Cases Torts Go Vii. Civil Liability Arising From Crime

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 371
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. vs. Velez
*
G.R. No. 129282. November 29, 2001.
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC.,

(DMPI-ECCI), petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M.
VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Misamis Oriental,
Br. 20, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum-Shopping; Circular No.
28-91 was revised on February 8, 1994 by extending the requirement
to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial
agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
On the first issue, Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court
requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to
petitions filed before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
This circular was revised on February 8, 1994 by extending the
requirement to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasijudicial agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals.
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
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VOL. 371, NOVEMBER 29, 2001
73
Same; Criminal Procedure; Actions; Under the present rule,

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only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.Under the
present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged
is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Same; Same; Same; There is no more need for a reservation of
the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.There is no more
need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to
the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be
prosecuted separately even without a reservation.
Same; Same; There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Isidro Q. Lico and Marieto P. Gallego for petitioner.
Public Attorneys Office and Constantino Jaraula for
private respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner DMPI
Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. (DMPI-ECCI) seeks the
annul74
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1
ment of the order of the Regional Trial Court, Misamis

Oriental, Branch 20, granting the motion for
reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas, and thus
reversing the previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94214.
The Facts
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with
the Regional Trial Court,
Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an
2
information for estafa against Carmen Mandawe for
alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas
the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted
this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of
petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of
petitioner.
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta
Villegas filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Misamis
3
Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint against Carmen
Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money
and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of
the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the
dismissal of the civil case on the following grounds: (1) that
there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising
from the same facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to
contain a certification against forum 4shopping as required
by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.
5
On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an order
dismissing Civil Case No. CV-94-214. On January
21, 1997,
6
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order. 7
On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order
granting respondents motion for reconsideration, thereby
recalling the dismissal of the case.
_______________
1
In Civil Case No. CV-94-214.
Petition, Annex D, Rollo, p. 21.
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Petition, Annex E, Rollo, pp. 23-27.
Petition, Annexes F and H, Rollo, pp. 28-33 and pp. 37-41.
Petition, Annex J, Rollo, pp. 45-46.
Petition, Annex K, Rollo, pp. 47-48.
Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 14-16.

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75

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Hence, this petition.

The Issues
The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiff s failure to

attach a certification against forum 9shopping in the
complaint is a ground to dismiss the case; and, (2) whether
the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal
case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the
civil action.
The Courts Ruling
10
On the first issue, Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme

Court requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to be
attached to petitions filed before the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals.
This circular was revised on
11
February 8, 1994 by extending the requirement to all
initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasijudicial
agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals.
Respondent Villegas failure to attach a certificate of
non-forum shopping in her complaint did not violate
Circular No. 28-91, because at the time of filing, the
requirement applied only to petitions filed12 with the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Likewise,
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is inapplicable for the
_______________
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Petition, Rollo, pp. 1-13. On January 31, 2000, we gave due course to
the petition (Rollo, pp. 102-103).

9
Civil Case No. CV-94-214.

Re: Additional Requisites for Petitions filed with the Supreme
10
Court and the Court of Appeals to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple

Filing of Petitions and Complaints. (Dated September 4, 1991 but took
effect on January 1, 1992).
11
By Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which took effect on April 1,
1994.
12
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Flores, 350 Phil. 889, 896; 287
SCRA 449 (1998), citing Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 192,
196 (1994) and Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 770
(1994).
76
76

reason that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994,

three days
before April 1, 1994, the date of effectivity of the
13
circular.
On the second issue, as a general rule, an offense causes
two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury
produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired
thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the
second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the
crime which injury is sought to be
compensated through
14
indemnity which is civil in nature.
Thus, every
person criminally liable for a felony is also
15
civilly liable. This is the law governing the recovery of
civil liability arising from the commission of an offense.
Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage
16
caused, and indemnification of consequential damages.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an
accused arising from the commission of the offense in the
criminal case since the civil action is either deemed
instituted with the criminal action or is separately
instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000,
provides that:
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(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. [Emphasis
supplied]
Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil
action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment
has been entered in the criminal action. [Emphasis supplied]
_______________
13
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Flores, 350 Phil. 889, 897; 287
SCRA 449 (1998).

14
Ramos v. Gonong, 72 SCRA 559, (1976), citing Guevarra,
Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 5th Ed., p. 159.

15
Article 100, Revised Penal Code.
16
Article 104, Revised Penal Code.

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However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil
liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has
been changed.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising
from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately,
or
17
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to
file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil
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liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission which18 may be prosecuted separately even without
a reservation.
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

pertaining to independent civil actions which became
effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. There
are no vested rights in the rules of
19
procedure.
_______________
17
Justice Oscar M. Herrera (Ret.), Treatise on Criminal Procedure:
Salient Changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (Rules 110127, Revised Rules of Court) (2001), p. 44.
18
Supra, Note 17, pp. 44-45.
19
Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan, G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001, 358 SCRA 240.
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78

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil

action for damages on account of the fraud committed
against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, may proceed independently even if there was no
reservation as to its filing.
The Fallo
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WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.

The Court
20
AFFIRMS the order dated February 21, 1997.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and
Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, order of February 21, 1997 affirmed.
Note.Where forum-shopping is deemed to exist, the
summary dismissal of both actions is warranted.
(Prubankers Association vs. Prudential Bank & Trust
Company, 302 SCRA 74 [1999])
o0o
_______________
20
In Civil Case No. CV-94-214 of the Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 20.

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Casupanan vs. Laroya
G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002.
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO,

petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Actions; Dismissals; Under Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 the order of dismissal is without prejudice to
refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states
it is with prejudice.The MCTC dismissed the civil action for
quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its
order of dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice
to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly
states it is with prejudice. Absent a declaration that the dismissal is
with prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
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VOL. 388, AUGUST 26, 2002
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MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice.
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Same; Same; Same; An order dismissing an action without

prejudice is not appealable.Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an
order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The
remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under
Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the
judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the
Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the
ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Same; Same; Forum-shopping; Essence of forum-shopping.
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.
However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the
law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action
which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Same; Same; Same; Since the present Rules require the accused
in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil
action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such
separate civil action.Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity)
expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, to wit: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal
and civil actions.(a) x x x. No counterclaim, crossclaim or thirdparty complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but
any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied) Since the
present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forumshopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Same; Same; Independent Civil Actions; To file a separate and
independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the
offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to
bring such action.Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as amended in 1988,
allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the
criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file
such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action
before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil
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actions arising from the same act or omission were

30
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deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case. These civil

actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the
recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages
for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations. Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for
quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve
in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise,
such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
action.
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111
what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the
action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto.
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed
instituted with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil
liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no
longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal
action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent
civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended
party in the criminal action, not to the accused.Section 3 of the
present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules,
expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As
stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended
party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged
in the criminal action. There is no question that the offended party
in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for
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quasidelict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111

expressly states that the offended party may bring such an action
but the offended party may not recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly,
Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal
action, not to the accused.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the

Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Br. 66.
Yolanda C. Castro for petitioners.
Pablo Olarte for private respondent.
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VOL. 388, AUGUST 26, 2002
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CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition
for review on certiorari to set aside the
1
Resolution dated December 28, 19992 dismissing the
petition for certiorari and the Resolution dated August 24,
2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in
Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore
Laroya (Laroya for brevity) and the other owned by
petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and
driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for
brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were
filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for
brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99.
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On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil

case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then
at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in
the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the
ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the
criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order
of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo
insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which
can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC
denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May
7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court3
(Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,
assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
_______________
1
Penned by Judge Josefina D. Ceballos.
Penned by Judge Cesar M. Sotero.
Docketed as Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).

32
32

The Trial Courts Ruling

The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The
Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the
MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and
therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal.
The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the
Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the
MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a
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pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.

Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in the
Resolution of August 24, 2000.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of
them may think and believe that the accident was caused by the
fault of the other, x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to be the
aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless
imprudence against the second party. On the other hand, the second
party, together with his operator, believing themselves to be the real
aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private complainant in the
4
criminal case.
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending

criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action
for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case.
_______________
4
Petition for Review on Certiorari dated October 27, 2000, pp. 1 & 2;
Rollo, pp. 9 & 10.

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VOL. 388, AUGUST 26, 2002
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The Courts Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089,
which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forumshopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case.
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Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a

criminal case has a counterclaim against the private
complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate
civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action
on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from
the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a
criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case
arising from the same incident. They maintain that under
Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they
point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed
the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also
Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a
party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is
fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents.
Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo
forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when
they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya
argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the
order of dismissal is already final and a petition for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that
the petition raises the legal question of whether there is
forum-shopping since they filed only one actionthe
independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the
ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No.
04-94. The MCTC did not state
5
in its order of dismissal that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to re_______________
5
Records of Special Civil Action No. 17 C-99, Order of March 26,
1999, pp. 12-14.

34
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filing the complaint, unless6the order of dismissal expressly

states it is with prejudice. Absent a declaration that the
dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without
prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the
matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice.
7
Section I of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing
an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy
of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under
Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where
the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the
petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper
remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously
or successively, to secure a favorable
8
judgment. Forum-shopping is present when in the two or
more cases pending, there9 is identity of parties, rights of
action and reliefs sought. However, there is no forumshopping in the instant case because the law and the rules
expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which
can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal
Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action
for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Although these two actions arose
_______________
6
7
Sto. Domingo-David vs. Guerrero, 296 SCRA 277 (1998).

Section 9, Rule 40 (Appeal from Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts) provides:

SEC. 9. Applicability of Rule 41.The other provisions of Rule 41 shall apply
to appeals provided for herein insofar as they are not inconsistent with or may
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serve to supplement the provisions of this Rule.

8
Melo vs. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 94 (1999).
International School, Inc. (Manila) vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA
474 (1999).
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VOL. 388, AUGUST 26, 2002
35

from the same act or omission, they have different causes
of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal
punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil
case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa
aquiliana read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he

proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered
damage because of the fault or negligence of another.
Either the private complainant or the accused can file a
separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing
in the law or rules that state only the private complainant
in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity)
expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim
in a separate civil action, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be
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filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action
which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal

action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action,
there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such
separate civil action.
36
36

Filing of a separate civil action

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as amended in 1988,
allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of
the criminal action provided the offended party reserved
the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party
reserved the civil action before the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from
the same act or omission were deemed impliedly
instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions referred
to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of
damages for quasidelict, and the recovery of damages for
violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on
Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for
quasidelict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to
reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such
action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly
instituted in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules provided as follows:
Section 1.Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Page 10 of 19
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Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil
actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions
shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence
and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the accused.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
37
VOL. 388, AUGUST 26, 2002
37

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on
December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) xxx
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the
civil and criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed

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instituted with the criminal action is only the action to

recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto.
All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted,
and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently
even without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a
waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil
action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The
prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these
articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the
filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based
on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of 10the civil action deemed instituted in the
criminal action.
_______________
10
Neplum, Inc. vs. Evelyn V. Orbeso, G.R. No. 141986, prom. July 11,
2002, at pp. 11-12, 384 SCRA 466.

38
38

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still

given the option to file a separate civil action to recover
civil liability exdelicto by reserving such right in the
criminal action before the prosecution presents its
evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such
reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing
the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not
yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with
the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does
not apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act
or omission11 filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code.
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a
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separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action,

could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered
in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed
before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil
action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the
criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil
action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not
apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed
independently regardless of the filing of the criminal
action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.After the
criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action.
_______________
11
Section 1 of Rule 31, however, allows consolidation, in the discretion
of the trial court, of actions involving common questions of law or fact

pending before the same court (Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, (203
SCRA 619 [1991]), or pending even in different branches of the same
regional trial court if one of the cases has not been partially tried
(Raymundo vs. Felipe, 42 SCRA 615 [1971]).
39
VOL. 388, AUGUST 26, 2002
39

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already
been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it
may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall
last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil
action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be
consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the
criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already
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adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically

reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of
the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions
shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the
period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted
separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not

change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to
recover damages exdelicto, is suspended upon the filing of
the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also
prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal
action, of a separate civil action to recover damages exdelicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and
Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the criminal
case, can file a separate civil action against the offended
party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules provides as follows:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the

amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the offended party
to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of
40
40
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the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule
111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged
in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the
criminal action can file an independent civil action for
quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present
Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may
bring such an action but the offended party may not
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged
in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers
to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the
accused.
Casupanan and 12Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in
Cabaero vs. Cantos where the Court held that the accused
therein could validly institute a separate civil action for
quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case
filed his Answer with Counterclaim for malicious
prosecution. At that time the Court noted the absence of
clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly
instituted civil actions and the necessary consequences and
implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the trial
court should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case
and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court
further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case
against the offended party after the criminal case is
terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which
may be promulgated. The Court explained that a crossclaim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil
aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings
and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was
incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address the
lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the
accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the
same provision states that any cause of action which could
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have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or

third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil
ac_______________
12
271 SCRA 391 (1997).

41
VOL. 388, AUGUST 26, 2002
41

tion. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, even as the civil
action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal
action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent
civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may
be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does
not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action
under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil
action arising from the crime, if such civil action is
reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal
action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for
the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where
the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed
instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict
without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two
cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of
each other. The commencement or prosecution of the
criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasidelict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no
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reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover

damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
In some instances, the accused may be insolvent,
necessitating the filing of another case against his
employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasidelict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the
criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6,
Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate
civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the
accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in
the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal
case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately
his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused
does not file a
42
42

separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period

may set in since the period continues to run until the civil
action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a
right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same
way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which
is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the
accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal
case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts,
and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed
separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order
of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the
ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the
decision of the trial court in the criminal case may vary
with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil
action. This possibility has always been recognized ever
since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an
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independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176

of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code,
expressly provides that the independent civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless 13of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs.
Potenciano, the Court declared:
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for
to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to
the result of the criminal prosecutionwhether it be conviction or
acquittalwould render meaningless the independent character of
the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code
introduced the concept of a civil action separate and
independent from the criminal action although arising from
the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to
encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions
of trial courts, one hearing the criminal
_______________
13
5 SCRA 468 (1962).

