Science of Logic

oped, it included the fullest description of his dialectic.

Hegel considered it one of his major works and therefore
kept it up to date through revision. Science of Logic is
sometimes referred to as the Greater Logic" to distinguish it from the Lesser Logic", the moniker given to the
condensed version Hegel presented as the Logic section
of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.

1 Brief history
Hegel wrote Science of Logic after he had completed his
Phenomenology of Spirit and while he was in Nuremberg
working at a secondary school and courting his ance.
It was published in a number of volumes. The rst, The
Objective Logic, has two parts (the Doctrines of Being
and Essence) and each part was published in 1812 and
1813 respectively. The second volume, The Subjective
Logic was published in 1816 the same year he became a
professor of philosophy at Heidelberg. Science of Logic is
too advanced for undergraduate students so Hegel wrote
an Encyclopaedic version of the logic which was published in 1817.
In 1826, the book went out of stock. Instead of reprinting, as requested, Hegel undertook some revisions. By
1831, Hegel completed a greatly revised and expanded
version of the Doctrine of Being, but had no time to revise the rest of the book. The Preface to the second edition is dated 7 November 1831, just before his death on
14 November 1831. This edition appeared in 1832, and
again in 18345 in the posthumous Works. Only the second edition of Science of Logic is translated into English.

Title page of original 1816 publication

Science of Logic (German: Wissenschaft der Logik, rst
published between 1812 and 1816) is the work in which
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel outlined his vision of
logic, which is an ontology that incorporates the traditional Aristotelian syllogism as a sub-component rather
than a basis. For Hegel, the most important achievement
of German Idealism, starting with Kant and culminating
in his own philosophy, was the demonstration that reality
is shaped through and through by mind and, when properly understood, is mind. Thus ultimately the structures
of thought and reality, subject and object, are identical.
And since for Hegel the underlying structure of all of reality is ultimately rational, logic is not merely about reasoning or argument but rather is also the rational, structural core of all of reality and every dimension of it. Thus
Hegels Science of Logic includes among other things
analyses of being, nothingness, becoming, existence, reality, essence, reection, concept, and method. As devel-

2 Introduction
2.1 Hegels General Concept of Logic
According to Hegel, logic is the form taken by the science
of thinking in general. He thought that, as it had hitherto
been practiced, this science demanded a total and radical reformulation from a higher standpoint. His stated
goal with The Science of Logic was to overcome what he
perceived to be a common aw running through all other
former systems of logic, namely that they all presupposed
a complete separation between the content of cognition
(the world of objects, held to be entirely independent of
thought for their existence), and the form of cognition
(the thoughts about these objects, which by themselves
1

are pliable, indeterminate and entirely dependent upon

their conformity to the world of objects to be thought of
as in any way true). This unbridgeable gap found within
the science of reason was, in his view, a carryover from
everyday, phenomenal, unphilosophical consciousness.[1]
The task of extinguishing this opposition within consciousness Hegel believed he had already accomplished
in his book Phnomenologie des Geistes (1807) with the
nal attainment of Absolute Knowing: Absolute knowing is the truth of every mode of consciousness because
... it is only in absolute knowing that the separation of
the object from the certainty of itself is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and certainty
with truth.[2] Once thus liberated from duality, the science of thinking no longer requires an object or a matter
outside of itself to act as a touchstone for its truth, but
rather takes the form of its own self-mediated exposition
and development which eventually comprises within itself every possible mode of rational thinking. It can
therefore be said, says Hegel, that this content is the
exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before
the creation of nature and a nite mind.[3] The German
word Hegel employed to denote this post-dualist form of
consciousness was Begri (traditionally translated either
as Concept or Notion).

2.2

General Division of the Logic

The self-exposition of this unied consciousness, or Notion, follows a series of necessary, self-determined stages
in an inherently logical, dialectical progression. Its course
is from the objective to the subjective sides (or judgements as Hegel calls them) of the Notion. The objective
side, its Being, is the Notion as it is in itself [an sich],
its reection in nature being found in anything inorganic
such as water or a rock. This is the subject of Book One:
The Doctrine of Being. Book Three: The Doctrine of
the Notion outlines the subjective side of the Notion as
Notion, or, the Notion as it is for itself [fr sich]; human
beings, animals and plants being some of the shapes it
takes in nature. The process of Beings transition to the
Notion as fully aware of itself is outlined in Book Two:
The Doctrine of Essence, which is included in the Objective division of the Logic.[4] The Science of Logic is thus
divided like this:
Volume One: The Objective Logic
Book One: The Doctrine of Being
Book Two: The Doctrine of
Essence
Volume Two: The Subjective Logic
Book Three: The Doctrine of the
Notion

OBJECTIVE LOGIC: DOCTRINE OF BEING

This division, however, does not represent a strictly linear progression. At the end of the book Hegel wraps all
of the preceding logical development into a single Absolute Idea. Hegel then links this nal absolute idea with
the simple concept of Being which he introduced at the
start of the book. Hence the Science of Logic is actually
a circle and there is no starting point or end, but rather a
totality. This totality is itself, however, but a link in the
chain of the three sciences of Logic, Nature and Spirit,
as developed by Hegel in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817), that, when taken as a whole,
comprise a circle of circles.[5]

3 Objective Logic: Doctrine of Being

3.1 Determinate Being (Quality)
3.1.1 Being
A. Being
Being, specically Pure Being, is the rst step taken in the
scientic development of Pure Knowing, which itself is
the nal state achieved in the historical self-manifestation
of Geist (Spirit/Mind) as described in detail by Hegel in
Phnomenologie des Geistes (1807).[6] This Pure Knowing is simply Knowing as Such, and as such, has for its rst
thought product Being as Such, i.e., the purest abstraction
from all that is (although, importantly, not distinct from,
or alongside, all that is), having no diversity within itself
nor with any reference outwards. ... It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness.[7]
EXAMPLE: Hegel claims that the Eleatic
philosopher Parmenides was the person who
rst enunciated the simple thought of pure being as the absolute and sole truth.[8]
B. Nothing
Nothing, specically Pure Nothing, is simply equality
with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content. It is therefore identical with Being,
except that it is thought of as its very opposite. This distinction is therefore meaningful as posited by thought.[9]
EXAMPLE: in Hegels estimation, Pure Nothing is the absolute principle in the oriental systems, principally in Buddhism.[8]
C. Becoming
Pure Being and Pure Nothing are the same, and yet absolutely distinct from each other. This contradiction is resolved by their immediate vanishing, one into the other.
The resultant movement, called Becoming, takes the form
of reciprocal Coming-to-Be and Ceasing-to-Be.[10]

3.1

Determinate Being (Quality)

EXAMPLE: Hegel borrows Kants example of
the hundred dollars [Critique of Pure Reason (1787)] to emphasize that the unity of
Being and Nothing in Becoming only applies
when they are taken in their absolute purity as
abstractions. It is of course not a matter of indierence to ones fortune if $100 is or is not,
but this is only meaningful if it is presupposed
that the one whose fortune it might or might not
be, already is, i.e., the $100s being or not must
be referenced to an others. This, then, cannot
be Pure Being which by denition has no reference outwards.[11] Heraclitus is cited as the rst
philosopher to think in terms of Becoming.[8]

3.1.2

Determinate Being

A. Determinate Being as Such The transition between Becoming and (a) Determinate Being as Such is
accomplished by means of sublation. This term, the traditional English translation of the German word aufheben,
means to preserve, to maintain, but also to cease, to put
an end to. Hegel claims that it is one of the most important notions in philosophy. Being and Nothing were
complete opposites whose inner unity needed to be expressed, or mediated, by a third term: Becoming. Once
having been accomplished through mediation, their unity
then becomes immediate. Their opposition, still extant in
Becoming, has been put an end to. From the newly acquired standpoint of immediacy, Becoming becomes Determinate Being as Such, within which Being and Nothing are no longer discrete terms, but necessarily linked
moments that it has preserved within itself. Sublation,
then, is the ending of a logical process, yet at the same
time it is its beginning again from a new point of view.[12]
So, as moments of Determinate Being, Being and Nothing take on new characteristics as aspects of (b) Quality. Being becomes emphasized, and, as Quality, is Reality; Nothing, or Non-Being, is concealed in Beings background serving only delimit it as a specic Quality distinct from others, and, in so doing, is Negation in General, i.e., Quality in the form of a deciency. Quality,
then, comprises both what a Determinate Being is and
is not, viz., that which makes it determinate in the rst
place.[13] Within Quality, however, Reality and Negation
are still distinct from one another, are still mediated, just
like Being and Nothing were in Becoming. Taken in their
unity, that is, in their immediacy as, again, sublated, they
are now only moments of (c) Something.[14]
EXAMPLE: Hegel contrasts his logically derived notion of Reality from the earlier metaphysical one present in the ontological proof
of Gods existence, specically Leibnizs formulation of it. In this theory, God was held
to be the sum-total of all realities. These realities are taken to be perfections, their total-

