PEOPLE vs MATEO

FACTS:
> Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts
can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly,
the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court
of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as
the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire
records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.
> On October 30, 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, were filed
against appellant Efren Mateo. The lower court found Mateo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General,
however, assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal
of the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court
by virtue of the express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death?
RULING:
NO. The case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records are ordered to be
forwarded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.

and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior
determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would
minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm
the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, it could then render
judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant,
refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the
Supreme Court for its final disposition.

PEOPLE VS ABON
FACTS:
> Accused who is the father of the victim, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge on the
person of AAA (her daughter), against her will.
> AAA was physically examined and the findings showed that her hymen was
already ruptured and she had old lacerations inflicted approximately three months
before the date of the examination.
> When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
During the trial, he interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. Furthermore, he
stated that AAA filed the case against him for the reason that he used to whip her
very hard on the buttocks with a yard-long piece of wood.
> RTC sentenced [accused-appellant] to suffer death penalty.
> Due to the penalty imposed, the case was forwarded to this Court for automatic
review, however, in accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo, this Court,
transferred this case to the CA for intermediate review.
> The CA affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction.
ISSUE:

Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or
arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for
which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed).

Whether or not CA erred in taking cognizance of the intermediate appeal of

criminal case sentenced to suffer death penalty?

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme

Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate
review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise
and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before
the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all
possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused,

NO. An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered

by bringing it to a higher court authority. It is not a right but a mere statutory privilege
to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Recent developments in criminal law and jurisprudence have brought about changes
in the rules on appeal, specifically in cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

RULING:

However, Mateo modified these rules by providing an intermediate review of the

cases by the CA where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment,
or death. Pursuant to Mateo's ruling, the Court issued A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC 2004-1012, amending the pertinent rules governing review of death penalty cases, thus:
The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial
Court is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is
imposed for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of
the same occurrence that gave rise to the more, serious offense for which the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be
by notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with paragraph (a)
of this Rule.

> Plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a
Comment opposing accused-appellant Rochas Motion to Withdraw Appeal, since It
is well-settled that in cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, appeal
in criminal cases to this Honorable Court is a matter of right. A review of the trial
courts judgment of conviction is automatic and does not depend on the whims of the
convicted felon. It is mandatory and leaves the reviewing court without any option.
Plaintiff-appellee also claims that accused-appellant Rochas motion is actually a
scheme to evade the supreme penalty of reclusion perpetua
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a mandatory review on appeal to the SC?

Also affecting the rules on appeal is the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines, which took
effect on June 29, 2006. Under Sec. 2 of RA 9346, the imposition of the death
penalty is prohibited, and in lieu thereof, it imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC); or life imprisonment, when the law violated does not
make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC. Consequently, in the
provisions of the Rules of Court on appeals, death penalty cases are no longer
operational.

PEOPLE vs ROCHA
FACTS:
> The above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with several others, all
armed with high power (sic) guns, with intent to gain and by means of violence and
intimidation against person (sic), did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
> The said accused pursuant to their conspiracy and with intent to kill two security
guards, thereby inflicting upon them serious and mortal wounds which were the
immediate cause of their death.
> RTC promulgated its Decision, herein accused-appellants guilty of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
> Accused-appellants appealed to this Court, however, they filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal, which was granted by this Court.
> Pursuant to the Decision of this Court in People v. Mateo, we transferred the case
to the Court of Appeals.
> Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, affirming with clarification the Decision
of the RTC.
> Accused-appellant Rocha, having been detained for more than seventeen years,
filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal, stating that he intends to apply for parole.