43
VOL. 388, AUGUST 26, 2002
43

case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear
of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more
apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient
remedies under the Rules of
Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC
issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or
before the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect
considering the well-settled rule that
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x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be

construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense
14
and to that extent.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is

hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28,
1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C
(99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman) and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On leave.
Petition granted, resolutions annulled.
Note.Forum-shopping exists where the elements of
litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. (Cruz vs.
Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 784 [1999])
o0o
_______________
14
People vs. Arrojado, 350 SCRA 679 (2001) citing Ocampo vs. Court of
Appeals, 180 SCRA 27 (1989), Alday vs. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521 (1983) &
People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946).
44
Page 19 of 19
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G.R. No. 141538. March 23, 2004.
HERMANA R. CEREZO, petitioner, vs. DAVID TUAZON,

respondent.
Remedial Law; Default; Remedies available to a party declared
in default.Lina v. Court of Appeals enumerates the remedies
available to a party declared in default: (a) The defendant in default
may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground
that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3,
Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]); (b) If the judgment has already
been rendered when the defendant discovered the
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
168
168

Cerezo vs. Tuazon
default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may
file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; (c) If the
defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become
final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2
[now Section 1] of Rule 38; and (d) He may also appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014fd11df1073c48679f000a0094004f00ee/p/AJS022/?username=Guest
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presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41).

Same; Same; A petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a
judgment by default is also available if the trial court improperly
declared a party in default or even if the trial court properly
declared a party in default if grave abuse of discretion attended such
declaration.Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the
nullity of a judgment by default is also available if the trial court
improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court
properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion
attended such declaration.
Same; Annulment of Judgments; Annulment is available only
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.After our
resolution denying Mrs. Cerezos petition for relief became final and
executory, Mrs. Cerezo, in her last ditch attempt to evade liability,
filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the
judgment of the trial court. Annulment is available only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on
extrinsic fraud, a party must file the petition within four years from
its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before laches or
estoppel bars the petition. Extrinsic fraud is not a valid ground if
such fraud was used as a ground, or could have been used as a
ground, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from
judgment.
Same; Same; Same; A party may avail of the remedy of
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 only if the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
party.Mrs. Cerezo insists that lack of jurisdiction, not extrinsic
fraud, was her ground for filing the petition for annulment of
judgment. However, a party may avail of the remedy of annulment
of judgment under Rule 47 only if the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the party. Mrs.
Cerezo could have availed of a new trial or appeal but through her
own fault she erroneously availed of the remedy of a petition for
relief, which was denied with finality. Thus, Mrs. Cerezo may no
longer avail of the remedy of annulment.
Criminal Law; Quasi-Delict; Civil Liability; An action based on
a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action.
The
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169
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
169
Cerezo vs. Tuazon

same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an
action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An
aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action
based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the
criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil
liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasidelict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasidelict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Employers Liability; An
employers liability in an action for a quasi-delict is not only
solidary, it is also primary and direct.Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos
assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An
indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the courts
action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the
case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezos liability as an employer in
an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary
and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final
resolution of Tuazons action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary; Where the
obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable and the other is not even a necessary party because
complete relief is available from either. The responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where
there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case,
each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is
liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or
renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where the
obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because
complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over
Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from
Page 3 of 29
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Mrs. Cerezo alone.

Same; Same; Same; Same; An employers liability based on a
quasi-delict is primary and direct while the employers liability
based on a delict is merely subsidiary.Moreover, an employers
liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the
employers liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The
words primary and direct, as contrasted with subsidiary, refer to
the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than
to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability
under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the
employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When
an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer
has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns.
While the employer is civilly
170
170

Cerezo vs. Tuazon
liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employees criminal

negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately
for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in
selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the
employers liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To hold the employer liable in a
subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate
a criminal action where the employees delict and corresponding
primary liability are established.In contrast, an action based on a
delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for
the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary
capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal
action where the employees delict and corresponding primary
liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict,
then the trial courts jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.
However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs.
Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
Page 4 of 29
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Court of Appeals.
Dionisio S. Daga for petitioner.
Oscar Malinis for private respondent D. Tuazon.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1
This is a 2petition for review on certiorari to annul the

Resolution dated 21 October 1999 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its Resolution dated 20
January 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
Court of 3 Appeals denied the petition for annulment of the
Decision dated 30 May 1995 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 (trial court), in
Civil Case No. 7415. The trial court ordered petitioner
Hermana R. Cerezo (Mrs. Cerezo) to pay respondent
David
_______________
1
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with Associate
Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring.

3
Penned by Judge Carlos D. Rustia.

171
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
171
Cerezo vs. Tuazon

Tuazon (Tuazon) actual damages, loss of earnings, moral
damages, and costs of suit.
Antecedent Facts
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines
passenger bus with plate number NYA 241 collided with a
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tricycle bearing plate number TC RV 126 along Captain M.

Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat, Pampanga. On 1 October
1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages
against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband
Attorney Juan Cerezo (Atty. Cerezo), and bus driver
Danilo A. Foronda (Foronda). The complaint alleged that:
7. At the time of the incident, plaintiff [Tuazon] was in his proper
lane when the second-named defendant [Foronda], being then the
driver and person in charge of the Country Bus with plate number
NYA 241, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
operate the said motor vehicle in a negligent, careless, and
imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules and
regulations, there being a Slow Down sign near the scene of the
incident, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
loss of lives or injuries, his negligence, carelessness and imprudence
resulted to severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical
injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and becoming
disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand being
4
cut[.]
On 1 October 1993, Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a

pauper. Subsequently, the trial court issued summons
against Atty. Cerezo and Mrs. Cerezo (the Cerezo
spouses) at the Makati address stated in the complaint.
However, the summons was returned unserved on 10
November 1993 as the Cerezo spouses no longer held office
nor resided in Makati. On 18 April 1994, the trial court
issued alias summons against the Cerezo spouses at their
address in Barangay Sta. Maria, Camiling, Tarlac. The
alias summons and a copy of the complaint were finally
served on 20 April 1994 at the office of Atty. Cerezo, who
was then working as Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor. Atty.
Cerezo reacted angrily on learning of the service of
summons upon his person. Atty. Cerezo allegedly told
Sheriff William Canlas: Punyeta, ano ang gusto mong
mangyari? Gusto
_______________
4
CA Rollo, p. 8.
172
Page 6 of 29
172
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Cerezo vs. Tuazon
mong hindi ka makalabas

ng buhay dito? Teritoryo ko ito.
5
Wala ka sa teritoryo mo.
The records show that the Cerezo spouses participated
in the proceedings before the trial court. The Cerezo
spouses filed a comment with motion for bill of particulars
dated 29 April 1994 and a reply to
opposition to comment
6
with motion dated 13 June 1994. On 1 August 1994, the
trial court issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to
file a comment to the opposition to the bill of particulars.
Atty. Elpidio B. Valera (Atty. Valera) of Valera and Valera
Law Offices appeared on behalf of the Cerezo spouses. On
29 August 1994, Atty. Valera filed an urgent ex-parte
motion praying for the resolution of Tuazons motion to
litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of new summons
on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy
proper service in
7
accordance with the Rules of Court.
On 30 August 1994, the trial court issued an order
resolving Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and the
Cerezo spouses urgent ex-parte motion. The order reads:
At the hearing on August 30, 1994, the plaintiff [Tuazon] testified
that he is presently jobless; that at the time of the filing of this case,
his son who is working in Malaysia helps him and sends him once
in a while P300.00 a month, and that he does not have any real
property. Attached to the Motion to Litigate as Pauper are his
Affidavit that he is unemployed; a Certification by the Barangay
Captain of his poblacion that his income is not enough for his
familys subsistence; and a Certification by the Office of the
Municipal Assessor that he has no landholding in the Municipality
of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga.
The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted testimony of the
plaintiff that he is entitled to prosecute his complaint in this case as
a pauper under existing rules.
On the other hand, the Court denies the prayer in the
Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion requiring new summons
to be served to the defendants. The Court is of the opinion that any
infirmity in the service of the summons to the defendant before
plaintiff was allowed to prosecute his complaint in this case as a
pauper has been cured by this Order.
Page 7 of 29
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_______________
5
Ibid, pp. 13-17.
Rollo, p. 66.
CA Rollo, pp. 18-20.

173
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
173
Cerezo vs. Tuazon

If within 15 days from receipt of this Order, the defendants do not
question on appeal this Order of this Court, the Court shall proceed
8
to resolve the Motion for Bill of Particulars.
On 27 September 1994, the Cerezo spouses filed an urgent

ex-parte motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied
the motion for reconsideration.
On 14 November 1994, the trial court issued an order
directing the Cerezo spouses to file their answer within
fifteen days from receipt of the order. The Cerezo spouses
did not file an answer. On 27 January 1995, Tuazon filed a
motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default. On 6
February 1995, the trial court issued an order declaring the
Cerezo spouses in 9default and authorizing Tuazon to
present his evidence.
On 30 May 1995, after considering Tuazons testimonial
and documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in Tuazons
favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Forondas
liability because there was no service of summons on him.
The trial court did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon
failed to show that Mrs. Cerezos business benefited the
family, pursuant to Article 121(3) of the Family Code. The
trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages
sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs.
Cerezos employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
defendant Hermana Cerezo to pay the plaintiff:
ordering
the
Page 8 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
a) For Actual Damages

1) Expenses for operation and medical treatmentP69,485.35
2) Cost of repair of the tricycle39,921.00
b) For loss of earnings43,300.00
c) For moral damages20,000.00
d) And to pay the cost of the suit.
The docket fees and other expenses in the filing of this suit shall
be lien on whatever judgment may be rendered in favor of the
plaintiff.
_______________
8
Ibid, p. 21.
Rollo, p. 4.
174
174

Cerezo vs. Tuazon
SO ORDERED.
10
Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision on 25 June

1995. On 10 July 1995, Mrs. Cerezo filed before the trial
court a petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of
fraud, mistake or excusable negligence. Testifying before
the trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied
receipt of notices of hearings and of orders of the court.
Atty. Valera added that he received no notice before or
during the 8 May 1995 elections, when he was a senatorial
candidate for the KBL Party, and very busy, using his office
and residence as Party National Headquarters. Atty.
Valera claimed that he was able to read the decision
of the
11
trial court only after Mrs. Cerezo sent him a copy. Tuazon
did not testify but presented documentary evidence to
prove the participation of the Cerezo spouses in the case.
Tuazon presented the following exhibits:
Exhibit 1
Sheriff s return and summons;
Page 9 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
Exhibit 1A
Alias summons dated April 20, 1994;
Exhibit 2
Comment with Motion;
Exhibit 3
Minutes of the hearing held on August 1,

1994;
Exhibit 3A
Signature of defendants counsel;
Exhibit 4
Minutes of the hearing held on August 30,

1994;
Exhibit 4A
Signature of the defendants counsel;
Exhibit 5
Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion;
Exhibit 6
Order dated November 14, 1994;
Exhibit 6A
Postal certification dated January 13, 1995;
Exhibit 7
Order dated February [illegible];
Exhibit 7A
Courts return slip addressed to Atty.

Elpidio Valera;
Exhibit 7B
Courts return slip addressed to Spouses

Juan
and Hermana Cerezo;
Exhibit 8
Decision dated May [30], 1995;
Exhibit 8A
Courts return slip addressed to defendant

Hermana Cerezo;
Exhibit 8B
Courts return slip addressed to defendants

counsel,
Atty. Elpidio Valera;
_______________
10
CA Rollo, p. 23.
11
Ibid., pp. 24-33.

175
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
175
Cerezo vs. Tuazon

Page 10 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
Exhibit
9
Order dated September 21, 1995;
Exhibit
9-A
Second Page of Exhibit 9;
Exhibit
9-B
Third page of Exhibit 9;
Exhibit
9-C
Fourth page of Exhibit 9;
Exhibit
9-D
Courts return slip addressed to Atty. Elpidio

Valera; and
Exhibit
9-E
Courts return slip addressed to plaintiff s

counsel,
12
Atty. Norman Dick de Guzman.
13
On 4 March 1998, the trial court issued an order denying

the petition for relief from judgment. The trial court stated
that having received the decision on 25 June 1995, the
Cerezo spouses should have filed a notice of appeal instead
of resorting to a petition for relief from judgment. The trial
court refused to grant relief from judgment because the
Cerezo spouses could have availed of the remedy of appeal.
Moreover, the Cerezo spouses not only failed to prove fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence by conclusive
evidence, they also failed to prove that they had a good and
substantial defense. The trial court noted that the Cerezo
spouses failed to appeal because they relied on an expected
settlement of the case.
The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule
14
65. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48132.
The petition questioned whether the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service
of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses
claimed
15
was an indispensable party. In a resolution dated 21
January 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for
certiorari and affirmed the trial courts order denying the
petition for relief from judgment. The Court of Appeals
declared that the Cerezo spouses failure to file an answer
was due to their own negligence, considering that they
continued to participate in the proceedings without filing
an answer. There was also
Page 11 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
_______________
12
Ibid, pp. 35-36.
13
Penned by Judge Lourdes F. Gatbalite.
14
Captioned Hermana R. Cerezo and Juan D. Cerezo, as husband,
petitioners, v. Hon. Lourdes Gatbalite and David Tuazon, respondents.

