Poli Cases SCRA 1

Macariola vs.
Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 , May 31, 1982

Case Title : BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant, vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Acts unbecoming a judge.
Syllabi Class : Judges|Sales|Administrative Law|Public Officers|Statutes|Anti-Graft Law|Constitutional Law|Civil Service
Syllabi:
1. Judges; Sales; The prohibition to judges from acquiring properties in litigation applies only where the sale takes place during the pendency of
the litigation.The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons
disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that x x x for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property
2. Same; Being an officer of a business corporation is violative of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. However, in the case at bar respondent judge
and his wife sold their shares already without a short time after acquisition+
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Only permanent officers in the classified service are subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commissioner.
Judges do not fall under this category.+
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Judges are not officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the Civil Service Commission.+
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; The Section 12 of the Civil Service Act and RA. 2260, of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations do not apply to
members of the Judiciary.+
6. Same; Administrative Law; Public Officers; Anti-Graft Law; Civil Service; Although Civil Service regulations prohibit public officers from
engaging in business without prior authority of his department head, violation of such administrative rule does not constitute violation of the
Anti-Graft Law.+
8. Same; Constitutional Law; Judges are not prohibited from engaging or having any interest in any lawful business.+
10. Same; Anti-Graft Law; A judge cannot be held guilty of violating the Anti-Graft Law where there is no showing that he intervened in the
business or transactions of a commercial firm.+
12. Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce prohibiting certain public officers from engaging in business
activities is political in nature and has already been abrogated with the transfer of sovereignty from Spain, to the United States and later to the
Republic of the Philippines.Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article
14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted
by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
13. Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Law defined.Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the
State and defined the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled
that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections.
Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain
public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.
14. Same; Administrative Law; Public Officers; Constitutional Law; The provision of the Code of Commerce incapacitating judges and justices
and other public officers from engaging in business is part of Political Law.It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial
laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain
public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
15. Same; While a judge may not have acquired property in litigation before him in the technical sense, it was, however, improper for him to
have done so under the Canons of Judicial Ethics.Finally, while it is true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded
of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach. And as aptly observed by the imvestigating Justice: x x it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or
acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which
he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and
responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his
actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of
respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust.
16. Same; Respondent acted in good faith in approving project of partition without the signature of the parties where the lawyers manifested that
they were authorized to sign the same by the clients.+
17. Same; Same; Same.+
18. Same; Same; Incapacity of judges to acquire property involved in cases before their sala does not apply where property was not acquired
from any of the parties to the case.+
19. Same; Same; Respondent judge did not acquire property at bar during the prohibited period.+
20. Same; It is but natural for a judge to believe that a person who publicly holds himself out as an Attorney-at-Law is a bona fide member of
the Bar.+
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE
DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887 , October 04, 1922

Case Title : THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. GREGORIO PERFECTO, defendant and appellant.Case
Nature : APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Harvey, J.
Syllabi Class : ID.
Syllabi:
1. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIBEL OF LEGISLATURE.While it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a
legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.Where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the Legislature
to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication.
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF CHANGE FROM SPANISH TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PHILIPPINES ON ARTICLE 256 OF THE
PENAL CODE. (OPINION OF JUSTICES MALCOLM, OSTRAND, AND JOHNS.)Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the
Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic principles of government.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.All those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, lse majest, religion and worship, rebellion, sedition,
and contempts of ministers of the crown, are no longer in force. Article 255 of the Penal Code is of a similar nature.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.
"It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much
less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must
hold it subject to the constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan
[1845], 3 How., 210.)
6. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF PHILIPPINE GOVEBNMENT.The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that
Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. The President and Congress framed the government on
the model with which Americans are f amiliar and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection
of individual rights and privileges.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the
King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a
Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizens must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of
our Constitutions and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man." (State vs. Shepherd
[1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.In the United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is not known. In this country no distinction as to persons is recognized.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. The gulf
which separates this article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin is as wide as that which separates a monarchy
from a democratic republic like that of the United States.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it
place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the peopleany official halo, which calls for drastic
punishment for contemptuous remarks.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.The crime of lse majest disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under
the American flag.
Docket Number: No. 18463
Counsel: Alfonso E. Mendoza, Attorney-General Villa-Real
Ponente: MALCOLM
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be
reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, 267 SCRA 408 , February 03, 1997
Case Title : MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.Case
Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and Mandamus.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Statutes|Contracts|Words and Phrases|Statutory Construction|National Economy and Patrimony|Manila
Hotel|Filipino First Policy|Bids and Bidding|Nationalism|Separation of Powers|Supreme Court|Judicial Review|Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations|Government Service Insurance System
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Contracts; Words and Phrases; A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nationit is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme Iaw of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.+
2. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Statutory Construction; A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and.construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.+
3. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Statutory Construction; Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.+
4. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Statutory Construction; Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature
of constitutional provisions.+
5. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Statutory Construction; The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a
right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executingthe rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further
the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.+
6. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Statutory Construction; A constitutional provision may be selfexecuting in one part and non-self-executing in
another.+
7. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just thatqualified
Filipinos shall be preferred.On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation
to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just thatqualified Filipinos shall be
preferred.
8. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; When the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances,
an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subjectsuch right enforces itself by its
own inherent potency and puissance.+
9. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Words and Phrases; When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.+
10. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; Manila Hotel has become a landmarka living testimonial of
Philippine heritage.+
11. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony.+
12. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; Filipino First Policy; Words and Phrases; The term qualified
Filipinos as used in the Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos.+
13. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation
have juridical life of their own and can be the source of judicial remedy.+
14. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of a person distinct from the
government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government
has approved or authorized the action.+
15. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people
but also to the government as elements of the State.+
16. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; Bids and Bidding;Since the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos, the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder.+
17. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; Bids and Bidding;Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, the Filipino First Policy constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by GSIS, lest the
bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution.+
18. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; Bids and Bidding;Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself
is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the
highest, bid+
19. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; Where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity.+
20. Constitutional Law; Any person desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to
know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.+
21. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable, thus the Supreme Court would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution
lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.+
22. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; Nationalism; The Filipino First
Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism, embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but
primarily to be enforcedso must it be enforced.+
23. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; National Economy and Patrimony; The Supreme Court will always defer to the Constitution in
the proper governance of a free society, after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review
when the Constitution is involved.+
24. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; National Economy and Patrimony; Nationalism;Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of
the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government
authority emanates.+
25. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; National Economy and Patrimony; Nationalism;Manila Hotel; Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture, and in this sense, it has become
truly a reflection of the Filipino soula place with a history of grandeur, a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a
country.+
26. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; National Economy and Patrimony; Nationalism;Manila Hotel; The conveyance of Manila
Hotel, an epic exponent of the Filipino psyche, to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a
veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver.+
27. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; There is no doubt that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our
national patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation.+
28. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; Bids and Bidding; The Constitutional preference should give the
qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to
be significant at all.+
29. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards
foreign investments in our country, stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country, yet we should not
preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved.+
30. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; Bids and Bidding; In this particular case before us, the only
meaningful preference, it seems, would realty be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid.+
31. Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Supreme Court; Judicial Review; It is regrettable that the Supreme Court at times is seen to be
the refuge for bureaucratic inadequacies which create the perception that it even takes on non-justiciable controversies.+
32. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; Bids and Bidding; In the context of the present controversy the only
way to enforce the constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos is to allow petitioner ioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm for the
purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation.+
33. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; Bids and Bidding; The history of the Manila Hotel should not be
placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical values of our people.+
34. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing, a searching
inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as a definite law, or if it needs future
legislation for completion and enforcement.+
35. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath
to constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them.+
36. Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; A constitutional provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its
language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into effect.+
37. Constitutional Law; Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations; Government Service Insurance System; As a state-owned and
controlled corporation, the GSIS is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution especially those designed to promote the
general welfare of the people.+
38. Constitutional Law; Only a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as a living constitution.+
39. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; The second paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the
Constitution is pro-Filipino but not anti-alienit is pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos but it is not anti-alien per se for it does not
absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.+
40. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; In implementing the policy articulated in Section 10, Article
XII of the Constitution, the stellar task of our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desideratafirst, the need to
develop our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos.+
41. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; Bids and Bidding; 1 submit that the right of preference of a
Filipino bidder arises only if it tied the bid of the foreign bidder.+
42. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; While the Filipino First Policy requires that we incline to a
Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien.+
43. Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; Bids and Bidding; The majoritys strained interpretation
constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can
win.+
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 122156
Counsel: Arturo M. Tolentino, Napoleon G. Rama, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Perla Y. Duque & Francis Y. Gaw, The Government Corporate Counsel,
Yulo, Torres, Tarriela & Bello Law Office, Jooaquin Bernas, Enrique M. Fernando
Ponente: BELLOSILLO
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary
for the purpose.
Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections, 427 SCRA 96 , April 13, 2004

Case Title : REV. ELLY VELEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.Case Nature :
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class : Election Law|Equal Access to Public Office|Constitutional Law|Declaration of Principles and State Policies|Statutory
Construction|Words and Phrases|The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations|Nuisance
Candidates
Syllabi:
1. Election Law; Equal Access to Public Office; There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek the
presidencywhat is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring equal access to opportunities for public office is the claim that
there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.
2. Election Law; Equal Access to Public Office; Constitutional Law; Declaration of Principles and State Policies; The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the equal access
provisionlike the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.+
3. Election Law; Equal Access to Public Office; Constitutional Law; Declaration of Principles and State Policies; Statutory
Construction; Words and Phrases; Words and phrases such as equal access, opportunities, and public service are susceptible to
countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.The provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as
operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can
be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as equal access opportunities and public
service are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to
inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
4. Election Law; Equal Access to Public Office; The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations; Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to
file a certificate of candidacy.As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on Nuisance Candidates and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or
cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause
is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to
file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.
5. Election Law; Equal Access to Public Office; Nuisance Candidates; The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and
the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divinethe State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly; Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the electiona disorderly
election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions.+
6. Election Law; Equal Access to Public Office; Nuisance Candidates; Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly
election, the State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, their trips to the moon on gossamer wings.+
7. Election Law; Equal Access to Public Office; Nuisance Candidates; The determination of bona fide candidates is governed by the statutes,
and the concept is satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.+
8. Election Law; Equal Access to Public Office; Nuisance Candidates; The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is
both legal and factual.+
Division: EN BANC
Counsel: Alioden D. Dalaig
Ponente: TINGA
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further
evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with
deliberate dispatch.
Imbong vs. Ferrer, 35 SCRA 28 , September 11, 1970

Case Title : MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner, vs. JAIME FERRER,as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR
MIRAFLOR, as members thereof, respondents., IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE
VALIDITY OF R.A. NO. 6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970, RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COMELEC,respondent.Case Nature : ORIGINAL PETITIONS in the Supreme Court. Declaratory relief.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Constitutional Law|Statutes|Constitutional Convention Law|Due Process of Law|Equal Protection of the
Law|Apportionment of Delegates|Constitutional Convention Law
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Constitutional Convention Law; Due Process of Law; Equal Protection of the Law; Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 not
denial of due process and equal protection clause.+
2. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Constitutional Convention Law; Competence of Congress acting as Constituent Assembly.While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolution Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No.
6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of
Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication
withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as long as such statutory details do not clash with any
specific provision of the Constitution, they are valid.
3. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Constitutional Convention Law; Apportionment of Delegates;Discretion of Congress as Constituent Assembly
to apportion delegates.Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates
to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally
allocate one delegate for each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention.
4. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Constitutional Convention Law; Discrimination which is based on substantial distinction and germane to the
purposes of the law is constitutional.+
5. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Constitutional Convention Law; Freedom to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.+
6. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Constitutional Convention Law; Prohibition in the challenged provision is an invasion of vital constitutional
safeguards to freedom Imbong vs. Ferrer of belief, expression and association.+
7. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Constitutional Convention Law; Right to farm association for purpose not contrary to law, inviolable.+
8. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Constitutional Convention Law; Right of suffrage is meaningless when the right to campaign is curtailed.The right of suffrage which is the cornerstone of any democracy is meaningless when the right to campaign in any election therein is
unreasonable and unnecessarily curtailed, restrained or hampered, as is being done under the statute in dispute.
Docket Number: No. L-32432, No. L-32443
Counsel: Manuel B. Imbong, Raul M. Gonzales, Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr.,
Solicitors Raul I. Goco, Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres, Guillermo C. Nakar, Lorenzo Taada, Arturo Tolentino,
Jovito Salonga, Emmanuel Pelaez
Ponente: MAKASIAR
WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot
be declared unconstitutional. Without costs.I reserve my right to expand this explanation of my vote in the next few days.
Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA 702 , October 16, 1971

Case Title : ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT,THE AUDITOR,
and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RESPONDENTS,RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS
G. BARRERA,PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA,MARCELO B. FERNAN,JOSE Y. FERIA,LEONARDO SIGUION
REYNA,VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.Case Nature : ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Political law|
Syllabi:
1. Political law; Power of judicial review.The courts may review the validity of an act of the constitutional convention proposing a particular amendment to the Constitution. There should
be no more doubt regarding the jurisdiction of the Su- preme Court vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which
concededly is at par with the former. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congressacting as a constituent
assemblyviolates the Constitution of essentially a justiciable one, not political, and hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this
view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed modified.
2. Political law; Power to review acts of the constitutional convention.A constitutional convention is supreme within the domain of its legitimate authority. A revolutionary convention which drafts the first
Constitution of an entirely new government born either of war or liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing
government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d etat is completely without restraint and omnipotent. The current constitutional
convention, however, came into being only by virtue of the provisions of the present Constitution.
3. Same; Same; Same; Rationale.In upholding the jurisdiction of the Court over the case at bar, it is not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is
subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and
upon principle, reason and authority, per Justice Laurel, supra it is within the power, as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing
Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case.
4. Same; Limits to the power of a constitutional convention.As to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the
Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now we hold that even as to its latter
task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to
Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same case and facility
in changing an ordinary legislation.
5. Same; Same.As a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in
regard to the process of their amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie
in the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and
omnipotent as their original counterparts.
6. Same; Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution contemplates a single election.In the case at bar, the ultimate question is this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated
by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there
is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a
single election or plebiscite.
7. Same; When calling of a plebiscite valid.In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution
with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering
the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of
them cannot comply with this requirement. Under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, a proposal to amendment the Constitution should be
submitted to the people not separately from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
8. Political law; The people must have ample time to reflect proposed Constitutional amendment.Based on the minimum requirements expounded in Gonzales vs. COMELEC which must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to
the people of a proposed amendment to the Constitution, the people, in the case at bar, are not, and by election time, will not be, sufficiently
informed of the meaning, nature and effects of the constitutional amendment being proposed in Resolution No. 1 of the Convention. They have not
been afforded ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted from a full and dispassionate
consideration of the merits and demerits of the proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive involvement in local elections and politics.
They cannot thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the proposed amendment.
9. Political law; Powers of the constitutional convention not absolute.It does not follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional convention may lay claim to an attribute sovereign in character.
Section 1 of Article II of the Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom sovereignty resides.
10. Political law; Same.The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional convention, alike recognized by the Constitution, are
coordinate, there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of proposing amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the Constitution which can be the only source of valid
restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body that the call to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any
wise be interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate and paramount task
assigned to it.
11. Political law; Resolution No. 1 of the Convention valid.Considering that a constitutional convention is not precluded from imposing additional restrictions on the powers of either the executive or
legislative branches, or, for that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better policy to interpret Article XV in such a way that would not
sanction such restraint on the authority that must be recognized as vested in a constitutional convention. From such an approach, I am
irresistibly led to the conclusion that the challenged resolution was well within the power of the convention.
12. Political law; Constitutional amendments need not be introduced in only one election.-
The conclusion arrived at by the majority is not the appropriate interpretation of the last sentence of Article XV of the present Constitution. It is
true that the Constitution uses the word election in the singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should be accorded rules of
grammar; they do not exert a compelling force in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be sought not from specific language in the singular
but from the mosaic of significance derived from the total context. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the
obvious purposes at which they are aimed.
13. Political law; Provisional nature of proposed amendment not controlling.There is plausibility in the view that until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed upon by the electorate. A literal reading of
the Constitution would support it. The spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From its silence I deduce the inference that
there is no repugnancy to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention ascertains the popular will.
Docket Number: No. L-34150
Counsel: Arturo M. Tolentino, Ramon A. Gonzales, Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco, Tomas L. Echivarre, Intervenors
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the
implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the
resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are; hereby declared null and void. The respondents
Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in
compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately
executory. No costs.
Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 , March 31, 1973