3
ity therefore comprising the most perfect being imaginable: God. Speculative logic, however, shows that Reality is inextricably bound
up with its own negation, and so any grand total of these realities would not result in something strictly positive, e.g., God, but would inevitably retain, to an equal degree, the negation of all these realities. The mere addition
of realities to each other, then, would not in
any way alter their principle, and so the sum
of all realities would be no more or less than
what each of them already was: a Reality and
its Negation.[15]
Something is the rst instance in The Science of Logic of
the negation of the negation. The rst negation, Negation in General, is simply what a Determinate Being is
not. Hegel calls this abstract negation. When this negation itself is negated, which is called absolute negation,
what a Determinate Being is, is no longer dependent on
what it is not for its own determination, but becomes an
actual particular Something in its own right: a BeingWithin-Self. Its negation, what it is not, is now cut o
from it and becomes another Something, which, from the
rst Somethings point of view, is an Other in general.
Finally, just as Becoming mediated between Being and
Nothing, Alteration is now the mediator between Something and Other.[16]
B. Finitude (a) Something and Other are separate
from each other, but each still contains within itself,
as moments, their former unity in Determinate Being.
These moments now re-emerge as Being-in-Itself, i.e.,
Something as Something only insofar as it is in opposition to the Other; and Being-for-Other, i.e., Something as Something only insofar as it is in relation to
the Other.[17] (Hegels view is in this way contrasted
with Kants noumenon, the unknowable thing in itself:
Being-in-itself taken in isolation from Being-for-Other is
nothing but an empty abstraction and to ask what it is
is to ask a question made impossible to answer.)[18]
Something is now no longer only an isolated something,
but is in both positive and negative relationship to the
Other. This relationship, however, is then reected back
into the Something as isolated, i.e., in-itself, and bestows
upon it further determinations. What a Something is in
opposition to an Other is its (b) Determination;[19] what
it is in relation to an Other is its Constitution.[20]
EXAMPLE: A human beings Determination
is thinking reason, since that is what she unalterably is in opposition to her Other: nature.
However, humans are entangled in nature in
myriad other ways than just thinking rationally
about it, and how humans react to this external inuence also tells us about what they are.
This is their Constitution, the part of their be-

OBJECTIVE LOGIC: DOCTRINE OF BEING

ing that undergoes alteration in relation to its

Others.[21]

Once again, sublation occurs. Both Limitation and the

Ought point beyond the Finite something, the one negatively and the other positively. This beyond, in which
[28]
The point at which Something ceases to be itself and be- they are unied, is the Innite.
comes an Other is that Somethings Limit. This Limit is
also shared by its Other which is itself an other Something C. Innity The negation that Being-in-Itself experionly insofar as it is on the far side of this Limit. It is there- enced in the Limitation, the negation that made it Finite,
fore by their common Limits that Somethings and Others is again negated resulting in the armative determination
are mediated with one another and mutually dene each of (a) the Innite in General which now reveals itself,
others inner Qualities.[22]
not as something distinct from, but as the true nature of
the Finite. At the name of the innite, the heart and the
mind light up, for in the innite the spirit is not merely
EXAMPLE: The point at which a point ceases
abstractly present to itself, but rises to its own self, to the
to be a point and becomes a line constitutes the
light of thinking, of its universality, of its freedom.[29]
Limit between them. However, a line is not
only something other than a point, i.e., only a
This armation of the Innite, however, carries with it a
Determinate Being, but its very principle is at
negative relation to an other, the Finite. Because of this,
the same time dened by it, just as a plane is
it falls back into the determination of the Something with
dened by the line and the solid by the plane,
a Limit peculiar to itself. This In-nite, then, is not the
etc.[23]
pure Innite, but merely the non-Finite. Hegel calls this
the Spurious Innite and it is this that is spoken of whenFrom the perspective of the Limit, a Something is only a ever the Innite is held to be over and aboveseparated
particular Something insofar as it is not something else. fromthe Finite. This separateness is in itself false since
This means that the Somethings self-determination is the Finite naturally engenders the Innite through Limionly relative and entirely dependent on what it isnt to tation and the Ought, while the Innite, thus produced,
be what it is. It is thus only temporary, contains its is bounded by its Other, the Finite, and is therefore itown Ceasing-to-Be within itself and so is (c) Finite, i.e., self Finite. Yet they are held to be separate by this stage
doomed to eventually cease to be. For Finite things, of thought and so the two terms are eternally stuck in an
the hour of their birth is the hour of their death.[24] At empty oscillation back and forth from one another. This
[30]
this point the Limit ceases to play its mediating role be- Hegel calls (b) the Innite Progress.
tween Something and Other, i.e., is negated, and is taken This impasse can only be overcome, as usual, via subback into the self-identitythe Being-Within-Selfof lation. From the standpoint of the Finite, the Innite
the Something to become that Somethings Limitation, cannot break free into independence, but must always be
the point beyond which that Something will cease to bounded, and therefore nitized, by its Other, the Finite.
be.[25] The ip side of this, though, is that the Limit also For further logical development to be possible, this standtakes its negative along with it back into the Something, point must shift to a new one where the Innite is no
this being the Other yet now as posited in the Something longer simply a derivation of the Finite, but where the
as that Somethings very own Determination. What this Finite, as well as the Innite in General, are but moments
means is that, in the face of its own Limitation, the very of (c) the True Innite. The True innite bears the same
Quality that dened the Something in the rst place be- relation of mediation to these moments as Becoming did
comes the Other to its own self, which is to say that it no to Being and Nothing and as Alteration did to Something
longer strictly is this Quality but now Ought to be this and Other.[31]
Quality. Limitation and the Ought are the twin, selfcontradictory moments of the Finite.[26]
EXAMPLE: Hegel gives as a symbol of the InEXAMPLE: The sentient creature, in the limitation of hunger, thirst, etc., is the urge to
overcome this limitation and it does overcome
it. It feels pain, and it is the privilege of the
sentient nature to feel pain; it is a negation in
its self, and the negation is determined as a
limitation in its feeling, just because the sentient creature has the feeling of its self, which
is the totality that transcends this determinateness [i.e., it feels it Ought not to feel pain].
If it were not above and beyond the determinateness, it would not feel it as its negation and
would feel no pain.[27]

nite Progress the straight line which stretches

out to innity in both directions. This Innity
is, at all times, the beyond of the Determinate
Being of the line itself. True Innity is properly represented by the circle, the line which
has reached itself, which is closed and wholly
present, without beginning and end.[32]
This move is highly signicative of Hegelss philosophy
because it means that, for him, [it] is not the nite which
is the real but the innite. The reality of the True Innite is in fact more real than the Reality of Determinate
Being. This higher, and yet more concrete, reality is the
Ideal [das Ideell]: The idealism of philosophy consists

3.1

Determinate Being (Quality)

in nothing else than in recognizing that the nite has no Constitution, etc. It is therefore indeterminate and unalveritable being.[33]
terable. There is Nothing in it.[39] Just as there is no criAs having been sublated, the mediation which was per- terion to distinguish Being and Nothing despite the fact
formed by the True Innite between the Finite and the that they are opposites, the One is also identical with its
The Void can be said to be the
Innite now has resulted in their immediate unity. This opposite, (b) the Void.
[40]
Quality
of
the
One.
[34]
unity is called Being-for-Self.
3.1.3

Being-For-Self

A. Being-for-Self as Such At this point we have arrived back at simple Being from which all the previous developments had initially proceeded. This Being, though,
is now in the standpoint of Innity from which these developments can be seen as moments of itself and so it
is (a) Being-for-Self as Such. Until this point Determinate Being was burdened with Finitude, depended on the
Other for its own determination, and so was only relatively
determined Being. From the Ideal standpoint of Innity,
Being-for-Self has become free from this burden and so
is absolutely determined Being.[35]
As a consequence of having overcome this relativity,
however, both sides of the relationship between Something and Other are now also in equal relation to the Innite Being that they have become Ideal moments of. So,
although through their relationship Something and Other
mutually determine each others inner Qualities, they do
not have the same eect on the Innite Beingbe it God,
spirit or ego (in the Fichtean sense)to which they are
now objects. This Being is not just another Finite Other,
but is the One for which they are and of which they are
a part. The Being-for-Other of Finitude has become the
(b) Being-for-One of Innity.[36]
EXAMPLE: This Being-for-One recalls
Leibnizs monad because it involves a simple
oneness that maintains itself throughout the
various determinations that might take place
within it. Hegel, however, is critical of Leibnizs construction because, since these monads
are indierent to each other and, strictly
speaking, are not Others to one another, they
cannot determine each other and so no origin
can be found for the harmony that is claimed to
exist between them. Being-for-One, containing as it does the moments of determination
within it, avoids this contradiction.[37]
If we now take in isolation that to which all the preceding
moments refer, i.e., that which we now have immediately
before us, we end up with (c) the One.[38]
B. The One and the Many This (a) One in its Own
Self, standing in negative relation to all its preceding moments, is entirely dierentiated from each of them. It
is neither a Determinate Being, nor a Something, nor a