15
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate
Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.,

concurring.
176
176

Cerezo vs. Tuazon
nothing in the records to show that the Cerezo spouses

actually offered a reasonable settlement to Tuazon. The
Court of Appeals also denied Cerezo spouses motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Atty. Cerezo himself
signed the petition, docketed as G.R. No. 137593. On 13
April 1999, this Court rendered a resolution denying the
petition for review on certiorari for failure to attach an
affidavit of service of copies of the petition to the Court of
Appeals and to the adverse parties. Even if the petition
complied with this requirement, the Court would still have
denied the petition as the Cerezo spouses failed to show
that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. The
Courts resolution was entered in the Book of Entries and
Judgments
when it became final and executory on 28 June
16
1999.
Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of
Appeals on 6 July 1999 a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 with prayer for restraining order.
Atty. Valera and Atty. Dionisio S. Daga (Atty. Daga)
represented Mrs. Cerezo
in the petition, docketed as CA17
G.R. SP No. 53572. The petition prayed for the annulment
of the 30 May 1995 decision of the trial court and for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
execution of the trial courts decision pending resolution of
the petition.
Page 12 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment

of judgment in a resolution dated 21 October 1999. The
resolution reads in part:
In this case, records show that the petitioner previously filed with
the lower court a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground
that they were wrongfully declared in default while waiting for an
amicable settlement of the complaint for damages. The court a quo
correctly ruled that such petition is without merit. The defendant
spouses admit that during the initial hearing they appeared before
the court and even mentioned the need for an amicable settlement.
Thus, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
spouses.
_______________
16
Rollo, pp. 60-61.
17
Captioned Hermana R. Cerezo and Juan D. Cerezo, as husband,
petitioners, v. Lourdes Gatbalite, Presiding Judge (incumbent), RTC

Branch 56, Angeles City, and David Tuazon, respondents.
177
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
177
Cerezo vs. Tuazon

Therefore, petitioner having availed of a petition for relief, the
remedy of an annulment of judgment is no longer available. The
proper action for the petitioner is to appeal the order of the lower
court denying the petition for relief.
Wherefore, the instant petition could not be given due course
and should accordingly be dismissed.
18
SO ORDERED.
On 20 January 2000, the Court of Appeals

denied the
19
Cerezo spouses motion for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals stated:
A distinction should be made between a courts jurisdiction over a
person and its jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case. The
former is acquired by the proper service of summons or by the
parties voluntary appearance; while the latter is conferred by law.
Resolving the matter of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
Page 13 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
Section 19(1) of B[atas] P[ambansa] 129 provides that Regional

Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Thus, it was proper for the lower court to
decide the instant case for damages.
Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case which is
absolute and conferred by law; any defects [sic] in the acquisition of
jurisdiction over a person (i.e., improper filing of civil complaint or
improper service of summons) may be waived by the voluntary
appearance of parties. The lower court admits the fact that no
summons was served on defendant Foronda. Thus, jurisdiction over
the person of defendant Foronda was not acquired, for which reason
he was not held liable in this case. However, it has been proven that
jurisdiction over the other defendants was validly acquired by the
court a quo.
The defendant spouses admit to having appeared in the initial
hearings and in the hearing for plaintiffs motion to litigate as a
pauper. They even mentioned conferences where attempts were
made to reach an amicable settlement with plaintiff. However, the
possibility of amicable settlement is not a good and substantial
defense which will warrant the granting of said petition.
xxx
Assuming arguendo that private respondent failed to reserve his
right to institute a separate action for damages in the criminal
action, the petitioner cannot now raise such issue and question the
lower courts jurisdiction because petitioner and her husband have
waived such right by
_______________
18
Rollo, pp. 36-37.
19
Ibid., pp. 33-34.
178
178

Cerezo vs. Tuazon
voluntarily appearing in the civil case for damages. Therefore, the

findings and the decision of the lower court may bind them.
Records show that the petitioner previously filed with the lower
court a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground that they
Page 14 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
were wrongfully declared in default while waiting for an amicable

settlement of the complaint for damages. The court a quo correctly
ruled that such petition is without merit, jurisdiction having been
acquired by the voluntary appearance of defendant spouses.
Once again, it bears stressing that having availed of a petition
for relief, the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer
available. Based on the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration
could not be given due course and is hereby DENIED.
20
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
On 7 February 2000, Mrs. Cerezo, this time with Atty.
Daga alone representing her, filed the present petition for
review on certiorari before this Court. Mrs. Cerezo claims
that:
1. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment, the Court of Appeals assumes that the
issues raised in the petition for annulment is based
on extrinsic fraud related to the denied petition for
relief notwithstanding that the grounds relied upon
involves questions of lack of jurisdiction.
2. In dismissing the Petition for Annulment, the Court
of Appeals disregarded the allegation that the lower
court[s] findings of negligence against defendantdriver Danilo Foronda [whom] the lower court did
not summon is null and void for want of due process
and consequently, such findings of negligence which
is [sic] null and void cannot become the basis of the
lower court to adjudge petitioner-employer liable for
civil damages.
of Appeals ignored the allegation that defendantdriver Danilo A. Foronda whose negligence is the
main issue is an indispensable party whose
presence is compulsory but [whom] the lower court
did not summon.
of Appeals ruled that assuming arguendo that
private respondent failed to reserve his right to
Page 15 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
institute a separate action for damages in the

criminal action, the petitioner cannot now raise
such issue and question the lower courts
jurisdiction because petitioner [has] waived such
right by voluntarily
_______________
20
Ibid., pp. 18-19.

179
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
179
Cerezo vs. Tuazon

appearing in the civil case for damages
notwithstanding
that lack of jurisdiction cannot be
21
waived.
The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit. As the issues are interrelated,
we shall discuss them jointly.
Remedies Available to a Party Declared in Default
An examination of the records of the entire proceedings
shows that three lawyers filed and signed pleadings on
behalf of Mrs. Cerezo, namely, Atty. Daga, Atty. Valera, and
Atty. Cerezo. Despite their number, Mrs. Cerezos counsels
failed to avail of the proper remedies. It is either by sheer
ignorance or by malicious manipulation of legal
technicalities that they have managed to delay the
disposition of the present case, to the detriment of pauper
litigant Tuazon.
Mrs. Cerezo claims she did not receive any copy of the
order declaring the Cerezo spouses in default. Mrs. Cerezo
asserts that she only came to know of the default order on
25 June 1995, when she received a copy of the decision. On
10 July 1995, Mrs. Cerezo filed before the trial court a
Page 16 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, alleging

fraud, mistake, or excusable negligence as grounds. On 4
March 1998, the trial court denied Mrs. Cerezos petition
for relief from judgment. The trial court stated that Mrs.
Cerezo could have availed of appeal as a remedy and that
she failed to prove that the judgment was entered through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Mrs.
Cerezo then filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 assailing the denial of
the petition for relief from judgment. On 21 January 1999,
the Court of Appeals dismissed Mrs. Cerezos petition. On
24 February 1999, the appellate court denied Mrs. Cerezos
motion for reconsideration. On 11 March 1999, Mrs. Cerezo
filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, questioning the denial of the petition for
relief from judgment. We denied the petition and our
resolution became final and executory on 28 June 1999.
_______________
21
Ibid., pp. 6-7.

180
180

Cerezo vs. Tuazon
On 6 July 1999, a mere eight days after our resolution

became final and executory, Mrs. Cerezo filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment
of the trial court under Rule 47. Meanwhile, on 25 August
1999, the trial court issued over the objection of Mrs.
Cerezo an order of execution of the judgment in Civil Case
No. 7415. On 21 October 1999, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment. On 20
January 2000, the Court of Appeals denied Mrs. Cerezos
motion for reconsideration. On 7 February 2000, Mrs.
Cerezo filed the present petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 challenging the dismissal of her petition for
annulment of judgment.
22
Lina v. Court of Appeals enumerates the remedies
available to a party declared in default:
Page 17 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after

discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion
under oath to set aside the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that
he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now
Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when
the defendant discovered the default, but before the
same has become final and executory, he may file a
motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the
judgment has become final and executory, he may
file a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section
1] of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41).
(Emphasis added)
Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a
judgment by default is also available if the trial court
improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial
court properly declared a party in default,
if grave abuse of
23
discretion attended such declaration.
_______________
22
No. L-63397, 9 April 1985, 135 SCRA 637.
23
Pacete v. Cariaga, Jr., G.R. No. 53880, 17 March 1994, 231 SCRA
321. See also Matute v. Court of Appeals, 136 Phil. 162; 26 SCRA 768
(1969); Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation v. Vallejos, No. L38974, 25 March 1976, 63 SCRA 285.
181
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
181
Cerezo vs. Tuazon

Mrs. Cerezo admitted that she received a copy of the trial
Page 18 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
courts decision on 25 June 1995. Based on this admission,

Mrs. Cerezo had at least three remedies at her disposal: an
appeal, a motion for new trial, or a petition for certiorari.
24
Mrs. Cerezo could have appealed under Rule 41 from
the default judgment within 15 days from notice of the
judgment. She could have availed of the power of the Court
of Appeals to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence, and perform all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised
in cases falling within its appellate
25
jurisdiction.
26
Mrs. Cerezo also had the option to file under Rule 37 a
motion for new trial within the period for taking an appeal.
If the trial court grants a new trial, the original judgment
is vacated, and the action will stand for trial de novo. The
recorded evidence taken in the former trial, as far as the
same is material and competent to establish the issues,
27
shall be used at the new trial without retaking the same.
Mrs. Cerezo also had the alternative of filing under Rule
28
65 a petition for certiorari assailing the order of default
within 60 days
_______________
24
Section 3, Rule 41.
25
Section 9(3), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
26
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration.Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved

party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order
and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially
affecting the substantial rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party
has probably been impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented
would probably alter the result.
xxx
27
28
Sections 1 and 6, Rule 37.

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or

in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
Page 19 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person
182
182

Cerezo vs. Tuazon
from notice of the judgment. An order of default is

interlocutory, and an aggrieved party may file
an
29
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. In a
petition for certiorari, the appellate court may declare void
both the order of default and the judgment of default.
Clearly, Mrs. Cerezo had every opportunity to avail of
these remedies within the reglementary periods provided
under the Rules of Court. However, Mrs. Cerezo opted to
file a petition for relief from judgment, which is available
only in exceptional cases. A petition for relief from
judgment should be filed within the reglementary period of
60 days from knowledge of judgment and six months from
entry of judgment,
pursuant to Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil
30
Procedure. Tuason v. Court of
_______________
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, allegingthe
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annullingor
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxx
Section 4. Where petition filed.The petition may be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in
the Supreme Court; or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of
a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction.
If it involves acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable
only by the Court of Appeals.
Page 20 of 29
29
30
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
Section 1, Rule 41.

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other pro-
ceedings.When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other

proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition
in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.
Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.A petition
provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified,
filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken;
x x x.
183
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
183
Cerezo vs. Tuazon

31
Appeals explained the nature of a petition for relief from

judgment:
When a party has another remedy available to him, which may
either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision
of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking
such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief
will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects
of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his
own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to
revive the right to appeal which has been lost thru inexcusable
negligence.
Evidently, there was no fraud, accident, mistake, or

excusable negligence that prevented Mrs. Cerezo from
filing an appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for
certiorari. It was error for her to avail of a petition for relief
from judgment.
After our resolution denying Mrs. Cerezos petition for
relief became final and executory, Mrs. Cerezo, in her last
ditch attempt to evade liability, filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the
Page 21 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
trial court. Annulment is available only on the grounds of

extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic
fraud, a party must file the petition within four years from
its discovery, and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before
laches or estoppel bars the petition. Extrinsic fraud is not a
valid ground if such fraud was used as a ground, or could
have been used as a ground, in 32a motion for new trial or
petition for relief from judgment.
Mrs. Cerezo insists that lack of jurisdiction, not extrinsic
fraud, was her ground for filing the petition for annulment
of judgment. However, a party may avail of the remedy of
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 only if the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment, or other appropriate remedies
are no longer
33
available through no fault of the party.
_______________
See Turqueza v. Hernando, No. L-51626, 30 April 1980, 97 SCRA 483.
31 326 Phil. 169; 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
32
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 47.
33
Cipriano M. Lazaro v. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan),
Inc. and The Register of Deeds of Valenzuela City, G.R. No. 139895, 15
August 2003; 409 SCRA 186; Teresita Villasor Manipor v. Spouses
184
184

Cerezo vs. Tuazon
Mrs. Cerezo could have availed of a new trial or appeal but

through her own fault she erroneously availed of the
remedy of a petition for relief, which was denied with
finality. Thus, Mrs. Cerezo may no longer avail of the
remedy of annulment.
In any event, the trial court clearly acquired jurisdiction
over Mrs. Cerezos person. Mrs. Cerezo actively
participated in the proceedings before the trial court,
submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The
defense of lack of jurisdiction fails in light of her active
participation in the trial court proceedings. Estoppel or
Page 22 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
laches may also bar lack of jurisdiction as a ground for

nullity especially if raised for the first time on appeal by a
party who participated in the proceedings
before the trial
34
court, as what happened in this case.
For these reasons, the present petition should be
dismissed for utter lack of merit. The extraordinary action
to annul a final judgment is restricted to the grounds
specified in the rules. The reason for the restriction is to
prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a
losing party to make a complete farce of a duly
promulgated decision that has long become final and
executory. There would be no end to litigation if parties
who have unsuccessfully availed of any of the appropriate
remedies or lost them through their fault
could still bring
35
an action for annulment of judgment. Nevertheless, we
shall discuss the issues raised in the present petition to
clear any doubt about the correctness of the decision of the
trial court.
Mrs. Cerezos Liability and
Acquisition of Jurisdiction
the
Trial
Courts
Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition

for annulment is lack of jurisdiction. Mrs. Cerezo asserts
that the trial court could not validly render judgment since
it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs, Cerezo
points out that there was no service of summons on
Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to
institute a separate civil action for damages in the
_______________
Pablo and Antonia Ricafort, G.R. No. 150159, 25 July 2003, 407 SCRA
298.
34 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 181 Phil. 556; 23 SCRA 29 (1968).
35
See Ibabao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-74848, 20 May
1987, 150 SCRA 76.

185
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
185
Page 23 of 29
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Cerezo vs. Tuazon

criminal action. Such contention betrays a faulty
foundation. Mrs. Cerezos contention proceeds from the
point of view of criminal law and not of civil law, while the
basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under
the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code.
The same negligent act may produce civil liability
arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may
choose between the two remedies. An action based on a
quasi-delict
may proceed independently from the criminal
36
action. There is, however, a distinction between civil
liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from
a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a
delict or a quasi-delict, affects
the procedural and
37
jurisdictional issues of the action.
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a
quasidelict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs.
Cerezo, without exercising due care and diligence in the
supervision and management of her employees and buses,
hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled
because of Forondas recklessness, gross negligence and
imprudence, aggravated by Mrs. Cerezos lack of due care
and diligence in the selection 38and supervision of her
employees, particularly Foronda.
The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Article 2180 states in part:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda is not an

indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is
one whose interest is affected by the courts action in the
litigation, and without
_______________
36
See Article 2177, Civil Code of the Philippines. Compare Sections 1
Page 24 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
and 3, Rule 111, 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure with Sections 1 and 3,
Rule 111, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
37
See Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 (1942).
38
CA Rollo, pp. 8-9.

186
186

Cerezo vs. Tuazon
39
whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However,

Mrs. Cerezos liability as an employer in an action for a
quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and
direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final
resolution of Tuazons action for damages against Mrs.
Cerezo.
The responsibility of two or40more persons who are liable
for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary
obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each
debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor
is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no
merger or renunciation
of rights, but only mutual
41
representation. Where the obligation of the parties is
solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the
other is not even a necessary
party because complete relief
42
is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over
Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect
damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employers liability based on a quasi-delict
is primary and direct, while the43employers liability based
on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words primary and
direct, as contrasted with subsidiary, refer to the remedy
provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather
than to
44
the character and limits of the obligation. Although
liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent
act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the
employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the
law presumes that the employer has himself committed an
act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage.
This is the fault that the law condemns. While the
employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the
employees criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly
Page 25 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in

failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and
_______________
39
Imson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106436, 8 December 1994, 239
SCRA 59.
40
Article 2194, Civil Code of the Philippines.
41
Quiombing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93219, 30 August 1990,
189 SCRA 331 (citing Tolentino, IV Civil Code of the Philippines 218
[1985 ed.])
42 Ibid., (citing Feria, Civil Procedure 153 [1969 ed.]).
43
Poblete v. Fabros, No. L-29803, 14 September 1979, 93 SCRA 200.
44
33A Words and Phrases 215 (1971 ed.)

