AN OLD PSEUDOPROBLEM

by Wolfgang Khler
Ein

altes

Scheinproblem,

1929;

translated

by

Erich

Goldmeyer,

1971)

This article was first published in German as "Ein altes Scheinproblem" in the journal Die
Naturwissenschaften,
1929,
17,
pp.
395-401.
It was reprinted by permission of Springer-Verlag and translated by Erich Goldmeier in
Mary Henle (Ed.), The Selected Papers of Wolfgang Khler, New York: Liveright, 1971, pp. 125141.

Why are the objects of the phenomenal world perceived as before us, outside of ourselves, even
though today everybody knows that they depend upon processes inside of us, in the central
nervous system? A psychologist will as a rule, immediately be able to give a simple solution to this
curious problem. But that it is generally known may not be assumed. It is not only a philosopher
like SCHOPENHAUER who uncritically accepts the erroneous premises implicit in that question and
must then make the wildest assumptions to answer it. Many of the greatest physiologists, among
them even Helmholtz, have failed to achieve full clarity on this question. [From the principles of his
theory of space, HELMHOLTZ proposes to derive "an astonishing consequence": "the objects present in space appear
to us clothed in the qualities of our sensations. They appear to us red or green, cold or warm, they have smell or taste,
etc., while these sensory qualities belong, after all, only to our nervous system and do not at all extend into outer
space." (H. v. HELMHOLTZ, Die Thatsachen in der Wahrnehmung. Berlin. August Hirschwald, 1879.)] MACH and

AVENARIUS attempted to lead the scientific world away from the errors already implicit in the
formulation of the paradox. But either their explanations remained little known, or they did not
sufficiently elucidate the problem. [ A much clearer attempt, correct in its essential points, to give a concrete,
positive soIution of the paradox was made by Ewald HERING as early as 1862, at least for visual perception. (E.
HERING, Beitrge zur Physiologie. Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1861-1864. Heft 2, 1862, 164-166.) By the way, HERING
himself expressed great pessimism about the understanding of his arguments that could be expected among his
contemporaries.] For only a few years ago a well-known physician raised the question anew: "How is

it that consciousness, which is bound to an organism, relates the changes in its sense organs to
something located outside of itself?" All attempts to explain this "compulsion to project" appeared
useless to him, for he felt that here is one of the eternal enigmas, related to the mind-body
problem. lt seems clear that this contemporary physician is not alone; rather he represents the
majority of natural scientists. Students, at any rate even those of the natural sciences, always have
to go through a sort of revolution in their picture of the world as they try to transform what
appears so strange into a simple, transparent matter. Under these circimstances, it may indeed be
worthwhile once more to correct in somewhat more detail the error inherent in this question.
We have here a typical case of a difficulty which we create ourselves, in which we proceed on a
correct line of reasoning for a while, but not consistently to the end. If new knowledge is gained in
one area, while in a neighboring area an earlier stage of knowledge is inadvertently retained,
contradictions must result. The path in the present case is directly determined by the
development of physics from GALILEO and NEWTON on. Consequently, the way to discover and to
eliminate the core of the difficulty that developed leads over this same road of natural science.
Little would be gained if we tried to demonstrate by philosophical speculation that here must be
an error, while science would find itself, just as before, led on its way to the same old paradox.
The physics of the late baroque period destroyed naive realism. The objects which exist
independently of the observer and are to be the subject of scientific study could not possibly
1