EXAMPLE: At this stage, the Logic has incorporated the ancient atomism of Leucippus and
Democritus. Hegel actually held the ancient
philosophical notion of atomism in higher esteem than the scientic one of modern physics
because the former understood the void not
just as the empty space between atoms, but
as the atoms own inherent principle of unrest and self-movement. Physics with its
molecules and particles suers from the atom
... just as much as does that theory of the
State which starts from the particular will of
individuals.[41]
The original transition of Being and Nothing to Determinate Being is again echoed here in the sphere of Beingfor-Self. The One, though, as negatively related to all
aspects of Quality excepting its own Quality of being the
Void, cannot take on a Qualitative determinateness like
Determinate Being did. In its own self-dierentiation, it
can only relate to itself as another self identical to it, that
is, as another One. Since no new Quality has been taken
on, we cannot call this transition a Becoming, but rather
a Repulsion, i.e., the positing of (c) Many Ones.[42]
C. Repulsion and Attraction Once these many Ones
have been posited, the nature of their relationship begins
to unfold. Because it is the nature of the One to be purely
self-related, their relation to one another is in fact a nonrelation, i.e., takes place externally in the Void. From
the standpoint of the one One, then, there are no other
Ones, that is, its relation to them is one of (a) Exclusion.
Seen from within the One there is only one One, but at the
same time the One only exists in the rst place through
its negative external relation to other Ones, i.e., for there
to be the one One there must be Many Ones that mutually
Exclude one another.[43]
EXAMPLE: The idea that the One is entirely
self-subsistent and can exist without the Many
is, according to Hegel, the supreme, most
stubborn error, which takes itself for the highest truth, manifesting in more concrete forms
as abstract freedom, pure ego and, further, as
Evil.[44]
Now that Many Ones have been posited out of their Repulsion from the One, their original Oneness reasserts itself and their Repulsion passes over to (b) Attraction. Attraction presupposes Repulsion: for the Many to be At-

6
tracted by the One, they must have at rst been Repulsed
by it.[45]

OBJECTIVE LOGIC: DOCTRINE OF BEING

EXAMPLE: [S]pecic examples of pure

quantity, if they are wanted, are space and
time, also matter as such, light, and so forth,
and the ego itself.[50] Hegel here sharply criticizes Kants antinomy, put forth in his Critique
of Pure Reason, between indivisibility and innite divisibility in time, space and matter. By
taking continuity and discreteness to be entirely antithetical to one another, instead of in
their truth which is their dialectical unity, Kant
becomes embroiled in self-contradiction.[51]

The One having been restored to unity by Attraction now

contains Repulsion and Attraction within it as moments.
It is the Ideal One of Innite Being, which, for Hegel, actually makes it more real than the merely Real Many.
From the standpoint of this Ideal One, both Repulsion
and Attraction now presuppose each other, and, taken one
step further, each presupposes itself as mediated by the
other. The One is only a One with reference to another
OneRepulsion; but this other One is in itself identical to, is in fact, the original OneAttraction: each is the
moment of the other. This is the (c) Relation of Repul- B. Continuous and Discrete Magnitude
sion and Attraction, which at this point is only relative.[46] Although unied in Quantity, Continuity and Discreteness still retain their distinction from one another. They
EXAMPLE: Although in Hegels estimation
cannot be cut o from each other, but either one can
a triumph of the explanatory power of metabe foregrounded leaving the other present only implicphysics over the physics based on sense peritly. Quantity is a Continuous Magnitude when seen as a
ception as it was then practised, he believed
coherent whole; as a collection of identical Ones, it is a
that Kants Metaphysische Anfangsgrnde
Discrete Magnitude.[52]
der Naturwissenschaft [Metaphysical FounC. Limitation of Quantity
dations of Natural Science] (1786) retained
many of the errors committed by the latter,
Quantity is the One, but containing within it the moments
foremost among these being that, since matof the Many, Repulsion, Attraction, etc. At this point
ter is given to the senses as already formed and
the negative, Excluding nature of the One is reasserted
constituted, it is taken to be such by the mind
within Quantity. The Discrete Ones within Quantity now
as well. The forces of Attraction and Repulbecome Limited, isolated Somethings: Quanta.[53]
sion that are supposed to act upon matter to set
it in motion, then, are not seen also to be the
3.2.2 Quantum
very forces though which matter itself comes
[47]
into being in the rst place.
A. Number The rst determination of quantum is
Repulsion and Attraction are relative to one another inso- Number. Number is made up of a One or Many Ones
far as the One is taken either as the beginning or result of which, as quanta, are called Unitseach of which is identheir mediation with one another. Imparted with contin- tical to the other. This identity in the Unit constitutes
uous, Innite motion, the One, Repulsion and Attraction the Continuity of Number. However, a Number is also a
specic Determinate Being that encloses an aggregate of
become the sublated moments of Quantity.[48]
Units while excluding from itself other such aggregates.
This, the Amount, is the moment of Discreteness within
3.2 Magnitude (Quantity)
Number. Both Qualitative and Quantitative Determinate
Being have Limits that demarcate the boundary between
3.2.1 Quantity
their armative presence and their negation, but in the
former the Limit determines its Being to be of a specic
A. Pure Quantity
Quality unique to itself, whereas in the latter, made up
The previous determinations of Being-for-Self have now as it is of homogeneous Units that remain identical to
become the sublated moments of Pure Quantity. Pure each other no matter which side of the Limit they fall
Quantity is a One, but a One made up of the Many hav- upon, the Limit serves only to enclose a specic Amount
and to distinguish it from other
ing been Attracted back into each other out of their initial of Units, e.g., a hundred,
[54]
such
aggregates.
Repulsion. It therefore contains Many identical Ones, but
in their coalescence, they have lost their mutual Exclusion, giving us a simple, undierentiated sameness. This
sameness is Continuity, the moment of Attraction within
Quantity. The other moment, that of Repulsion, is also
retained in Quantity as Discreteness. Discreteness is the
expansion of the self-sameness of the Ones into Continuity. What the unity of Continuity and Discreteness, i.e.,
Quantity, results in is a continual outpouring of something out of itself, a perennial self-production.[49]

EXAMPLE: The species of calculation

counting,
addition/subtraction,
multiplication/division,
powers/rootsare
the dierent modes of bringing Numbers
into relation with each other. Although the
progress through these modes displays the
same sort of dialectical evolution as does the
Logic proper, they are nonetheless entirely

3.2

Magnitude (Quantity)
external to it because there is no inner necessity in the various arrangements imposed
on them by arithmetical procedure. With the
expression 7 + 5 = 12, although 5 added to 7
necessarily equals 12, there is nothing internal
to the 7 or the 5 themselves that indicates that
they should be brought in any sort of relation
with one another in the rst place.[55] For this
reason, number cannot be relied upon to shed
any light on strictly philosophical notions,
despite the ancient attempt by Pythagoras to
do so. It can however be used to symbolize
certain philosophical ideas. As for math as
a pedagogical tool, Hegel presciently had
this to say: Calculation being so much an
external and therefore mechanical process, it
has been possible to construct machines which
perform arithmetical operations with complete
accuracy. A knowledge of just this one fact
about the nature of calculation is sucient for
an appraisal of the idea of making calculation
the principal means for educating the mind
and stretching it on the rack in order to perfect
it as a machine.[56]

B. Extensive and Intensive Quantum Taken in its immediacy, a Number is an Extensive Magnitude, that is, a
collection of a certain Amount of self-same Units. These
Units, say ten or twenty of them, are the sublated moments of the Extensive Magnitudes ten or twenty. However, the Number ten or twenty, though made up of
Many, is also a self-determining One, independent of
other Numbers for its determination. Taken in this way,
ten or twenty (a) dierentiates itself from Extensive
Magnitude and becomes an Intensive Magnitude, which
is expressed as the tenth or twentieth Degree. Just as the
One was completely indierent to the other Ones of the
Many yet depended on them for its existence, each Degree is indierent to every other Degree, yet they are externally related to one another in ascending or descending
ow through a scale of Degrees.[57]
Although thus dierentiated from each other, Extensive
and Intensive magnitude are essentially (b) the same.
[T]hey are only distinguished by the one having amount
within itself and the other having amount outside itself.
It is at this point that the moment of the Something reasserts itself having remained implicit over the course of
the development of Quantity. This Something, which
reappears when the negation between Extensive and Intensive Magnitude is itself negated, is the re-emergence
of Quality within the dialectic of Quantity.[58]
EXAMPLE: Weight exerts a certain pressure
which is its Intensive Magnitude. This pressure, however, can be measured Extensively,
in pounds, kilograms, etc. Heat or cold can be
Qualitatively experienced as dierent Degrees

