1

The Significance of Territorial Presence and the Rights of Immigrants

Sarah Song*
Migration in Legal and Political Theory, eds. Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi (Oxford, forthcoming)
Abstract:
How should a liberal democratic state treat noncitizens who are inside its borders? The idea that all persons not
just citizens present in the territory of a state are entitled to civil, social, and even political rights is reflected in the
way the U.S. and European countries treat noncitizen residents. But what is the normative significance of territorial
presence? This article examines three answers based on the principles of (1)affiliation, (2)fair play, and (3)coercion.
I argue that the three principles taken together can account for the special rights and obligations of different groups
of territorial insiders. Turning to the question of the content of the special rights and obligations, I contend that the
three principles are consistent with an approach that disaggregates rights and obligations from citizenship status.
Keywords:
Affiliation, citizenship, coercion, fair play, immigrants, immigration, noncitizens, rights, territory, territoriality.

Contemporary philosophical debates about immigration have focused on two sets of

questions. The first has to do with the control of state borders and the movement of people across
them. Do states have the right to control their own borders? What, if any, limits are there on this
right? Some theorists defend this right by appeal to a communitys right to cultural preservation
or the idea of freedom of association.1 Others have pursued the question of what the content of a
liberal democratic states immigration policy should look like: who should get in and why.2 In
this article, I leave aside these important questions about the grounds of the states right to
control immigration and how this right ought to be exercised in order to focus on a second set of
normative questions about immigration: how a liberal democratic state should treat noncitizens
who are already inside its borders.
These two sets of questions are, of course, related. If one thinks that the state has the right
to control its own borders, one may also think that the state has the right to treat territorial
insiders in any way it wishes. In states that aspire to liberal democratic principles, however,
citizens must balance a political communitys right to self-determination against a commitment
to treating all persons in the territory as equals. One way of articulating the moral constraints on
a liberal democratic states right to self-determination is in terms of the value of equality. One
might emphasize the moral equality of all human beings to argue for basic human rights,
regardless of the territorial location of individuals.3 But others might maintain that the premise of

For comments and discussion, I am grateful to the editors of this volume, as well as Seyla Benhabib, Linda
Bosniak, Corey Brettschneider, Stephen Galoob, Bryan Garsten, Matthew Lister, Karuna Mantena, Hamsa Murthy,
Paulina Ochoa Espejo, Jon Quong, Daniel Viehoff, Leti Volpp, and participants at the 2011 Law and Society
Association meeting, the 2011 Princeton Program in Ethics and Public Affairs Seminar, and the 2012 Yale Political
Theory Workshop.
1
See, respectively, Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic
Books, 1983) and Christopher Heath Wellman, Immigration and Freedom of Association, Ethics 119 (2008): 10941.
2
Joseph Carens, Who Should Get In? The Ethics of Immigration Admissions, Ethics & International Affairs 17(1)
(2003): 95-110.
3
Joseph Carenss Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, Review of Politics, vol. 49, no. 2 (1987): 25173, reflects such a view. Yasemin Soysals Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe
(University of Chicago Press, 1994) and David Jacobsons Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of
Citizenship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) offer a political sociological analysis of the way
states have turned in incremental fashion to international human rights law (such as the UN human rights

2
moral equality is consistent with the view that physical presence in a states territory should
make a difference to the rights one is entitled to. This chapter explores this normative position by
considering what equality requires in the treatment of noncitizens who are present in the territory
of liberal democratic states. A full treatment of this topic would require showing how the
demands of equality should be weighed against the states right to self-determination, including
the right to control immigration. My more modest aim is to offer pro tanto reasons for extending
rights to territorially present noncitizens in a way that is consistent with treating them as equals.
This normative inquiry is important because liberal democratic states are already engaged
in the practice of extending a range of rights to noncitizens in virtue of their territorial presence,
but without deeper consideration of why territorial presence matters. For example, in the U.S.,
noncitizens are entitled to many of the same rights as citizens, including the protection of
antidiscrimination law, due process rights in criminal proceedings, and access to public
education and some welfare benefits. In the 1886 case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the U.S. Supreme
Court first acknowledged that basic rights should be extended to all persons within the territory,
regardless of their citizenship status: [Fundamental rights] are not confined to the protection of
citizens These provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.4 That
territorial presence was significant was asserted again in the 1982 case, Plyler v. Doe, which
struck down a Texas statute barring the children of unauthorized migrants from attending public
schools. The Court held that equal protection of the laws extends to anyone, citizen or stranger,
who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a states territory.5 These
legal claims to personhood are not appeals to personhood simpliciter that all persons qua
persons are entitled to equal concern and respect but what Linda Bosniak has called claims of
territorial personhood that all persons within the territorial jurisdiction are entitled to some of
the same protections and benefits that citizens enjoy.6
This essay examines three different accounts of the normative significance of territorial
presence, based on the principles of (1) affiliation, (2) fair play, and (3) coercion.7 Each of these
principles offers a way of delimiting the scope of the duties that human beings have to each
other. My focus is on whether these principles can account for the special obligations that
territorial insiders of a state have to one another. The claim that territorial insiders have special
responsibilities toward one another rests on the following premises: (1) that there are certain
kinds of relationships that ground special responsibilities, and (2) that territorial insiders share
the kind of relationship that grounds special responsibilities. I assume the first premise and look
to different accounts of the second premise. What kind of relationship do territorial insiders have
to one another, and what sorts of rights and responsibilities does the relationship generate?

instruments and the European Convention on Human Rights) as a basis for extending rights to migrants; one might
build on their analyses to argue, from the premise of moral equality, that this is what states ought to be doing.
4
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). A decade later, in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228
(1896), the Court ruled that noncitizen criminal defendants, like citizen defendants, are entitled to the protection of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
5
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982).
6
Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 55.
7
This chapter is inspired by Linda Bosniaks Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants,
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8(2) (2007): 389-410, which examines the principles of affiliation, anti-caste, and
mutuality of obligation (or the coercion principle). I explore the affiliation and coercion principles in greater depth
and consider an additional account based on fair play.

