03 Nam-Lin - Hur
03 Nam-Lin - Hur
03 Nam-Lin - Hur
**
Nam-lin Hur
Prologue
In the late sixteenth century, East Asia was plunged into turmoil as Japans Hideyoshi regime invaded Korea in 1592. It was a massive invasion
involving more than 150,000 Japanese forces. Scholars have suggested
that Japans invasion was part of its plan to conquer Ming China, but this
issue is still subject to discussion.1 The invasion soon developed into an
international conflict of unprecedented scale in premodern East Asia, embroiling Korea, Japan, and China and finally ending, seven years later, in
the eleventh month of 1598. In Korea, this conflict is commonly known
as the Imjin War, and, for the sake of simplicity, I follow this convention.
The Imjin War is so called because it broke out in the year of Imjin (the
twenty-ninth year of the sexagenary cycle in the Chinese calendar system),
1592.
The aftermath of the Imjin War brought about regime collapse and had
a long-term impact upon the regions history. For Korea, Japans invasion
was devastating, causing anguish throughout the nation. It took Korea
many years to recover its prewar vigor and stability. For Japan, the war
** This work was partially supported by the Academy of Korean Studies of the Republic of Korea in the year of 2013.
** Professor, Department of Asian Studies, The University of British Columbia
54
resulted in the collapse of the Toyotomi regime, which had just succeeded
in unifying the nations warring states. As for China, its military aid to
Korea further worsened its military strength and fiscal condition and contributed to its eventual demise.
Despite the passing of more than four centuries, this international conflict still grips the popular imagination of East Asian peoples. In Korea
and Japan, the Imjin War has inspired dozens of documentaries, movies,
and TV dramas, and two museums are devoted solely to this historical
event -- the Chinju National Museum in Korea and the Nagoyaj Prefectural Museum in Japan. Not surprisingly, this war has also been a popular
topic of academic research. To date, hundreds of books and thousands of
journal articles and book chapters have been dedicated to this event. The
sheer number of publications might indicate that there is no compelling
need for further research on this subject. However, it should be noted that
Western scholarship has just begun to show some interest in the Imjin
War; very few English-language works have been published on this topic.
The many extant works in the Korean, Japanese, and Chinese languages
reveal a whole range of problems. First of all, many of them feature a
military narration of one kind or another based on a select set of warrelated events. In my view, there is no single work that offers a comprehensive, international thesis articulated within a coherent theoretical
framework. In their narratives, Korean scholars, who pay a great deal of
attention to righteous armies (ibyng) or Admiral Yi Sunsin, often
either slip into soul-searching in an attempt to offset Koreas failure of
national defence or overemphasize certain bright spots at the cost of obscuring the nature of the war itself. For their part, Japanese scholars tend
to be defensive about Japans invasion and to be very selective about the
data upon which they focus, thus providing a thin, not to say skewed, interpretation and analysis. Compared to Korean and Japanese scholars,
Chinese scholars, who are very few in number, tend to emphasize Ming
Chinas military aid to Chosn Korea and its dominant diplomatic role
with Japan.
Second, these works suffer, to one degree or another, from a lack of
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is minuscule.
Austin, Audrey. Admiral Yi Sun-sin: National Hero. Korean Culture 9,
#2 (1988): 4-15.
Elisonas, Jurgis. The Inseparable Trinity: Japans Relations with China a
nd Korea. In The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 4: Early M
odern Japan, ed. John Whitney Hall, 235-500. Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press, 1991.
Finch, Michael. Civilian Life in Chosn during the Japanese Invasion of
1592: The Namhaeng illok and Imjin illok in Swaemirok by
Himun. Acta Koreana 12, #2 (2009): 55-77.
Hawley, Samuel. The Imjin War: Japans Sixteenth-Century Invasion of
Korea and Attempt to Conquer China. Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 2005.
. Haengju Mountain Fortress on the River of Hell. Transaction
s of the Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch 85 (2010): 29-35.
Hasegawa, Masato. Provisions and Profits in a Wartime Borderland:
Supply Lines and Society in the Border Region between China
and Korea, 1592-1644. PhD diss., Yale University, 2013.