7
of temperature, but can also be Extensively
measured in a thermometer. High and low Intensities of notes are the results of a greater or
smaller Amount of vibrations per unit of time.
Finally, in the spiritual sphere, high intensity
of character, of talent or genius, is bound up
with a correspondingly far-reaching reality in
the outer world, is of widespread inuence,
touching the real world at many points.[59]
In the realm of Quantity, the relationship between Something and Other lacked any mutual Qualitative Determinateness. A One could only relate to another One identical to itself. Now, however, that Qualitative Determinateness has returned, the Quantum loses its simple selfrelation and can relate to itself only through a Qualitative
Other that is beyond itself. This Other is another Quantum, of a greater or lesser Amount, which, in turn, immediately points beyond itself to yet an Other Quantum
ad innitum. This is what constitutes the self-propelled
(c) Alteration of Quantum.[60]
C. Quantitative Innity Although a particular Quantum, of its own inner necessity, points beyond itself,
this beyond is necessarily an Other Quantum. This fact,
that Quantum eternally repulses itself, yet equally eternally remains Quantum, demonstrates the (a) Notion of
Quantitative Innity, which is the self-related, armative opposition between Finitude and Innity that lies
within it.[61] This irresolvable self-contradiction within
Quantum yields (b) the Quantitative Innite Progress.
This progress can take place in one of two directions, the
greater or the smaller, giving us the so-called innitely
great or innitely small. That these innites are each
the Spurious Quantitative Innite is evident in the fact that
great and small designate Quanta, whereas the Innite
by denition is not a Quantum.[62]
EXAMPLE: Hegel here gives several examples
of the appearance of the Spurious Quantitative
Innite in philosophy, namely in Kants notion
of the sublime and his categorical imperative,
as well as Fichtes innite ego as outlined in his
Theory of Science (1810). At bottom of all
these ideas, says Hegel, is an absolute opposition that is held to exist between the ego and
its other, this latter taking the form, respectively, of art, nature and the non-ego in general.
The opposition is supposed to be overcome by
the positing of an innite relation between the
two sides, the egos level of morality, for example, ever increasing in proportion to a decrease
in the power of the senses over it. According
with the nature of the Spurious Quantitative Innite, however, it does not matter how great a
level the ego raises itself to, the absolute opposition between it and its other is there and everywhere reasserted and the whole process can

3
have no other outcome than a desperate and futile longing.[63]

OBJECTIVE LOGIC: DOCTRINE OF BEING

In the Direct Ratio, the previously sublated Quantitative

moments of Amount and Unit are retrieved and brought
into immediate relation with each other. One side of the
ratio, y, is a certain Amount relative to the other side, x,
which serves as the Unit whereby this Amount is measured. If the constant is given, then the Quantum on any
one side of the ratio could be any Number, and the Number on the other side will automatically be determined.
Therefore, the rst Number of the ratio completely loses
its independent signicance and only functions as a determinate Quantum in relation to an other. Formerly,
any single Number could simultaneously denote either an
Amount or a Unit; now, it must serve exclusively as the
one or the other in relation to another Number serving
as the opposite. The constant would seem to bring these
moments back into unity with each other, but in actuality,
it too can serve only as either Amount or Unit. If x is Unit
and y Amount, then k is the Amount of such Units,

The Quantitative Innite negates Quantum, and Quantum

in turn negates Innity. As occurs so often in The Science of Logic, a negation that is itself negated produces
a new armative standpoint, the formerly negated terms
having become the unied moments thereof. This standpoint is (c) the Innity of Quantum from where it is
seen that Innity, initially the absolute Other of Quantum, essentially belongs to it and in fact determines it as
a particular Quality alongside all the other Determinate
Beings that had long since been sublated. This particular Quality which distinguishes Quantum from any other
Qualitatively Determined Being is in fact the total lack of
explicit self-determinateness that dierentiated Quantity
from Quality in the rst place. The repulsion of Quantum from itself out into the beyond of Innity, is actually
a gesture back towards the world of Qualitative Determination, thus bridging once again the two worlds. This
gesture is made explicit in the Quantitative Ratio, where y = kx;
two Quanta are brought into relationship with one another
in such a way that neither one in itself is self-determined, if x is Amount, then k is the Unit, the amount of which,
but in relating to each other, they Qualitatively determine y, determines it,
something beyond themselves, e.g., a line or a curve.[64]
EXAMPLE: Hegel here engages in a lengthy
survey of the history and development of the
Dierential and Integral Calculus, citing the
works of Cavalieri, Descartes, Fermat, Barrow,
Newton, Leibniz, Euler, Lagrange, Landen,
and Carnot. His main point of concern is
the compulsion of mathematicians to neglect
the innitesimal dierences that result from
calculus equations in order to arrive at a coherent result. The inexactitude of this method of
procedure results, says Hegel, primarily from
their failure to distinguish between Quantum
as the Quantity that each individual term of
a dierential co-ecient represents, and the
Qualitative nature of their relationship when in
the form of a ratio. Dx, dy, are no longer
quanta, nor are they supposed to signify quanta;
it is solely in their relation to each other that
they have any meaning, a meaning merely as
moments.[65]

x = y/k.
As in themselves incomplete in this way, these Quanta
serve only as the Qualitative moments of one another.[66]
B. Inverse Ratio
The Inverse Ratio is a ratio, x:y, in which the relation between both sides is expressed in a constant which is their
product, i.e.,

k = xy
or

y=

k
.
x

Whereas formerly with the Direct Ratio, the quotient between the two terms was xed, in the Inverse Ratio it
becomes alterable. Because the Inverse Ratio connes
within itself many Direct Ratios, the constant of the former displays itself not merely as a Quantitative, but also
3.2.3 The Quantitative Relation
as a Qualitative Limit. It is therefore a Qualitative Quantum. The Spurious Innity/True Innity dialectic again
A. The Direct Ratio
makes an appearance here as either term of the ratio is
A ratio, such as x:y, is a Direct Ratio if both terms of only capable of innitely approximating the ratios conthe ratio are delimited by a single Quantum, a constant, stant, the one increasing in proportion to a decrease in
k (what Hegel calls in the language of his day the expo- the other, but never actually reaching it (neither x nor y
nent of the ratio),
may equal zero). The constant is nonetheless present as
a simple Quantum, and is not an eternal beyond, making
its self-mediation through the two terms of the ratio an
y
k= .
example of True Innity.[67]
x

3.3

Measure

C. The Ratio of Powers

The Ratio of Powers takes the following form:

y = kx .
It is in this form of the Ratio, says Hegel, that quantum has reached its Notion and has completely realized
it. In the Direct and Inverse Ratios, the relation between
the constant and its variables was not continuous, the former only being a xed proportionality between them, and
the latter relating itself to them only negatively. With the
Ratio of Powers, however, this relationship is not simply one of external limitation, but, as a Quantum brought
into relationship with itself through the power, it is selfdetermining Limit. This self-determination constitutes
the Quality of the Quantum, and nally demonstrates the
full signicance of the essential identity of Quality and
Quantity. Originally, Quantity dierentiated itself from
Quality in that it was indierent to what was external to
it, that which it quantied. Now however, in the Ratio of
Powers, what it relates itself to externally is determined
by its own self, and that which relates externally to its own
self has long since been dened as Quality. But quantity is not only a quality; it is the truth of quality itself.
Quantum, having sublated the moment of Quantity that
originally dened it and returned to Quality, is now what
it is in its truth: Measure.[68]

3.3
3.3.1

Measure
Specic Quantity

A. The Specic Quantum Measure is the simple relation of the quantum to itself ... ; the quantum is thus
qualitative. Previously, Quantum was held to be indifferent to the Quality of that which it quantied. Now, as
Measure, Quality and Quantity though still distinct from
one another are inseparable and in their unity comprise a
specic Determinate Being: Everything that exists has
a magnitude and this magnitude belongs to the nature of
the something itself. The indierence of Quantum is retained in Measure insofar as the magnitude of things can
increase or decrease without fundamentally altering their
Quality, and yet their essential unity nevertheless manifests at the Limit where an alteration in Quantity will
bring about a change in Quality.[69]
EXAMPLE: Aristotle gives the example of a
head from which hairs are plucked one by one.
Its Quality of being a head of hair remains if
only a few hairs are gone, but at a certain point,
it undergoes Qualitative Alteration and become
a bald head. Although the Quantitative change
is gradual, the Qualitative one, oftentimes, is
unexpected. It is the cunning of the Notion to seize on this aspect of a reality where