3
My chapter proceeds as follows. First, I analyze the three principles affiliation, fair
play, and coercion to see how well they account for special rights and obligations of territorial
insiders. While each account suffers weaknesses, I argue that the three principles, taken together,
do ground a case for the special rights and obligations of different groups of territorial insiders. I
then turn to consider the question of what equality requires when it comes to the treatment of
territorially present noncitizens: does equality require uniform treatment, or is differential
treatment permissible? I conclude by exploring the implications of my analysis for the content of
the special rights and responsibilities of different groups of territorial insiders.
Affiliation
We might view territorial presence as generating special rights and responsibilities in
virtue of certain kinds of affiliations that inhabitants of a territory share with one another. Legal
scholar Hiroshi Motomura has described immigration as affiliation as the view that the
treatment of lawful immigrants and other noncitizens should depend on the ties that they have
formed in this country.8 The affiliation principle is also at the heart of Joseph Carenss
argument for amnesty for unauthorized migrants: there is something deeply wrong in forcing
people to leave a place where they have lived for a long time. Most people form their deepest
human connections where they liveit becomes home. Webs of social connection or de facto
social membership (as opposed to official legal membership) is taken to ground a case for the
right to reside permanently in a states territory. As Carens puts it, People who live and work
and raise their families in a society become members, whatever their legal status. That is why we
find it hard to expel them when they are discovered.9
Affiliations were a central rationale for the legalization programs enacted by the U.S.
Congress and signed into law by President Reagan in 1986, which extended a path to citizenship
to 2.9 miliion unauthorized migrants.10 The importance of affiliations is also reflected in U.S.
immigration law in the context of deportation proceedings. Consider noncitizens admitted to the
U.S. as lawful permanent residents (LPRs). LPRs who commit certain crimes are subject to
deportation, but if they have lived in the U.S. as LPRs for at least five years, have seven years of
continuous residence, and no commission of an aggravated felony, they may appeal to an
immigration judge to cancel the deportation order.11 The underlying rationale seems to be that
the longer noncitizens are here, the deeper their affiliations, and the stronger their claim to
remain. Some appeal to human rights, but most rely on familial and social ties to citizens of the
host society.
What kind of affiliations should count? One answer is provided by theorists of
nationalism, who emphasize the importance of ties to the nation. On David Millers prominent
theory of nationality, nations are defined as communities bound together by natural
sentiments.12 In characterizing what is distinctive about national identity, Miller says it
requires that the people who share it should have something in common, a set of characteristics
that in the past was often referred to as a national character, but which I prefer to describe as a
8

Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 11.
9
Joseph Carens, Immigrants and the Right to Stay, 12, 18-19.
10
Immigrant Reform and Control Act of 1986, Public Law 99-603 (Act of November 6, 1986).
11
Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (hereafter IIRIRA), P.L. 104-208 240A(a),
8 U.S.C. 1229b(a) (2006).
12
Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 58 n.11.

4
common public culture.13 You and I share a national culture, even if we never meet, if each of
us has a personal history involving the national culture, has been initiated into its traditions, and
identifies with the nation. Miller emphasizes the openness of his account to immigrants:
immigration need not pose problems, provided only that the immigrants come to share a
common national identity, to which they may contribute their own distinctive ingredients.14
For the sake of argument, lets grant that national affiliations have ethical significance,
that they are a valid source of rights and obligations. We nonetheless run into some difficulties.
First, the boundaries of national affiliations dont map neatly onto territorial boundaries. Not
even all citizens of a state speak the national language, and many residents, including many
citizens, may lack a sense of belonging together or a strong degree of identification with the
national culture. On a strict interpretation of the nationality principle, such disengagement with
the national culture would undermine the disengaged noncitizens access to citizenship, or in
the case of disengaged birthright citizens, jeopardize the citizenship status they already possess.
Proponents of the nationality principle might say this is as it should be. My point here is that
national affiliations are an imperfect proxy for territorial presence.
Second, it seems morally perverse to require affiliation with the dominant national
culture as a condition of equal treatment. Consider Chinese migrants in the late-nineteenthcentury America. On the nationalist view, the greater the immigrants identification and
interaction with the dominant society, the greater his claim to rights. But what if racial prejudice
and inequality are barriers to integrating into the national culture as they have been in the U.S.
and elsewhere? In order to claim rights, Chinese and other nonwhite migrants would have had to
identify and affiliate with the white majority who sought to exclude them.15
In response, one might argue that what triggers equal concern is not affiliation with
members of the dominant group but with any local group in the host society. Affilations with
family, friends, neighbors, and co-workers in the host society is sufficient to trigger equal
concern. These local affiliations are what Carens seems to have in mind in making his case for
amnesty. In practice, local, not national, affiliations are the kinds of ties that U.S. immigration
law has tended to prioritize. For example, in considering appeals to deportation orders, much
greater weight is given to family ties than national ties. Whether the noncitizen being deported is
able to speak the language of the country to which they will go sometimes comes up, but it is a
relatively minor factor. More weight is given to whether deportation would result in extreme
hardship to their spouses, parents, or children who would be left behind.16
The local affiliations view, however, is not free of problems either. First, it seems too
weak to generate equal concern. Consider a migrant in the UK who develops friends in the UK
while also maintaining ties of family and friendship with people from his home country. Why
does the fact that he interacts with a group of people in the UK entitle him to equal concern from
the British government if he also has affiliations of a similar kind outside the territory? In
response, the local affiliations view needs to explain the nature, density, and depth of affiliations
that should trigger equal concern. A proponent of the local affiliations view would have to argue
something like the following: when a persons primary affiliations are in the host country, he is
entitled to equal concern. For example, one might argue that noncitizens whose most intimate
13

Miller, On Nationality, 25.