RULING:
NO. The confusion in the case at bar seems to stem from the effects of the
Decision of this Court in People v. Mateo.
We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that cases where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are subject to the mandatory review of this
Court. In Mateo, these cases were grouped together with death penalty cases
because, prior to Mateo, it was this Court which had jurisdiction to directly review
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and death penalty cases alike. The mode of
review, however, was different. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases
were brought before this Court via a notice of appeal, while death penalty cases
were reviewed by this Court on automatic review.
Court promptly caused the amendment of the foregoing provisions, but retained the
distinction of requiring a notice of appeal for reclusion perpetua and life
imprisonment cases and automatically reviewing death penalty cases.
Neither does the Constitution require a mandatory review by this Court of cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Since the case of accused-appellants is not subject to the mandatory review of this
Court, the rule that neither the accused nor the courts can waive a mandatory review
is not applicable. Consequently, accused-appellants separate motions to withdraw
appeal may be validly granted.
The granting of a Motion to Withdraw Appeal is addressed to the sound discretion of
the Court. In the case at bar, we see no reason to deny accused-appellants Motion
to Withdraw Appeal. Plaintiff-appellees allegation that the Motion was for the
purpose of evading the penalty of reclusion perpetua and trifling with our judicial
system is unsubstantiated, as the Court of Appeals imposition of reclusion perpetua,

unlike an imposition of the death penalty, may be entered by said appellate court
even without another review by this Court. Neither should we deny the Motions just
because of accused-appellants intention to apply for executive clemency, since the
granting of such executive clemency is within the prerogative of the Executive
Department, and not of this Court.

TABUJARA vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
> Respondent Daisy Dadivas-Afable simultaneously filed two criminal complaints
against petitioners for Grave Coercion and Trespass to Dwelling.
> Petitioners filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit.
> Petitioners denied the allegations against them. They argued that they went to the
house of respondent to thresh out matters regarding some missing pieces of jewelry.
Respondent was a former employee of Miladay Jewels, Inc., a company owned by
the Dayrits and who was then being administratively investigated in connection with
missing jewelries. Despite several summons to appear, respondent went on AWOL.
> MTC dismissed the complaints for lack of probable cause.
> Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. MTC reversed his earlier findings
of lack of probable cause. This time, he found probable cause to hold petitioners for
trial and to issue warrants of arrest.
> Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that the alleged affidavit of
Mauro V. de Lara on which the court a quo based its findings of probable cause was
hearsay because it was not sworn before the Judge; did not personally appear
before the investigating judge during preliminary investigation.
> Petitioners moved for clarificatory hearings. However, before the court a quo could
render a resolution based on said clarificatory hearings, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari before the Regional Trial Court with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners argued that the court
a quo gravely abused its discretion in issuing said Orders finding probable cause
and ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest based solely on the unsworn
statement
> RTC issued an Order granting a 72-hour temporary restraining order and enjoining
the Municipal Trial Court from proceeding with the prosecution of petitioners in
Criminal Case.
> RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition for annulment of the 2 May 2000
and 14 July 2000 Orders of the Municipal Trial Court.
> Petitioners filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals asserting that
the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion in basing its findings of probable
cause and ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest solely on the unsworn
statement.
> Court of Appeals denied the petition on the ground that petitioners resorted to the
wrong mode of appeal; i.e., instead of an ordinary appeal, petitioners filed a petition

for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CS erred in dismissing the petition for the ground that
petitioners resorted to the wrong mode of appeal?

RULING:
YES. It is only when the decision of the RTC was rendered in the exercise
of appellate jurisdiction would a petition for review under Rule 42 be proper.
We do not agree in the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals.
The present controversy involved petitioners sacrosanct right to liberty, which is
protected by the Constitution. No person should be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.
While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate
the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of the dockets of the courts is a
laudable objective, it nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial
justice.
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent
procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and that
strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far
better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse
and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a
false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if
not a miscarriage of justice.
In those rare cases to which we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there
always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our
judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance
between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every
litigant is given the full opportunity for a just and proper disposition of his cause.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. Time and again, we have consistently held that rules
must not be applied so rigidly as to override substantial justice.

The Court of Appeals should have looked beyond the alleged technicalities to open
the way for the resolution of the substantive issues in the instance case. The Court
of Appeals, thus, erred in dismissing petitioners petition for review. By dismissing the
said Petition, the Court of Appeals absolutely foreclosed the resolution of all the
substantive issues petitioners were repeatedly attempting to raise before the Court
of Appeals.

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of her jurisdiction in denying the Petition for
Certiorari and petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration on the ground of a
prejudicial question pursuant to the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the prevailing
jurisprudence?
RULING:
NO. We find the instant petition to be without merit.