187
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
187
Cerezo vs. Tuazon

supervising his employee. The idea45 that the employers
liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible
(for another), without including the author of the act. The action
against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the
existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is
not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the
judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is
subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of
46
the employer) is in itself a principal action.
Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to

acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial courts
acquisition of jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to
dispose of the present case on the merits.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce
the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal
negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer liable in a
subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party
must initiate a criminal action where the employees delict
Page 26 of 29
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47
and corresponding primary liability are established. If the

present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial courts
jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the
present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo
and not for the delict of Foronda.
The Cerezo spouses contention that summons be served
anew on them is untenable in light of their participation in
the trial court proceedings. To uphold the Cerezo spouses
48
contention would make a fetish of a technicality.
Moreover, any irregularity in the service of summons that
might have vitiated the trial courts juris_______________
45
See Barredo v. Garcia, supra note 37 (1942) (citing Amandi, 4
Cuestionario del Cdigo Civil Reformado 429, 430).

46
Ibid., (citing Laurent, 20 Principles of French Civil Law 734-735
[Spanish translation]).
47
Poblete v. Fabros, supra note 43; Franco v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 71137, 5 October 1989, 178 SCRA 331.

48
Gumabay v. Baralin, No. L-30683, 77 SCRA 258, 31 May 1977; Rule
14, Section 20.

188
188

Cerezo vs. Tuazon
diction over the persons of the Cerezo spouses was deemed

waived when the
Cerezo spouses filed a petition for relief
49
from judgment.
We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction and was
competent to decide the case in favor of Tuazon and against
Mrs. Cerezo even in the absence of Foronda. Contrary to
Mrs. Cerezos contention, Foronda is not an indispensable
party to the present case. It is not even necessary for
Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action
because he opted to file a civil action for damages against
Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for her
own civil negligence. The words of Justice Jorge Bocobo in
Barredo v. Garcia still hold true today as much as it did in
1942:
Page 27 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
x x x [T]o hold that there is only one way to make defendants

liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the
latters) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the
plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining
relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also
a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article [2180] of the Civil
Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil
wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is
wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and other similar
public conveyances do not have sufficient means with which to pay
damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to
go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to
50
shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is due51on the amount

of damages adjudged by the trial court. The 6% per
annum interest shall commence from 30 May 1995, the
date of the decision of the trial court. Upon finality of this
decision, interest at 12% per annum, in lieu of 6% per
annum, is due on the amount of damages adjudged by the
trial court until full payment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition for
review. The Resolution dated 21 October 1999 of the Court
of Appeals in CA_______________
49
See J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Estabillo, No. L-20610, 9 January
1975, 62 SCRA 1.
50
Barredo v. Garcia, supra note 36, pp. 620-621.
51
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 12
July 1994, 234 SCRA 78; Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., No. L-59096, 11
October 1985, 139 SCRA 260.
189
VOL. 426, MARCH 23, 2004
189
L.T. Datu & Co., Inc. vs. Sy
Page 28 of 29
9/15/15, 9:07 PM
G.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its Resolution dated 20

January 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount
due shall earn legal interest at 6% per annum computed
from 30 May 1995, the date of the trial courts decision.
Upon finality of this decision, the amount due shall earn
interest at 12% per annum, in lieu of 6% per annum, until
full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Ynares-Santiago and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., On Official Leave.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.The annulment of a judgment may be based only
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
(Republic vs. Heirs of Sancho Magdato, 340 SCRA 115
[2000])
o0o
Page 29 of 29
338
9/15/15, 11:03 PM

Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada
23
MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. Hon. THELMA

A. PONFERRADA, in Her Official Capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and GLADYS
NOCOM, respondents.
Actions; Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Parties; An
offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime;
Exceptions.Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may
intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following
instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law
defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a
private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense,
the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they
waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the
right to do so, or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of
these instances, the private complainants interest in the case
disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of
the public prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply to the instant
case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from
intervening in the estafa suit.
Same; Same; Estafa; Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22); While the
single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct
criminal offensesestafa and violation of B.P. 22the same involves
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014fd187db11e002da000a0094004f00ee/p/AJQ530/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 21
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339
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
339
only one civil liability for the offended party since he sustained only
a single injury.True, each of the overt acts in these instances may
give rise to two criminal liabilitiesone for estafa and another for
violation of BP 22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing check
involves only one civil liability for the offended party, who has
sustained only a single injury. This is the import of Banal v. Tadeo,
which we quote in part as follows: Generally, the basis of civil
liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law
that Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable (Art. 100, The
Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the
traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends
two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the
political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2)
the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor,
chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by
the same punishable act or omission. However, this rather broad
and general provision is among the most complex and controversial
topics in criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its implications
especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime
in one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a
separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of the
criminal prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many
legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally
accepted notion that the civil liability actually arises from the crime
when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or omission
is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused
damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily
see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation
and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable
by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil
liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage
or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.
Page 2 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil

action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally
liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is
punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material
damage to another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and
Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).
340
340

Same; Same; Same; Same; Forum Shopping; The possible single

liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the
subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case
and the BP 22 violation prosecution, and as both remedies are
simultaneously available to such party, there can be no forum
shopping.The possible single civil liability arising from the act of
issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions
deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation
prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically
in the present case, the institution of a civil action without need of
election by the offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously
available to this party, there can be no forum shopping.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Election of Remedies;
Words and Phrases; In its broad sense, election of remedies refers to
the choice by a party to an action of one of two or more coexisting
remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of the same
facts, but the term has been generally limited to a choice by a party
between inconsistent remedial rights, the assertion of one being
necessarily repugnant to, or a repudiation of, the other.Petitioner
is actually raising the doctrine of election of remedies. In its broad
sense, election of remedies refers to the choice by a party to an
action of one of two or more coexisting remedial rights, where
several such rights arise out of the same facts, but the term has
been generally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent
remedial rights, the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to,
or a repudiation of, the other. In its more restricted and technical
sense, the election of remedies is the adoption of one of two or more
Page 3 of 21
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coexisting ones, with the effect of precluding a resort to the others.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While some American
authorities hold that the mere initiation of proceedings constitutes a
binding choice of remedies that precludes pursuit of alternative
courses, the better rule is that no binding election occurs before a
decision on the merits is had or a detriment to the other party
supervenes.The Court further elucidates in Mellon Bank v.
Magsino as follows: As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose of
the doctrine of election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any
remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. It is
regarded as an application of the law of estoppel, upon the theory
that a party can341
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
341

not, in the assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions which
form the basis of his respective remedies. However, when a certain
state of facts under the law entitles a party to alternative remedies,
both founded upon the identical state of facts, these remedies are
not considered inconsistent remedies. In such case, the invocation of
one remedy is not an election which will bar the other, unless the
suit upon the remedy first invoked shall reach the stage of final
adjudication or unless by the invocation of the remedy first sought
to be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an advantage thereby
or caused detriment or change of situation to the other. It must be
pointed out that ordinarily, election of remedies is not made until
the judicial proceedings has gone to judgment on the merits.
Consonant with these rulings, this Court, through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, opined that while some American authorities hold that the
mere initiation of proceedings constitutes a binding choice of
remedies that precludes pursuit of alternative courses, the better
rule is that no binding election occurs before a decision on the merits
is had or a detriment to the other party supervenes. This is because
the principle of election of remedies is discordant with the modern
procedural concepts embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure which
permits a party to seek inconsistent remedies in his claim for relief
Page 4 of 21
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without being required to elect between them at the pleading stage of

the litigation. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the
Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a
criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes
the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action,
even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check.In the
present cases before us, the institution of the civil actions with the
estafa cases and the inclusion of another set of civil actions with the
BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each
other. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of
a civil action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding
civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same
check.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Filing Fees; While ordinarily no
filing fees were charged for actual damages in criminal cases, the
rule on the necessary inclusion of a civil action with the payment of
filing fees based on the face value of the check involved was laid
down to prevent the practice of creditors of using the threat of a
criminal
342
342

prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge.The purpose of

Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by Justice Florenz D. Regalado
(ret.), former chairman of the committee tasked with the revision of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. He clarified that the special rule
on BP 22 cases was added, because the dockets of the courts were
clogged with such litigations; creditors were using the courts as
collectors. While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for actual
damages in criminal cases, the rule on the necessary inclusion of a
civil action with the payment of filing fees based on the face value of
the check involved was laid down to prevent the practice of
creditors of using the threat of a criminal prosecution to collect on
their credit free of charge. Clearly, it was not the intent of the
special rule to preclude the prosecution of the civil action that
Page 5 of 21
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corresponds to the estafa case, should the latter also be filed. The
crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22 are different and distinct
from each other. There is no identity of offenses involved, for which
legal jeopardy in one case may be invoked in the other. The offenses
charged in the informations are perfectly distinct from each other in
point of law, however nearly they may be connected in point of fact.
Same; Same; Same; Same; What Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court prohibits is the reservation to file the corresponding
civil action; The fact that the Rules do not allow the reservations of
civil action in BP 22 cases cannot deprive the private complainant of
the right to protect her interests in the criminal action for estafain
promulgating the Rules, the Supreme Court did not intend to leave
the offended parties without any remedy to protect their interests in
estafa cases.What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court prohibits is
the reservation to file the corresponding civil action. The criminal
action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
[U]nless a separate civil action has been filed before the institution
of the criminal action, no such civil action can be instituted after the
criminal action has been filed as the same has been included
therein. In the instant case, the criminal action for estafa was
admittedly filed prior to the criminal case for violation of BP 22,
with the corresponding filing fees for the inclusion of the
corresponding civil action paid accordingly. Furthermore, the fact
that the Rules do not allow the reservation of civil actions in BP 22
cases cannot deprive private complainant of the right to protect her
interests in the criminal action for estafa. Nothing in the current
law or rules on BP 22 vests the jurisdiction of the corresponding
civil case exclusively in the
343
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
343

court trying the BP 22 criminal case. In promulgating the Rules,
this Court did not intend to leave the offended parties without any
remedy to protect their interests in estafa cases. Its power to
promulgate the Rules of Court is limited in the sense that rules
shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Private
Page 6 of 21
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complainants intervention in the prosecution of estafa is justified

not only for the prosecution of her interests, but also for the speedy
and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; A recovery by
the offended party under one remedy necessarily bars that under the
otherobviously stemming from the fundamental rule against
unjust enrichment, this is in essence the rationale for the
proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or
omission.The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that
the private prosecutor may intervene before the RTC in the
proceedings for estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of the
corresponding civil action in the proceedings for violation of BP 22
pending before the MTC. A recovery by the offended party under
one remedy, however, necessarily bars that under the other.
Obviously stemming from the fundamental rule against unjust
enrichment, this is in essence the rationale for the proscription in
our law against double recovery for the same act or omission.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
RRV Legal Consultancy Firm for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing
check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). The
Rules of Court allow the offended party to intervene via a
private prosecutor in each of these two penal proceedings.
However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising
from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either
344
344

criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in

Page 7 of 21
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the other criminal action. While the law allows two

simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it
authorizes recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes
arise from a single set of facts, only one civil liability
attaches to it.
The Case
1
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the2

Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the July 27, 2002 Order
of the Regional Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 104) in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-106256 to3 Q-01-106259. Also
assailed is the August 16, 2002 Order of the RTC denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The first assailed
Order is quoted in full as follows:
For consideration is the opposition of the accused, through counsel,
to the formal entry of appearance of private prosecutor. Accused,
through counsel, contends that the private prosecutor is barred
from appearing before this Court as his appearance is limited to the
civil aspect which must be presented and asserted in B.P. 22 cases
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
The private prosecutor submitted comment stating that the
offended party did not manifest within fifteen (15) days following
the filing of the information that the civil liability arising from the
crime has been or would be separately prosecuted and that she
should therefore be required to pay the legal fees pursuant to
Section 20 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Considering that the prosecution under B.P. 22 is without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the
Revised Penal Code (BP 22, Sec. 5), the civil action for the recovery
of the civil liability arising from the estafa cases pending before this
Court is deemed instituted with the criminal action (Rule 111, Sec.
1 [a]).
_______________
1
Rollo, pp. 3-22.
Id., p. 23. Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.
Id., p. 24-27.
345
Page 8 of 21
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
345

The offended party may thus intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense (Rule 110, Sec. 16).
WHEREFORE, the appearance of a private prosecutor shall be
allowed upon payment of the legal fees for these estafa cases
pending before this Court pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the
4
Rules of Court, as amended.
The Facts
The undisputed facts are narrated by petitioner as follows:
On 10 December 2001, the Honorable Assistant City Prosecutor
Rossana S. Morales-Montojo of Quezon City Prosecutors Office
issued her Resolution in I.S. No. 01-15902, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
Premises considered, there being PROBABLE CAUSE to charge
respondent for ESTAFA under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as amended by
PD 818 and for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, it is respectfully
recommended that the attached Information be approved and filed in
Court.
As a consequence thereof, separate informations were

separately filed against herein [p]etitioner before proper [c]ourts,
for Estafa and [v]iolation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Upon payment of the assessed and required docket fees by the
[p]rivate [c]omplainant, the informations for [v]iolation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against herein [p]etitioner were filed and raffled
to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 42, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 0108033 to 36.
On the other hand, the informations for [e]stafa cases against
herein [p]etitioner were likewise filed and raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-106256 to 59.
On 17 June 2002, petitioner through counsel filed in open court
before the [p]ublic [r]espondent an Opposition to the Formal Entry
of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor dated 14 June 2002.
_______________
Page 9 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
June 27, 2002 Order; Rollo, p. 23.