Miller, On Nationality, 26.
15
On racial discrimination in the history of immigration policy, see Sarah Fines chapter in this volume.
16
See, e.g., Cruz Rendon v. Holder, 604 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2009) (minor childs specialized medical and
educational needs offered as grounds for cancelling the deportation order).
14

5
affiliatespartners, children, and other family members or close friendsare in the host state
have a prima facie claim to remain in the territory.
A second problem with the local affiilations view is that ties to family, friends, and
neighbors is an imperfect proxy for territorial presence, especially for the most recently arrived
migrants. Carens is probably right that most people form their deepest human connections
where they live.17 Yet, there is some irony in grounding a case for the rights of immigrants on
affiliations since the disjuncture between country of residence and the location of ones familial
and other affiliations is greatest in the case of migrants, including temporary workers who leave
loved ones behind in order to work and send money back home. Many immigrants will develop
social ties in the host country, but most will not do this right away. Using time as a proxy for
affiliation, Carens suggests that one or two years is not enough to develop substantial affiliations
and fifteen to twenty years are much more than enough. He settles upon five years of settled
residence without any criminal convictions as sufficient to establish anyone as a responsible
member of society.18 But before a noncitizen establishes local affiliations, on what grounds
could she claim rights? Consider the case of a first-time visitor to the U.S. who has no
affiliations to any residents of the host country. Under current law, such a visitor would still
enjoy legal protections against unreasonable search and seizure from the moment she sets foot in
the territory. Noncitizens who have just entered the territory are treated, for many legal purposes,
the same as those who have lived here for years.19 The affiliations view cannot account for the
rights and responsibilities of short-term and temporary visitors.
This limitation is not a reason for rejecting the affiliation principle as an account of the
significance of territorial presence. While it may not apply to the most recently arrived, it does
capture the situation of many migrants. The affiliation principle is scalar, not binary. It admits of
degrees. The deeper ones affiliation to the country, the greater ones entitlement to rights. This
view of affiliations as a matter of degree is reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court decision,
Mathews v. Diaz, which upheld a Social Security Act provision that excluded noncitizens from
Medicare unless they had resided in the country for at least five years:
The decision to share [the social] bounty with our guests may take into account the character of the
relationship between the alien and this country: Congress may decide that as the aliens tie grows stronger,
so does the strength of his claim to an equal share of that munificence it is unquestionably reasonable for
Congress to make an aliens eligibility depend on both the character and the duration of his residence.20

The Court affirmed the view it had articulated earlier that the noncitizen has an ascending scale
of rights as he increases his identity with our society.21 The affiliations view does account for
some rights and responsibilities of noncitizens, typically those of longer term residents, but it
does not provide the whole story about the rights and responsibilities of territorial insiders.
Fair Play
17

Carens, Immigrants and the Right to Stay, 12.

Carens, Immigrants and the Right to Stay, 20-1.
19
Kal Raustiala argues that the logic underlying this practice is simply spatial (The Geography of Justice,
Fordham Law Review 73 (2005), p. 2554). This chapter explores the normativity of spatiality with the aim of
showing that the rationales for distributing rights and responsibilities based on territorial presence is not simply
spatial.
20
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80, 82-83 (1976).
21
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
18

6
A second way of accounting for the special rights and responsibilities of territorially
present persons is the principle of fair play or reciprocity. On this principle, all those who
participate in a scheme of social cooperation are entitled to the benefits and must bear the
burdens of that scheme. Arguments about fair play presuppose a view of the state as a mutually
beneficial system of social cooperation. As Rawls puts it, the basic idea is, We are not to gain
from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair share.22 Indeed, the modern state is
the most consequential social scheme we know. Without the institutions of the modern state to
make, enforce, and interpret the laws, each of us would be left to our own devices to ensure our
own security and survival.
The principle of fair play has typically been invoked in debates about political obligation
to answer the question of why individuals should obey the law. Here I consider the reverse to
justify obligations that the state has to individuals, or in the case of democratic states, to justify
obligations that citizens have to one another as well as to noncitizens in their midst. If we think
of a democratic state as the representation of the collective will or interests of the citizens who
make up the state, the question then is: what obligations do democratic citizens have to
newcomers who are participants in the scheme of social cooperation that is the state?
To answer, we need to consider what relationship must hold between an individual and a
cooperative scheme for her to be said to be a participant in some significant sense. Someone
who accepts benefits from the social scheme unintentionally or without knowing the moral
consequences of doing so is not a participant. One might think that to be a participant in a social
scheme one must have expressly or tacitly consented to participate. Before getting to the
question of whether one can participate in a scheme without consenting to it, let me briefly say
something about the problems with the consent principle for grounding the special rights and
responsibilities of territorial insiders.
Consider first those inhabitants who are already citizens. As many critics of the consent
principled have argued, the vast majority of citizens have never consented to citizenship. In
defending a consent-based theory of citizenship, Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith seek to make
consent to citizenship a real possibility by offering children born to citizens and long-term lawful
resident noncitizens the opportunity to renounce citizenship when they reach the age of
majority.23 But even if a state agency were to notify birthright citizens of the opportunity to selfexpatriate at age 18 or thereabouts, the enormous costs and challenges of exiting a political
community make it implausible to regard failure to self-expatriate as a sign of consent.
As for noncitizens in a states territory, only lawful permanent residents (LPRs) can live
up to the liberal ideal of consent. They enact consent in a way that native-born citizens never do.
The good, consenting immigrant, in Bonnie Honigs words, reperform[s] the official social
contract by naturalizing to citizenship.24 In contrast, the unauthorized migrant is the bad
immigrant whose territorial presence has not been consented to and therefore is deemed not
only unworthy of membership but also ineligible for many of the rights accorded to LPRs.

22

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, [1971] 2005), p. 4, 112). See also Rawlss
Legal Obligation and the Principle of Fair Play, in S. Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy: A Symposium (New York:
New York University Press, 1964).
23
Peter Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). Schuck and Smiths claim is not that the native-born children of illegal
immigrants should be denied citizenship but that birthright citizenship (jus soli) is not constitutionally required and
therefore open to democratic contestation.
24
Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 92.