possess all the variegated characteristics which the phenomenal environment certainly shows.
Thus the physicist subtracts many socalled sensory qualities if he wants to extract what he
considers the objective realities from the phenomenal manifold. I do not venture to judge whether
the greatest minds of that time were immediately aware that much more is needed, namely a
radical departure from the identity of phenomenal object and physical object. Sometimes it seems
that for them the phenomenal object was simply the physical object itself, somewhat changed by
all kinds of subjective trimmings, thus both basically still one and the same existence. Whatever
the historical truth, after the elimination of the "secondary qualities," physics developed so rapidly
that soon its way of thinking had to be applied to the relation between physical events and the
organism. For example, whether a sound wave impinges on a violin string or on the human
eardrum can, after all, make no difference in principle. From this moment on, there seems to be
no escape from the paradox. Anatomy, physiology, and pathology teach us that about one point
there can no longer be any possible doubt. The physical processes between object and sense
organ are followed by further events which are propagated through nerves and nerve cells as far
as certain regions of the brain. Somewhere in these regions processes take place which are tied to
the occurrence of perception in general and, therefore, also to the existence of phenomenal
objects. Thus a physical object which reflects light differently from its surroundings will be the
source of a long series of successive processes of propagation and transformation through rather
different media, until finally a complex of processes takes place which can be considered the
physiological carrier of the corresponding phenomenal object. Now it would obviously be
meaningless to identify with each other the starting point and such a late or distant phase of this
sequence of events. Therefore this reasoning might well allow for similarities of some degree
between the phenomenal object and its partner in the physical world; but in any case the two
represent existences at least as different as the physical object and - in an entirely different spatial
position - the brain process on which the existence of the phenomenal object directly depends. If I
shoot at a target, nobody will claim that the hole in the target is the same thing as the revolver
from which the bullet came. By the same reasoning, we may not identify the phenomenal object
with the physical object from which the stimuli in question came. Under no circumstances has the
phenomenal object anything to do with the place in physical space where the "corresponding"
physical object is located. If it has to be localized at all at some point in physical space, then
obviously it belongs most properly to that place in the brain where the directly corresponding
physological process takes place. It is immediately apparent that SCHOPENHAUER, HELMHOLTZ,
the above-mentioned physician, and everybody for whom this paradox exists would regard just
such a localization of phenomenal objects and phenomenal qualities as the natural one. But
instead, without any doubt, we have the phenomenal objects before us and outside of ourselves.
We might be tempted to say that parts of the phenomenal world should not be thought of as
localized in any place in the physical world as a matter of principle, since phenomenal and physical
localizations are incommensurable. Therefore localization of a phenomenal object within the brain
is also ruled out. But we should not make the answer to our question too easy. Such a purely
negative statement certainly does not solve the problem before us. For the problem lies in the fact
that phenomenal objects are localized in a definite position relative to our body, only not in it, but
outside of it. Thus the simplest experience seems to contradict the epistemological argument just
considered. One finds, therefore, among biologists and even philosophers, the assumption that
the phenomenal object is somehow again withdrawn from the body into physical space and,
wherever possible, precisely to the place of its physical counterpart ("compulsion to project").
Fantastic as such an idea may be, it is unfortunately not uncommon to find all kinds of hypotheses
in psychology so confused that nobody would tolerate them in the natural sciences proper. There

are surely also those who see in such an extraordinary achievement an expression of the
superiority of mind over mere nature.
As to the epistemological argument of the incommensurability of physic and phenomenal
localization there is, however, this to say. Let us assume that it is absolutely correct and that,
therefore, the total phenomenal world of a person is simply not definitely localizable anywhere in
the physical world, because it is not possible even to conceive of the relative localization of
phenomenal and physical facts. Then it follows that we may arbitrarily think of the totality of a
person s phenomenal world. wherever in the physical world it would help our thinking. Such a
procedure, if followed systematically, can never lead to an inconsistency precisely because, in fact,
we are always dealing with the relative localization either of physical data or of phenomenal data
among themselves, but never with localization of the one relative to the other. [Similarly, I am
completely free to think of the "pyramid of concepts" of classical logic or of the color pyramid in any arbitrary regions
of space, precisely because their quasi-spatial nature neither excludes nor requires coincidence with a definite region
of "real" space.] Now, according to our basic assumption, the totality of a person s perceptual world