MAGESTRADO vs PEOPLE
FACTS:
> Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint[3] for perjury against
petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
> After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the
Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for perjury
against petitioner.
> petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial
question. Petitioner alleged that Civil Case for recovery of a sum of money pending
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery
of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City, must be resolved
first before Criminal Case may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are
similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.
> MeTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion since issues raised
in the civil actions is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
> Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court, with a prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before
the RTC of Quezon City, on the ground that MeTC Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to
suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case.
> RTC dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and holds that there is no prejudicial question involved as to
warrant the suspension of the criminal action to await the outcome of the civil cases.
> Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the
Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case and petitioners motion to suspend the
proceedings in Criminal Case.
> Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition.

ISSUE:

The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the proper remedy which petitioner
should have availed himself of before the Court of Appeals: an ordinary appeal or a
petition for certiorari.
We hold that the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioners Petition for
Certiorari.
The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not only because RTC did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners Petition for
Certiorari in Civil Case but also because RTC Order of dismissal was a final order
from which petitioners should have appealed in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by the Revised Rules of Court to be appealable. The manner of
appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving
a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such
cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy available to petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was
adequate to deal with any question whether of fact or of law, whether of error of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of judgment which the trial court
might have committed. But petitioners instead filed a special civil action for certiorari.

We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only when there
is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
[19] Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment
despite the availability of that remedy,[20] certiorari not being a substitute for lost
appeal.
As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have repeatedly emphasized
that the perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal
renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is founded upon
the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere
statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of
technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. While every
litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination
of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal
within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional
problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal.
As petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, RTC dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari
had long become final and executory.
For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly denied outright the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioner before it.

CONSTANTINO vs SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
> Constantino, in his capacity as mayor, together with his co-accused Lindong, was
charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 otherwise known as The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.
> Accused willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Lease Agreement for the
rental of various heavy equipments (sic) for a period of six (6) years for and in
consideration of the sum of PESOS. In the aggregate sum of PESOS: TWO
MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND NINETY and 91/100
(P2,177,090.91), unwarranted benefits and advantage and causing undue injury to
the government.
> Both accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.
> Finding that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
Constantino and Lindong of the offense as charged, the Sandiganbayan rendered
the assailed decision sentencing them both GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
> It appears that during trial, both accused were represented by the same counsel.
However, after judgment was rendered against them, Constantino and Lindong filed
separate appeals to the Supreme Court which have taken disparate routes. During
the pendency of his present appeal, Constantino passed away. Lindong himself
likewise filed a petition for review on certiorari to seek a reversal of the
Sandiganbayan decision finding him guilty as Constantinos co-conspirator.
> With the demise of Constantino during the pendency of his appeal, the same
should normally be regarded as moot and academic following the norm that the
death of the accused marks the extinction of his criminal liability.26 However, the
present two petitions are so intertwined that the absolution of Constantino is
ultimately determinative of the absolution of Lindong. Indeed, the exoneration of
Constantino will necessarily signify the injustice of carrying out the penalty imposed
on Lindong. Thus, the Court in this instance has to ascertain the merits of
Constantinos appeal to prevent a developing miscarriage of justice against Lindong.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extinction of criminal liability of the principal accused will
also be in favor of the co-accused though they have applied for appeal separately?
RULING:
YES. Petitioner Constantino impugned his conviction and asserted that the
Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him based on its finding that he violated Resolution No. 21
by entering into a "Lease Agreement" with the Norlovanian Corporation and for his failure to