9
its quality does not seem to come into play; and
such is its cunning that the aggrandizement of
a State or of a fortune, etc., which leads nally
to disaster for the state or for the owner, even
appears at rst to be their good fortune.[70]
B. Specifying Measure Insofar as Quantity describes
the upper and lower Limits between which a specic
Quality can maintain itself, it serves as a (a) Rule. The
Rule is an arbitrary external standard or Amount that
measures something other than itself. Although it is often
tempting to assume so, there is in actuality no object that
can serve as a completely universal standard of measurement, i.e., be pure Quantity. Rather, what is involved in
measurement is a ratio between two Qualities and their
inherent Quantities, the one made to act as the (b) Specifying Measure of the other, this other, however, being
itself just as capable of measuring that which it is being
measured by.[71]
EXAMPLE: In the measure of temperature,
we take the expansion and contraction of
mercury relative to the heat it contains as
a Quantitative Rule for the increase or decrease of temperature in general by dividing
the range of its change in magnitude into a
scale of arithmetical progression. Tempting
though it is to believe, this is not the measure
of temperature as such, but only the measure
of how Quantitative change specically affects the Quality of mercury. The water or air
the mercury thermometer measures has a very
dierent Qualitative relationship to changes
in the Quantity of heat which do not necessarily bear any direct relation to mercurys.
Thus, what is actually going on when we take
a temperature is a relationship of comparison between two Qualities and their respective natures when exposed to a Quantitative increase or decrease in heat, and not a universal
determination by some disembodied, abstract
thing that is temperature itself.[72]
So long as we arbitrarily use the Quantitative properties
of some Quality or other as a Rule to Measure the magnitude of other Qualities, we abstract from it its Qualitative
nature. However, once we have established a Quantitative ratio between two or more Qualities, we can give this
ratio an independent existence that Quantitatively unites
things that are Qualitatively distinct. We can thus take
the Qualities of both sides into account, the independent,
or Realized, Measure serving as their (c) Relation. This
Measure necessarily involves variable magnitudes since
the Qualitatively distinct ways in which dierent things
relate to Quantity can only be registered in their respective rates of increase or decrease relative to each other.
Further, in order for each side of the ratio to fully reect

10

the distinctiveness of the Quality it represents, both sides

must be Quantitatively self-related, i.e., take the form of
powers as in the case of the Ratio of Powers explicated
above.[73]
EXAMPLE: Velocity is the ratio of spaces relation to time:
v=

d
.
t

It is only an intellectual abstraction, though,

since it merely serves to measure space by the
Rule of time or time by the Rule of space. It
supplies no objective standard for the inherent
Quantitative relation to each other that pertains
to their specic Qualities. The formula for a
falling body comes closer,
d = at2
but here time is still serving as an arbitrary
Rule, that is, it is assumed to vary in a simple
arithmetical progression. It is the form of motion described by Keplers third law of planetary motion that comes closest for Hegel to being a Realized Measure of the relation between
the inherent Qualities of space and time:
d3 = at2 . [74]
C. Being-For-Self in Measure Although now united
by the Quantitative Ratio, the two or more Qualities thus
brought into relation retain their mutual separation as distinct Qualities. For example, even though we can determine the Quantitative relationship between space and
time in the example of a falling body, each of them can
still be considered on its own, independent of the other.
However, if we then take the constant produced by the
ratio of the two sides as a self-subsistent Something in
its own right, that is, a Being-For-Self, then the two formerly entirely distinct Qualities become its own sublated
moments, their very natures now seen to have been in fact
derived from this relation of Measure in the rst place.[75]
3.3.2

Real Measure

A. The Relation of Self-Subsistent Measures Real

Measure gives us a new standpoint external to the dierent Measures being brought into relation with each other,
this relation now designating the independent existence
of an actual physical Something. This Something gains
its Qualitative determination from the Quantitative (a)
combination between two Measures immanent in it, i.e.,
volume and weight. One designates an inner Quality, in
this case weight; the other designates an external Quality,
in this case volume, the amount of space it takes up. Their
combination gives us the ratio of weight to volume which
is its specic gravity. The constant that results from this

OBJECTIVE LOGIC: DOCTRINE OF BEING

ratio is the inner characteristic Real Measure of the thing

in question, but, taking the form as it does of a mere number, a Quantum, this constant is likewise subject to alteration, i.e., addition, subtraction, etc. Unlike mere Quantum, however, the Real Measure of a thing is inwardly determined, and so preserves itself somewhat in alteration.
If two material things are combined, the dual Measures
of the one are added to those of the other. The degree to
which they exhibit self-preservation is registered in the
internal Measureweight in this casewhich ends up
being equal, after combination, to the sum of the original
two Measures; the degree to which they exhibit Qualitative alteration is registered in the external Measure
space in this casewhich does not necessarily result in a
sum equal to its parts, but often in the case of material
substances exhibits a diminution in overall volume.[76]
If we adopt the constant of one specic Real Measure as
our Unit, the constants of other Real Measures can be
brought into relation to it as Amounts in a (b) series of
Measure relations. Since it is arbitrary which one Real
Measure in such a series will serve as the Unit, there are
as many incommensurable series of Measure relations as
there are individual Real Measures. However, when two
Real Measures, which are themselves ratios, are combined, the result is a new ratio of those ratios, itself designated by a constant in the form of a Quantum. If this
constant is adopted as the Unit, instead of an individual
Real Measure, then what were two incommensurable series are now made commensurable with each other in a
common denominator. Since each Real Measure within
a series forms such a constant with every other member
in that series, any individual series in which a particular
Real Measure serves as the Unit can be made commensurable with any other series with a dierent Real Measure
as Unit. Since it is a things Real Measure that determines its specic Quality, and since that Real Measure is
in turn derived from the Quantitative relation it has with
other Real Measures in the form of a series of constants, it
would appear that, as in Determinate Being above, Quality is only relative and externally determined. However,
as we have seen, a Real Measure also has an internal relation that gives it a self-subsistence that is indierent to
any external relation. Therefore, the series of Quantitative relationships between these Real Measures only determines the (c) Elective Anity between their dierent
Qualities, but not these Qualities themselves.[77]
The Quantity/Quality dialectic manifests itself in the
realm of Elective Anity in that a Real Measure within
in a series will not necessarily resonate Qualitatively with
those in another series even if they bear a proportional
Quantitative relationship. In fact, the specic Quality of a
particular Real Measure is in part registered by the other
Real Measures it has a special Anity for, that is, how
it responds to Quantitative Alteration. It is the Intensive
side of Quantity (see above) such as it relates to specic
Real Measures that determines its Qualitative behaviour
when subject to changes in Extensive Quantity.[78]

3.3

Measure
EXAMPLE: Hegel makes it clear that the
above analysis applies to the system of chemical anities and that of musical harmony. In
the case of the latter, for example, each individual note is a Real, self-subsistent Measure,
consisting as it does of a specic internal ratio between, say, the length and thickness of
a guitar string. An individual note, however,
only achieves meaning in its relation to a system of other notes that are brought into Quantitative relation to each other through a specic
note that serves as the Unit, or key. A note
serving as the key in one system, is equally an
individual member in other systems in which
other notes play this role. Notes that harmonize when played together are demonstrating
their Elective Anity for one another, that is,
the higher Qualitative unity that results from a
combination in which each individual note nevertheless retains its self-subsistence.[79]

B. Nodal Line of Measure-Relations The relation of

Elective Anity is an external relation between two Real
Measures that is determined by their Quantitative aspects.
In and of themselves, each Real Measure retains its Qualitative indierence to all others, even those it has Anity
for. Real Measures, however, are also subject to internal alteration akin to what has already been discussed in
Measure above, i.e., that its Quality can be maintained
only within a certain Quantitative range beyond which it
undergoes a sudden leap into another Quality. These
dierent Qualities form Nodes on a line of gradual Quantitative increase or decrease.[80]
EXAMPLE: Natural numbers consist of a series of numbers that gradually increase by one
in perpetual succession. However, some of
these numbers relate in specic ways to others, being their multiple, power or root, etc.,
and thus constitute Nodes. Transition from
the liquid to the frozen state in water does
not occur gradually with a diminution of temperature, but all of a sudden at 0C. Finally,
the state has its own measure of magnitude
and when this is exceeded this mere change
in size renders it liable to instability and disruption under that same constitution which was
its good fortune and its strength before its expansion. Thus, contrary to Aristotles doctrine
that natura non facit saltum, according to Hegel
nature does make leaps.[81]
C. The Measureless Measure, being the unity of Quality and Quantity, now transitions into its version of the
Innite, the Measureless, which accordingly is the unity
of the Qualitative and Quantitative Innites. In the Measureless, the Quantitative Innite is manifested in the po-