Hur, Nam-lin. Confucianism and Military Service in Early SeventeenthCentury Chosn Korea. Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 8,
#1 (2011): 51-84.
. National Defense in Shambles: Wartime Military Build-up in
Chosn Korea, 1592-98. Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 22,
#2 (2009): 113-35.
Ledyard, Gari. Confucianism and War: The Korean Security Crisis of
1598. Journal of Korean Studies 6 (1988-89): 81-120.
Lee, Sook-in. The Imjin War and the Official Discourse of Chastity. Se
oul Journal of Korean Studies 22, 2 (2009): 137-56.
Kim, Samuel Dukhae. The Korean Monk-Soldiers in the Imjin Wars: An
Analysis of Buddhist Resistance to the Hideyoshi Invasion,
1592-1598. PhD diss., Columbia University, 1978.
Niderost, Eric. Yin Sun Sin and Won Kyun: The Rivalry That Decided
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concerned, in addition to the Snjo sillok and Snjo sujng sillok, there is
a wide range of other basic materials. One of these is the Imjin Waeran
saryo chongs -- a select ten-volume edition of primary sources that was
compiled and published by the Chinju National Museum in 2002. Hawley
examines none of the materials included in this edition. Similarly, he fails
to explore any of the documents issued by Toyotomi Hideyoshi -- a group
of documents that is considered indispensable to the study of the Imjin
War. As Miki Seiichir shows in his catalogue of the Hideyoshi documents, more than two thousand pieces are related to the war and contain
detailed information on how Hideyoshi conducted it.4 Clearly, Hawleys
work is far from being original research.
Moreover, one might wonder to what extent Hawleys book reflects
Korean, Japanese, and Chinese scholarship. Does his research surpass
these works in quality? His bibliography does not include any secondary
work written in Japanese or Chinese, and his coverage of secondary
works in Korean is also very limited. Hawleys lack of fluency in Chinese,
Korean, and Japanese not only renders his perspective local and fragmented but also precludes his ability to offer an analysis that might transcend the level of conventional scholarship. One simply cannot expect new
research or insightful analysis from an author who relies on secondary
materials chosen for their availability in his or her language of choice.
Kenneth M. Swope. A Dragons Head and a Serpents Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598.
In this book, Swope offers a broad portrayal of the Imjin War, including background information on what led up to the outbreak of what he
refers to as the First Great East Asian War and its aftermath. From early
on, Swope details how, in the late sixteenth century, the Ming dynasty
tried to secure and protect its borders against hostile forces. Swope makes
it clear that, by the time it encountered the Japanese aggressors in 1592,
the Ming military had grown strong.
Against the backdrop of the rise of the Ming military, Swope depicts
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how the Japanese invasion unfolded in the Korean peninsula. With regard
to the arrival of Japanese forces in Pusan (Busan), he cites an eyewitness
account: The suns rays dimmed, the air filled with death, waves touched
the sky, black clouds covered the water as they approached. Countless
thousands of Japanese ships covered the ocean, their three-tiered masts
wrapped with blue awnings, the beat of drums and battle cries shaking the
waves as they came.5 The problem with this quote is that it is an excerpt
from The Record of the Black Dragon Year -- an English translation of
Imjin nok, a novel that features certain events and characters associated
with the Imjin War and that boasts forty different versions.6 The earliest
version of Imjin nok appeared four or five decades after the Imjin War
had ended.
Swopes purpose in writing Dragons Head is to recount the story of
the First Great East Asian War as one of the Ming emperor Wanlis three
major campaigns (the other two being the campaign against the Mongols
in Ningxia and that against Yang Yinglongs rebellion in Southwest China). Swope refutes the traditional image of Wanli, which holds that he
ha[d] become synonymous with imperial lassitude and avarice, eunuch
abuses, bureaucratic factionalism and infighting, military reverses, and
general dynastic decline.7 Instead, he spotlights Wanli, asserting that the
effectiveness of the Ming troops in the war in Korea owed much to his
excellent leadership: In light of the deplorable state of the Ming military
by the mid-1550s, its revival from 1570 to 1610 is truly remarkable. Over
these several decades, in addition to besting a succession of domestic
challenges, the Ming managed to defeat one of the most impressive military forces on the planet, the Japanese. Wanli was pivotal in making both
policy and strategic decision in these operations.8 What Swope tries to
suggest is clear. However, the trouble is that, during the war that spawned
a dozen massive battles, Chinas victory at Pyngyang (Pyeongyang)
was unique: in all other battles, the Chinese forces were either defeated or
performed miserably.