sign the accompanying "Undertaking." Likewise, he argued that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution was insufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in his
favor.
Constantinos petition would have been granted and he would have been absolved of criminal
liability had he been still alive today.
Undoubtedly, the standard of culpability imposed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 is quite high
which, in this case, was not hurdled by the evidence presented against Constantino. Verily,
the prosecution failed to satisfy the requisite proof to demonstrate Constantinos guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. While Constantino should have exercised more prudence when he
transacted with Norlovanian Corporation, he could not however be held liable for "gross
inexcusable negligence" as contemplated in R.A. No. 3019.
In light of the foregoing facts, which appear to the Court to be quite apparent on the record, it
is difficult to perceive how the Office of the Ombudsman could have arrived at a conclusion of
any wrongdoing by the Mayor in relation to the transaction in question. It is difficult to see how
the transaction between the Mayor and Norlovanian Corporation entered into pursuant to
Resolution No. 21 and tacitly accepted and approved by the town Council through its
Resolution No. 38 could be deemed an infringement of the same Resolution No. 21. In
truth, an examination of the pertinent writings (the resolution, the two (2) instruments
constituting the negotiated contract, and the certificate of delivery) unavoidably confirms their
integrity and congruity. It is in fine, difficult to see how those pertinent written instrument, could
establish a prima facie case to warrant the preventive suspension of Mayor Constantino. A
person with the most elementary grasp of the English language would, from merely scanning
those material documents, at once realize that the Mayor had done nothing but carry out the
expressed wishes of the Sangguniang Bayan.
The Court is thus satisfied that it was in fact the Councils intention, which it expressed in clear
language, to confer on the Mayor ample discretion to execute a "negotiated contract" with any
interested party, without regard to any official acts of the Council prior to Resolution No. 21.

The virtual acquittal of Constantino inevitably puts a welcome end to the tribulations
of Lindong. Thus, we grant the petition.
Hence, we now have before us an incongruous situation where execution of
judgment has been entered against a private person accused with conspiring with a
public officer for violation of the anti-graft law, but at the same time said public officer
would unequivocably be entitled to exoneration had he not died in the meantime.
Yet, it is utterly illogical to absolve Constantino who entered into the contract on
behalf of the government and send the private person to prison.
It is therefore apparent that in light of the prevailing milieu in the instant case, we
cannot sustain the execution of judgment against Lindong. The reversal of the
decision of the Sandiganbayan makes it legally absurd to execute any such
judgment against him.
In fact, the Court has at various times applied the foregoing provision without regard
to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was

favorable to him. Therefore, we cannot find a reason to treat Lindong differently,

especially so in this case where the public officer accused of violating the anti-graft
law has been acquitted, and the appeal by Lindong was dismissed on a technicality.

VILLEGAS vs CA
FACTS:
> an information for libel was filed by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila with the then
Court of First Instance of Manila against Villegas who denied the charge.
> Villegas left for the United States where he stayed until his death. Nevertheless, trial
proceeded on absentia by the time of his death the, the prosecution had already rested
its case Two months after notice of his death, the court issued an order dismissing the
criminal aspect of the case but reserving the right to resolve its civil aspect.
> Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial court's judgment modified only
with respect to the award of damages which was reduced to P2 million.
> The heirs of Villegas (the Heirs), through their father's counsel appealed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused before final judgment extinguish his
civil liability?
RULING:
NO. The rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on
whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict . Stated
differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it
were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
"The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator o(f) the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based.
The source of Villegas' civil liability in the present case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly
committed. Yet, this act could also be deemed a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 9
in relation to Article 1157 of the Civil Code. If the Court ruled in Bayotas that the death of an
accused during the pendency of his appeal extinguishes not only his criminal but also his civil
liability unless the latter can be predicated on a source of obligation other than the act or
omission complained of, with more reason should it apply to the case at bar where the
accused died shortly after the prosecution had rested its case and before he was able to
submit his memorandum and all this before any decision could even be reached by the trial
court.

Hence, logically, the court a quo should have dismissed both actions against Vilegas which
dismissal will not, however, bar Raquiza as the private offended party from pursuing his claim
for damages against the executor or administrator of the former's estate, notwitnstanding the
fact that he did not reserve the right to institute a civil separate civil action based on Article 33
of the Civil Code.