11
tential of the Nodal line to increase endlessly; the Qualitative Innite is manifested as the eternal beyond of
any particular Qualitative determination. Seeing as the
successive determinations are self-generated by an internal Quantitative Alteration of Measure, they can now be
seen, from the standpoint of the Measureless, to be different States of one and the same Substrate. The nature
of the Substrate is not tied, like the Something was, to
a merely external Qualitative appearance, but represents
the underlying unity of a variety of internally determined
appearances, which are its States.[82]
3.3.3 The Becoming of Essence
A. Absolute Indierence
This Substrate, as what persists through the succession
of States, is in a relation of Absolute Indierence to every particular determinationbe it of quality, quantity
or measurethat it contains. It is merely the abstract expression of the unity that underlies their totality.[83]
B. Indierence as Inverse Ratio of its Factors
Taken in its immediacy, this Indierence is simply the
result of all the dierent determinatenesses that emerge
within it. It itself does not determine its own inner uctuations, i.e., is not self-determining. However, in accordance with the measure relations developed so far,
each of its moments are in reciprocal, quantitatively determined ratios with one another. Formerly, from the
standpoint of Quality, a sucient Quantitative increase
or decrease would result in a sudden transition from one
Quality to another. Now, with Absolute Indierence as
our standpoint, every possible Qualitative determination
is already implicitly related to every other by means of
a Quantitative ratio. Every Quality is connected to, and
in equilibrium with, its corresponding other. It is therefore no longer meaningful to say that something can have
more or less of one Quality than another as if each
Quality were absolutely distinct from each other. Whatever Quality there is more of in one thing than another
can be equally said to be a less of whatever Quality exists in its stead in the other, i.e., there is an Inverse Ratio of their Factors. So, with a so-called Quantitative
change, one factor becomes preponderant as the other
diminishes with accelerated velocity and is overpowered
by the rst, which therefore constitutes itself the sole
self-subsistent Quality. The two Qualities are no longer
distinct, mutually exclusive determinations, but together
comprise a single whole.[84]
EXAMPLE: Here, Hegel makes a powerful argument in favour of the explanatory powers of
his speculative philosophy over those of empirical science, specically with regards to the
concepts of centripetal and centrifugal forces
as they are supposed to relate the elliptical motion of celestial bodies. If, as is supposed by

12

4
science, such an orbit is made up of an inverse
relation of centripetal and centrifugal forces
the former predominating over the other as the
body approaches perihelion, the reverse if approaching aphelionthen the sudden overtaking of the stronger force by the weaker that
takes place on either end of the orbit can only
be explained by some mysterious third force.
Indeed, what is to stop the dominant force from
completely overtaking the weaker, causing the
body either to crash into whatever it is orbiting or to y o at ever accelerating speeds
into space? Only the inherent unity of the two
Qualities, centripetal and centrifugal, arrived at
by the ascension of thought to Absolute Indifference, can adequately explain the Notion of
the elliptical orbit, says Hegel.[85]

C. Transition into Essence

Strictly within the realm of Being, the underlying unity
behind all its determinations necessarily stands externally, and in contradiction, to those determinations themselves. The transition to Essence occurs when these determinations reabsorb this unity back into themselves, i.e.,
they sublate it. The inherent contradiction between difference and unity is resolved when the latter is posited as
the negative of the former. So, from henceforth it cannot
be said that they simply emerge within the Substrate of Indierence, but that this substrate itself is their very own
living self-relation. In other words, the dierences between all the determinations of Being, namely the Quantitative dierence and the inverse ratio of factors, are no
longer self-subsistent, but in fact are mere moments in
the expression of the implicit unity that rules them and,
themselves, are only through their repulsion from themselves. Being has nally determined itself to no longer
be simply armative Being, i.e., that which characterized Being as Being in the rst place, but as a relation
with itself, as Being-With-Self, or Essence.[86]

4
4.1
4.1.1

Objective Logic:
Essence

Doctrine of

Reection-Within-Self
Illusory Being

A. The Essential and the Unessential The immediate characteristic displayed by Essence, once it nally
emerges from Being, is simply that it is not Being. This
apparently puts us back into the sphere of Determinate
Being (see above), where each side of a relation mutually determined the Other side as being not what it is.
In this immediate, merely relative relation, Essence and
Being thus become the Essential and the Unessential, respectively. There is nothing arising within this relation,

OBJECTIVE LOGIC: DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE

however, to tell us what it is about something that is Essential and what Unessential. Those that apply this mode
of thinking to something are making an arbitrary distinction, the opposite of which could always be claimed with
equal justication. What saves Essence from falling back
in to the relativism of Determinate Being is the very radical and absolute distinction from Being that denes it as
Essence in the rst place. Being cannot therefore simply
preserve itself as an Other relative to Essence, but, having
been sublated by Essence, it has for that very reason itself
become nothingness, a non-essence, Illusory Being.[87]

B. Illusory Being So in its relation to Essence, Being

has lost its being, has become Illusory. All the determinations of Being covered in the rst third of the Science
of Logic are no longer self-subsistent, but only are at
all as negations of Essence. This total dependence on
Essence means that there is nothing any longer in Being
itself upon which any of its own determinations can be
based, i.e., there is no longer any mediation within Being. This role is entirely taken up by Essence which is
pure mediation relative to Illusory Beings pure immediacy. Hegel claims this is the mode of thought that corresponds to ancient skepticism as well as the modern
idealism of Leibniz, Kant, and Fichte. Illusory Being,
though not Essence itself, nevertheless belongs entirely to
Essence. It is that through which Essence generates itself
as what it is, namely, the purely negative as regards Being. The constant appearance and disappearance of the
empty manifestations of Illusory Being can now be seen
as Essences own self-generating movement, its own Reection.[88]

C. Reection Reection in the sphere of Essence corresponds to Becoming in the sphere of Being. However,
in Being, this movement was between a positivepure
Beingand a negativepure Nothingness. Here however, the two terms are Illusory Being and Essence. Illusory Being, as has already been established, is a nullity,
nothingness. Essence, by denition, is non-being, absolute negativity. So Reection, the movement between
them, is the movement of nothing to nothing and so back
to itself. Both these terms, in being absolutely negative,
are identical to one another: Essence is Illusory Being and
Illusory Being is Essence. They are, however, also relatively negative, in that the one is, by denition, not what
the other is. This contradiction manifests in Essence in
that it presupposes or posits, on its own, that which it immediately dierentiates itself from: Illusory Being. This
absolute recoil upon itself is Essence as a) Positing Reection.[89]
The next determination of Reection, b) External Reection, shifts the emphasis from the absolute negativity,
or nothingness, in which the posited Illusory Being and
its positing Essence nd their identity, to the relative negativity upon which their opposition is based. Although it

4.1

Reection-Within-Self

knows that the Illusory Being it nds immediately before it has been posited by none other than itself, External
Refection nevertheless regards this Being as something
external to it from which it returns to itself. What concerns it, therefore, is no longer the act of positing itself,
but the specic determinateness of that which is posited,
since it is this and nothing else that establishes its externality in the rst place.[90]
EXAMPLE: Hegel oers for comparison with
his notion of External Reection the reective
judgement of Kant, which, in the Critique of
Judgement, is described as the faculty of the
mind that determines the universals that lie behind immediately given particulars. This action is similar to that of External Reection
with the crucial dierence that, for Hegel, the
universal does not simply lie behind the particular, but generates the particular from itself and so is the particulars own true Essence.
The immediate particular upon which Kants
judgement works is, in actuality, simply a nothingness posited by Reection itself solely in
order to generate its equally null universal,
Essence.[91]
With Positing Reection, the Illusory Being that was
posited was only a means for Essences mediation with
itself. Now, with c) Determining Reection, not only
is the moment of Illusory Being foregrounded again, but
the specic determinations of this Being come into play
as well. The absolute nothingness of Essence forms
the background to any and all of the determinations it
chooses to Reect itself o of. These Determinations
of Reectionformerly known as Determinate Beings
when they were in the realm of Quality (see above)
therefore share in the nullity that undergirds them. This
nullity actually serves to x them eternally in their specic determination and preserve them from Alteration,
because they no longer relate to each other externally
as Others to one another, but internally as equals in
Essences nothingness. All the possible determinations
of Being are thus preserved negatively in Essence as free
Essentialities oating in the void without attracting or repelling one another.[92]
4.1.2