7
While the consent principle can ground the rights and obligations of naturalized citizens,
it cannot account for all those birthright citizens who have never consented to citizenship. In
light of this, we need to ask whether one can be a participant in a social scheme without giving
her consent to it. In discussing the fair play principle, Rawls suggests that political obligation
depends on our having accepted and our intention to continue accepting the benefits of a just
scheme of cooperation.25 A. John Simmons disinguishes between accepting benefits from and
giving consent to a social scheme. He uses the example of Jones, who opposes the neighborhood
plan to dig a well for clean water. After the well is dug, however, he sneaks to the well every
night and takes some water home. While Jones has accepted benefits from the well, he has not
consented to it. Yet he still has an obligation to do his part within the cooperative scheme in
virtue of having accepted benefits.
Unlike the consent principle, the fair play principle does not insist on a consensual or
deliberate undertaking. Anticipating the objection that Jones sneaking out at night and taking
water from the well might be taken as a sign of consent, Simmons revises the example to have
Smith going to the well in broad daylight and shouting, Dont think this means Im coming into
your stupid scheme! Ill never consent to share the burdens of this enterprise!26 On this
scenario, Jones has obligations to contribute not in virtue of having consented but in virtue of
having accepted benefits from the scheme.
But how many citizens of a state have accepted the public goods provided by the state? I
think we can plausibly say that using public roads is a way of willingly accepting public goods. I
follow George Klosko in thinking that recipients of public goods have obligations of fair play if
the goods supplied are: (i) worth the recipients effort in providing them, (ii) indispensable for
satisfactory lives; and (iii) have benefits and burdens that are fairly distributed.27 The state
provides indispensable benefits, including protections to our physical security through national
defense, maintenance of law and order, public health measures, and provisions for satisfying our
basic bodily needs. My obligation to the state does not stem from my giving consent, but from
the fact that I accepted and benefitted from these goods.
Not only citizens but all residents in a states territory participate in the cooperative
scheme of the state to varying degrees. The contributions of noncitizens can take a variety of
forms. Noncitizens contribute through their labor and paying taxes. Many noncitizens, especially
unauthorized migrants and temporary workers, do exhausting, grueling work that most citizens
do not want to do at the wages currently on offer. This includes work in meatpacking companies
and industrial farms, cleaning homes and offices, and domestic care work. Some noncitizens
contribute through military service.28 The vast majority of noncitizens also contribute by simply
complying with the law. All of these contributions help sustain state institutions and the public
25

John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, p. 10. Rawls himself rejects the idea that actual
consent is necessary for us to be bound to uphold and comply with a scheme of social cooperation.
26
A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 127.
27
George Klosko, Political Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 6. As Jon Quong pointed out to
me, it is possible that the indispensability criterion may not be necessary to generate obligations of fair play. We
may have obligations of fair play even in cases where I accept benefits that are not indispensable for my well-being.
If accepting any goods produced by a scheme of social cooperation generates obligations of fair play, accepting
goods that are indispensable for my well-being presents an easier case.
28
About 65,000 foreign-born persons serve in the U.S. military, representing about 5 percent of all active-duty
personnel; one-third of the foreign-born serving in the military are not U.S. citizens. See Jeanne Batalova,
Immigrants in the U.S. Armed Forces, Migration Policy Institute (May 2008)
(http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=683, last accessed December 6, 2012).

8
goods they provide. On the fair play principle, it is in virtue of such contributions that
noncitizens are entitled to the benefits provided by the state.
Turning to consider the scope of the fair play principle, we encounter difficulties. One
might object that the fair play principle is not easily contained within the territorial boundaries of
states. This is a point made in debates about global justice by critics of attempts to restrict the
fair play principle within the boundaries of one state.29 In response, it is important, first, to
acknowledge the undeniable fact of global interdependence and cooperation, which is reflected
in the great and increasing volume of global communications, trade, investment, and the
movement of capital and labor across borders. The international economic and political
relationships that states participate in suggest a global scheme of social cooperation.30 But,
second, even if we accept that there is a global scheme of social cooperation, cooperation within
a states territorial boundaries is distinctive and grounds distinctive claims and responsibilities. It
is not simply that the social cooperation inside a state impacts us more profoundly and
pervasively; sometimes it doesnt. Rather, the state is indispensable in securing the just
background conditions that make fair transactions and agreements between individuals and
groups possible in the first place.31 A just state makes possible much more than fair economic
exchange; it provides the conditions necessary for individual autonomy through ensuring equal
basic liberties, as well as equal opportunities and some minimum of income and wealth. Given
the necessity of participation in a state for individual autonomy, each of us has, as Rawls puts it,
a natural duty of justice to comply with and to do our share in just institutions when they exist
and apply to us.32 By contributing toward the maintenance of the state in whose territory we
reside, each of us is entitled to the public goods provided by that state.
What do these considerations about fair play suggest for the rights and responsibilities of
noncitizens in a states territory? Like the affiliation principle, it admits of degrees. One might
take a proportional view that says the benefits one can claim should be proportional to the
contributions one has made, with the proviso that anyone who contributes through simple
compliance with the law is entitled to some minimum of rights and protections. On such a view,
all territorial insiders who support and comply with the state have a prima facie case to some
minimal share of the benefits of the cooperative scheme, e.g. protection of physical security and
the provision of basic goods. A more extensive set of public goods should go to those who have
contributed more over a greater period of time.
The fair play principle is already reflected in law. Take, for example, the U.S. Supreme
Court case, Graham v. Richardson. Under challenge were Arizona and Pennsylvania laws that
conditioned the receipt of public assistance on being a U.S. citizen or having resided in the U.S.
for at least 15 years. Both states justified their restrictions on the basis of a special public
interest in favoring their citizens over noncitizens in the distribution of scarce resources. The
Court acknowledged that states have a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its
29

See Arash Abizadeh, Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of Distributive
Justice, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35 (4): 318-58.
30
Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 143-54;
Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia? Philosophy and Public Affairs 34(2) (2006):
147-75.
31
Rawls, Justice as Fairness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 52-54; see also Political
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, [1993] 2005), pp. 265-69. See also Andrea Sangiovanni,
Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, Philosophy and Public Affairs 35(1) (2007), who develops a similar
argument in terms of reciprocity.
32
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 334.

9
programs, but argued that a concern for fiscal integrity did not justify the use of invidious
distinctions:
Aliens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces [A]liens may live within a state for
many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of the state There can be no special
public interest in tax revenues to which aliens have contributed on an equal basis with the residents of the
States.33

Similarly, in a case striking down a New York requirement that state employees had to be
citizens, the Court stated, A resident alien may reside lawfully in New York for a long period of
time. He must pay taxes. And he is subject to service in this countrys Armed Forces.34 The
logic of fair play underlies these cases. Although the courts have focused on lawful long-term
residents, the fair play principle ought to be seen as extending to all noncitizens, including
unauthorized migrants and some temporary workers, who in virtue of their contributions have a
prima facie claim to civil rights and basic public goods.35
It is worth elaborating briefly on the importance of work as a form of contribution, which
is particularly strong in the American political tradition. The connection stems in part from the
history of exclusion of African Americans from the right to work and earn. As Judith Shklar
observed, The issue is not labor as such, but earning and the independence it confers. The slave
is degraded not because he has to work everyone should do thatbut because he is kept rather
than remunerated.36 She points to the example of Frederick Douglass, who upon receiving his
first paying job after escaping slavery, remarked:
I was now my own mastera tremendous fact The thought, I can work! I can work for a living; I am
not afraid of work; I have no Master Hugh to rob me of my earningsplaced me in a state of
independence All that any man has a right to expect, ask, give or receive in this world, is fair play.37

Perhaps because the fair play rationale in American political discourse has been so focused on
paid work outside the home, it raises some worrying implications. One is that the kinds of work
that get counted as a contribution will be defined narrowly with exclusionary implications for
many groups of territorially present persons, including children who dont work, noncitizen
elderly adults who dont work, and economically unremunerated workers.38 I think this objection
can be answered by insisting on a broad definition of what counts as a contribution to the
scheme of social cooperation: not only paid work in the labor market but also unpaid domestic
labor and public service in local neighborhoods and communities. As Andrea Sangiovanni has
suggested, the kinds of contribution that give rise to obligations of fair play (what he calls

33

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1970).

Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 645, 646 (1973).
35
Because unauthorized migrants have violated immigration laws, one would have to address countervailing reasons
articulated by those who argue for imposing additional requirements for undocumented immigrants who wish to
remain, such as paying a fine.
36
Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1991), 94.
37
Frederick Douglass, The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, ed. Philip S. Foner, vol. 4 (International
Publishers, 1955), 271-2.
38
On this point see the discussion of reciprocity in Arash Abizadehs contribution to this volume.
34

10
reciprocity) ought to be defined expansively to include contributions paid in the coin of
compliance, trust, resources, and participation.39
Coercion
A third way of accounting for the normative significance of territorial presence is in
terms of autonomy and coercion. The basic idea is that because state coercion infringes on
peoples autonomy, all those subject to state coercion are entitled to some form of justification.
Personal autonomy involves, in Joseph Razs words, a vision of persons as part creators of their
own moral world who have a commitment to projects, relationships, and causes which affect
the kind of life that is for them worth living.40 Because coercion always invades personal
autonomy, coercion must either be stopped or justified to those who are coerced. The most
obvious form of state coercion is the imposition of criminal penalties: incarceration removes
almost all autonomous pursuits from the prisoner.41 As Michael Blake has argued, while
coercion is most starkly present in criminal law, it abounds in private law as well. In the law of
contracts, property, and torts, adjudication of disputes will involve a transfer of legal rights from
the loser of the legal dispute to the winner, and the civil judgment is backed by coercive
measures.42
What sort of justification is owed to those subject to state coercion? Some interpret the
coercion principle as requiring a hypothetical justification: we ask not what is actually consented
to here and now, but what would be consented to, ex ante, under some appropriate method of
modeling rational consent. What matters is the justness of the institutions and laws through
which political power is exercised. For example, in Blakes view, the justification of ongoing
state coercion must take the form of state concern with the relative material deprivation of all
those coerced. In contrast, on the democratic interpretation of the coercion principle, what is
owed to those subject to state coercion is actual opportunities to participate in the political
processes that decide how state power is exercised.43 The democratic strategy of justification
links personal autonomy with public autonomy: coercive infringements on personal autonomy
are justified only insofar as those subject to coercion have the opportunity to govern those
infringements.
As with the affiliation and fair play principles, one problem with trying to account for the
normative significance of territorial presence through the coercion principle is that the scope of
state coercion does not line up neatly with the boundaries of citizenship or territory. Blake
restricts the scope of his arguments to citizens, assuming for his purposes that the set of people
bound under the territorial reach of a states laws and the set of that states citizens are
equivalent.44 Yet, there are many people bound under the territorial reach of a states laws
who are not citizens. All persons in the territory from tourists and temporary workers to
unauthorized migrants and legal permanent residents are subject to the criminal and civil law
of the state where they find themselves. Because these noncitizens are subject to a states legal
system, they too are owed some form of justification. Arash Abizadeh has argued that the
39

Sangiovanni, 20-21.
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 154.
41
Raz, The Moralityo of Freedom, 419.
42
Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, Philosophy and Public Affairs 30(3)
(2001), 276-7.
43
Arash Abizadeh, Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own
Borders, Political Theory 36(1) (2008): 37-65.
44
Blake, Distributive Justice, 266 n.8.
40

