EN BANC

G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANG TANG HO, DefendantAppellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
JOHNS, J.:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No.
2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and
speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances,
regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary
rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this
purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any
cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council
of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purpose of this Act, to wit:
chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

( a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice
or corn.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

chan roble s virtual law lib rary

( b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or

sale of the commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made
by the Government itself.
chan rob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

( c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a
company or individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the
industrial or merchant may demand.
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

( d) . . .

c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

chan roble s virtua l law lib rary

cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner

obstruct the production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of
raising the prices thereof; to corner or hoard said products as defined in
section three of this Act; . . .

Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice

or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice
or define any basic for fixing the price.
SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the
regulations, orders and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall
be punished by a fine of not more than five thousands pesos, or by
imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the
court: Provided, That in the case of companies or corporations the manager
or administrator shall be criminally liable.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

c han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, shall consider that the public interest requires the
application of the provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation,
and any provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith shall from then on be
temporarily suspended.
chan rob lesvi rtual awlib rary

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued,
the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall declare
the application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all laws
temporarily suspended by virtue of the same shall again take effect, but
such termination shall not prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or
cause begun prior to such termination, nor the filing of any proceedings for
an offense committed during the period covered by the Governor-General's
proclamation.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price
at which rice should be sold.
c han roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho,
charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No.
53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August,
1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868,
committed as follows:
chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally
sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos
(P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of
the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919,
under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months'
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this
court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53
of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the
offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that
it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his
proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first
published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was
first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in
so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice
should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in
an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and
promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules
and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the
question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does
not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the
discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the GovernorGeneral, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue
and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out
the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary
rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or
emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall
take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner
specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole
judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is
not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price
of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for
the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law
is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum
price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice,
sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any
cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not
have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence

of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price,
the seller commits a crime.
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the
United States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive
to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature
has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no
authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to
make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each
branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only
to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming,
without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at
which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so,
was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the
Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law,
all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred
upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the GovernorGeneral, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative
power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself,
and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make
rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself
created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other
hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and
some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the
doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a
delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
c han roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger
Cases (94 U.S., 183-187; 24 L. ed., 94), first laid down the rule:
Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public
interest and, under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to
legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight unless protected by
their charters.
cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary

chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates
of charges for the transportation of freights and passengers on the different
railroads of the State is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of
the United States or to that of the State.
It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public
utility, and that, being a public utility, the State had power to establish
reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the

State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing for, and empowering,

a railroad commission to hear and determine what was a just and reasonable
rate. The constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned and exhaustive opinion by Justice
Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38
Minn., 281), in which the court held:
Regulations of railway tariffs - Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. Under Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and
warehouse commission as to what are equal and reasonable fares and rates
for the transportation of persons and property by a railway company is
conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to compel compliance with the
tariff of rates recommended and published by them, no issue can be raised
or inquiry had on that question.
c han roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Same - constitution - Delegation of power to commission. - The authority

thus given to the commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion
and judgement, what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of
legislative power.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly
provides That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers
and property shall be equal and reasonable.
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad
commission to investigate all the facts, to hear and determine what is a just
and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not make the violation of the
order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It
was there held That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now
too well settled to require either argument or citation of authority.
chan roble svi rtualaw lib rary

chan roble s virt ual law l ibra ry

The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the
power to adopt rules and regulations, or to investigate and determine the
facts, in order to carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an
authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be
just and reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix these rates at
whatever it deemed equal and reasonable.
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

chan roble s virtual l aw lib rary

They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to

what the law shall be, - which would not be allowable, - but have merely
conferred upon it an authority and discretion, to be exercised in the
execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely
permissible. The legislature itself has passed upon the expediency of the
law, and what is shall be. The commission is intrusted with no authority or
discretion upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a single
provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration of the law, and
with no other power.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion
says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made."
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what
the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a
uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving
the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and
without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity
to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

chan roble s virtual law lib rary

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in
all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or
other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed
fact or event.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United
States vs. Grimaud (220 U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that
the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on
government land in a forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there

provided that the Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and
regulations and establish such service as will insure the object of such
reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve
the forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of
this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."
chanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:

In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon
stated terms or in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely assert
and enforces the proprietary right of the United States over land which it
owns. The regulation of the Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise of
legislative, or even of administrative, power; but is an ordinary and
legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized agent to allow person having
no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary control is
altogether different from governmental authority.
The opinion says:
From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed
conferring upon executive officers power to make rules and regulations, not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws
which did govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But
when Congress had legislated power. But when Congress had legislated and
indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under such general
provisions "power to fill up the details" by the establishment of
administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could be
punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed by
Congress, or measured by the injury done.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally

recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution."
chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the
defendants drove and grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of
the regulations, they were making an unlawful use of the government's
property. In doing so they thereby made themselves liable to the penalty
imposed by Congress.
The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands
are set apart as a forest reserve. He is required to make provisions to
protect them from depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to
regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from

destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and

occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by
Congress."
chanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of
delegating legislative power. It will be noted that in the "Granger Cases," it
was held that a railroad company was a public corporation, and that a
railroad was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the legislature had
the power to fix and determine just and reasonable rates for freight and
passengers.
chan roble svi rtualaw lib rary

chan roble s virt ual law l ibra ry

The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable,
the legislature could delegate the power to ascertain the facts and determine
from the facts what were just and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the
commission with such power was not a delegation of legislative power.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard
policy of fire insurance," and the court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to
provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so
that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of
all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in
respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could
not be delegated."
chan roble s virtual law libra ry

The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and
regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for
Government land in the forest reserve.
chanroblesv i rtualaw lib rary

chan roble s virt ual law l ibra ry

These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it
cannot delegate it legislative authority.
chan roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of

legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to
any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a
fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution.

c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of
itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some
certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be
suspended.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a
law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon
which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.
The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:
All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and
remain closed until 5 o'clock on the following morning, unless by special
permission of the president.
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,
that State says:

the Supreme Court of

We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts
to confer arbitrary power upon an executive officer, and allows him, in
executing the ordinance, to make unjust and groundless discriminations
among persons similarly situated; second, because the power to regulate
saloons is a law-making power vested in the village board, which cannot be
delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative
officer power to make a law, but it can make a law with provisions that it
shall go into effect or be suspended in its operations upon the ascertainment
of a fact or state of facts by an administrative officer or board. In the
present case the ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to
decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when a saloon
shall close. This is an attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and
cannot be sustained.
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.

chanrob lesvi rt ualawlib rary

chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any
rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer
in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he
would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of
rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in
the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price.
Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of
the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the
proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

The Executive order

c hanrobles vi rt ual law lib rary

provides:

(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the
time being as follows:

In Manila -

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57 kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.

Rice at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.
Corn at P8 per sack of 57 kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.

chan roble svi rtualawl ib rary

cha n roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

c han roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be
the Manila price less the cost of transportation from the source of supply and
necessary handling expenses to the place of sale, to be determined by the
provincial treasurers or their deputies.
cha nrob lesvi rtu alawlibra ry

c han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing

provinces, the maximum price shall be the authorized price at the place of
supply or the Manila price as the case may be, plus the transportation cost,
from the place of supply and the necessary handling expenses, to the place
of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to

communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director
of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of
the above regulations in their respective localities.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price
that the industrial or merchant may demand." The law is a general law and
not a local or special law.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

c han robles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and
different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and
delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial
treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of
legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that
power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed
to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the
Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper
enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities." The
issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of
the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that
power.
chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary

chan roble s virt ual law l ibra ry

Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not
authorize the Governor-General to fix one price of rice in Manila and another
price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize him to fix the price of rice in the