PEOPLE vs AYOCHOK
FACTS:
> The above-named accused, being then armed with a gun, with intent to kill and
with evident premeditation and by means of treachery and with cruelty by
deliberately and inhumanly outraging at the victim, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot SPO1 CLAUDIO CALIGTAN y
NGODO.
> When arraigned, Ayochok pleaded not guilty.
> Court finds the accused Jaime Ayochok guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Murder.
> The case was directly elevated to us for automatic review, however, pursuant to
our decision in People v. Mateo, it was transferred to the Court of Appeals.
> Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the RTC.
> Ayochok filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision of the Court
of Appeals. Subsequently, however, Ayochok filed a Motion to Withdraw Motion for
Reconsideration with Notice of Appeal since he believed there was no chance that
the appellate court would reverse itself, and prayed that the case already be
forwarded to us instead. Court of Appeals denied Ayochoks Motion to Withdraw
Motion for Reconsideration with Notice of Appeal.
> Ayochok, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals
conveying his intention to appeal to us the Decision.
> Director for Prisons and Security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed us that
Ayochok had died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal extinguished not
only his criminal liability but also his civil liability?
RULING:
YES. During the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his criminal liability
for the crime of murder committed against Senior Police Officer 1 Claudio N.
Caligtan, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime.

The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contract
e) Quasi-delicts
Clearly, in view of a supervening event, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on
Ayochoks appeal. Whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged has become
irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and our
disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Ayochok had incurred any criminal liability, it
was totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because Ayochoks appeal was still
pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him when he
died, his civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto, was
likewise extinguished by his death.

PEOPLE VS ASIS
FACTS:
> Respondent Jaime Abordo (Abordo) was riding his motorcycle on his way home.
He was met by private complainants. An altercation ensued between them. Abordo
shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen.
Montes escaped unhurt.
> Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder and one (1) count of
frustrated murder.
> The trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, The RTC held
Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries.
> All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil aspect. They
filed a supplemental motion to include moral damages.
> Acting on Chief State Prosecutor, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 before the CA based on the following grounds; RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD NO INTENT TO
KILL, IN HOLDING HIM GUILTY OF ONLY SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND
LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES INSTEAD OF FRUSTRATED MURDER
AND ATTEMPTED MURDER.
> The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition outright. According to
the appellate court, the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As
the State was questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by

the trial court, the remedy should have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for
certiorari placed the accused in double jeopardy.
> OSG comes to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari?

RULING:

judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued
without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double
jeopardy.
Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation
of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said
findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed
to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie.
Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed before it by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. There is,
however, no need for the remand of the case to the CA as the petition for certiorari,
on its face, cannot be given due course.

YES. We find that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition
outright.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict
of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We
adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable.[8] The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases,[9] the
Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused
in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases.
Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of
exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an
original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double
jeopardy is not violated. [Emphases supplied]
In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordo's acquittal was improper. Since appeal
could not be taken without violating Abordo's constitutionally guaranteed right
against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a serious error by the CA
to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy.
The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal,
the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the
trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice."[13] The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[14] presents an
instructive exception to the rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution
has been denied due process of law. "The rationale behind this exception is that a

MERCIALES vs CA
FACTS:
> Criminal Cas, for rape with homicide, in connection with the death of one Maritess
Ricafort Merciales, were filed against the private respondents before the Regional
Trial Court.
> During the trial, after presenting seven witnesses, the public prosecutor filed a
motion for the discharge of accused Joselito Nuada, in order that he may be utilized
as a state witness. However, the prosecution contended that it was not required to
present evidence to warrant the discharge of accused Nuada, since the latter had
already been admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the Department of
Justice. Consequently, the respondent judge denied the motion for discharge, for
failure of the prosecution to present evidence.
> The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari [G.R. No. 113273-78] before the
Supreme Court, questioning the respondent judge's denial of the motion to
discharge the accused.
> Herein private respondents filed a motion to set the case for hearing, invoking their
constitutional right to speedy trial. The respondent judge granted the motion and set
the case for hearing.
> Trial court issued the assailed for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, all the accused in all these cases are hereby
ACQUITTED and the cases filed against them are hereby DISMISSED.
> Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother of the victim in the said criminal
cases, filed before the respondent Court of Appeals a petition to annul the foregoing
Order of the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether not the CA erred in dismissing the petition on appeal for nullifying
the trials court decision for acquittal?

Lack of jurisdiction is one of the grounds for the annulment by the Court of Appeals
of judgments or final orders and resolutions of Regional Trial Courts. Hence, the
remedy taken by petitioner before the Court of Appeals was correct.