Case Title : Josue Javellana, petitioner, vs. The Executive Secretary, The Secretary of National Defense, The Secretary of Justice and The
Secretary of Finance, respondents.Case Nature : ORIGINAL PETITIONS in the Supreme Court. Mandamus and prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional law; Doctrine of Separation of powers; Six Justices agree that the issue of the validity of Proclamation 1102 (announcing
the ratification of the proposed Constitution) is a justiciable question; four Justices differ.On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Chief Justice
Concepcion, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation 1102 presents a justiciable and non-justiciable
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that inasmuch as it is claimed that there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into
the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep its hands-off out of respect
to the peoples will, but, in the negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935
Constitution has been complied with. Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political
and beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.
2. Same; Same; Necessity of strict adherence to constitutional requirements; Reasons for.+
3. Same; No valid ratification of Constitution where ratification not in accordance with mandatory requirements of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution.Since it appears on the face of Proclamation 1102 that the mandatory requirements of the constitutional articles have not been complied with
and that no election or plebiscite for ratification as therein provided as well as in section 16 of Article XVII of the proposed Constitution itself
has been called or held, there cannot be said to have been a valid ratification.
4. Same; Same; Same.Justice Laurel pointed out that in contrast to the United States Constitution, the Philippine Constitution as a definition of the powers of
government placed upon the judiciary the great burden of determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers and stressed that when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments ... but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them.
5. Constitutional law; Issue as to the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable question and constitutes a proper
subject of judicial review; Reasons.As was to be restated by Justice Jose P. Laurel a century and a third later in the 1936 landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
(T)he Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in
our Constitution are real as they should be in any living Constitution.
6. Same; How the case at bar should be viewed.+
7. Same; A decision in favor of the petitioners need not be immediately executory.+
8. Same; Petitions in the case at bar should not be dismissed.+
9. Same; Same.+
10. Same; Requirements of the Constitution for its amendment was not complied with.+
11. Same; Nature of judicial function.+
12. Same; The Philippines has a tradition of judicial activism.+
13. Same; Same; Whether there has been deference to the provisions of the Constitution is a judicial question.+
14. Constitutional law; When power of judicial review should be exercised.+
15. Same; Congress may still call a plebiscite.+
16. Same; Presidential declaration that government is not a revolutionary government subject to judicial notice.+
17. Same; Acceptance of Constitution is manifested by oath of office.It is in the taking of the oath of office where the affiant says that he swears to support and defend the Constitution that the acceptance of the
Constitution is made manifest. I agree with counsel for petitioners in L-36165 (Gerardo Roxas, et al. v. Alejandro Melchor, et al.) when he said
that the members of Congress who opted to serve in the interim National Assembly did so only ex abundante cautela, or by way of a precaution,
or making sure, that in the event the new Constitution becomes definitely effective and the interim National Assembly is convened they can
participate in legislative work in their capacity as duly elected representatives of the people, which otherwise they could not do if they did not
manifest their option to serve, and that option had to be made within 30 days from January 17, 1973, the date when Proclamation No. 1102 was
issued.
18. Same; It cannot be said that the people have accepted the 1978 Constitution.What appears to me, however, is that practically it is only the officials and employees under the executive department of the Government who
have been performing their duties apparently in observance of the provisions of the new Constitution.... True it is, that 92 members of the House
of Representatives and 15 members of the Senate, of the Congress of the Philippines had expressed their option to serve in the interim National
Assembly that is provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the proposed Constitution. It must be noted, however, that of the 15 senators who
expressed their option to serve in the interim National Assembly only one of them took his oath of office; and of the 92 members of the House of
Representatives, only 22 took their oath of office. This is an indication that only a small portion of the members of Congress had manifested their
acceptance of the new Constitution.
19. Same; The term election in Article XV of the Constitution should be taken in its historical perspective.It can safely be said that when the framers of the 1935 Constitution used the word election in Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution they had no other idea in mind except the elections that were periodically held in the Philippines for the choice of public officials
prior to the drafting of the 1935 Constitution, and also the election mentioned in the Independence Act. It is but logical to expect that the
framers of the 1935 Constitution would provide a mode of ratifying an. amendment to that Constitution itself.
20. Same; Meaning of people in the Constitution.+
21. Same; Voting in the barangays was not freely exercised because of the existence of martial law.-
One of the valid grounds against the holding of the plebiscite on January 15, 1973, as provided in Presidential Decree No. 73, is that there is
no freedom on the part of the people to exercise their right of choice, because of the existence of martial law in our country. The same ground
holds true as regards the voting of the barangays on January 10 to 15, 1973. More so, because by General Order No. 20, issued on January 7,
1973, the President of the Philippines ordered that the provisions of Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 73 in so far as they allow free public
discussion of the proposed constitution, as well as my order of December 17, 1972 temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081
for the purpose of free and open debate on the proposed constitution, be suspended in the meantime.
22. Same; The fact that a majority voted for the amendment of the Constitution, unless the vote was taken as provided by the Constitution, is not
sufficient to make a change in that instrument.In the cases now before this Court, the fact that the voting in the citizens assemblies (barangays) is not the election that is provided for in the
1935 Constitution for the ratification of the amendment to the Constitution, the affirmative votes cast in those assemblies cannot be made the
basis for declaring the ratification of the proposed 1972 Constitution, in spite of the fact that it was reported that 14,976,561 members of the
citizens assemblies voted for the rejection, because the votes thus obtained were not in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines. The rule of law must be upheld.
23. Same; Same; Manner of voting by the barangays subject to judicial notice.+
24. Same; Votes cast in the barangays not the votes contemplated in Section 1 of Article XVof the 1935 Constitution.It is my view that the President of the Philippines cannot by decree order the ratification of the proposed 1972 Constitution thru a voting in the
barangays and make said result the basis for proclaiming the ratification of the proposed Constitution. It is very clear, to me, that Proclamation
1102 was issued in complete disregard or in violation, of the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution.
25. Same; Election contemplated in Article XV of the Constitution is an election conducted under the election law.+
26. Same; Courts have power to determine validity of means adopted to change the Constitution.+
27. Same; The courts have the power to determine whether the acts of the Executive are authorized by the Constitution and the laws.+
28. Constitutional law; Meaning of political question.+
29. Same; Political question explained.+
30. Constitutional law; Issue as to whether or not Constitution of November 30, 1972 ratified in accordance with the amending process
prescribed by the 1935 Constitution and other related statutes highly political and not justiciable.Certainly, the invalidation of Proclamation No. 1102 and Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A by this Court would smack of plain political
meddling which is described by the United States Supreme Court as entering a political thicket in Colgrove vs. Green, 328 U.S. p. 549. At this
juncture it would be the part of wisdom for this Court to adopt the proper attitude towards political upheavals and realize that the question
before Us is political and not fit for judicial determination.
31. Same; Acceptance by the people of the 1973 Constitution cures any infirmity in its submission;Reason.The legality of the submission is no longer relevant; because the ratification, adoption and/or acquiescence by the people cures any infirmity in
its submission or any other irregularities therein which are deemed mandatory before submission as they are considered merely directory after
such ratification or adoption or acquiescence by the people.
32. Constitutional law; Issue as to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 political and not justiciable; Reasons.Assuming, without conceding, that the procedure for ratification prescribed in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution was not complied with, the
validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102 is a political, not a justiciable, issue; for it is inseparably or inextricably linked with and strikes
at, because it is decisive of, the validity of the ratification and adoption of, as well as acquiescence of the people in, the 1973 Constitution and the
legitimacy of the government organized and operating thereunder. And being political, it is beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry, tested by the
definition of a political question enunciated in Tanada, et al. vs.Cuenco, et al. (103 Phil. 1051).
33. Same; Ruling in Tolentino vs. Comelec (U SCRA 702) distinguished from case at bar.+
34. Same; 1973 Constitution already adopted by the people.It is my sincere conviction that the Constitution of 1973 has been accepted or adopted by the people. And on this premise, my considered
opinion is that the Court may no longer decide these cases on the basis of purely legal considerations. Factors which are non-legal but
nevertheless ponderous and compelling cannot be ignored, for their relevancy is inherent in the issue itself to be resolved.
35. Same; Referendum not in strict compliance with 1935 Constitution. At this juncture, I think it is fit to make it clear that I am not trying to show that the result of the referendum may be considered as sufficient
basis for declaring that the New Constitution has been ratified in accordance with the amending clause of the 1935 Constitution. I reiterate that
in point of law, I find neither strict nor substantial compliance. The foregoing discussion is only to counter, if I may, certain impressions
regarding the general conditions obtaining during and in relation to the referendum which could have in one way or another affected the exercise
of the freedom of choice and the use of discretion by the members of the Citizens Assemblies, to the end that as far as the same conditions may be
relevant in my subsequent discussions of the acceptance by the people of the New Constitution they may also be considered.
36. Same; Results of referendum valid.Let us not forget that the times are abnormal, and prolonged dialogue and exchange of ideas are not generally possible, nor practical,
considering the need for faster decisions and more resolute action. After all voting on a whole new constitution is different from voting on one,
two or three specific proposed amendments, the former calls for nothing more than a collective view of all the provisions of the whole charter, for
necessarily, one has to take the good together with the bad in it. It is rare for anyone to reject a constitution only because of a few specific
objectional features, no matter how substantial, considering the ever present possibility that after all it may be cured by subsequent amendment.
Accordingly, there Was need to indicate to the people the paths open to them in their quest for the betterment of their conditions, and as long as it
is not shown that those who did not agree to the suggestions in the comments were actually compelled to vote against their will, I am not
convinced that the existence of said comments should make any appreciable difference in the Courts appraisal of the result of the referendum.
37. Same; Referendum through Citizens Assemblies not mere consultative.It is contended, however, that the understanding was that the referendum among the Citizens Assemblies was to be in the nature of a loose
consultation and not an outright submission for purposes of ratification. I can see that at the, outset, when the first set of questions was released,
such may have been the idea. It must not be lost sight of, however, that if the newspaper reports are to be believed, and I say this only because
petitioners would consider the newspapers as the official gazettes of the administration, the last set of six questions were included*precisely
because the reaction to the idea of mere consultation was that the people wanted greater direct participation, thru the Citizens Assemblies, in
decision-making regarding matters of vital national interest. Thus, looking at things more understanding^ and realistically, the two questions
emphasized by counsel, namely, (1) Do you approve of the New Constitution? and (2) Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new
Constitution? should be considered no longer as loose consultations but as direct inquiries about the desire of the voters regarding the matters
mentioned.
38. Same; Result of referendum is as the President stated.In my opinion in those cases, the most important point I took into account was that in the face* of the Presidential certification through
Proclamation 1102 itself that the New Constitution has been approved by a majority of the people and having in mind facts of general knowledge
which I have taken judicial notice of, I am in no position to deny that the result of the referendum was as the President had stated. I can believe
that the figures referred to in the proclamation may not be accurate, but I cannot say in conscience that all of them are manufactured or
prefabricated, simply because I saw with my own eyes that people did actually gather and listen to discussions, if brief and inadequate for those
who are not abreast of current events and general occurrences, and that they did vote.. . . I am not prepared to discredit entirely the declaration
that there was voting and that the majority of the votes were in favor of the New Constitution. If in fact there were substantially less than 14
million votes of approval, the real figure, in my estimate, could still be significant enough and legally sufficient to serve as basis for a valid
ratification.
39. Same; When Article XV of the 1935 Constitution not complied with.+
40. Constitutional law; Validity of a law presumed until otherwise declared unconstitutional.With full consciousness of my limitations but compelled by my sense of duty and propriety to straighten out this grave issue (on whether the
Court is acting as an 11-man Court under the 1935 Constitution or as a 15-man Court under the 1973 Constitution) touching on the capacity in
which the Court is acting in these cases, I hold that we have no alternative but to adopt in the present situation the orthodox rule that when the
validity of an act or law is challenged as being repugnant to a constitutional mandate, the same is allowed to have effect until the Supreme Court
rules that it is unconstitutional. Stated differently, We have to proceed on the assumption that the new Constitution is in force and that We are
acting in these present cases as the 15-man Supreme Court provided for therein. Contrary to counsels contention, there is here no prejudgment
for or against any of the two constitutions. The truth of the matter is simply that in the normal and logical conduct of governmental activities, it is
neither practical nor wise to defer the course of any action until after the courts have ascertained their legality, not only because if that were to
be the rule, the functioning of government would correspondingly be undesirably hesitative and cumbersome, but more importantly, because the
courts must at the first instance accord due respect to the acts of the other departments, as otherwise, the smooth running of the government
would have to depend entirely on the unanimity of opinions among all its departments, which is hardly possible, unless it is assumed that only the
judges have the exclusive prerogative of making and enforcing the law, aside from being its sole interpreter, which is contrary to all norms of
juridical and political thinking. To my knowledge, there is yet no country in the world that has recognized judicial supremacy as its basic
governmental principle, no matter how desirable we might believe the idea to be. ... It is undeniable that the whole government, including the
provincial, municipal and barrio units and not excluding the lower courts up to the Court of Appeals, is operating under the 1973 Constitution.
Almost daily, presidential orders and decrees of the most legislative character affecting practically every aspect of governmental and private
activity as well as the relations between the government and the citizenry are pouring put from Malacafiang under the authority of said
Constitution. ... Moreover, what makes the premise of presumptive validity preferable and] imperative, is that We are dealing here with a whole
Constitution that radically modifies or alters not only the form of our government from presidential to parliamentary but also other
constitutionally based institutions vitally affecting all levels of society.
41. Same; Matter of whether or not the Constitution has become effective because of popular acquiescence beyond the domain of judicial
review.+
42. Same; Same; Same.+
43. Same; Procedure of ratification followed not in accordance with the 1935 Constitution and the related statutes; Reasons.There should be no serious dispute as to the fact that the manner in which the voting was conducted in the Citizens Assemblies, assuming that
such voting was held, was not within the intendment of Article XV, Section 1, of the 1935 Constitution nor in accordance with the Election Code
of 1971. The referendum can by no means be considered as the plebiscite contemplated in Section 2 of said Code and in Article XVII, lection 16,
of the draft Constitution itself, or as the election intended by Congress when it passed Resolution No. 2 on March 16, 1967 calling a Convention
for the revision of the 1935 Constitution.
44. Remedial law; Certiorari; Due course should be granted to the petitions there being more than prima facie showing of noncompliance with
the Constitution.+
45. Same; Same; The enrolled bill rule does not apply to the acts of the President in reference to powers he does not possess.+
46. Same; Same; The compliance by the people with the orders of the martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed
Constitution.+
47. Same; Same; Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition.+
48. Same; Same; A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts.+
49. Same; Same; The acts of the executive department under martial law cannot be construed as an acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.+
50. Same; Same; The citizens assemblies did not adopt the proposed Constitution.+
51. Same; Same; Proclamation 1102 is not an evidence of ratification.+
52. Same; Same; The Presidential proclamation of the ratification of the proposed Constitution, when assailed, may be inquired into.+
53. Same; Same; Commission on Elections; The plebiscite on the Constitution, not having been conducted under the supervision of the Comelec
is void.+
54. Same; Same; Same; Viva voce voting for the ratification of the Constitution is void.+
55. Same; Same; Same; The votes of persons less than 21 years of age renders the proceedings in the Citizens assemblies void.+
56. Same; Amendments; Elections; The right to vote is conferred by the Constitution and the same may not be increased or diminished.+
57. Same; Same; The issue of whether the exercise of a Constitutional power has met its conditions is justiciable.+
58. Same; Doctrine of Separation of Powers; The validity of Proclamation 1102 does not partake of the nature of a political, and, hence,
nonjusticiable question.+
59. Same; Same; The question of the effectivity of the new Constitution should be determined by applying the provisions of the former
Constitution.+
60. Constitutional law; Courts; Only a majority of all the members of the Supreme Court is required to annul an executive proclamation.+
61. Constitutional law; Amendments; Four Justices hold that the new Constitution of 1973 is in force; four Justices did not vote on the
question; while the remaining two Justices voted that the proposed Constitution is not in force.+
62. Remedial law; Certiorari; Six Justices voted to dismiss the petitions while the four others voted to give them due course.+
63. Same; Same; Four Justices hold that the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in by the people; two Justices hold that the people
have not expressed themselves; one Justice thinks the doctrine of Constitution by acquiescence inapplicable; while the three other justices
agree that they lack the knowledge or competence to make a determination.+
64. Same; Amendments; Six Justices agree that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has not been ratified validly
conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions; one Justice qualifies his vote while the three others dissent.+
Counsel: Ramon A. Gonzales
Ponente: CONCEPCION, C.J.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the
four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed.
This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections, 73 SCRA 333 , October 12, 1976