Philippine Islands under a law, which is General and uniform, and not local
or special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in the
proclamation must be the same all over the Islands. There cannot be one
price at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is a mater of common
knowledge, and of which this court will take judicial notice, that there are
many kinds of rice with different and corresponding market values, and that
there is a wide range in the price, which varies with the grade and quality.
Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the grade or quality of the
rice, and the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and
convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57
kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to all grades of rice, and
says nothing about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is
confined to palay, rice and corn. They are products of the Philippine Islands.
Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many other things are also
products. Any law which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous
other products of the Islands is not general or uniform, but is a local or
special law. If such a law is valid, then by the same principle, the GovernorGeneral could be authorized by proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs,
chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the Islands.
In the very nature of things, all of that class of laws should be general and
uniform. Otherwise, there would be an unjust discrimination of property
rights, which, under the law, must be equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is
nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a
proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice
at a price in excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or
quality.
chan rob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it
was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it
to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what
was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not
"an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain
undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without
regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be
issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long
it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The
Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or
define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the
absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was
made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the
different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the

sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a
price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."
chanroble s vi rtual law lib rary

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it
undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a
proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation
of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the
proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
chan roble svi rtualawl ib rary

chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and
profiteering, which worked a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that
an emergency existed, but the question here presented is the
constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and none of such
matters is an argument for, or against, its constitutionality.
chan rob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability

protects the life, liberty and property rights of the rich and the poor alike,
and that protection ought not to change with the wind or any emergency
condition. The fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the
people of the Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican form of
government. We make the broad statement that no state or nation, living
under republican form of government, under the terms and conditions
specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the power to
any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can never
be delegated under a republican form of government.
cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary

chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law
was not dealing with government property. It was dealing with private
property and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. If this
law should be sustained, upon the same principle and for the same reason,
the Legislature could authorize the Governor-General to fix the price of
every product or commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to
make it a crime to sell any product at any other or different price.
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the
provision of the Constitution should be suspended. But the Stubborn fact
remains that at all times the judicial power was in full force and effect, and
that while that power was in force and effect, such a provision of the
Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended even in times of war. It
may be claimed that during the war, the United States Government
undertook to, and did, fix the price at which wheat and flour should be
bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United States had declared
war, and at the time was at war with other nations, and it was a war
measure, but it is also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act,

the United States commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took
possession of it, either actual or constructive, and the government itself
became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for
it. That is not this case. Here the rice sold was the personal and private
property of the defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The
government had not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have any
interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private
property of the defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest
of the public, but the members of this court have taken on solemn oath to
uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to
meet the changing winds or emergency conditions. Again, we say that no
state or nation under a republican form of government ever enacted a law
authorizing any executive, under the conditions states, to fix the price at
which a price person would sell his own rice, and make the broad statement
that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be found
which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868
here in question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to
constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested
exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people
of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of
the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn
may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.
c hanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the
right of the Governor-General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the
Act, to fix the price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price,
and which holds that portions of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide
or undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining
portions of the Act.
chan roble svi rtualaw lib rary

chan roble s virt ual law l ibra ry

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged.
So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:

c han robles v irt ual law li bra ry

I concur in the result for reasons which reach both the facts and the law. In
the first place, as to the facts, - one cannot be convicted ex post facto of a

violation of a law and of an executive order issued pursuant to the law, when
the alleged violation thereof occurred on August 6, 1919, while the Act of
the Legislature in question was not published until August 13, 1919, and the
order was not published until August 20, 1919. In the second place, as to
the law, - one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order
issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an
ascertainable standard of guilt. (U.S. vs. Cohen Grocery Company [1921],
255 U.S., 81, holding section 4 of the Federal Food Control Act of August 10,
1917, as amended, invalid.)
c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding of our position, I

would respectfully invite attention to the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in German Alliance Ins. Co. vs. Lewis ([1914, 233 U.S.,
389), concerning the legislative regulation of the prices charged by business
affected with a public interest, and to another decision of the United States
Supreme Court, that of Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark ([1892], 143 U.S.,
649), which adopts as its own the principles laid down in the case of Locke's
Appeal ([1873], 72 Pa. St., 491), namely; "The Legislature cannot delegate
its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends
to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation
must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must,
therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of
legislation."
Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

Village of Little Chute vs. Van Camp.

Executive Order No. 53, series of 1919.