The Essentialities

A. Identity In the sphere of Being, above, Qualities

were determined only relatively. What something was,
was determined entirely by that which dierentiated it
from what it wasn't, i.e., it was negatively determined
by its Other. Here in Essence however, the negativity necessary to establish determination is no longer directed outward, towards an Other, but inward. This is
because Essence is in itself absolute negativity, nothingness, and it follows that any determination made therein

13
will share in this negativity and itself be essentially nothing. Therefore, an Essentiality, as opposed to a Quality, is
essentially the same as its otherthey are both essentially
nothing. As self-determining, whatever determination
Essence takes on is freely self-generated, it is what it is,
and so is simple Identity-with-self. This absolute Identity
rests on the absolute negativity that unites Essence with
its Essentialities. However, if we recall from Reection
above, Essence is also negative relative to its Essentialities. The Essentialities are determined Essence and, as
we know, determination by denition involves negation.
Therefore, while the Essentialities are absolutely Identical in their shared nothingness, their absolute negativity,
they are equally absolutely Dierent in their determinations, their relative negativity.[87]
EXAMPLE: Here Hegel embarks on a critique
on one of the most basic assumptions of classical logic, the Law of Identity, usually expressed
as A=A. Although supercially the immediate
truth of this proposition cannot be denied, further reection reveals that nothing absolute can
be derived from it. For it can only hold true
provisionally insofar as A is dierent from notA. The Law of Identity, the purpose of which
is to draw an absolute distinction between identity and dierence, therefore contains dierence as a necessary moment implicitly within
it. The paucity of the absolute truth it is meant
to represent becomes very clear when applied
empirically. If ... to the question 'what is a
plant?' the answer is given 'A plant isa plant',
the truth of such a statement is at once admitted by the entire company on whom it is tested,
and at the same time it is equally unanimously
declared that the statement says nothing.[93]
B. Dierence The Dierence of Reection must be
distinguished from the Otherness of Determinate Being.
The latter is a relative relation between two Determinate
Beings whereby they distinguish themselves one from the
another and in turn determine themselves as specic Beings based on this distinction. In the sphere of Reection,
however, any determination posited by Essence is, as a determination, necessarily Dierent from the absolute negativity that is its Essence. The Dierence of Reection,
therefore, is dierent in relation to its own self, and so it
is not relative but a) Absolute Dierence.[94]
Absolute Dierence contains both Dierence and Identity within it as moments just as, conversely, Identity contains itself and Dierence as its moments. The relation
between Identity and Dierence takes the form of one
term reecting o the other back into itself: Dierence
o of Identity back into itself or Identity o of Dierence back into itself. This is to be considered as the
essential nature of reection and as the specic, original
ground of all activity and self-movement. Because each

14
of these two moments are self-related in this way, they
do not mutually determine one another. Instead, they are
indierent to one another. Therefore, Dierence is b)
Diversity.[95]

OBJECTIVE LOGIC: DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE

of this, the Negative can equally well be regarded as positive and vice versa. They are not Positive and Negative
merely in comparison with one another, but each contains
within itself the other as an essential element of its own
[96]
Yet another duality emerges at this point. As moments, determination.
Identity and Dierence require each other and are bound
up with one another: one term could not exist without
EXAMPLE: An hours journey to the east and
the other. But at the same time, they absolutely negate
the same distance traveled back to the west,
one another and only are at all by virtue of their mucancels the rst journey. ... At the same time,
tual negation of each other. So if we are an external
the hours journey to the east is not in itself the
party concerned with a specic determination of Idenpositive direction, nor is the journey west the
tity, the moment of Dierence, though intrinsic to the
negative direction; ... it is a third point of view
fact of this Identity, is very far from our minds. That it
outside them that makes one positive and the
is Dierent from other things does not concern us or it
other negative. ... [T]he distance covered is
at the moment: it is implicit. The category of Identity itonly one distance, not two, one going east and
self, however, is not determined by whatever it is that it
the other going west. But at the same time,
is applied to, but by its reection o of Dierence back
the distance traveled east and west is the sum
into itself. So if, from our external standpoint, that which
of a twofold eort or the sum of two periods
comprises the Identity of something cannot be established
of time.[97]
without a Comparison of Likeness with something else.
What specically is Dierent about something can similarly only be determined by a Comparison of Unlikeness
between it and something else. Like and Unlike, being C. Contradiction Both the Positive and the Negative
external to the things they refer to, can each be equally are self-subsistent determinations: each side can stand on
applied to one and the same Determination. Things are its own without explicit reference to the other. At the
Like each other insofar as the are not Unlike each other same time, however, they completely exclude one another
and vice versa: the two terms are mutually exclusive in- and in fact rely on this exclusion for their self-subsistence.
sofar as they refer to the same thing, but in themselves, In that sense, the Positive itself is constituted by the very
apart from the things they refer to, there is no dierence Negative that it excludes; it is based on this exclusion and
between them. Since any aspect may be externally se- thus contains what it excludes it within itself. Ditto the
lected to demonstrate the Likeness and Unlikeness of any Negative. This inclusion of what is excluded is what contwo things, these terms really only refer, not intrinsically stitutes the Positive and the Negative as what they are.
to their objects, but to themselves only and, as likewise This is Contradiction. (In the Negative, this self- conself-referred, are indistinguishable from each other inde- tradiction is explicit, but it is no less the nature of the
pendent of their objects. Likeness and Unlikeness are Positive.)
both in fact only Likeness. The internal union that existed So, similar to Becoming above, the Positive and the Negbetween Identity and Dierence which is merely implicit ative immediately transition the one into the other: the
to the outside observer, therefore emerges again in exter- Positive includes the Negative which immediately exnal reection between Likeness and Unlikeness, and thus cludes the Positive; the resulting Negative however also
overcomes the external Diversity that held Identity and includes the Positive which in turn excludes the Negative
Dierence indierently apart from each other. This re- and so on ad innitum. This mutual inclusion and excluconstituted unity that thus comes out of Diversity is c) sion cancels out the both of them. This results in nullity.
Opposition.
Out of this nullity, the unity of the two sides is restored
The hidden, internal unity that bound the two moments in the following way. As stated above, both the Positive
of Identity and Dierence together despite their appar- and the Negative are each self-subsistent on their own, but
ent mutual indierence becomes explicit once they are it is a self-subsistence that is immediately obliterated by
mediated from the outside by Likeness and Unlikeness. the others. Now, however, arising out of their mutual deThey are no longer indierent to one another but relate to struction comes a self-subsistence that is common to the
each other intrinsically as Opposites. A given determina- both of them. Instead of merely excluding each other,
tion, as seen from its Positive aspect, is Likeness reected each side sublates the other, meaning that whatever is
back onto itself o of Unlikeness. Seen from its Nega- posited as Positive is at the same time equally the Negative
tive aspect, it is Unlikeness reected back onto itself o of its Negative, and whatever is Negative is at the same
of Likeness. These two aspects, however, are the con- time equally a Positive. The two sides posit and negate
stitutive moments of one and the same overall determi- each other simultaneously, and in doing so they no longer
nation. Although as a whole, the Positive and Negative destroy each other, but preserve one another. Therecomprise a unity, the Positive on its own is also a self- fore the Positive and Negative are in fact the same and
their
subsistent being, as is the Negative on its own. Because this, their samenesswhich nevertheless includes
Contradictionis their Essence as Ground.[98]

15
EXAMPLE: Light is usually reckoned as
purely Positive and dark, purely Negative: the
absence of light. However, it is not inherent
to these terms that they should be so. Darkness can be taken to be a Positive in its own
right as the non-self-dierentiating womb of
generation and vice versa. Furthermore, although they are usually dened as being mutually exclusive, the one being the absence of the
other, there is a quantitative spectrum of grey
and a qualitative spectrum of colour which exist between the one extreme and the other. The
Ground would be a concept of light which includes all of the above.[99]

4.2

Ground

Simply put ground is the essence of essence, which for

Hegel arguably means the lowest, broadest rung in his ontology because ground appears to fundamentally support
his system. Hegel says, for example, that ground is that
from which phenomena is understood. Within ground
Hegel brings together such basic constituents of reality as
form, matter, essence, content, relation, and condition.
The chapter on ground concludes by describing how these
elements, properly conditioned, ultimately will bring a
fact into existence (a segue to the subsequent chapter on
existence).
Hegel considers form to be the focal point of absolute
ground, saying that form is the completed whole of reection. Broken into components, form taken together
with essence gives us a substrate for the ground relation
(Hegel seems to mean relation in a quasi-universal sense).
When we combine form with matter the result is determinate matter. Hegel thinks that matter itself cannot
be seen": only a determination of matter resulting from
a specic form can be seen. Thus the only way to see
matter is by combining matter with form (given a literal
reading of his text). Finally, content is the unity of form
and determinate matter. Content is what we perceive.
Determinate ground consists of formal ground, real
ground, and complete ground. Remember with Hegel
that when we classify something as determinate we are
not referring to absolute abstractions (as in absolute
ground, above) but now (with determinate ground) have
some values attached to some variablesor to put it in
Hegels terminology, ground is now posited and derived
with determinate content.