11
coercion principle pushes not only beyond the boundaries of citizenship but also beyond
territorial boundaries. A great many foreigners beyond the territorial boundaries of a powerful
state are subject to its coercion, with radically inclusionary implications: justification is owed not
only to territorial inhabitants but to all foreigners subject to a states immigration and economic
policies.45
I think the radically inclusionary implications of the coercion principle can be resisted.
First, while state coercion has a profound impact on the life chances of people outside the states
territory, we should not let these instances of extra-territorial coercion blind us to the fact that
those inside the territory of the state are subject to profound and pervasive coercion in a way that
most territorial outsiders are not. There is an important dis-analogy between nonresident
noncitizens, on the one hand, and inhabitants of the territory, on the other: the foreigner at the
border is subject only to the immigration power of the state she wishes to enter, but she is not
subject to the entire legal system. The coercion principle is scalar. Different degrees and forms of
coercion require different justifications. Every dimension of a territorial insiders life choices is
structured by the policies of the state in which she resides; the same cannot be said of territorial
outsiders who are members of other states and are therefore subject to the legal system of their
home states.46 Second, consent makes a difference here. While the vast majority of citizens
simply find themselves, by the accident of birth, inside the territory of a particular state, many
noncitizens have entered a host state voluntarily and have their home states to return to. Different
migrants have different opportunities for exit and return, but where there is a viable exit option,
the force of the coercion principle is considerably weakened as a basis for extending full and
equal rights of citizenship.
A related concern is whether the coercion principle can distinguish among different
groups of territorial insiders, including tourists, temporary workers, and long-term resident
noncitizens. All seem equally liable to the criminal and civil laws of the state in which they find
themselves. On the democratic interpretation of the coercion principle, all these individuals
should be entitled to an equal voice in the making of the laws to which they are subject.
However, coercion, like affiliation and fair play, is not an all-or-nothing affair. It admits of
degrees, even inside the territorial boundaries of a state. Consider tourists or foreign students
visiting the U.S. That they are subject to the host states coercive power during their stay is
undeniable. This is why they are entitled to certain basic rights and protections from the moment
they set foot in the territory. But there are important differences between short-term visitors and
longer-term residents. The former are in the country for a short period of time; their aspirations
and life projects are bound up with their lives and networks back in their home countries. While
these short-term visitors are subject to the laws of the host state during their stay, the degree of
control that the host state exerts over their lives is far less than the degree of control that the host
state exerts on long-term residents. To see why, we must recognize that the way in which
territorial presence matters will depend in part on the persons own goals and life plans. The state
has more power over the life of someone who pursues her life plan centrally inside the territory
of the state than someone who is primarily engaged in short-term projects. This explains why we
45

Abizadeh, Democratic Theory and Border Coercion.

I do not mean to suggest that territorial outsiders should have no voice whatsoever in the making of policies to
which they are subject; they might be granted some voice. For example, Mexicans subject to U.S. economic and
immigration policy would not have equal voting rights in U.S. elections, but they could reasonably demand a voice
through their political representatives speaking to representatives of the U.S. government through transnational
deliberative bodies.
46

12
treat tourists and foreign students differently from long-term residents. In many cases, temporary
workers are more like other short-term visitors in that they are in the country for a short period of
time and their own aspirations are to return home. The longer foreign workers live and work in
the host state and the more their own life plans become pervasively subject to the host state, the
stronger their claim to remain becomes.
Implications for the rights of immigrants
Rather than defending one principle over another, my central contention is that the three
principles considered above affiliation, fair play, and coercion work together to ground a case
for the special rights and obligations of territorial insiders. The affiliation principle is perhaps the
most imperfect proxy for territorial presence, especially in the case of newcomers to a states
territory. As ones affiliations with members of the host society expand and deepen, so does the
extent of rights and obligations. Similarly, the fair play principle extends a greater set of rights
and obligations based on the nature and extent of the contribution. The coercion principle
accounts for why newcomers present in the territory are entitled to certain rights and
responsibilities from the moment they set foot in the territory.
If one accepts these principles as grounds for the special rights and responsibilities of
territorial insiders, the question then is: what is the content of the special rights and
responsibilities of territorial insiders? Before taking up this question, we first need to consider
whether all territorial insiders ought to be treated identically or whether differential treatment is
permissible for different groups of territorial insiders.
Equality: uniform or differential treatment?
There is a strong presumption in contemporary liberal theory in favor of treating most, if
not all, territorial insiders in exactly the same way. Call this the uniform treatment view. Michael
Walzer implies such a view when he writes:
Men and women are either subject to the states authority, or they are not; and if they are subject, they must
be given a say, and ultimately an equal say, in what that authority does.47

Walzer was writing with temporary workers in mind, arguing that they must be set on the road
to citizenship. Admission into the territory must eventually come with full inclusion as equal
members, which is subject only to certain constraints of time and qualification. Why?
Walzer provides two reasons. The first is shared subjection to state authority. We may
think of temporary workers as guests, but they ought to be regarded as subjects just as citizens
are. Subjection to state coercion triggers the demand for justification, which may be met through
the provision of certain rights and protections. But as we saw, what is owed to those subject to
state coercion is subject to debate: not necessarily full membership but a set of basic rights.
Second, Walzer seeks to avoid the creation of a permanent, vulnerable caste of foreigners. This
concern stems from the two historical cases that inform Walzers theory of membership: the
metics of ancient Greece and guest workers in Germany. Migrants typically perform difficult,
dangerous work that is socially necessary, but they are regarded as strangers with little to no
civil, social, and political rights. Because their presence in the territory is tied to employment,
they live under the constant threat of deportation and their marginal economic and political

47

Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 60-1.

