PAFLU v.

Bureau of Labor Relations

GR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring
Facts: In the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent
Union obtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly,
under the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code, a
majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of the victorious labor
union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. There were four votes cast by
employees who did not want any union. On its face therefore, respondent Union
ought to have been certified in accordance with the above applicable rule.
Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine announced in the case of
Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations
that spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast.
Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that
there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Director.
Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting
NAFLU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine
Blooming Mills
Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari does
not lie. The conclusion reached by the Court derives support from the
deservedly high repute attached to the construction placed by the executive
officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules and
Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by Secretary
Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on 3 February 1975, the
present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as 1
May 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to 1 November 1974,.
It would appear then that there was more than enough time for a really serious
and careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations to avoid any
inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore the
interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen, a
1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the
leading American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: The
principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive
officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great
respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the
courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be
cited to support it. There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a

pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty, a 1918 decision: Courts will and should

respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the
executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation
is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby. Since then, such a
doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions. As was emphasized by
Chief Justice Castro, the construction placed by the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given
controlling weight.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner
PAFLU.
Philippine Apparel Workers Union v. NLRC
GR L-50320, 31 July 1981 (105 SCRA 444)
First Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concurring
Facts: In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining
agreement, the Union submitted a set of bargaining proposals to the company.
Negotiations were held thereafter, but due to the impasse, the Union filed a
complaint with the Department of Labor praying that the parties be assisted in
concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding the complaint, the parties
continued with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September 1977, the parties signed
the agreement providing for a three-stage wage increase for all rank and file
employees, retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977,
Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to take effect on 1 May 1977 providing
for an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance ordained by Presidential
Decree 525. This increase was implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the
company. The controversy arose when the petitioner union sought the
implementation of the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in the
collective bargaining agreement. The company alleges that it has opted to
consider the P0.80 daily wage increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial
compliance with the requirements of PD 1123, so that it is obliged to pay only
the balance of P38 per month, contending that that since there was already a
meeting of the minds between the parties as early as 2 April 1977 about the
wage increases which were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within
the exemption provided for in the Rules Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on
the other hand, maintains that the living allowance under PD 1123 (originally
PD 525) is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.
On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and
violation of the CBA against the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order was

issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint and referred the case to
the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the machinery
established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this order, both
parties appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated its decision, setting aside the order appealed
from and entering a new one dismissing the case for obvious lack of merit,
relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor that agreement between the
parties was made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per month retroactive to 1 April
1977 which was squarely under the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of
the rules implementing PD 1123. The union filed for reconsideration, but the
Commission en banc dismissed the same on 8 February 1979. Hence, the
petition.
Issue: Whether the Commission was correct in determining the agreement falls
under the exceptions.
Held: The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3
September1977, when PD 1123 was already in force and effect, although the
increase on the first year was retroactive to 1 April 1977. There is nothing in
the records that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid before May
1977, to allow the company to fall within the exceptions provided for in
paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected
contract nor an actual payment of said increase. There was no grant of said
increases yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed in the letter of the
Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was based on a wrong
premise or representation on the part of the company. The company had
declared that the parties have agreed on 2 April 1977 in recognition of the
imperative need for employees to cope up with inflation brought about by,
among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting the fact that
negotiations were still being held on other unresolved economic and noneconomic bargaining items (which were only agreed upon on 3 September
1977).
The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word grant as used in
its rules implementing PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the exemptions
to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when it is based on
misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties,
the same cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation and
explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one explains the
intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus, the construction or
explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based

on a misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it goes beyond the

scope of the law.
The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of
the commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased
allowance provided for in PD 1123, the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily
effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases embodied in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs against
the company.
IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong
GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)
Second Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part
Facts: On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the
payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor
Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed,
and upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration on 7
July 1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a
decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioners complaint for payment
of holiday pay. Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision.
Instead, it complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday
pay up to and including January 1976.
On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending,
among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay.
Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code,
the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and
regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial
section thereof reads as Status of employees paid by the month. Employees
who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working
days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established
minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether
worked or not. On 23 April 1976, Policy Instruction 9 was issued by the then
Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank,
by reason of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the
Labor Code and by Policy Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to
an its employees.
On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce
the arbiters decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank opposed. On 18

October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued
an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its employees their regular
holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order of the
Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its
resolution en banc dismissing the banks appeal, and ordering the issuance of
the proper writ of execution. On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with the
Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent
prayer to stay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order
directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to compute
the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in
accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November
1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G.
Inciong, issued an order setting aside the resolution en banc of the NLRC dated
20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for
certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly
paid employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
Held: From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree
850, and Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees
are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing
rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes
monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under Rule IV,
Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: employees
who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working
days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established
minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether
worked or not. Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by
executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the courts,
still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null
and void. So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the
provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order betrays
inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the
Act must prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long
as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within
the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further,

administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the

courts that finally determine what the law means.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy
Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor
Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.
Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople
GR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA 273)
En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on
leave
Facts: On 20 May 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in
representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint
with the Regional Office IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank, for the payment of 10 unworked
legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked
legal holidays from 1 November 1974.
Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled
in favor of the petitioners ordering the bank to pay its monthly paid employees
the holiday pay and the premium or overtime pay differentials to all employees
who rendered work during said legal holidays.
On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and
dismissed the petitioners claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section
2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction 9, claiming
the rule that If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the
maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from
January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the 10 paid legal
holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account
of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the 10 paid
legal holidays.
Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in maintaining that monthly
paid employees are not entitled to the holiday pay nor all employees who
rendered work during said legal holidays are entitled to the premium or
overtime pay differentials.
Held: When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. An administrative interpretation, which
diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or

withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In the present case, the provisions of the
Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and
explicit, it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit. In
Policy Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state
that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law
clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay.
While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute
by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by
the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be
declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when
necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the
context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost
always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that
stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power. Section 2,
Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor Code and Policy
Instruction was declared null and void in IBAAEU v. Inciong, and thus applies
in the case at bar. Since the private respondent premises its action on the
invalidated rule and policy instruction, it is clear that the employees belonging
to the petitioner association are entitled to the payment of 10 legal holidays
under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from their monthly salary.
They are not among those excluded by law from the benefits of such holiday
pay
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Ministers 7 September
1976 order, and reinstated with modification (deleting the interest payments)
the 24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC affirming the 30 October 1975
resolution of the Labor Arbiter.

Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission

GR L-16704, 17 March 1962 (4 SCRA 627)
En Banc, Barrera (p): 9 concurring
Facts: On 15 October 1958, the Social Security Commission (SSC) issued its
Circular 22 providing that effective 1 November 1958, all employers in
computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and
include in the Employees remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well
as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the
Employees remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2%

contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, Victorias Milling Company, Inc., wrote the SSC
in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular
7 (7 October 1957) , and further questioned the validity of the circular for lack
of authority on the part of the SSC to promulgate it without the approval of the
President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling these
objections, the SSC ruled that Circular 22 is not a rule or regulation that
needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to
be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere
statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to the Supreme Court on
appeal.
Issue: Whether Circular 22 is a rule or regulation.
Held: There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and
an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an
administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and
regulations, it makes a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while
when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a
pre-existing law Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the
procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced
by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually
couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives,
remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the
manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency
entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and
regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts so
long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is
within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are
not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom On the
other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory,
for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with
their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is
specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in
enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase
or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some

other purpose. RA 1161 specifically defined what compensation should mean

For the purposes of this Act. RA1792 amended such definition by deleting
some exceptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express
substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or
judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give
way to the clear mandate of the new law.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed resolution, with costs against
appellant.

Sarmiento v. Mison [GR L-79974, 17 December 1987]

En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur
Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and
professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget,
from effecting disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments,
on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain
the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison
as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination
to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is
entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries
and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition and the petition in intervention, without costs.
1. Standing to file suit / Prohibition as proper remedy: Procedural
questions set aside due to demands of public interest
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in
the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is
the proper remedy to test Misons right to the office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this
suit.

2. Constitutional Construction
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The
intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed
in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez)
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want
them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.
3. Presidents power to appoint
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to
appoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
(3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4)
officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third groups of officers
can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded
proceedings of Constitutional Commission.
4. Express enumeration excludes others not enumerated
It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case
at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly
stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.
5. Constitutional provision presumed to have been framed and adopted
in light of prior laws
A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted
in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to
them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are
familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its
provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in

its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments

required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the commission was frequently transformed into
a venue of horse-trading and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the
1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of
appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the
legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and
the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a
middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President,
without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the
second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of
lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support
this conclusion.
6. Construction of also in second sentence; consideration of different
language of proximate sentences to determine meaning
The word also could mean in addition; as well; besides, too besides in like
manner which meanings could stress that the word also in said second
sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers
enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent or
confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the
interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said
second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the
first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible
meanings of the word also as used in the context of said second sentence, the
Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence
speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second
sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of
different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a
difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are
not pebbles in alien juxtaposition.
7. Power to appoint fundamentally executive in character; Limitations
construed strictly
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character.

Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed.

Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly
stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated
require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
8. The use of word alone after President in third sentence is a lapse
in draftsmanship, a literal import deemed redundant
After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the Court found the use of the word alone after the word
President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything
else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and
expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to
offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no
reason to use in the third sentence the word alone after the word President
in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked
officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint is already vested in him, without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word alone in the
third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10,
Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the
second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments,
except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.
9. President authorized Commissioner of Bureau of Customs;
Commissioner not included with the first group of appointment
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not
one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately
excluded the position of heads of bureaus from appointments that need the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the
President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972).

