Grande vs. Ca

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GRANDE vs.

CA

GR No. L-17652. June 30, 1962

FACTS

Ignacio Grande et al were owners of a parcel of land in the province of Isabela by inheritance
from their deceased mother Patricia Angui. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration
sometime in 1930, its Northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, and for many
years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the Northeastern side took place, by action of the
current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a
distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of .9964 hectares,
more or less, had been added to the registered area.

Esteban Calalung and Domingo Calalung were found to be possessing said alluvium. Grande et
al filed an action to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion against the Calalung. They
alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest were formerly in peaceful and continuous
possession thereof, until September, 1948, when the Calalung entered upon the land under
claim of ownership.

The Calalung on the other hand, claimed ownership in themselves, asserting that they had been
in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to
the present. Hence, they had already acquired the property by accretion.

The CFI ruled in favor of Grande et al and ordered the Calalung to vacate the premises of said
property. The CA on the other hand, ruled that the Calalung had rightful ownership over the
contested property by prescription.

ISSUE

(1) Whether or not the alluvium belonged to Grande et al.

(2) Whether or not the Calalung have acquired the alluvial property in question through
acquisitive prescription.

RULING

(1) YES. That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of accretion
which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both
parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong
to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Art. 366
of the old Civil Code (now Art. 457), which provides that 'to the owner of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the water.

The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of Grande et al, the
accretion belongs to the them. Assuming, arguendo that the accretion has been occupied by
the Calalung since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act
of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit
becomes manifest. Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the riparian owner is
necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require
the same.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the new Civil Code and Article 966 of the
old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered
owners of the land to which it adjoins.

(2) YES. Grande et al lost right over the land through prescription because the Calalung were in
possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a
claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958.

Just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not,
by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. To acquire
imprescriptibility of registered land, it must first be registered.

However, in the present case, Grande et al failed to register the contested property. The
increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to
the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
VDA. DE NAZARENO vs. CA

GR No. 98054. June 6, 1996

FACTS

Antonio Nazareno, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners Desamparado Vda De Nazareno and


Leticia Nazareno- Tapia owned a parcel of land in Cagayan de Oro City. In 1979, he leased
portions of said land to private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya, who built their
respective houses therein. In the latter part of 1982, Salasalan et al allegedly stopped paying
rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno and Vda Navareno et al filed a case for ejectment, which
was granted by the court. Later, despite successive efforts in court by Salasalan et al, the court
finally executed its judgment and they were ejected from the lots they occupied.

Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of a survey plan
with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the
approved survey plan could be released to the applicant however, Salasalan et al protested.
Upon order of the District Land Officer, respondent Land Investigator Avelino Labis conducted
an investigation and rendered a report, recommending that the survey plan in the name of
Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate
public land applications. Based on the said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau
of Lands Roberto Hilario ordered the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio
Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by SALASALAN ET AL. who, if qualified,
may file public land applications covering their respective portions.

Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad then ordered Antonio Nazareno to vacate the
portions adjudicated to Salasalan et al and to remove whatever improvements they have
introduced thereon. He also ordered that Salasalan et al be placed in possession thereof. Upon
the denial of the motion for reconsideration, Vda De Nazareno, as heirs of late Antonio
Nazareno filed a case to annul the order of PALAD. Their argument was that the subject land
was not a public land but rather a private land being an accretion to Antonio Nazareno’s titled
property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code. They added that the accretion site was the
result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other
filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land.

ISSUE

(1) Whether or not the subject land formed part of the property of Nazareno through accretion.

(2) Whether or not the property was a public land.

RULING

(1) NO. Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires
the concurrence of these requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and

(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea
coast).

These are called the rules on alluvium which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the
current of waters.

However, in the case at bar, the 2nd and 3rd requisites were absent. Hence, Vda De Nazareno
et al, could not claim the rights of a riparian owner.

The 3rd requisite that the alluvium be the result of the action of the waters of the river was not
met since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. Even if this Court were to take into
consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio
Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the same would still be part of the
public domain.

The 2nd requisite that the deposit of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible was also not
met it could not be claimed that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling
materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current
of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. The word "current' 'Indicates the participation of
the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide.

The conclusion of the court, therefore, was that the accretion was man-made or artificial. The
requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Putting it differently, alluvium must be the exclusive work of nature.

(2) YES. The property was a public land, being an artificial accretion of sawdust.. Hence, it was
a proper subject of a public land applications.

The court agreed with Salasalan et al that Vda De Nazareno et al. were estopped from denying
the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when
the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA). The mere filing of
said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land, having
been the subject of a survey plan.
BAGAIPO vs. CA

GR No. 116290. December 8, 2000

FACTS

Petitioner Dionisa P. Bagaipo was the registered owner of Lot No. 415, an agricultural land
situated in Ma-a, Davao City. It was bounded on the southeast by the Davao River. Respondent
Leonor Lozano on the other hand, was the owner of a registered parcel of land located across
and opposite the southeast portion of petitioner’s lot facing the Davao River. Lozano acquired
and occupied her property in 1962 when his wife inherited the land from her father who died
that year.

In 1989, Bagaipo a complaint for Recovery of Possession against Lozano for the recovery of a
land area, which Bagaipo lost when the Davao River traversed her property. Bagaipo contended
that as a result of a change in course of the said river, her property became divided into three
lots. Later, Bagaipo commissioned a survey of Lot 415 and it was showed therein that her land
was taken up by the new course of the Davao River and was then illegally occupied by Lozano.
She presented a witness who testified that the change of the course of the Davao River was
caused by a big flood in 1968 and that the river which flowed previously in front of a chapel
located 15 meters away from the riverbank within Bagaipo’s property now flowed behind it.

For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo was actually an accretion to their
titled property. He asserted that the Davao River did not change its course and that the
reduction in BAGAIPO’s domain was caused by gradual erosion due to the current of the Davao
River. He added that it was also because of the river’s natural action that silt slowly deposited
and added to his land over a long period of time. He presented 3 witnesses, all who concurred
that each time there was flood, there was erosion that occurred on the property of Bagaipo,
which carried away the soil therein.

In 1991, after the trial court conducted an ocular inspection, it dismissed the complaint. It
concluded that the applicable law was not Art. 461 but rather Art. 457, which states that to the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.

Hence, this appeal by Bagaipo.

ISSUE

(1) Whether or not the decrease in land area was brought about by erosion and not a change in
the river’s course.

(2) Whether or not Art. 453 and not Art. 461 should be applied.
(3) Whether or not the registration of BAGAIPO over the accretion to the land by a Torrens
certificate of title precluded LOZANO from being the owner thereof.

RULING

(1) The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land area was
brought about by erosion and not a change in the river’s course. This conclusion was reached
after the trial judge observed during ocular inspection that the banks located on petitioner’s
land are sharp, craggy and very much higher than the land on the other side of the river.
Additionally, the riverbank on respondent’s side is lower and gently sloping. The lower land
therefore naturally received the alluvial soil carried by the river current.

(2) The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the corresponding expansion of respondent’s
property were the combined effect of erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil
Code then is inapplicable. Petitioner could not claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed
because the same was inexistent. The riverbed’s former location could not even be pinpointed
with particularity since the movement of the Davao River took place gradually over an
unspecified period of time, up to the present.

The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites
are present:

1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;

2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and

3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.

These requisites were sufficiently proven in favor of respondents. In the absence of evidence
that the change in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the
presumption is that the change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion.

(3)The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiff’s estate, which is covered
by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof.
Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land
through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of
rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners
of the banks. Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and
the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act.

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