convenience of each state, the tact remains that this does not bring
administration to the door step of the people, which is the, main hypothesis of proposed
change. Given below is a list of the discretionary provisions of the 73rd amendment act
in brief (Bajpai and Verma, 1995):
1)
Nomenclature of panchayats and chairpersons
2)
Size in terms of population and area covered for village and intermediate level
3)
Composition of panchayats; representation (whether or not to provide) of the

chairpersons at a level in the next successive higher level; MPs and MLAs belonging
to the upper and lower houses of state and union legislatures, representing that
constituency; mode of election of the chairperson of the village panchayat, that is,
whether direct or indirect; manner in which various seats would be circulated for
giving effect to reservations; provide or not for reservations for backward class of
citizens.
4)
Powers and functions of Gram Sabha
5)
Devolution of powers and functions to panchayats at the appropriate level with

respect to preparation of plans for economic development and social justice, and
implementation of the same as well as in relation to the matters listed in the 11th
schedule ascribed to the local bodies.
6)
To decide what taxes, duties, tolls and fees would be leviable by the panchayats,
and to establish procedures, limits and conditions for the same and those that would
be levied and collected by the states and assigned to the panchayats.
7)
To decide the amount of grants-in aid that will be provided to the panchayats fro
the consolidated fund of the state.
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8)
To authorise the panchayats at all different levels to create a fund for crediting all the
money received thereto and withdrawals therefrom.
9)
To provide for the composition of the Finance Commission, the qualifications requisite
for members, manner of their selection, powers and functions, and the Governor shall
cause to be laid before the legislature of the state its recommendations along with the
explanatory memorandum with respect to the action taken by the government.
10) To make provisions with respect to the maintenance of accounts by the Panchayats
and the auditing of such accounts.
11) To determine the conditions of service and tenure of office of the State Election
Commissioner and to make provision with respect to all matters relating to or in
connection with election to the panchayats. However the office of the state election
commissioner has been treated as on par with the judge of a high court to ensure
neutrality and impartiality on his part and secure autonomy as would be necessary for
discharge of his constitutional responsilities. Hence, the State Election Commissioner
shall be removed from his office in like manner and on the like grounds as judge of
a High Court. The condition of service of the State Election Commissioner shall not
be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment and the Governor of the state
when so required may put at his disposal such staff as may be required for the
discharge of any function.
12) To make provisions regarding all matters in connection with elections to the
panchayats.
13) To make provisions with respect to the:
a)
The composition and functions of the District Planning Committee;
b)
The manner in which the post of the chairperson of the DPC shall be filled; not
less than 4/5 of the total members shall be elected by the members of the
district level panchayat and municipalities, from amongst themselves, in proportion
to the ratio of the population of urban areas and rural areas in the district.
14) Provision regarding panchayats, or any law relating to panchayats in existence before
the amendment, continuing if not dissolved, amended or repealed respectively has
been kept discretionary.
13.2.2
Features of the 74th Constitutional Amendment
From the very beginning, since independence, the urban local government received a stepmotherly treatment from those who stood for the cause of self-government at the
grassroots level in India. Like the 73rd amendment, the 74th amendment also lays down
the structure of urban local bodies; provides for their regular, free and fair elections;
makes provision for reservation of seats for SC, ST and OBCs; fixes their term to five
years; protects them against arbitrary dissolution, specifies their powers and responsibilities;
and attempts to strengthen the fiscal base of the urban local bodies. It does two more
things, which are not to be found in the 73rd amendment; that is that, besides elected, it
also provides for nominated members for decentralised planning.
In the 43rd year of the Republic of India, 1992 the Constitution (74th Amendment) was
passed which came into force on 1st June 1993. Two important Committees, namely (1)
Committee for District Planning (Article 243ZD, (DPC) and Committee for Metropolitan
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Planning (Articla243 ZE, (MPC) have been constituted. The features are discussed below:
1)
Constitutional status has been accorded to Urban Local Government bodies. Threetier structure has been envisaged, whereby there would be municipal corporations, for
larger areas, municipal councils for smaller areas, and nagar panchayats for villages
in transition to becoming towns. Since, Local Government is a state subject, the
state legislatures have been left within their powers to define the details of the
powers and functions of different units of urban government institutions whose broad
outline only has been drawn by the Parliament.
2)
Direct election to these Municipal bodies by the people in the manner as the
elections are held for the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies has been provided. For
the purpose of elections, the Municipal elections are to be conducted by the State
Election Commission.
3)
Reservation of one-third of seats for women including women belonging to Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes is ensured.
4)
The State Finance Commission would ensure financial viability of the Municipalities.
Municipal funds have been augmented through taxes, tolls, duties and fees, grants-inaid.
5)
Urban municipal institutions of self-government have been endowed with power and
authority to formulate and implement schemes for economic development and social
justice on 18 subjects.
6)
Developmental Committees, namely, (DPC) and Metropolitan Planning Committees

have been constituted. Thus, planning in India has been decentralised up to the grassroots level.
7)
For better proximity with citizens, wards committees have been constituted.
8)
The 74th CAA and also the 73rd CAA (on Panchayats) have created local self
government institutions through out rural and urban India with powers (29 for rural
and 18 for urban) delineated, devolution, deliberative and executive wings of
government created, authority and responsibilities defined, developmental committees
(DPC, MPC) and Finance Commission constituted; and within each Municipality,
Wards Committees and Zonal Committees have been constituted.
Observations on the 74th Amendment