is strictly correlated with certain processes in his central nervous system. lt will then simplify our
discussion and our terminology if, in what follows, we do not consider spatial relations of the
phenomenal world as entirely separate from. thos in physical space, but think of the totality of the
phenomenal world and its subdivisions as being mapped on those brain processes which certainly
at least correspond to them. After what has been said. this procedure will prejudice nothing.
Whoever believes that he can cautiously avoid this assumption and prefers to conceive of the
totality of the phenomenal world as permanently set apart in an imommensurable space, must
reach exactly the same result, the same solution to the paradox which we will reach. And besides,
I want to show that this solution succeeds entirely even if one maintains, with HELMHOLTZ and so
many biologists, that phenomenal data "belong only to our nervous system."
Phenomenal space everywhere offers examples of the relationship "outside one another." Next to
my book, outside of it, is the pencil; still farther from both is the phenomenal object, the inkwell.
This seems entirely natural to us. The only consideration required for the solution of our curious
problem now consists in the fact that "my body," before which and outside of which the
phenomenal objects are perceived, is itself such a phenomenal object along with others, in the
same phenomenal space, and that under no circumstances may it be identified with the organism
as the physical object which is investigated by the natural sciences, anatomy and physiology. Since
at first, as long as this distinction is not yet obvious so that the pseudoproblem disappears, the
situation is necessarily somewhat confusing, I shall explain it step by step. If I put my own hand
next to the pencil and the inkwell, the hand reflects light and this stimulates my eye, exactly as the
other two objects do. In that brain field which contains the physiological correlate of our
perception - and, according to our assumption, also this perception itself - there thus occur not
only two total processes corresponding to the external objects pencil and inkwell, but also a third
process of generally exactly the same nature, connected with the appearance of the phenomenal
object "hand." Nobody is surprised that the phenomenal object "pencil" is outside the
phenomenal thing "inkwell." But it is no more astonishing that the hand as a third phenomenal
object appears next to the other two and that they, in turn, appear outside of the hand. The
processes in that brain field undoubtedly possess some properties on the basis of which
perception in general is spatial; but also, more particularly, specific behavior of several brain
processes corresponds to the phenomenal relations next to and outside of the respective
phenomenal objects. If this particular behavior exists for the processes corresponding to pencil
and inkwell, then in the case just discussed, it certainly does so in exactly the same way for both of
these in their relation to the "hand process."
3

Now, as I sit at my desk, besides my hand there is also visible in the more peripheral field a good
portion of both arms and the upper part of my body. Obviously arms and body are phenomenal
objects just as the hand or the pencil and inkwell. They arise, physically and physiologically, in
exactly the same way as the others, through retinal images and the ensuing processes in the
nervous system; consequently they are subject to the same rules of relative localization as those
objects. If there are understandable reasons why, under the conditions of our example, those
other objects appear external to each other, then exactly the same reasons apply to their being
external to my body as a phenomenal object.
To enable us to see the situation still more concretely, we shall introduce an assumption which is
certainly not entirely correct in this form and will need later correction. We shall assume that if
two objects, such as pencil and inkwell, exist phenomenally side by side at a particular
phenomenal distance, the corresponding brain processes simply exist next to each other at a
particular distance, in short that phenomenal space and the spatial distribution of the directly
corresponding processes in the brain field are, to some extent, geometrically similar or even
congruent. Then consideration of the example just discussed shows that the complex of processes
for my body as a phenomenal object is localized at a particular place in the physical brain field,
that the processes for other phenomenal objects take place all around it, and that, because of the
relative geometrical relationships of these processes, phenomenal objects must be next to each
other everywhere in phenomenal space, and at the same time they must all lie outside of one (for
me) especially important phenomenal object which I call my body.
This is the first essential step to the solution of the paradox. If SCHOPENHAUER and many natural
scientists after him were astonished by the "external localization" of phenomenal objects,
the reason was only that they failed to apply to their own body an assumption which had
become natural to them in considering other objects. For the body they retained the naive
identification or confusion of physical and phenomenal object. But if we say some object is
in front of "us," then what we mean by "us" is not the organism in the physical,
physiological sense, but a phenomenal object among others which must show the same
kind of localization relative to them as they have among themselves. And both, the other
phenomenal objects as well as the "self" (in the everyday phenomenal sense) depend
functionally on certain processes in one's own physical body; and likewise all relative
phenomenal localizations depend on the distribution of these processes. Nobody has ever
seen a phenomenal object localized relative to (outside of) his physical body. When we speak
of the phenomenal self, the personality in a deeper sense remains entirely outside of our discussion. We
speak here of the self which is intended when we say, "I lie down on the couch," "I sit down," "I go
downstairs," etc.[ When we speak of the phenomenal self, the personality in a deeper sense remains entirely
outside of our discussion. We speak here of the self which is intended when we say, "I lie down on the
couch," "I sit down," "I go downstairs," etc.]