In trying to address what he considers unjust images of the Chinese ruler, Swope emphasizes Wanlis generosity and benevolence in salvaging
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Ming Chinas model tributary country, Chosn Korea, despite strong opposition and factional infighting. Swope contends that Wanli responded
quickly to the Korean kings appeal for help in May 1592 and immediately approved the release of 100,000 liang of silver to go towards military
aid. Swope maintains that Wanlis dedication to Chinas responsibility to
its tributary never wavered, and he quotes the emperor as follows: The
imperial court will not let losses get in the way and we wont rest until the
bandits are extirpated and our vassal state is at peace.9
After contextualizing the Ming dynastys aid to Korea that actually
came in the twelfth month of 1592, Swope provides details of the movements of troops and supplies with regard to a number of battles. He examines Japanese documents far less frequently than he does Chinese or Korean ones, and here again we encounter problems. In describing how the
Japanese prepared themselves for the upcoming aggression, Swope introduces readers to a dazzling list of statistics (pp. 67-68); however, the reliability of the sources upon which he relies for this list (which includes
John A. Lynn, ed., Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas, and Institutions of
Warfare, 1445-1871 [1990]; George Sansom, A History of Japan, 13341615 [1994]; and Clarence Norwood Weems, ed., Hulberts History of
Korea [1962]) is suspect.
Swopes account is detailed and lively, but when it comes to certain
critical issues, he is ambiguous or, worse, contradictory. For one thing,
regarding why Hideyoshi invaded Korea, Swope enumerates a long list of
suggestions made by various scholars in the field and discredits each in
one way or another. He complains that modern scholars have tended to
emphasize economic and domestic political factors, downplaying
Hideyoshis desire for glory,10 and he seems to embrace the suggestion
that the invasion was a means by which [Hideyoshi] could keep pressure on the daimyo, removing the dangerous ones to a safe distance and
allowing for the strengthening of his own authority at home. 11 Here,
Swope simply does not realize that the daimyo whom Hideyoshi sent to
Korea were those he trusted most. After bouncing back and forth regarding Hideyohis motive for invading Korea, Swope concludes: The desire
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action could be contemplated as, without it, no military action was possible. Throughout the war, China, Japan, and Korea all found themselves
engaged in a constant struggle to procure and to deliver food. They all
found this internal battle to procure enough food much harder to fight
than the external battle with the enemy.
Chinese forces, once they had crossed the Yalu (Amnok) River, had to
give up on their plan to secure grain from Korea and, instead, rely upon
grain that was supplied from their own country. The problem was that the
Koreans were unable to supply the Chinese because their major mode of
transport was on foot over muddy and rugged trails. Again and again, the
Korean court was haunted by the failure of its people to deliver grain to
the Chinese in a timely manner. For their part, the Chinese used Koreas
failure to deliver grain as an excuse to disengage from combat and to opt
for diplomacy.15
Once diplomacy emerged as an option, it quickly occupied the central
stage of this international conflict. Japans invasion of Korea is often referred to as a seven-year war, but more than half of this period consisted
of a stalemate in which there were no serious military skirmishes. During
this period, which lasted from mid-1593 to early 1597, Japan and China
were engaged in diplomatic efforts to achieve a negotiated solution, despite Koreas vigorous and sustained opposition. Interestingly, the Korean
court was excluded from this diplomatic process, even though its purpose
was to end a war that was taking place on Korean soil. Ming China asserted suzerainty over Korea, while Japan, for its part, gradually came to
regard China as the country with which it should negotiate a settlement to
its invasion of Korea.