Case Title : PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents., VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.,
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional law|Political question|Plebiscite; Referendum|Martial Law|Amendments|Courts|Martial law|Prohibition
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional law; Valid source of statute may be challenged by one who will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.+
2. Constitutional law; Amending process of the Constitution raises a judicial question.+
3. Constitutional law; Political question; Political questions are associated with the wisdom, not legality, of a particular act.+
4. Constitutional law; Political question; Issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable
question.+
5. Constitutional law; Political question; Whether the constitutional provision on amending procedures has been followed or not is a proper
subject of inquiry, not by the people who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court.+
6. Constitutional law; Political question; There are two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition.+
7. Constitutional law; Political question; President will determine when interim National Assembly shall initially be convened.+
8. Constitutional law; Political question; Philippines is in a crisis today and in such a situation governmental powers generally concentrated in
the President.+
9. Constitutional law; Political question; Presidential exercise of legislative powers a valid act in times of martial law.+
10. Constitutional law; Political question; It is within constitutional and legal bounds for the President to assume the constituent powers of the
interim National Assembly.+
11. Constitutional law; Political question; In the Philippines sovereignty resides in the people.+
12. Constitutional law; Political question; The October 16, 1976 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their
sovereign power as constitutional legislator.+
13. Constitutional law; Political question; Fact that the people are simultaneously asked to answer a referendum and a plebiscite question does
not infirm the referendum-plebiscite.+
14. Constitutional law; Political question; Plebiscite; Referendum; Plebiscite and Referendum distinguished.+
15. Constitutional law; Political question; Martial Law; Martial law does not stultify freedom of dissent.+
16. Constitutional law; Political question; The time for deliberation of the referendumplebiscite questions, a period of three weeks, is not too
short.+
17. Constitutional law; Political question; Constituent body may fix the time when the people may act in a plebiscite.+
18. Same; Amendments; Absence of constitutional provision or provisions on modes in accordance with which formal changes in fundamental
law may be effected during first stage of transition period; Stages in transition period.+
19. Same; Amendments; Amendments to Constitution may be effected during first stage of transition period by the people in the manner then see
fit and through the agency they choose; Reasons.+
20. Same; Amendments; Submission to people of proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper
submission.+
21. Constitutional law; Courts; The judiciary must survey things as they are in the light of what they must become.+
22. Constitutional law; Courts; Courts must also be conscious that the conclusion reached by it has support in the law that must be applied.+
23. Constitutional law; Courts; Martial law; I dissent from proposition that there is concentration of powers in President during a crisis
government.+
24. Constitutional law; Courts; Martial law; President Marcos has maintained that Proclamation No. 1081 was based on the Constitution and
its reality could be passed upon by the Supreme Court. For me, that is quite reassuring.+
25. Constitutional law; Courts; Martial law; Rossiters view, on concentration of powers on President during a crisis, now possesses juristic
significance, however, after the decision in Aquino vs. COMELEC.+
26. Constitutional law; Courts; Martial law; What for me gives cause for concern is that the opinion of the Court which introduced an alien
element in the limited concept of martial law would be allowed further incursion.+
27. Constitutional law; Courts; Martial law; Although Considerable progress has been achieved under martial rule, dangers posed by martial
rule prevents concurrence from Rossiter concept of power concentration.+
28. Constitutional law; Courts; I find myself unable to join readily in the majoritys conviction (that since the interim Assembly is not likely to be
convened, the President possesses the power to propose amendments to the Constitution).+
29. Constitutional law; Courts; Recognition of power of President to propose constitutional amendments is best with obstacles.+
30. Constitutional law; Courts; The Presidents power to propose constitutional amendment cannot be implied during this transition stage as
solely the interim National Assembly is mentioned.+
31. Constitutional law; Courts; What would justify step taken by the President is the necessity that unless such authority be recognized, there
may be paralyzation of governmental activities. While not squarely applicable, such approach has a persuasive quality, as far as power to
propose amendments is concerned.+
32. Constitutional law; Courts; Judicial review goes no further than to checking infractions of the fundamental law.+
33. Constitutional law; Courts; Prohibition; There is still discretion that may be exercised, prohibition being an equitable remedy. There are, for
me, potent considerations against acceding to the plea.+
34. Constitutional law; Courts; Petitioners plea is fraught with pernicious consequences: prospect of interim Assembly being convened is dim;
of greater weight is pronouncement of the President that the plebiscite is intended only to solve an anomaly of a country devoid of a legislative
body and to provide machinery to hasten end of martial law.+
35. Constitutional law; Courts; Sovereignty resides in the people. The destiny of the country lies in their keeping.+
36. Constitutional law; Courts; Amendments to the Constitution gives rise to a justiciable questions.+
37. Constitutional law; Courts; This Court has shunned the role of a mere interpreter and exercises creative power.+
38. Constitutional law; Courts; Immortality does not inhere in judicial opinions.+
39. Constitutional law; Courts; Popular sovereignty requires both freedom of its manifestation and accuracy in ascertaining the peoples will.+
40. Constitutional law; Courts; It is only plebiscite proper, not referendum that is impressed with authoritative force.+
41. Constitutional law; Courts; Freedom of speech and assembly and constructive criticism should be welcomed.+
42. Constitutional law; Political question; Question as to constitutionality of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 not a political
question; Reasons.+
43. Constitutional law; Amendments; Amendments to Constitution may be effected during transition period only in accordance with
constitutional provision on amendments; Reasons.+
44. Constitutional law; Amendments; Presidential without constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution to be
submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite; Reasons.+
45. Constitutional law; Amendments; During transition period, interim National Assembly with constituent power to propose amendments to
Constitution; Reasons.+
46. Constitutional law; Amendments; Submission to people of proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor not a sufficient and
proper submission; Reasons.+
47. Constitutional law; Political question; Question as to constitutionality of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 not a political
question; Reasons.+
48. Constitutional law; Amendments; During transition period, President with authority to propose amendments to the Constitution.+
49. Constitutional law; Amendments; President with constituent power to propose amendments to the Constitution; Reasons.+
50. Constitutional law; Amendments; Transitory provision of Constitution regarding convening of interim National Assembly rendered legally
inoperative by political developments.+
51. Constitutional law; Political question; Since validity of proposed constitutional amendments is to be ultimately decided by the people, same
as political.+
52. Constitutional law; Political question; The contrary view negates the very essence of republican democracy.+
53. Constitutional law; Political question; Since the President can legislate as enforcer of martial rule, he can also exercise the power of the
interim National Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution.+
54. Constitutional law; Political question; If President can call a constitutional convention, a constituent power, he can likewise propose
amendments to the constitution.+
55. Constitutional law; Political question; Political question refer to those which are decided by the people in their sovereignty capacity.+
56. Constitutional law; Political question; Absences of satisfactory criterion for judicial determination or appropriateness of attributing finality
to action of the political departments is a dominant consideration in determining when an issue is political.+
57. Constitutional law; Political question; Since the people gave binding force and effect to the new Constitution, their objection against the
convening of the interim Assembly must be respected.+
58. Constitutional law; Political question; The term people as sovereign is comprehensive in its context.+
59. Constitutional law; Political question; Absent the interim National Assembly which can exercise constituent powers, either the people should
exercise that power themselves or through any other instrumentality.+
60. Constitutional law; Political question; Whether the President has authority to act for the people in submitting proposals to amend the
Constitution is essentially a political question.+
61. Constitutional law; Political question; Right of the people to regulate their own government and alter or abolish the Constitution must be
recognized, not limited by the Court.+
62. Constitutional law; Political question; Basic premise of republicanism is that the ordinary citizen can be trusted to determine his political
destiny.+
63. Constitutional law; Amendments; Amendments to constitution may be effected during transition period only in accordance with
constitutional provisions on amendments; Reasons.+
64. Constitutional law; Amendments; President without constituent power to propose amendments to the Constitution; Reasons.+
65. Constitutional law; Political question; Political question defined.+
66. Constitutional law; Political question; Issue of whether President may propose to the people amendments to Constitution is not a political
question as it involves determination of conflicting claims of authority.+
67. Constitutional law; Political question; The peoples authority to amend the Constitution cannot be gainsaid.+
68. Constitutional law; Political question; Martial law; In proposing amendments to the Constitution, the President is not exercising his martial
law powers, he is merely acting to carry out the will of the people.+
69. Constitutional law; Political question; The period granted for people to consider the proposed constitutional amendments is reasonably long
enough to afford intelligent discussion.+
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: No. L-44640, No. L-44684, No. L-44714
Ponente: MARTIN
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is immediately executory.IN VIEW OF
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We vote to dismiss the petitions.
In Re: Saturnino V. Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160, October 24, 1986

Case Title: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.
Syllabi Class: Jurisdiction|Actions|Constitutional Law|Actions|Declaratory Relief|Constitutional Law|Statutes
Syllabi:
1. Jurisdiction; Actions; Declaratory Relief; The Supreme Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. A petition directed
in effect againstPresident Corazon C. Aquino cannot be entertained the President being immune from suit during her incumbency.Prescinding from petitioners lack of personality to sue or to bring this action (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is elementary that this Court
assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent
President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
2. Jurisdiction; Actions; Declaratory Relief; Constitutional Law; A petition questioning the clarity ofaprovision in the proposed 1986
Constitution states no cause of action it being of common knowledge that the officials referred to in the 1st par. of Sec. 5, Art XVIII there of are
incumbent Pres. Aquino and Vice-Pres. Laurel.The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly
gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that tha Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on
the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous
cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was iikewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this Court.
3. Actions; Constitutional Law;Copies of the certified returns frora the provincial and city boards of canvassers have not been furnished this Court nor is there any need to do
so, In the absence of a legislature, we cannot assume the function of stating, and neither do we have any factual or legal capacity to officially
declare, who were elected President and Vice President in the February 7,1986 elections.
4. Actions; Constitutional Law; The officials referred to in the proposed Constitution are Pres. Corazon Aquino and Vice-Pres. Salvador
Laurel.As to who are the incumbent President and Vice President referred to in the 1986 Draft Constitution, we agree that there is no doubt the 1986
Constitutional Commission referred to President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel
5. Constitutional Law; Statutes;Division: EN BANC
Ponente: PER CURIAM
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 , July 21, 2003

Case Title : REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and
ELIZABETH DIMAANO, respondents. Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
Syllabi Class : Administrative Law|Constitutional Law|Searches and Seizures|Political Law|Political Law: Revolutionary Governments|Public
Officers|Ill-Gotten Wealth|Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)|Armed Forces of the Philippines|Statutory
Construction|Ejusdem Generis|Words and Phrases|Ombudsman|Actions|Jurisdictions|Waivers|Revolutionary Governments|Bill of
Rights|International Law|Sequestration Orders|International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant)|Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration)|Search Warrants|Constitutional Law|Legal Philosophy|Natural Law|Judgments|Legal Research|Searches and
Seizures|Right to Privacy|Exclusionary Rule|Public International Law
Syllabi:
1. Administrative Law; Public Officers; Ill-Gotten Wealth; Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG); Armed Forces of the
Philippines; The PCGG can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who have either (a) accumulated
ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close
associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationships, or (b) involved
in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.+
Philippines; Statutory Construction; Ejusdem Generis; Words and Phrases; Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically
make him a subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos; The term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 and 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former President
Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business
association, dummy, agent or nominee in EO No. 2there must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by
virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.+
Philippines; Position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General does not suffice to make the
occupant a subordinate of former President Marcos for purpose of EO No. 1 and its amendments.+
Philippines; EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such
specific and limited purpose.+
Philippines; It is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a subordinate of former Pres. Marcos that
vests jurisdiction on PCGG.+
Philippines; The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No.
1 and its amendments.+
Philippines; Ombudsman; The PCGG should have recommended the instant case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases.+
Philippines; Actions; Jurisdictions; Waivers; Where there is no jurisdiction to waive, as the PCGG cannot exercise investigative or
prosecutorial powers never granted to it, then the respondent could not be deemed to have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition
by filing an answer with counterclaim; Parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.+
9. Constitutional Law; Revolutionary Governments; Bill of Rights; International Law; The resulting government following the EDSA
Revolution in February 1986 was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.+
10. Constitutional Law; Revolutionary Governments; Bill of Rights; During the interregnumi.e., after the actual and effective take-over of
power by the revolutionary government up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution)a person could
not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights then.+
11. Constitutional Law; Revolutionary Governments; Bill of Rights; Sequestration Orders; To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the PCGG before the adoption of
the Freedom Constitution.+
12. Constitutional Law; Revolutionary Governments; Bill of Rights; International Law; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant); Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration); Even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy,
under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.+
(Covenant); The Declaration is part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of
international law laid down in the Covenant.+
(Covenant); It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void.+
15. Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; A raiding team exceeds its authority when it seizes items not included in the search warrant unless
contraband per se.+
16. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Revolutionary Governments; The question of whether the Filipinos were bereft of
fundamental rights during the one month interregnum between February 26 and March 24, 1986 is not as perplexing as the question of whether
the world was without a God in the three days that God the Son descended into the dead before He rose to life.+
17. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Natural Law; With the establishment of civil government and a constitution, there
arises a conceptual distinction between natural rights and civil rights, difficult though to define their scope and delineation.+
18. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Natural Law; Words and Phrases; The distinction between natural and civil rights is
between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering into society, and those which he throws into the common stock as a
member of society.+
19. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Natural Law; Words and Phrases; Natural Rights and Civil Rights,
Distinguished.+
20. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Natural Law; Words and Phrases; Similar to natural rights and civil rights, human
rights as the refurbished idea of natural right in the 1940s, eludes definitionthe usual definition that is the right which inheres in persons from
the fact of their humanity seemingly begs the question.+
21. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Though the Tydings-McDuffie law mandated a republican constitution
and the inclusion of a Bill of Rights, with or without such mandate, the Constitution would have nevertheless been republican because the
Filipinos were satisfied with their experience of a republican governmenta Bill of Rights would have nonetheless been also included because
the people had been accustomed to the role of a Bill of Rights in the past organic acts.+
22. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Because of the wide-scaled violation of human rights during the
dictatorship, the 1987 Constitution contains of Bill of Rights which more jealously safeguards the peoples fundamental liberties in the essence
of a constitutional democracy.+
23. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Judgments; Legal Research; Considering the American model and
origin of the Philippine constitution, it is not surprising that Filipino jurist and legal scholars define and explain the nature of the Philippine
constitution in similar terms that American constitutional law scholars explain their constitution.+
24. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Searches and Seizures; The power to search in England was first used
as an instrument to oppress objectionable publications.+
25. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Searches and Seizures; Right to Privacy; From Boyd vs. United
States, 116 US 616, 625 (1885), it may be derived that our own Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is an
almost exact copy of the Fourth Amendment, seeks to protect rights to security of person and property as well as privacy in ones home and
possessions.When the Convention patterned the 1935 Constitutions guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures after the Fourth
Amendment, the Convention made specific reference to the Boyd case and traced the history of the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure back to the issuance of general warrants and writs of assistance in England and the American colonies. From the Boyd case, it may be
derived that our own Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is an almost exact copy of the Fourth
Amendment, seeks to protect rights to security of person and property as well as privacy in ones home and possessions.+
26. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Searches and Seizures; Right to Privacy; While there has been a shift
in focus of the Fourth Amendment in American jurisdiction, from protection of the individual from arbitrary and oppressive conduct to protection
of privacy rather that property, the essence of his right in Philippine jurisdiction has consistently been understood as respect for ones
personality, property, home privacy.+
27. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Searches and Seizures; Right to Privacy; Exclusionary Rule; It is
said that the exclusionary rule has three purposesthe major and the most often invoked is the deterrence of unreasonable searches and
seizures, the second is the imperative of judicial integrity, and the third is the more recent purpose pronounced by some members of the United
States Supreme Court which is that of assuring the peopleall potential victims of unlawful government conductthat the government would
not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government.+
28. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Searches and Seizures; Right to Privacy; Exclusionary Rule;
Invoking natural law because the history, tradition and moral fiber of a people indubitably show adherence to it is an altogether different story,
for ultimately, in our political and legal tradition, the people are the source of all government authority and the courts are their creationwhile
it may be argued that the choice of a school of legal thought is a matter of opinion, history is a fact against which one cannot argue.+
29. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Searches and Seizures; Right to Privacy; Exclusionary Rule; It could
confidently be asserted that the spirit and letter of the 1935 Constitution, at least insofar as the system of government and the Bill of Rights were
concerned, still prevailed at the time of the EDSA Revolution.+
Although Filipinos have given democracy its own Filipino face, it is undeniable that our political and legal institutions are American in origin;
When government not only defaults in its duty but itself violates the very rights it was established to protect, it forfeits its authority to demand
obedience of the governed and could be replaced with one to which the people consent, and this highest of rights the Filipino people exercised in
the EDSA Revolution of February 1986.+
Revolutionary Governments; It is implicit from the pledge in Proclamation No. 1 dated February 25, 1986 that the president and the vice
president pledged to do justice to the numerous victims of human rights violations that the new government recognized and respected human
rights.+
32. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Searches and Seizures; Right to Privacy; Exclusionary Rule; The
rights against unreasonable search and seizure is a core right implicit in the natural right to life, liberty and property.+
33. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Searches and Seizures; Right to Privacy; Exclusionary Rule; A
natural right to liberty indubitably includes the freedom to determine when and how an individual will share the private part of his beings and the
extent of his sharing; Truly, the drapes of a mans castle are but an extension of the drapes on his body that cover the essentialsin
unreasonable searches and seizures, the prying eyes and the invasive hands of the government prevent the individual from enjoying his freedom
to keep himself and to act undisturbed within his zone of privacy.+
34. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Bill of Rights; Searches and Seizures; Right to Privacy; Exclusionary Rule; A
reflective grasp of what it means to be human and how one should go about performing the functions proper to his human nature can only be
done by the rational person himself in the confines of his private spaceonly he himself in his own quiet time can examine his life knowing that
an unexamined life is not worth living.+
Revolutionary Governments; A revolution is staged only for the most fundamental of reasonssuch as the violation of fundamental and natural
rightsfor prudence dictated that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient reasons.+
Revolutionary Governments; Considering that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a natural right, the government cannot claim
that a person was not entitled to the right for the reason alone that there was no constitution granting the right at the time the search was
conductedthis right precedes the constitution and does not depend on positive law since it is part of natural rights; Even in the absence of the
constitution, individuals had a fundamental and natural right against unreasonable search and seizure under natural law.+
Revolutionary Governments; The exclusionary rule is likewise a natural right that can be invoked even in the absence of a constitution
guaranteeing such right; To be sure, though, the status of the exclusionary right is a natural right is admittedly not as indisputable as the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures which is firmly supported by philosophy and deeply entrenched in history.+
Revolutionary Governments; Without the strength of history and with philosophy alone left as a leg to stand on, the exclusionary rights status
as a fundamental and natural right stands on unstable groundthe conclusion that it can be invoked even in the absence of a constitution also
rests on shifting sands.+
Revolutionary Governments; The exclusionary right is available to someone who invoked it when it was already guaranteed by the Freedom
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution.+
40. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Revolutionary Governments; I cannot believe and so hold that the Filipinos during
the one month from February 25 to March 24, 1986 were stripped naked of all their rights, including their natural rights as human beingswith
the extraordinary circumstances before, during and after the EDSA Revolution, the Filipinos simply found themselves without a constitution, but
certainly not without fundamental rights.+
41. Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Revolutionary Governments; The 1986 EDSA Revolution was extraordinary, one that
borders the miraculousit was the first revolution of its kind in Philippine history, and perhaps even in the history of this planetand fittingly,
this separate opinion is the first of its kind in this Court, where history and philosophy are invoked not as aids in the interpretation of a positive
law, but to recognize a right not written in a papyrus but inheres in man as man.+
42. Political Law: Revolutionary Governments; Words and Phrases; A revolution results in a complete overthrow of established government
and of the existing legal order; A rebellion or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and the political institution, but not the social
structure and prevailing values; A coup detat in itself changes leadership and perhaps policies but not necessarily more extensive and intensive
than that; A war of independence is a struggle of one community against the rule by an alien community and does not have to involve changes in
the social structure of either community.+
43. Political Law: Revolutionary Governments; Words and Phrases; Proclamation No. 3 is an acknowledgment by the Aquino government of
the continued existence, subject to its exclusions, of the 1973 Charter.+
44. Political Law: Revolutionary Governments; Public International Law; It is no longer correct to state that the State could only be the
medium between international law and its own nationals, for the law has often fractured this link as and when it fails in its purpose; At bottom,
the Bill of Rights (under the 1973 Constitution), during the interregnum from 26 February to 24 March 1986 remained in force and effect not
only because it was so recognized by the 1986 People Power but also because the new government was bound by international law to respect the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.+
45. Political Law; Revolutionary Governments; The Freedom Constitution made the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution operable from the
incipiency of the Aquino government.+
46. Political Law; Revolutionary Governments; It was unmistakable thrust of the Freedom Constitution to bestow uninterrupted operability to
the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution.+
47. Political Law; Revolutionary Governments; Even if it is supposed that the Freedom Constitution had no retroactive effect or it did not extend
the effectivity of the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution, still there would be no void in the municipal or domestic law at the time as far as the
observance of the fundamental right is concernedthe Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution would still be in force, independently of the
Freedom Constitution, or at least the pro-visions thereof proscribing unreasonable search and seizure and excluding evidence in violation of the
proscription.+
Division: EN BANC
Counsel: The Solicitor General, Luisito Baluyut, Armando S. Banaag
Ponente: CARPIO
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25
March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may
warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
De Leon vs. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 , August 31, 1987