At this point the reader might still be slightly uneasy because now, to be sure, phenomenal objects
are understandably outside of the phenomenal self but still, according to our assumption, both of
them exist inside our physical body. Later all doubts in this respect should disappear. But first an
extension and a correction of what has been said so far are needed.
An extension is necessary because our phenomenal world contains very much more than just
visual facts. So far the discussion has been confined to the visual content of phenomenal space
because we know, and are accustomed to this knowledge, that visual processes occur in orderly
fashion in one connected physiological field. Therefore the arrangement of the visual phenomenal

body next to other visual phenomenal objects is immediately convincing once we know that the
phenomenal body may not be identified with the physical organism.
Sound is also localized in phenomenal space but, in general, less precisely so. Likewise I feel the
hardness of the table under my hands (as phenomenal objects), thus again in phenomenal space.
An old controversy is concerned with the relations to vision of such phenomenal spatial data in
other modalities. But in any case one fact is phenomenologically certain: Whether sharply or
diffusely localized, sound appears to us in places of the same phenomenal space in which we see
phenomenal objects (in the same or in different places). It is only because of this that I can say, for
instance, "Just now I heard a rustling sound in the bushes over there," and thus relate the place of
a sound to the position of a visually given phenomenal object. In just the same way I feel the
hardness of the table for instance, somewhat to the left of the place where the phenomenal
object pencil lies, and thus I localize a felt place in relation to a seen one. Anyone who is in the
habit of letting his judgement about the facts of perception be determined by his knowledge of
the peripheral sense organs may not at once agree at this point, since the organs of sight, hearing,
and touch represent separate receptor surfaces, and certainly the primary regions of entrance of
the respective nerves into the cortex are also separate from each other. But as to the first point,
the two eyes are also two separate peripheral sense organs, the stimulation of which nevertheless
unquestionably results in one connected visual phenomenal space. Furthermore, there is no good
evidence at all for the assumption that the primary regions of entrance of the several sensory
nerves are also the last stations of the sensory process. The alternative hypothesis would
correspond much better with direct experience - that all sensory processes finally enter a field
common to them all, and that here they interact according to their respective relations; this would
be the basis for their localization in a single phenomenal space. This is the physiological version of
a view which at one time was considered almost obvious, and which more recently has been
advanced again by William STERN. It would be a bad argument if someone wished to object that
not infrequently discrepancies are observed between the localization of a sound and the position
of the visual source of the sound, and that there are similar inconsistencies between the felt
object and its seen form. The above assumption by no means implies that this could not happen;
the observation of such a discrepancy indeed presupposes that acoustic location and visual
location of the source of sound, that the tactual and the visual image, have in principle
comparable characteristics since, in fact, I do compare the two. Normally, of course, not only does
the localization of the phenomena of different sensory modalities take place in one and the same
phenomenal space but also, at least by and large, whatever belongs together is perceived
together; thus the locus of the sound and the locus of the source of the sound as a visual object
coincide, etc. It is not essential for our question whether this approximate "fit" of the relative
phenomenal localization of visual, auditory, and tactual objects is partly based on anatomy (as the
unitary spatial order of seeing with the two eyes), or if an almost inconceivable amount of learning
brings the locations of sounds, tactile objects, etc., into an approximately fitting relation to the
unitary spatial order of the visual world, or if, finally, still other possible explanations might be
considered. At any rate, this coordination of localization already exists very early in the life of the
human being. And thus the other phenomenal data fit inte the one phenomenal context which
was described first in its visual extension before the visually given body-self. Therefore we may
also conceive of the sensory processes of nonvisual origin as taking place in the same regions of
the cerebral field where the corresponding visual process complexes take place (but see below).
But a corresponding extension must also be made in regard to the phenomenal make-up of our
bodily self. For it and its changing states, sensory data of nonvisual origin are undoubtedly even
more important than its visual appearance which, for ourselves, always remains rather
5

incomplete. Just as our phenomenal world is enriched by the sense of touch, but at the same time
preserves to a high degree the correct correlation of visual phenomenal objects and tactile data in
one phenomenal space, so what we perceive of ourselves through the sense of touch incorporates
itself in and attaches itself, on the whole correctly, to the visual object, "our body." Into the same
region of phenomenal space, again in proper context, a great deal of data are included which exist
essentially only for one's own phenomenal body and its members, and about whose physiological
foundations in sense organs of the skin, muscles, joints, etc., we are actually very poorly informed.
These are what we experience even without looking: the phenomenal positions of our limbs, the
felt tension or relaxation of extremities and parts of the body. In the consideration of the
immediate phenomenal data, we need continually to guard against slipping what is meant by
these words into the physical-physiological states and changes in the corresponding regions of the
physical organism. Obviously one of the most important groups of phenomenal data may not be
forgotten, the one that concerns the change and motion of the phenomenal body and its limbs. It
is well known that stimulation of the vestibular nerves gives rise, in a sense, to the purest
perception of spatial dynamics. And all these states and events occur in and on the same
phenomenal structure for which we have -phenomenologically quite properly - a single name, the
self (in the everyday sense) without concerning ourselves with the enormous variety of different
sensory inputs which, physiologically, contribute constantly to its make-up. This is again possible
only because all these data, whatever their peripheral physiological source, may be ordered, in
general, so entirely adequately in one structure of phenomenal space. The tension, which I just
now feel in my right arm as I make a fist is localized in the structure which I experience visually as
my right arm, etc. Again there is a conclusion to be drawn for brain physiology: the data from all
these different sense organs contribute to the determination of one single segregated process
complex, whose phenomenal correlate is called "self." Neither from considerations of brain
physiology nor of phenomenology, therefore, does the "sensory heterogeneity" of the
phenomenal self and of the phenomenal environment change anything of the fact that the one is
surrounded by the parts of the other. There is then no reason whatever why the phenomenal
environment should appear within the phenomenal self. This actually occurs only in special cases
where it is a consequence precisely of the principle of normal appropriate organization of all
sensory data in one phenomenal context: In taking food, I certainly perceive phenomenal objects,
just now objects of the phenomenal environment, in the interior of the phenomenal body self that is to say, in the mouth - for a few minutes. But, of course, this has nothing to do with the
paradox from which we started. It only means that in a unitary perceptual field (and,
correspondingly, in a brain field of unitary structure) it is quite possible to have continuous shifts
of a phenomenal image (and likewise of the underlying brain processes) from a surrounding area
to a surrounded one (the complex of self processes).
In addition to the above generalization of our considerations, from the visual facts only to
perception in general, the solution of the paradox still requires the correction of a simplifying
assumption which is not seriously tenable, but which has been made up to now. It is impossible
that the spatial relationships in phenomenal space simply corrrespond to the geometrical
relationships of their respective processes in the brain field. G. E. MLLER pointed out a long time
ago that this is not conceivable because, for example, visual space acts like a fairly uniform
continuum, while the corresponding processes of the brain field are anatomically-geometrically
distributed over the two hemispheres; and therefore, from purely geometrical considerations,
something, like a gap or at least a gross disturbance of continuity would have to be brought about
by this inhomogeneity of the geometrical distribution of the processes. The same thing follows
from the irregular arrangement of blood vessels in the nervous tissue (also emphasized by
MLLER). Quite aside from such considerations, phenomenal space has a large number of
6

characteristics which would be alttogether incomprehensible on the assumption that its structure
and its articulation in each concrete case were determined by nothing but purely geometrical
relations of individual local processes. The new psychology of perception has demonstrated
beyond any doubt that only the functional distribution of processes, as well as gradations and
articulations in such a context, can be regarded as the physiological basis of the phenomenal
spatial order. Accordingly, the physiological theory of phenomenal space must be dynamic, not
geometrical. The symmetry of a perceived circle, for example, would not depend on the mere
geometrical relationships between the loci of independent individual processes, but on the fact
that, in an extended whole process which underlies the visual circle, a corresponding symmetry of
the functional context exists. A more detailed discussion would lead us too far from our topic. [But
cf. M. WERTHEIMER, Experimentelle Studien ber das Sehen von Bewegung, Zeitschrift fr Psychologie, 1912, 61, 161265; and W. KHLER, Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationren Zustand, Braunschweig: F. Vieweg & Sohn,
1920.] It will suffice if we show, by means of an analogy from elementary physics, how this changed

assumption permits us also to solve those difficulties arising from the anatomical peculiarities.
Let a three-dimensional network or lattice be formed from filiform conductors, such that the
conductors may be considered the edges of many equal small cubes. Consequently, at the corners
of each such cube six filaments are in electrical contact, while they are otherwise encased in
insulating sheaths. If such a network is connected to the poles of a battery in a certain manner,
then the distribution of the stationary current may, of course, be represented purely
geometrically. But this is a rather superfidal procedure, since purely spatial data mean very little
for what takes place here, and since the distribution of the current must essentially be related to
portions of the conductor. As far as geometry is concerned, the stationary distribution of current
would be very different - it would be distorted - if the network were "bent," if some filaments
were curved, etc. At the same time, however, in terms of length of conductor or amount of
resistance, the distribution would be the same as before. Indeed, in these terms the distribution
could still be considered the same even if some of the filaments (between two junctions) differed
in length from the others but had the same resistance. Under these conditions there would
certainly be considerable discrepancies between a description of the current in purely geometrical
coordinates and one (the only adequate one) in functional coordinates. For instance, in the latter
terms a certain distribution of current would have to be characterized as "homogeneous" while its
density per square centimeter would vary considerably from place to place.
Since the distinction between functional and geometrical coordinates may be applied to other
events, and thus must not be restricted to the case of stationary electrical currents, it may well be
applied to the central nervous system and especially to that part of it whose processes underlie
the spatial order of our perception. It is clear, then, that only functional coordinates may be used
and that, therefore, the geometrical-anatomical position of the individual conducting structures
and cells relative to each other becomes meaningless (a position partly determined by all kinds of
secondary factors). With this step, the difficulties discussed by MLLER disappear. As a very rough
approximation we can, of course, still assume a correspondence of geometrical-anatomical and
functional coordinates of the system. For functionally neighboring parts of the tissue are usually
also geometrical-anatomical neighbors, and functionally very distant parts are also separated
anatomically from each other by a certain distance in space. But this correspondance will not hold
in detail and will not apply strictly. lt will be irrelevant for the understanding of the ordering of
events in such a field since the functional distances are the only ones that really matter.
Without this principle it is impossible to understand even the relation between visual ordering of
space and the corresponding brain events. It is all the more necessary if we want to make
7