The two (73rd and 74th) Amendments to the Constitution mark a watershed in the
evolution of local government in India. For the first time the Panchayati Raj Institutions
in rural India and the municipalities and municipal corporations in urban India have been
accorded constitutional status by these two Amendments. They have been raised to the
status of governments at the local level like the Union Government at the national level
and the State Government at the state level (Bhattacharya, 2004).
The Nagar Palika Central Legislation i.e., the 74th CAA has scattered spatially hundreds
of small local governments through out India. Governments with their respective territorial
jurisdictions have been formed. India has, thus, become a federation of federations. The
74th CAA has not only constitutionalised the status of urban local government but also
improved its life, structure, working and finance (Dash, 2004).
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However, certain questions remain unanswered. First and foremost, the very exercise of
classifying an area, rural or urban is a confused one. Some of the states with larger
concentration of non-municipal activities like the Gujarat, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West
Bengal have nearly two-thirds of towns as census or non-municipal towns. In spite of
predominance of non-agricultural activities in these towns, they are not accorded the
municipal status. The state governments are interested in retaining their panchayat status,
as they fetch grants under rural development schemes. Their classification as urban
would require the government in turn to give them grants. On the other hand, local bodies
lose out because urban local bodies have the benefit of better sources of finance, such
as the property tax, entertainment tax and service charges, which are lost if the urban
classification is not given. Moreover, panchayats are easier to control than urban bodies
and hence, the power elites prefer the rural tag. Besides, in the BIMARU states like
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh, districts are carved out for political
reasons; which defies theoretical logic. It was pointed out as early as during the 1961
census, that instead of the two fold classification into rural and urban, there should be
threefold classification, into urban, sub urban and rural, as it conforms better to reality.
Owing to all of this confusion, all urban areas defined by census are not necessarily
accorded the municipal status. On the other hand, all settlements accorded municipal
status are automatically declared as urban. Hence, there is a need to redefine the rural
and urban boundary keeping in view their revenue potential in order to reorganise them
as urban or rural local bodies. Another problem is that of urban outgrowths, which are
the urban areas that develop around the fringes of a cantonment board because of a
university or a port etc. Since, these areas lie within the geographical limit of an adjoining
village panchayat, the municipality does not govern them even though they are urbanised.
Since they are too small they cannot be set up as independent municipalities. This
problem needs to be addressed since vital revenue is lost if they are erroneously classified
(R.B. Bhagat)
For the first time the DPCs (District Planning Committee) under 243Z (d) have got
constitutional status by way of 74th Constitutional Amendment Act. Here we must mention
that the Planning Commission is an extra constitutional body and even then it is so
powerful that every year all the State Governments come begging before the Planning
Commission for funds. But unfortunately the institution, which has got constitutional status
for District Planning, is largely ineffective. The need of the hour is that the DPCs should
be made effective and the district plan prepared by the PRIs and the Municipalities should
also approve the State Government without any change. This is also desirable that the
DPC may issue guidelines to lower level units in regard to their annual action plan and
consolidated five years plan.
What is significant, however, is that apart from the traditional municipal functions,
municipal bodies, as per article 243 W, have been allocated the function of preparation
of preparation of plans for economic development and social justice, which suggests their
elevation from mere instrumentalities for agency functions to responsible bodies for
development planning. Traditionally, municipal bodies had been endowed with the
responsibility of providing some basic amenities of civic life. Services such as water supply
and sanitation, roads and drains, street-lights collection and disposal of solid waste,
maintenance of public places, burial grounds and crematoria, cattle ponds, registration of
births and deaths, maintenance of markets and some regulatory functions relating to
construction of buildings, public health areas such as eating places, slaughter houses and
tanneries, etc. The 74th constitutional amendment broadens the range of functions to be
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performed by the urban local bodies to arenas such as urban and town planning,
regulation of land use planning for economic and social development, safeguarding the
interests of weaker sections of society including the handicapped and mentally retarded,
slum improvement and upgradation, urban poverty alleviation and promotion of cultural,
educational and aesthetic aspects. The subject of cattle pounds has been extended to
include, prevention of cruelty to animal (The Tenth Plan, 2002-07).
Also significantly, there are around 73,000 elected representatives in the ULBs all over
the country. This shows that democracy has percolated down to the lowest level and is
effective at the grass roots; at least the right start has been made. As per the official
document, the role set out for the ULBs in the immediate future will be:
to be responsive and accountable to the community
to develop cities with standards of service comparable to the best in that particular
category; and
to constantly improve their capabilities so as to equip themselves to undertake their

tasks in resource raising, service provision and poverty alleviation(ibid).
As can be seen, the tasks are onerous. The question is, whether requisite institutional
capacity has been created and whether the administrative expertise exists to carry through
the aforesaid functions. The success of the venture, if it is not to be a mere paper
venture, would depend on the commitment of political parties ruling different states to
developing institutional capacity and administrative capability, through training elected
local functionaries in the nuances of administration through workshops organised for the
purpose and thereupon, delegation of tasks. As per the New Public Management
principle, that is the guiding maxim behind democratic decentralisation in the present
context, innovative regimes such as public-private participation, in urban infrastructure
development and channelising of non-government organisations in a synergetic mode with
the government to augment total (system) capacity at the local level. Development of
capacity is crucial since that would encourage the state bureaucracy to delegate, since
there would be the assurance that the task would be successfully accomplished. Since
delegation thrives on trust of the subordinates capability, the same would have to be
developed to create the right environment for delegation.
Moreover, like the eleventh schedule, it is not clear how the three tier bodies would work
in tandem to accomplish the tasks, as these subjects are not clearly demarcated between
different local units of the urban local government, leaving it to respective states to work
out the arrangements by themselves in this regard. This has given the states the liberty to
impose their own choices in this respect, which has at times created more confusion than
order, regarding what is to be delegated and what is not. This has created a much
undesirable situation of flux in the local administration scenario. This is not conducive
either to its sustenance or development in the future. Notably, the 64th and the 65th
amendments were defeated in the Rajya Sabha, because they did not give this much
discretion to the states in the design of local government reforms (Chaudhari, 2003). The
new amendments divide the provisions into mandatory, denoted by shall and discretionary,
denoted with may. In many cases although the powers have been transferred on paper,
their actual transfer has not taken place, and the concerned government departments at
the state level retain monopoly over those subjects who are handling them directly rather
than operating through the concerned local unit. Similar is the case with transfer of funds.
This is critical since the main problem that the local units have always faced hitherto, has
229
been lack of financial resources. In the absence of proper funds, powers become
meaningless because the same cannot be translated effectively into real efforts and
outcomes. An obvious contradiction is that on the one hand the local bodies are staving
for funds but on the other hand, elected representatives want more allowances and other
perks and facilities in view of their newly acquired constitutional status. The above
bottlenecks need to be taken care of if the Constitution (seventy- forth) Amendment has
to become a reality, both in letter and spirit.
74th Amendment Act provides for the constitution, by every state, of a State Finance
Commission, within one year of the amendment and thereafter every five years, regarding
the financial resources of local bodies. Unfortunately, the recommendations of the Commission
are not binding on the respective states. But still the Municipalities blame the State
Governments that they are not getting the required finances to run the urban body.
In spite of the fact that the 74th Amendment visualises the peoples participation as one
of the main objectives, the peoples actual participation in the municipal affairs of the city
is still limited. Major cause of this attitude is that the people look towards the municipal
bodies with inherent suspicion and take it for granted that their problems and grievances
will not be taken care of.
As most of the municipalities are badly governed, no private party is willing to shake
hands with the municipal authorities. Private parties also think that to push their project
through the municipal authorities is really time consuming and wasteful (Dixit, 2004). Lot
of effort would need to be put in to change this negative perception of municipalities. The
effort has been made on paper. Now the constitutional scheme needs to be worked out
in practice. Computerisation would help cut on delays; there would be more certainty
about records and also their timely availability. Training of municipal personnel has to be
taken up in right earnest to develop requisite managerial capabilities among staff, so
work is performed on the basis of sound managerial principles. computerisation
13.2.3
Decentralised Planning in Context of 73rd and 74th