nomena, but we may later nd upon critical examination

that this phenomenon supposedly explained by centrifugal force is actually used to infer centrifugal force in the
rst place. Hegel characterizes this sort of reasoning as a
witchs circle in which phenomena and phantoms run
riot.
Real ground is external and made up of two substrates,
both directly applicable to content (which evidently is
what we seem to perceive). The rst is the relation between the ground and the grounded and the second substrate handles the diversity of content. As an example
Hegel says that an ocial may hold an oce for a variety
of reasonssuitable connections, made an appearance on
such and such occasion, and so forth. These various factors are the grounds for his holding oce. It is real ground
that serves to rstly make the connection between holding
oce and these reasons, and secondly to bind the various
reasons, i.e. diverse content, together. Hegel points out
that the door is wide open to innite determinations that
are external to the thing itself (recall that real ground is
external). Potentially any set of reasons could be given
for an ocial to be holding oce.
In complete ground Hegel brings together formal and real
ground, now saying that formal ground presupposes real
ground and vice versa. Complete ground Hegel says is
the total ground-relation.

5 Subjective Logic or the Doctrine

of the Notion
This volume is the third major piece within the Science
of Logic. Here Hegel introduces his Notion within which
he extends Kants basic schemes of judgement and syllogism classication. Hegel shows that the true idea can
only be based upon valid reasoning and objectivity.

6 References
[1] Hegel (1969), 3541
[2] Hegel (1969), 51
[3] Hegel (1969), 5053
[4] Hegel (1969), 7880
[5] Hegel (1969), 1814
[6] Hegel (1969), 93

In formal ground Hegel seems to be referring to those

causal explanations of some phenomena that make it what [7] Hegel (1969), 132
it is. In a (uncharacteristically) readable three paragraph [8] Hegel (1969), 136
remark, Hegel criticizes the misuse of formal grounds,
claiming that the sciences are basically built upon empty [9] Hegel (1969), 133
tautologies. Centrifugal force, Hegel states as one of sev[10] Hegel (1969), 179
eral examples drawn from the physical sciences, may be
given as prime grounds (i.e. explanation of) some phe- [11] Hegel (1969), 140-146

16

[12] Hegel (1969), 184187

[50] Hegel (1969), 402

[13] Hegel (1969), 195198

[51] Hegel (1969), 404406, 425

[14] Hegel (1969), 208209

[52] Hegel (1969), 429431

[15] Hegel (1969), 201202

[53] Hegel (1969), 434436

[16] Hegel (1969), 210212

[54] Hegel (1969), 438444

[17] Hegel (1969), 219224

[55] Hegel (1969), 445451

[18] Hegel (1969), 227

[56] Hegel (1969), 462471

[19] Hegel (1969), 231

[57] Hegel (1969), 472478

[20] Hegel (1969), 233235

[58] Hegel (1969), 479482

[21] Hegel (1969), 232

[59] Hegel (1969), 488491

[22] Hegel (1969), 239

[60] Hegel (1969), 493496

[23] Hegel (1969), 246

[61] Hegel (1969), 497499

[24] Hegel (1969), 247249

[62] Hegel (1969), 500503

[25] Hegel (1969), 254

[63] Hegel (1969), 504517

[26] Hegel (1969), 255261

[64] Hegel (1969), 530537

[27] Hegel (1969), 266

[65] Hegel (1969), 538570

[28] Hegel (1969), 269

[66] Hegel (1969), 674678

[29] Hegel (1969), 273274

[67] Hegel (1969), 679687

[30] Hegel (1969), 275286

[68] Hegel (1969), 688694

[31] Hegel (1969), 300304

[69] Hegel (1969), 712-717

[32] Hegel (1969), 302

[70] Hegel (1969), 718-722

[33] Hegel (1969), 316

[71] Hegel (1969), 725-729

[34] Hegel (1969), 318

[72] Hegel (1969), 730

[35] Hegel (1969), 320321

[73] Hegel (1969), 731-734

[36] Hegel (1969), 322

[74] Hegel (1969), 735

[37] Hegel (1969), 326

[75] Hegel (1969), 738-741

[38] Hegel (1969), 328

[76] Hegel (1969), 745-748

[39] Hegel (1969), 332334

[77] Hegel (1969), 749-753

[40] Hegel (1969), 335336

[78] Hegel (1969), 755-756

[41] Hegel (1969), 338339

[79] Hegel (1969), 754

[42] Hegel (1969), 340342

[80] Hegel (1969), 769-773

[43] Hegel (1969), 349352

[81] Hegel (1969), 774-778

[44] Hegel (1969), 356

[82] Hegel (1969), 779-84

[45] Hegel (1969), 358

[83] Hegel (1969), 785-786

[46] Hegel (1969), 361365

[84] Hegel (1969), 787-796

[47] Hegel (1969), 374, 385

[85] Hegel (1969), 797-802

[48] Hegel (1969), 370

[86] Hegel (1969), 803-806

[49] Hegel (1969), 395398

[87] Hegel (1969), 819-822

REFERENCES

17
Di Giovanni, George (ed) 1990. Essays on Hegels
Logic Albany: New York State University Press.

[88] Hegel (1969), 823-832

[89] Hegel (1969), 833-845

Harris, Errol E. 1983. An Interpretation of the Logic

of Hegel Lanham.

[90] Hegel (1969), 846-849

[91] Hegel (1969), 850-852

Harris, William T. 1985. Hegels Logic: A Book on

the Genesis of the Categories of the Mind. A Critical
Exposition Chicago.

[92] Hegel (1969), 853-859

[93] Hegel (1969), 875-884

Hartnack, Justus, 1998. An Introduction to Hegels

Logic. Indianapolis: Hackett. ISBN 0-87220-424-3

[94] Hegel (1969), 885-889

[95] Hegel (1969), 890-901
[96] Hegel (1969), 908-918 908-918
[97] Hegel (1969), 922

Rinaldi, Giacomo, 1992. A History and Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel Lewiston: Edwin Mellen
Press.

[98] Hegel (1969), 931-945

[99] Hegel (1969), 946-951

6.1

Roser, Andreas, 2009. Ordnung und Chaos in

Hegels Logik. 2 Volumes, New York, Frankfurt,
Wien. ISBN 978-3-631-58109-4

Bibliography

Hegel, G. W. F. (1969). Hegels Science of Logic.

Allen & Unwin.

Editions of Science of Logic

translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers.
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929
translated by Henry S. Macran (Hegels Logic of
World and Idea) (Bk III Pts II, III only). Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1929
translated by A. V. Miller; Foreword by J. N. Findlay. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1969
translated by George di Giovanni, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010

Trisokkas, Ioannis, 2012. Pyrrhonian Scepticism

and Hegels Theory of Judgement. A Treatise on the
Possibility of Scientic Inquiry Boston: Brill.
Wineld, Richard Dien, 2006. From Concept to Objectivity. Thinking Through Hegels Subjective Logic
Aldershot: Ashgate. ISBN 0-7546-5536-9.

9 External links
Source text (German) Wissenschaft der Logik Vol. 1
Vol. 2
Outline of Hegels Logic at marxists.org
The Meaning of Hegels Logic (commentary at
Wikisource)
Dunayevskaya : Rough Notes on Hegels SCIENCE
OF LOGIC

Secondary literature
Bencivenga, Ermanno 2000.
Logic Oxford.

Houlgate, Stephen, 2006. The Opening of Hegels

Logic: From Being to Innity Purdue: University
Press.

Terry Button : Hegels Logic A Brief Synopsis

Hegels Dialectical

Burbidge, John W., 1995. On Hegels Logic. Fragments of a Commentary Atlantic Highlands, N.J.
Burbidge, John W. 2006. The Logic of Hegels
Logic. An IntroductionPeterborough, ON.
Butler, Clark. 1996. Hegels Logic. Between Dialectic and History Evanston.
Carlson, David 2007. A Commentary on Hegels Science of Logic New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 9781403986283

Lenin : Consepectus of Hegels Science of Logic

Lecture Course in Hegels Science of Logic
Richard Dien Wineld (Audio)

18

10

10
10.1

TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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