10. Laws approved during the effectivity of previous constitution must

be read in harmony with the new one
RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with
Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President,
as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment,
however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Perfecto v. Meer
GR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)
First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.
Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the
members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive
such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office. It also provides that until Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an
annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice,
fifteen thousand pesos. When Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had
not provided otherwise, by fixing a different salary for associate justices. He
received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand
pesos a year.
The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay
income tax upon his salary as member of the judiciary. The latter paid the
amount under protest. He contended that the assessment was illegal, his
salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would
reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of
the Judiciary amount to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the
Constitution.
Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the
judiciary amounts to a diminution thereof. If said imposition would not be
considered as a diminution, it would appear that, in the matter of

compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with
the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of
affairs. Further, the Constitution provides that judges shall hold their offices
during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a
compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
Thus, next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the
independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. In the
general course of human nature, a power over a mans subsistence amounts to
a power over his will. The independence of the judges as of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a
gratuity or privilege. It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon
valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is a
guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is
the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens
in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the
establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby
judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by
talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a
private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern. On
the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at the
bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with their
clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous
duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that the guaranty against a
reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation
in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which others are liable. The
exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a nominal
exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose
promoted is received in the place of the tax.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur
Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income
taxes from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respectively. The lower
court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,

85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo
and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore
was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the
refund of said taxes. Respondent, through the Solicitor General contended
that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which
Congress enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the
salaries of judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.
Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income
tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease
of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise.
Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on
the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his
salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition,
thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said
statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest
court of the land. In the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted
or ascertained the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task
and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more
true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which
is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the legislature
to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial processes
and court decisions.
Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the
Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws
belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret
and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can

determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and

ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of
the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two,
because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared
invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of
a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is
reiterated.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v.
Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the
Judiciary.
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Resolution)
GR L-78780, 23 July 1987
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal
Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes
from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the
judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December
1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over
Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial
Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries. With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the
issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter
administratively.
Issue: Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to
exempt justices and judges from taxes as it was in the 1935 Constitution.
Held: The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the

Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. In

the present case, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the Constitution
authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of
Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are
receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to
those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read
into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in
the Constitutional Commission. Thus, the debates, interpolations and opinions
expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of
the Judiciary taxable.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.
Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila
that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons.
Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,
Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of
the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director
of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the
greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was
sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the
Constitution.
Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the
minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,

implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that

shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,
promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,
they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating
influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director
of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special
postage stamps would be advantageous to the Government. Of course, the
phrase advantageous to the Government does not authorize the violation of
the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property
for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar,
the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to
favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not
issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the
issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of
international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and
attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic
chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City
of Manila, and an inscription that reads Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR 122156, 3 February 1997
En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent
Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic

partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a
letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers
check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On
17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender
of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the
Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue(s):

Whether the provisions of the Constitution,

particularly Article XII Section 10, are selfexecuting.
Whether the 51% share is part of the
national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional
provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The
mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for
the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be selfexecuting. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does
not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation

must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional

right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have
been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in
effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative
body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated
as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In
fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In
the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue
of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the
granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters
involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a
qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over
the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the
Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to
Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44
per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to
effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)
En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no part, 1 on
leave
Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern
(Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders. They maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they are proper parties for the petition. The
respondents alleged, however through the Solicitor-General, that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They further
contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectiveness of laws where the laws provide for their own
effectivity dates. Thus publication is not indispensable.
Issue: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity
of laws
Held: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however, considered in
the light of other statutes applicable to the issue does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non
excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the

persons affected thereby. In the present case, Presidential issuances of general

application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. The
implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication
in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which
cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
that unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)
En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring
Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication
to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force
and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for
reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor
General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February
Revolution took place, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General
to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause unless
otherwise provided.
Held: The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2 of the Civil Code,
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred
by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of
enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4)
Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the

national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5)
Monetary Board circulars to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws.
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in
the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with
Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Primicias v. Urdaneta
GR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 462)
First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 on leave, 1 did not take part.
Facts: On 13 March 1964, Ordinance 3 (Series of 1964) was enacted by the
Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Ordinance is patterned after and
based on Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act 3992, as amended (Revised Motor
Vehicle Law). On 20 June 1964, RA 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic
Code) became effective. Section 63 explicitly repealed Act 3992.
On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within
Urdaneta when a member of Urdanetas Municipal Police asked him to stop. He
was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance 3 (S. 1964),
for overtaking a truck. The policeman then asked for plaintiffs license which
he surrendered, and a temporary operators permit was issued to him. This
incident took place about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio
Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the
Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance 3 (S.
1964).
Due to the institution of the criminal case, Primicias initiated an action for the
annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta,
Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from
enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined
from further proceeding in the criminal case. On 29 June 1966, the Court of
First Instance Lingayen held in its decision that the ordinance was null and
void and had been repealed by RA 4136. The writ of preliminary injunction
against Judge Soriano definite and permanent. It also restrained Perez, Suyat,

and Andrada from enforcing said ordinace throughout Urdaneta, ordering them
to return the plaintiffs drivers license, and to pay the cost of the suit. The
public officials appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.
Held: The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The
ordinances validity should be determined vis-a-vis RA 4136, the mother
statute (not Act 3992), which was in force at the time the criminal case was
brought against Primicias. Further, when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta
used the phrase vehicular traffic (Section 1, Ordinance) it did not distinguish
between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses.
Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and
certainty are all the more important so that an average man should be able
with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will
incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct. Thus, as the
Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its
thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, RA
4136. The Ordinance refers to only one of the four classifications mentioned in
paragraph (b), Section 35. The classifications which must be based on Section
35 are necessary in view of Section 36 which states that no provincial, city or
municipal authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution
specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in this Act.
The ordinance, therefore in view of the foregoing, is void.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision.