TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident JAIT Report

TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident
Joint Accident Investigation

Team (JAIT) Report
Jeffry L. Roberson
Acting Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety
National Nuclear Security Administration
JAIT Co-Chair
Theodore D. Sherry
Associate Deputy Director
Los Alamos National Laboratory
JAIT Co-Chair
JAIT: Michael Briggs, Richard Caummisar, Gary Dreifuerst, Michael Johnson, John
McNeel, Nate Morley, Alexander Tasama, and Jeffrey Williams
Technical Advisory Team: Jeff Vincoli and Chris Cantwell
Prepared by a joint team representing both NNSA and Los Alamos National Laboratory
Los Alamos National Laboratory, an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer, is operated by Los
Alamos National Security, LLC, for the National Nuclear Security Administration of the U.S. Department
of Energy under contract DE-AC52-06NA25396
Release Authorization
On May 5, 2015, I appointed a National Nuclear Security Admini stration/Los Alamos
National Laboratory Joint Accident Investigation Team (JAIT) to investigate the accident
that occurred at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, Substation TA-53-0070, on
May 3, 20 15. The JAJT's responsibil ities have been completed w ith respect to this
investigation. The analysis and identification of the contributing and root causes, with the
resulting Judgments of Need, were performed in accordance with DOE Order 225.1 B,
Accident Investigations.
Don F. Nichols
Cognizant Secretarial Officer for Safety
Date
NOTICE: This report is an independent product of the JAIT. The discussion of facts, as
determined by the JAIT, and the views expressed in this report do not assume and a re not
intended to establish the existence of any duty at law on the part of the U.S. Government,
its employees or agents, contractors, their employees or agents or subcontractors at any
tier, or any other party.
This report neither determines nor implies liability.
ABSTRACT
An interdisciplinary, learning-focused, and joint Federal and Laboratory team
investigated the causes of an electrical accident at Technical Area (TA) 53 at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. This event affected nine Los Alamos employees, two of whom
required hospitalization. The Joint Accident Investigation Team (JAIT) determined the
direct cause of the accident to be cleaning fluid sprayed into the air gap between an
energized switchgear bus and the grounded enclosure. The aerosolized fluid created a
path to ground, resulting in an arc-flash. The root cause was less-than-adequate
management of control implementation. This report identifies relevant facts; determines
direct, contributing, and root causes; provides detailed analysis; and establishes
conclusions and judgments of need to prevent recurrence.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The JAIT acknowledges the significant support provided by those directly involved
in the accident and response and their shared interest with the JAIT in preventing
recurrence of such an incident. Support from key field managers, functional program
managers, and union leadership was timely and complete, allowing the JAIT to quickly
analyze accident facts and come to conclusions. Emergency Operations Center personnel
were most gracious in providing the JAIT physical facilities for our work. Finally, this
report could not have been produced without the dedicated and knowledgeable support
staff provided to the JAIT from PADOPS/LANL.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background
On May 2, 2015, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) maintenance personnel were
conducting 2-Yr breaker preventative maintenance (PM) and 5-Yr PM at 13.8-kV
substation Technical Area (TA) 53-0070, which provides power distribution for TA-53.
PM included racking out, cleaning, performing conduction and timing measurements, and
carrying out high-potential (hi-pot) testing on breakers, as well as cleaning the switchgear
cubicles. The entire switchgear was de-energized when these two PM activities
commenced on Saturday, May 2, 2015.
Once workers completed some elements of this maintenance on Saturday evening,
two of the three buses in the switchgear were re-energized to support TA-53 systems.
On Sunday morning, May 3, 2015, work resumed on the one bus that remained deenergized. While cleaning the switchgear cubicles, an employee (designated as E1)
entered a cubicle on the energized portion of the switchgear. E1 began to clean the
cubicle, using cleaning fluid to spray and wipe down the cubicle walls.
Based on physical evidence, spraying the cleaning solution created a path to ground
between the 13.8-kV bus and the grounded cubicle wall, resulting in an arc-flash and
-blast. This arc-flash and the resulting blast ejected E1 from the cubicle, resulting in
significant burns and a head injury as E1 fell backward and struck test equipment present
in the switchgear building. This test equipment was being used to support breaker
maintenance work.
On May 5, Dr. Don Nichols, the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSAs)
Cognizant Secretarial Officer for Safety, tasked Jeffry Roberson, Acting Deputy
Associate Administrator for Safety, and Theodore Sherry, Associate Deputy Director
at LANL, to convene a Joint Accident Investigation Team (JAIT). The JAITs objective
was to analyze the event and determine direct, root, and contributing causes, and from
these provide Judgments of Need (JONs).
The JAIT visited the accident site, reviewed LANLs recent past incidents of a similar
nature, conducted interviews, and reviewed relevant documentation. The JAIT formed
a Technical Advisory Team (TAT) to support the JAIT with scientific and engineering
analysis so that it could better understand the technical elements that contributed to this
event. The JAIT also collected benchmarking information related to the processes used at
other Department of Energy sites and industry in general. Barrier and change analyses
were also performed, along with causal tree mapping, to identify the conclusions that
drove the JONs.
This document presents the facts gathered and knowledge gained from the investigation,
and includes recommendations that, when implemented, will reduce the probability of a
similar event. The table at the end of this executive summary lists all causal factor
numbers; the root cause, contributing causes, and JONs; and all JON numbers.
Summary of Causal Factor Analysis

Direct Cause
Direct Cause: Cleaning fluid sprayed into the air gap between the bus bars and the
grounded enclosure of an energized cubicle.
The direct cause of this accident was wireman E1 entering an energized cubicle and
spraying cleaning fluid into the air gap between the bus bars and the grounded enclosure.
The aerosolized fluid created a path to ground, resulting in an arc-flash.
Root Cause
Root Cause: Less-than-adequate management of control implementation.
Two specific root causes, one related to failure to implement zero-voltage checks and the
other associated with lack of establishing physical barriers, were combined into the single
root cause of control implementation.
Training and process requirements for electrical work require zero-voltage checks
on equipment before commencing hands-on work. The crew assigned to this job was
a mixed crew composed of lineman (high-voltage workers), breaker maintenance
electricians, and wiremen (electricians familiar with lower voltage applications).
During this maintenance activity, the linemen isolated the switchgear and provided safety
grounds on the buses in which work was taking place, in accordance with process
requirements. This electrical isolation of equipment is known as a clearance. As a result
of inconsistent implementation of the zero-voltage check requirement, some wiremen
considered the lineman clearance as the zero-voltage check. Other wiremen did not
accept the clearance and conducted zero-voltage checks upon entering each cubicle for
cleaning. If this zero-voltage check had been conducted on every cubicle, including
where the accident occurred, this injury would have been prevented.
Over the two days that this PM was conducted, changes took place in the working
environment. During work on Saturday, the switchgear was completely isolated from
utility power and only control voltages were present in the switchgear. At the close of
work on Saturday, work had been completed on two of the three buses, and these two
buses were re-energized to support the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center facility
loads.
When work began Sunday morning, 13.8 kV was present in the west portion of the
switchgear. This is common for work in switchgear. Status of the energized portion of
the switchgear was denoted by one white clearance tag hung on the open tiebreaker at
cubicle 18, which indicated the separation of the two energized buses B and C from the
de-energized bus A. This is where the PM was to be conducted on Sunday.
TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident Joint Accident Investigation Team Report
ES-2
The hazard analysis process for this work did not contemplate changes in the work
environment from Saturday to Sunday, leaving a mix of lookalike equipment partially
energized. Without revisiting the hazard analysis step of work planning, no new controls
could be considered to delineate between the energized and de-energized equipment.
Conservative work control practices would implement conspicuous barriers to mitigate
crew errors of entering energized cubicles. A physical barrier preventing E1 from
entering the energized cubicle would also have prevented this accident.
Contributing Causes
The JAIT summarized all causal factors into five contributing causes during its
investigation of this event.
Contributing Cause: The scope of work at the task1 level was not adequately defined.
The Integrated Work Documents (IWDs) did not include tracking processes to validate
work required and work completed. Additional work steps to control workflow were not
developed to address concurrent maintenance activities. Mixed equipment status was not
addressed with process steps to avoid entering energized equipment. Zero-energy
verification for each cubicle is required by training and procedure but was not
consistently executed.
Contributing Cause: Weaknesses in hazard analysis processes resulted in some
hazards not being analyzed.
The hazard analysis process was conducted at the activity2 level and hence did not require
the development of task-level controls. Hazards introduced by working the two PM
activities in parallel and changing the operational status of some switchgear in the middle
of the work were not considered. The result was inadequate controls for safe execution of
concurrent activities and no added effective barrier to separate Bus A from the two
energized buses.
Contributing Cause: Controls were not effectively implemented to ensure safety on
the job.
A mixed crew of linemen, breaker maintenance electricians, and wiremen were assigned
to this job. Linemen rely primarily on the clearance process for utility work, whereas
electricians and wiremen rely on Lockout/Tagout. There are substantial common skills
and training among this crew; however, the IWD identified both sets of rules without
delineating the final control set. No accommodations were made to account for the
limited lines of sight and mixed equipment configuration unique to this particular
1
Task
Activity
A subset of an activity made up of one or more steps and often having different hazards than
other tasks within the activity. (P300)
A subset of a project describing floor-level work, made up of one or more tasks. (P300)
ES-3
maintenance evolution. The pre-job briefing was interactive between workers, but it did
not establish an effective and consistent understanding of the work scope and boundaries
for the days activities. Supervisory direction and oversight were insufficient to limit
work activities to the tasks assigned for the workday, allowing a worker to enter
energized equipment.
Contributing Cause: Work was not performed within controls, as envisioned by
management and job planners.
Confusion in the requirements for zero-voltage check resulted in inconsistent
implementation of this control. Work activities were not assigned to specific individuals
and were informally tracked. Without supervision of assigned tasks, E1 was able to
initiate work in energized cubicle 17. Visual work boundaries and work completion status
did not clearly indicate that the energized cubicle was outside of the work scope for
Sunday.
Contributing Cause: Feedback and lessons learned were not applied.
Although other electrical events with similar causal factors are documented at LANL, no
evidence existed of lessons learned applied to the hazard analysis used for this work.
Task-level controls that could have prevented this accident were not implemented.
Lessons learned from other accidents, incidents, and work also were not implemented.
Final Thoughts
Review of the management processes applicable to this work revealed procedures and
policies are in place to govern electrical maintenance work. However, it has been
demonstrated by this and other events at LANL in recent history that these procedures
and policies are often applied at the minimum level possible to execute work, or in some
cases not used at all.
Adequate procedures and policies are in place to prevent this accident and other recent
events of this type. However, without correcting the persistent weaknesses in
implementing these procedures and policies, it is likely that more events will occur in the
future. To avoid this fate, it is crucial that LANL leadership and all levels of responsible
management work together cohesively to achieve the level of rigor envisioned for
governing hazardous work at LANL. Either a zero-voltage check or a robust barrier to
restrict access would have prevented this accident, the former is required by LANL
processes and the latter is an industry standard practice.
ES-4
TA-53 Electrical Accident Causal Factors

Causal
Factor No.
ConclusionsRoot and Contributing Causes
JON No.

C12
E1 did not have zero-voltage verification performed for cubicle 17.
3, 5
C13
Processes (zero-voltage checks) were not consistently implemented or

understood at the task level.
3, 5
C20
The absence of a uniquely marked physical barrier enabled E1 to access

cubicle 17 by removing the cubicle door and internal panels.
3, 4, 11, 13, 2
Contributing Cause: The scope of work at the task level was not adequately defined.
C7
The yellow caution barricade, intended to demark the hi-pot testing

boundary, could have created confusion as to the location of the clearance
point boundary, leading E1 to believe cubicle 17 was de-energized.
2, 3, 4, 6, 11,
13
C15
Use of clearance tags is not the typical isolation method used by wiremen.
3, 11
C16
Trained employees did not identify the lack of required signs, tags, and
barriersa standard industry practice.
9, 11
C22
Lack of a formal work-tracking mechanism (in PM documentation)

prevented a clear understanding of specific work activities that may have
prevented E1 from entering cubicle 17.
1, 13
C25
Cluttered workspace, caused by working two jobs concurrently, reduced the

ability of the work team and supervisor from observing and preventing E1
from entering cubicle 17.
7, 9
C29
Performing two jobs simultaneously inserts additional hazards beyond

those addressed for individual tasks.
1, 7
Contributing Cause: Weaknesses in hazard analysis

processes resulted in some hazards not being analyzed.
C3
The opportunity was missed to establish and implement effective barriers

that would have prevented the accident.
C24
Because of the potential and consequence for human error, the hazard level
increases when Bus B and Bus C were re-energized.
C27
Mixed experience and qualifications caused confusion regarding roles,

responsibilities, and control implementation.
C30
The hazard analysis process did not address the risks and consequences
caused by changed conditions between the Saturday and Sunday substation
configurations.
1, 4, 11
1, 7
1, 7
ES-5
TA-53 Electrical Accident Causal Factors (continued)

Causal
Factor No.
JON No.
C31
Human error had not been fully addressed in terms of what-if scenarios.
Therefore, robust controls were not implemented.
1, 4, 11
C33
Opportunity for craft workers (performing the tasks) to identify concerns

for this job was not offered for the hazard analysis process.
1, 9
C34
Skill-of-the-craft was used instead of task-level work planning/hazard

assessment and controls implementation.
1, 3
Contributing Cause: Controls were not effectively implemented to ensure safety on the job.
C7
The yellow caution tape barricade, demarking the hi-pot testing boundary,
could have created confusion as to the location of the clearance point
boundary, thus leading E1 to believe that Cubicle 17 was de-energized.
2, 3, 4, 6, 11,
13
C10
Alerting techniques like safety signs, tags, barricades, and/or attendants

were not in place, as would have been standard industry practice. E1
entered lookalike equipment, cubicle 17.
2, 3, 4, 7, 11
C11
One foreman (E3) was monitoring the work through frequent work-area
passes but did not notice E1 accessing the energized cubicle.
C17
Reduced worker focus may have contributed to E1s error.
C20

cubicle 17 by removing the cubicle door and internal panels.
C21
Lack of a formal work-tracking mechanism prevented positive control and

backup by supervision for worker actions that would have prevented E1
C27

C28
Similarity of equipment and congested environment contributed to workers

not recognizing E1 was working in cubicle 17.
C32
Robust controls were not implemented to prevent the consequence of

human error.
4, 9
3, 4, 11, 13, 2
2, 6, 13
4, 7, 9, 10
2, 4, 9, 10, 11
Contributing Cause: Work was not performed within

controls, as envisioned by management and job planners.
C1
Control afforded by the pre-job briefing was not effective in preventing

entry into Bus B, cubicle 17.
4, 8, 9
C2
Not all workers had a clear understanding of system/job status and work
scope.
4, 8
ES-6

Causal
Factor No.
JON No.
C4
Failure to formally track cubicle progress and completion may have

resulted in belief that cubicle 17 had not been cleaned on Saturday.
6, 10, 13
C5
Work area was congested with people and equipment, contributing to a lack
of awareness of other workers.
1, 4, 7, 9, 10,
13
C6
The visual boundary (clearance tag) was ineffective in preventing E1 from

working outside the intended work scope.
4, 8, 11
C8
The absence of blue tape, intended to help identify that cubicle cleaning
was complete, possibly contributed to E1 thinking that the cubicle still
needed cleaning and was de-energized.
2, 6, 11, 13
C19
Opportunity was missed to identify and warn E1 not to open energized

cubicle.
6, 9
C23
Potential for early completion of the task may have shifted focus away from
the task.
C26
Cluttered workspace may have caused some confusion that led E1 to

believe cubicle 17 was de-energized.
2, 4, 7, 9, 10

C9
Task-level controls that would have prevented this accident were not
identified and implemented.
7, 12, 13
C14
Zero-energy verification was not followed, as prescribed in training.
5, 12
C18
Lessons learned were not applied to this work activity, resulting in missed
opportunities to improve the work process.
Judgments of Need
12
Related
Conclusions
Maintenance and Site Services (MSS) and Utility and Institutional Facilities
(UI) management need to strengthen expectations regarding work-scope
determination, as well as task-level work planning and hazard analysis.
These expectations should be reinforced and assessed frequently.
C3, C5, C22,

C24, C29,
C30, C31,
C33, C34
MSS, Logistics Division (LOG), and UI management need to strengthen

expectations regarding rigor in task-level work execution within controls.
These expectations should be reinforced and assessed frequently.
C7, C8, C10,

C21, C26,
C32
LANL needs to establish uniform and stringent implementation of safety

requirements when executing work involving mixed work crews (e.g.,
different disciplines, experience, and qualifications).
C7, C10,
C12, C13,
C15, C20,
C27, C34
ES-7

Judgments of Need
Related
Conclusions
LANL needs to effectively implement human-performance errorprevention tools in work planning and hazard analysis.
C1, C2, C3, C5,

C6, C7, C10,
C17, C20, C23,
C26, C28, C31,
C32
MSS, LOG, and UI management need to reinforce and clarify

expectations and implementation for zero-voltage verification
requirements in the course of electrical work at all organizational levels.
C12, C13, C14
MSS, LOG, and UI management and direct supervision need to reinforce

and clarify expectations (training, oversight, and accountability) for
Personal Protective Equipment requirements and work practices in the
course of electrical work at all organization levels.
C4, C7, C8,

C11, C19, C21
MSS and UI management need to closely evaluate changing conditions

when using standing IWDs during the planning process to ensure controls
are aligned with actual work activities and site conditions.
C5, C9, C10,

C24, C25, C26,
C28, C29, C30
MSS, LOG, and UI management need to strengthen pre-job briefings at

the beginning of each shift or when significant changes occur so that
worker engagement, focus on important controls, operations integration,
and a full understanding by all workers are all assured.
C1, C2, C6
LANL management needs to ensure workers are encouraged to and are

acknowledged for playing an active role in ensuring their own (and work
teams) safety and compliance with work rules.
C1, C5, C16,

C17, C19, C25,
C26, C28, C32,
C33
10
MSS, LOG, and UI management need to facilitate more direct

involvement and ownership by craft in developing the work scope and
job planning.
C4, C5, C26,

C28, C32, C33
11
MSS and UI management need to ensure robust, durable, and visible

barriers and signs are appropriately placed and accurately reflect current
work conditions, equipment status, and hazards to ensure worker safety.
C3, C6, C7, C8,

C10, C15, C16,
C20, C31, C32
12
LANL needs to improve its ability to implement and verify corrective

actions from previous assessments and events.
13
MSS and UI management need to evaluate use of informal work practices

in the context of potential impact on the effectiveness of safety controls.
C9, C14, C18
C4, C5, C7, C8,

C9, C20, C21,
C22
ES-8
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... ES-1
ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS ............................................... ii
PERSONNEL ID KEY FOR REPORT ............................................................................. iv
1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Facility Description ................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Scope, Conduct, and Methodology ........................................................................... 3
2.0 THE ACCIDENT.......................................................................................................... 5
2.1 Accident Description ................................................................................................ 5
2.2 Accident Response .................................................................................................. 12
2.3 Summary of the Medical Report ............................................................................. 13
2.4 Event Chronology ................................................................................................... 13
3.0 FACTS AND ANALYSIS .......................................................................................... 15
3.1 Emergency Response .............................................................................................. 15
3.2 Post-Event Accident Scene Preservation and Management Response ................... 17
3.3 Assessing Prior Events and Accident Precursors.................................................... 18
3.4 ISM/Work Planning and Controls .......................................................................... 21
3.5 Conduct of Operations ............................................................................................ 29
3.6 Supervision and Oversight of Work ....................................................................... 32
3.7 NNSA/Los Alamos Field Office Oversight ............................................................ 38
3.8 Human-Performance Analysis and Interfaces ........................................................ 40
4.0 CAUSAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS .................................................................... 48
4.1 Direct Cause ............................................................................................................ 48
4.2 Contributing Causes ................................................................................................ 48
4.3 Root Cause .............................................................................................................. 49
5.0 CONCLUSION AND JUDGMENTS OF NEED....................................................... 50
6.0 JOINT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBER SIGNATURES ............ 56
APPENDICES
Appendix A. Team Members, Advisors, Consultants, and Staff .................................... A-1
Appendix B. Appointment Letter ....................................................................................B-1
Appendix C. NNSA Member Appointment Memo .........................................................C-1
Appendix D. Contractor Member Appointment Memo .................................................. D-1
Appendix E. Barrier-Analysis Worksheet ....................................................................... E-1
Appendix F. Change-Analysis Worksheet ....................................................................... F-1
Appendix G. Events and Causal Factors Chart ............................................................... G-1
Appendix H. Personnel Task Experience Summary ....................................................... H-1
ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

Activity
A subset of a project describing floor-level work, made up of one or

more tasks. (P300)
AR
Arc-rated
CON
Conclusion
CMMS
Computerized Maintenance Management System
DARHT
Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
DOE
U.S. Department of Energy
EM
Emergency Management
EOC
Emergency Operations Center
EOSC
Emergency Operations Support Center
ESH
Environmental Safety and Health
ESO
Electrical Safety Officer
FCA
Facility Centered Assessments
FOD
Facility Operations Director
HAZMAT
Hazardous Material
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability Analysis
Hi-pot
high-potential
HV
High Voltage
ISM
Integrated Safety Management
IWD
Integrated Work Document
IWM
Integrated Work Management
JAIT
Joint Accident Investigation Team
JON
Judgment of Need
LAFD
Los Alamos Fire Department
LAMC
Los Alamos Medical Center
LANL
LANS
Los Alamos National Security, LLC
LANSCE
Los Alamos Neutron Science Center
LL
Lessons Learned
LOTO
Lockout/Tagout
NA-LA
Los Alamos Field Office
ii
ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS (continued)

MSS
Maintenance and Site Services
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association
NNSA
ORPS
Occurrence Reporting and Processing System
PADOPS
Principal Associate Directorate, Operations and Business
PERS
Performance Evaluation Reports
PIC
Person in Charge
PM
Preventative Maintenance
PNOV
Preliminary Notice of Violation
PPE
Personal Protective Equipment
RCO
RadChem Operations
RLM
Responsible Line Manager
RLUOB
Radiological Laboratory/Utility Office Building
RLW
Radioactive Liquid Waste
SIWD
Standing Integrated Work Document
Step
A subset of a task, typically sequenced into an IWD, procedure, or

work instruction, having a discrete set of related hazards and controls.
(P300)
SME
Subject-Matter Expert
STO
Science and Technology Operations
TA
Technical Area
Task
A subset of an activity made up of one or more steps and often having

different hazards than other tasks within the activity. (P300)
TAT
Technical Advisory Team
TP
Training Plan
UI
Utility and Institutional Facilities
VPP
Voluntary Protection Program
WFO
Weapons Facility Operations
iii
PERSONNEL ID KEY FOR REPORT

ID
Role
E1
Wireman (in substation)
E2
E3
Foreman Wireman (in substation)
E4
E5
Lineman (in substation)
E6
E7
Wireman Apprentice (in substation)
E8
E9
General Foreman Wireman (outside substation)
E10
Wireman (inside substation)
EM1-3
Emergency Management Personnel
S1
Electrical Superintendent (outside substation)
L1
Lineman (in and out of substation)
L2
General Foreman Lineman (ESO)
O1
Electric System Operator
FP1
Fire Protection
FP2
Fire Protection
FP3
Fire Protection
G1
Groundsman
G2
Groundsman
L5
Lineman Apprentice (outside substation)
L6
L7
As a convention in this report, medium-voltage and <600V electricians will be

designated as wiremen. High-voltage electricians will be designated as linemen.
iv
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
National Nuclear Security Administration/Los Alamos Field Office
Created by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-65 (1999), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) serves as a
semiautonomous organization under the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE). NNSA
focuses on DOEs mission of operating the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise and
associated facilities nationwide. Within NNSA, Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) supports this mission through weapons-system maintenance, non-nuclear testing,
advanced computer modeling, and development and applied science and engineering.
NNSA relies upon the Los Alamos Field Office (NA-LA) to interface with the LANL
management team and its operations contractor, Los Alamos National Security, LLC
(LANS).
Key responsibilities of the NNSA Field Office include safety oversight, contract
management, strategic planning, project management, and budget execution. These
functions are carried out in close coordination with LANS management and staff
members. To help ensure the desired level of contractor performance, NNSA uses a
formal oversight system that leverages LANLs Contractor Assurance System (CAS).
This system breaks down LANL operations and mission execution into key functional
areas. Federal and contractor staff members focus on monitoring and coordinating work
and evaluation of these areas.
Federal staff members achieve safety oversight in four specific areas: Nuclear Safety
Basis, Safety System Oversight, Facility Representatives, and Safety Programs. The first
three areas focus on nuclear facilities operations, with safety programs crosscutting all
LANL operations and programs. Electrical safety at LANL is monitored part-time as part
of industrial safety oversight. Such safety is supplemented on a case-by-case basis by the
electrical systems engineer from Safety System Oversight.

LANL was established in 1943 under the Manhattan Project and has grown substantially
since that time in terms of both size and its diversity of mission functions. Today, this
NNSA facility is widely recognized as a vital national institution for supercomputing,
basic science, nuclear stockpile stewardship, advanced engineering science, and material
science.
The accident took place at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), a large
facility at LANL. LANSCE consists of a linear accelerator approximately three-quarters
of a mile long that generates high-energy subatomic particles for a variety of science and
nuclear engineering applications. Examples

include medical isotope production, materials
analysis, subatomic physics, and advanced
imaging technologies.
LANSCE operates on regular annual cycles
of continuous beam operation for several
months at a time. Beam operations are
typically conducted 24 hours a day, seven
days a week. This operation is followed by
planned long-term outages that can last
several months. It is during such outages that
workers perform maintenance and testing of
the myriad specialized equipment required
for operations.
Figure 1-1. The 13.8-kV substation was
the site of the electric-arc accident on
May 3, 2015.
During these planned outages, personnel

maintain ancillary equipment designed to
avoid interruption of beam operations, which
is very undesirable. Such maintenance
includes the 13.8-kV switchgear station,
which is fed by incoming 115-kV utility
power lines. Collectively, this gear provides
power to the entire TA-53 area and houses all
distribution breakers for TA-53, which
includes LANSCE (Figure 1-1). The
switchgear is located in a dedicated and
fenced switching yard near Building 1
(Figure 1-2), which is west of the accelerator
beam facilities.
1.2 Facility Description
Figure 1-2. The switchgear is located

near Building 1 at TA-53.
The electrical substation TA-53-0070 is

located in Technical Area (TA) 53 (Figure
1-3) and serves the adjacent LANSCE. The
substation receives 115-kV utility power to
two transformers that step the voltage down
to 13.8 kV, which is supplied to buses A and
B. Additionally, 13.8 kV from distribution
circuit EA-06 is connected to Bus C as an
alternate power source. There are alternate
configurations for power line-up. The
incoming power is distributed through the

switchgear to multiple administrative and
experimental facilities across TA-53.
Figure 1-4 shows an aerial view of
Building 70 (substation at TA-53-0070)
and Building 1
The substation at TA-53-0070 consists of
28 cubicles that contain distribution
breakers, tiebreakers, and power-system
metering instrumentation. These cubicles
are all closely adjoined, beginning with
number 1 on the west end. They can be
electrically segmented by opening
tiebreakers in cubicles 8 and 18 as needed,
thus isolating them into separate buses.
Bus C powers cubicles 1 to 8, Bus B
powers cubicles 8 to 18, and Bus A
powers cubicles 18 to 28. Transformer
TR-2 feeds Bus B and TR-1 feeds Bus A.
Bus C can be connected to alternate power
via circuit EA-6, fed into cubicle 3.
Figure 1-3. An aerial view of TA-53,

looking west.
1.3 Scope, Conduct, and Methodology

The Joint Accident Investigation Team
(JAIT) established a charter consistent with
the Appointing Officials letter and DOE
Order 225.1B, Accident Investigations.
This charter outlined the following
approach:
Identify relevant facts

Analyze the facts to determine
Figure 1-4. An aerial view of Building 70
direct, contributing, and root causes and Building 1.
for the event
Develop judgments of need to
prevent recurrence
Investigate DOE programs and
oversight
Review previous electrical incidents
at LANL for common
causes/weaknesses
Maintain team confidentiality
Do not cast blame
The JAIT consisted of both NNSA and LANL representatives, as well as related
contractor personnel. The JAIT was co-chaired by senior management from both NNSA
and LANL, as identified by the Appointing Officials memorandum, dated May 5, 2015.
Both chairmen provided separate appointment memos to the federal and contractor
members of the team.
Members of the JAIT included personnel with significant leadership and subjectmatter expertise in high-rigor operations, human factors, failure analysis, highvoltage electrical safety, as well as safety culture and work process and control. The
memoranda from the Appointing Official and the chairs identified that those assigned
to the team were relieved of all other duties while participating on the JAIT. The
federal co-chair appointed a trained accident investigator.
Technical advisors were identified to provide support to the JAIT members. These
advisors worked closely with the JAIT to identify and review evidence, determine the
appropriate facts, execute analysis and draw conclusions, and provide input and
judgments of need for this report. Technical advisors brought with them relevant
experience in emergency response and accident investigations.
All team members signed a nondisclosure agreement. These forms were collected and are
included in the JAITs evidence folders. Team participants were dedicated to the team
for the duration of the investigation.
Team Members and technical support personnel all worked seamlessly and closely to
understand the events leading up to the accident, as well as the emergency response that
followed the accident. Team Members followed the structure for conducting accident
investigations, as identified in DOE-HDBK-1208-2012, Accident and Operational
Safety Analysis. Members gathered evidence; identified facts; performed analysis of
the facts by developing an events and causal factors chart, as well as barrier and
change analyses; and developed causal factors, conclusions, and judgments of need
using the processes and forms identified in the Handbook.
The JAIT met daily as a group to discuss the collected information, key issues identified
during the day, questions raised during the day, needed support, and issues of interest to
other JAIT members. Co-Chairs held a daily briefing with the Appointing Official, as
well as senior NA-LA and LANL management. Written daily updates of JAIT
activities were provided to LANL personnel each afternoon.
Establishing a JAIT with members from both NNSA and LANL enabled a
common understanding of the federal and contractor sides of the issues
surrounding the accident, as well as a better understanding of the basis for
improvements to avoid this type of accident ever happening again. This joint
effort also ensured that the JAIT could call upon local resources with historical
knowledge of the process and the basis of the JAITs results.
2.0 THE ACCIDENT

2.1 Accident Description
During May 23, 2015, workers performed scheduled preventative maintenance
(PM) operations at Substation Building 70 (TA-53-0070). Figure 2-1 shows substation
TA-53-0070, looking from north-by-northeast.
Workers were simultaneously executing two separate work orders at TA-53-0070: (1) a
5-Yr Switchgear PM and (2) a 2-Yr Air Circuit Breaker PM. Engaged in the PM work
were a mixed crew of workers consisting of Maintenance and Site Services (MSS)
wiremen and linemen (both groups are deployed from Logistics Division), with various
levels of substation and switchgear experience. In general, a composite crew of linemen
and wiremen were assigned to both efforts. At least one lineman, however, was available
to support the wiremen for both zero-voltage checks and attaching grounds.
The substation provides 13.8-kV distribution services to LANSCE through the following
three segments: Bus A, Bus B, and Bus C. Bus C powers cubicles 1 through 8, Bus B
powers cubicles 8 through 18, and Bus A powers cubicles 18 through 28. Tiebreakers in
cubicles 8 and 18 connect the segments as needed. During normal use, the three buses
can be connected by closing the tiebreakers in cubicles 8 and 18. Tiebreakers can be
opened to isolate parts of the switchgear.
On May 2, 2015, all three buses were de-energized so that workers could perform
maintenance tasks (Figure 2-2). Breaker maintenance and cleaning operations for Bus B
and Bus C were completed, and both were re-energized by linemen, using the approved
switching procedure, at the end of shift (1904 MDT), so that electrical service could be
restored to some facilities within TA-53 to minimize outage impacts. Personnel attached
a clearance tag (Figure 2-3) to the cubicle-18 tiebreaker. This tag indicated a demarcation
between energized and de-energized cubicles. A lineman was available for zero-energy
checks.
On Sunday, May 3, 2015 (the second day of scheduled PM), a crew of ten employees
(identified as E1E10 in this report), who had all supported PM operations the previous
day, returned to complete the remaining maintenance and cleaning work required for
Bus A, which remained de-energized. The Saturday Person in Charge (PIC) and two
other linemen who had worked on Saturday did not return on Sunday due to off-site
training. One of the Alternate PICs, E9, was designated the Sunday PIC, was on site and
attended the pre-job briefing. (LANL PIC duties and training are similar to those of the
Work Supervisor described in DOE-HDBK-1211-2014, Activity Level Work Planning
and Control Implementation.)
Figure 2-1. A north-by-northeast view of Substation Building 70 at TA-53.
Figure. 2-2. Substation TA-53-0070 clearance configuration on Saturday, May 2, 2015

(top) and on Sunday, May 3, 2015. On Saturday, energy isolation breakers of disconnect
blades (yellow) were opened to achieve the desired boundary. TA-53-0070 buses A, B,
and C were all de-energized.
Figure. 2-3. The Clearance Tag hangs from the cubicle 18 tiebreaker.
Work began at 0700 with a pre-job briefing, which included a reading of the work scope
by the designated foreman, E3, as well as a detailed briefing on the associated hazards,
mandatory mitigation measures, and personnel safety requirements. The crew received
the brief from E3 directly in front of the tiebreaker (cubicle 18), where they were
reminded again that Bus B and Bus C were now energized and that all work on this day
was to be performed only on Bus A (cubicles 1928), which was not energized.
The clearance tag hung on the cubicle 18 tiebreaker the night before was verified as still
in place as part of the power dispatch authorization process to allow entry into Bus A
cubicles.
No other physical barriers or barricades between the energized cubicles (118)
and de-energized cubicles (1928) were installed to identify the separation of the
energized from the de-energized cubicles.
However, yellow caution barricade tape was placed across the aisle at the junction
between cubicles 8 and 9, as well as the junction between cubicles 16 and 17. This tape
designated the area where hi-pot testing would occur as part of the 2-Yr breaker-testing
activity, and was not associated with marking energized buses.
During the pre-job briefing, E1 inquired about the status of the personnel safety ground.
It was then determined that a ground had not been installed, but that it would be a good
additional control. At this point, E1, together with a lineman (E5), installed and verified
this ground before continuing work.
All ten employees associated with this activity acknowledged their understanding of the
work scope and safety requirements. Nine employees proceeded with their assigned
duties inside the switchgear while the tenth, E9 (General Foreman), went to an adjacent
building (Control Building 53773) to complete paperwork and documentation. Figure 2-4
shows the location of employees E1 through E10 at the time of the accident.
At approximately 1100, E1 walked past the clearance tag that was fixed to cubicle 18 and
opened the door to cubicle 17, which was part of the energized Bus B segment. E1 was
wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) consisting of nitrile gloves and an arc-rated
(AR) shirt, and other clothing including non-arc-rated overalls, and a baseball cap.
E1 positioned a four-foot fiberglass stepladder along the inside of cubicle 17 (Figure 25.). He removed the side-by-side internal steel protective-cover panels to expose the bus
bars and associated switchgear, apparently to allow cleaning of the internal surfaces,
components, and assemblies.
Bus B and Bus C were energized at the end of the shift on the previous day, so the action
of E1 unbolting and removing these protective covers inside this cubicle exposed the
energized bus bars. Based on physical evidence at the scene and system-monitoring data,
at 1108 E1 hand sprayed a commercial liquid cleaner into the air gap between the
energized switchgear bus and the grounded enclosure inside cubicle 17 (Figure 2-5).
Figure 2-4. Substation TA-53-0070 configuration

at time of accident on Sunday, May 3, 2015
The JAIT verified this assumption based on the

post-event condition of the spray container, which
indicated that it had been extremely close to a high
heat source (Figure 2-6). In addition, post-event
waveform analysis of the arc-flash event supports
the conclusion that the liquid was sprayed in very
close proximity to the energized C-phase bus.
The initial fault measured as a C-phase-to-ground
arc transitioning quickly to a B-phase-to-ground arc,
followed by multiple phase-to-phase faults as
plasma flooded the cubicle.
Figure 2-5 Position of E1 just

before the accident.
The spray cleaner used is a commercially available

household cleaner with no established dielectric
characteristics, which means it has no insulating
properties to prevent the conducting of electrical
current. This sprays intended use for this
application was to clean non-energized surfaces.
The presence of this conductive, aerosolized

fluid in the dielectric airspace between the
energized bus bar components and the
grounded cubicle sidewall surface resulted
in an immediate arcing fault, which rapidly
transitioned to an arc-flash event.
The above conclusion is based on the waveforms
captured from the monitoring systems and the
physical damage on the cubicle wall and bus bars.
The low-current leader of the fault is hidden by the
very high currents following the initial flash, with
the arc fault sustained by the establishment of highly
conductive plasma. This energy discharge burned
the bus bars and vaporized the copper and other
metal parts in the vicinity, resulting in an arc-blast.
The resultant explosion impacted E1 directly. Figure
2-7 shows an example of an arc-flash event.
Within the relatively confined cubicle space, it is
assumed that E1 placed his hands, forearms, chest,
and face in close proximity to the energized
Figure 2-6. Post-even condition of components of all three phases within Bus B at the
time of the accident. Medical assessment of the
the spray bottles bottom (top
resulting injuries determined no evidence of direct
image) and sprayer (bottom
image) on the floor outside cubicle electrical contact to any skin surface; all burns were
caused by exposure to the extreme thermal energy
17.
of the arc-flash.
Post-event analysis of E1s clothing (Figure. 2-8)
indicates no sign of combustion below chest level.
The rapid release of thermal energy from the
flash event resulted in serious burns to E1s
hands, forearms, chest, face, head, and left
rear upper torso. The subsequent pressure
wave forced him backward and downward
onto the floor, where his head struck a microohm testing instrument.
Figure 2-7. This photo shows the
energy released from thermal,
pressure, sound, and light modes
during a typical arc-flash event.
10
Figure 2-8. Clothing recovered from E1

after the arc-flash event.
Figure 2-9. What cubicle 17 looked like

after the arc-flash event.
As a result of this strike, E1 suffered a laceration to the back of his head. Figure
2-9 shows cubicle 17 after the arc-flash event. Figure 2-10 shows the position of E1 after
the arc-flash event.
11
2.2 Accident Response

Immediately following the event,
E2 and E4 observed E1 lying on the
floor in front of cubicle 17. E3
called for everyone to evacuate the
switchgear. E4 moved toward the
west exit door and informed E3
that E1 was down and on fire. E2
reached E1 first and began to
manually pat out the flames on
E1s shirt and sleeves after donning
leather gloves.
Figure. 2-10. Position of E1 after the arc-flash

event.
Figure. 2-11. This fire extinguisher was brought to

the scene but not used to extinguish the fire on E1
at the arc-flash accident scene.
E3 had retrieved the closest fire

extinguisher from the west entry
door to assist with extinguishing the
fire on E1. However, because E2
had already put out the fire, the
extinguisher was not required.
Post-event status of the extinguisher
gage and safety pin verified that it
had not been used or discharged
(Figure 2-11).
E1 was initially responsive, but
became unresponsive after several
seconds. E2 took action to revive
him, and E1 was then able to walk
out of the east exit with the help of
E2. E1 was escorted to the
southeast corner inside the
substation fence enclosure to await
arrival of emergency response.
Facility management assessed the
TA-53-0070 substation to ensure
that the high-voltage source power
remained de-energized. The
immediate accident scene inside the
switchgear was made secure and
red DANGER barricade tape was
installed to isolate the boundaries of
the arc-flash event, as well as
exterior areas of the switchgear.
12
Access to the remainder of the substation building was restricted to only those that
required access. The substation complex itself, which is already protected by a perimeter
fence and locked gates, was locked down to prevent any unauthorized access, pending the
arrival of the JAIT.
2.3 Summary of the Medical Report

Nine individuals were transported by emergency vehicles to the Los Alamos Medical
Center (LAMC, a local hospital) as the result of the arc-flash. The general foreman, E9,
who was in an adjacent building at the time of the arc-flash, did not require medical
attention. As a result of the arc-flash, E1 suffered a burn injury to his hands, wrists, face,
neck, and torso. E1 also received a minor laceration to the back of the head. After
evaluation and treatment, E1 was identified as critical and transferred by CareFlight to
the regional burn center for ongoing treatment. There was no evidence of injury to
hearing or vision.
E2 was referred for admission to the LAMC for ongoing observation and treatment
related to inhalation exposure, then subsequently released two days later. All others were
evaluated, treated, and released.
Behavioral Health Services was also mobilized and offered their services to all
employees on the day of the event. The support remains ongoing and continues to be
offered or provided to any impacted employees.
2.4 Event Chronology

Table 2-1 summarizes the events and actions associated with TA-53-0070 before the
accident described in Section 2.1, Accident Description. This table is designed to assist
with putting context around events on the day of the accident. A detailed description of
the timeline associated with this accident is provided in the Event and Causal Factors
Chart in Appendix G.
13
Table 2-1. Summary of Events and Actions Pre-accident.

Date
Action
~2010
5-Yr Switchgear Cleaning PM performed.
~2011
2-Yr Air Circuit Breaker PM performed.
~2013
2-Yr Air Circuit Breaker PM performed.
1/14/2015
5-Yr Switchgear Cleaning PM Work Order generated.
1/14/2015
2-Yr Air Circuit Breaker PM Work Order generated.
~March 2015
Hazard Analysis Process for both PMs utilized a document generated the prior year on
4/4/2014.
3/21/2015
Initial work on Air Circuit Breaker PM commenced with a Pre-Job Brief and work on
breakers that did not require individual buses to be de-energized.
4/22/2015
The combined 5-Yr Switchgear Cleaning PM and 2-Yr Air Circuit Breaker PM were
planned to work the weekend of 5/16/2015.
4/27/2015
After consultation amongst groups involved, the combined PMs were moved to the
weekend of 5/2/2015 to accommodate facility and resource schedules.
4/27/2015
An outage request for TA-53 was requested for all of TA-53-0070 to be de-energized on
5/2/2015 (Saturday) and 5/3/2015 (Sunday).
4/28/2015
A decision by LANSCE and maintenance was made to re-energize Buses B and C on

Saturday evening, 5/2/2015, after the work on those buses was complete.
5/1/2015
Switching procedure authorized to control de-energizing all buses, then re-energizing

Buses B & C on Saturday evening.
5/2/2015
The combined PMs were performed on Buses B and C, with the entire switchgear deenergized.
5/2/2015
After work was complete for the day, Buses B and C were re-energized to minimize
outage impacts on LANSCE.
5/3/2015
All crewmembers except the PIC and two other linemen return to TA-53-0070 to
complete the cleaning. Wiremen and one lineman inside, other linemen demobilize
equipment from outside work.
5/3/2015
At about 1108, the Arc-Flash Accident occurred.
14
3.0 FACTS AND ANALYSIS

3.1 Emergency Response
Facts
Emergency Operations Response
At 1109, the Los Alamos Fire Department (LAFD) received an alarm notification for a
possible electrocution burn. At 1115, the LAFD arrived on scene and began providing
initial treatment to E1 and the other eight employees involved with the event. After initial
assessment of E1, LAFD requested that CareFlight be dispatched to LAMC.
At approximately 1118, E1 was transported to LAMC by ambulance and
subsequently transported by a CareFlight helicopter to the Albuquerque Medical
Center Burn Center at the University of New Mexico Hospital in Albuquerque.
The eight other members of this work crew were transported via ambulance to LAMC.
Two individuals were evaluated for potential smoke inhalation. Seven of these employees
were later released, with one (E2) remaining at the hospital for further observation before
being released two days later.
At 1110, the LANL Emergency Operations Support Center (EOSC) within the
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) copied the LAFD radio call dispatching of medical
units to TA-53-0070. Emergency Management Duty Officer (EM3) arrived at the scene
at 1141. Additional LAFD assets arrived on scene and established EOC/LAFD Unified
Command at 1148.
At 1206, the EOSC requested that management and technical support personnel report to
the EOC at 1300 or sooner. The HAZMAT team was placed on standby for support. The
Unified Command post was relocated to TA-53-0044 because of lightning warnings in
the area. On-Scene Command post was terminated at 1236.
At 1243, EM3 turned the substation over to the Facility Superintendent. EM3 declared
the incident as Non-Emergency-Significant Event at 1402. At 1432, EM3 and the LAFD
terminated unified command.
15
Medical Response
Immediately following the accident, E2 and E3 responded to assist E1, who was initially
responsive. E2 patted E1 down and extinguished the fire that was on E1s clothing. At the
same time E3 went to get a fire extinguisher but it was not needed. E1 became
unresponsive and was revived by E2 who helped E1 remove burnt clothing, applied cool
wet rags to E1, and assisted E1 out of TA-53-0070 while E3 went and called 911. Other
individuals on the scene also called 911.
At 1109, the Los Alamos Fire Department (LAFD) received an alarm notification for a
possible electrocution burn and initial emergency units were dispatched to the scene at
1110. At 1115, Medic 1 and other LAFD units arrived on scene. Site personnel had
opened the gates to allow the arriving emergency units direct and unencumbered access
to the accident scene. Personnel in Medic 1 began providing initial treatment to E1 and
the other eight employees involved with the event. Medic 1 personnel took the lead for
treating E1 and personnel from other LAFD units assisted in evaluating and treating the
other eight employees, and LAMC is notified to expect mass casualties from the accident.
After initial assessment of E1, Medic 1 personnel requested that CareFlight be dispatched
to LAMC. Medic 1 leaves the site with E1 at 1118 and arrives at LAMC at 1125. E1 is
assessed at LAMC, where he is prepared for his trip to the University of New Mexico
Hospitals (UNMH) Level 1 Trauma Unit via helicopter. At 1228 E1 is transported to the
Los Alamos High School (LAMCs normal helicopter pad was unavailable) to be placed
into the helicopter. The helicopter with E1 aboard leaves Los Alamos for UNMH at
approximately 1235.
The eight other members of this work crew were transported via ambulance to LAMC at
approximately 1145. All eight individuals were evaluated for potential injury. Five
individuals were evaluated and released, two were treated and released, and one (E2)
remains at the hospital for further observation before being released two days later.
Analysis
The involved personnel reacted effectively and appropriately to ensure that workers were
successfully evacuated from the switchgear and moved to a safe location. Appropriate
first aid was given to E1.
The ability of the workers to react quickly despite the trauma involved in this type of
event may have prevented additional injury to E1. The call to 911 was placed shortly
after the event and LAFD responded to the scene within the required response time.
LAFD and LAMC provided appropriate first aid and medical treatment. The decision to
airlift E1 to the New Mexico Burn Center at the University of New Mexico in
Albuquerque, NM, was timely and appropriate.
16
Proper and timely incident notifications were made to the EOC, UI Facility Operations
Director (FOD), LANSCE FOD, and LANL management. The LAFD effectively secured
the scene and the lineman crew ensured the switchgear was in a safe and stable
configuration. The EOC coordinated the recall of support personnel in a timely manner.
The EOC and the LAFD established a Unified Command Structure and managed the
scene until it was released back to the UI FOD. The EOC properly staffed and classified
the event as a Non-Emergency-Significant Event.
The overall emergency response by those individuals at the scene, the responding fire and
medical staff, LAMC and Albuquerque hospitals, and the LANL EOC was timely and
appropriate. The actions of E2 and E3 to ensure other employees evacuated the
switchgear and to render aid to E1 were commendable. Also commendable was the
LAFD response to the scene to provide aid, assist in emergency transportation, and
support to all involved workers.
3.2 Post-Event Accident Scene Preservation and Management Response

Facts
Emergency Management employee 3 (EM3) released the scene at 1243 to the Electrical
Superintendent (S1), per LANL SEO-3 EM Incident Record for Incident 15-066.
S1 instructed L1 and E9 to de-energize Bus B and Bus C by isolating TR2 and executing
standard high-voltage isolation actions, involving operating the necessary 13.8-kV
breakers and the voltage-isolating switches.
S1 instructed all linemen to leave the yard because of an approaching lightning storm.
Nothing was removed or altered inside TA-53-0070 until early in the week of May 3,
when hazard signs were placed on the cubicle doors to identify energized cubicles.
S1 instructed all personnel inside TA-53-0070 and inside the fence line to depart. LANL
provided hotel accommodation for all affected employees to avoid the need to drive
home. S1 used his camera to document the status of TA-53-0070.
The Videx electronic locking system controls all access to TA-53-0070, whether it is a
fence door, gate, or TA-53-0070 door. The key for these locks is authorized only by S1.
This key is available only to the HV linemen. EM (fire and protective forces) does not
have a key.
No post-event drug or alcohol testing was performed on any members of this work crew
as required by LANL Procedures. It is recognized that the priority was treatment of the
injured employee, but other involved workers in the accident could have been available
for testing.
17
Analysis
Scene preservation satisfied the need of the JAIT to maintain the direct link to the
accident for pertinent facts.
Lack of drug and alcohol testing post-event prevented the JAIT from ruling out
impairment as a contributor. Implementation of LANL drug and alcohol testing policy is
inadequate to ensure that these tests are conducted in a timely manner. Laboratory
management has reviewed and is updating execution mechanisms for future accidents.
3.3 Assessing Prior Events and Accident Precursors

Facts
The JAIT performed a review to identify historical precursors by reviewing and
summarizing LANLs recent and historical electrical safety and related Integrated Work
Management (IWM) experience. This effort included reviews and results from multiple
sources.
Facility Centered Assessments

Institutional Facility Centered Assessments (FCAs) that incorporated assessment criteria
for electrical safety and Integrated Safety Management (ISM)/IWM implementation were
evaluated. Assessments cited include DARHT (2012), Weapons Facility Operations
(WFO, 2011), RadChem Operations (RCO, 2014), Science and Technology Operations
(STO, 2010), Radioactive Liquid Waste (RLW, 2013), and Utilities and Institutional
Facilities (UI, 2013). Results varied slightly across the operations yet reported electrical
and ISM/IWM implementation as meeting the review criteria, with a few exceptions.
Some common observations and opportunities for improvement from the assessments
included the following:
Engagement of subject-matter experts (SMEs) and workers in scoping and work

planning to improve hazard analysis and implementation of clearly defined
controls.
Improve work-package consistency and formality to help minimize confusion and
worker error.
18
Special Assessments
Two special assessments of LANL electrical safety events were also evaluated. This
evaluation included a team review (2011 IWM Team Report) of five events, four of
which were electrical, that occurred over a short period of time and another more recent
assessment (April 2015) of an electrical shock event and facility-related experience at the
Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB) facility. Data from the
assessments identified common precursors, including factors associated with the
following:
Work scoping and bounding to include risk assessments, Integrated Work

Document (IWD) boundaries, two-person rule, PPE, etc.
Changing work conditions and distractions to workers and supervision.
Clarifying and communicating roles and responsibilities, chain-of-command and
involvement of workers, SMEs, planners, foremen and supervisors.
Working outside of the IWD or failure to implement described controls.
Pre-job briefing lacking or inadequate.
Lessons Learned Records

Lessons Learned (LL) since 2009 addressing specific high- and low-voltage events at
LANL were reviewed for content highlighting and communicating information regarding
specific electrical events. LL were from troubleshooting a failed vacuum pump at
LANSCE (July 2010), multiple electrical events summary (fall of 2010 to spring of
2011), and scoping of subcontracted repair work (October 2012).
These LL Records highlighted the need to engage SMEs and personnel in work planning,
scoping, and assessments. Additional Electrical safety and/or IWM-related
recommendations for ensuring safe conduct of electrical work included the following:
Daily task reviews

Conducting zero-energy checks and powering down equipment as a positive
barrier
Addressing changes in work scope, equipment, material, or techniques that differ
from previous work
DOE Occurrence Reports

Select ORPS reports and history associated with electrical events were reviewed for
common issues and precursors. Specific events were associated with acceptance testing
of a vacuum pump disconnect (WFO, February 2015); construction subcontractor support
activities for a programmatic upgrade project (WFO, October 2014); unauthorized repair
of programmatic equipment (STO, October 2014); and facility electrical system tracing
19
(TA-55, February 2015). From a review of these recent events, common precursors were
again identified, including the following:
Engagement of SMEs and workers in work planning

Work scoping and IWD development to clearly define and plan work processes,
tasks, and steps sufficient to support hazard identification and implementation of
controls
Clear definition of roles, responsibilities, and expectations for all workers
Communication across the Program, Responsible Line Manager (RLM), PIC and
craft workers of work conditions
Identification and implementation of controls such as Lockout/Tagout (LOTO),
zero-voltage testing, and PPE
Changes in the scope of work
Office of Enforcement Reports

A review of historical DOE Enforcement activities was also conducted for work activity
and compliance factors as they related to event precursors. This was limited to an
investigation resulting in a PNOV issued to LANL in October 2012. The scope of the
enforcement action covered four electrical events involving LANL and LANL
subcontractors. One occurred in October 2010, one in December 2010, and two others in
January 2011. Similar precursors from the event investigations and enforcement action
summary included the following:
Weaknesses in work planning to analyze hazards and develop controls

Monitoring and assessment of work practices
Using a safety watch or qualified electrical worker to monitor work
Implementing required work permits
Employing practices to eliminate or reduce employee exposure to electrical
energy by applying physical controls or using barricades and signs to exclude
workers from hazards
Analysis
The JAIT analyzed LANLs past experience associated with electrical safety and related
IWM implementation. This included an analysis of information from multiple sources,
including LANL assessments, LL, occurrence reports, and enforcement actions.
Analysis of the key precursor data and improvement opportunities showed the precursors
grouped within eight general categories. There is a strong correlation to the causal factors
observed in this event investigation. Precursors were identified in historical information
as follows:
20
Engagement of SMEs and workers in scoping and work planning was identified in
three of five sources
Improving work package consistency and formality was in one source
Defining and communicating roles and responsibilities were in two of five
sources
Work scoping and effective hazard analysis and implementation of controls were
in three of five sources
Pre-Job Briefing or communicating work conditions were in three of five sources
Changing work conditions was in three of five sources
Working outside the IWD or failure to implement controls was in one of five
sources
Assessing Work Practices (Feedback) was in one source
LANL had previously identified the precursors and established corresponding corrective
actions, improvement plans, and integrated activities with goals and objectives. In some
cases actions have demonstrated commitment by management and workers with progress
as demonstrated through VPP worker involvement and Strategic Plan for Improving
Integrated Work Management. Others have not yet been completed, but those completed
were not sustained or effective at the task level as shown by this historical analysis.
JON-12: LANL needs to improve its ability to implement and verify corrective actions
from previous assessments and events.
3.4 ISM/Work Planning and Controls

Facts
The overarching upper-level document for LANL work planning and control is procedure
P300, Integrated Work Management. Based on ISMs core functions, P300 has been
established so that it is possible to perform work in a way that protects people, the
environment, property, and the security of the nation.
P950, Conduct of Maintenance along with AP-Work-002, Work Planning, document and
provide a detailed planning process for maintenance/construction activities identified
through the work request, screening, and acceptance process.
LANLs Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS) and IWM processes
were used to plan the LANSCE electrical switchgear PM outage. Using the IWM
process, the Responsible Line Manager (RLM) determined that work at TA-53-0070 was
considered a moderate-hazard activity. The outage planning included a detailed switching
order and associated IWD.
21
A typical work-planning development process takes approximately eight weeks.

LANSCEs outage scheduling led to the integration of the 5-Yr PM activity and the 2-Yr
PM activity well in advance of the typical eight-week planning period.
The TA-53-0070 switchgear was initially planned to be de-energized over the entire
weekend of May 23. However, on April 28, a proposal was made by MSS personnel to
re-energize Bus B and Bus C while leaving Bus A de-energized at the end of the day on
Saturday, May 2. This decision was approved by the UI and LANSCE FODs, and
followed discussions that had begun as early as April 21. Re-energizing Bus B and Bus C
enabled LANSCE to transfer vacuum pump and other equipment power from temporary
generators back to line power. LANSCE uses vacuum pumps to keep the accelerator
beam cavity evacuated and the facility was prepared to support a two-day shutdown
without bringing vacuum pumps back on line. Re-energizing Bus B and Bus C also
allowed UI to bring power back to local sanitary lift stations.
The clearance procedure to re-energize Bus B and Bus C on Saturday evening was
requested by the Planner on April 28, but no additional hazard analysis was initiated.
The PIC and work crew were also informed after the April 28 decision.
Because these two activities are performed every two and five years, two model workorder packages were created for TA-53-0070 switchgear maintenance. These two model
work-orders were created years before the work, and had been successfully performed
independently in previous evolutions. Both model work orders were reviewed by the
Planner as part of the work package development process.
The JAIT reviewed both work packages. The 2-Yr PM package involved maintenance for
the air circuit breakers. The 5-Yr PM was for cleaning the cubicles. Both packages
included a Work Order Task section; Form 2103 (IWD Part 3, Validation and Work
Release); Form 2101 (IWD Part 2, FOD Requirements and Approval for Entry and Area
Hazards and Controls); Form 2100-WC (AP-Work-002: Attachment 15- Facility
Maintenance Activity Specific Information); and AP-Work-002: Attachment 11
Maintenance and Site Services Work Completion Form. The following sections describe
the results of the JAIT review.
Define the Scope of Work

Within the standing IWD is the scope of work for both PM work packages. Form 2100WC contains an Activity Description/Overview statement. The 5-Yr PM Activity
Description/Overview statement reads as follows: PERFORM 5YR. PREVENTATIVE
MAINTENANCE ON SWITCHGEAR. OUTAGE REQUIRED FOR AFFECTED
ELECTRICAL SWITCHGEAR, TRANSFORMER AND BLDGS. WIPE, CLEAN,
AND INSPECT. MAKE NECESSARY REPAIRS ONLY IF ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
IS COMPROMIZED.
22
The scope of work for the 5-Yr PM and the work package steps did not include
information associated with work on a partially energized switchgear.
Analyze the Hazards

The IWD process uses several tools and approaches to analyze work hazards. Once work
is identified and the scope of work is defined, the first step to identify hazards is to
determine hazard level by using the online Hazard Grading Table. An automated hazardscreening tool is also available on the LANL network. The TA-53-0070 Substation PM
screened as a moderate-hazard activity.
According to P300, a work activity that screens at the moderate-hazard level, must use a
hazard analysis method, such as what-if or Hazard and Operability Analysis
(HAZOP), to determine the hazards associated with potential accidents or incidents and
how harm might be caused. This generally requires each of the tasks and work steps with
an activity to be identified, defined, and planned so the associated hazards can be
adequately mitigated. P300 states that: The analysis may be graded based on the
complexity of the moderate-hazard activity ranging from a relatively quick
brainstorming for simple activities to a documented what if or HAZOP for more
complicated ones. The result of tabletop hazard analysis is incorporated into the
Precautions/Limitations/Prerequisite, General Hazards and Work Step sections of APWORK-002: Attachment 15 Form 2100-WC.
Also included into maintenance IWD work packages is IWD Part 2, Form 2101, FOD
Requirements and Approval for Entry and Area Hazards and Controls. This form is
similar to the traditional Job Hazard Analysis, although it serves a different purpose.
Besides its use as rudimentary high-level facility hazard screening, this form is mostly
used to coordinate entry into LANL facilities and to identify site hazards.
Develop and Implement Controls

P300 provides information regarding the expectations on how to develop and implement
controls, including details associated with a hierarchy of controls to mitigate hazards.
The process also includes information related to IWD work-package documentation, peer
review before approval, the expectation for a validation walk down and worker
authorization. IWD forms used to document these expectations and additional more
detailed procedure steps are found in MSS Work Control - Conduct of Maintenance
(P950) Administrative Procedure AP-WORK-002, R14 Work Planning, as well as forms
associated with that procedure.
Although there are slight differences among controls listed on the various forms in the
two PM work packages, the following are common to both:
23
Mode 0, Class 1.5 PPE is the minimum required during the work: Hard Hat,
Safety Glasses, Nomex Long Sleeve Shirt, and Leather Gloves.
A VERIFY zero voltage step that reads:
- Confirm no voltage or residual electrical present in circuit with an adequately
rated voltage detection instrument to test each phase conductor or circuit part
to verify that they are de-energized.
A ENSURE when performing Preventive Maintenance Work step that reads:
- All affect(ed) equipment between clearance points is checked for zero
voltage and grounded (if multiple equipment is being worked on in stages
personal grounds may be applied and logged into Switching Procedure with
dispatch).
- Use a second person to verify zero voltage when testing (lineman,
electrician, or apprentice).
Perform Work within Controls

The IWM process and the IWD (Part 3, Work Validation and Work Release) describe the
minimum content of pre-job briefs. Specifically, the following questions are to be asked
as part of the pre-job:
How can we make a mistake at this point?

What is the worst thing that can go wrong?
The LANL Electrical Safety Program, (P101-13) also has requirements for pre-job brief
content. Section 6.2.6 Pre-Job Briefing requires 12 subjects to be discussed for electrical
work. Requirements applicable to this event include the following:
Procedures that must be followed (e.g., two-person rule or safety watch)

Special tools or test equipment to be used when executing the work task
Any special precautions that are required by the working conditions
Required PPE and protective clothing
Other work being performed in the immediate physical area
Provide Feedback and Improvement

According to MSS Work Control - Conduct of Maintenance (P950) Administrative
Procedure AP-WORK-002 R14 Work Planning, maintenance work activities that use
IWD work packages, feedback is performed using AP-WORK-002: Attachment 11,
Maintenance and Site Services Work Completion Form, as well as the Lessons Learned
process.
24
Analysis
Define the Scope of Work
The scope of work in the switchgear-cleaning IWD work package [Work Order Task
00489196 01] was written at a broad activity level to enable the greatest flexibility of
work execution.
As a result, hazards at the task work level were not sufficiently identified,
analyzed, or mitigated.
Specifically, the IWD task steps involved bus de-energizing, cleaning, and re-energizing.
This approach allowed the work package to be used for Saturdays work, when all three
buses were de-energized, as well as for Sundays work, when Bus B and Bus C were
energized and Bus A remained de-energized.
JON-1: MSS and UI management need to strengthen expectations regarding work-scope
determination, as well as task-level work planning and hazard analysis. These
expectations should be reinforced and assessed frequently.
JON-10: MSS and UI management need to facilitate more direct involvement and
ownership by craft in developing the work scope and job planning.
Analyze the Hazards

The IWD analysis did not evaluate the hazards and their associated effects of the
following:
Concurrently performing two PMs, which contributed to workplace clutter and a

crowded environment
Initiating a changing work configuration, when on Saturday all buses were
de-energized but on Sunday such a configuration was changed to only a partial
de-energization
The possibility of human error by accidently entering and performing work on an
energized cubicle
Failure to perform this analysis resulted in a missed opportunity to include tasklevel controls, such as specific work-scope boundaries intended to demarcate
between the energized and de-energized equipment.
25
JON-7: MSS and UI management need to closely evaluate changing conditions when
using standing IWDs during the planning process to ensure controls are aligned with
actual work activities and site conditions.
Develop and Implement Controls

A work package developed at the task level may have prevented the human error that led
to E1s injury.
The specific failure was that the IWD did not evaluate hazards associated with
changing conditions from Saturday to Sunday, when the switchgear went from
completely de-energized to partially energized. The JAIT concluded that this
omission constituted a missed opportunity, particularly when it came to
identifying the need for an additional physical barrier that identified the
boundaries of the de-energized Bus A.
Such a barrier would have decreased the likelihood of the occurrence of human error that
led to E1s injury.
Perform Work within Controls

The broad nature of the work-package planning meant that the work package neither
acknowledged nor provided specific hazard-control information regarding the controls
for working with partially energized equipment. The linemen used a rigorous and detailed
switching procedure that provided step-by-step instructions to configure the switchgear
for Sundays work, so that Bus B and Bus C were energized while Bus A was deenergized. However, the IWD that the wiremen used did not provide a level of detail that
addressed the hazards associated with the changed work configuration.
One work package was used to perform similar work on the switchgear on Saturday and
Sunday, despite the fact that the switchgear configuration had changed, thereby
introducing additional hazards from energized buses in adjacent lookalike cubicles.
The work package Form 2100-WC (Facility Maintenance Activity-Specific Information)
did not address the possibility of a worker mistakenly opening and beginning work on an
energized cubicle.
26
The work package did not identify the elevated hazard associated with
continuing the work on Sunday with a portion of the switchgear energized. This
hazard was not recognized or addressed in the IWD, so no additional controls
were in place to prevent human error.
The additional hazard inserted due to the partial re-energization could have been
mitigated had all workers implemented the zero-voltage check requirements in the IWD.
A lineman capable of conducting zero-voltage checks on high voltage equipment was
available on Sunday, though he was not always utilized for these checks. In interviews,
several workers stated that they had conducted zero-voltage checks to satisfy their own
personal safety concerns.
JON-5: MSS and UI management need to reinforce and clarify expectations and
implementation for zero-voltage verification requirements in the course of electrical work
at all organizational levels.
In 2013, LANL accepted NFPA 70E 2012, Standard for Electrical Safety in the
Workplace, which specifically addresses the caution necessary around lookalike
equipment in section 130.7(E)(4) Look-Alike Equipment, where work performed on
equipment that is de-energized and placed in an electrically safe work condition exists in
a work area with other energized equipment that is similar in size, shape, and
construction, one of the alerting methods in 130.7(E)(1), (2), or (3) shall be employed to
prevent the employee from entering lookalike equipment. In summary, these methods
involve clear signage, physical barricades, or an attendant (safety watch).
The LANL Chief Electrical Safety Officer has indicated that this particular standard from
70E was not in effect due to the exclusion in 70E granted to installations that are under
the exclusive control of an electrical utility. While this exclusion may be valid, it has
not been effectively implemented or proceduralized to provide adequate compensatory
measures for instances when mixed crews, trained in 70E and 1910.269 are working
together in such an installation. It is also noted that the JAIT benchmarking effort found
other DOE facilities who utilize the 70E exclusion have implemented robust barriers as
standard industry practice.
JON-11: MSS and UI management need to ensure robust, durable, and visible barriers
and signs are appropriately placed and accurately reflect current work conditions,
equipment status, and hazards to ensure worker safety.
Concurrent with the switchgear PM work to clean the cubicles, a separate PM was
performed on the switchgear breakers. As part of this breaker PM, on Sunday morning
workers removed breakers from the de-energized Bus A. The breakers were staged to
move to the opposite end of the switchgear so they could undergo hi-pot testing. This
testing necessitated additional equipment, tools, and personnel to complete the work.
27
The JAIT concluded that the congested work area, additional personnel, and
equipment might have contributed to an error-likely situation in which E1 chose
to open cubicle 17 and work on an energized bus.
High-voltage hazards in the hi-pot testing areaunder the second PM necessitated that
yellow caution tape be hung to establish a boundary around the testing area. As discussed
in other sections of this report, the JAIT concluded that the location of the yellow caution
tape could have provided a confusing visual cue that influenced E1 to choose to work on
energized cubicle 17.
The IWM process and the IWD (Part 3, Work Validation and Work Release) describe the
minimum content of pre-job briefs. Specifically, the following questions are to be asked
as part of the pre-job:
How can we make a mistake at this point?

What is the worst thing that can go wrong?
Although it is unclear if these questions were asked, it is clear that the pre-job did not
anticipate the possibility of a worker mistakenly opening and beginning work on an
energized cubicle. In addition to this IWD Part 3, it is also unclear if any of the required
subjects for electrical work presented in the LANL Electrical Safety Program (P101-13)
were incorporated into the pre-job briefs.
JON-8: MSS and UI management need to strengthen pre-job briefings at the beginning of
each shift or when significant changes occur so that worker engagement, focus on
important controls, operations integration, and a full understanding by all workers are all
assured.
JON-9: LANL management needs to ensure workers are encouraged to and are
acknowledged for playing an active role in ensuring their own (and work teams) safety
and compliance with work rules.
The IWD process did identify hazards and develop controls for the cubicle cleaning that
involved the use of PPE. However, the JAIT, through a review of physical and
photographic evidence, found that not all workers used the identified PPE, and this
expectation was neither communicated nor enforced by supervision or co-workers.
JON-6: MSS and UI management and direct supervision need to reinforce and clarify
expectations (training, oversight, and accountability) for PPE requirements and work
practices in the course of electrical work at all organization levels.
28
Provide Feedback and Improvement

The work packages Work Completion Form was not completed because the PM
was interrupted by the arc-flash event. Regardless, the JAIT evaluated previous
efforts to review and improve LANLs Work Planning and Control process. One
particularly applicable self-assessment was completed in 2013. The self-assessment
identified Hazard Identification and Control as a dominant weakness.
Factors contributing to this conclusion that are relevant to this accident investigation
include the following:
ESH personnel were not consistently involved in work planning or when changes
occurred to work
IWDs and Exposure Assessments did not always consider co-located workers
IWDs did not always define the work in sufficient detail to adequate identify and
analyze hazards.
Hazard controls were not always adequate for the identified hazards; sometimes
controls were missing altogether
Analysis also identified observations chronicled in the Health, Safety, and Security
Investigation Reports (January 2012) involving four Hazardous Control Events at LANL.
These observations included a potential violation of NPFA 70E, Section 120.1 Process
of Achieving an Electrically Safe Work Condition. The specific applicable requirement
that links to this event is the following requirement: Use an adequately rated voltage
detector to test each phase conductor or circuit part to verify they are de-energized.
This accident could have been prevented if LANLs corporate feedback and improvement
process had driven corrective actions adequately from this 2012 event. Such actions
would ensure an electrically safe work environment, particularly when it came to the
verification of zero energy before starting work.
3.5 Conduct of Operations

Facts
In July 1990, DOE issued DOE Order 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for
DOE Facilities. This Orders guidelines were designed to form a compendium of good
management practices and describe key elements that support excellence in operation.
In 2001, this Order was added to the Prime Contract. In June 2010, DOE Order 422.1,
Conduct of Operations, superseded DOE Order 5480.19 and was added to LANLs
contract in January 2011. The requirements in P315, the LANL Conduct of Operations
Manual, are applicable to all Laboratory workers.
Training & Qualification and Control of Equipment and System Status are two key
Conduct of Operations elements applicable to this accident and are discussed below.
29
Training & Qualification

Members of the medium-voltage-breaker maintenance crew and linemen crew are both
under rigorous training and qualification programs. Each program requires thousands of
hours of experience and hundreds of hours of formal training all of which produces
licensed journeymen electricians qualified to work within the LANL environment.
A key aspect of this training and experience is to be proficient at recognizing a variety
of electrical hazards and detailed knowledge of implementing associated controls.
These controls come from several national standards and are implemented at LANL
through training identified in P 101-13, Electrical Safety Program.
Applicable national standards, LANL P 101-13, formal training and demonstrated
proficiency requirements all focus heavily on how to identify and quantify hazards.
Workers must demonstrate that they know the proper instruments to test for a given
voltage for all work they are trained to perform. They are also required to demonstrate
that they know and understand PPE requirements for this work. This stage of electrical
work is considered the most critical line of defense. Working on energized equipment is
rarely permitted within DOE facilities and requires senior management approval, per
P 101-13, Electrical Safety Program. (In this accident, there was no intention to work on
energized equipment.) Linemen, however, do regularly work on energized overhead
equipment and power lines.
There are two institutional training plans that apply to electrical craft work at LANL.
TP 2559, Electricians/Apprentice Electricians and Facility Engineers and TP2911,
Linemen & Utility Engineers. Additionally, although not required, some workers have
completed training plan 810, Electrician Sub-station Electrical Worker.
TP 2911 is assigned to all linemen crewmembers. This plan contains the following:
training on the LANL electrical safety program for electrical craft,

electrical transmission and distribution safety (OSHA 1910.269),
personal protective equipment and signage (NFPA 70E),
National Electrical Safety Code (NESC) (focuses on utility work),
First Aid, and
Annual CPR/AED certification.
TP 810 was previously assigned only to crew members dedicated to breaker maintenance
and contains two classes delivered by AVO, a subcontractor to LANL:
Course 33964, Circuit Breaker Testing Certification

Course 3967, Substation Maintenance Certification
TP 2559 is assigned to all wiremen and electrical breaker maintenance crewmembers.

This plan contains the following:
training on the LANL electrical safety program for electrical craft,
30
personal protective equipment and signage (NFPA 70E),

First Aid,
Annual CPR/AED certification, and
NEC Update Training (Tri-Annual).
Analysis
Training & Qualification for Electrical Work
Training Plans (TP) and Electrical Worker Qualification Forms are both tracked using
electronic databases to maintain the status of each electrical worker at LANL.
Training and qualification programs and the associated requirements for all involved
workers were reviewed in depth and were deemed to be well designed and implemented
with two caveats:
Though both linemen and wiremen are trained in 70E, there was no evidence
presented that wiremen were trained to recognize the exclusion from 70E
requirements while working in the Substation and switchgear, asserted to be
under the exclusive control of the electrical utility, i.e., the linemen.
Subcontracted technical training offered to the breaker maintenance crew, mostly
wiremen, has not been offered for several years. This training increases skills for
working on breakers and in switchgear. It is recommended LANL evaluate
whether this training should be provided in the future.
Control of Equipment and System Status

The work packages to execute both the 2- and 5-Yr PM activities required for 13.8-kV
switchgears at LANL were developed during previous evolutions for this particular set of
equipment. They were retained in the CMMS as standing work orders to facilitate
scheduling routine work and work history. The 2-Yr breaker maintenance work order was
triggered in the scheduling system in January of 2015. This work order contains an IWD
that identifies the key work steps, precautions, and controls from P 101-13, Electrical
Safety Program to conduct the work safely. The 5-Yr switchgear maintenance work order
was initiated in the same timeframe. Individually, these two packages have both been
conducted safely.
On this switchgear maintenance evolution, breaker work began two months before the
accident. Individual breakers were isolated, removed, and tested under smaller power
outages. This process reduced the overall work required the weekend of May 2 and 3.
The status of the switchgear maintenance was informally tracked by applying
tape to cubicles as they were completed. Red tape indicated breaker completion
while blue tape indicated cleaning completion.
31
This process was used as an Operator Aid, but was not formally approved. In addition to
this informal process, no task-level assignments were made to complete the defined work
scope.
JON-13: MSS and UI management need to evaluate use of informal work practices in the
context of potential impact on the effectiveness of safety controls.
3.6 Supervision and Oversight of Work

Facts
Work was performed on substation TA-53-0070, which is under the control of UI
Division Office, a part of UI-FOD.
Supervision Interaction during the Event

The line of supervision during the two IWDs being executed was as follows:
E3, a wireman foreman, was present in the area when the event occurred. E3
conducted the job pre-brief and was monitoring the crew on the day of the event.
E9, a general foreman assigned as an Alternate PIC. E9 was located in an adjacent
building working on paperwork.
L1 was also assigned as an alternate PIC on Sunday, and he briefed the linemen
working on the outside of the switchgear.
S1, a superintendent who served as RLM assigned to this work. S1 was also
designated as facility and outage point of contact. S1 was not present in the area
the day the event occurred.
O1, a UI Electric Systems Operator. Located in the control center, O1 interacted
via radio with lineman L1 at the beginning of shift.
There was interaction between L1 and O1 via radio to declare beginning of work
activities inside substation TA-53-0070 at 0710 on May 3, 2015.
Hazard Analysis and Controls by Supervision
IWDs part 2, FOD Requirements and Approval for Entry and Area Hazards and
Controls, were in place to address TA-53-0070 facility hazards. The form is a
coordinating document between the facility tenant and non-tenant work crew and
identifies general facility hazards. It is not intended to provide work-activity or task-level
hazard analysis and controls.
The IWD form 2100-WC contains the hazard analysis at the work activity and task level.
This form indicates the work steps developed by S1 and L2, both of whom are qualified
ESOs, in conjunction with a planner. The form was approved by all three, as well as by a
32
FOD designee, who in this case was a UI-OPS person. The form contains several notes,
cautions, and warnings not embedded in the work steps. Because the controls are written
generically, the IWDs do not mandate that the crew performing the work go back and
read/comply with the notes, cautions, and warnings every time the work is re-started after
a pause.
There is a hold point before step 1 of the work order for the 5-Yr PM that requires that
equipment be evaluated for additional AC/DC electrical hazards present from another
source and evaluate appropriate controls prior to commencing work, but there are no
sign-offs to indicate who releases such a hold point.
Work Control Supervision

Pre-Job Brief. IWD part 3, form 2103, for the 5-Yr PM, which contains the PIC
designation and the pre-job brief attendance, documents the assignment of the primary
PIC and two authorized alternate PICs. The 2-Yr PM form 2103 named E9 as a PIC.
E3 conducted the pre-job brief in the switchgear before work started on May 3, 2015.
This brief accurately described the boundaries of the clearance that was issued for the
work to be performed on that day.
The pre-job brief, conducted in front of cubicle 18 (Tiebreaker Bus A and Bus B),
explained to all crewmembers that the clearance tag located on cubicle 18 was the
electrical boundary to isolate Bus A from the energized Bus B and Bus C. This tag also
indicated that the tiebreaker inside cubicle 18 had been racked out of the circuit and
physically locked in that position. Forms 2103 for both IWDs have a pre-job brief
attendance roster but do not have a method to track daily attendance.
Housekeeping and Conduct. The available work area inside the switchgear building is
small. The corridor was crowded with two breakers in front of the energized Bus B and
Bus C. This corridor was enclosed with yellow caution tape because of hi-pot testing, in
addition to the actual hi-pot test set and respective cables, which hung from the ceiling
(Figure. 3-1). In front of Bus A were another breaker in the corridor, a bench, and several
stools. There was a piece of test equipment on the floor against the wall across from
cubicle 17, where E1s head would strike. Two doors were open in cubicles from Bus A
that somewhat limited the line of sight across the corridor (Figure 3-2).
The JAIT found a half-burned cigarette on the floor in front of cubicle 17 (Figure 3-3).
Danger-No Smoking signs were visible in the switchgear. There is no evidence that this
cigarette was from E1, or even that it had been deposited on the day of the accident.
It was noted that E1 was wearing a baseball capnot a hard hat, as required by the IWD.
Moreover, E1 had his AR shirts long sleeves rolled up at the time of the accident.
33
Figure 3-1. This photo shows the area in front of energized Bus B and Bus C, both of
which power the LANSCE area. Note how close the breakers under test were set to the
operating equipment. There is an open cubicle door on the operating area. The blue
device is the hi-pot test set. The area is so crowded that it almost blocks the east side exit
door.
Figure 3-2. This photo shows the front

of de-energized Bus A. Note the one air
breaker on the floor, as well as a bench,
trash, and extension cord, and scattered
tools.
Figure 3-3. This close-up shot shows the area

in front of cubicle 17. Note the ductor test
set, tools, a class-2 glove, a cigarette butt, and
a bench.
34
Work Execution. The JAIT found no individual cubicle sign-off for the maintenance
activity for the 5-Yr PM.
It is important to note that the switchgear cleaning/inspection process is performed at the
front and at the back of the cubicle. The front part is accessible from inside the
switchgear and is cleaned/inspected by wiremen (electricians). The back part is accessible
from outside the switchgear and is cleaned/inspected by linemen.
An informal process employing blue tape and red tape to track the completion of the
cleaning process and circuit breaker testing was used. Blue indicated that the cubicle
cleaning had been completed. Red indicated the completion of breaker testing and
cleaning. The tape was adhered to each cubicle as the crew reported activities as
complete. Cubicle 17, which is part of Bus B cleaned Saturday, did not have any blue
tape installed.
Analysis
Supervision Interaction during the Event.
The following supervision layers had opportunities, but did not make changes in hazard
controls on Sunday to account for the energized buses: E3 (foreman), E9 (General
Foreman and PIC), S1 (Superintendent), and UI-FOD representative. However, E3 was
clear as to the area to be worked on Bus A, and where not to work, during the pre-job
brief. No additional resources were identified to better monitor the work area on the day
of the accident.
The UI-FOD representative did not visit the area on Sunday, and as a result an
opportunity was missed to have another set of eyes to point out additional control
measures at partially energized switchgear. The following is a section of the IWM P300
manual, which provides guidance in a situation like the one on Sunday:
If multiple activities within a project or work area must be coordinated to ensure
safety, security, or environmental protection, the FOD must designate an
individual to provide that coordination and must inform the other participating
RLMs and PICs of that individuals identity and authority. Information regarding
Negotiating Shared Space/Shared Activities is available in the IWM Toolbox in
the Guidance Documents section.
However, there were no physical area control measures mandated by UI-FOD or UI-OPS
to prevent traffic or access to the corridor in front of energized Bus B and Bus C that
were restored on Saturday night for LANSCE operation. Area control measures like
plastic barricades are typically installed to divide the area that contains equipment in
operation and equipment out for maintenance (Figure. 3-1).
35
JON-4: LANL needs to effectively implement human-performance error-prevention tools

in work planning and hazard analysis.
Hazard Analysis and Controls by Supervision

IWDs did not sufficiently recognize the unique characteristics of combining the two
maintenance activities with partially energized switchgear. In addition to the added
challenges posed by mixed experience and qualification levels of the work crew, the
increased risk of human error was not recognized.
The hazards analysis took place at the activity level, rather than at the task level. As a
result, no new controls were added to mitigate new hazards. The PIC (L2), the wireman
foreman (E3), and the craft workers had no input into the hazard analysis process.
The following considerations from IWM P300 were not taken into account during the
hazard analysis for Sunday activities and could have been helpful to prevent the accident:
Consideration should also be given to facility-related conditions that may adversely
affect the safety of an activity such as the loss of electrical power, and operational upsets
in shared facilities. The facility-related conditions of congestion and partially-energized
switchgear should have led supervision to determine that more controls or additional
hazard analysis was required.
Supervision of Work Control

Pre-Job Brief. The PIC did not carry out the pre-job brief on Sunday. Because there
had been such a change in hazards, the PIC should have carried out another pre-job brief.
However, he was in attendance during the Sunday pre-job brief that was presented by E3.
Although the PIC did not conduct the pre-job brief, the crew was clear that E3 was
supervising work inside the switchgear. It was also clear that both job activities were
being monitored by E3. This also allowed the PIC to catch up on paperwork in a building
directly adjacent to the switchgear.
During the pre-job brief, there was a missed opportunity to mitigate the additional risk
introduced by partially energizing the switchgear. There was no discussion about extra
precautions that may need to be taken, especially since the previous days work had taken
place with all components completely de-energized.
If a pre-job brief is conducted daily, P300 Form 2103 does not have a requirement or
place to track the daily attendance. This means that it is not possible to validate worker
agreement and confirmation of his or her authorization, qualifications, and fitness to
perform work, as mandated by the IWM P300 process. This particular IWD had been first
used on March 21 and a pre-job brief was performed on multiple days as work
progressed.
36
It is noted that Standing IWDs (SIWDs) can be used for repetitive, moderate-hazard work
activities in single or multiple facilities, in accordance with the IWM P300 manual. This
document consists of a standardized, previously developed and approved Part 1,
combined with an appropriate Part 2 for each facility that lists the specific facility entry
and coordination requirements and work-area hazards. In each case, the PIC must ensure
the activity-specific and work-area requirements do not conflict.
Activities covered by SIWDs require the PIC to walk down the actual system or
equipment and conduct a pre-job brief before beginning work. Only one pre-job brief is
required if the work (1) is performed repetitively at the same location with the same
workers and (2) when periodic reviews are performed to detect changes in the work,
work site, and hazards. The second stipulation did not apply for work on Sunday because
there were significant changes in the work conditions from Saturday. Instead, a new prejob brief form should have been signed.
Housekeeping and Conduct. Figures 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 show that housekeeping in the
switchgear was less than adequate, a factor that could have contributed to the accident.
Management and supervision at all levels need to reinforce and clarify expectations for
the implementation of IWM P300.
Work Execution.
Supervision did not implement a formal work-tracking mechanism for the 5-Yr
PM.
The JAIT found that form JS00009provided in the IWDis not adequate to record
details and to provide an accurate record of the maintenance activity. An individual
record-per-cubicle, with places for both front and back side cleaning/inspection, would
have been helpful so that the supervisor could track completion and perhaps even prevent
E1 from entering a previously cleaned cubicle.
Not tracking or giving out cubicle assignments meant that work activity and scope were
left to the discretion of the individual workers. This approach prevented positive control
and peer check by supervision for worker actions that could have prevented E1 from
entering cubicle 17.
Zero-voltage and positive-energy control was not enforced/not performed when
cubicle 17 was opened on Sunday.
E1 opened and began work in an energized cubicle. No one noticed that E1 was working
in cubicle 17 and did not recognize that it was in fact outside the clearance boundary. The
JAIT estimated that E1 had the door to cubicle 17 open for at least 10 minutes before he
commenced work.
37
JON-2: MSS and UI management need to strengthen expectations regarding rigor in tasklevel work execution within controls. These expectations should be reinforced and
assessed frequently.
The JAIT also has photographic and other evidence that PPE specified by the IWDs was
not worn in all cases inside the switchgear work area, and supervision took no action to
correct these deficiencies on either Saturday or Sunday, the day of the accident.
JON-6: MSS and UI management and direct supervision need to reinforce and clarify
expectations (training, oversight, and accountability) for PPE requirements and work
practices in the course of electrical work at all organization levels.
3.7 NNSA/Los Alamos Field Office Oversight

Facts
The NNSA/NA-LA is the onsite federal organization responsible for routine oversight of
LANL. NA-LA conducts its oversight in accordance with an annual assessment plan,
which follows DOE/NNSA policy and directives for line oversight. This assessment plan
is integrated with internal LANL activities and other outside agency assessments for
efficiency and complete coverage. Development of the plan requires an assessment of
risk and oversight options in each area.
Safety oversight is accomplished by federal staff in four specific areas: Nuclear Safety
Basis, Safety System Oversight, Facility Representatives, and Safety Programs. The first
three areas are focused on nuclear facility operations, with the safety programs
crosscutting all LANL operations and programs.
Program oversight for relevant Safety Programs, including Electrical Safety and
Maintenance, is conducted by a group of nine SMEs. Although there is no designated
Electrical SME NA-LA, Electrical Safety at LANL is monitored on a part-time basis as
part of industrial safety oversight and supplemented on a case-by-case basis by the
electrical systems engineer from Safety System Oversight.
The Maintenance Program has been reviewed at the required periodicity. Although there
is no requirement for a programmatic assessment of the Electrical Safety Program, a
programmatic assessment of Electrical Inspections, which included some elements of
electrical safety, was performed in 2012. Members of the SME team are actively
involved in oversight of programmatic activities, and frequently shadow LANL
employees performing assessments.
38
The Facility Representative Team is comprised of a team leader and seven facility
representatives, with one vacancy. Three of the eight members of the team are retirementeligible and there were 12 facility representatives as recently as 2011. Due to limited
available staffing, no targeted safety assessments were scheduled in 2014, and none are
planned for 2015. No facility representatives are assigned to non-nuclear facilities,
including UI or LANSCE.
Contractor Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) produced by the federal field office
for 2014 and 2013 indicate issues with LANL formality of operations, self-discovery of
operational issues, and effective corrective action processes.
Analysis
NA-LA and other external entities perform a significant number of assessments and other
oversight activities at LANL each year. These assessments are integrated with LANL
internal assessments, a good practice that generates both efficiencies and opportunities
for partnering on assessments.
Industrial Safety SMEs are very active in shadowing LANL assessments, and they are
active in appropriate safety committees at LANL. Without a formally appointed
Electrical Safety SME, however, there is reduced opportunity for NA-LA to follow up on
corrective actions from previous incidents. Development of a set of roles and
responsibilities for an Electrical Safety SME would be beneficial as a checklist for
anyone acting in the position, even temporarily. An Electrical Safety Program
Assessment, such as those performed at many sites around 2009, would also be
beneficial.
Federal oversight of safety management programs at LANL is heavily focused on
implementation through work control processes. No federal staff member has been
assigned to focus on these processes since initial development of the IWM Process in the
2002 timeframe. This initial effort was driven both by the DOE-wide effort to implement
ISM and a series of serious accidents at LANL resulting in a temporary stand down of all
work at LANL.
Several concerted efforts since 2004 by LANL to improve IWM have been undertaken,
mainly driven by serious accidents and near-miss events. Electrical work-related events
are a dominant theme in this data, in spite of the fact that the LANL electrical safety
program has shown improvement. This improvement was achieved through a deliberate
joint improvement effort between the LANL and NA-LA from 2005 to 2011. Also,
historical data indicate that the IWM improvement efforts were more effective at
improving safety in scientific work than facility work.
39
Efforts by NA-LA over the last decade to improve work control have had limited lasting
impact. The vision of the DOE ISM System for executing hazardous work at LANL has
not been fully achieved. This outcome is largely caused by ineffective processes to ensure
lessons learned drive sustained improvement by both LANL and DOE, as documented in
numerous assessments.
Focused electrical safety oversight by NA-LA was initiated in response to the NNSA
Administrators demand in 2004 to improve electrical safety complex-wide. Once this
objective was achieved, federal resources were substantially pared back. Today, there are
few active electrical safety professionals in DOE.
Based on these analyses, federal oversight and the contractor evaluation processes have
not been effective in driving the necessary improvements in work control at LANL, with
emphasis added on implementation of the documented processes.
PERs conducted in previous years have noted problems associated with self-discovery
and formality of operations. To help focus on improvement efforts, it is important that
additional assets be provided to enable targeted assessments and oversight. This oversight
can provide needed assurance to the NA-LA Manager that repeat issues are being
corrected.
3.8 Human-Performance Analysis and Interfaces

Facts
A team made up of linemen and wiremen was assembled to work overtime on May
23, 2015. This teams objective was to clean the TA-53-0070 switchgear and complete
circuit breaker maintenance. Each team member clearly understood the objectives
stipulated for the weekend work. Appendix H indicates tasks assigned and experience
level of personnel.
Up to twenty-eight hours of overtime was requested for the weekend work, and the
workers had completed a forty hour work week by Friday. Because the work was
expected to be completed before the end of the day on Sunday, all the overtime requested
would not have been used. This overtime was requested and worked in accordance with
LANL policy.
The work package for the TA-53-0070 switchgear PM used a 5-Yr-old-model work
package. This work package was created at the activity level, not at a task level. When
work conditions (status of buses being energized or de-energized) changed from Saturday
to Sunday, the work package did not include detailed hazard controls necessary to
prevent E1 from entering cubicle 17.
The activity-level work packages also did not evaluate the impact and potential
hazards introduced by working two PMs concurrently in a small workspace.
40
Four team members normally did other electrical work and did not work with the
switchgear team, and one was doing this sort of work for the first time. Note that E1 was
familiar with switchgear work. It is not clear how training and qualification was verified
for these team members.
PPE worn by the team members did not match the requirements of the work
packages. See 3.4.
Several team members did comment that working two PMs concurrently was unusual and
did contribute to workplace congestion.
On May 2, the PIC conducted a pre-job brief for the entire crew. This brief was followed
by three additional briefs: (1) one for the crew working the switchgear, (2) one for the
linemen outside, and (3) one for the fire-protection crew.
The crew worked 14 hours on May 2. LANL provided hotel accommodations for the
crew to afford the members maximum downtime by avoiding the traveling of great
distances. Three members of the work crew did not take advantage of the
accommodations because they lived close to Los Alamos.
Work on May 2 ended with Bus B and Bus C re-energized. Linemen had completed
cleaning all cubicles from the outside of the switchgear.
Information obtained from worker interviews revealed that all employees were well
rested and felt good upon returning to work at 0630 on May 3. The progress made on the
previous day was such that they felt there was a good chance that work on May 3 would
be completed early. In interviews, it was stated that there were conversations to suggest
E1 did not want to be at work any longer than necessary on May 3 so that he could attend
a personal event later in the day.
On May 3, three pre-job briefs were held: (1) one for the crew assigned to work inside the
building, (2) one for the linemen working outside, and (3) one for the fire-protection
crew. The crew assigned to work inside the building received a comprehensive brief at
Cubicle 18 of what specifically had been re-energized (cubicles 1-18). The tag on cubicle
18, marking a clearance point, was explained to all workers. There was an opportunity for
questions and clarification in all the briefs.
During the switchgear-room brief, E1 asked about extra safety grounding on the 13.8-kV
side of transformer TR-1, which is located outside the building. The crew agreed that
such extra grounding would provide an extra safety measure. It was also agreed that work
would be carried out with E1 observing the ground placement.
The interviews revealed that some of the employees expressed concern over some
equipment being re-energized, though these concerns were not noted at the prejob brief.
41
To track work progress, an informal system that is neither proceduralized nor formalized
was used to signify that breaker work and cubicle cleaning were completed. Blue tape
indicated that the cubicle cleaning had been completed. Red tape indicated the
completion of breaker testing. After the event, red and blue strips of tape were found on
cubicles for work completed on May 2. Tape was also found on one cubicle from work
performed earlier in the month.
Cubicle 17 (where the accident took place) should have been marked with blue tape only,
as it contains no breaker, and it had been cleaned on Saturday.
Photographic evidence (Figure 3-4) and subsequent JAIT inspection revealed
that cubicle 17 did not have tape of any color on it and there had never been any
colored tape placed there.
Figure. 3-4. No tape was found on cubicle 17.

Note the red and blue tape on the adjacent cubicle.
No crewmember remembers noticing the cubicle-17 door open leading up to the accident.
However, E6 remembers seeing the cubicle-17 door open as he walked past immediately
before the accident. E4 was aware that the door was open immediately before the
accident, but he cannot remember seeing anyone there. Both employees saw and heard
the arc-flash immediately after they became cognizant of the open door. No one
remembers seeing E1 open the door or working in the cubicle.
42
The work carried out on May 3 involved

a significant number of people (8-9) and
equipment in a relatively confined
space. Yellow caution tapeidentified
after the accidentwas used as a barrier
for the hi-pot testing. The tape (Figure
3-5), along with a verbal protocol, was
used to establish an exclusion zone
while testing took place. This process
was clearly stated and understood at the
pre-job brief.
Figure. 3-5. Yellow caution tape was used as
a barrier for hi-pot testing.
During the post-Accident interview

process, some employees expressed
concern that this was the first time they
had worked near energized cubicles.
These concerns were not raised during
the pre-job brief.
Other employees countered that such work was common practice. This split was further
highlighted by differences in expectations when it came to LOTO. Linemen knew that the
clearance tag was the norm, whereas the wiremen were accustomed to LOTO as the
norm, but trained to recognize the clearance process.
Some members of the crew pointed out that this was the first time they had worked on
two concurrent PMs (cleaning cubicles and breaker testing). Practice before this
evolution had been to complete cleaning with the switchgear fully isolated. Then at some
later date, execute limited outages to allow cleaning and testing of a few breakers at a
time. This was actually done to several breakers a month before the accident.
Interviews also revealed that there was confusion about whether zero-voltage
checks should be performed on each cubicle. Some workers did not know who
should perform the checks, if they were to be performed at all. Testimony
states that some cubicles were checked, but not all.
There were no physical barriers or deterrents to prevent work in cubicle 17. Instead,
workers had to rely on the clearance tag, a problem for workers not accustomed to
performing work with such a tag.
All employees interviewed understood clearly who the foreman and general foreman
were for the entire job. Interviewed workers stated that no one saw the event take place.
However, E2 stated that he saw a body ejected from cubicle 17. E2 further stated that he
saw E1 on the floor immediately after the arc-flash, as did E4, who then informed E3.
43
Many of the interviewed workers say that they heard E1 say things after the accident
happened that implied that E1 had not expected the cubicle to be energized. E1 was
described as hardworking and driven employee.
No drug or alcohol testing was performed post-event, as specified in Procedure P732,
Section 3.6.4:
Drug and/or alcohol testing is/are required when
a non-vehicular incident or accident that resulted in a serious injury or had the

potential for serious injury occurs at work.
It is recognized that the priority was treatment of the injured employee, but other
involved workers in the accident could have been available for testing.
Analysis
Table 3-1 indicates there were a significant number of error precursors present prior to
this event.
Familiarity with Work Tasks and Location with Mixed Teams

Several assigned crewmembers did not typically work with the switchgear crew. These
members joined the work crew to support available breaker crewmembers and as a result
of overtime polling. The resultant crew was mixed, with some members accustomed to
this work (routine) and others possessing little or no experience. Additionally, one
individual was performing this type of work for the first time. Significant work
experience may breed overconfidence on one extreme and little to no experience in the
detailed safety precautions required on the other. Such characteristics are particularly
noted when it came to zero-grounding requirements, in which interviews revealed that
there were many variations of what should be done and what was perceived to be done,
with no consistency through the answers.
JON-3: LANL needs to establish uniform and stringent implementation of safety
requirements when executing work involving mixed work crews (e.g., different
disciplines, experience, and qualifications).
Work control demonstrated several human-factor issues in terms of concerns (such as
partial re-energization and combining work packages) raised by various team members
assigned to carry out the work.
44
Table 3-1. Human Performance Error Precursors.

Task Demands
Individual Capabilities
Time considerations
Need to re-energize B&C Saturday Night
Lack of knowledge (faulty mental mode)

Loss of bearings and missed visual demarcation
Need to be finished by Sunday night
Lack of PPE adherence
May get finished early
Numbers of workers non routine to Substation work

One person first time ever on the job
Repetitive actions
Clean a cubicle mark it move on to another
unmarked cubicle
Illness or fatigue
14-hour day on Saturday
Irreversible actions
Opened cubicle 17 and cleaning started
E1 sprayed cleaning fluid into cubicle 17
Interpretation of requirements
Only clean to the East Side of the clearance tag on
cubicle 18
West of the clearance is energized
Human Nature
Work Environment
Unclear goals roles or responsibilities
Clean cubicle should not have led to an energized
cubicle being opened
Changes/departure from routine
For some, doing two PMs simultaneously
Working beside re-energized equipment
Not completing the job without de-energization the
whole time
Confusing displays or controls
Red/blue tape signifies complete, missing from
cubicle 17 (which is energized)
Assumptions
If the cubicle needs cleaned it is de-energized
If cubicle does not have colored tape it needs
cleaning
Mindset (intentions)
E1 is a hard worker and does not like to sit around
Desire to help the team get finished
Clearance tags more normal for linemen, not

wiremen
E1 is an wireman
Yellow caution tape directly next to cubicle 17
Unexpected equipment conditions
Cubicle17 had no colored tape to signify it had been
completed, implication therefore it needed cleaning
and must be de-energized
Lack of alternative indication
No physical deterrent from opening an energized
cubicle
45
Activity-level planning using standing work orders allowed an assumption that two
packages normally worked separately would not introduce new hazards when both were
worked together. Work was planned at the activity level, so combining two PMs did not
trigger a new analysis. Each work package was looked at separately.
Conflicting Visual Cues

A high-voltage clearance tag was placed on cubicle 18 to indicate the separation point
between energized systems from de-energized systems. Linemen traditionally use such
tags, but it is not part of the normal process used by wiremen. The pre-job brief clearly
identified and pointed out the tag, as well as which side of the tag was energized and
which side was de-energized. The difficulty is that wiremen use a different LOTO
process. Although wiremen are trained to recognize clearance tags, such recognition is
not routine practice (they do not see such tags every day).
JON-4: LANL needs to effectively implement human-performance error-prevention tools
in work planning and hazard analysis.
An informal process was used with red and blue tape to identify when work is complete
(Fig. 3-6). Red tape on the cubicle indicates the breaker is finished and the blue tape
means that the cubicle is clean. This process is not documented or developed in formal
job planning. While a process is helpful to prevent duplication and provide visual status
of work, if it is not well understood and formalized, it can cause errors. The cubicle
where the event took place should have had blue tape, as it was cleaned on Saturday.
Figure 3-6. Cubicle 19 showing both the breaker testing and cleaning is complete,
in contrast to Cubicle 17 with no tape on Sunday, even though Cubicle 17 is on a
re-energized bus.
46
However, because the process was informal, there was no verification step to ensure all
cubicles cleaned Saturday were labeled. The absence of tape may have caused confusion
among the crewmembers. Cubicle 17 has no breaker so the door would not have red tape,
which may have also confused E1 when looking at the door to determine what work was
left to complete.
Hi-pot testing took place in front of the energized cubicles. As a precaution, visible
yellow caution tape was used to prevent access to the hi-pot testing work area. Testing
took place just past the cubicle where the arc-flash event occurred. By placing yellow
caution tape at the junction between cubicle 16 and 17, this highly visible aid may have
unintentionally placed energized cubicle 17 into what could have been perceived as a
safe area to work.
Recognizing and Addressing Personnel Performance Issues

Informality of wearing PPE and apparent lack of recognition by supervision indicates that
standards and safety culture had slipped in the wiremen work team.
JON-9: LANL management needs to ensure workers are encouraged to and are
acknowledged for playing an active role in ensuring their own (and work teams) safety
and compliance with work rules.
May 2 proved to be a long day, and it had become apparent that an early finish was a
possibility for May 3. Although this is not an issue in its own right, it is a distraction from
the work being performed, as the focus was on getting everything done as soon as
possible. Everyone had been working in a relatively small and congested area. Employees
focused on getting the work done, so much so that situational awareness by each worker
may have been impacted, thus, no one saw E1 open the door and start working in cubicle
17.
47
4.0 CAUSAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The JAIT used the following to conduct causal analysis: event charting, barrier analysis,
and change analysis. Once causal analysis was completed, the JAIT identified
conclusions, which were further grouped into contributing causes and a root cause.
4.1 Direct Cause

The direct cause of this accident was wireman E1 entering an energized cubicle and
spraying cleaning fluid into the air gap between the bus bars and the grounded enclosure.
The aerosolized fluid created a path to ground, resulting in an arc-flash.
4.2 Contributing Causes

The JAIT identified five contributing causes during its investigation of this event.
Although the two PM work packages each comprised relatively straightforward activities,
a more detailed plan at the task level should have been performed. When both PMs were
combined, they were performed within a cramped work space. These activities were
further complicated by energizing two of the three buses in the switchgear. A new work
plan should have recognized the physical and energy-source interfaces between the two
groups, and the small and cramped work environment, and could have utilized a formally
controlled and documented work status, thus enabling supervisory personnel to apply
more oversight during critical times.
Contributing Cause: Weaknesses in hazard-analysis processes resulted in some
hazards not being analyzed.
Additional hazards were introduced that were not covered by the general industrial
hazard-analysis process because of the cramped workspaces and the interaction between
the two PMs. When the work scopes definition was further changed by energizing two
of the three buses in the switchgear, additional hazards of working in the vicinity of such
energized equipment were not adequately evaluated.
Contributing Cause: Controls were not effectively implemented to ensure safety on
the job.
Zero-voltage checks are the recognized method used before entering and interacting with
new equipment. However, its application within two different groups who have varying
standards and expectations, injected an element of risk for all the workers involved. The
general hazard controls implemented in this event were not rigorously enforced inside the
48
switchgear, thus resulting in inconsistent application of PPE and so on. The workspaces
cramped nature necessitated the use of yellow caution tape as barriers for some of the
work. The caution tape could have given false visual cues regarding the boundary
between the energized and de-energized portions of the switchgear. The cramped nature
of the switchgear made it difficult for supervision and other workers to routinely observe
and question the performance of their co-workers.
Contributing Cause: Work was not performed within controls, as envisioned by
management and job planners.
The informal work-status tracking mechanism used during this job meant that not all
workers understood well the true status of all work. Inconsistent application of zerovoltage checks, as envisioned by management, was not caught by supervisors or
questioned by co-workers.
Task-level controls that could have prevented this accident were not implemented.
Lessons learned from other accidents, incidents, and work also were not implemented.
4.3 Root Cause
This accidents root cause lies in the management of control implementation. Such
management was less than adequate, resulting in E1 accessing an energized cubicle
without performing a zero-voltage check. These checks were applied inconsistently
across the involved work groups.
When the decision was made to work with the switchgear partially energized, a clearance
tag was used as the only barrier preventing entry to an energized panel. A more robust
physical barrier or barriers with controls would have prevented human error by
precluding entry to an energized area.
49
5.0 CONCLUSION AND JUDGMENTS OF NEED

Tables 5-1 and 5-2 list the JAITs conclusions (root and contributing causes) and
Judgments of Need (JONs). The contributing causes discussed in the previous section
follow ISMs core process (such as defining the scope of work, analyzing hazards,
developing and implementing controls, performing work, and providing feedback and
improvement). LANL work control policies and procedures establish a framework
consistent with ISMs core processes and principles. However, implementing these workplanning and executions procedures was inadequate for the two PM jobs being performed
at the time of the accident.
In defining the scope of work, the planning process did not evaluate the added
complexities associated with (1) performing two jobs concurrently and (2) working in a
partially energized environment on May 3. Work packages developed years ago for each
individual job were used without evaluating these changes in condition. Therefore,
analyzing the hazards meant that such changes (combining the jobs and working in a
partially energized environment) were not recognized. There was not an evaluation of
possible human error as an initiator for a potential accident.
The absence of such an analysis meant that the development of robust controls (such as a
physical barrier or safety watch) was not contemplated. During work execution, an
environment was created in which a mistake resulted in an employee injury as a result of
(1) a lack of robust controls, (2) a cluttered/congested work environment, (3) a lack of a
formal work-tracking mechanism, and (4) possibly confusing visual cues to all
employees, but in particular to E1.
Although this accident involved an electrical arc-flash, the shortfalls that contributed to
the accident reside in work control implementation. A review of past assessments, events,
and incidents reveal that LANL has experienced a number of similar work control
negative trends and related corrective actions. If these lessons and corrective actions had
been fully implemented in the work planning effort for the weekend of May 2, 2015, the
likelihood of the accident would have been significantly reduced.
Table 5-1 lists the JAITs specific conclusions. Conclusion numbers reference specific
causal factors derived from applying both barrier and change analyses performed by the
JAIT and its technical advisors. Table 5-2 lists the JONs identified by the JAIT. The
JAIT strongly recommends critical thought be applied to corrective action development
in response to the JONs, particularly when contemplating the addition of procedures,
policies, or requirements. Simply adding more documentation will not necessarily
address the issues experienced during this particular event. Instead, place more focus on
finding ways to ensure proper implementation, clearly understood expectations, and
effective verification of implementation. Also consider reviewing current processes to
remove inefficiencies and distractions to effective implementation.
50
Table 5-1
Causal
Factor No.
JON No.

C12
E1 did not have zero-voltage verification performed for Cubicle 17.
3, 5
C13
Processes (zero-voltage checks) were not consistently implemented of

understood at the task level.
3, 5
C20
The absence of a uniquely marked physical barrier enables E1 to access

Cubicle 17 by removing the cubicle door and internal panels.
3, 4, 11, 13, 2
C7
The yellow caution barricade, intended to demark the hi-pot testing

boundary, could have created confusion as to the location of the
clearance point boundary and thus led E1 to believe Cubicle 17 was deenergized.
2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 13
C15
Use of clearance tags is not the typical isolation method used by wiremen
3, 11
C16
Trained employees did not identify the lack of required signs, tags, and
barriers, a standard industry practice.
9, 11
C22
Lack of a formal work-tracking mechanism (in PM documentation)

prevented a clear understanding of specific work activities that may have
prevented E1 from entering Cubicle 17.
1, 13
C25
Cluttered workspace, caused by working two jobs concurrently, reduced

the ability of the work team and supervisor from observing and
preventing E1 from entering Cubicle 17.
7, 9
C29
Performing two jobs simultaneously inserts additional hazards beyond

those addressed for individual tasks.
1, 7
Contributing Cause: Weaknesses in hazard analysis processes resulted in some hazards not being
analyzed.
C3
The opportunity was missed to establish and implement effective barriers

that would have prevented the accident.
C24
Because of the potential and consequence for human error, the hazard
level increases when Bus B and Bus C were re-energized.
1, 7
C27

C30
The hazard analysis process did not address the risks and consequences
caused by changed conditions between the Saturday and Sunday
substation configurations.
1, 7
1, 4, 11
51
Table 5-1 (continued)

Causal
Factor No.
JON No.
C31
Human error had not been fully addressed in terms of what-if scenarios
and therefore robust controls were not implemented.
1, 4, 11
C33
Opportunity for craft workers (performing the tasks) to identify concerns

for this job was not offered for the hazard analysis process.
1, 9
C34
Skill-of-the-craft was used instead of task-level work planning/hazard

assessment and controls implementation.
1, 3
Contributing Cause: Controls were not effectively implemented to ensure safety on the job.
C7
The yellow caution tape barricade, demarking the hi-pot testing

boundary, could have created confusion as to the location of the
clearance point boundary, thus leading E1 to believe that Cubicle 17 was
de-energized.
2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 13
C10
Alerting techniques like safety signs, tags, barricades, and/or attendants

were not in place as would have been standard industry practice. E1
entered lookalike equipment, cubicle 17.
2, 3, 4, 7, 11
C11
One foreman (E3) was monitoring the work through frequent work-area
passes but did not notice E1 accessing the energized cubicle.
C17
Reduced worker focus may have contributed to E1s error.
C20

Cubicle 17 by removing the cubicle door and internal panels.
3, 4, 11, 13, 2
C21
Lack of a formal work-tracking mechanism prevented positive control

and backup by supervision for worker actions that would have prevented
E1 from entering Cubicle 17.
2, 6, 13
C27

C28
Similarity of equipment and congested environment contributed to

workers not recognizing E1 was working in Cubicle 17.
C32
Robust controls were not implemented to prevent the consequence of

human error.
4, 9
4, 7, 9, 10
2, 4, 9, 10, 11
52

Causal
Factor No.
JON No.
Contributing Cause: Work was not performed within

controls, as envisioned by management and job planners.
C1
Control afforded by the pre-job briefing was not effective in preventing

entry into Bus B, Cubicle 17.
4, 8, 9
C2
Not all workers had a clear understanding of system/job status and work
scope.
4, 8
C4
Failure to formally track cubicle progress and completion may have

resulted in belief that Cubicle 17 had not been cleaned on Saturday.
C5
Work area was congested with people and equipment, contributing to a

lack of awareness of other workers.
C6
The visual boundary (clearance tag) was ineffective in preventing E1

from working outside the intended work scope.
C8
The absence of blue tape, intended to help identify that cubicle cleaning
was complete, possibly contributed to E1 thinking that the cubicle still
needed cleaning and was de-energized.
2, 6, 11, 13
C19
Opportunity was missed to identify and warn E1 not to open energized

cubicle.
6, 9
C23
Potential for early completion of the task may have shifted focus away
from the task.
C26
Cluttered workspace may have caused some confusion that led E1 to

believe Cubicle 17 was de-energized.
6, 10, 13
1, 4, 7, 9, 10, 13
4, 8, 11
2, 4, 7, 9, 10

C9
Task-level controls that would have prevented this accident were not
identified and implemented.
7, 12, 13
C14
Zero-energy verification was not followed, as prescribed in training.
5, 12
C18
Lessons learned were not applied to this work activity, resulting in

missed opportunities to improve the work process.
12
53
Table 5-2
Judgments of Need
Related Conclusions
MSS and UI management need to strengthen expectations

regarding work-scope determination, as well as task-level work
planning and hazard analysis. These expectations should be
reinforced and assessed frequently.
MSS and UI management need to strengthen expectations

regarding rigor in task-level work execution within controls. These
expectations should be reinforced and assessed frequently.
C7, C8, C10, C21,

C26, C32
LANL needs to establish uniform and stringent implementation of

safety requirements when executing work involving mixed work
crews (e.g., different disciplines, experience, and qualifications).
C7, C10, C12, C13,

C15, C20, C27, C34
LANL needs to effectively implement human-performance errorprevention tools in work planning and hazard analysis.
C1, C2, C3, C5, C6,

C7, C10, C17, C20,
C23, C26, C28, C31,
C32
MSS and UI management need to reinforce and clarify

expectations and implementation for zero-voltage verification
requirements in the course of electrical work at all organizational
levels.
C12, C13, C14
MSS and UI management and direct supervision need to reinforce

and clarify expectations (training, oversight, and accountability)
for PPE requirements and work practices in the course of electrical
work at all organization levels.
C4, C7, C8, C11, C19,

C21
MSS and UI management need to closely evaluate changing

conditions when using standing IWDs during the planning process
to ensure controls are aligned with actual work activities and site
conditions.
C5, C9, C10, C24,

C25, C26, C28, C29,
C30
MSS and UI management need to strengthen pre-job briefings at

the beginning of each shift or when significant changes occur so
that worker engagement, focus on important controls, operations
integration, and a full understanding by all workers are all assured.
C1, C2, C6
LANL management needs to ensure workers are encouraged to

and are acknowledged for playing an active role in ensuring their
own (and work teams) safety and compliance with work rules.
C1, C5, C16, C17,

C19, C25, C26, C28,
C32, C33
10
MSS and UI management need to facilitate more direct

involvement and ownership by craft in developing the work scope
and job planning.
C4, C5, C26, C28,

C32, C33
11
MSS and UI management need to ensure robust, durable, and

visible barriers and signs are appropriately placed and accurately
reflect current work conditions, equipment status, and hazards to
ensure worker safety.
C3, C6, C7, C8, C10,

C15, C16, C20, C31,
C32
C3, C5, C22, C24,

C29, C30, C31, C33,
C34
54

Judgments of Need
12
LANL needs to improve its ability to implement and verify

corrective actions from previous assessments and events.
13
MSS and UI management need to evaluate use of informal work

practices in the context of potential impact on the effectiveness of
safety controls.
Related Conclusions
C9, C14, C18
C4, C5, C7, C8, C9,

C20, C21, C22
55
6.0 JOINT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBER SIGNATURES
56
APPENDIX A
TEAM MEMBERS, ADVISORS, CONSULTANTS, AND STAFF
Co-Chair
Jeffry Roberson, Joint Accident Investigation Team

Acting Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration
Co-Chair
Theodore Sherry, Joint Accident Investigation Team

Associate Deputy Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Board Members
Michael Briggs, Accident Investigation Team

The Babcock & Wilcox Company
Richard Caummisar, Accident Investigation Team
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration
Gary Dreifuerst, Accident Investigation Team
University of California, Office of the President
Michael Johnson, Accident Investigation Team
AECOM
John McNeel, Accident Investigation Team
Nathan Morley, Accident Investigation Team
Accident Investigator, Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Albuquerque Complex
Alexander Tasama-Escobar, Accident Investigation Team
Bechtel National, Washington
Jeffrey Williams, Accident Investigation Team
Los Alamos Field Office
Technical Advisors
James (Chris) Cantwell, Bechtel National Corporation

Jeffrey Vincoli, Bechtel Global Logistics, Houston
Medical Advisor
Sara Elizabeth Pasqualoni, M.D., Los Alamos National Laboratory
Legal Advisors
David Sosinski, Los Alamos National Laboratory

Sean T. Counce, Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration
Administrative Coordinators
Christina Archuleta, Los Alamos National Laboratory

Patrick Trujillo, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Technical Writer-Editor
Octavio Ramos. Los Alamos National Laboratory
Administrative Support
Linda K. Salazar, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Appendix A
A-1
APPENDIX B
ACCIDENT INVESTGATION BOARD APPOINTMENT MEMO
U1501191
Appendix B
B-1
U1501191
Appendix B
B-2
APPENDIX C
NNSA MEMBER APPOINTMENT LETTER
Appendix C
C-1
Appendix C
C-2
APPENDIX D
CONTRACTOR MEMBER APPOINTMENT MEMO
Appendix D
D-1
Appendix D
D-2
APPENDIX E
BARRIER-ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
Hazard: 13.8 KV
Target: Electrician 1
What were the
How did each barrier
barriers?
perform?
Cubicle 17, Door
Cubicle 17, internal

enclosure panels
Appendix E
Door was bypassed
Panels were removed
Why did the barrier fail?
Identification of barrier
ineffective, no unique signs
or additional physical
measures implemented as
part of work control to
distinguish energized
cubicles from de-energized
cubicles.
The barrier failed when the

panels were removed.
How did the barrier affect

the accident?
Context: ISM/HPI
If the cubicle door had stayed in ISM:

place E1 would not have had
CF 4 Perform work within controls
access to the energized
equipment.
GP 1 Line Management responsible for
safety
GP 5 Hazards evaluated and controlled
HPI:
TD #6 Interpretation of requirements
HN #3 Assumptions
HN #5 - Mindset
If the panels had not been