After having had two major armed clashes -- one at Pyngyang and the
other at Pykchegwan (Byeongchegwan) -- China and Japan quickly
moved towards diplomacy, an option born out of their observation that
Korea simply did not have any capacity for military defence. Over time,
China became convinced that it did not have to sacrifice too much for its
vassal country, given that the battlefronts were gradually being formed
along the southern coastal areas of the Korean peninsula. For its part, Ja-
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pan saw its initial successes quickly evaporate and wanted a way both to
save face and to extricate itself from a situation that was increasingly
threatening the stability of its domestic political order.
Thus, China and Japan had many reasons to negotiate; however, because of their different perceptions of geopolitics, particularly regarding
what constituted tribute and investiture, they were unable to compromise. When Ming Chinas minister of war, Shi Xing, brought the option of truce negotiations to the fore, the Ming court became embroiled in
heated debates regarding its pros and cons. A group consisting of grand
secretaries, the minister of war, the Liaodong military commissioner, and
field generals clashed with a group consisting of supervising secretaries,
censors, and young bureaucrats who relentlessly opposed the strategy of
diplomacy.16
The arguments and counter-arguments that Ming officials put to the
Wanli emperor transformed the war in Korea into a vehicle for factional
infighting at the Ming court. Despite the ongoing, very confrontational,
debates, all participants shared the belief that China should command a
Sinocentric regional order. Traditionally, the standard formula for this
involved non-Chinese countries offering a tribute to the Chinese emperor
and the latter investing the leader of the former with kingship. But, from
early on in the negotiations, the Ming government decided not to allow
Japan to bring tribute to China. This was mainly because it feared that this
might lead to full-blown trade with Japan. As far as Ming China was concerned, Japan remained a powerful commercial country and a trading relationship with it could well result in an array of problems related to
coastal defence and social order.
According to the agreement between Shen Weijing and Konishi
Yukinaga, in the fifth month of 1593, Song Yingchang, the Chinese
commissioner of war, dispatched envoys (Xie Yongzi and Xu Iguan) to
Japan. With regard to this, Hawley states: [Li Rusong] simply pulled two
officers from his staff, Xu Yihuan and Xie Yonsu, dressed them up in the
robes of high officials, and sent them back to Seoul with Shen.17 Hawleys inaccuracy extends not only to how the Chinese envoys were set up
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but also to their names. Before dispatching these envoys, Song tried to
dissuade Korea from insisting that China launch a military strike against
Japan. In doing so he made three points: (1) Japan had already asked for
forgiveness after the defeat at Pyngyang, and, given this, it would not
be appropriate to attack it; (2) the Ming troops stationed in Korea were
depleted and exhausted, and reinforcements from China were not viable;
and (3) even though the Japanese were Koreas sworn enemies, to China
they were simply outer barbarians pleading for surrender.18 King Snjo
was particularly angry about Chinas intention to invest Hideyoshi as the
king of Japan. 19 With regard to the envoys dispatched to Japan, Song
Yingchang hoped this would result in having Hideyoshi surrender to the
Ming emperor, accept Chinas offer of the kingship of Japan, and thus
bring an end to the Imjin War.
The Chinese envoys, who led an entourage of about one hundred attendants, arrived in Nagoya, and Hideyoshi treated them well. Negotiations for terms of peace between the Chinese envoys and their Japanese
counterparts followed. But the discussion did not proceed well, and the
envoys eventually had to leave Japan without success. Right after they
departed from Nagoya for Pusan, Hideyoshi handed down what is commonly known as the seven conditions for truce to his key officials, including Konishi Yukinaga. These were straightforward and included: (1)
A daughter of the Great Ming emperor will be greeted and made Japans
consort; (2) both official and commercial ships will come and go between
the two countries; and (3) four provinces and the capital city of Chosn
will be returned to the king of Chosn (i.e., the four southern provinces of
Korea will be annexed to Japan).20
The first condition deserves particular attention. At the time, the Japanese emperor (Goyzei), who was married and had a consort, had not
indicated that he wanted to have a woman from the Chinese imperial family as a consort. As far as Hideyoshi was concerned, what the first condition meant was this: China was to send him a daughter of the Chinese
emperor as a hostage, and, once she arrived in Japan, she would in all
likelihood be made a concubine of the Japanese emperor. The point is that
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Hideyoshi did not show any interest whatsoever in having the Ming emperor invest him as the king of Japan. So, did Hideyoshi seek to have the
Ming emperor invest him as king? Or did he ask for Chinas forgiveness,
as Song Yingchang implied?
Before the Chinese envoys crossed over to Nagaya, Hideyoshi had received a report from his field generals in Korea: After the previous battle
and attack on the fortress, the chief Chinese commander has delivered
words of apology or wabigoto Today on the seventeenth day [of the
fourth month], two envoys from China who would cross to Japan have
arrived [in Hansng (Hanseong), the Korean capital] in order to deliver an
apology [to Japan].21 Regarding the report on the Chinese apologies
that was delivered to Nagoya, according to Ishida Masazumi, who forwarded it to his overlord, the Taik-sama [Hideyoshi] was very
pleased.22 At this time, despite the fact that all Japanese troops had been
evacuated to the south of the Korean peninsula, Hideyoshi decided to
presume that China was offering to surrender to Japan and that its emissaries were on their way to Nagoya with the appropriate apologies. In
theory, it makes sense that Hideyoshi, as the self-proclaimed victor of the
war and according to the martial conventions that he had practiced all his
life, would demand that China send an imperial hostage as evidence of its
surrender and that Korea, where the victorious war had been executed,
cede territory.
Upon arriving in Nagoya, the Chinese envoys conducted a series of negotiations with their Japanese counterparts. However, their peace talks,
which were premised on Japans surrender and subjugation to Chinese
sovereignty, had nowhere to go. It is highly probable that the Chinese
envoys came to learn what was in Hideyoshis mind, but they were not
officially informed of it during their stay in Nagoya. Hideyoshi did not
deliver his seven conditions for peace to his officials until the Chinese
envoys had left Japan. Nevertheless, according to Hawley: The two Chinese envoys found these seven demands appallingly presumptuous
Konishi and his colleagues did their best to soothe the irate envoys, pointing out that these seven conditions were not a list of intractable demands,
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and this something should come from Korea, where all military action
had taken place. As far as Hideyoshi was concerned, a piece of investiture paper and a wardrobe delivered by China did not mean much -- except perhaps that Ming China was now abandoning the business of war in
Korea.
With regard to the ceremony of investiture held at Osaka Castle, Hawley says that, when the Wanli emperors rescript was read: In a towering
rage, he tore off his Chinese robes and threw his crown to the floor
Hideyoshis initial reaction was by all accounts so extreme that for a moment the very lives of the Chinese and Korean envoys were in danger.31
This is a story that was fabricated way after the fact. Undeterred, Hawley
goes on to say that, when the Ming envoys were waiting in Nagoya for
the kind of weather that would allow them to cross back to Pusan:
Hideyoshi came to accept that there was little to be gained by sending
the envoys away in such a brusque manner and resuming his quarrel with
China. A messenger was therefore sent after the retreating delegation
bearing presents and a note from Hideyoshi stating that he had no argument with Beijing. While he regarded the offer of investiture as an insult,
the document read, I intend to put up with it.32 Again, this simply did
not happen.
Swope offers a similar account of what occurred when Wanlis rescript
of investiture was delivered: Finally, Hideyoshi retreated to the mountains and asked the monk Saish Shotai to read the letter of investiture
from Wanli. Konishi Yukinaga secretly told the monk the true contents of
the letter and begged him to alter it to avoid Hideyoshis fury. Saish refused to entertain Konishis request, and he translated the letter accurately,
ending with the fateful words, We hereby invest you king of Japan.
Hideyoshi was livid when he heard the letter and its demeaning language.
He is alleged to have exclaimed: Why would I want to be king of Japan?
Yukinaga said the Ming emperor was going to make me ruler of the Ming.
I want to mobilize troops immediately.33 Truly entertaining, but, unfortunately, not true.
In the end, Swope concludes: In hindsight, it is astonishing that
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Hideyoshi could really have been unaware of what was transpiring, and if
so, this was truly one of the great diplomatic blunders of history.34 After
turning the truce negotiations between Ming China and Japan into an anecdote depicting monumental stupidity, Swope attributes this -- one of
the great diplomatic blunders of history -- to the chief negotiators of both
countries: The attempt to conceal the truth of Ming terms from
Hideyoshi by Konishi and Shen was ill conceived and poorly executed.35
Also not true.
The two books authored by Hawley and Swope, respectively, contain
countless factual errors, fictionalized accounts, and outright fabrications,
all stemming from the quality of the sources upon which they relied. Almost every page of these two books contains some form of misinformation. The authors fail to rely upon firm empirical data on the Imjin
War. Having failed in this most basic and fundamental task, their analyses
could not help but be fatally flawed. It is as though they decided to critique Shakespeares Richard III (which is believed to have been written in
1592), without actually reading it, by choosing, instead, to rely on secondhand comments, anecdotes, and gossip, to which they cavalierly add their
own guesswork.
Epilogue
Research on the Imjin War (or on anything else, for that matter) requires, first and foremost, access to solid empirical data. Without this, any
analysis will be flawed. It is, of course, up to the author to what extent she
or he chooses to detail empirical data, but in all cases, these data should
be winnowed, verified, and cross-referenced through the use of reliable
primary sources.
A lot of the data used by Hawley and Swope was collected from secondary works or dubious primary sources -- sources that were written
long after the war and that were tailored for various purposes.36 The danger of relying on such sources is twofold. First, either consciously or un-
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and linguistic skill. Among these sources, the most essential are the Snjo
sillok (Korea), the Hideyoshi documents (Japan), and the Shenzhong shilu
(China). Without a thorough examination of these basic sources, research
on the Imjin War cannot be anything but partial and amateurish.
Once one has established a firm empirical base, one can proceed to analyze the Imjin War from various angles. Scholars in the field have already
produced a large number of books, articles, and multimedia works, mostly
in Korean, Japanese, and Chinese. Familiarizing oneself with these
achievements is also crucial. In order to provide an in-depth contextual
analysis of the war, it is also important to fully grasp the dynamics of
politics, economics, and culture in Chosn Korea, Japan, and Ming China.
And, in order to adequately assess the geography, battle sites, fortresses,
transport routes, and local towns and villages that, in one manner or another, have preserved the legacies of the war, it is necessary to conduct
fieldwork. Failing to do this will result in unacceptable errors or wild
guesses (both of which are frequently encountered in Hawleys and
Swopes respective books). Once, and only once, one has conducted all
these basic tasks will it be time to turn ones attention to writing a coherent analysis of the Imjin War.
Works Cited
Hara Tomitar monjo [, Hara Tomitar Documents]
Hawley, Samuel. The Imjin War: Japans Sixteenth-Century Invasion of
Korea and Attempt to Conquer China. Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 2005.
Hwang Sin []. Ilbon wanghwan ilgi [, The Diary of a
Visit to Japan] , 1596.
Kagoshimaken ishin shiry hensanjo [], ed.
Kagoshimaken shiry kyki zatsuroku khen 2[
] 2. Kagoshima: Kagoshimaken ishin shiry hensanjo.
[Kagoshima Prefecture Documents: The Latter Part of Old and
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Notes :
1 For details, see Yi Kyehwang, Hanguk kwa Ilbon hakkye i Imjin Waeran
wninnon e taehay, in Tong Asia segye wa Imjin Waeran, ed. Han-Il
kwangye sa yngu nonjip pynchan wiwnhoe (Seoul: Kyngin
Munhwasa, 2010), 39-79.
2 Samuel Hawley, The Imjin War: Japans Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea
and Attempt to Conquer China (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch,
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2005), viiii.
3 Ibid., 642.
4 Miki Seiichir, Toyotomi Hideyoshi monjo mokuroku (Nagoya: Nagoya
daigaku bungakubu kokushigaku kenkyshitsu, 1989), 76-115.
5 Kenneth M. Swope, A Dragons Head and a Serpents Tail: Ming China and
the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598 (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2009), 89.
6 For details, see Peter Lee, trans., The Record of the Black Dragon Year (Seoul:
Institute of Korean Culture, Korea University, and Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, 2000), 15-18.
7 Swope, 15.
8 Ibid., 22.
9 Ibid., 297.
10 Ibid., 65.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 66.
13 Ibid., 298.
14 Ibid.
15 For example, see Snjo sillok, 36:667b-668a (1593/3/20).
16 For apt accounts of factional infighting at the Ming court, see Miki Satoshi,
Banreki hwa-k, so no ichi: Banreki nijni-nen go-gatsu no hk chshi o
megutte, Hokkaid daigaku bungaku kenkyka kiy 109 (February 2003), 5072; ____, Banreki hwa-k, so no ni: Banreki nijyo-nen go-gatsu no kuky
kad kaigi o megutte, Hokkaid daigaku bungaku kenkyka kiy 113 (July
2004), 11-39; Ono Kazuko, Minki dsha k: Trint to fukusha (Kyoto:
Dhsha shuppan, 1996), 116-133.
17 Hawley, 341.
18 Snjo sillok, 37:678a (1593/4/1).
19 Snjo sillok, 37:681a (1593/4/3).
20 See Nanzen kyki (Naikaku bunkoz).
21 See Hara Tomitar monjo.
22 No. 1112 in Kagoshimaken ishin shiry hensanjo, ed. Kagoshimaken shiry
kyki zatsuroku khen 2 (Kagoshima: Kagoshimaken ishin shiry hensanjo,
1982).
23 Hawley, 365-366.
24 Ibid., 369.
78
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
Ibid.
Swope, 188.
Shenzong shilu, 270:5022
Hawley, p406.
Kuwano Eiji Tong-Asia segye wa Bunroku-Keich i yk: Chosn, Yugu,
Ilbon e isss Tae-Myng oegyo i kanchm es, in Che 2 ki Han-Il yksa
kongdong yngu pogos: che 3 kwn che 2 pun kwa Ilbon-pyn, ed. Han-Il
yksa kongdong yngu wiwnhoe (Seoul: Han-Il yksa kongdong yngu
wiwnhoe, 2000), 92.
These primary sources include: Keitetsu Genso, Sensk; Hwang Sin, Ilbon
wanghwan ilgi (entries on the third, sixth, and eighth days of the ninth month
of 1596); and Snjo sillok, 83:127a (1596/12/7).
Hawley, 419.
Ibid., 420.
Swope, 221.
Ibid., 222.
Ibid., 226.
In the case of Hawley, it is almost impossible to comment on his examination
of primary sources simply because, for empirical data, he relies almost entirely
on English secondary works and, occasionally, on English translations of a few
documents and popular stories about the war. In the case of Swope, the Japanese materials that he examines as primary sources number only three (Chsen
no eki, Chsen seibatsuki, and Seikan iryaku), none of which Japanese historians recognize as reliable. See Swope, 313-314.
Snjo sillok, 59:417a (1595/1/8).
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<Abstract>
Nam-lin Hur
The Imjin War has been a popular topic of research in Korea, Japan and China.
To date, hundreds of books and thousands of journal articles and book chapters
have been written on this international conflict. In contrast, the overall number of
works in English remains miniscule. In this article, Hur introduces a list of major
English-language books and articles on the Imjin War and proceeds to offer critical comments on the most representative works to date -- Samuel Hawleys The
Imjin War: Japans Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer
China and Kenneth Swopes A Dragons Head and a Serpents Tail: Ming China
and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598. In order to further illustrate a
range of limits and problems found in these two books, Hur takes up some key
issues pertaining to truce negotiations in the Imjin War and reviews how these are
treated by Hawley and Swope, respectively. Hur points out that the two books
contain countless factual errors and a flood of false data, all stemming from the
quality of the sources upon which they relied. As a result, their analyses are fatally
flawed or skewed. Given that primary sources on the Imjin War are plentiful and
that they come in different languages, Hur suggests that it would be a challenge to
establish a firm base of empirical data, but that, without accomplishing this fundamental task, it would be impossible to produce a high-quality analysis of the
Imjin War.
Key words: monograph, limits and problems, truce negotiation, primary source,
cross-referencing
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Samuel Hawley The Imjin War: Japans Sixteenth-Century
Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China Kenneth Swope A
Dragons Head and a Serpents Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian
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