346
346

The [p]ublic [r]espondent court during the said hearing noted the
Formal Entry of Appearance of Atty. Felix R. Solomon as [p]rivate
[p]rosecutor as well as the Opposition filed thereto by herein
[p]etitioner. x x x.
As ordered by the Court, [p]rivate [c]omplainant through
counsel filed her Comment to the Opposition of herein [p]etitioner.
On 27 June 2002, the [p]ublic [r]espondent court issued the first
assailed Order allowing the appearance of the [p]rivate [p]rosecutor
in the above-entitled criminal cases upon payment of the legal fees
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
On 31 July 2002, [a]ccused through counsel filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated 26 July 2002.
On 16 August 2002, the [p]ublic [r]espondent court issued the
second assailed Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
5
herein [p]etitioner.
Ruling of the Trial Court

Noting petitioners opposition to the private prosecutors
entry of appearance, the RTC held that the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is deemed instituted, unless the offended party (1)
waives the civil action, (2) reserves the right to institute it
separately, or (3) institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. Considering that the offended party had
paid the corresponding filing fee for the estafa cases prior
to the filing of the BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), the RTC allowed the private prosecutor to
appear and intervene in6 the proceedings.
Hence, this Petition.
_______________
Page 10 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 153-155.
The case was deemed submitted for decision on May 28, 2004, upon
receipt by this Court of Petitioners Memorandum signed by Atty.

Redemberto R. Villanueva. Respondents Manifestation and Motion For
Leave to Adopt Comment as Memorandum, signed by Assistant Solicitor
General Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Associate
347
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
347
Issues
Petitioner raises
consideration:
this
sole
issue
for
the
Courts
Whether or not a [p]rivate [p]rosecutor can be allowed to intervene

and participate in the proceedings of the above-entitled [e]stafa
cases for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability
arising from the issuance of the checks involved which is also
7
subject matter of the pending B.P. 22 cases.
The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue: Civil Action in BP 22 Case Not a Bar
to Civil Action in Estafa Case
Petitioner theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising
from the criminal case pending before the MTC for
violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the
corresponding civil action in the criminal case for estafa
now pending before the RTC. She hinges her theory on the
following provisions of Rules 110 and 111 of the Rules of
Court:
SECTION 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.
Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in
the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
Page 11 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When
a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
_______________
Solicitor Josephine de Sagon Mejia, was received by the Court on August 20,
2003.
7
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; Rollo, p. 155.
348
348

the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against
the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or
information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment awarding such damages.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any
of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing
fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment.
Page 12 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the
civil and criminal actions.
Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may

intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the
following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime
and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability
arises in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when,
from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are
entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to
institute a civil action, (b) ex349
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
349

pressly reserve the right to do so, or (c) the suit has already
been instituted. In any of these instances, the private
complainants interest in the case disappears and criminal
prosecution8 becomes the sole function of the public
prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply to the instant
case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from
intervening in the estafa suit.
True, each of the overt acts in these instances may give
rise to two criminal liabilitiesone for estafa and another
for violation of BP 22. But every such act of issuing a
bouncing check involves only one civil liability for the9
offended party, who has sustained only
a single injury.
10
This is the import of Banal v. Tadeo, which we quote in
part as follows:
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that Every man criminally liable
is also civilly liable (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying
this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person
commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law
Page 13 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society

whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or
directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
However, this rather broad and general provision is among the most
complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be
misleading in its implications especially where the same act or
omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in
another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed
independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which
it is intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a
misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion that the civil
liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate
analysis, it does not. While an act or omission is felonious because it
is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime
_______________
8
Gorospe v. Gamaitan, 98 Phil. 600, 602, March 14, 1956.
See Joseph v. Bautista, 170 SCRA 540, February 23, 1989.
10
156 SCRA 325, 329-330, December 11, 1987, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
350
350

but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things

pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil
liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to
repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his
own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or
not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability
will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or
omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct
and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is
evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in
criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act
or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or
not it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco,
Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp.
246-247).
Page 14 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act
of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil
actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP
22 violation prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and
violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly
allows, even automatically in the present case, the
institution of a civil action without need of election by the
offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously
11
available to this party, there can be no forum shopping.
Hence, this Court cannot agree with what petitioner
ultimately espouses. At the present stage, no judgment on
the civil liability has been rendered in either criminal case.
There is as yet no call for the offended party to elect
remedies and, after choosing one of them, be considered
barred from others available to her.
Election of Remedies
Petitioner is actually raising the doctrine of election of
remedies. In its broad sense, election of remedies refers to
the choice by a party to an action of one of two or more
coex_______________
11
See Cancio v. Isip, 391 SCRA 393, November 12, 2002.

351
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
351

isting remedial rights, where several such rights arise out
of the same facts, but the term has been generally limited
to a choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights,
the assertion of one being 12
necessarily repugnant to, or a
repudiation of, the other. In its more restricted and
technical sense, the election of remedies is the adoption of
one of two or more coexisting13ones, with the effect of
precluding a resort to the others.
The 14
Court further elucidates in Mellon Bank v.
Magsino as follows:
Page 15 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose of the doctrine of

election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to
15
prevent double redress for a single wrong. It is regarded as an
application of the law of estoppel, upon the theory that a party
cannot, in the assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions
which form the basis of his respective remedies. However, when a
certain state of facts under the law entitles a party to alternative
remedies, both founded upon the identical state of facts, these
remedies are not considered inconsistent remedies. In such case,
the invocation of one remedy is not an election which will bar the
other, unless the suit upon the remedy first invoked shall reach the
stage of final adjudication or unless by the invocation of the remedy
first sought to be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an
advantage thereby or caused detriment or change of situation to the
16
other. It must be
_______________
12
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, 190 SCRA 633, 649, October 18, 1990, per
Fernan, CJ.
13
Id., citing People v. Court of Appeals, No. 54641, November 28, 1980, 101
SCRA 450, 463-464 citing Whitney v. Vermon [Tex. Civ. A] 154, 264, 267 and
Southern R. Co. v. Attalla, 147 Ala. 653, 41 S. 664.
14
Ibid.
15
Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 603 P. 2d 793.
16
Giron v. Housing Authority of Opelousas, 393 So. 2d 1267.
352
352

pointed out that ordinarily, election of remedies is not made until

17
the judicial proceedings has gone to judgment on the merits.
Consonant with these rulings, this Court, through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, opined that while some American authorities hold that the
mere initiation of proceedings constitutes a binding choice of
remedies that precludes pursuit of alternative courses, the better
rule is that no binding election occurs before a decision on the merits
18
is had or a detriment to the other party supervenes. This is because
the principle of election of remedies is discordant with the modern
procedural concepts embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure which
Page 16 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
permits a party to seek inconsistent remedies in his claim for relief

without being required to elect between them at the pleading stage of
19
the litigation.
In the present cases before us, the institution of the civil

actions with the estafa cases and the inclusion of another
set of civil actions with the BP 22 cases are not exactly
repugnant or inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the
Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil action
in a20criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law precludes the institution in an estafa case of the
corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to
the issuance of the same check.
The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by
Justice Florenz D. Regalado (ret.), former chairman of the
committee tasked with the revision of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. He clarified that the special rule on BP 22 cases
was added, because the dockets of the courts were clogged
with such litigations; creditors were using the courts as
collectors. While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for
actual damages in criminal cases, the rule on the necessary
inclusion
_______________
17
Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Tracy, 557 P. 2d 639,
276 Or. 1193; Johnson v. Daves Auto Center, 257 Or. 34, 476 P. 2d 190.
18
Radiowealth, Inc. v Lavin, L-18563, April 27, 1963, 7 SCRA 804.
19
Giron v. Housing Authority of the City of Opelousas, supra.
20
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

353
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
353

of a civil action with the payment of filing fees based on the
face value of the check involved was laid down to prevent
the practice of creditors of using the threat of a 21criminal
prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge.
Clearly, it was not the intent of the special rule to
preclude the prosecution of the civil action that corresponds
Page 17 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
to the estafa case, should the latter also be filed. The

crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22 are different and
distinct from each other. There is no identity of offenses
involved, for which legal jeopardy in one case may be
invoked in the other. The offenses charged in the
informations are perfectly distinct from each other in point
of law,
however nearly they may be connected in point of
22
fact.
What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court prohibits is the
reservation to file the corresponding civil action. The
criminal action shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. [U]nless a separate civil action
has been filed before the institution of the criminal action,
no such civil action can be instituted after the criminal
action has
been filed as the same has been included
23
therein. In the instant case, the criminal action for estafa
was admittedly filed prior to the criminal case for violation
of BP 22, with the corresponding filing fees for the
inclusion 24
of the corresponding civil action paid
accordingly.
_______________
21
Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 9th
revised ed., pp. 293-294.

22
23
Ada v. Virola, 172 SCRA 336, 341, April 17, 1989.

Agpalo, Handbook on Criminal Procedure (2001), pp. 96-97.
Emphasis supplied.
24
Section 20, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 20. Other Fees.The following fees shall also be collected by the clerks
of Regional Trial Courts or courts of the first level, as the case may be:
(a) In estafa cases where the offended party fails to manifest within fifteen
(15) days following the filing of the in-
354
354

Furthermore, the fact that the Rules do not allow the

reservation of civil actions in BP 22 cases cannot deprive
Page 18 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
private complainant of the right to protect her interests in

the criminal action for estafa. Nothing in the current law or
rules on BP 22 vests the jurisdiction of the corresponding
civil case
exclusively in the court trying the BP 22 criminal
25
case.
In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not intend to
leave the offended parties without any remedy to protect
their interests in estafa cases. Its power to promulgate the
Rules of Court is limited in the sense that rules shall
not
26
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Private
complainants
_______________
formation that the civil liability arising from the crime has been or
would be separately prosecuted[.]
25
Unlike in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 (Revising
Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating A Special Court to Be Known as

Sandiganbayan and For Other Purposes, December 10, 1978), as
amended, which provides:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with
it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil
action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided,
however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter
filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be,
for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise
the separate action shall be deemed abandoned.
26
See Abellana v. Marave, 156 Phil. 79; 57 SCRA 106, May 29, 1974.
Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
xxx
xxx
355
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
355
Page 19 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM

intervention in the prosecution of estafa is justified not
only for the prosecution of her interests, but also for the
speedy and inexpensive administration
of justice as
27
mandated by the Constitution.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the
private prosecutor may intervene before the RTC in the
proceedings for estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of
the corresponding civil action in the proceedings for
violation of BP 22 pending before the MTC. A recovery by
the offended party under one remedy, however, necessarily
bars that under the other. Obviously stemming
from the
28
fundamental rule against unjust enrichment, this is in
essence the rationale for the proscription in our law against
double recovery for the same act or omission.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the
assailed Order AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
Corona, J., On Official Leave.
Petition dismissed, assailed order affirmed.
_______________
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
27
See Banal v. Tadeo Jr.; supra, p. 331.
28
Joseph v. Bautista, 170 SCRA 541, 545, February 23, 1989.

356
356
Page 20 of 21
9/15/15, 11:03 PM
Abad vs. Guimba

Notes.The judgment creditors having received what is
due them, should not seek nor be granted anything more,
not even by a final and executory judgment, for to do so
would be to sanction unjust enrichment. (Buan vs. Court of
Appeals, 235 SCRA 424 [1994])
A party can not be required to pay twice for the same
items, for it would be tantamount to unjust enrichment on
the part of the other party. (Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals,
291 SCRA 656 [1998])
o0o
Page 21 of 21
454
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. vs. Asia Dynamic

Electrix Corp.
30
HYATT
INDUSTRIAL
MANUFACTURING
CORP.,
petitioner, vs. ASIA DYNAMIC ELECTRIX CORP. and
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Actions; Criminal Procedure; Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22);
Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of
BP 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing
of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the
recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted
under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for
violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no
longer needed.
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
455
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
455
Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. vs. Asia Dynamic Electrix

Corp.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014fd189439003f0b098000a0094004f00ee/p/AJQ537/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 13
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
Same; Same; Same; The inclusion of the civil action in the

criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases
filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks.
Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but
because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for
violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees
upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help
declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors
actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee
is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the
intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis
and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even
informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal
case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed
before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also
expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for
civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed
that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate
filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a
separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a
separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The
only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the
civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have
previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of
recovering the amount of the dishon-ored checks would only prove
to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and
would further delay the final disposition of the case. This
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners rights may
be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort
to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.
In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22,
Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to
the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Litis Pendentia; Elements; The pendency of
the civil action before the court trying the criminal case bars the
filing of another civil action in another court on the ground of litis
pendentia.The pendency of the civil action before the court trying
the criminal case bars the filing of another civil action in another
court on the ground of litis pendentia. The elements of litis
pendentia as a
Page 2 of 13
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
456
456

Corp.
ground for dismissal of an action are: (1) identity of parties, or at
least such parties who represent the same interest in both actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity, with respect to the
two preceding particulars in the two cases, is such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; The Court will
certainly not allow the complainant to recover a sum of money twice
based on the same set of checks, nor will it allow it to proceed with
two actions based on the same set of checks to increase its chances of
obtaining a favorable rulingsuch runs counter to the Courts policy
against forum shopping.Petitioner contends that there is no
identity of causes of action in the civil and criminal cases as the
amount claimed in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 is greater than the
total amount of the checks involved in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S.
No. 00-01-00300. We are not persuaded. We find that the inclusion
of additional checks in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 is an attempt to
circumvent the rule against forum shopping, to make it appear that
the objects of the civil and criminal proceedings are different. It is
clear from the records that the checks involved in I.S. No. 00-0100304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 are the same checks cited by
petitioner in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493. The Court will certainly
not allow petitioner to recover a sum of money twice based on the
same set of checks. Neither will the Court allow it to proceed with
two actions based on the same set of checks to increase its chances
of obtaining a favorable ruling. Such runs counter to the Courts
policy against forum shopping which is a deplorable practice of
litigants in resorting to two different fora for the purpose of
obtaining the same relief to increase his chances of obtaining a
favorable judgment. It is a practice that ridicules the judicial
process, plays havoc with the rules on orderly procedure, and is
vexatious and unfair to the other parties of the case.
Page 3 of 13
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Alan A. Leynes for petitioner.
457
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
457

Electrix Corp.
Gloria Morte for respondent.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 8, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71467
and its resolution dated May 14, 2004. The assailed
decision and resolution reversed the order dated December
10, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 210 in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 denying the
motion to dismiss filed by herein respondent, Asia Dynamic
Electrix Corporation.
On April 4, 2001, petitioner Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City a complaint for recovery of sum
of money against respondent Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corporation. The complaint alleged that respondent
purchased from petitioner various electrical conduits and
fittings amounting P1,622,467.14. Respondent issued
several checks in favor of petitioner as payment. The
checks, however, were dishonored by the drawee bank on
the ground of insufficient funds/ account closed. The
complaint further alleged that respondent failed to pay
despite demand. It prayed that respondent be ordered to
pay 1the amount of purchase, plus interest and attorneys
fees.
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds: (1) the civil action was deemed included
in the criminal actions for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) previously filed by petitioner against the
Page 4 of 13
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
officers of respondent corporation; (2) Section 1(b) of Rule

111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits
the filing of a separate civil action in B.P. 22 cases; and (3)
respondent 2 was guilty of forum shopping and unjust
enrichment.
_______________
1
Rollo, pp. 34-39.
Rollo, pp. 41-47.