ISM:
removed E1 would not have had
GP-1 Line Management responsible for
access to the energized
safety
equipment
GP-5 Hazards evaluated and controlled
GP-6 Controls shall be tailored to work

performed and hazards
CF-3 Develop and implement controls
CF-4 Perform work within controls
E-1
Hazard: 13.8 KV
What were the
barriers?
perform?
Pre-job briefing
Pre-job briefing generally All areas of IWD pre-job

identified hazards and
brief content not covered.
controls for the job, but did Task level controls were not
not specifically identify
identified or discussed.
task level controls (e.g.,
zero voltage checks in
each cubicle, what could The documentation to
go wrong discussion) per positively reflect
IWD.
understanding by workers is
inadequate.
Initial pre-job briefing was

delivered in March and
worker acknowledgment
spans the time from March
through May.

the accident?
Context: ISM/HPI
Control afforded by pre-job

ISM:
briefing was not effective to
prevent entry into Bus B, cubicle
17.
CF 4 Perform work within controls
C-1
Not all workers had a clear
understanding of system/job
status and work scope.
HPI:
IC #5 - Imprecise communication habits
C-2
By not requiring daily signatures
for the pre-job briefing an
opportunity was missed to verify
worker understanding of system
status and controls.
UI practice is that individuals

are only required to sign
IWD once, versus signing
daily.
Appendix E
E-2
Hazard: 13.8 KV
What were the
barriers?
perform?
IWDs
IWDs did not sufficiently IWDs did not specify change

address work on a partially in conditions that produced
energized substation and an unaddressed hazard
switchgear.
The IWDs level of detail and
implementation was less than
adequate at the task level.
Work package was
intentionally created in the
broadest terms to allow
flexibility in job execution.

the accident?
The opportunity was missed to
establish and implement
effective barriers that would
have prevented the accident.
Context: ISM/HPI
ISM
GP- 6 Controls tailored to work and

hazard
C-3
Failure to formally track cubicle
progress and completion may
have resulted in belief that
cubicle 17 had not been cleaned
Saturday.
Specifically cubicles were

C-4
not identified individually in
the 5-Yr PM IWD (to record
completion of each cubicle).
Workers being aware of Personnel were

the work going on within concentrating on their
their surroundings.
individual work.
Other workers did not

No one noticed work taking
ISM:
recognize that E1 was
place on the wrong side of the
CF 4 Perform work in within controls
working in an energized Bus clearance tag.
GP 2 Clear roles and responsibilities
B cubicle.
No one prevented E1 for
GP-3 Competence commensurate with
This was outside of the scope working in energized Bus B
responsibilities
of work for that day. No one cubicle on May 3.
prevented him from entering
Work area was congested with
the energized Bus B cubicle.
people and equipment
The work area was small and contributing to lack of awareness
congested.
of other workers.
C-5
Appendix E
E-3
Hazard: 13.8 KV
What were the
barriers?
perform?
Positive energy control
Positive energy control

was established for the
intended work scope.

the accident?
The visual boundary

It was not effective at
(clearance tag) was
maintaining the work scope
ineffective in preventing E1 boundary.
from working outside the
intended work scope.
Context: ISM/HPI
ISM:

responsibilities
GP-1 Line management responsible for

safety
C-6
Clearance Tag on Cubicle Barrier did not prevent E1 E1 entered cubicle 17,
The yellow caution barricade,
18
from entering Cubicle 17. potentially being confused by demarking hi-pot testing
the existence of yellow
boundary, could have created
caution barricade tape hung confusion as to the location of
between 16 and 17 as
the clearance point boundary,
marking the de-energized
and led E1 to believe cubicle 17
boundary.
was de-energized.
Blue adhesive tape was not
applied to cubicle 17,
possibly adding to E1s
assumption that this cubicle
still required cleaning.
There was no specific
signage on cubicle 17 to
indicate to E1 that he was
accessing an energized
cubicle.
Appendix E
ISM:
CF 3 Develop and Implement Hazard

Controls
GP 6 Hazard controls tailored to the
work being performed
GP 1 Line Management responsible for
safety
C-7
The absence of blue tape,
intended to help identify that
cubicle cleaning was complete,
possibly contributed to E1
thinking the cubicle still needed
cleaning and was de-energized.
C-8
E-4
Hazard: 13.8 KV
What were the
barriers?
perform?
Hazard Analysis and

Control Development
JHA is conducted at the

generic job-scope level,
therefore, did not develop
controls at the task level.

the accident?
Context: ISM/HPI
The hazardous analysis and

control development process
was not applied at the task
level for this job.
The Hazard Analysis process

ISM:
and control development
bounded the job scope but did
safety
not detail controls for task level
hazards.
GP-5 Hazards evaluated and safety
There is no difference in
standards agreed
controls between the deTask level controls are left to
energized work on Saturday skill- of-the-craft.
GP-6 Controls tailored to the work and
and mixed work (partially
the hazards
Task level controls that would
energized) on Sunday.
have prevented this accident
CF-2 Analyze Hazards
The unique aspects of
were not identified or
CF-3 Develop and Implement hazard
working two PMs
implemented.
controls
concurrently in a small space
C-9
were not analyzed.
Alerting techniques like safety
signs & tags, barricades and/or
attendants were not in place as
required, E1 entered look-alike
equipment, cubicle 17.
C-10
Clear Roles and

Responsibilities
Appendix E
Up to three Persons in
Charge (PICs) identified;
crew unsure exactly who
was in charge.
Two different crews with two One Foreman (E3) was

ISM:
different PICs.
monitoring the work through
GP-2 Clear lines of authority and
frequent work area passes, but he
responsibility for safety established
did not notice E1 accessing
energized cubicle.
responsibility
C-11
E-5
Hazard: 13.8 KV
What were the
barriers?
perform?
Zero-Voltage Verification Zero-Voltage Verification E1 did not perform Zeronot conducted on cubicle Voltage Verification for
17 prior to E1 entering.
cubicle 17.
C-12

the accident?
Context: ISM/HPI
Without voltage present, there ISM:

would be no dielectric
breakdown resulting in an arcresponsibility
flash due to E1 spraying cleaner.
Processes (zero-voltage
checks) were not consistently
implemented or understood at
the task level.
C-13
Training, Qualifications,
and Experience
All workers, the planner, Zero-energy verification was

PIC and foremen were
not followed as prescribed in
qualified and experienced training.
for this job.
C-14
Use of clearance tags is not
the typical isolation method
used by Wiremen.
C-15
Fitness for Work
Appendix E
Long work hours from the Excessive work hours.

week through the weekend
may have reduced fitness
for work.
Weak implementation of training ISM:

requirements by the crew
contributed to E1 not detecting
responsibility
the hazard present.
Trained employees did not
safety
identify the lack of required
signs, tags, and barriers, a
GP-7 Operations Authorization
standard industry practice.
C-16
Reduced worker focus may have ISM:
contributed to E1s error.
C-17
responsibility
GP-7- Operations Authorization
E-6
Hazard: 13.8 KV
What were the
barriers?
perform?
Feedback and Lessons

Learned
Barrier was not used.

the accident?
Context: ISM/HPI
AP-Work-002: Attachment Lessons learned not applied to ISM:

11 MSS Work Completion this work activity resulting in
CF-5 Provide feedback and Continuous
Form from previous work not missed opportunities to improve
Improvement
reviewed by the planner as the work process.
part of work package
C-18
development.
AP-Work-002 was being
completed by PIC for the job.
e.g., Summarize the Work
Performed section was
being partially completed. No
issues had been identified.
Team Safety Awareness
Appendix E
Questioning attitude by
coworkers was not
demonstrated throughout
the job.
Workers were focused on

accomplishing their
individual task.
Opportunity was missed to

identify and warn E1 to not open
energized cubicle.
C-19
E-7
APPENDIX F
CHANGE-ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
Factors
WHAT
conditions, occurrences,
activities, equipment
Accident Situation
Prior, Ideal or Accident-Free

Situation
Yellow caution tape not marked Yellow caution tape marked as hias the hi-pot activity boundary. pot boundary.
Physical boundary not in place

to limit access to energized
equipment and cubicle doors.
Difference
Purpose of yellow caution tape
not marked.
Evaluation of Effect
May have caused some
confusion that led E1 to
believe cubicle 17 was deenergized.
Physical boundary in place to limit Physical boundaries were not in The absence of a uniquely
access to energized equipment and place and clearly understood.
marked physical barrier
cubicle doors.
allowed E1 to access cubicle
17, by removing the cubicle
door and internal panels.
C-20
Appendix F
Clearance tag used to identify

boundary.
Physical boundary in place to limit Physical boundaries were not in The absence of a physical
access to energized equipment and place and clearly understood.
boundary allowed E1 to
cubicle doors.
access cubicle 17.
Blue and red adhesive tape

informally used to track work
progress and tape was absent
from cubicle 17.
Formal process used and

implemented to clearly track work
progress.
An informal system was being

used to signify cleaning
complete.
May have caused some

confusion that led E1 to
believe cubicle 17 was part of
Sundays work-scope.
No blue adhesive tape present on

cubicle 17 to indicate it had been
cleaned (no red tape required as
This prevented a clear
cubicle 17 had no breaker).
understanding of specific
work activities that may have
prevented E1 from entering
cubicle 17.
F-1
Factors
Accident Situation

Situation
Supervision did not implement a Supervision implemented a formal

formal work tracking
work tracking mechanism.
mechanism.
Difference
Work activity and scope left to
individual worker discretion.
Lack of a formal work
tracking mechanism
prevented positive control
and backup by supervision
for worker actions that would
have prevented E1 from
C-21
Work plan did not include a

Work plan did include a tracking
tracking mechanism for work at mechanism for work at the
the individual task level for
individual task level for cleaning.
cleaning.
Work task and scope left to

individual worker discretion.
Lack of a formal work

tracking mechanism (in PM
documentation) prevented a
clear understanding of
specific work tasks that may
have prevented E1 from
C-22
Buses B and C were energized

on Sunday.
All Buses de-energized on Sunday. Decision was made to complete The decision to re-energize
the 2 and 5-Yr maintenance
Buses B and C raised the risk
evolutions with the switchgear of someone working on an
partially re-energized on Sunday. energized cubicle.
The hazard analysis did not
capture the change between
Saturday and Sunday.
Employee working in energized Employee working in de-energized

cubicle.
cubicle.
Appendix F
Work took place in partially re- The decision to re-energize

energized switchgear.
Buses B and C raised the risk
of someone working on an
Work took place in an
energized cubicle.
energized cubicle.
F-2
Factors
Accident Situation

Situation
Difference
E1 was not prevented from
entering and beginning work
in an energized cubicle.
Zero Voltage and positive

Zero Voltage checks conducted
energy control was not
when cubicle 17 was opened on
performed when cubicle 17 was Sunday.
opened on Sunday.
WHEN
Occurred, identified,
facility status, schedule
Crew focus on finishing job

early.
Crew focused on safe work

performance.
Electrical safety training and

demonstrated proficiency
requirements applicable to this
job were not followed in all
cases.
This control is the last line of

defense to avoid injury. If
this were rigorously executed
on the job, no accident would
have occurred.
Neither the electrician nor a

lineman conducted a zero
voltage check on cubicle 17
prior to work.
It was not recognized the

cubicle 17 was energized.
Focus had begun to shift towards Potential for early completion

the expectation of finishing early of the task may have shifted
after a long day Saturday.
focus away from the task.
C-23
Decision to reenergize Bus B

and Bus C for Sunday work.
Complete work with all Buses deenergized
Due to the potential and

consequence for human error,
the hazard level increased when
Buses B & C were re-energized
Worker potential exposure

and consequences due to
hazardous energy from
human error increased.
C-24
WHERE
Physical location,
environmental
conditions
Appendix F
Hallway was crowded with

Workspace had sufficient room for
equipment and people because all work scheduled.
two work packages were worked
concurrently.
Cluttered workspace with

associated industrial hazards
(trips, cuts, etc.) as a result of
two jobs concurrently.
Cluttered workspace, due to

working two jobs
concurrently, reduced the
ability of work team and
supervisor from seeing and
F-3
Factors
Accident Situation

Situation
Difference
Line of sight to E1 and other
workers was restricted by
equipment and configuration.
preventing E1 from entering
cubicle 17.
C-25
Cluttered workspace may
have caused some confusion
that led E1 to believe cubicle
17 was de-energized.
C-26
WHO
Staff involved, training,
qualification, supervision
Mixed experienced and

qualification levels of the work
crew.
Controls and compensatory

No evidence that special
measures instituted to address
provisions or measures instituted
mixed experienced and qualification for less experienced workers.
levels of the work crew.
Mixed experienced and

qualifications caused
confusion on roles and
responsibilities and control
implementation.
C-27
No one noticed E1 working in

cubicle 17 and recognized that it
was outside the clearance
boundary.
Someone noticed E1 working on

cubicle 17 and took action to
prevent E1 from entering or
working in an energized cubicle.
Congestion in the workplace

may have contributed to workers
not recognizing E1s working on
cubicle 17.
Workers lost situational
awareness.
Confusion as to who was the

PIC.
Appendix F
PIC is known by all personnel

conducting the work.
Lack of clear roles,

responsibilities, authorities and
accountability.
Similarity of equipment and

congested environment
contributed to workers not
recognizing E1 was working
in cubicle 17.
C-28
From interviews of workers
in the switchgear there was
no confusion regarding who
was in charge and therefore
this effect was not
significant.
F-4
Factors
Accident Situation

Situation
Situational awareness of work Supervision and crew had a clear

status broke down at the time of understanding of work status.
the accident.
Difference
Lack of awareness allowed for
undesired access to energized
equipment.
Confusion, undesired actions,
and subsequent injuries.
HOW
Control chain, hazard
analysis monitoring
The IWDs did not sufficiently

recognize the unique aspects of
combining the two maintenance
activities.
The IWDs are sufficiently

developed to recognize the unique
aspects of combining the two
maintenance activities.
This prevented a clear
understanding of specific
work activities that may have
prevented E1 from entering
cubicle 17.
Performing two jobs

Work proceeded without
simultaneously inserts additional proper recognition of all
hazards beyond those addressed hazards.
for individual tasks.
C-29
Risk of human error was not

recognized.
The hazard analysis process

The hazard analysis process did Consideration of human error
recognized risk of human error and not address the risks and
and the development/
developed controls.
consequences due to the changed implementation of associated
conditions between the Saturday controls may have prevented
and Sunday switchgear
the accident.
configurations.
C-30
Human error had not been fully
addressed in terms of what-if
scenarios and therefore robust
controls not implemented.
C-31
The scenario that took place was
not considered in the hazard
analysis process since it was
assumed the clearance tag was a
sufficient control.
Appendix F
F-5
Factors
Accident Situation
Employee opened and began
work in an energized cubicle

Situation
Employee did not open and begin
work in an energized cubicle.
Difference
Human error had not been fully The implemented controls

addressed in terms of what-if (e.g., clearance tag, pre-job
scenarios.
briefing) did not prevent E1
Robust controls were not
implemented to prevent the
consequence of human error.
C-32
Craft Workers did not have input Craft workers did have input into
into the hazard analysis process. the hazard analysis process.
Opportunity for craft workers

(performing the task) to identify
concerns for this job was not
offered for the hazard analysis
process.
There was a missed

opportunity to further
identify hazards and establish
controls that may have
prevented the accident.
C-33
Skill-of-the-craft was used
instead of task level work
planning/hazard assessment and
controls implementation.
C-34
OTHER
Appendix F
Drug and Alcohol testing not

Drug and Alcohol testing was
conducted per Laboratory policy effectively conducted
There is no way of determining Evidence never obtained to

if either drugs or alcohol is a
determine if this impacted the
determining factor.
accident.
F-6
APPENDIX G
EVENTS AND CAUSAL FACTORS CHART
Appendix G
G-1
CC5-1
Feedback and
lessons learned
were not applied
CC-5
Contributing
Cause
CC1-1
Activitylevel
controlsthatwould
havepreventedthis
accidentwerenotin
place
C-9
Performingtwojobs
simultaneously
insertsadditional
hazardsbeyond
thoseaddressedfor
individualtasks
C-29
CC2-3
Skillofthecraftwas
usedinsteadof
activitylevelwork
planning/hazard
assessmentand
controls
implementation
C-34
Lessonslearnednot
appliedtothiswork
activityresultingin
missed
opportunitiesto
improvethework
process
C-18
Similar issues to
this event
Lackofaformal
worktracking
mechanism(inPM
documentation)
preventedaclear
understandingof
specificwork
activitiesthatmay
havepreventedE1
fromentering
cubicle17
C-22
No re-review for
new hazards of
concurrent work
Thehazardanalysis
processdidnot
addresstherisksand
consequencesdue
tothechanged
conditionsbetween
theSaturdayand
Sundaysubstation
configurations
C-30
1st time that both

action will be done
together
Outage plan
included detailed
switching orders
No re-review for
new hazards of
concurrent work
If work control was

good enough last
time it is good
enough now
LANL CMMS/IWM
system used to
plan the job
Job hazard
identified as
moderate for both
work orders
LOTO, Zero
Energy
verification, HPI
issues
Overall, hazard
identification and
control was
identified as a
major weakness
Electrical issues
human
performance, work
planning and work
activity
performance,
hazard analysis
and control
IWDs and
Exposure
Assessments did
not always
consider colocated workers
Issues with ISM/

IWM, HPI,
equipment,
procedures, T&Q,
S&H requirements
ESH personnel
were not
consistently
involved in work
planning or when
changes occurred
to work
Standing IWD
1st time that both

action will be done
together
Work plans are

mostly boilerplate
LANL CMMS/IWM
system used to
plan the job
WP&C SelfAssessment
2013
CMMS develops
PM Work Order
with attachments
Work orders
triggered
~02/15/2015
Work orders
routed to Planner
by WC-TL
RLM verified
grading
Conduct of
previous
investigations
Appendix G
Conduct previous
5 year PM on
switchgear in TA53-70
~2010
Conduct 2 year
PM on Air Breaker
~2011, 2013
G-2
CC2-1, 2 &
3
CC3-1
Robustcontrols
werenot
implementedto
prevent
consequenceof
humanerror
C-32
Job review done 2

yrs. ago
Weaknessinhazard
analysisprocess
resultedinsome
hazardsnotbeing
addressed
CC-2
Humanerrorhad
notbeenfully
addressedinterms
ofwhatif
scenariosand
thereforerobust
controlsnot
implemented
C-31
RC-3
Opportunityforcraft
workers(performing
thetask)toidentify
concernsforthisjob
wasnotofferedfor
thehazardanalysis
process
C-33
Craft workers
actually
conducting the job
were not involved
in the hazard
analysis
Did not analyze

hazard differences
between 05/02
and 05/03 work
Duetopotentialand
consequencefor
humanerror,the
hazardlevel
increasedwhen
BusesB&Cwere
energized
C-24
No discussion on
208 V energized
systems when the
busses are deenergized
Approvals on the
back of the IWD
No discussion on
the mixed
energized work in
work documents
for 5 yr. PM
Did not recognize

change in
condition between
Saturday and
Sunday
No discussion on
the mixed
energized work in
work documents
for 5 yr. PM
Reviewed by ESO,
RLM, FOD
Operations, and
ESH
Written at a broad
level for flexibility
Form used on prejob briefs on

multiple jobs prior
to the May 2-3
work
PMs conducted on
03/21/2015, 04/01/
2015, 04/18/2015,
04/19/2015
Reviewed hazards
and controls
Work plans are

mostly boilerplate
Request made per

UI-PROC-63-00190-R4
IWD signed
Recognized
scheduling conflict
between TA53-70
maintenance and
required training
Form used for

multiple tasks
Reviewed planned
work activities
Standing IWD
Request made per

UI-PROC-63-00180-R1
Form 2101 signed
Form signed 03/

21/2014
Outage done early

for each load
circuit, 5 yr. PM on
480 V load switch
gear station
Planner
developing work
package
FOD Designee
reviews and
authorizes Work
Package
Planner schedules
walk down of the
job
Appendix G
Contributing
Cause
Form 2103 IWD