Case Title : ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA
and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners, vs. HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal,
HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M.
TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents. Case
Nature : ORIGINAL ACTION for prohibition to review the order of the OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal.
Syllabi Class : Action|Prohibition|Local Government
Syllabi:
1. Action; Prohibition; Local Government; Security of tenure of barangay officials. It is a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the
autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a
policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities."
Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, and
limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local governments.
2. Action; Prohibition; Local Government; Term of office of local elective officials. Sec. 8 Art. X of 1987 Constitution provides that the term of
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials which shall be determined by law, shall be three years.Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
3. Action; Prohibition; Local Government; There is no inconsistency between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the
1987 Constitution.Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987
Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Division: EN BANC
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA
WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain
and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ
of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this
Petition. Without costs.
Lambino vs. Commission on Elections, 505 SCRA 160 , October 25, 2006
Case Title : RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent., MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V.
SAGUISAG, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T.
FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents. Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution|Peoples Initiative|Logrolling|Statutory
Construction|Certiorari|Commission on Elections|Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735)|Pleadings and Practice|Parties|Judgments|Stare
Decisis|Words and Phrases|Amendment and Revision| Distinguished|Supreme Court|Republicanism|One-Subject One-Title Rule|Judicial
Review|Separation of Powers|Res Judicata|Delegation of Power|Political Questions|Constituent Powers|Statutes|One-Subject|One-Title Rule
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; Peoples Initiative; The essence of amendments directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people+
2. Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the sovereign
peoples political rights, courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring the peoples right to exercise their sovereign
power.+
3. Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion+
4. VELASCO, JR., J., Separate Opinion:; In Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), the Court focused on what DRA 6735
was not, and lost sight of what RA 6735 was.+
5. Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient
or inadequate actually gave rise to more questions rather than answers, due to the fact that there has never been a judicial precedent wherein the
Court invalidated a law for insufficiency or inadequacy.+
6. Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; After a careful reading of Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), I
believe in earnest that the permanent injunction actually issued by this Court against the COMELEC pertains only to the petition for initiative
filed by Jesus S. Delfin, and not to all subsequent petitions for initiative to amend the Constitution.+
7. Same; Same; Same; The right of the sovereign people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative is more superior
than the power they delegated to Congress or to a constitutional convention to amend or revise the Constitution.+
8. CHICO-NAZARIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:; While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the Philippine Constitution of
1987 for being the supreme law of the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that there is an ultimate authority to which the Constitution is
also subordinate+
9. Same; Same; Same; The initiative process should be acknowledged as the purest implement of democratic rule under law.+
10. Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; The biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of the Constitution and the elements of
democracy on which our rule of law is founded+
11. Same; Same; Same; The initiative process involves participatory democracy at its most elemental+
12. Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The proper interpretation of a constitution depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than the framers understanding thereof+
13. Same; Same; Same; If the absence of a record of deliberations stands as so serious a flaw as to invalidate or constrict processes which
change a constitution or its provisions, then the entire initiative process authorized by the Constitution should be scarlet-marked as well.+
14. Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress may not restrict the right to initiative on grounds that are not provided for in the Constitution.+
15. Same; Same; Same; Statutes; One-Subject, One-Title Rule; For as long as it can be established that an initiative petition embraces a single
general subject, the petition may be allowed no matter the number of constitutional provisions proposed for amendment if the amendments are
germane to the subject of the petition.+
16. Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Commission on Elections; By any measure, the COMELECs failure to perform its executive and
administrative functions under Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion.+
17. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The ruling in Santiago is erroneous, illogical, and should not be perpetuated.+
18. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The curious twist to Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), and PIRMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
129754, 23 September 1997, is that for all the denigration heaped upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in those cases, the Court did not invalidate any
provision of the statute+
19. TINGA, J., Separate Opinion:; The Court has long been mindful of the rule that it necessitates a majority, and not merely a plurality, in
order that a decision can stand as precedent.+
20. Same; Same; Same; For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my view, separable in nature, a unicameral legislature is one,
and a parliamentary form of government is another+
21. Same; Same; Same; Article VIII on Judicial Department cannot stand as is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a system, the
Parliament is supreme, and thus the Courts power to declare its act a grave abuse of discretion and thus void would be an anomaly.+
22. Same; Same; Same; The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct proposals by the people through initiative is a practical one,
namely, there is no one to draft such extensive changes, since 6.3 million people cannot conceivably come up with a single extensive document
through a direct proposal from each of them.+
23. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; I concur in the view that Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), should be reexamined and, after doing so, that the pronouncement therein regarding the insufficiency or inadequacy of the measure to sustain a peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution should be reconsidered in favor of allowing the exercise of this sovereign right.+
24. Same; Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the peoples right directly to propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of Congress
pursuant thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes of a constituent act; The provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the
procedure for proposing amendments to the Constitution, can and should be upheld, despite shortcomings perhaps in legislative headings and
standards.+
25. AZCUNA, J., Separate Opinion:; When Congress acts under Article XVII, which is the Constitution of Sovereignty, it acts not as a
legislature exercising legislative powers but as a constituent body exercising constituent powers.+
26. Same; Same; Same; It is for the protection of minorities that constitutions are framed+
27. Same; Same; Same; Same; I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity, can disregard the Constitution
altogether.+
28. Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of purportedly
more than six million registered voters who have signified their assent to the proposal to amend the Constitution, the same still constitutes a
justiciable controversy, hence, a non-political question.+
29. Same; Same; Same; Same; The remand of the case to the COMELEC for reception of evidence of the parties on the contentious factual
issues is, in effect, an amendment of the abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not empowered to do.+
30. Same; Same; Same; Same; There is nothing in RA 6735, as well as in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement
the former statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing, whether full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or
administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.+
31. Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Delegation of Power; The law mandates upon the election registrar to
personally verify the signatures, a solemn and important duty imposed on the election registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person,
even to barangay officials.+
32. Same; Same; Same; Amendment and Revision, Distinguished; Words and Phrases; Considering the encompassing scope and depth of
the changes that would be effected, not to mention that the Constitutions basic plan and substance of a tripartite system of government and the
principle of separation of powers underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that the
proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment.+
33. Same; Same; Same; The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people, and in expressing that will, the Filipino people
have incorporated therein the method and manner by which the same can be amended and revised, and when the electorate have incorporated
into the fundamental law the particular manner in which the same may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards that express will
is a direct violation of the fundamental law.+
34. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties should not be encouraged to seek re-examination of determined principles and speculate
on fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of it.+
35. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Stare Decisis; Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening
event, i.e., passage of a law to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that would warrant the reexamination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply to the present case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare decisis.+
36. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the decision in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), the pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned constitutes a definitive ruling on the
matter.+
37. Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be
resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety+
38. CALLEJO, SR., J., Separate Concurring Opinion:; It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course
to the petition for initiative as capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.+
39. Same; Same; Same; Republicanism; If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which are mere representative bodies, can propose
changes to the Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic itself+
40. Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the peoples right to directly propose changes to the
Constitution by declaring a law inadequate simply for lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant omissions.+
41. CORONA, J., Dissenting Opinion:; There is no identity of parties in Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997) and the
instant case.+
42. Same; Same; Same; Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 (1973). The
Court then ruled that This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect, although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the people in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution.+
43. Same; Same; Same; Considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view that the so-called peoples initiative to amend our
Constitution from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of our
politicians.+
44. Same; Same; Same; The phrase directly proposed by the people excludes any person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the
total number of registered voters; The plea that the Court should hear and heed the peoples voice is baseless and misleading+
45. Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); R.A. No. 6735 is not the enabling law contemplated by the
Constitution.+
46. Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution
that any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.+
47. Same; Same; Same; Same; Although, at first glance, petitioners proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific provisions only,
however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed changes will alter the very structure of our government and create
multifarious ramifications+
48. Same; Same; Same; Amendment and Revision, Distinguished; Words and Phrases; Both revision and amendment connote
change+
49. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or
more than nine (9) years ago, and during that span of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law practitioners, law professors, law students,
the entire judiciary and litigants have recognized this Courts Decision as a precedent.+
50. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed
even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices, and this policy is based on the assumption that
certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system, i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their
conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.+
51. Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; Stare Decisis; There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis
is a good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and
also by notions of justice and fairness.+
52. Same; Same; Same; Judicial Review; The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for initiative on the basis
of a case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as capricious or whimsical, patent and gross, or arbitrary
and despotic.+
53. Same; Same; Same; Same; History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God; After a thorough
consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of
God.+
54. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:; Caution should be exercised in choosing ones battlecry, lest it does more harm than
good to ones cause.+
55. Same; Same; Same; Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of direct democracy, we should not forget that, first and foremost, we are a
constitutional democracy.+
56. Same; Same; Same; While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered as a provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and
revision to Congress, Section 2, in contrast, is a self-limitation on that sovereign power; In choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no
absence or lack of even a fraction of the sovereign power of the people since self-limitation itself is an expression of that sovereign power.+
57. Same; Same; Same; The voice and will of our people cannot be any clearer when they limited peoples initiative to mere amendments of
the fundamental law and excluded revisions in its scope; Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a constitution of sovereignty
because it defines the constitutional meaning of sovereignty of the people+
58. Same; Same; Same; The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise shows the intention of the proponents to effect
even more farreaching changes in our fundamental law; The proposal to convene a constituent assembly, which by its terms is mandatory, will
practically jeopardize the future of the entire Constitution and place it on shaky grounds.+
59. Same; Same; Same; The shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government cannot be regarded as anything but a drastic change. It
will require a total overhaul of our governmental structure and involve a reorientation in the cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional
set-up.+
60. Same; Same; Same; The proposed changes will have serious qualitative consequences on the Constitution.+
61. Same; Same; Same; The distinction between the two terms+
62. Same; Same; Same; It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to relate only to a shift in the form of government, it
actually seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane to the constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought.+
63. Same; Same; Same; Logrolling; One-Subject One-Title Rule; The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution,
has the same object and purpose as the one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution; As applied to the
initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially designed to prevent surprise and fraud on the electorate.+
64. Same; Same; Same; The requirement of setting forth the complete text of the proposed changes in the petition for initiative is a safeguard
against fraud and deception.+
65. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Separate Opinion:; Evidently, for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution, they must, in the first
instance, know exactly what they are proposing+
66. Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Now that we have revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC, 336 Phil. 848
(1997), decision, there is only one clear task for COMELEC+
67. QUISUMBING, J., Separate Opinion:; Clearly, by the power of popular initiative, the people have the sovereign right to change the present
Constitution.+
68. Same; Same; Same; Same; Republicanism; Stripped of its abstractions, democracy is all about who has the sovereign right to make
decisions for the people and our Constitution clearly and categorically says it is no other than the people themselves from whom all government
authority emanates+
69. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prevailing doctrine is that, the affirmance by an equally divided court merely disposes
of the present controversy as between the parties and settles no issue of law+
70. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In the United States, an affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court upon equal division of opinion is
not an authority for the determination of other cases, either in that Court or in the inferior federal courts.+
71. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under any alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority
cannot write a rule with precedential value.+
72. Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; COMELECs reliance on Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 336 Phil. 848
(1997), constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction+
73. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy of the peoples will over the state
which they themselves have created.+
74. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The argument that the people through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change
the Constitution turns sovereignty on its head.+
75. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the
people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or
abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding,
and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed; A constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or
technical principles, but liberally and on broad general lines, to accomplish the object of its establishment and carry out the great principles of
government+
76. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used the word revision, they had in
mind the rewriting of the whole Constitution, or the total overhaul of the Constitution+
77. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; It is familiar learning, however, that opinions in a constitutional convention,
especially if inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the
people) since the constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not from the action of the convention but from the powers (of the people)
who have ratified and adopted it.+
78. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Our Constitutions carried the traditional distinction between amendment and revision, i.e.,
amendment means change, including complex changes while revision means complete change, including the adoption of an entirely new
covenant.+
79. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The proposed changes will not change the fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and
republican state.+
80. Same; Same; Same; Same; Amendment and Revision, Distinguished; Words and Phrases; The words simple and substantial are
not subject to any accurate quantitative or qualitative test; We stand on unsafe ground if we use simple arithmetic to determine whether the
proposed changes are simple or substantial.+
81. Same; Same; Same; Same; R.A. 6735 clearly expressed the legislative policy for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution by
direct action, and the fact that the legislature may have omitted certain details in implementing the peoples initiative in R.A. 6735, does not
justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is insufficient+
82. Same; Same; Same; Same; In enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that Congress intended the said law to implement the right of the
people, thru initiative, to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action.+
83. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are
agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings, viz., workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law
and changes in fact, aside from the fact that courts put in the balance the following determinants+
84. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reasons for Following and Refusing the Stare Decisis Rule.+
85. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis+
86. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars+
87. Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Judgments; Stare Decisis; Words and Phrases; The latin phrase
stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm; The doctrine of stare decisis started with the
English Courts and later migrated to the United States.+
88. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or officer may file a petition
for certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate court.+
89. PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:; There is no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate documents to authorize
petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.+
90. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Until and unless Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), is revisited and
changed by this Court or the legal moorings of the exercise of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in
accord with the Supreme Courts pronouncements.+
91. PANGANIBAN, C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion:; Even assuming arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and
unsettled question of law, the Supreme Court still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the poll body with respect to that action.+
92. Same; Same; Same; Incantations of peoples voice, peoples sovereign will, or let the people decide cannot override the specific
modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself.+
93. Same; Same; Same; A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in the country.+
94. Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Commission on Elections; For following the Courts ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the COMELEC.+
95. Same; Same; Same; Same; The Lambino Groups logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, No petition
embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x.+
96. Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the petition as signatories.+
97. Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Judicial Review; There is no need to revisit the Courts ruling in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), declaring R.A. No. 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution+
98. Same; Same; Same; A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several
provisions in many articles of the Constitution; Revision of the Constitution through a peoples initiative will only result in gross absurdities in
the Constitution.+
99. Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with
a prior law, the later law prevails.+
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 174153, G.R. No. 174299
Counsel: Demosthenes B. Donato, R.A.V. Saguisag, Alberto C. Agra, Arnel Z. Dolendo, Ocampo, Arciaga-Santos, Nuez, Lomangaya and
Ribao, Topacio Law Office, Seno, Mendoza & Associates Law Office, Neri Javier Colmenares, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Pete Quirino-Quadra,
Carlos P. Medina, Amparita S. Sta. Maria, Gilbert V. Sembrano, Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Giovanni F. Vallente, Ray Paulo J. Santiago, Ma. Ngina
Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga, Marlon J. Manuel, Ibarra M. Gutierrez III, Rosselynn Jaye G. De la Cruz, M.M. Lazaro & Associates, Ongkiko,
Kalaw, Manhit & Acorda Law Offices, Reynaldo Y. Maulit, Pablo P. Garcia, Rufus B. Rodriguez, Aquilino L. Pimentel III, Janijay B. Alonzo
Ponente: CARPIO
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
Occena vs. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1 , April 02, 1981

Case Title : SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE
NATIONAL TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents., RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA
MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T. DRILON, NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS, petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL
TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. Case Nature : PETITION for prohibition from the resolutions of
National Treasurer and Commission on Elections.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; The ruling in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary is authoritative as to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution whose
provisions have been applied already in several cases before the Supreme Court.It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive
Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to
four. It then concluded: This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect. Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It
made manifest that as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court
and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a
factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as
simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so
convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it
may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was
done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the
concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v.
Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.
2. Constitutional Law; The Interim Batasang Pambansa is authorized to meet as a constituent assembly and propose amendments to the
Constitution.The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call
by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body, it acted by
virtue of such competence. Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions
now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new.
3. Constitutional Law; Whether the Interim Batasang Pambansa proposals would amend or revised the Constitution becomes immaterial the
moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.And whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and
propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted
to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact
that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one * * * is no argument against the validity of the law because
amendment includes the revision or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part
or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people. There is here the adoption of the
principle so wellknown in American decisions as well as legal texts that a constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. We are
not disposed to deviate from such a principle not only sound in theory but also advantageous in practice.
4. Constitutional Law; Only a majority vote is required for the Interim Batasang Pambansa to be able to propose amendments to the
Constitution.The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It
would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has
been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is
concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose
amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three-fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It
is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country
to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to
the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity?
5. Constitutional Law; The Constitution clearly states when a proposed amendment to the Constitution should be submitted to the people for
ratification.As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision. The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang
Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for
April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. Thus any argument to the contrary is unavailing.
6. Constitutional Law; The Constitution has withheld from the President the power to propose constitutional amendments. Such power must
come from the Interim National Assembly.I had held in Sanidad that the transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution as well as to set up the
machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of the amendments proposals has been withheld by the Constitution from the President
(Prime Minister) as sole repository of executive power and that so long as the regular National Assembly provided for in Article VIII of the
Constitution had not come to existence and the proposals for constitutional amendments were now deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted
for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the amending process as provided in the Constitution must be
complied with. This means, under the prevailing doctrine of Tolentino vs. Comelec that the proposed amendments to be valid must come from the
constitutional agency vested with the constituent power to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Article XVII
which would then have to be convened and not from the executive power as vested in the President (Prime Minister) from whom such constituent
power has been withheld.
7. Constitutional Law; The period of 39 days for the people to deliberate on the proposed amendments is totally inadequate.The three resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of government were considered and
approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite for thirtynine days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the
people to sufficiently inform them of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their will in a
genuine manner.
8. Constitutional Law; Same.Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that x x x The great men who builded the structure of our state in this respect had
the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary
excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of
the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be
allowed efficacy. x x x Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign says. All great mutations shake and
disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse.
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: No. L-56350, No. L-56404
Ponente: FERNANDO
WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1 , March 05, 1947

Case Title : ALEJO MABANAG ET AL., petitioners, vs. JOSE LOPEZ VITO ET AL., respondents. Case Nature : ORIGINAL ACTION in the
Supreme Court. Prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Syllabi Class : COURTS|CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW|EVIDENCE|JURISDICTION|JUDICIARY
Syllabi:
1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; CONCLUSIVENESS OF ENACTMENT OR RESOLUTION DISTINGUISHED FROM.Jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, should not be confused with conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of
evidence and practice.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIARY; POLITICAL QUESTIONS NOT WITHIN PROVINCE OF.Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred
upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIARY; PROPOSAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT A POLITICAL
QUESTION.If ratification of a constitutional amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two
steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in
section. 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in
attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political
function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this
power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed
to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification.
4. EVIDENCE; DULY AUTHENTICATED BILL OR RESOLUTION, CONCLUSIVENESS OF.A duly authenticated bill or resolution importsabsolute verity and is binding on the courts. The rule conforms to the policy of the law making'
body as expressed in section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act; No. 2210.
Counsel: Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felix berto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio Barredo, Jose W. Diokno, Secretary
of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Taada, First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes
Ponente: TUASON
In view of the foregoing considerations, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators and representatives who were
ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members of Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution.The petition is dismissed without costs.Our vote is for the granting of the petition.
Santiago vs. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 , March 19, 1997
Case Title : MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents. Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Actions|Constitutional Law|Prohibition|Pleadings and Practice|Initiative|Statutes|R.A. No. 6735|Statutory Construction|Words and
Phrases|Delegation of Powers|Initiatives|Separation of Powers|Parties|The petition on its face states no cause of action against the
Pedrosas|Republicanism|Freedom of Speech
Syllabi:
1. Actions; Prohibition; Pleadings and Practice; A petition for prohibition may be filed with the Supreme Court where the COMELEC fails to
act on a motion to dismiss alleging that such body has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain a particular petition.+
2. Actions; Prohibition; Pleadings and Practice; A petition for prohibition may be treated also as a special civil action for certiorari where
there are claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a petition for initiative because said petition is not supported by the required
minimum number of signatures of registered voters, and that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss said petition.+
3. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; The right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation.+
4. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; The system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not
self-executory.+
5. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; Statutory Construction; Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not
accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution through the system of initiativethey
can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions.+
6. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; Statutory Construction; If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of
things, the primacy of inter-est, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.+
7. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; Na-tional Initiative and Local
Initiative, Explained; The Court cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle
on National Initiative and Referendum.+
8. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; R.A. No. 6735 delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.+
9. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; Delegation of Powers; What has been delegated cannot be delegated; Exceptions.+
10. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; Delegation of Powers; In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid; Tests of Valid Delegation.+
11. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; Delegation of Powers; R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy the requirements in
subordinate legislation insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned.+
12. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; Delegation of Powers; COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it prescribes
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.+
13. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Pleadings and Practice; A petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the
total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereinwithout the
required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.+
14. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Pleadings and Practice; The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its
filingthe petition is the initiatory pleadingand nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.+
15. Constitutional Law; Initiative; Pleadings and Practice; The COMELEC acts without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
dignifying a petition for initiative that does not comply with Constitutional and statutory requirements.+
16. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; Statutory Construction; R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the
people to initiate amendments to the Constitution thru initiative.+
17. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; The text of R.A. No. 6735 should be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to
implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.+
18. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; Laws are not always written in impeccable English but it has always been the
Courts good policy not to refuse to effectuate the intent of a law on the ground that it is badly written.+
19. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; The hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters
and sections of a statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are entitled to very little weight, and they can
never control the plain terms of the enacting clause.+
20. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; The delegation of power granted to the COMELEC by Section 20 of R.A. 6735
cannot be assailed as infirmed.+
21. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Statutes; Separation of Powers; A due regard and respect to the legislature, a co-equal and coordinate
branch of government, should counsel this Court to refrain from refusing to effectuate laws unless they are clearly unconstitutional.+
22. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Parties; The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas; It is not enough for the
majority to lift the temporary restraining order against the Pedrosasit should dismiss the petition and all motions for contempt against them
without equivocation.+
23. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Republicanism; The Pedrosas solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed in black and white by Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and springs from the principle proclaimed in Section 1, Article II that in a democratic and republican state
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.+
24. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Freedom of Speech; Undeniably, freedom of speech enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think
and let think, and it is for this reason that the Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the speechless.+
25. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Freedom of Speech; Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not by a monologue for in a democracy
nobody can claim any infallibility.+
26. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; Pending a petition for a peoples initiative that is sufficient in form and substance,
it behooves the Court to yet refrain from resolving the question of whether or not Republic Act No. 6735 has effectively and sufficiently
implemented the Constitutional provision on right of the people to directly propose constitutional amendments.+
27. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; I take exception to the conclusion reached in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an
inadequate legislation to cover a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.+
28. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Statutes; R.A. No. 6735; Taken together and interpreted properly, the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution 2300 are sufficient to implement constitutional initiatives.+
29. Constitutional Law; Initiatives; Freedom of Speech; The right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of
free speech and free assembly.+
Division: EN BANC
Counsel: Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, Roco, Bunag, Kapunan & Migallos, Rene V. Sarmiento and R.A.V. Saguisag, Pete
Quirino Quadra
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., PUNO
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby renderedThe Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elec-tions, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby
reserved.WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago, et al. and to DIRECT Respondent Commis- sion on Elections
to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the
temporary restraining order issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from
exercising their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 774 , November 09, 1967