RULING:

MUPAS vs PEOPLE

YES. In the case at bar, the public prosecutor knew that he had not
presented sufficient evidence to convict the accused. Yet, despite repeated moves
by the accused for the trial court to continue hearing the case, he deliberately failed
to present an available witness and thereby allowed the court to declare that the
prosecution has rested its case. In this sense, he was remiss in his duty to protect
the interest of the offended parties. More specifically, the public prosecutor in this
case was guilty of blatant error and abuse of discretion, thereby causing prejudice to
the offended party. Indeed, the family of the deceased victim, Maritess Merciales,
could do nothing during the proceedings, having entrusted the conduct of the case in
the hands of the said prosecutor. All they could do was helplessly watch as the
public prosecutor, who was under legal obligation to pursue the action on their
behalf, renege on that obligation and refuse to perform his sworn duty.

FACTS:

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court.
Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due
process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a
quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is
as if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double
jeopardy.
By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not
violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
It is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following
elements concur:

(1) the accused are charged under a complaint or information sufficient in

form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction;
(3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are
convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their consent.
Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be
placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had
acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.

> Private petitioner Carmelita F. Zafra (petitioner Zafra) was Supply Officer V of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). On 14 November 1998,
she arranged for the withdrawal for replacement, of two hundred (200) cartons of
Bear Brand Powdered Milk that were nearing their expiry date. She made the
arrangement for their withdrawal through DSWD personnel.
> Petitioner Zafra instructed Marcelina Beltran to have someone from the DSWD
Property Division withdraw the 200 cartons of milk from the DSWD, however, no one
from the Property Division arrived to pick up the milk cases. Instead, three
unidentified persons on board a four-wheeler truck came and hauled the 200 cases
of milk. Turns out to be the sister of Zafra. The 200 cases of milk withdrawn by
Saclayan and her unidentified companions were valued at three hundred six
thousand seven hundred thirty-six pesos.
> An internal investigation was conducted by the DSWD on the persons involved in
the loss of the milk cases. The committee report dismissed petitioner Zafra and her
co-employees Beltran and Roga, whom they implicated in the loss of the milk cases.
The committee found substantial evidence to hold petitioner Zafra guilty of
dishonesty and negligence of duty.
> They appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission), while absolving
petitioner Zafra of the charge of dishonesty, found her guilty of simple neglect.
> Petitioner Zafra, Beltran and Roga were charged with malversation, as amended.
> Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty to the charges.
> After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner Zafra filed a Motion for Demurrer to
Evidence. She alleged therein that the prosecution failed to present proof that she
and her co-accused had wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously caused the withdrawal of
the 200 cases of Bear Brand Powdered Milk and appropriated these for themselves
to the prejudice of DSWD. Thus, she concluded that the prosecution failed to
establish the elements of the crime of malversation.
> public respondent Judge Mupas issued an Order granting the demurrer to
evidence of petitioner Zafra. Public respondent ruled that, after evaluating the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, he found them substantially
insufficient to warrant the conviction of petitioner Zafra under the charges filed
against her by the Ombudsman.
> People filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the lower
courts grant of petitioner Zafras demurrer to evidence, resulting in her acquittal.
> CA reversed the order of trial court.

BANGAYAN vs GO-BANGAYAN

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the acquittal order of the trial court
by reason of demurrer of evidence?
RULING:
NO. We AFFIRM the entire ruling of the Court of Appeals.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, particularly the issues proffered
by petitioner, we adopt the findings of the appellate court. We find no reversible error
in the ruling which is eloquently supported by existing jurisprudence.
We agree with the CAs disquisition that the lower courts grant of the demurrer to
evidence of petitioner Zafra was attended by grave abuse of discretion. The
prosecutions evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed
against her for her inexcusable negligence, subject to the defense that she may
present in the course of a full-blown trial. The lower court improperly examined the
prosecutions evidence in the light of only one mode of committing the crimes
charged; that is, through positive acts. The appellate court correctly concluded that
the crime of malversation may be committed either through a positive act of
misappropriation of public funds or passively through negligence by allowing another
to commit such misappropriation.
As a general rule, an order granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence amounts to
an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would
not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court
ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused demurrer
to evidence, its judgment is considered void.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court when it granted the accused demurrer to evidence, we deem its
consequent order of acquittal void.

