Republic vs. Ca and Naguit
Republic vs. Ca and Naguit
Republic vs. Ca and Naguit
CA AND NAGUIT
G. R. No.144057
January 17, 2005
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of
title which seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect
title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged
that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have
occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even
the government until she filed her application for
registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming
the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico
Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal
opposition to the petition.
The Solicitor General, representing the Republic
of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on
the grounds that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be
alienable. Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide
claim of ownership since the subject land was declared
as alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980.
The alienable and disposable character of the land
should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14
(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and
disposable before the applicants possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership could even
start.
RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed.
There are three requirements for registration of
title, (1) that the subject property is alienable and
disposable; (2) that the applicants and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
and exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that
the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945.
There must be a positive act of the government
through a statute or proclamation stating the intention of
the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and
disposable. However, if there has been none, it is
presumed that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property and the possession of the land no
matter how long would not ripen into ownership through
acquisitive prescription.
To follow the Solicitor Generals argument in the
construction of Section 14 (1) would render the
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of
accretion
FACTS
RULING: No.
FACTS:
HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and
unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent
court that the term foreshore land includes the
submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands"
refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or
stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water
line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace
and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually
marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA
1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much
less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of
Congress were to include submerged areas, it should
have provided expressly. That Congress did not so
provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged
areas from the term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City
Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158,
and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be
outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.
Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Director Of Lands
V. IAC (1986)
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
ownership since
HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which
may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and
of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest.
The applicant does not come under the exception, for
the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor
in interest began in 1880.
Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a
decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
ISSUEs:
FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the
Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they
openly, continuously and adversely possessed since
1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied
for registration of this land. The Solicitor General
opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said
land and also because he was an alien.