13
position renders them vulnerable to exploitation. Reflecting on these cases, it is no surprise that
Walzer concludes that temporary workers must be set on the road to citizenship.48
These are serious concerns, but I think there is an alternative to the either/or choice
implied by Walzers uniform treatment approach: either inclusion of guest workers as full
members or acceptance of their situation as a vulnerable caste with few rights. Before
elaborating an alternative proposal, lets consider the limits of the uniform treatment view.
First, Walzers theory presupposes only one type of migration across borders
permanent resettlementbut not all movement fits this model. Some intend to migrate only
temporarily, and some who intend to remain permanently do not wish to become citizens.49 If we
take seriously the agency of immigrants the aspirations and projects of the migrants
themselves we see that many migrant workers do not wish to settle in the host country.50
Temporary workers goal of returning home is reflected in their higher rate of savings and
remittances, and their willingness to accept lower-paying jobs in contrast to permanent
residents.51 If temporary workers wish to work for a time and eventually return to their home
states, a group-differentiated approach that accords certain rights but not the same rights as
citizens or long-term residents may be consistent with treating them as equals.
Second, there is the practical consideration that if the uniform treatment approach were to
be implemented as a matter of policy, host societies would drastically reduce or eliminate
temporary worker programs. Many egalitarians may rejoice at this, but temporary worker
programs are one way of addressing global inequality. To be sure, such programs are limited
tools of global redistribution because it is typically not the worst off members of a society who
tend to migrate and because there are more direct means of redistributing wealth and income
across countries. Yet, temporary worker programs do serve as one vehicle of global
redistribution through remittances. According to the World Bank, $111 billion was remitted
worldwide in 2001. About 65 percent went to developing countries, with half going to countries
considered to be lower-middle income countries. Remittances constituted over 10 percent of
GDP for countries such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Eritrea, Jamaica, and Jordan.52
Third, the uniform treatment view is at odds with the longstanding practice of groupdifferentiated rights, not only with regard to the treatment of temporary versus long-term
migrants but also through policies such as pregnancy leave for women, language rights for
linguistic minorities, and limited self-government rights for indigenous groups, all of which have
been defended on grounds of egalitarian justice.53 We need to inquire into the purpose and
justification of particular cases of group-differentiated policies to see whether they are consistent
with egalitarian justice. A uniform treatment approach is too sweeping in its blanket opposition
to differential treatment.
Rather than viewing rights as an all-or-nothing bundle attached to citizenship status, as
reflected in the uniform treatment view, we ought to consider an approach that disaggregates
48

Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 57, 59, 60.

See Douglass S. Massey et al., Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic
Integration (New York: Russell Sage, 2002).
50
Valeria Ottonelli and Tiziana Torresi, Inclusivist Egalitarian Liberalism and Temporary Migration: A Dilemma,
The Journal of Political Philosophy 20(2) (2012), 7, 19.
51
Oded Galor and Oded Stark, Migrants Savings, the Probability of Return Migration and Migrants
Performance, International Economic Review 31 (1990): 463-7; Massey et al., Beyond Smoke and Mirrors.
52
Kevin ONeil, Remittances from the United States in Context, Migration Policy Institute (June 2003).
53
See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, 1995); Sarah Song,
Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, 2007).
49

14
certain rights from the formal status of citizenship and extends them to noncitizens in virtue of
their territorial presence.54 There are at least two advantages to a disaggregation approach. First,
it leaves open the possibility that certain practices of group-differentiated rights and
responsibilities are justifiable. Second, permitting differential treatment of different groups of
territorial insiders is more likely to address Walzers concern about the domination of vulnerable
groups, including temporary workers and unauthorized migrants. On the uniform treatment view,
unauthorized migrants must either remain in the shadows or be granted recognition as full
members. A disaggregation approach could offer a middle position that extends a range of rights
to them, not in virtue of membership but in virtue of territorial presence.
Which rights for which territorial insiders?
If one adopts a strategy of disaggregation, the question then is: which rights for which
territorial insiders? In closing, I provide a brief proposal to illustrate one form the disaggregation
approach might take. There are at least three categories of resident noncitizens that ought to be
distinguished: sojourners, residents, and members. The table below indicates which of the three
principles discussed above offers normative support for each category and provides examples of
different rights claims associated with each. No doubt, some will disagree with the particular
content I suggest and favor alternative content, but my hope is that they will nonetheless see the
appeal of the disaggregation approach.55
Who

Rights

(i) Sojourners
tourists,
visiting students,
temporary workers

(ii) Residents
long-term resident noncitizens

(iii) Members
citizens
(native-born and naturalized)

Civil rights & liberties

Civil rights & liberties
Civil rights & liberties
(freedom of religion, speech, & assembly; equal protection of the laws; due process rights in criminal
proceedings; protection of property law and contract law)
Basic public goods
(access to public roads,
emergency healthcare)

Extended public goods

Extended public goods
(non-emergency healthcare, welfare benefits, basic education)
Right to remain in the territory

Right to remain in the territory

Political rights
Political rights
(right to vote, freedom to contribute to political campaigns)
Right to run for & hold political office
54

A number of scholars have provided historical, sociological, and legal analyses of the phenomenon of the
disaggregation of rights from citizenship status as civil, social, and political rights are increasingly predicated on
residency. In addition to Jacobsons Rights across Borders, Soysals Limits of Citizenship, and Bosniaks The
Citizen and the Alien cited above, see also Seyla Benhabibs The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens
(Cambridge, 2004) and Saskia Sassens Territory, Authority, Rights (Princeton, 2008). These arguments are situated
within broader arguments about the decline of nation-state sovereignty, especially in the European context. My
argument is intended to offer normative grounds for domestic legal regimes to extend rights to noncitizens and does
not depend on international human rights law as the sole or primary basis of the move toward disaggregation.
55
Ryan Pevnick has also defended a disaggregation approach in a different context (as part of a critique of the social
trust argument for a states right to exclude foreigners); he distinguishes only between claims of residence and of
membership, and assigns extended public goods and political rights and duties to members only. See his Social
Trust and the Ethics of Immigration Policy, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 2 (2009): 146-67. A more
complete analysis than I can provide here would discuss not only the particular rights but also the obligations of
different groups of territorial insiders.