Case Title : RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondents., PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent. Case Nature : ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional law|Power of reapportionment of congressional districts.|Sayne||De facto doctrine|Rep. Act 4913|Validity of Rep.
Act 1493|Constitutional amendments|Amendments
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional law; Power of judicial department to determine allocation of powers between several departments.The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
2. Constitutional law; Power to pass upon validity of constitutional amendmtnt.In Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1), the Court declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in
favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law, characterizing the issue
as a political one. The force of this precedent has been weakened by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino vs. Cuenco
(L2851, March 4 14, 1949), Taada vs. Cuenco (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957), and Macias vs. Commission on Elections (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961).
The Court rejected the theory advanced in these four cases that the issues therein raised were political questions, the determination of which is
beyond judicial review.
3. Constitutional law; Nature of power to amend the Constitution.The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It
(is a part of the inherent powers of the peopleas the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as oursto make, and hence, to
amend their own fundamental law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power.
Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
competent elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike
the people, when performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitutionthey are the very source of all
powers of government, including the Constitution itself.
4. Power of reapportionment of congressional districts.;+
5. Power of reapportionment of congressional districts.; Failure of Congress to make reapportionment did not make Congress illegal or
unconstitutional.The fact that Congress is under obligation to make apportionment, as required under the Constitution, does not justify the conclusion that such
failure rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto officers. The effect of this omission has been
envisioned in the Constitution which provides that until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the
same number of members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified elections from the present
Assembly districts. This provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make the apportionment, a Congress
which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with the
representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of said period.
6. Power of reapportionment of congressional districts.; No valid apportionment since adoption of Constitution in 1935.Since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not made a valid apportionment as required in the fundamental law.
7. Power of reapportionment of congressional districts.; Senate and House constituted on Dec. 30, 1961 were de jure bodies.The Senate and House of Representatives organized or constituted on December 30, 1961 were de jure bodies and the Members thereof were de
jure officers.
8. Power of reapportionment of congressional districts.; Effect of failure of Congress to discharge mandatory duty.+
9. Sayne; Provisions of Election Law relative to election of members of Congress in 1965 not repealed.+
10. Sayne; De facto doctrine; Reason therefor.The main reason for the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an
office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the publicas distinguished from the officer in questionis concerned.
Indeed, otherwise those dealing with officers and employees of the Government would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their
title to the positions they hold, before dealing with them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even if they should act
within the limits of the authority vested in their respective offices, position or employments. One can imagine the great inconvenience, hardships
and evils that would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine.
11. Sayne; De facto doctrine; Title of de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.+
12. Sayne; De facto doctrine; Validity of acts of de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would
be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as
the public is concerned.
13. Sayne; Construction of terms; Meaning of the term or.The term or has, oftentimes, been held to mean and or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.
14. Sayne; Power of Congress to approve resolutions amending the Constitution.There is nothing in the Constitution or in the history thereof that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the contested
resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in different sessions or different days of the same Congressional session. Neither has any
plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.
15. Sayne; Meaning of term election in Art. XI, Constitution,+
16. Sayne; Legislation cannot be nullified for failure of certain sectors to discuss it sufficiently.+
17. Sayne; Public knowledge of proposed amendments.+
18. Sayne; Judicial power to nullify executive or legislative acts, not violative of principle of separation of powers.+
19. Sayne; Determination of conditions for submission of amendments to people purely legislative.+
20. Constitutional law; Rep. Act 4913; Manner prescribed in law sufficient to have amendments submitted for ratification by people.+
21. Constitutional law; Defect is in implementation.+
22. Constitutional law; Requisite for declaring law unconstitutional.+
23. Constitutional law; Ratification of amendments need not be in special election or plebiscite.+
24. Constitutional law; Validity of Rep. Act 1493; Jurisdiction of the court.+
25. Constitutional law; Special election not required to ratify constitutional amendment.+
26. Constitutional law; Validity of Rep. Act 4913; 3/4 vote not required.+
27. Constitutional law; Law complies with substantive due process.+
28. Constitutional law; Effect of failure of Congress to pass valid redistricting law.+
29. Constitutional law; Constitutional amendments; Certain aspects of amending process deemed political.Certain aspects of the amending process may be considered political. The process itself is political in its entirety, from submission until an
amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.
30. Constitutional law; Amendments; Meaning of phrase submitted to the people for their ratification.The words submitted to the people for their ratification, if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitutiona fundamental charter that
is legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign willis that it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves
according to the procedures ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or
spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the
original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free
from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. The word submitted can only mean that the government, within its maximum
capabilities, should strain every effort to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning,
nature and effects thereof. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put
every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or
rejection. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendment no
matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people decree their own fate.
31. Constitutional law; Procedure for dissemination of information on amendments defective.The procedure does not effectively bring the matter to the people. First, the Official Gazette is not widely read. It does not reach the barrios. And
even if it reached the barrios, it is not available to all. Secondly, many citizens, especially those in the outlying barrios do not go to municipal,
city and or provincial office buildings, except on special occasions like paying taxes or responding to court summonses. Thirdly, it would not help
any if at least five copies are kept in the polling place for examination by qualified electors on election day. Fourthly, copies in the principal
native language shall be kept in each polling place; but this is not in the nature of a command because such copies shall be kept therein only
when practicable and as may be determined by the Commission on Elections. Fifthly, it is true that the Comelec is directed to make
available copies of such amendments in English, Spanish or whenever practicable in the principal native languages, for free distribution.
However, Comelec is not required to actively distribute them to the people. Finally, it is of common knowledge that Comelec has more than its
hands full in these preelection days. They cannot possibly make extensive distribution. Surely enough, the voters do not have the benefit of proper
notice of the proposed amendments through dissemination by publication in extenso. People do not have at hand the necessary data on which to
base their stand on the merits and demerits of said amendments. There is, therefore, no proper submission of the proposed constitutional
amendment of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution.
32. Constitutional law; Proper submission of amendments to the people required.That proper submission of amendments to the people to enable them to equally ratify them properly is the meat of the constitutional requirement,
is reflected in the sequence of uniform past practices. The Constitution has been amended thricein 1939, 1940 and 1947. In each case the
amendments were embodied in resolutions adopted by the Legislature, which thereafter fixed the dates at which the proposed amendments were
to be ratified or rejected. These plebiscites have been referred to either as an election or general election. At no time, however, was the vote
for amendments of the Constitution held simultaneously with the election of officials, national or local.
33. Constitutional law; Constitutional amendment; Majority votes cast at election, insufficient to ratify proposed amendments in Rep. Act 4913.It is impossible to believe that it was ever intended by the framers of the Constitution that an amendment should be submitted and ratified by just
a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification, if the concentration of the
people's attention thereon is to be diverted by other extraneous issues such as the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the
Constitution, aware of the fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable, could have only meant
that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted at an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the
subject. That this was the intention and spirit of the provision is corroborated in the case of all other constitutional amendments in the past, that
were submitted to and approved in special elections exclusively devoted to the issue whether the legislature's amendatory proposals should be
ratified or not.
Docket Number: No. L-28196, November 9, 1967, No. L-28224
Counsel: Ramon A. Gonzales, Juan T. David, Solicitor General, Salvador Araneta
Almario vs. Alba, 127 SCRA 69 , January 25, 1984