FACTS:
> This case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Sally GoBangayan (Sally Go) accusing petitioners Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin, Jr.)
and Resally de Asis Delfin (Resally) of having committed the crime of bigamy.
> The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City conducted a preliminary investigation and
thereafter issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for bigamy
against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for having contracted a marriage despite knowing
fully well that he was still legally married to Sally Go. The information was duly filed
to the Regional Trial Court.
> After the arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty.
> Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case for
bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient
evidence of his guilt.
> the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for
insufficiency of evidence. It reasoned out that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Benjamin, Jr. used the fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco
Jr., in contracting his marriage with Resally. Corollarily, Resally cannot be convicted
of bigamy because the prosecution failed to establish that Resally married Benjamin,
Jr.
> Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. CA
promulgated its Decision granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case
to the RTC for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners right against double jeopardy was violated by the
CA when it reversed the RTC Order dismissing the criminal case against them?
RULING:
YES. Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present:
(1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is
considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit:
(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence

10

filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested, which

has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an
acquittal.

declared null and void for lack of due process, it must be shown that a party was
deprived of his opportunity to be heard. Sally Go cannot deny that she was given
ample opportunity to present her witnesses and her evidence against petitioners.
Thus, her claim that she was denied due process is unavailing.

(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the

accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial
which is in effect a failure to prosecute.[38]
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking
his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to
make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. For instance,
there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the
presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the information
for insufficiency of evidence;[40] and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time
when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.[41]
In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid
information for the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the
institution of a criminal case against them before the proper court. They pleaded not
guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case was dismissed after
the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial
courts order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed
them in double jeopardy.
As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not
appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be
subject to review only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.
The CA determined that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
ignoring the evidence presented by the prosecution and granting petitioners
demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish by
sufficient evidence the existence of the crime. An examination of the decision of the
trial court, however, yields the conclusion that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on its part. Even if the trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence
against the petitioners, it only committed an error of judgment, and not one of
jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by a petition for certiorari because double
jeopardy had already set in.
As regards Sally Gos assertion that she had been denied due process, an
evaluation of the records of the case proves that nothing can be further from the
truth. Jurisprudence dictates that in order for a decision of the trial court to be

11

SERG'S PRODUCTS, INC., vs PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC

FACTS:
> Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. ("PCI Leasing" for short) filed with the
RTC sum of money, with an application for a writ of replevin.
> Issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize upon an ex-parte application of
PCI Leasing, respondent judge and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI
Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
> The sheriff proceeded to petitioners factory, seized one machinery with [the] word
that he [would] return for the other machineries.
> Petitioners filed a motion for special protective order, praying for a directive for the
sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
> "This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing, on the ground that the properties
[were] still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin.
> Petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable as
defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be
prejudicial to innocent third parties.
> PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these machineries as personal because
the contracts in which the alleged agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham
and farcical.
> The sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the
remaining properties. He was able to take two more, but was prevented by the
workers from taking the rest.
> They went to [the CA] via an original action for certiorari.
> The appellate court held that the subject machines were personal property, and
that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners. It also ruled that the
"words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the
contracting parties."

"ART. 415. The following are immovable property:

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works;
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were
placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were
essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although
each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become
"immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the
industry."16 In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines
are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property
be considered as personal.18After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a
party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact
found therein.
That the machinery used in a factory and essential to the industry, as in the present
case, was a proper subject of a writ of replevin because it was treated as personal
property in a contract.
In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in
question are to be considered as personal property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the
Agreement reads as follows:
It should be stressed, however, that our holding -- that the machines should be
deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar
as the contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the
Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation
characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In any event, there is no showing
that any specific third party would be adversely affected.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said machines are personal, not immovable, property
which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin?
RULING:
YES. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued
for the recovery of personal property only.

12

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs REPUBLIC

FACTS:
> The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land.
> Applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the
Regional Trial Court.
> Claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the
land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his
title.
> To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
> RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for land registration.
> The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
> CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC.
> Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of
the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted
that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession
prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of
possession.
> Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; hence, it
was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court.