458
458

Electrix Corp.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in its order
dated December 10, 2001. It ruled that since the act
complained of arose from the alleged non-payment of the
petitioner of its contractual debt, and not the issuance of
checks with insufficient funds, in accordance with Article
31 of the Civil Code, the civil action could proceed
independently of the criminal actions. It said that Section
1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
does not apply to the obligation
in this case, it being ex3
contractu and not ex-delicto.
Respondent questioned said order before the Court of
Appeals in a petition for certiorari. The appellate court, in
its decision dated October 8, 2003, reversed the order of the
trial court. It held that the civil actions deemed instituted
with the filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22
and Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 are of the same nature, i.e.,
for sum of money between the same parties for the same
transaction. Considering that the courts where the two
criminal cases were pending acquired jurisdiction over the
civil actions, which were deemed instituted therein, the
respondent court
could no longer acquire jurisdiction over
4
the same case.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by5 the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated May
14, 2004.
Page 5 of 13
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
Hence, this petition raising the following arguments:

1. There is no identity of interests, causes of action,
and reliefs in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City and the
criminal complaints for violation of BP Blg. 22 filed
against Gil Santillan and Juanito Pamatmat before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City docketed
as I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300.
_______________
3
Rollo, pp. 59-61.
Rollo, pp. 20-28.
Rollo, pp. 31-33.

459
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
459

Electrix Corp.
2. Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping.
3. Petitioner did not violate Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when6 it
filed the complaint in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493.
The petition is unmeritorious.
It appears that prior to the filing of the case for recovery
of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, petitioner had already filed separate
criminal complaints for violation of B.P. 22 against the
officers of respondent corporation, Gil Santillan and
Juanito
Pamatmat. They were docketed
as I.S. No. 00-017
8
00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300, respectively, and were
both pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City. These cases involve the same checks which are the
subjects of Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 before the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the
civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was
Page 6 of 13
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of

the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present
revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
The reservation
to file a separate civil action is no longer
9
needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
(a) x x x
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
_______________
6
Rollo, p. 11.
Rollo, pp. 50-52.
Rollo, pp. 53-55.
Ngo vs. People, 434 SCRA 522 (2004).
460
460

Corp.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based
on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged
but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment.
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the
civil and criminal actions.
Page 7 of 13
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of

this Court. It specifically states that the criminal action for
violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant
to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for
criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil
action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules
require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the
complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court
dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors
actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no
filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages,
the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge
to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon
being paid,
10
the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion
of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the
courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also
expected to
_______________
10
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II (9th Revised
Edition), pp. 293-294.

461
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
461

Electrix Corp.
expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and
another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried.
It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules
is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The
Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil
action, which means that one can no longer file a separate
civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The
only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is
when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case.
Page 8 of 13
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Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the

civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that
a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the
amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be
costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties
and would further delay the final disposition of the case.
This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where
petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the
proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate
11
action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In
view of this special rule governing12actions for violation of
B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court
will not apply to the case at bar.
The pendency of the civil action before the court trying
the criminal case bars the filing of another civil action in
another court on the ground of litis pendentia. The
elements of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal of an
action are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties
who represent the same interest in both actions; (2)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity, with
respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, is
such that any judgment that may
_______________
11
Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325 (1987).
12
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
462
462

Electrix Corp.
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
13
is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
We reject petitioners assertion that there is no identity
of parties and causes of action between the civil case, Civil
Page 9 of 13
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Case No. MC 01-1493, and the criminal cases, I.S. No. 0001-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300.
First, the parties in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493
represent the same interests as the parties in I.S. No. 0001-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300. I.S. No. 00-01-00304
and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 were filed against the officers of
respondent corporation who signed the checks as agents
thereof. The records indicate that the checks were in fact
drawn in the account of respondent corporation. It has not
been alleged in the suit that said officers acted beyond
their authority in signing the checks, hence, their acts may
also be binding on respondent corporation, depending on
the outcome of the proceedings.
Second, Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 and I.S. No. 00-0100304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 seek to obtain the same
relief. With the implied institution of the civil liability in
the criminal actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, the two actions are merged into one composite
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the
civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish
the offender to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform
or rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
The purpose, meanwhile, of the civil action is for the
restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by
14
reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.
Hence, the relief sought in the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-0100304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 is the same
_______________
13
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Pingol Land Transport
System Co., Inc., 420 SCRA 652 (2004).

14
Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99, December
13, 2004, 446 SCRA 166.

463
VOL. 465, JULY 29, 2005
463

Electrix Corp.
Page 10 of 13
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as that sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is, the

recovery of the amount of the checks, which, according to
petitioner, represents the amount to be paid by respondent
for its purchases. To allow petitioner to proceed with Civil
Case No. MC 01-1493 despite the filing of I.S. No. 00-0100304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 might result to a double
payment of its claim.
Petitioner contends that there is no identity of causes of
action in the civil and criminal cases as the amount
claimed in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 is greater than the
total amount of the checks involved in I.S. No. 00-01-00304
and I.S. No. 00-01-00300. We are not persuaded. We find
that the inclusion of additional checks in Civil Case No.
MC 01-1493 is an attempt to circumvent the rule against
forum shopping, to make it appear that the objects of the
civil and criminal proceedings are different. It is clear from
the records
that the checks involved
in I.S. No. 00-0115
16
00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 are the same checks
17
cited by petitioner in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493. The
Court will certainly not allow petitioner to recover a sum of
money twice based on the same set of checks. Neither will
the Court allow it to proceed with two actions based on the
same set of checks to increase its chances of obtaining a
favorable ruling. Such runs counter to the Courts policy
against forum shopping which is a deplorable practice of
litigants in resorting to two different fora for the purpose of
obtaining the same relief to increase
his chances of
18
obtaining a favorable judgment. It is a practice that
ridicules the judi_______________
15
Check Nos. 0000091862, 0000110833 and 0000110918.
16
Check No. 0000110862.
17
Petitioner based its claim in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 on the
following dishonored checks: Check Nos. 91862, 110833, 11807, 110862,

110918, 110917 and 93318.
18
Jaban vs. City of Cebu, 423 SCRA 56 (2004).

464
464
Page 11 of 13
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Electrix Corp.
cial process, plays havoc with the rules on orderly
procedure, 19
and is vexatious and unfair to the other parties
of the case.
Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in the assailed decision and resolution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga and ChicoNazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.The Supreme Court has laid down the
yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping as where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. (Manalo vs.
Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 752 [2001])
The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti is based on the
ancient principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly
at the expense of the other. (Genova vs. De Castro, 407
SCRA 165 [2003])
o0o
_______________
19
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Pingol Land Transport
System Company, Inc., 420 SCRA 652 (2004).

465
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Page 13 of 13
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G.R. No. 165732. December 14, 2006.
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER

PAJARILLO, petitioners, vs. LAURO TANGCO, VAL
TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO
TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO
and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondents.
Actions; Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Pleadings and Practice;
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil
liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and,
(2) independent civil liabilities, such as those arising from culpa
contractual under Article 31, intentional torts under Articles 32 and
34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, or
those where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33
of the Civil Code; The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint
itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.An act or omission
causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto,
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent
civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations
arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts
under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article
2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities
may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both
causes. It is important to determine the nature of respondents
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014fd188c7b7ae6a5a84000a0094004f00ee/p/AKB558/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 29
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cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is determined by the

facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
action.The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to
be determined not by the claim of the party filing
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
68
68

Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. vs. Tangco
the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the

complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 2176 of the Civil Code, where
it refers to a fault or negligence, covers not only acts not
punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent.The scope of Article 2176 is
not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay
v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220 (1995), we held: x x x Wellentrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77
SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that: x x x Article 2176,
where it refers to fault or negligence, covers not only acts
not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character,
whether
intentional
and
voluntary
or
negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is crimi-nally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also crimi-nally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Page 2 of 29
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or the employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or
both.As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was
69
VOL. 511, DECEMBER 14, 2006
69

negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him
after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article
2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Evidence; Appeals; Generally, factual findings of the trial court,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal; Exceptions.The issue of negligence is
factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question
of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition
for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
errors of law. Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed
by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made
Page 3 of 29
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is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is

grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the
judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Same; Witnesses; We have no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experiencewhatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.Evidence, to be
believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itselfsuch as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.
70
70

Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Employer-Employee Relationship; In the

selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records; Due
diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the employer has relations through
his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary
measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted
Page 4 of 29
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to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of

and beneficial to their employer.As the employer of Pajarillo,
Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict
committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in
the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law.
This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing
that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its
employee. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and
service records. On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision
of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of
proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures
upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure
the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said
rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting
through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on
their supervisory functions. To establish these factors in a trial
involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages are awarded to enable
the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that
will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by
reason of the defendants culpable actionits award is aimed at
restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code
provides that the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate
descen71
71
Page 5 of 29
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dants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages

for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral
damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendants
culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity of the pain
experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the
intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with
the wealth or means of the offender.
Same; Same; Same; Exemplary damages are awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions, and in quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negli-gence.We likewise uphold the award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the
Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. It is awarded as a deterrent to
socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

Padilla, Asuncion & Padilla for petitioners.
Cesar T. Ching for respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard)
and Admer
1
Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision dated July 16,
2004 and the
_______________
1
CA Rollo, pp. 127-135; Penned by Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
and concurred in by Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Fernanda

Lampas-Peralta.
Page 6 of 29
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72
72

2
Resolution dated October 20, 2004 issued by the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline
Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan
Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise
of the banks cashier as she would sign a specimen card.
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with
corresponding permit to carry the same outside her
residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was
stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from
her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly,
Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting
her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangelines husband, together with his
six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of
Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No.
0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents
reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said
criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently
convicted Pajarillo
of Homicide in its Decision dated
3
January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision
was affirmed
with modification as to the penalty in a
4
Decision dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was
made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents
filed with
5
RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages
against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and
against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by
its
_______________
2
Id., at p. 158.
Penned by Judge Percival Mandap Lopez.
Page 7 of 29
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Docketed as G.R. CR No. 23947; Penned by Justice Bernardo P.
Abesamis and concurred in by Justices Godardo A. Jacinto (retired) and

Eliezer R. delos Santos.
5
Records, pp. 1-5; Docketed as Case No. 98-417-MK.

73
73

security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
6
In their Answer, petitioners denied the material
allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangelines
death was not due to Pajarillos negligence as the latter
acted only in selfdefense. Petitioners set up a compulsory
counterclaim for moral damages and attorneys fees.
Trial thereafter ensued.
On January 10, 2003, the RTC
7
rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants
Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said
defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual
damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND
indemnity;
PESOS
(P50,000.00)
as
death
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;

4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as
exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorneys
fees; and
6. costs of suit.
For
lack
of
merit,
defendants
counterclaim
is
hereby
Page 8 of 29
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DISMISSED.
8
SO ORDERED.
_______________
6
Id., at pp. 21-30.
Id., at pp. 320-336.
Id., at p. 336.
74
74

The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It

rejected Pajarillos claim that he merely acted in selfdefense. It gave no credence to Pajarillos bare claim that
Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the
shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report
to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC
further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation
demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence
and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to
ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that
Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in
Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to
proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo
to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled
that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps
exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly
of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguards
evidence simply showed that it required its guards to
attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision
contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not
only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed
for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance
of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to
it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully
complied with.
Page 9 of 29
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Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On

July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc.s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art.
9
103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs.
_______________
9
CA Rollo, p. 134.
75
75

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA
held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts,
but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies
under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had
been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory
judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa,
he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil
liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely
dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises
from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the
civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the
extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that
the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not
exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict,
the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the
employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable
and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex
delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of
their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which
the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
Page 10 of 29
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Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari

with the following assignment of errors, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner
Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of damages and
other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner
Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the
payment of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find
that petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due dili76
76

gence in the selection and supervision of its employees, hence,

10
should be excused from any liability.
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty

of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard
should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to
respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by
respondents
is based on culpa aquiliana under Article
11
2176 of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly
and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has
established that it had exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be
exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that
respondents, in filing a separate civil action against
petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising
from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of
Safeguard as employer
under Articles 102 and 103 of the
12
Revised Penal Code is
_______________
10
Rollo, p. 16.
Page 11 of 29
11
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
CIVIL CODE, Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the

damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
12
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of
innkeepers, tavern-keepers and proprietors of establishments.In default

of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-keepers, and any
other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed
in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulations shall have been
committed by them or their employees. Innkeepers are also subsidiarily
liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value
thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposits of such
goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions
77
77

subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of employee is not available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is
only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed
is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute
it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and
Page 12 of 29
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Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil

action and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant
case must be the crime of homicide, for which he had
already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof,
thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
_______________
which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall
attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeepers employees. Art. 103. Subsidiary
civil liability of other persons.The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons,
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed
by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
78
78

An act or omission causing damage to another may give

rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual
or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil
Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and
culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code;
or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an
action independent and distinct from the criminal action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities
may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission
13
or under both causes.
It is important to determine the nature of respondents
Page 13 of 29
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is

determined by the facts alleged
in the complaint as
14
constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action
or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by
the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by
the complaint itself, its
15
allegations and prayer for relief.
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and
posted in the Ecology BankKatipunan Branch, Quezon City, who
was employed and under employment of Safeguard Security Agency,
Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship between codefendants.
_______________
13
Cancio, Jr. v. Isip, 440 Phil. 29, 34-36; 391 SCRA 393, 396-397
(2002).
14
Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 8, 20; 243 SCRA 220, 227
(1995), citing Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35512, February 29, 1988,
158 SCRA 282, 285.
15
Id., citing De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., 197
Phil. 919, 926; 112 SCRA 243, 248 (1982).

79
79

The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline
Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly without
exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the
use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M.
Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are
16
jointly and severally liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.
Thus, a reading of respondents complaint shows that the

Page 14 of 29
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latter are invoking their right to recover damages against

Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury
caused by Pajarillos act of shooting and killing Evangeline
under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions

17
resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,
we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of
Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
x x x Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence, covers
not only acts "not punishable by law but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal
_______________
16
Records, pp. 3-4.
17
Supra note 14, at pp. 20-21; p. 228.

80
80

act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or

acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award
of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
Page 15 of 29
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the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is

not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from

the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but
one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is
separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from
18
crime. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced
in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission
punishable by law.
19
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera, where the issue
involved was whether the civil action filed by plaintiffappellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime
in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the
criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the
court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the
assumption that defendant Pontinos negligence in the accident of
May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept
the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this
Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that
case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to
institute
_______________
18
Bordas v. Canadalla, G.R. No. L-30036, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
37, 39.
19
G.R. No. L-32055, February 26, 1988, 158 SCRA 168.

81
81

a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a
Page 16 of 29
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separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to

be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin
vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court
is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from
crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for
quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party
chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the
negligent act of his employee, subject to the employers defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for
damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants
reserved their right in the criminal case to file an
independent civil action did not preclude them from
20
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict. (Emphasis
supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding

Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and executory,
such 21judgment has no relevance or importance to this
case. It would have been entirely different if respondents
cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in
which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only
subsidiary liable
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
22
Penal Code.
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint,
respondents cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by
the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or the employer either in the selection of the
servant
_______________
20
Id., at pp. 170-171.
21
McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68102, July 16,
1992, 211 SCRA 517, 536.

22
Id.
Page 17 of 29
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82
82

or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection

or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was
negligent in shooting Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a
person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as a
general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review
on certiorari,23 as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
errors of law. Generally, factual findings of the trial court,
affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not
be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on
the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the
24
evidence on record.
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show
any cogent reason for us to deviate from the factual finding
of
_______________
Page 18 of 29
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23
Yambao v. Zuiga, 463 Phil. 650, 657; 418 SCRA 266, 271 (2003).
24
Child Learning Center Inc. v. Tagorio, G.R. No. 150920, November
25, 2005, 476 SCRA 236, 241-242.

83
83

the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner
Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents evidence established that Evangelines
purpose25 in going to the bank was to renew her time
deposit.
On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that
Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same
at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in selfdefense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun
at him26 at a distance of about one meter or one arms
length he stepped 27backward, loaded the chamber of his
gun and shot her. It is however unimaginable that
petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if
indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement
could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot
him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in
shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension that
Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim
is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that
prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the
28
fly over which was about 10 meters away
from
the
bank
29
and saw her talking to a man thereat; that she left the
man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached
the bank. However, except for the bare testimony of
Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline
was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting
suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is
no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head
guard or the banks branch manager regarding his concerns
or that he reported the same to the police authorities whose
outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
Page 19 of 29
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_______________
25
TSN, October 1, 1998, p. 33; TSN, November 12, 1998, p. 6.
26
TSN, April 4, 2002, p. 36.
27
Id., at p. 79.
28
Id., at p. 42.
29
Id., at pp. 40-41.

84
84

Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of

the bank, she could have already apprised herself that
Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed
with 30a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the
bank manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite
incredible that if she really had a companion, she would
leave him under the flyover which is 10 meters far from the
bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a
back-up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying
the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure
entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the
entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs
to the miraculous
31
and is outside judicial cognizance.
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before
entering the bank and was actually in the act of pulling her
gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot
her, finds support from the contentions raised in
petitioners petition for review where they argued that
when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen
pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo
who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a
dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure
Page 20 of 29
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32
instinct; that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening

act, regardless of whether or not the
gun was intended to
33
be used against petitioner Pajarillo; that the fear that was
created in the mind of petitioner Pa_______________
30
Id., at p. 99.
31
Castaares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-41269-70, August 6,
1979, 92 SCRA 568, 580.

32
Rollo, p. 17.
33
Id., at p. 18.
85
85

jarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from
her purse was suddenly very real and
the former merely
34
reacted out of pure self-preservation.
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of
Evangeline is absent, Pajarillos claim of self-defense
cannot be accepted specially when such claim was
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other
than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillos
apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a
bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that
the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of
Pajarillos imagination which caused such unfounded
unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of
contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed
firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in
such establishment where people would react instinctively
upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent,
she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun
and did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming
outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have
held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who
mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
Page 21 of 29
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We are not persuaded.

As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate
his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the
vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the
shooting incident. Evangelines death was merely due to
Pajarillos negligence in shooting her on his imagined
threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable
since it had adequately shown that it had exercised the
diligence required in the selection and supervision of its
employees. It claims that it had required the guards to
undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite
qualifications
_______________
34
Id., at p. 19.
86
86

and credentials which even the RTC found to have been

complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did
not exercise the diligence required in the supervision of its
employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts
monitoring of the activities of its personnel, wherein
supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of
the security guards which include among others, whether
or not they are in their proper post and with proper
equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the employees
performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his
firearm contrary to Safeguards operating procedure is not
sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of
proper supervision; that it was likewise error to say that
Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures
and policies were not properly implemented by reason of
one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Page 22 of 29
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable

not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and

solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the
former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the
selection and supervision of his employee by operation of
law. This presumption may be overcome only by
satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care
and the diligence of a good
87
87

father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its
employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as35 to their qualifications,
experience, and service records. On the other hand, due
diligence in the supervision of employees includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the
guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his
or its employees and the imposition of necessary
disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or
as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their
employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should
Page 23 of 29
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
be the constant concern of the employer, acting through

dependable supervisors who
should regularly report on
36
their supervisory functions. To establish these factors in a
trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers
must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
We agree with the RTCs finding that Safeguard had
exercised the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since the
record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and
neuropsychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de
Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted,
submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training
course for security guards, as well as police and NBI
clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short
of the diligence required in the supervision of its employee,
particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard
presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations,
who testi_______________
35
Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 18,
32; 298 SCRA 495, 504 (1998).

36
Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
104408, June 21, 1993, 223 SCRA 521, 540-541.

88
88

fied on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such

as the 37Guidelines of Guards
Who Will Be Assigned To
38
Banks, Weapons Training, Safeguard Training Center
39
Marksmanship
Training
Lesson
Plan,
40
Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,
it had also been
established during Cameros crossexamination that
41
Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and regulations.
Notwithstanding Cameros clarification on his re-direct
examination that these company rules and regulations are
lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors
Page 24 of 29
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during classroom instructions

and not necessary to give
42
students copy of the same, the records do not show that
Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate
training and continuous evaluation of the security guards
performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service
training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa,
his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which
was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was established
that the concept of such training was purely on security of
equipments43 to be guarded and protection of the life of the
employees.
It had not been established that after Pajarillos training
in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further training of
Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which
has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In
fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is
different from being44 on duty in a factory since a bank is a
very sensitive area.
_______________
37
Records, pp. 263-267, Exhibit 10.
38
Id., at pp. 268-270, Exhibit 11.
39
40
41
TSN, April 11, 2000, p. 26.
42
Id., at pp. 30-31.
43
TSN, May 19, 1999, pp. 15-16.
44
TSN, April 4, 2002, p. 83.

89
89

Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangelines act of
just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of
immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no
training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients
and on human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that
Page 25 of 29
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
there were inspectors who go around the bank two times a

day to see the daily performance of the security guards
assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of
such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such
inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline
could have been taken noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the
award of actual damages in the amount P157,430.00 which
were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection
with the burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts.
The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the
Civil Code provides that the spouse, legitimate children
and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish
by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are
awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the
defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed at
restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; thus
it must be proportionate to the suffering
45
inflicted. The intensity of the pain experienced by the
relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of
_______________
45
Pleyto v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, June 16, 2004, 432 SCRA 329,
342.
90
90

affection for him and bears no relation

whatsoever with the
46
wealth or means of the offender.
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral
suffering caused by Evangelines death was so sudden
causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six
children who were all minors at the time of her death. In
Page 26 of 29
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
47
People v. Teehankee, Jr., we awarded one million pesos as

moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who
was murdered. In
Metro Manila Transit Corporation v.
48
Court of Appeals, we likewise awarded the amount of one
million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third
year high school student and who was also their youngest
child who died in a vehicular accident since the girls death
left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the
respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million
pesos as Evangelines death left a void in the lives of her
husband and minor children as they were deprived of her
love and care by her untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in
the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil
Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to 49moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. It is
awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In
quasi-delict, exemplary damages may50 be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys
fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case,
exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the
award of attorneys fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
_______________
46
Secosa v. Heirs of Erwin Suarez Francisco, G.R. No. 160039, June
29, 2004, 433 SCRA 273, 282.

47
319 Phil. 128, 216; 249 SCRA 54, 125 (1995).
48
Supra note 35, at p. 44; p. 516.
49
CIVIL CODE, Art. 2229.
50
CIVIL CODE, Art. 2231.

91
91

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The
Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is
Page 27 of 29
9/15/15, 11:04 PM
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of

petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY
and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Working Chairperson), Callejo, Sr.
and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Retired as of
December 7, 2006.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.In negligence cases, the offended party (or his
heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement of
civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of
damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. (Ace Haulers Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 338 SCRA 572 [2000])
Where the loss of a hotel guests money was
consummated through the negligence of the hotel
employees in allowing the companion of said guest to open
the safety deposit box without the guests consent, both the
assisting employees and the hotel owner and operator are
solidarily liable. (YHT Realty Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 451 SCRA 638 [2005])
o0o
92
92

Sy vs. Secretary of Justice
Page 28 of 29
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Page 29 of 29
456
9/15/15, 11:06 PM

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People
*
G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Double Jeopardy;
Parties; Both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal
case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not
thereby be placed in double jeopardy; The offended parties may also
appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability.
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states thus: Any party may appeal from a judgment or
final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a
criminal case, but the government may do so only if the accused
would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy. Furthermore, the
prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should
have been given a more severe penalty. On the other hand, the
offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their
right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the
judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same
right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.
Same; Same; Same; Well-established is the principle that the
appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an
appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail, on the
rationale that the appellant loses his standing in court when he
absconds.Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that
the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an
appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second
paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides: The Court of Appeals may also, upon
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014fd189d8df54258270000a0094004f00ee/p/AKF359/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 29
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motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the

appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to
a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. This rule is
based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court
when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek
judicial relief. Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the
accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does
so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains
the principle in this wise: x x x. When, as in this case, the accused
escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in
absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless
remained at large his
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
457
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
457

appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of
this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x
Same; Same; Same; An accused who has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal rendering the judgment against him final and executory.As
to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in
Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which we quote: A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation. In the case before us,
Page 2 of 29
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the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the

proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final
and executory.
Same; Same; Independent Civil Actions; The 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed
instituted in a criminal prosecutionit is only the civil liability of
the accused arising from the crime charged that is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action.At the outset, we must explain that
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil
actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. x x x Only
the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute
it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of
the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
Same; Same; Same; The 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of
reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed
separately from criminal actionswhat is deemed instituted in every
criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising
from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts.It is clear that the
2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil
actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal
actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and
independent of any criminal prosecution based on the same act.
Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission: 1.
The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code
need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not
deemed included therein. 2.
458
458

Page 3 of 29
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The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil

action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right
to bring such action. 3. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil
liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex
delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts
or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately,
the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and
the offended party maysubject to the control of the prosecutor
still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein.
Same; Same; Subsidiary Civil Liability; Parties; The cases
dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare
that, strictly speaking, the employers are not parties to the criminal
cases instituted against their employees; While employers may assist
their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, the
former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only
defend the accused.In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a
comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it,
because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not
interpose an appeal. Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case
in which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in
such circumstances is not possible. The cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted
against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they
have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of
their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to
the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case,
the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can
only defend the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An employers appeal would violate
the employees right against double jeopardy since the judgment
against the latter could become subject to modification without his
consent.An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a
waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and
throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The
latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the, appellant. This is
Page 4 of 29
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the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of

conviction. Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse,
affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or
reduce the penalty it imposed. If the present appeal is given course,
the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open to
review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has
already been imposed by
459
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
459

the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would
thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment
against him could become subject to modification without his
consent. We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why
the accused effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It
is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating
his right against double jeopardy.
Same; Same; Same; An accused, by fleeing, exhibits contempt of
the authority of the court and places himself in a position to
speculate on his chances for a reversal.By fleeing, the herein
accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed
himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In
the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to
render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate
court. Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who
escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper authorities
becomes final and executory.
Same; Same; Same; The provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on subsidiary liabilityArticles 102 and 103are deemed written
into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.Under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the
event of the latters insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on subsidiary liabilityArticles 102 and 103are deemed
written into the judgments in the cases to which they are
Page 5 of 29
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applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial

court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer.
Same; Same; Same; To allow employers to dispute the civil
liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court;
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding
and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the
formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount.In the
absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the
offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person
who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a
criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability. To allow
employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered
by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal
the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters
consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or
defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a
criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only
with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with
460
460

regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be

separated from that of the employee.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites.Before the employers
subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate
evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the
convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind
of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in
the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the
latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The resolution of
these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the
determination must be based on the evidence that the offended
party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such
Page 6 of 29
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determination may be done in the same criminal action in which

the employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;
and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the
employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the
judgment.
Same; Same; Same; There is only one criminal case against the
accused-employee, and a finding of guilt has both criminal and civil
aspectsit is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final
as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose
liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former; Where the
civil liability of the accused-employee has become final and
enforceable by reason of his flight, then his employers subsidiary
civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.According
to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the
finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed
upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not
affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first,
for itself; and second, for its accused-employee. The untenability of
this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case
against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal
and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to
be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity
whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former. The
subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on
the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil
liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of
his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also
become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing
that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the
imposition of the primary civil liability.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; The right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process.As to the argument that
petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is
sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and
dependent upon the employees
461
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
461
Page 7 of 29
9/15/15, 11:06 PM

criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and
upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal
wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence. It should be stressed
that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a
remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
provisions of law authorizing such exercise. Hence, the legal
requirements must be strictly complied with.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; It can be said that by
jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived the
employer of the right to appeal.After a judgment has become final,
vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case. In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the
accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings before the
RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due
process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied
its day in court. In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the
accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to
appeal.