Part 3, Validation
and Work
Release approved
03/21/2015
Work originally
planned for May
16
Request made to
move job
04/22/2015
G-3
Events
Conditions
Causal Factors
Assumed
Events
Assumed
Conditions
Assumed
Causal Factors
Connector
Clearance of entire
substation to
support work
Request to move
job date discussed
with Supervisor
04/23/2015
Appendix G
2-yr cabinet
cleaning and 5-yr
breaker
maintenance
combined for first
time
Saturday was to
end with reenergization of
Busses B & C
Electrician who
normally does
traffic lights given
OJT for the switch
gear
LANSCE had
generators ready
Previous 5 year
review was
reviewed
No operational
pressure to
reenergize
Included entire
crew
No one disagreed
with the decision
Buses A, B, and C
were involved in
the activity
Overtime work
E1 is journeyman
electrician
Buses A, B, and C
de-energized
Using 29 CFR
1910.269 to
control hazardous
energy
Crew was a
combination of
Lineman, Medium
Voltage and
borrowed
electricians
Job now
scheduled to start
May 2
LANSCE prepared
for 2-day outage
Includes
reenergizing Bus B
& C on 05/02
Request to
reschedule job
finalized
04/27/2015
Determination
made to energize
Bus B & C on
Saturday evening
04/28/2015
Switching
procedures for
both PMs
approved
FOD Designee
Release work at
the POTD
05/02/2015
Began 5-year and

2-year PM
activities in TA-5370
0658
G-4
CC2-1
Notallworkershad
aclear
understandingof
system/jobstatus
andworkscope
C-2
CC3-1
Teams included
individuals with
varying degrees of
training,
qualification and
experience
Mixedexperience
andqualifications
causedconfusionon
rolesand
responsibilitiesand
control
implementation
C-27
2nd pre-job briefing
confusing for some
but not for others
Work conducted
by teams
Everyone
understood the
work
None of the other

crews heard what
the other crews
were being briefed
Adhoc system
Switching
procedures with
modes
No work was to be
conducted on
energized
equipment
Specific pre-jobs
for crew inside
switch room,
outside linemen,
fire protection crew
Completion of
actions identified
by red tape for
breaker work
completed and
blue tape for
cubicle cleaned
Humidity up a bit
but acceptable in
TA-53-70
Discussed
procedure and test
control
E1 requests a
ground be placed
on the primary of
TR-1 feeding Bus
A
Procedures for
clearance process
were detailed
Discussed work
inside the
switchgear
Clearance process
based on OSHA
utility requirements
29 CFR 1910.269
not 29 CFR
1910.147 for
LOTO
Discussed deenergizing of the

gear
1st Pre-job brief

conducted
0630
Appendix G
CC4-2
Concurrent pre-job
brief conducted
C-3
C4-1
Temperature ok in
the TA-53-70
No formal in
process tracking
for work
completion/
progress for 5yr
PM
Lineman
completed outside
cleaning on all 3
buses
All Buses deenergized
Work was clicking

- nothing unusual
PPE used
Procedure initiated
0758
Bus B & C work

nearly complete
1500
Clearance
released
1837
Breakers back in
and energized
1730
G-5
May 3, 2015
TA-53 Arc Flash
CC4-1
Controlaffordedby
theprejobbriefing
wasnoteffectiveto
prevententryinto
BusB,cubicle17
C-1
3-4 crew members

spend night in their
Los Alamos home
LANSCE
reenergizes load
Bus B and C
reenergized
Bus A remains deenergized
Release clearance
for Buses B & C
1837
Clearance
reissued for Bus A
1904
Appendix G
No discussion on
the mixed
energized work in
work documents
for 5 yr. PM
CC1-1 & 2
Inside cleaning of
Bus A left for
Sunday, May 3
Most crew
members spend
night in hotel
rooms in Los
Alamos
E1 requested extra
grounding on TR-1
that feeds Bus A
All goals met for

the day
LANL provided
hotel rooms to the
crew for the night
E1 part of inside
pre-job briefing
Panel 17 cleaning
completed
Crew is tired
Inside pre-job
briefing clearly
demonstrated the
clearance tag and
the sides
energized and deenergized
Prior to this job

overtime was
minimum for
electricians
Pre-job held inside

and outside TA5370
Saturday PIC not

on site Sunday
Always the plan to

bring up Buses B
and C
Bus B and C
energized
Crews worked 14
hour day
No overall briefing
Half of the linemen

crew from
Saturday off at
training
Bus B and C
energized
Work ended for

the day
1930-2000
Concerns not
expressed during
pre-job
Employees had
concerns on work
Opportunity for
questions and
clarification at all
pre-job briefings
First time that job

was done with a
partially energized
system
Work was only to

be done on Bus A
Concurrent pre-job
briefings
05/03/2015
0630
G-6
RC-1, 2, 3,
4, & 5
Managementof
control
implementationwas
lessthanadequate
RC
Root Cause
Thescopeofthe
workatthetask
levelwasnot
adequatelydefined
CC-1
Contributing
Cause
Trainedemployees
didnotidentifylack
ofrequiredsigns,
tags,andbarriersas
requiredbyNFPA
70E
C-16
CC4-5
Useofclearance
tagsisnotthe
typicalisolation
methodusedfor
Wireman
C-15
Thevisualboundary
(clearancetag)was
ineffectivein
preventingE1from
workingoutsidethe
intendedworkscope
C-6
White tag
confirmed on
cubicle 18 by
personnel involved
in the PM
Clearance tag at
Breaker 18 defined
as a boundary not
in accordance with
NFPA 70E
Use of cleaner
needed for the job
C-3
CC2-2
Clutteredworkspace
mayhavecaused
someconfusionthat
ledE1tobelieve
cubicle17wasde
energized
C-26
Clearance point
established
No confirmation
whether S1 and
E9 attended the
pre-job briefing
White tag is not

recognized as
readily as the red
and blue tape
Two jobs being

conducted
simultaneously
Tiebreaker
established
Only one PIC to

oversee two IWDs
White tag used for

establishing
clearance point in
place on cubicle
18
Work area was

crowded and
congested
Bus B is energized
Confusion as to
who is the PIC
Yellow caution
tape identified
between cubicles
16 and 17 for hipot
work only
E1didnotperform
ZeroVoltage
Verificationfor
cubicle17
C-12
Bus A double
grounded
IWD Part 2 does

not include
partially energized
work
Hotel reservations
made for Sunday
night, if needed
Difference in
experience
between linemen
and electricians
Red tape not

applicable for
cubicle 17
Processes(zero
voltagecheckswere
notconsistently
implementedor
understoodatthe
tasklevel
C-13
Requested by E1
Wiremen
(Electricians)
working on two
PMs inside
substation
Work going well
Difference of
opinion as to
whether crew
members had
worked on mixed
energized systems
Blue tape could

not be identified in
photographs taken
after the accident
Personal
protection ground
Exclusion area not

established for
energized/in
operation cubicles
Everyone
understood the
work
Crew is well rested

and ready to finish
job
Red and blue tape

from May 3 work
still present on
completed
cubicles and
breakers
Cluttered
workspace,dueto
workingtwojobs
concurrently,
reducedtheability
ofworkteamand
supervisorfrom
seeingand
preventingE1from
enteringcubicle17
C-25
Ground installed
on primary side of
TR-1
Appendix G
CC4-3
Theopportunitywas
missedtoestablish
andimplement
effectivebarriers
thatwouldhave
preventedthe
accident
C-3
RC-3
L1 by radio call
informed UI-OPS
work commencing
0710
G-7
RC-4
CC4-1,2, 3,
4&5
CC5-1
Zeroenergy
verificationwasnot
followedas
prescribedin
training
C-14
Reduced worker
focus may have
contributed to the
E1's error
C-17
Question on
whether zerovoltage checks are
needed
Anticipating early
finish
Humidity and
temperature
acceptable
Crew is well rested

and ready to finish
job
Pick up tools
~0730
Appendix G
Potentialforearly
completionoftask
mayhaveshifted
focusawayfrom
task
C-23
Workwasnot
performedwithin
controlsas
envisionedby
managementand
jobplanners
CC-4
Workareawas
congestedwith
peopleand
equipment
contributingtolack
ofawarenessof
otherworkers
C-5
Failure to formally
track cubicle
progress and
completion may
have resulted in
belief that cubicle
17 had not been
cleaned Saturday
C-4
Theyellowcaution
barricade,
demarkinghipot
testingboundary,
couldhavecreated
confusionastothe
locationofthe
clearancepoint
boundary,andled
E1tobelievecubicle
17wasdeenergized
C-7
C3-2
No one noticed E1
working in Bus B
Similarityof
equipmentand
congested
environment
contributedto
workersnot
recognizingE1was
workingincubicle
17
C-28
E1 working in
energized Bus B
Cubicles looked
similar
No work was
planned for Bus B
Work area was

crowded and
congested
S1 and E9
completing
paperwork and
were not in TA5370
Cleaned at least 1
cubicle on Bus A
before moving to
Cubicle 17
Busy and
congested work
area
C4-1
Hipot testing on
going
Breaker testing
activity registered
by SCADA Cubicle
2032
0742
Contributing
Cause
Lackofformalwork
trackingmechanism
preventedpositive
controlandbackup
bysupervisionfor
workeractionsthat
wouldhave
preventedE1from
enteringcubicle17
C-21
Breaker testing
activity registered
by SCADA Cubicle
2039
0749
E1 cleaning other
panels
Breaker testing
activity registered
by SCADA Cubicle
2038
1037
G-8
Appendix G
G-9
E3 arrives on the
scene
8 other employees
directly effected
E4 recognized E1
on the floor and on
fire
E1 stated he
thought it was
de-energized
Assessing if
system is deenergized
SF6 breakers,
voltage switches,
and breaker lineup
E2 saw a body
ejected from
cubicle 17
Use of fire
extinguisher not
needed
TA53-70 assessed
by Facility
Management
S1 instructs L1
and E9 to isolate
T2
Some workers
observed flame
and felt blast
Fire padded out by

coworker E2
Smoke coming out

of switchgear
Emergency
Operations Center
copied
E1 cut head on
wall
E3 going to get fire

extinguisher
2 paramedics and
7 others
dispatched
Returning linemen
unlock gate
Small micro-ohm
test instrument
laying on floor
opposite cubicle
17
E1 not responsive
E1 blown out of
cubicle 17 and
against wall the
South wall of
TA53-70
E2 put out fire
Appendix G
E1 revives and E2
helps E1 remove
burnt clothing and
applies cool wet
rags
E2 and E3 escort
E1 out of structure
Other 911 calls

being made
Using wet piece of

cloth
Possible
electrocution of
employee at TA53-70 reported
Battalion 1, Engine
40, and Medic 1
dispatched
E1 walks out of
structure
E3 calls 911
E3 cooling E1s
burns
Emergency 911
call received by
Dispatch
1109
LAFD Medical and

fire units
dispatched to TA53
1110
G-10
Southeast side of
substation
complex
Rescue 1
dispatched
1111
Appendix G
Confusion as to
who is the PIC
E1 on Southeast
corner of TA53-70
On Scene Incident
Command
established by
Engine 40
Medic 1 able to go
directly to the
scene
No fire reported by
LAFD
Prevents entry into

accident area
Gate by E1s
location
E1 observes
condition in truck
mirror
Engine 40 arrives
on scene
Gate leading into

the substation is
open
Returning lineman
crew open
perimeter gate
E1 waiting LAFD
arrival in pickup
truck
LAFD units begin

arriving on scene
1115
Medic 1 arrives on
scene
1116
E1 walks to
Medic 1
Medic 1 crew
assesses E1
LAFD isolates the

scene
1117
G-11
Access to the
remainder of
TA53-70 limited to
those requiring
access
Around cubicle 17
and exterior to the
substation
Red DANGER
Tape used
Immediate
accident scene
secured
Brief description
provided
Mass casualty
event
Two additional
ambulances
requested
Most to least
critically injured
employees
identified by
Engine 40 crew
Injuries above the

waist
Notifications are
required
LAMC informed
that they would be
receiving multiple
patients
Incident Command
requests additional
medical units
E40 crew performs

medical triage
Medic 1 leaves site

for LAMC with E1
1118
EOC made
emergency
notifications
1119
Appendix G
LAMC Notified
LAFD that E1
would need to be
moved to UNMH
1123
Medic 1 arrives at
LAMC with E1
1125
Two additional
ambulances
arrives on scene
1135, 1141
G-12
Required by LANL
P 732, Section
3.6.4.
S1 makes the
decision to move
No blood draws
taken for drug/
alcohol use
Lightning in the
area
Normal LAMC
helicopter site
unavailable
Incident Command
moved to TA-5345
~1200
E1 arrives at LAHS
for transport to
UNMH
1228
Remaining 8
patients
transported to
LAMC-ER
~1145
Appendix G
Unified Command
established
1148
Released per the

LANL SEO-3 EM
Incident Record for
Incident 15-066
E1 leaves for
UNMH via
helicopter
~1235
EM Duty Officer
turns site over to
Facility
Superintendent
1243
Unified command
terminated
1534
Statements taken
from other
electricians
~1600
G-13
Not available to
emergency
response or
protective forces
Location secured
awaiting the arrival
of the accident
investigation team
Only available to
Hi voltage lineman
as authorized by
S1
Perimeter gates
locked
Nothing removed
or altered inside
TA53-70
Access to TA53-70
controlled by Vitex
electronic locking
system
Control of site
turned back over
to U&I FOD
E5 and E3 access
yard to remove
work trucks
belonging to those
transported to
Medical
S1 instructs
everyone in TA5370 and inside the
fence to depart
Appendix G
G-14
APPENDIX H
PERSONNEL TASK EXPERIENCE SUMMARY
ID
ROLE
TASK
TASK PERFORMED EXPERIENCE LEVEL
E1
Wireman (in switchgear)
5-Yr / 2-Yr /Switchgear
5-Yr Package/Yes (Y); 2-Yr Package/Yes (Y); Switchgear Work/Yes (Y)

High-level experience
E2
Y/Y/Y Moderate-level experience
E3
Foreman Wireman (in switchgear)
Y/Y/Y High-level experience
E4
N/N/N No Experience
E5
Lineman (in switchgear)
E6
E7
Wireman Apprentice (in switchgear)
N/N/Y Minimal-level experience
E8
E9
General Foreman Wireman (outside

switchgear)
E10
EM
1-3
Emergency Management Personnel
Emergency Management Duty

Officer
Duty Officer High-level experience
S1
Electrical Superintendent (outside

switchgear)
L1
Lineman (in and out of switchgear)
Appendix H
H-1
ID
ROLE
TASK
TASK PERFORMED EXPERIENCE LEVEL
L2
General Foreman Lineman (ESO)
O1
Electric System Operator
FP1
Fire Protection
Fire Protection System Support
Fire station notifications and fire panel monitoring, no switchgear work

performed. High-level experience.
FP2
Fire Protection
Fire station notifications and fire-panel monitoring, no switchgear work

FP3
Fire Protection
Fire station notifications and fire-panel monitoring, no switchgear work

G1
Groundsman Provide non-electrical

support for Linemen.
5-Yr / 2-Yr/Switchgear
N/N/N Familiar with the tasks, no electrical work performed. Moderatelevel experience.
Not electrical worker.
Appendix H
H-2

TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident JAIT Report

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TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident JAIT Report

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What caused the electrical accident at TA-53?

What caused the electrical accident at TA-53?

What were the direct, contributing, and root causes of the accident according to the report?

What were the direct, contributing, and root causes of the accident according to the report?

TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident

Joint Accident Investigation

Technical Advisory Team: Jeff Vincoli and Chris Cantwell

Summary of Causal Factor Analysis

TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident Joint Accident Investigation Team Report

TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident Joint Accident Investigation Team Report

TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident Joint Accident Investigation Team Report

TA-53 Electrical Accident Causal Factors

ConclusionsRoot and Contributing Causes

Root Cause: Less-than-adequate management of control implementation.

E1 did not have zero-voltage verification performed for cubicle 17.

Processes (zero-voltage checks) were not consistently implemented or

The absence of a uniquely marked physical barrier enabled E1 to access

The yellow caution barricade, intended to demark the hi-pot testing

Lack of a formal work-tracking mechanism (in PM documentation)

Cluttered workspace, caused by working two jobs concurrently, reduced the

Performing two jobs simultaneously inserts additional hazards beyond

Contributing Cause: Weaknesses in hazard analysis

The opportunity was missed to establish and implement effective barriers

Mixed experience and qualifications caused confusion regarding roles,

TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident Joint Accident Investigation Team Report

TA-53 Electrical Accident Causal Factors (continued)

ConclusionsRoot and Contributing Causes

Opportunity for craft workers (performing the tasks) to identify concerns

Skill-of-the-craft was used instead of task-level work planning/hazard

Alerting techniques like safety signs, tags, barricades, and/or attendants

Reduced worker focus may have contributed to E1s error.

The absence of a uniquely marked physical barrier enabled E1 to access

Lack of a formal work-tracking mechanism prevented positive control and

Mixed experience and qualifications caused confusion regarding roles,

Similarity of equipment and congested environment contributed to workers

Robust controls were not implemented to prevent the consequence of

Contributing Cause: Work was not performed within

Control afforded by the pre-job briefing was not effective in preventing

TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident Joint Accident Investigation Team Report

TA-53 Electrical Accident Causal Factors (continued)

ConclusionsRoot and Contributing Causes

Failure to formally track cubicle progress and completion may have

The visual boundary (clearance tag) was ineffective in preventing E1 from

Opportunity was missed to identify and warn E1 not to open energized

Cluttered workspace may have caused some confusion that led E1 to

Contributing Cause: Feedback and lessons learned were not applied.

Zero-energy verification was not followed, as prescribed in training.

C3, C5, C22,

MSS, Logistics Division (LOG), and UI management need to strengthen

C7, C8, C10,

LANL needs to establish uniform and stringent implementation of safety

TA-53 Arc-Flash Accident Joint Accident Investigation Team Report

TA-53 Electrical Accident Causal Factors (continued)

C1, C2, C3, C5,

MSS, LOG, and UI management need to reinforce and clarify

C12, C13, C14

MSS, LOG, and UI management and direct supervision need to reinforce

C4, C7, C8,

MSS and UI management need to closely evaluate changing conditions

C5, C9, C10,