Case Title : ALEX G. ALMARIO, ISAGANI M. JUNGCO, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., DORINTINO FLORESTA, FIDELA Y. VARGAS,
ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL ALBA and THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. Case Nature : PETITION to review
the decision of the Commission on Elections.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Statutes|Jurisdiction
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Section 2, Article XVI of the Constitution allows a period of not more than three months for the conduct of information
campaigns before the holding of a plebiscite to amend the Constitution.+
2. Constitutional Law; The petitioners failed to show sufficient cause for post-ponement of the plebiscite for amending the Constitution.+
3. Constitutional Law; The present Constitution is adequate to support government grants of public lands to deserving citizens.+
4. Constitutional Law; Legislations on urban land reform still have to pass the usual constitutional tests.+
5. Constitutional Law; Petitioners failed to explain why despite public discussions on the proposed amendments in the media there was still no
fair and proper submission thereof to the people.+
6. Constitutional Law; No question need arise under the standard of proper submission on the precept of social justice has been long understood
in this country.+
7. Constitutional Law; The time between the approval of the Resolutions in question and their submission to the electorate is sufficiently within
constitutional bounds.+
8. Constitutional Law; There is no need to hold two separate plebiscites.+
9. Constitutional Law; Questions Nos. 3 and 4 appear simple, but in reality they are complicated.+
10. Constitutional Law; There has not been ample time for the dissemination of information on the significance and implications of Questions
Nos. 3 and 4.+
11. Constitutional Law; The citizenry has not been adequately educated on the proposed amendments in question.+
12. Constitutional Law; Same.+
13. Constitutional Law; Statutes; A statute cannot become effective until it has been published in the Official Gazette even if it provides for a
specific date of its effectivity.+
14. Constitutional Law; Statutes; In a plebiscite for constitutional revision it is not enough that the ballots or the law mention the amendments in
substance. The exact amendments must be made known to the citizenry.+
15. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Jurisdiction; The number of days when a proposed Constitutional amendment is to be submitted in a plebiscite
is within the exclusive power of the Batasan to determine.+
16. Constitutional Law; The people in the provinces have not yet been sufficiently informed of the implications and meaning of the proposed
amendments Nos. 3 and 4.+
Division: EN BANC
Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA 702 , October 16, 1971
Case Title : ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT,THE AUDITOR,
and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RESPONDENTS,RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS
G. BARRERA,PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA,MARCELO B. FERNAN,JOSE Y. FERIA,LEONARDO SIGUION
REYNA,VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors. Case Nature : ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Political law|
Syllabi:
1. Political law; Power of judicial review.The courts may review the validity of an act of the constitutional convention proposing a particular amendment to the Constitution. There should
be no more doubt regarding the jurisdiction of the Su- preme Court vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which
concededly is at par with the former. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congressacting as a constituent
assemblyviolates the Constitution of essentially a justiciable one, not political, and hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this
view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed modified.
2. Political law; Power to review acts of the constitutional convention.A constitutional convention is supreme within the domain of its legitimate authority. A revolutionary convention which drafts the first
Constitution of an entirely new government born either of war or liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing
government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d etat is completely without restraint and omnipotent. The current constitutional
convention, however, came into being only by virtue of the provisions of the present Constitution.
3. Same; Same; Same; Rationale.+
4. Same; Limits to the power of a constitutional convention.As to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the
Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now we hold that even as to its latter
task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to
Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same case and facility
in changing an ordinary legislation.
5. Same; Same.+
6. Same; Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution contemplates a single election.In the case at bar, the ultimate question is this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated
by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there
is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a
single election or plebiscite.
7. Same; When calling of a plebiscite valid.In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution
with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering
the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of
them cannot comply with this requirement. Under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, a proposal to amendment the Constitution should be
submitted to the people not separately from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
8. Political law; The people must have ample time to reflect proposed Constitutional amendment.Based on the minimum requirements expounded in Gonzales vs. COMELEC which must be met in order that there can be a proper submission to
the people of a proposed amendment to the Constitution, the people, in the case at bar, are not, and by election time, will not be, sufficiently
informed of the meaning, nature and effects of the constitutional amendment being proposed in Resolution No. 1 of the Convention. They have not
been afforded ample time to deliberate thereon conscientiously. They have been and are effectively distracted from a full and dispassionate
consideration of the merits and demerits of the proposed amendment by their traditional pervasive involvement in local elections and politics.
They cannot thus weigh in tranquility the need for and the wisdom of the proposed amendment.
9. Political law; Powers of the constitutional convention not absolute.It does not follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional convention may lay claim to an attribute sovereign in character.
Section 1 of Article II of the Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom sovereignty resides.
10. Political law; Same.The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional convention, alike recognized by the Constitution, are
coordinate, there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of proposing amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the Constitution which can be the only source of valid
restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body that the call to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any
wise be interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate and paramount task
assigned to it.
11. Political law; Resolution No. 1 of the Convention valid.Considering that a constitutional convention is not precluded from imposing additional restrictions on the powers of either the executive or
legislative branches, or, for that matter, the judiciary, it would appear to be the better policy to interpret Article XV in such a way that would not
sanction such restraint on the authority that must be recognized as vested in a constitutional convention. From such an approach, I am
irresistibly led to the conclusion that the challenged resolution was well within the power of the convention.
12. Political law; Constitutional amendments need not be introduced in only one election.The conclusion arrived at by the majority is not the appropriate interpretation of the last sentence of Article XV of the present Constitution. It is
true that the Constitution uses the word election in the singular, but that is not decisive. No undue reliance should be accorded rules of
grammar; they do not exert a compelling force in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be sought not from specific language in the singular
but from the mosaic of significance derived from the total context. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the
obvious purposes at which they are aimed.
13. Political law; Provisional nature of proposed amendment not controlling.There is plausibility in the view that until impressed with finality, an amendment is not to be passed upon by the electorate. A literal reading of
the Constitution would support it. The spirit that informs it though would not, for me, be satisfied. From its silence I deduce the inference that
there is no repugnancy to the fundamental law when the Constitutional Convention ascertains the popular will.
Counsel: Arturo M. Tolentino, Ramon A. Gonzales, Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco, Tomas L. Echivarre, Intervenors
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the
implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the
resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are; hereby declared null and void. The respondents
Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in
compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately
executory. No costs.
1. Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,
were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas;
2. Angara was proclaimed and took his oath of office, took part in passage of measures
3. Ynsua filed with Electoral Commission Motion of Protest, praying he be declared
winner and the past election be nullified.
4. The assembly set rules that no protest shall be taken after that day
5.
Case Title : IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR.,
FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, petitioners, vs. HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents., IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES,
TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALIND GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO
CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, et al., respondents., IN THE MATTER OF THE
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, petitioner, vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents., MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents., ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondents., CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN
HIAN, petitioners, vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondents., IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA, JUAN L.
MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG,
ROBERTO ORDONEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents., IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, petitioner, vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT.
GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents., ERNESTO RONDON, petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO
MIANA, respondents. Case Nature : ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Habeas Corpus.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional law|Civil procedure|Courts|Action|; Judicial Review||Special proceedings|Constitutional law|Martial law|Military
law|Judicial review|Habeas corpus|Martial Jaw|Habeas Corpus|Dismissal of
actions|Courts|Judges|President|Jurisdiction|Rebellion|Judgments|Civil procedure|Motion to withdraw|Sovereignty|Statutory
construction|Separation of powers
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional law; Factual bases for the proclamation of martial law a matter of contemporary history within the cognizance of the courts;
No necessity to receive evidence showing that a state of rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation No. 1081 was issued.+
2. Constitutional law; State of rebellion continues up to the present.+
3. Constitutional law; Question us to whether or not the Court can inquire into the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become
moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973.+
4. Constitutional law; Question as to the validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973
Constitution.+
5. Constitutional law; Proclamation of martial lair automatically suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.+
6. Constitutional law; Withdrawal of petition for habeas corpus; Grounds for allowance; Case at bar.+
7. Civil procedure; Special proceedings; Habeas corpus; A case may not be unilaterally withdrawn when the public interest or questions of
public importance are involved.+
8. Courts; Resolution of a case may take some time when issues raised are of utmost gravity and delicateness.+
9. Courts; Constitutional law; It did not offend against principle or ethics for members of the Supreme Court to take an oath to support
Constitution after it had been decided that the new Constitution is in force and effect.+
10. Constitutional law; Martial law; Doctrinal development of martial law has relied mainly on case-law.+
11. Constitutional law; Martial law; The genesis of martial law.+
12. Constitutional law; Martial law; Confusion in earhj definition of martial law.+
13. Constitutional law; Martial law; Military law; Military jurisdiction distinguished from military law, martial law and military
government.+
14. Constitutional law; Martial law; Fundamental justification of martial few.+
15. Constitutional law; Martial law; A continuing state of Communist rebellion exists in the Philippines.+
16. Constitutional law; Martial law; Central matter involved in the cases at bar is not merely liberty of isolated individuals, but collective peace
and security of whole nation.+
17. Constitutional law; Martial law; President determines public exigency requiring martial law.+
18. Constitutional law; Martial law; Courts are not bound by the recitals in the proclamation of martial law.+
19. Constitutional law; Martial law; Presidents finding as to necessity is persuasive upon the courts.+
20. Constitutional law; Martial law; Open-court theory of doubtful applicability iv context of present-day subversion as well as particular
provision of 1935 Constitution.+
21. Constitutional law; Martial law; U.S. Federal Constitution does not explicitly authorize U.S. President to proclaim martial law unlike our
Constitution.+
22. Constitutional law; Martial law; Open court theory does not apply to the Philippine situation.+
23. Constitutional law; Martial law; Martial Jaw implies the power to make arrests and detention.+
24. Constitutional law; Martial law; Judicial review; Definition of respective powers of courts and the President in matters involving
declaration of martial law.+
25. Constitutional law; 1973 Constitution is now effective.+
26. Constitutional law; Martial law; Habeas corpus; Suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus subsumed in declaration of martial law.+
27. Constitutional law; Martial law; Habeas corpus; General Orders Nos. 3 and 3-A deemed partially revoked.+
28. Constitutional law; Martial law; Castro, J., sums up his views.+
29. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Forcefulness of the remedy of petition for the writ of habeas corpus explained.+
30. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Martial Jaw; The declaration of martial law does not affect the scope of the writ of habeas corpus.+
31. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; The Court has the duty to entertain petitions for habeas corpus even under martial law.+
32. Constitutional law; Martial law; The violation of human liberty is justified only if it is necessary to the defense of the state.+
33. Constitutional law; Martial law; Habeas Corpus; Declaration of martial Jaw does not imply the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.+
34. Constitutional law; Political question doctrine explained.+
35. Constitutional law; Martial law; The decision in Lansang vs. Garcia applies to the declaration of martial law in that the latter act is subject
to judicial review.+
36. Constitutional law; Martial law; Question of validity of declaration of martial law is precluded by transitory provision.+
37. Constitutional law; Martial law; Independent of the transitory provisions, the declaration of martial law is not arbitrary.+
38. Constitutional law; Martial law; There is not enough evidence to warrant discontinuance of martial law.+
39. Constitutional law; Martial law; Habeas corpus; Detention if continued for unreasonable length of time may be questioned in a habeas
corpus proceeding.+
40. Action; Habeas corpus; Dismissal of actions; Person subject to restraint should be free to withdraw his action for the writ of habeas
corpus.+
41. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Release of detainee subject to restraints on his freedom of movement may be the abject of habeas corpus
proceedings.+
42. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Habeas corpus proceeding is yiot the proper vehicle for rendering restraints on freedom of speech, press
and assembly.+
43. Constitutional law; Martial Jaw; American constitutional nrfings have substantial relevance to the Philippine case.+
44. Constitutional law; Martial Jaw; The supremacy of the Constitution is not diminished by the advent of national emergencies.+
45. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Motion to withdraw petition for habeas corpus should be granted where there are other similar cases
not withdrawn where Court can rule on identical issues raised.+
46. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Judgmental Simple majority of 7 sufficient to grant withdrawal of a petition.+
47. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Courts; Exercise of judicial power should be confined to lis mota presented and may be justified only by
necessity.+
48. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Courts; When constitutional issues to be passed upon.+
49. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; There is no point in denying withdrawal of petition for habeas corpus and then dismissing same as
raising a political question.+
50. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Withdrawal of petition for habeas corpus may be granted even if it raises issues of public interest.+
51. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Where petitioner had nothing to do with alleged propaganda against the Government.+
52. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Courts; Judgments; Subjective evaluation of Courts judgment is of no moment, its authority rests on
sustained public confidence.+
53. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Supreme Court not a new court, but one operating wider a new Constitution.+
54. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Justices who dissented in the Ratification Cases had to abide by the Rule of Law.+
55. Constitutional law; Courts; New oath taken by Supreme Court Justices on October 29, 1973 meant to assure their continuity of tenure.+
56. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Realization of prospects of normalcy as pledged by President added reason for granting withdrawal
motion of Diokno.+
57. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Petition for habeas corpus of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. should be dismissed because superseded by
prohibition case where he questions the filing of charges against him before a military commission.+
58. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Conditional release of persons under detention ground for dismissal of their petition for habeas corpus
as they are no longer deprived of physical liberty.+
59. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Individual freedom may not be restricted without due process of law+
60. Constitutional law; Basic precepts underlying old and new Constitutions not disparate.+
61. Constitutional law; Judges; Oath taken by Justices a continuing guarantee of their unswerving fealty to democracy and liberty.+
62. Constitutional law; Judges; Justices of the Court took new oath to regain their independence from the Executive.+
63. Constitutional law; Judges; Tenure of Supreme Court Justices now permanent.+
64. Constitutional law; President; Jurisdiction; General Orders Nos. 3 and 3-A may be considered partially repealed.+
65. Constitutional law; President; Revocatory acts of President need not be as explicit as in the case of National Assembly.+
66. Constitutional law; President; Due Process; Martial Law; Judicial Review; Habeas Corpus; Fundamental verities of our system of
Government+
67. Constitutional law; Judicial review; Court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of the instant petitions for habeas corpus.+
68. Constitutional law; Judicial review; Courts authority to decide does not impose upon it the duty to interpose its fiat as only mean., of
settling a conflict.+
69. Constitutional law; Judicial review; Court has authority whether to decide or decline to decide a conflict.+
70. Constitutional law; Judicial review; Court should abstain from inquiring into the constitutional sufficiency of Proclamation 1081.+
71. Constitutional law; Martial law; Martial law involves totality of government authority.+
72. Constitutional law; Martial law; In a martial law condition, it is what is done by administrator thereof on individual rights and liberties that
must pass constitutional standards.+
73. Constitutional law; Martial law; Legality of Executive power to declare martial la iv not yet panned upon by any court in a categorical
manner.+
74. Constitutional law; Martial law; Court believes it should not interfere with determination of truth of factual premises that led to declaration
of martial law.+
75. Constitutional law; Martial law; Rebellion; Rebellion being capable of judicial notice no inquiry is needed to determine propriety of
Executive action.+
76. Constitutional law; Martial law; Rebellion; Executive has power to determine factual bases of rebellion.+
77. Constitutional law; President; Martial law; Emergency powers; Presidents power to declare martial law independent of legislative grant of
emergency powers.+
78. Constitutional law; President; Martial law; President may declare martial law where Congress is not sufficiently alarmed, indifferent or
does not know what to do with easily verifiable reports of open rebellious activities in different parts of the country.+
79. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Judicial Review; Doctrine in Lansang vs. Javellana (42 SCRA 466) not applicable to martial law.+
80. Constitutional law; Bill of Rights; Unlike privilege of habeas corpus, declaration of martial law not countered by Bill of Rights.+
81. Same; Judicial Review; Martial law; There are insurmountable pragmatic obstacles to the theory of justiciability invoked by petitioners
relative to martial law.+
82. Same; Judicial Review; Martial law; Supreme Court abstains from reviewing Proclamation 1081 but is not powerless to support and
defend the Constitution in cane of open defiance of Constitution.+
83. Same; Judicial Review; Martial law; The Constitution expects the Court to defer to Executives decision in imposing martial law for public
safety.+
84. Same; Judicial Review; Martial law; Constitution merely in a state of anaesthesia since a major surgery is needed to save the nations life.+
85. Same; Judicial Review; Martial law; Legislature; Fact that Congress in session not argument against declaration of martial law.+
86. Same; Judicial Review; Martial law; Habeas corpus; When martial law is declared, habeas corpus privilege automatically suspended.+
87. Same; Judicial Review; Martial law; Framers of new Constitution did not see anything constitutionally repugnant with what the President
has done in declaring and implementing martial law.+
88. Same; Judicial Review; Martial law; Constitutional convention; Freedom of convention to act suffered no diminution as a result of martial
law.+
89. Same; Judicial Review; Scope of Section 3(2) Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) of the new Constitution.+
90. Same; Judicial Review; Proclamation 1081 valid and binding on account of Section 8(2), Article XVII of new Constitution.+
91. Same; Judicial Review; New Constitution now in force and effect.+
92. Same; Judicial Review; Political question; Doctrine of political question a part of the rule of law.+
93. Same; Judicial Review; Courts; Judgments; Honest mistake of a judge is law.+
94. Same; Judicial Review; 1973 Constitution is an entirely new Charter, not a mere amendment of the 1935 Constitution.+
95. Same; Judicial Review; Civil procedure; Dioknos motion to withdraw detracts from Presidential declaration that new Constitution has been
approved by the people and the fact that the government has been operating without any visible resistance on the part of any significant sectorof
the populace.+
96. Same; Judicial Review; Judgments; Decision in case at bar does not govern claims of authority related to lower levels of hierarchy.+
97. Same; Judicial Review; Habeas corpus; Motion to withdraw; Habeas corpus exists only against involuntary confinement so that where the
person detained withdraws his petition his detention becomes in law automatically voluntary and with his express consent+
98. Constitutional law; Sovereignty; The State has inherent and implied powers to defend its existence.+
99. Constitutional law; Sovereignty; The powers relating to the security of the State is lodged exclusively in the President.+
100. Constitutional law; Sovereignty; Martial law; The Constitution intended a strong executive to preserve the nation.+
101. Constitutional law; Sovereignty; Martial law; The powers of the President to preserve the nation is sufficiently broad to cope with any
emergency.+
102. Constitutional law; Sovereignty; Martial law; The President has broad authority and discretion to meet any national emergency.+
103. Constitutional law; Sovereignty; Martial law; Jurisdiction; The court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the President as to the
manner of meeting a national emergency.+
104. Constitutional law; Sovereignty; Martial law; Jurisdiction; Necessity for declaring martial law is to be determined exclusively by the
President.+
105. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; The Constitutional Convention of 1935 intended to give the President exclusive authority to determine
what occasion necessitates the suspension of the privilege of the writ.+
106. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Jurisdiction; Scope of the power of the Supreme Court to review the Presidents decision to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.+
107. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Court must rely on findings of chief executive as to existence of an emergency.+
108. Constitutional law; Martial law; Fact that courts are open does not preclude the declaration of martial law.+
109. Constitutional law; Martial law; Open Court theory does not apply to the Philippines.+
110. Constitutional law; Martial law; Reforms in the society are not inconsistent with the effort to stamp out rebellion.+
111. Constitutional law; Statutory construction; Debates in the Constitutional Convention to be considered in the construction of ambiguous
provisions.+
112. Constitutional law; Martial law; Jurisdiction; The determination of the necessity for the declaration of martial law is political and lies
exclusively with the President+
113. Constitutional law; Martial law; Jurisdiction; The court is not empowered to deal with the problems of rebellion or subversion.+
114. Constitutional law; Martial law; Jurisdiction; The result of the referendum authorizing the President to continue with his reforms takes the
question of the legality of martial rule out of the hands of the court.+
115. Constitutional law; Martial law; Habeas corpus; The declaration of martial law impliedly includes the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.+
116. Constitutional law; Martial law; Habeas corpus; During martial law, the chief executive has the power to detain individuals suspected of
having to do with the insurrection.+
117. Constitutional law; Martial law; Restriction on freedom of movement of certain persons is an essential aspect of martial law.+
118. Constitutional law; Martial law; The Constitution of 1935 grants the President exclusive power to declare martial law.+
119. Constitutional law; Martial law; The constitutional convention of 1934-35 intended a strong executive to govern the nation.+
120. Constitutional law; Martial law; Habeas corpus; The declaration of martial law includes the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.+
121. Constitutional law; Martial law; Jurisdiction; Doctrine of judicial review of the exercise by the President of his martial law powers should
be overturned.+
122. Constitutional law; Martial law; Jurisdiction; There is greater justification in relying upon the judgment of the President in the matter of
the determination of a national emergency.+
123. Constitutional law; Martial law; Jurisdiction; Judicial review of the exercise by the President of his martial la iv powers could lead to
serious confrontation.+
124. Constitutional law; Martial law; Jurisdiction; Application of the test of reasonableness in the exercise of the martial law powers of the
President reveals the limits of judicial competence.+
125. Constitutional law; Martial law; Jurisdiction; Separation of powers; The Court should refrain from determining political questions.+
126. Constitutional law; Martial law; Jurisdiction; Whether the grounds for the declaration of martial law are sufficient is a political question
that the Court cannot decide.+
127. Constitutional law; Question as to whether or not there exist factual bases for the proclamation of martial law a political question; Power
to proclaim martial law exclusively vested in the President+
128. Constitutional law; Court has jurisdiction only to receive the petition and to find out whether or not the issues raised are political and nonjusticiable.+
129. Constitutional law; Validity of Proclamation No. 1081; Action of the President neither capricious nor arbitrary.+
130. Constitutional law; Question as to the continuation of martial law a political question.+
131. Constitutional law; Validity of the continuation of martial law; President not acting arbitrarily in not lifting the proclamation.+
132. Constitutional law; Proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.+
133. Constitutional law; Effect of Transitory Provision on all decrees, orders and acts of the President executed after the proclamation of
martial law and during the Transitory Period; Transitory Provision confirms the validity of the enumerated acts under the old Constitution and
its continuing validity under the New Constitution.+
134. Constitutional law; Question as to whether or not there exist factual bases for the proclamation of martial law a justiciable one; If Court
can inquire into factual bases for the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, Court can inquire into the factual bases
for the proclamation of martial law; Reasons.+
135. Constitutional law; Validity of Proclamation No. 1081; Action of the President neither capricious nor arbitrary; Factual bases exist for the
proclamation of martial law.+
136. Constitutional law; Arbitrary act defined.+
137. Constitutional law; Proclamation of martial law did not carry with it the automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
Privilege of the writ cannot be suspended by implication.+
138. Constitutional law; Commander-in-Chief clause provides for three different modes of executive action in times of emergency and one mode
does not necessarily encompass the other.+
139. Constitutional law; Automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus only when there is total collapse of civil authorities.+
140. Constitutional law; Effect of Transitory Provision on all decrees, orders and acts of the President executed after the proclamation of
martial law and during the Transitory Period; Acts still subject to the power of judicial review; if and when they are shown to be arbitrary,
oppressive, or unjust, in violation of the Constitution and/or the generally accepted principles of International Law.+
141. Constitutional law; Withdrawal of petition for habeas corpus; Grounds for allowance; Case at bar.+
142. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Purpose of writ.+
143. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Nature of writ.+
144. Constitutional law; Habeas corpus; Return of the writ; Validity of; Evidentiary facts supporting the cause for the restraint need not be
given or enumerated in return; Reasons.+
145. Constitutional law; Arrest and detention of prisoners without charges having been filed against them before the competent court nor
warrants for their arrest issued by the latter; Validity of.+
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: No. L-35546, No. L-35538, No. L-35539, No. L-35540, No. L-35547, No. L-35556, No. L-35567, No. L-35571, No. L-35573
Ponente: MAKALINTAL, ESGUERRA
REASONS STATED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THEIR SEPARATE OPINIONS, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED
DISMISSING ALL THE PETITIONS, EXCEPT THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY WITHDRAWN BY THE RESPECTIVE
PETITIONERS WITH THE APPROVAL OF THIS COURT, AS HEREINABOVE MENTIONED. NO COSTS.WHEREFORE, We hereby
conclude that (a) the proclamation of martial law (Proclamation No. 1081) on September 21, 1972 by the President of the Philippines and its
continuance, are valid, as they have been done in accordance with the Constitution, and (b) as a consequence of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, upon the proclamation of martial law, the Court is therefore precluded from inquiring into the legality of the arrest and
detention of these petitioners or on the restrictions imposed upon their movements after their release from military custody.
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659 , March 20, 1987
Case Title : RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO CITY, respondents. Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Jurisdiction|Due Process|Damages
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Lower courts have authority to resolve the issue of constitutionality of legislative measures.This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless
not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and
orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of
such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
2. Constitutional Law; Due Process; Judgments must be based on the sporting idea of fair play.+
3. Constitutional Law; Due Process; The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly related to public welfare.+
4. Constitutional Law; Due Process; The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one province to another (E.O. 626-A), their confiscation
and disposal without a prior court hearing is violative of due process for lack of reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose to be achieved and for being confiscatory.But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty
that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive
Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
5. Constitutional Law; Due Process; Same.Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the
measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine
and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial
is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
6. Constitutional Law; Due Process; Same.We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive
order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman
of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the
usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they
be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
7. Constitutional Law; Due Process; Same.To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of
the property conf iscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the of ficers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
8. Constitutional Law; Due Process; Omission of right to a prior hearing can be justified only where a problem needs immediate and urgent
correction.It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the
omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were
not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order
should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.
9. Constitutional Law; Due Process; Damages; A police officer who confiscated carabaos being transported in violation of E.O. 626-A is not
liable for damages even if said Executive Order were later declared unconstitutional.+
Division: EN BANC
Counsel: Ramon A. Gonzales
Ponente: CRUZ
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 195 SCRA 444 , March 20, 1991
Case Title : THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, EASTERN EXTENSION
AUSTRALASIA AND CHINA TELEGRAPH COMPANY, LTD., respondents. Case Nature : PETITION to review the decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Courts|Constitutional Law|Statutes|Constitutional Questions|Corporations|Legislative Franchise|Abuse of discretion
Syllabi:
1. Courts; Constitutional Questions; Every court must approach a constitutional question with grave care and considerable caution.Although We sustain the respondent tax courts finding that the constitutional issue was squarely raised by the parties, We find merit with the
contention of the petitioner that it is not necessary for the disposition of this case. The fact that constitutional question was properly raised by a
party is not alone sufficient for the respondent court to pass upon the issue of constitutionality. This is supported by recent Supreme Court rulings
which oblige every court to approach a constitutional question with grave care and considerable caution. Thus: It is a well-settled rule that no
constitutional question will be heard and resolved unless the following requisites of a judicial inquiry are present: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 400 [1980]; National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657
[1989]). Undoubtedly, the last criterion is not present. This case can be resolved based on the other available grounds obtaining in this case.
Respondent court should have avoided the issue and instead maintained the presumption of constitutionality. A law is supposed to have been
carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive.
Accordingly, this Court gives high respect for the acts of the other departments of the government and, as much as possible, avoids deciding the
constitutional question.
2. Constitutional Law; Corporations; Legislative Franchise; A legislative franchise partakes of the nature of a contract.A legislative franchise partakes of the nature of a contract. In the case of the Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light
Company, Inc., (G.R. No. L-45355, January 12, 1990, 181 SCRA 38), We stated: So was the exemption upheld in favor of the Carcar Electric
and Ice Plant Company when it was required to pay the corporate franchise tax under Section 259 of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 39 (Carcar Electric and Ice Plant v. Collector v. Internal Revenue, 53 O.G. [No. 4] 1068). This court pointed out that such exemption is
part of the inducement for the acceptance of the franchise and the rendition of public service by the grantee. As a charter is in the nature of a
private contract, the imposition of another franchise tax on the corporation by the local authority would constitute an impairment of the contract
between the government and the Corporation (Italics supplied) Franchises spring from contracts between the sovereign power and private
citizens made upon valuable considerations, for purposes of individual advantage as well as public benefit. It is generally considered that the
obligation resting upon the grantee to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant constitutes a sufficient consideration. It can also be said
that the benefit to the community may constitute the sole consideration for the grant of a franchise by the state. Such being the case, the franchise
is the law between the parties and they are bound by the terms thereof.
3. Statutes; Special statutes are exemptions to the general law because they pertain to special charter, granted to meet a particular set of
conditions and circumstances.Petitioner, being a government agency, is also bound by the terms of the franchise. It cannot declare the franchise as ineffective and
unenforceable merely by stating that the private respondent failed to comply with the requirements of the general statutes which are not
mentioned in R.A. No. 808. To allow petitioners claim would be to defy and ignore the superiority of a legislative franchise granted by a special
enactment over a mere authorization or permit granted in accordance with the provisions of laws of general application. Republic Act No. 808 as
amended by Republic Act No. 5002, is a special law applicable only to the respondent corporation, while the Public Service Act and the
Corporation Law are general statutes. The presumption is that special statutes are exemptions to the general law because they pertain to special
charter granted to meet a particular set of conditions and circumstances (Province of Misamis Oriental v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light
Company, Inc., supra).
4. Courts; Abuse of discretion; An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same
was performed in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.The answer is in the negative. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility (Butuan Bay Wood Export Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. L45473, April 28, 1980, 97 SCRA 297; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Traders, Inc., G.R. No. L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163, SCRA 489).
Division: FIRST DIVISION
Counsel: Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo
Ponente: MEDIALDEA
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is hereby modified, as follows:The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 44 , February 01, 2001