RULING:
NO. It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes
property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be
subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared
alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in
particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While
the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not
only of that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is
deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring
welcome closure to the long pestering problem.

ISSUE:
Whether or not for purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed
private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance
with the Civil Code?

13

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE vs.CITY

OF ZAMBOANGA

and the principles of law laid down by this Supreme Court in its main decision of the
present case.

FACTS:

MACASIANO vs DIOKNO

> Appellant City seeks reconsideration of our decision in so far as the latter
declares that Republic Act 3039 is unconstitutional and void in so far as the same
seeks to deprive the Province of Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the 26 lots
situated within the City of Zamboanga, and hereinafter enumerated, without just
compensation, for the reason that said 26 lots are patrimonial property of the old
Province of Zamboanga.
> The movant City contends that the 26 lots aforestated were not patrimonial
property of the former Province of Zamboanga, for the reason that said 26 lots have
always been used for public purposes, such as school sites, playgrounds and
athletic fields for schools.
> To bolster its contention, the City of Zamboanga submitted photographs, plans and
a sworn certification of its City Engineer.
> The motion for reconsideration is vigorously opposed by plaintiff-appellee Province
of Zamboanga del Norte.
> Alternatively, the appellee Province of Zamboanga contends that the 26 lots are
vacant, or that the buildings existing thereon were constructed in bad faith; and that
the said Province has additional evidence to show that most of these properties are
not actually devoted to public use or governmental purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject 26 lands belong to the City of Zamboanga?
RULING:
Considering that both contending parties are actually subdivisions of one
entity, the Republic of the Philippines, so that public interest is involved and
demands that the issues presented be determined speedily without regard to
technicalities, the Court resolved that, in the interest of justice and equity, its main
decision and that of the court below be reconsidered and set aside, in so far as they
affect the twenty-six lots heretofore enumerated, and the monetary indemnities
awarded. Instead, the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for a new
trial, wherein the parties shall be given opportunity to adduce and submit any
evidence in their possession to show whether or not the 26 lots aforesaid were or
were not actually devoted to public use or governmental purposes prior to the
enactment of Republic Act No. 3039. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance shall
decide the issues anew, taking into account the evidence submitted by the parties

FACTS:
> Respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which
authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishment
of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council
pursuant to MMC Ordinance authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or
municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea
market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions.
> Municipal council of Paraaque issued a resolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor
Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the
establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or
vending areas.
> Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said
streets.
> Petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic
Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J.
Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag,
giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market
stalls shall be dismantled.
> Respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for
prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction.
> The trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from
enforcing his letter.
> The trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance enjoining
petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against respondent
Palanyag.
> Petition was filed by the petitioner thru the Office of the Solicitor General alleging
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the trial judge in issuing the assailed order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of
Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites
for flea markets is valid?

14

RULING:
NO. We find the petition meritorious. In resolving the question of whether
the disputed municipal ordinance authorizing the flea market on the public streets is
valid, it is necessary to examine the laws in force during the time the said ordinance
was enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as Local
Government Code, in connection with established principles embodied in the Civil
Code an property and settled jurisprudence on the matter.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public
use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property
for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states:
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and
municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for
public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall
be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of
special laws.
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered
public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government
which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute
control of Congress (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, L24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334). Hence, local governments have no
authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless
specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. One such example of this
authority given by Congress to the local governments is the power to close roads as
provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the Local Government Code.

principle that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available
to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of
or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the
requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing a road,
street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or
other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is
no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already
withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the
local government unit concerned (Article 422, Civil Code).
Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with
the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance. The allegations
of respondent municipality that the closed streets were not used for vehicular traffic
and that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of a flea
market on said streets are unsupported by any evidence that will show that this first
condition has been met. Likewise, the designation by respondents of a time
schedule during which the flea market shall operate is absent.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with
people, houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying
the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel,
G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would
not help in solving the problem of congestion.
Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to
limitations laid down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code.
Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount
considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community. Every
local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance
the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote
the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective,
the local government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice
or adversely affect the general welfare.

However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local government
units to close roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted in
accordance with basic principles already established by law. These basic principles
have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or municipality to close
a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic

15