comprehensible in physiological terms the fitting coordination of the phenomena of the various
sensory modalities in one common space. (This needs to be considered in relation to the
simplifying formulation above [2nd part].) But perhaps this point of view is most important for the
understanding of the construction of the phenomenal self from such different sensory material.
Again, it cannot seriously be maintained that in the brain region in question the corresponding
process complex represents a kind of geometrical copy of the phenomenal body. For what matters
are precisely the functional coordinates, and these may be "distorted" in a great many ways. This
correction of the relevant coordinate system will not in the least change the relative localization of
phenomenal self and phenomenal environment. "Being outside" and the changing distance of
phenomenal objects relative to the phenomenal body are again to be thought of as functionally
determined only, as a gradation in the extended context of processes which the purely
geometrical distributions reflect only very roughly.
After this, nothing at all remains of the paradox of the localization of our phenomenal
environment around us. Whatever relative phenomenal localization may take place is determined
by functional proximities and distances in the underlying nervous process distributions. The fact
that in their totality these are contained within the meninges and the skull in no way enters into
these functional connections. Therefore they could not possibly appear in our perception, whose
spatial character, indeed, depends only on those functional connections. Only if, during the
analysisis, we shift from one kind of coordinate sytem to an entirely different kind, can we possibly
still find difficulties here. If the phenomenal self depends on one process complex, the
phenomenal environment on other such complexes, and if the relative phenomenal localization of
the two corresponds to functional externality (just as two different phenomenal objects in the
environment are outside of each other), then there is no problem left.
I do not wish to give the impression that this discussion leads to nothing more than to the
disappearance of the old paradox. So far the emphasis has been on the fact that, in general,
separate localization of phenomenal environment and self is natural and necessary for consistent
thinking. From a slightly different point of view, however, these same considerations lead, rather,
to a functional equivalence and kinship of the phenomenal self and phenomenal objects, which
again cannot be understood as long as this self is not recognized as a separate part of the
phenomenal world. Physiologically, the self and the objects of the environment represent
complexes of processes in one and the same brain field. It is by no means necessary, and not even
likely that these proccess complexes are functionally entirely indifferent to each other. The
psychology of perception is full of instances of mutual influences between the objects nd
occurrences of the phenomenal environment. For example, forms, sizes, and directions of seen
objects may be strongly influenced by a suitably chosen surrounding visual environment. Because
objectively and physically these are nothing but independent and mutually practically indifferent
objects, forms, or contours, because there is thus no corresponding influence outside the
organism, these distortions are usually called "illusions." But psychology is coming more and more
to realize that, physiologically in any case, this is a matter of true influences on visual process
complexes by their neighbors in the field. After what has been said, it is not astonishing that
among the processes which underlie the phenomenal organization of space, more intimate
functional connections exist than between the individual objects in physical space, whose forms,
sizes, etc., are independent of each other under ordinary circumstances. Particularly striking
influences are often observed in phenomenal space when there are movements in the field.
Everybody has noticed, for example, that the moon clearly moves in the opposite direction when
clouds pass in front of it. This is called "induced" movement of a phenomenal object, and recently
DUNCKER has been able to offer a satisfactory explanation of its remarkable properties. [K.
8

DUNCKER, ber induzierte Bewegung, Psychologische Forschung, 1929, 12, 180-259]

If, now, the phenomenal

self belongs to the same interconnected field in which objects of the phenomenal environment
can exert such an influence on one another, we may then expect that the same influence which is
exerted, for instance, on the moon by the passing clouds may, under suitable conditions, also be
exerted on the phenomenal self by vigorous movements of the phenomenal surroundings. Now, it
is well known, and has even become a favorite amusement at country fairs, that obvious rotation
of the visual environment leads regularly to rotation of the phenomenal self in the opposite
direction, while the physical organism remains at rest. This phenomenon becomes, in principle,
fully comprehensible if we consider the organization of the process complex which underlies the
phenomenal self as part of the whole field of connected processes corresponding to everything
phenomenal.
This simple example shows particularly impressively that phenomenal space and the underlying
physiological field structure have qualities which do not exist in the same way in physical space. In
particular, there are dynamic relations between the process complex of the self and the
environment processes in the brain field which have no correlate in any analogous causal
connections between the physical organism and its physical environment. But if we have gone this
far, to be consistent, we must go very much farther. For, considerations of continuity demand that
every kind of behavior in which we are directed toward a part of the environment will have to be
understood as the expression of a vectorial state or event between the momentary process of the
self and the environmental process in question. Depending on the actual characteristics of the two
which, of course, always determine such a vectorial state, very different directions may occur.
Such psychological facts as "attending to," "feeling attracted or repelled by," "hesitating before
something," etc., occur in experienced space as directed from a phenomenal object to the self or
vice versa. If one wants to be consistent, these will have to be incorporated in the schema outlined
here of a correspondence between phenomenal order and functional connections in the brain
field. But a more concrete development of this idea is hardly possible without also treating the
phenomena of memory; it would therefore lead us too far from our problem.