Case Title : SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MIRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, and PHILIPPINE EXCHANGE CO., INC., respondents. Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Remedial Law|Constitutional Law|Civil Law|Courts|Jurisdiction|Statutes|Statutory Construction|Damages
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Courts; Jurisdiction; Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute,
presidential decree, or executive order.It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or
executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.
2. Remedial Law; Courts; Jurisdiction; In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation,
notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the
action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of
his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving
declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in any action and not just actions involving
declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions assailing the
validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
3. Remedial Law; Courts; Jurisdiction; Our jurisdiction in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to reviewing
questions of law and factual issues are not within its province.Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding upon this Court unless said findings are not supported by the evidence. Our
jurisdiction in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to reviewing questions of law and factual issues are not
within its province. In view of the aforequoted finding of fact, no manifest error is chargeable to the respondent court for refusing to pierce the
veil of corporate fiction.
4. Constitutional Law; Courts; Requisites for the exercise of judicial review.Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling
for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity
of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
5. Constitutional Law; Statutes; Statutory Construction; The power to declare a law unconstitutional does not lie with the legislature, but with
the courts.The settled rule of statutory construction is that repeals by implication are not favored. R.A. No. 7202 cannot be deemed to have repealed P.D.
No. 579. In addition, the power to declare a law unconstitutional does not lie with the legislature, but with the courts. Assuming arguendo that
R.A. No. 7202 did indeed repeal P.D. No. 579, said repeal is not a legislative declaration finding the earlier law unconstitutional.
6. Civil Law; Damages; Absent showing of bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded.+
Division: SECOND DIVISION
Counsel: Alejandro M. Mirasol & Associates, Rodolfo V. Gumban, Carlos S. Ayeng, The Chief Legal Counsel
Ponente: QUISUMBING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the respondent court in CA-G.R. CV 38607 AFFIRMED.
Guingona, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 402 , July 10, 1998
Case Title : SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.; STATE PROSECUTORS JUDE ROMANO, LEAH ARMAMENTO, MANUEL
TORREVILLAS, JOAQUIN ESCOVAR, MENRADO CORPUS; the NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; and POTENCIANO
ROQUE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO PINEDA, respondents. Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Courts|Criminal Procedure|Judicial Review|Requisites|Advisory Opinions|Separation of Powers|Moot and Academic
Questions|Witness Protection Program|State Witnesses|Statutes
Syllabi:
1. Courts; Judicial Review; Requisites; Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following: (1) there must be
an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must
have standing; that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury.Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds the petition fundamentally defective. The Constitution provides that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
According to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist, courts are mandated to settle disputes between real conflicting parties through the
application of the law. Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following: (1) there must be an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have standing;
that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury.
2. Same; Same; The Supreme Court should then leave to the executive branch the decision on how best to administer the Witness Protection
Program.This Court should then leave to the executive branch the decision on how best to administer the Witness Protection Program. Unless an actual
controversy arises, we should not jump the gun and unnecessarily intervene in this executive function.
3. Same; Same; Statutes; R.A. 6981 is a much needed penal reform law that could help the government in curbing crime by providing an
antidote, as it were, to the usual reluctance of witnesses to testify.RA 6981 is a much needed penal reform law that could help the government in curbing crime by providing an antidote, as it were, to the usual
reluctance of witnesses to testify. The Department of Justice has clearly explained the rationale for said law: Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and
economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal,
criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of criminal justice,
there was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in investigative
bodies/courts.
4. Criminal Procedure; Witness Protection Program; State Witnesses; Only when an information, charging two or more persons with a certain
offense, has already been filed in court will Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, come into play.+
5. Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic Questions; Witness Protection Program; Where the propriety of a witness admission into the
Witness Protection Program is already a moot and academic issue, it does not warrant judicial review.After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government prosecutors, Respondent Court allowed the admission of Roque into
the Program. In fact, Roque had already testified in court against the private respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roques admission into the
Program is already a moot and academic issue that clearly does not warrant judicial review. Manifestly, this petition involves neither any right
that was violated nor any claims that conflict. In fact, no affirmative relief is being sought in this case. The Court concurs with the opinion of
counsel for private respondent that this action is a purely academic exercise, which has no relevance to the criminal cases against Respondent
Pineda. After the assailed Decision had been rendered, trial in those cases proceeded in earnest, and Roque testified in all of them. Said counsel
filed his Memorandum only to satisfy his academic interest on how the State machinery will deal with witnesses who are admittedly guilty of the
crimes but are discharged to testify against their co-accused. Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to show a
case ripe for adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this Court might make in this case would constitute an attempt at abstraction that can only
lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
6. Same; Same; Same; A mere apprehension does not give rise to a justiciable controversy.In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the appellate court and disallow
the admission in evidence of Respondent Roques testimony, inasmuch as the assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict with any of their
present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed Decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage
witnesses to come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor
7. Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to
discharge its duties as it sees fit.+
8. Same; Same; Same; A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.Closely related to the requirement of an actual case, Bernas continues, is the second requirement that the question is ripe for
adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
Thus, in PACU vs. Secretary of Education, the Court declined to pass judgment on the question of the validity of Section 3 of Act No. 2706, which
provided that before a private school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the secretary of education, because all the
petitioning schools had permits to operate and were actually operating, and none of them claimed that the secretary had threatened to revoke
their permit.
9. Same; Same; Same; A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves
a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interestsa justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of
opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
10. Same; Same; Same; Advisory Opinions; Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical
or feigned problems.The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power. Courts have no authority to pass
upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties
without real adverse interests. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist.
Division: FIRST DIVISION
Counsel: The Solicitor General, Abad & Associates
Ponente: PANGANIBAN
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 , September 26, 1991

Case Title : DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner, vs. REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL,
COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr., and THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents. Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to review the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
Syllabi Class : Political Law|Constitutional Law||House Electoral Tribunal|Grounds for removal
Syllabi:
1. Political Law; Separation of powers; Judicial review of acts of the other branches of government.Since a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided For as to what may be done and how it is to be
accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the
mandate of the fundamental law The question thus posed is Judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196). That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express
grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the
courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
2. Political Law; Same.The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative branches of the Government, does
not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk the irksome
task of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the
courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. lt is"a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power
vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. x x x It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose
of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
3. Constitutional Law; House Electoral Tribunal; Nature of functions.The use of the word sole in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive
jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to
function as a nonpartisan court although twothirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians x x x To be able
to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election
contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
4. Constitutional Law; House Electoral Tribunal; Grounds for removal; Disloyalty to party not a valid cause for termination of membership.As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and
independenceeven independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline,
are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. ln expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes
by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its
resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
5. Constitutional Law; House Electoral Tribunal; Grounds for removal; Same.Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to
security of tenure, Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of
the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 198? Constitution). Therefore; membership in the House Electoral
Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from-the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal
for-other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty short of proof that he has formally
affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of
another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No, 97710
Counsel: Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera, Horacio S.J. Apostol, Nicanor S. Bautista, Benedicto R. Palacol
Ponente: GRIO-AQUINO
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared
null and void abinitio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a
member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 910018 dated March 14,1991, cancelling the
promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 26 (Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda) is also set aside. Considering the
unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the
exercise .of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon
service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.

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Macariola vs.

Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 , May 31, 1982

People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887 , October 04, 1922

Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections, 427 SCRA 96 , April 13, 2004

Imbong vs. Ferrer, 35 SCRA 28 , September 11, 1970

Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA 702 , October 16, 1971

Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 , March 31, 1973

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections, 73 SCRA 333 , October 12, 1976

In Re: Saturnino V. Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160, October 24, 1986

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 , July 21, 2003

De Leon vs. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 , August 31, 1987

Occena vs. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1 , April 02, 1981

Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1 , March 05, 1947

Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 774 , November 09, 1967

Almario vs. Alba, 127 SCRA 69 , January 25, 1984

Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 44 , February 01, 2001

Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 , September 26, 1991

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