Constitutional Amendment Act
Efforts to establish suitable planning machinery at the local levels have been half-hearted.
The effective decentralisation in planning in India existed at the state level vis--vis
planning at the state level seems to depend very much on the size of the state (Rao,
1989). The Planning machinery at the district level was weak both in terms of technical
expertise and financial resources. There was virtually no such co-coordinating agency,
which could take the responsibility to link various existing programmes and schemes so
that they can be implemented effectively. Decentralised planning at the District level was
effective precisely in those states where performance in respect of land reform was better
like West Bengal, Karnataka, and Jammu and Kashmir belongs to this category (ibid).
All the Committees prior to 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment advocated decentralized
planning. All these efforts culminated into the presentations of two bills viz., 64th and 65th
Constitutional Amendment Bills in the Parliament in the election year of 1989 for providing
Constitutional status to the local government institutions in the rural and urban areas
respectively. The two bills though crucial steps towards decentralised planning were
passed by the Lok Sabha but fell in the Rajya Sabha due to want of majority. Thus it
is obvious that none of these attempts towards decentralized planning in the postindependence era (before the passage of 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts)
230
could satisfy the set of requisites the research team developed. Therefore, these efforts
could not give desired results and the idea of decentralized planning remained a distant
dream.
It was felt necessary to build up and strengthen the planning capabilities at the district and
block levels. Accordingly, the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts were enacted. With the
PRIs and Municipalities setting constitutional status by way of the 73rdand 74th Amendment
Acts respectively decentralised planning has got a new responsibility of formulation and
implementation of the programmes of economic development and social justice. It may be
said that now onwards there would be three-tier in the planning process, viz., the centre,
the states and the Panchayats (Kumar, 1997).
13.3 INITIATIVES AFTER ECONOMIC REFORMS

In the wake of economic reforms initiated by the Narasimha Rao led Congress ministry
in the early nineties, the need for democratic decentralization planning was once again
realised. This realisation led to the passage of much talked about constitutional amendment
acts. The two acts were regarded as milestone of decentralised governance and decentralised
planning. In view of this, it becomes imperative to see as to how akin these two acts are
to the idea of decentralised planning i.e., to what extent they satisfy the following prerequisites:
1)
Creation of regular bodies in the planning hierarchy;
2)
Decentralisation of power and functions to each of these tiers;
3)
Devolution of financial resources to each of these tiers;
4)
Subordination to higher political echelons rather than to bureaucracy;
5)
Assigning professionally trained manpower to each of these tiers;
6)
Devising effective co-ordination mechanism among these tiers; and
7)
Devising means to ensure effective peoples participation.
Creation of Regular Bodies

Article 243B provided for the creation of a three-tier structure of panchayats at the
village, block and district levels. Further, Article 243E provided for a fixed tenure of five
years of these local bodies. Legislatures of all the states to which the Acts apply in
consonance with the provisions of the two acts have created the necessary structures in
the urban and rural areas and are holding regular elections to them. This shows that that
73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments Acts satisfy essential pre-requisites of decentralised
planning.
Devolution of Financial Powers
The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts have favoured devolution of financial
powers (through creation of 11th and 12th Schedules vide which functional and fiscal
powers have been devolved to them) upon the local governments institutions. However,
it is pertinent to note, The two schedules by themselves do not contain subjects of
revenue resources except by way of incidental receipts. The taxes, duties, tolls and fees
to be levied by them and assigned to them and the grants-inaid to be given to them are
left to the discretion of the state governments (Ibid).
231
The two acts also provided for the appointment of Panchayat Finance Commissions, to
look into the needs of the rural and urban local bodies in totality and make suitable
recommendations so as to enable these institutions to perform the assigned functions
effectively. This was definitely a landmark step in the direction of providing financial
autonomy to the local bodies. But it is noteworthy that though most of the states have
constituted the PFCs, but many of them have not yet submitted their reports and, in the
case of those state finance commissions which have submitted their reports, no tangible
action has been taken on their recommendations. Thus, the above analysis shows that
much leaves to be done for devolution of financial powers to these institutions and hence,
the third pre-requisite of decentralised planning under the two Acts also seems to be half
heartedly attempted.
Subordination to Higher Political Echelons Rather than to Bureaucracy
As also hinted earlier, one of the significant postulates of democracy is the subordination
of bureaucracy to the democratically elected representatives of the people. This is because
bureaucracy is a good servant but a bad master. This is as much applicable at the
grassroots as at the centre and the state levels. Ironically, however, the enactments of the
different states have given upper hand to the bureaucracy vis a vis the representatives of
the people at the local level(Maheshwari, (1992-93). The higher bureaucracy under the
Acts of various states has been given the powers to suspend and even supersede these
institutions. In most of the states, it is the district level functionaries who regulate and
control the working of these institutions. For instance, Section 47(1) of the Harayana
Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 empowers the District Development and Panchayat Officer or
the Sub Divisional Officer ( Civil) to suspend the execution of any resolution or order of
the Gram Panchayat or prohibit the doing of any act. In this connection, the observations
of Gangarde are also worth mentioning:
The Karnataka Panchayati Raj Act vests the power of adjudging the performance of
the panchayats with the bureaucracy. Under the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act, 1993,
officials are also the controlling authority. Panchayat leaders have to tender their resignations
to bureaucrats. The Harayana Panchayati Raj Act also confers most of the powers on
the bureaucracy or the government, leaving little room for panchayat to work independently.
In several cases the order of the Director, Panchayat, is not only final but also cannot
be questioned in any court of law. The government can cancel any resolution of the
Panchayat under the pretext of it being against the public interest. The Kerala Panchayat
Act is also an effort towards establishing of Officers Raj in place of peoples Raj. The
Himachal Pradesh Panchyati Raj Act has not given administrative and financial autonomy
to panchyats for discharging their responsibilities effectively. The Punjab Panchayti Raj
Act empowers the Director, Panchayt to remove any Sarpanch. The U.P. Assembly
ratified the Action such a hurry that the opposition was not given a chance even to
discuss it. The Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Act, too is no exception where control over
the Panchayat by the Bureaucracy is concerned ( Gangarde, 1995).
Assigning Professionally Trained Manpower
Planning is a specialized activity requiring technical skill, information and database, which
the peoples representatives in a democracy cannot be expected to posses. Moreover,
they are elected to the offices for a short period. On the other hand, bureaucracy, being
permanent, has wide field experience and knowledge. Further, most of the information lies
in the official records, which remain in the custody of the bureaucracy. Thus in a
role of bureuacracy- it has an important role to play as it has the requisite skills- thus it is essential for them
to work under people's representatives
- make them subordiante and subservient
232
democracy, it is essential for planning to assign professionally trained manpower to the

peoples representatives and make them subordinate and subservient to the later. The
dichotomy is that they are always made responsible for the formulation and implementation
of local plans without making the local bureaucracy subordinate and subservient to them.
Rather, most of the authority has ever rested with the district administration. It is mainly
because historically, local government was virtually a part of district administration and
with the emergence of the democratic aspirations of the people, was gradually made a
separate entity but was ever looked upon as only an offshoot and satellite of the district
administration. Local government has formidable competitor and revival in the form of
district administration(Maheshwari, 1992-93), op.
cit).
historical
roles of district admin in local govt
The 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts as well as the Acts of the various state governments
have also not made any progress in the direction of assigning professionally trained
manpower to the local bodies and bringing the local bureaucracy under the local popular
control. Therefore, the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts have also not been able to qualify
this prerequisite of decentralised planning.
Devising Effective Coordination Mechanism
Multi-level planning, which is essential for decentralised planning, leads to mere misuse
and wastage of scarce resources. It becomes obligatory to develop and devise interlinkages among the plans formulated at different levels. Thus, devising effective coordination
mechanism is one of the essential prerequisites of decentralized planning. In this connection,
74th Amendment Act made a revolutionary step by providing for the creation of District
Planning Committees ( DPCs) to coordinate the plans framed by the various tiers of local
bodies both in the urban and rural areas. Article 243Z(D) of the 74th Amendment Act
also provides the setting up of District Planning Committeesconsisting of the elected
representatives of both the urban and rural areasin every district to prepare composite
plan for the whole district.
However, the implementation of this provision leaves much to be done. Undoubtedly, the
formation of DPCs is a step towards making decentralization pro-poor yet even after
more than a decade from the effect of 74th Amendment Act many states are yet to
constitute the DPCs in their respective states(Chatterjee, op. cit). In so far as the creation
of DPCs , which is a statutory obligation of the state governments, is concerned, some
of the states have only set them up formally without making them operational. Andhra
Pradesh has not even set them up. Although a few states like Kerala and West Bengal
have taken to decentralize planning earnestly, the tardiness of the others in constituting and
operational sing the DPCs may limit their role as instruments of decentralized planning
(Mathew,) 2000). Even in the state like Karnataka where panchayats have taken roots
and had once become a model of decentralized planning (under 1985 Act), DPC is not
functioning properly (Mishra, 2000 op. cit.). Amazingly, provision for constituting DPCs is
not made in the Gujarat State Panchayati Raj Act (Chandrashekhar, 2000).
Peoples Participation
Peoples participation is a must for the success of every plan. Peoples participation in the
context of decentralized planning means their direct involvement at the level of both plan
formulation and implementation. The necessity of peoples participation in planning was
highlighted in the fifth five-year plan. Perhaps the most effective system of securing
peoples participation in decentralised planning is through the constitution of Gram Sabhas
at the village level. Though the role of the Gram Sabha was recognised even earlier and
233
in some of the states, it was even provided a statutory status as far back as 1960s, but
it was the 73rd Constitutional status to this body. The Act provides that a Gram Sabha
is to be constituted in each village, exercising such powers and performing such functions
at the village- level as the State Act may provide. It consists of all registered voters in
the area of the Panchayat. The significance of the institution lies in the fact it is the only
political institution in the country in which direct democracy is in operation.( Maheshwari,
1992-93,op. cit), It has been rightly observed that the Gram Sabha is the unique forum
for collective thinking, planning, and decision making and overseeing different activities in
the village. This institution is designed to help in bringing common people to the decisionmaking and uplift the status of women and the depressed classes ( Sharma, 2003).
In fact it is the only forum, which can ensure direct democracy. It offers equal
opportunity to all the citizens of a village to discuss, criticize and approve or reject the
proposal of the panchayat executive and assess its past performance and is a watchdog
of democracy at the grassroots level( Mathew, 2000, op.cit)
Thus, it may be said that since the two Constitutional Amendment Acts have not satisfied
the basic pre-requisites of decentralized planning, the claim of their being revolutionary
steps in the direction of decentralized planning is hollow. Further, the idea of decentralized
planning, unless any such effort in this direction satisfies the above said pre-requisites,
would remain a distant dream.
The Constitution ( 73rd Amendment ) Act 1992 has been passed by the Parliament with
a view mainly to strengthen and revitalize the Panchayati Raj bodies so that they can sub
serve the needs of the millions that live in rural areas. The first sign of a healthy
democracy is that evolving of a mechanism for arriving collective decisions by involving
the people who are most affected by them. Decentralisation is the vital mechanism through
which democracy becomes truly representatives and responsive. The linking mechanism
between effective administrative set up and participation is the delegation of powers to the
people at the grassroots level. In a country like India where majority of its people lives
in rural areas, decentralization of governance should not remain at local level as a mere
creed, but it should be an operational imperative. After independence the focus of the
rulers shifted from regulatory to welfare administration.
The crucial challenge ahead was the upliftment of the rural masses from an utmost
poverty. Number of rural development schemes evolved in this regard could succeed due
to lack of active participation of the people at the implementation level. Prior to the
historic 73rd constitutional Amendment, any references to the decentralization of local
government was confined to the Directive Principles of State Policy. The successive
central and state governments have tried to shift the responsibility to one another in
implementation of the decentralization schedule. The 73rd amendment has given a new
lease of life to Panchayati Raj Institutions, where central and state governments have to
delegate all powers to Panchayats to enable them to function effectively as self-governing
institutions. It provides for the reservation of seats and offices for SC/STs, OBC and
women, fixed tenure for Panchayats, prevents its dissolution and provide more powers
and functions of the Panchayats. It also provides for the constitution of a State Election
Commission for the conduct of election to the PRIs and a State Finance Commission to
review the financial position of the Panchayats and to make recommendations to the
Government (Krishna, 2005).
234
13.4 FUNCTIONING OF PRIs IN VARIOUS STATES AFTER

73RD AMENDMENT
All the states completed the process of enacting fresh legislation on strengthening the PRIs
on April 23, 1994. As many as eleven states pushed through fresh legislation in 72 hours,
some of them even in the early hours of April 23, 1994 to beat the stipulated deadline
of April 23, 1994, the day Panchayats became part of the Indian constitution. However,
the 73rd Constitutional (Amendment) Act is not applicable to Jammu and Kashmir,
Mizoram, Nagaland and certain Scheduled Areas of the country. However it did contain
a provision for future extension of the act to scheduled areas. As per that, parallel
provisions regarding local government in scheduled areas was ultimately enacted through
the provisions of panchayats by the Extension to the Scheduled Areas Act of 1996. But
mere legislative enactments do not ensure effectiveness and viability of the PRIs in the
States. What is more important is their operationalisation.
Andhra Pradesh
The Andhra Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act 1994 became on May 30, 1994. In the Gram
Panchayats the existing Sarpanchas were re-nominated as in-charge Sarpanchas. In
Andhra Pradesh, the Gram Panchayats have to perform 12 obligatory functions and 27
optional functions, apart from the 29 subjects mentioned in Schedule I of the Andhra
Pradesh Panchayti Raj Act, 1994 which is a replica of the Eleventh Schedule. The
Mandal Parishads in the state have to perform functions specified in Schedule I of the Act
besides functions mentioned in Schedule I of the Panchayati Raj Act under 4 broad items
(i) Community Development (ii) Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, (iii) Agriculture, (iv)
Health and Rural Sanitation (Vittal, C.P 1988). The irony is that even after holding
elections to Panchayati Raj bodies in the state, powers and functions were not transferred
to the PRIs to the desired extent let alone financial resources. The State Assembly has
amended the Andhra Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act to provide for depositing all funds
received by the Panchayats under the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana( JRY) and the Employment
Assurance Scheme ( EAS) in the nationalized banks, cooperative banks or post-offices.
Bihar
Though the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act came into force on August 6, 1993, election to all
the three tiers of PRIs has not been conducted so far. Even threat of Central Government
to stop release of funds for rural development for failing to hold election in time has not
been effective. The provision of reservation of seats was utilized by him for crating vote
banks for the State Assembly election ( Mishra, Kumar and Pal, 1996,).
Gujarat
The Gujarat Panchayati Raj Act became effective from August 26, 1993 and the elections
to the local bodies were held in May- June 1995. The autonomy of the local bodies like
the Panchayats in Gujarat as elsewhere has been marginalized by the increasing influence
of the MLAs and MPs in era of coalition government. The MLAs who by threatening
to join some other exercise control over the Chief Minister are strong enough to influence
the activities of the panchayats even after the 73rd Amendment Act (Purohit, P.V, 1998).
As a result of decentralization process in Gujarat all developmental activities were
transferred to the PRIs. However, so far as funding is concerned, it remains in the hands
of the government, and district bodies hardly had a say in fund allocations. In Gujarat,
235
the powers and functions were assigned to the PRIs in a big way. The state government
has transferred all the developmental machinery to the District Panchayat and below i.e.,
Taluk Panchayts and Gram Panchayat. The Gram Panchayat has powers to impose about
20 different taxes and fees and the Taluk Panchayat has powers to increase the taxation
rates of Gram Panchayats.
Haryana
So far as Haryana is concerned, the elections to all the three tiers were conducted in
December- January 1994-95. The State Government has delegated more powers to the
PRIs. These include control and inspection of the schemes and programmes launched by
the Departments of food and supplies, Education, Public Health, Women and Child
Welfare, Agriculture, Horticulture, Animal Husbandry, Forests, etc. besides the schemes of
the Panchyat Department. The records of the PRIs had been made accessible to all
voters and members of the Gram Sabha. Gram Panchayats provide all details of income
and expenditure incurred on various schemes on a board known as Vikas Patt put up
at each Panchayat.
Karnataka
Karnataka was the first state to pass the new legislation on April 7, 1993, which became
effective from April 30, 1993. The Gram Panchayat elections were held on non-party
basis on December 29, 1993, which was landmark in itself as 43 per cent of those
elected, were women and 32 per cent belonged to SC/STs. A Review Committee,
popularly known as the Nayak Committee, was appointed by the State Government to
look into issues and problems viz. a weak gram Sabha, bureaucratic dominance in
Panchyati Raj administration at different levels, devolution of powers and functions
between and among the tiers, absence of provision for Nyaya Panchayts, accommodating
different reserved categories as chairpersons in a term of Five years. The Committee
forwarded its recommendations in a report submitted to the Government on March 19,
1996. In the light of the given issues, the meaningful recommendations were accepted by
the Government in the form of the 3rd Amendment to the Act of 1993. With these
amendments, Karnataka is moving towards realizing the spirit of the provisions 243G of
the 73rd Amendment which implies that PRIs should become institutions of self- government
(Subha, K, 1998). The Government of Karnataka is trying to curb corruption at the
grassroots by bringing elected chairpersons under the purview of Lokayukt. Besides, the
Government is also thinking to come out with a bill on Naaya Panchayats and the District
Planning Committees will be operating the way it is envisaged in the Constitutional
Amendment so as to lead to genuine decentralized planning (Ibid.)
Kerala
In Kerala, the new Panchayati Raj system came into operation from September 30, 1995.
Though organic linkage exists between the three-tiers in the form of ex-officio membership
at the higher level, each tier is independent of others and performs certain exclusive
functions given to it (John, Oommen, 1998). The Government on August 17, 1996
formally inaugurated the Peoples Campaign for the Ninth Plan. Under this process,
people are to be mobilized through the local bodies in all stages of development planning
from formulation, implementation to maintenance. With the landing of the peoples
campaign for the Ninth Plan the state has entered into an era of a new development
culture. The campaign has also contributed towards peoples unity in development action
and has generated a new development consciousness in the State (Biju, M.R., 1998). The
236
State Planning Board has announced new norms for allocation of Plan funds to the local
bodies. The block and gram panchayats would get a weight age of 65 per cent age
points for population, excluding that of SCs and STs (Panchayati Raj Update, March
1998). The PRIs in Kerala are in a better position now when compared to previous
years. Apart from constitutional protection, it has that resourcefinance and that too in
plenty, which it lacked before.
Madhya Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh is the first State to have elections at all levels under the new
constitutional provisions. The elections for Gram Panchayat, Janapad Panchayat and Zilla
Panchayat were held in May-June 1994. The first meeting of the elected Panchayats was
held in August, 1994 and August 20, 1994 was observed as Adhikar Divas as all the
elected office bearers of the PRIs took charge of their offices. As against 29 subjects,
23 subjects are reported to have been transferred to the PRIs. The remaining items are
with the concerned departments requiring necessary action in this regard. The State
Government is not able to channelise funds beyond what it receives from the centre for
JRY and EAS even after setting up SFC. Finally, there are reports of planned attempts
by bureaucracy to underline the powers of the elected panchayats (Vittal, C.P., 1998).
Maharashtra
In Maharastra the elections to the three-tiers of PRIs were completed inn September1995.
The State Government has reduced the terms of Chairpersons of Zilla Parishads and
Panchayats Samities from five years to one year. Of the 29 Zila Parishads in Maharashtra,
ten have been reserved for various categories of people to be decided by draw of lots.
( Panchayati Raj Update, February 1997).The Thane Zilla Parishad has undertaken an
action programme to activate the gram sabha in the district. The response to the action
programme was good in the district as a whole but it was more so I the tribal areas.
Gram Sabhas in all talukas except two went off successfully in about 83 percent of the
Gram Panchayat areas.( Panchayati Raj Update, June 1998) Zilla Parishad has planned
to mobilize popular participation in development works to ensure greater transparency and
accountability in the working of the Panchayats.
Orissa
Orissa has been the first state to implement 33 percent reservation of seats for women
in Panchayts, having 2, 500 representatives in the Panchayats. A unique provision of
Orrissa Gram Panchayat Act states that if the Gram Panchayat Sarpanch elected or
nominated is not a woman, the office of Naib-Sarpanch will go to a woman. In Orissa,
the Panchayats are having effective role in socio-economic development. The role of the
Panchayts is being publicized through films, photographs, wall writings, group discussions
etc. In October, 1997 a meeting of Presidents and Vice President of over 20 Zila
Parishads was convened in Bhubaneshwar in which they expressed their concern over the
state Governments failure to transfer to them powers stipulated in the 73rd Amendment
Act (Panchayati Raj Update, November, 1997). In early 1998, the State Government had
directed all the district collectors to ensure autonomous functioning of Panchayat institutions.
It was observed that the Sarpanchas do not inform the people about the meetings of palli
sabhas and gram sabhas. The gram sabha meetings are called without a prior notice.
Besides, they are also not held regularly. Some of the Gram Panchayats are functioning
very effectively and have been awarded cash prizes to three gram Panchayats, viz,
Ghanantri Panchayt, Kotapeta Panchayt and Padmapur Panchayat under Rajagada Panchayt
237
Samiti, for their good performance in development, utilization of JRY funds, sanitation,
literacy, old age pensions, Indira A was Yojana (IAY), family welfare and other areas
(Panchayati Raj Update, June 1998)
Punjab
So far as the State of Punjab is concerned, the Government passed a fresh legislation,
constituted a separate SEC as well as SFS, and held elections to the village Panchayats,
Panchayats Samitis and Zilla Parishads in 1993-94. Subsequently, the Government also
identified the schemes and selected the departments which were to be transferred to the
PRIs, by the beginning of 1997. The Punjab Panchayati Raj Act 1994 violated the
provisions of the 73rd Amendment Act which aimed at extending power to the grassroots
level by providing for direct elections for the membership of Panchayats Samitis and Zilla
Parishads. The Act, on the other hand, by inserting a clause, allocated only 40 per cent
seats by direct elections and the remaining 60 percent by indirect elections from amongst
the Sarpanches themselves ( Verma, 1998).
In the case of Punjab, the empirical findings show that most of the Sarpanchas,
Chairpersons and Vice-Chairpersons represent a relatively better off families from the
economic point of view. In fact the leading agricultural families have captured most of
these positions. Apart from that many state level leaders have pushed in their blood
relations such as sons, brothers, nephews in these positions. It was a surprise to note that
even in those village Panchayts where the SCs have a majority, land owing Jat-sikhs have
been elected as Sarpanchas ( ibid). The State Government dissolved all the panchayats
in the State and the elections to all the three tiers of PRIs were held in June July,
1998. Although the elections were held on non-party basis, various political parties had
fielded candidates as independents. For the first time as many as 4, 124 women have
been seen elected as Sarpanchas in the present panchayats elections ( PanchayatI Raj
Update, June, 1998).
Rajasthan
In Rajasthan, the elections for the three tiers of PRIs were held in 1995 under the
supervision of SEC and these institutions have come into position after March 1995
(Hooja, 1998) The State Government has transferred Rs.164 crores to Panchayat Samitis
for taking up development works of various categories. Earlier, the expenditure used to
be made by the departments concerned. The Panchayat Samitis would spend the money
on the works identified in the meetings of elected representatives. Previously, although the
Panchayat Samitis and village Panchayts had been authorized to utilize the funds for
development, supervisory powers had been vested in Zila Parishads.
Tamil Nadu
In the case of Tamil Nadu, the new Panchayti Raj System came into effect from April
1994 and the elections were conducted in 1996. The Panchayts in Tamil Nadu have been
assigned three broad types of functions- mandatory, discretionary and those entrusted by
government notification ( Sekhar, 1998).The PRIs in Tamil Nadu continue to remain as
welfare institutions rather than the village republics with the power of self- rule (Ibid.
p.91). An innovative mode of funding has been devised by the Tamil Nadu Government,
to enable the financially weak rural local bodies overcome the lacuna in the population
based devolution formula for the panchayats. In this mode of funding an outright grant
from the equalization fund is given to the financially weak panchayats.
238
Uttar Pradesh
In the case of UP, the legislative formalities were completed in April 1994 and the
elections to all the three tiers of PRIs were conducted in April 1995. In accordance with
the Tenth Finance Commissions recommendation, the gram panchayts have been allocated
Rs. 189.8 crore for construction of roads and drainage ( Panchayati Raj Update,
March,1998). The State Government has decided to decentralize the administration.
Under the new scheme, village panchayts would be granted direct control over officials
functioning in their jurisdictions. The Panchyats would appoint these officials belonging to
10 departments, including primary education, healthcare, and rural development and also
supervise their activities.
West Bengal
In West Bengal, the Panchayat elections were held in May 1993, in which the left front,
particularly the CPI(M), had gone home with a larger majority. Gram Sansad has
substituted the institution called Gram Sabha. This is an institutional innovation for ensuring
effective participation of the people (Datta, 1998) The Gram sansads are authorized to
transact annual or half yearly meeting and such other business relating to the affairs of the
Gram Panchaya as may be agreed upon by the persons present at such meetings. It has
to be admitted that with the functioning of the Gram Sabha and the Gram Sansad, the
formation of the District Council in West Bengal, the Panchayats in the state have become
responsive and effective vehicles for identification and resolution of local problems, for
ensuring social justice, and for improving the quality of life to the rural people (Ray,
1998). After the completion of five years terms, elections to all the three tiers of PRIs
were held on May 28, 1998. The State Election Commission (SEC) conducted the
elections for the first time. The State budget for 1998-99, presented in the State
Assembly on March 23, proposes to arm panchayts with a wide range of new functions
in education, health and rural electrification sectors. It also provides for setting up 1,000
new type of primary educational centres in addition to an equal number of conventional
primary schools under the supervision of panchayat Samitis. Similarly, in the health sector,
the Panchayat Samitis will take control of new primary health centres. Besides, the
government proposes to set up a corporation to coordinate with the Panchayts in
implementing rural electrification programmes ( Panchayati Raj Update, March, 1998).
Thus, the functioning of new panchayti raj reveals the fact that though the legislative
formalities have been completed in almost all the States yet at the operational level, there
are large variations between them. Elections to all the three tiers of PRIs have been
completed in all the states except Bihar, where elections have been delayed for one
reason or the other. In some states, viz. Karnataka, Punjab, West Bengal, PRIs have
been constituted for the second time either because of completion of their tenure or due
to dissolution. Still the highhandedness of bureaucracy, with a few exceptions, over the
local autonomy prevails. We hope that PRIs may be deeply rooted in the rural community
and may become the real vehicle of change and development in the countryside. The only
danger which we visualize is from the side of the state governments ( Singh, 1993).
So far as the assigning of powers and functions of each tier of PRIs is concerned, we
find that the powers and functions entrusted to the PRIs vary from state to state. The
experiences gained so far are that at the district level various line department/ agencies
implement programmes and functions under the overall supervision and control of the
District Collector/District Magistrate. And the PRIs have to be content with backseat
driving ( Vittal, op.cit.).
239
Thus, it becomes clear that the sphere of activity of each tier under each item has not
been defined and left to the discretion of the concerned state government. In the changing
scenario, Panchayati Raj has to devote itself to the task of development and PRIs should
enjoy a large measure of autonomy to the extent possible.
13.5 FUNCTIONING OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE AFTER

73RD AND 74TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT:
OBSERVATIONS
There are some observations given below regarding the functioning of PRIs after 73rd and
74th Constitutional Amendment .It has been observed that there is a wide gap between
theory and practice in implementation.
Assets have been created under the various rural development programmes. But
assets were not being utilised properly. Primary schools have been built but children
are not going to schools and in some cases there are no staffs. Community scheme
is a total failure because the people want that each and Sarpanch should do
everything.
It was found that beneficiaries for rural development programmes are not selected in
proper manner. It is supposed to be selected in according to Base Line Survey
(BLS). This BLS contains the names of those families are not included in the record
available at Block and DRDA office. The list contains tax payees, as beneficiaries are
the sufferers. With regards to loans and subsidy it was found that the total amount
of loan is never given to beneficiary.
So far as the meetings of PR bodies are concerned it is found regular. But meeting
of Gram Sabha in all the three districts are not held regularly and even if they are
held the adult members of the village do not attend them.
According to the provisions of the new Act, 29 items have been given to the
Panchayats. But it has been noted that very few of these subjects have been
transferred to the Panchayats and are neither substantial nor meaningful. They are
only supervisory in nature.
It was also found that the ex-Sarpanchas with the help of the MLAs of the area,
try to intervene in the working and functioning of the DPC, it was found that the
women Sarpanch.
With regard to the functioning of DPC, it was found that the most of the
beneficiaries, peoples representatives and even some of the officials are not aware
of the constitution, composition and structure of the DPC.
It was found that still MPs and MLAs are still controlling the PRIs. They get
development work done in their area and as such the needy and the remote village
get neglected and remain underdeveloped their dominance are also seen with regard
to giving grants to Panchayats. They are giving grants to only those panchayats,
which are dear to them.
It was observed that due to the dominance of the MLAs and MPs and BDO cum
Panchayat Raj Officer and their subordinate staffs virtually dominates over even upon
240
the articulate representatives of the Gram Panchayts.
Ex-Sarpanchas with the help of the MLAs of the area, try to intervene in the
working and functioning of the Sarpanchs especially the women Sarpanch.
With regard to the functioning of the DPC, it was found that the most of the
beneficiaries, peoples representatives and even some of the officials are not aware
of the composition, constitution and structure of the DPC.
With regards to womens participation in the affairs of the panchayats, it was found
that maximum numbers of them are still working on the advice of the male members
of the family (Pal, 2002).
13.6 CONCLUSION
In a nutshell, it may be said that illiteracy, lack of training and prevalence of old
traditionally dominant systems are the basic reasons for their non-performance. But this
should not be taken as a sign of total surrender. We must realize that due to the new
system gradually consciousness is coming among such sections of the rural community and
they have raised their voice against exploitation and excess. In this connection, regular
election to PRIs will prove to be a milestone towards enlightment and social political
consciousness of the weaker sections. Now they are coming up and quite vocal. In the
coming years they teach lesson to the dominant sections of the society.
Local Government in India has not been a great success. A part of the fault lies in the
system, a part in the immediate social environment but a large part is to attribute to the
controlling state government itself. There are some areas of concern in local bodies. The
first area of concern is the wide gap between the aspirations of the people and the
performance by the grassroots institutions. The second area of concern is the mismatch
between the financial resources of the local bodies and the functions allotted to them or
between expenditure responsibilities and their own resources available. The third area
relates to weaknesses in the working of Gram Sabhas. The fourth area of concern is
to redefine and re-look at the picture of local bodies in the light of challenges, which they
are facing. The fifth area is most important is the type of political culture that has been
evolving in India. Let the local bodies guard themselves, let the local bodies change their
attitude, policies, technology and systems and get empowered for better governance.
The ethos of democracy can find real nourishment only when power reaches the
grassroots level. For the ordinary citizen, it is local democracy, which can have real
meaning and significance. In a vast country where large masses are still unlettered, village
panchayats and participative democracy can do wonders. If the aim is to establish a
democratic society, where change is brought about by voluntary consent and willing
cooperation and not by the force of arms, there may be no alternative to Panchayati Raj
or Local Self Government Institutions. In that sense, the most revolutionary measures in
recent decades have been the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments. It is hoping that
with this Indian democracy could become a unique model for the rest of the world.
13.7 KEY CONCEPTS

Cabinet Government
: The British system, whereby the cabinet as a whole,

rather than only the prime minister who heads it, is
considered the executive, and the cabinet is collectively
241
responsible to the Parliament for its performance. In

addition, the cabinet ministers are typically drawn
from among the majority partys members in Parliament,
whereas in the United States the cabinet secretaries
are only from the executive branch.
Constitutional Architecture
: The administrative arrangements created by a

governments constitution - from the separation of
powers to the requirement that specific departments
be created or services performed.
Regulation
: The totality of government controls on the social and

economic activities of its citizens; the rule-making
process of those administrative agencies charged with
the official interpretation of laws.
Statutory and Census Towns : The Indian definition of urbanisation incorporates both
administrative and demographic criteria. Two types of
town are identified by the census. First one, are
known as municipal or statutory towns and the second
one, census or non-municipal towns based on the
different criteria of their identification. The urban
definition adopted in 1961 Census has the following
criteria: (a) All places having municipal corporation,
municipality, notified area committee and cantonment
board, etc; (b) The places which satisfy the following
criteria: (i) Population not less than 5,000 (ii) Density
of population 1,000 persons per sq mile (400 per sq
km), (iii) Seventy-five per cent of workers engaged in
non agricultural sector.
Transitional Areas
: The transitional area, smaller urban area or larger

urban area means such area as the governor may
having regard to the population of the area, the
density of population therein, the revenue generated
for local administration, the percentage of employment
in non-agricultural activities, and the economic
importance of other factors as he deem fit, specify by
public notification for this purpose. Since the 74th
amendment act does not define the population size
and leaves it to the government to decide, which it
does quite arbitrarily at present.
13.8 REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING

Biju, M.R., 1998, The Saga of decentralization in Kerala: Unique Model of
Participatory Planning Process, in Sebasti L. Raj SJ and Edward Mathias(eds),
Peoples Power and Panchayati Raj Theory and Practice, Indian Social Institute, New
Delhi.
Chaudhari, Shubham, What difference does a constitutional amendment make? The 1994
Panchayati Raj Act, and the attempt to revitalize rural local government in India, at, http:/
242
/www.sticerd.Ise.ac.uk/d
Mishra, S.N., Kumar, Lokesh and Pal, Chaitali,( 1996 ) New Panchayati Raj in
Action, Mittal Publications, New Delhi,
Bajpai, Ashok, (1997) Panchayati Raj and Rural Development, Sahitya Prakashan,N.D.
Bhagat, R.B., Challenges of Rural-Urban Classification for Decentralised
Governance, at http://balasainet.com/projectreports/decegovernance.pdf.
Panchayati Raj Update,( 1998 ) April.
John, Oommen, (1998) Panchayati Raj at Work in Kerela: An Analysis, Kurukshetra,
Vol. 47, No.1, October.
Vittal, C.P., (1988) Devolution of Powers and Functions to Panchayati Raj Institutions,
Kurukshetra, Vol. 47, No.2, November.
Hanumantha Rao C.H., 1989 Decentralised Planning: an overview of experience and
prospects in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXIV, No. 8, Feb 25.
Datta, Prabhat, 1998, Peoples Participation, RURAL Administration and the Bureaucracy:
The West Bengal Experience, Kurukshetra, Vol. XlVI, No.7, April.
Hooja, Meenakshi and Hooja, Rakesh, (1998 ) Panchayti Raj in Rajasthanpolicy
issues and concerns , The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. XLIV, No.
3, July- Sep.
India Today, March 13, 2006.
Krishna, Sri. S. Kumar, Anil, S, (2005). Working of PRIs in India after the 73rd
Constitutional Amendment Act an abstract for the XIX All- India Conference, Indian
Public Administration Association, organized by Department of Public Administration,
Punjabi University, Patiala ( July29-30).
Kumar, Sharat, (1997) Panchyati Raj and perspective planning, in Kurukshertra, Vol.
45, No. 10, July.
Mishra, S.N., Mishra, Sweta, (2002) Decentralised Governance, Shipra Publications,
New Delhi.
Panchayati Raj Update (1998), July.
Panchayati Raj Update, (1998), March.
Panchayati Raj Update,( 1997) February.
Purohit, P.V.,( 1998 ) Panchayats in Gujarat Panchayati Raj Update, February.
Ray, S.N.,(1998) Reconceptualised Rural Development and Revitalized Panchayti
Raj: The West Bengal Experience, in Sebasti L. Raj SJ and Edward Mathias.
Sekhar, Madhushree and Nelson, Chales, (1998 ) PanchayAt Reforms in Tamil Nadu:
A Perspective, Journal of Rural Development., Vol. 17, No.1, January- March.
Subha, K,(1998) Panchayats on the road to becoming Institutions of Self-Government
Panchayti Raj Update, June.
243
Mathur, P.C, Jha, S.N., 1999, Decentralisation and Local Politics, Sage Publications,
New Delhi.
Joshi, R.P. (ed), 1998, Constitutionalisation of Panchayati Raj : A Reassessment,
Rawat Publications, Jaipur.
Kuashik, Sushila, (1995), Panchayati Raj in Action: Challenges to Womens Role,
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, New Delhi.
Meenakshisundaram, S.S. (1994), Decentralisation in Developing Countries, Concept
Publishing, New Delhi.
Sharma, Shakuntala, (1994), Grassroots and Panchayati Raj, Deep and Deep
Publications, New Delhi.
G. Ramathilagam , (1995) 73rd Constitutional Amendment and its Implications for
Women,, Kurukshetra, 43(7), April.
Kashyap, Subhash, (2003), Institutionalisation of Grassroots Governance, Grassroots
Governance, Vol. I, No. 1, June.
Aslam, M, 2004, Towards Empowering Gram Sabha in The Grassroots Governance
,Volume II. No.2, December.
Pal Chaitali, 2002, Decentralisation and Responsiveness in Administration: A
theoretico- operational framework, (Ph.D thesis.)
Singh, Mohinder, Democratic Dcentralisation through Panchayati Raj: Problems
and Prospects in Barthwal, C.P, (ed), 1993, Public Administration in India, New
Delhi, Ashish Publishing House, p.310.
Chatterjee, Bishwajeet and Ghosh, Dillip Kumar, Globalisation and Decentralised
Governance reflections on Panchayats in I ndia in Ijpa, AprilJune, 2003, Vol.
XLIX, No. 2)
Mathew, George, (ed), 2000, Status of Panchayati Raj in the States and Union
Territories of India, New Delhi, Concept Publishinmg Company.
Bhattacharya, Mohit, 2004, Municipal Planning in the Perspective of 74th
Amendment in Urban Administration in India, Serials Publications, New Delhi.
Dash, C.D. ( 2004), The Constitution ( 74th Amendment) Act, 1992: some
observations, in Urban Administration in India, Serials Publications, New Delhi.
Palnithulai G, and V. Raghupathi, Governnace for Development at Grassroots, Rural
India, Achieving Millennium Development Goals and Grass Roots Development,
3rdInternational Conference, Rajiv Gandhi Chair for Panchayati Raj Studies, Gandhigran
Rural Institute, at http://www.sahanav.org
13.9 ACTIVITIES
1)
Discuss the features of 73rd and 74th constitutional amendment.
2)
Briefly discuss the functioning of local governance in various states after the
constitutional amendment.

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UNIT 13

FEATURES OF 73rd AND 74th

13.3 Initiatives after Economic Reforms

13.0 LEARNING OUTCOME

Identify the background of revitalisation of local governance;

Understand the features of 73rd and 74th constitutional amendment;

Discuss the initiatives after economic reforms; and

Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment

13.2 INITIATIVES TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS

Features of 73rd Constitutional Amendment

Types of Local Governance

Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment

Observations on the 73rd Amendment Act

Types of Local Governance

Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment

Types of Local Governance

Nomenclature of panchayats and chairpersons

Composition of panchayats; representation (whether or not to provide) of the

Powers and functions of Gram Sabha

Devolution of powers and functions to panchayats at the appropriate level with

Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment

The composition and functions of the District Planning Committee;

Features of the 74th Constitutional Amendment

Types of Local Governance

Reservation of one-third of seats for women including women belonging to Scheduled

Developmental Committees, namely, (DPC) and Metropolitan Planning Committees

Observations on the 74th Amendment

Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment

Types of Local Governance

to be responsive and accountable to the community

to constantly improve their capabilities so as to equip themselves to undertake their

Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment

Decentralised Planning in Context of 73rd and 74th

Types of Local Governance

13.3 INITIATIVES AFTER ECONOMIC REFORMS

Creation of regular bodies in the planning hierarchy;

Decentralisation of power and functions to each of these tiers;

Devolution of financial resources to each of these tiers;

Subordination to higher political echelons rather than to bureaucracy;

Assigning professionally trained manpower to each of these tiers;

Devising effective co-ordination mechanism among these tiers; and

Devising means to ensure effective peoples participation.

Creation of Regular Bodies

Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment

Types of Local Governance

democracy, it is essential for planning to assign professionally trained manpower to the

Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment

Types of Local Governance

13.4 FUNCTIONING OF PRIs IN VARIOUS STATES AFTER

Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment

Types of Local Governance

Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment

Types of Local Governance

Features of 73rd and 74th Amendment

13.5 FUNCTIONING OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE AFTER

Types of Local Governance

the articulate representatives of the Gram Panchayts.

13.7 KEY CONCEPTS