15

Normative
Grounds

coercion

coercion,
affiliation,
fair play

coercion,
affiliation,
fair play

(i) Claims of sojourners

Sojourners include temporary workers, tourists, visiting students, and other temporary
migrants who enter a states territory after agreeing to a short-term stay. Sojourners ought to be
entitled to civil rights and liberties and basic public goods. In practice, the U.S. and Western
European countries already extend civil rights and basic public goods to noncitizens. In the
European context, the extension of these rights is predicated on international human rights
instruments, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights.56 My point is that the
coercion principle offers distinctive grounds for extending rights to sojourners.
Sojourners may seek to adjust their status from sojourner to resident on grounds of
affiliation or fair play, but as I suggested above, whether such adjustment is ultimately granted
will depend on how these pro tanto reasons are weighed against the states right to selfdetermination, a part of the analysis that I have not been able to provide here.57 On the
democratic interpretation of the coercion principle of the kind defended by Abizadeh, sojourners
would have a prima facie case for equal rights of political participation. In my view, the
constitutive and instrumental conditions of democracy, including considerations about political
equality and solidarity, weigh against enfranchising sojourners.58
(ii) Claims of residents
Like sojourners, long-term residents are entitled to civil liberties and basic public goods.
In contrast to sojourners, they are entitled to a more extensive set of rights, including the right to
remain permanently in the territory, extended public goods, and rights of political participation.
The affiliation and fair play principles provide pro tanto reasons for extending such rights to
long-term residents, including unauthorized migrants. These principles would apply to someone
who has resided, worked, and/or formed affiliations in the host country for a significant period of
time, as opposed to someone who has just crossed the border. As in the case of sojourners, a full
consideration of the rights of unauthorized migrants needs to address how their pro tanto claims
based on affiliation, fair play, and coercion should be weighed against the states right to selfdetermination.
On the democratic interpretation of the coercion principle, noncitizen residents would be
entitled to equal rights of political participation. The concerns about knowledge, solidarity, and
stability that apply to sojourners are less of a concern in the case of long-term residents. On the
fair play principle, contributions to the scheme of social cooperation through working and paying
taxes ground a pro tanto case for social and economic rights.
My proposal for the claims of residents diverges significantly from current law in the U.S.
For example, only citizens have the right to reside permanently in the territory, which, among
56

See Jacobson, Rights across Borders; Soysal, Limits of Citizenship.

For discussion of the modern states right to self-determination, including the right to control immigration, see my
Why Does the State Have the Right to Control Immigration, NOMOS: Migration, Immigration, and Emigration
(forthcoming).
58
Sarah Song, The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory: Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by the State,
International Theory 4(1) (2012): 39-68.
57

16
other things, means freedom from deportation. Federal laws prohibit noncitizens from receiving
public assistance and from working in particular jobs.59 When it comes to political rights, only
citizens have the right to vote in most local and all state and federal elections.60 In contrast, the
disaggregation of citizenship status and political rights is more widespread in Europe. The 1993
Maastricht Treaty granted the right to vote to any citizen of the 15 signatory states of the EU who
resides in another EU state. Since 1993, Ireland, the Netherlands, and all the Scandinavian
countries have introduced universal local franchise for all residents, independent of their
nationality. New Zealand has the most inclusive policy of all countries: local and national voting
rights after one year of legal residence.61
(iii) Claims of citizens
Under the disaggregation approach, many of the civil, social, and political rights, which
have traditionally been tied to political membership, would be unbundled from citizenship status
and extended in virtue of residency. Rights of political participation or access to welfare benefits
would no longer be restricted to citizens as is the current practice. One right that ought to be
reserved for citizens is the right to run for and hold public office. This claim requires more
defense than I can provide here, but a key premise is that effective political leadership requires
not only certain expertise but also a deeper level of commitment to the political community. A
noncitizen residents decision to become a citizen might be taken as a proxy, however imperfect,
of the extent of her loyalty to the political community.
One important objection to my proposal for disaggregating rights from citizenship status is
that it would diminish the worth of citizenship, what Peter Schuck has called the devaluation of
citizenship.62 U.S. Senator Diane Feinstein echoed similar concerns when she expressed
opposition to noncitizen voting rights in local school board elections in San Francisco, a measure
that lost by a slim margin: Allowing noncitizens to vote clearly dilutes the promise of
citizenship.63 In response, it is important to acknowledge that the disaggregation approach
would diminish the material worth of citizenship, but citizenship would retain symbolic
importance: the shared pride and collective sentiment associated with the common history and
common experiences of the political community. That it is symbolic does not mean it is
insignificant. For noncitizens, the decision to become a citizen would signal a desire to belong to
the political community. This would shift the motivational basis for noncitizens decisions to
become citizens: one would join not for the sake of the benefits attached to the status of
citizenship but out of affective attachment and identification with the political community.
Conclusion
59

For limits on lawful permanent residents access to public assistance, see 8 U.S.C. 1611-1613, 1621-1622, 16311632 (2006), and for restrictions on employment opportunities for lawful permanent residents, see Cabell v. ChavezSalido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982). One notable exception is the California legislatures passage of AB 1024, which
Governor Brown signed into law in October 2013 and which authorizes the California Supreme Court to admit to
the practice of law an applicant who fulfilled all the requirements for admission to practice law but is not lawfully
present in the U.S. (see http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB1024).
60
See Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote (Basic Books, 2000).
61
Rainer Baubck, Expansive CitizenshipVoting beyond Territory and Membership, PS: Political Science and
Politics, vol. 38, no. 4 (2005): 683-87.
62
See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Devaluation of Citizenship, in Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens: Essays on
Immigration and Citizenship (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 163-75.
63
Ron Hayduk, Democracy for All: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the United States (New York: Routledge,
2006),126.

17
This chapter considered the question of whether and why territorial presence makes a
normative difference. Taken together, the three principles examined above affiliation, fair play,
and coercion account for the special rights and obligations of different groups of territorial
insiders. Turning to the question of the particular content of the special rights and obligations, I
defended an approach that disaggregates rights and obligations from citizenship status. As I have
tried to show, liberal democratic states owe a range of rights and protections to noncitizens inside
their territorial boundaries in virtue of coercion, affiliation, and fair play, and such a system of
disaggregated rights is consistent with equality.