Court of Appeals.
Peter H. Santiago for petitioner.
Ramon M. Nisce collaborating counsel for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
Romulo Rivera and Benjamin Z. De Leon, Jr. private
prosecutors.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the
judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The
employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by
filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of
Page 8 of 29
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asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the

primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one
single decision that has become final and executory.
462
462

The Case
1
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule

45 of
2
the Rules of Court,
assailing the March 29, 2000 and the
3
March 27, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was
dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is
4
GRANTED and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED.
The second Resolution

denied petitioners Motion for
5
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this
wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was
found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage
to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to
pay damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum of
P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for
Page 9 of 29
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one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for

the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum of
P300,000.00 as moral damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00
as indemnity for her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for
funeral expenses, her unearned income for three years at
P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as
attorneys fees[;]
_______________
1
Rollo, pp. 9-28.
Id., pp. 30-34. Penned by Justice Mariano M. Umali and concurred in
by Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Division chair) and Edgardo P. Cruz

(member).
3
Id., pp. 36-37.
CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 34.
Annex G of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 115-124.

463
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
463

c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for her death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral
expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and
her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and
the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as
hospital expenses, doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the
orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an
additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover
future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical
expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00 as
moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as
medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and
Page 10 of 29
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P25,000.00 as moral damages;

g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical
expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss
earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the
amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as
hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for
medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical
expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual
damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for
hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual
damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as
moral damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of
the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual
damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the
owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual
damages;
The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the
insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final
and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It
is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail.
Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial
court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf
of accused.
464
464

Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of

appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the
trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On
Page 11 of 29
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December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998,

the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners]
brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to
represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The
motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On
March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant
6
motion to dismiss. (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied
the institution also of the civil action arising from the
offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against
the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an
employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed
in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be
to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the
notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been
dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and
the award of civil liability became final and executory.
Included in the civil liability of the accused was the
employers subsidiary liability.
7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
_______________
6
CA Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 31-33.
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 24, 2002,
upon this Courts receipt of respondents Memorandum signed by

Assistant Solicitors General Carlos N. Ortega and Roman G. del Rosario
and Associate Solicitor Elizabeth Victoria L. Medina. Petitioners
Memorandum, signed by Atty. Ramon M. Nisce, was received by the
Court on April 9, 2002.
Page 12 of 29
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465
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
465

A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully
participated in the defense of its accused-employee,
may
appeal
the
judgment
of
conviction
independently of the accused.
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of
Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay8 v. Adil (164
SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an
adjunct to Item A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal
from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that the
judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has
not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter
had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal
takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a

criminal case, but the government may do so only if the
Page 13 of 29
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accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.

Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground
that the10 accused should have been given a more severe
penalty. On the other hand, the
_______________
8
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II (2001, 9th revised
edition), p. 502.
10
Ibid.
466
466

offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect

to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to
appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties
should have the same right to 11
appeal as much of the
judgment as is prejudicial to them.
Appeal by the Accused
Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the
appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss
an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail.
The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
12
during the pendency of the appeal.
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose

their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they
surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they 13
are
deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused
who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who does
Page 14 of 29
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so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly

explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his
arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in absentia
proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him
and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large
his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid
provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal
14
Procedure]. x x x
_______________
11
12
People v. Ursua, 60 Phil. 252, August 1, 1934.

This is substantially the same as the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
13
People v. Del Rosario, 348 SCRA 603, December 19, 2000.
14
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra, p. 540.

467
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
467

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless
they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or
are otherwise arrested 15
within 15 days from notice of the
judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek
relief from 16the court, as they are deemed to have waived
the appeal.
Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is
explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
Page 15 of 29
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served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to

appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped

and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he
is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently,
the
17
judgment against him has become final and executory.
Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary
civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all
cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or
their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging
therein, or for
_______________
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid., citing People v. Mapalao, 274 Phil. 354; 197 SCRA 79, May 14, 1991.
17
People v. Enoja, 378 Phil. 623; 321 SCRA 7, December 17, 1999.
468
468

payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect
to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
Page 16 of 29
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Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to

employers, according to Article 103 which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now

address the main issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are
deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
x x x
xxx
x x x
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime
charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action;
that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute18 it separately, or institutes it
prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil
liability of the employer under
_______________
18
Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity & Diversity (2000 ed.), pp.
211-212.
469
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
469

Page 17 of 29
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Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by

execution on the basis
of the judgment of conviction meted
19
out to the employee.
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement
of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to
proceed separately from criminal
actions. Thus, the civil
20
actions referred to in Articles 32,
_______________
19
Id., p. 212.
20
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner

impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken
for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to
Page 18 of 29
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face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of

witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self,
or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced
470
470

21
22
23
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain

separate, distinct and independent of any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
1.
The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the

Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal
prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
_______________
by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a
statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional;
and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendants act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted),
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence:
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or
other penal statute.
21
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
Page 19 of 29
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action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.
22
ART. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses
or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life

or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and
the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The
civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support
such action.
23
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
471
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
471

2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a
separate civil action arising from the crime charged
does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party
cannot recover
more than once for the same act or
24
omission.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is
the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se
(civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising
from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact,
even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil
liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the
offended party maysubject to the control of the
prosecutorstill intervene in the criminal action,
in order
25
to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised
Penal Code, which states that [e]very
person criminally
26
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Page 20 of 29
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a

party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the
outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded
the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion
including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is
not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed
solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive
list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to
it, because in all th[o]se cases,
the accuseds employer did
27
not interpose an appeal. Indeed, petitioner cannot cite
any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely
because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they
are not parties 28to the criminal cases instituted against
their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they
have an interest therein, this fact
_______________
24
Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity & Diversity, supra, p. 214.
25
Id., pp. 214-215.
26
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
27
28
Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670, July 31,
1956.
472
472

should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability.

While they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the
former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but
can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard
Page 21 of 29
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
Against Double Jeopardy

Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accusedemployee absolved of his criminal responsibility and the
judgment reviewed as a whole. 29These intentions are
apparent from its30 Appellants Brief filed with the CA and
from its Petition before us, both of which claim that the
trial courts
finding of guilt is not supported by competent
31
evidence.
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a
waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the
appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render
judgment as law and justice dictate,
whether favorable or
32
unfavorable to the, appellant. This is the risk involved
when the 33 accused decides to appeal a sentence of
conviction. Indeed, appellate courts have the power to
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower
court
34
and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case
against the accused-employee becomes open to review. It
thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has
already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out
to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right
against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him
could become subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why
the accused effectively waived his right to appeal by
jumping bail. It is
_______________
29
30
Rollo, pp. 9-28.
31
Appellants Brief, p. 14; CA Rollo, p. 84.
32
Lontoc v. People, 74 Phil. 513, December 29, 1943.
33
People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383, December 9, 1999.
34
Lontoc v. People, supra; United States v. Abijan, 1 Phil. 83, January
7, 1902. See also 11 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
473
Page 22 of 29
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
473

clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without
violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing
the prevailing criminal procedure, the accused impliedly
withdrew his appeal by jumping bail
and thereby made the
35
judgment of the court below final. Having been a fugitive
from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have
waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction36is now final
and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc ruled:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even
by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them.
This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may
avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or
by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been
submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have
waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him.
37
x x x.
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the

authority of the court and placed himself in a position to
speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he
kept himself out of the reach of justice, but
hoped to render
38
the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is
intolerable and 39does not invite leniency on the part of the
appellate court.
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who
escapes and who refuses to surrender
to the proper
40
authorities becomes final and executory.
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right
to appeal the criminal case against the accused-employee;
that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and
that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now
final.
_______________
Page 23 of 29
35
Francisco, Criminal Procedure (1996, 3rd ed.), p. 520.
36
73 Phil. 366, October 31, 1941.
37
Id., p. 369, per Abad Santos, J.
38
Francisco, Criminal Procedure, supra, p. 520.
39
Ibid.
40
People v. Enoja, supra.
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
474
474

Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now
accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings41of this Court in
42
Miranda v. Malate Garage
&
Taxicab,
Inc.,
Alvarez
v.
CA
43
and Yusay v. Adil do not apply to the present case,
because it has followed the Courts directive to the
employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases
against their employees. By participating in the defense of
its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the
undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on
subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic
tenet they have laid downthat an employers liability in a
finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers
are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities
of
44
their employees in the event of the latters insolvency. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability
Articles 102 and 103are deemed written into the
45
judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.
Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial
court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability
of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accusedemployee and the offended party, the judgment of
conviction
should bind the person who is subsidiarily
46
liable. In effect and implication, the stigma
of a criminal
47
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
Page 24 of 29
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To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a

criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify
or
48
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By
the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal
conviction of their employ_______________
41
Supra at note 28.
42
158 SCRA 57, February 23, 1988.
43
164 SCRA 494, August 18, 1988.
44
Lagazon v. Reyes, 166 SCRA 386, October 18, 1988.
45
Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, supra.
46
Martinez v. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1, May 13, 1948.
47
Ibid.
48
Yusay v. Adil, supra; Pajarito v. Seeris, 87 SCRA 275, December
14, 1978.
475
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
475

ees without the latters consent would also result in
improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is
binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with
regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to
its amount. The liability of an 49employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee.
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted,
however, there must be adequate evidence establishing
that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the
execution against
the latter has not been satisfied due to
50
insolvency.
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a
separate civil action. But the determination must be based
on the evidence that the offended party and the employer
may fully and freely present. Such determination may be
Page 25 of 29
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
done in the same criminal action in which the employees

51
liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced; and in a
hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the
employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the
judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the
defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its
liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains
subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its
subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the
accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then
the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness
dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the
proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for
jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In
effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for
itself; and second, for its accused-employee.
_______________
49
Lagazon v. Reyes, supra; Miranda P. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,
supra.
50
Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula, 156 SCRA 779, December 22, 1987.
51
Ibid.
476
476

The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There

is only one criminal case against the accused-employee. A
finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the
height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the
accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose
liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and
dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accusedemployee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become
final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
formers subsidiary civil liability has also become
Page 26 of 29
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing

that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent
on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due
process, we reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is
the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon
the employees criminal negligence. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters
insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not
only his primary civil liability, but also his52 employers
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.
It should be stressed that the right to appeal
is neither a
53
natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a
procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by the
54
provisions of law authorizing such exercise. Hence,
the
55
legal requirements must be strictly complied with.
_______________
52
Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, supra; Martinez v. Barredo, supra.
53
Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, 384 SCRA 466, July 11, 2002.
54
Oro v. Judge Diaz, 361 SCRA 108, July 11, 2001; Mercury Drug
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 902; 335 SCRA 567, July 13, 2000;
Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 708, December 4, 1998.
55
Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, June 14, 1996; Del Rosario v. Court
of Appeals, 241 SCRA 553, February 22, 1995.

477
VOL. 427, APRIL 14, 2004
477

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the
rules on appeal as merely harmless
and trivial
56
technicalities that can be discarded.
Indeed, deviations
57
from the rules cannot be tolerated. In these times when
court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such
Page 27 of 29
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity,

so
58
as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
then the former has the correlative
right to enjoy the
59
finality of the resolution of the case.
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accusedemployee, it participated in the proceedings before the
RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was
deprived of due process. It might have lost 60
its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it
can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not
the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC
Decision against the accused. It should be clear that only
after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of
petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that
there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the
employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and
found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner
that [o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from
Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being
then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman,
61
figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x.
Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a
finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the
discharge of his duties.
_______________
56
Casim v. Flordeliza, 374 SCRA 386, January 23, 2002.
57
People v. Marong, 119 SCRA 430, December 27, 1982.
58
Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, supra.
59
Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 50,
November 28, 1996.

60
Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, supra.
61
Petition for Review, p. 2; Rollo, p. 10; Memorandum for Petitioner, p.
2; Rollo, p. 194.
478
Page 28 of 29
478
9/15/15, 11:06 PM

Litonjua vs. Fernandez
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the

assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, assailed resolutions affirmed.
Notes.While the Supreme Court has sanctioned the
enforcement of the employers subsidiary liability in the
same criminal proceedings in which the employee is
adjudged guilty, execution against the employer must not
issue as just a matter of courseit behooves the court, as a
measure of due process to the employer, to determine and
resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal
applicability and propriety of the employers liability.
(Yonaha vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 397 [1996])
A final judgment rendered in a civil case absolving the
defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action.
(Bordador vs. Luz, 283 SCRA 374 [1997])
o0o
Page 29 of 29
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001
387
Manantan vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001.
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and
MARIA NICO-LAS, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; Elements; Appeals;
There is no double jeopardy where, from a judgment of acquittal, an
appeal was brought to the Court of Appeals by the private
complainant, elevating the civil aspect of the criminal case.
Preliminarily, petitioners claim that the decision of the appellate
court awarding indemnity placed him in double jeopardy is
misplaced. The constitution provides that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a
________________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
388
388

bar to another prosecution for the same act." When a person is

charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014fd18afcd534dc3b39000a0094004f00ee/p/AKE295/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent

of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense. This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to
exist, the following elements must be established: (a) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must
be for the same offense as the first. In the instant case, petitioner
had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No.
066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The
judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however,
that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066.
Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a
second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records
clearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to
petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower courts judgment, the
appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it
order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the
same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to
speak of. Petitioners claim of having been placed in double jeopardy
is incorrect.
Same; Civil Liability; Damages; Our law recognizes two kinds
of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused
(a) first is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of and this instance closes
the door to civil liability, and, (b) second is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused, in which case even if
the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.Our law recognizes two kinds of
acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability
ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which
may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
Page 2 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of

evidence only. This is the, situation contemplated in Article 29 of
the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is for the same
act or omission. Al389
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001
389

through the two actions have different purposes, the matters
discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding
cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact
there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or
omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the
same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable.
Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioners acquittal, the Court of
Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not
precluded from looking into the question of petitioners negligence
or reckless imprudence.
Same; Same; Same; Judgments; A finding in the trial courts
judgment that a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the
accused presented itself before the Court and since said hypothesis
is consistent with the record . . . the Courts mind cannot rest on a
verdict of conviction clearly shows that the acquittal of the accused
was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been
established with moral certainty, an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt.Our scrutiny of the lower courts decision in Criminal Case
No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court that the
acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioners civil
liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial
courts declaration that did not discount the possibility that the
accused was really negligent. However, it found that a hypothesis
inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself
before the Court and since said hypothesis is consistent with the
record . . . the Courts mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction.
The foregoing clearly shows that petitioners acquittal was
predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been established
Page 3 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on

reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act
or omission lies.
Same; Same; Same; Filing Fees; Before the adoption of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111,
Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of
the Supreme Court dated July 7, 1988, it was not required that the
damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or
information; The amendment, being in the nature of a curative
statute, applies retroactively and affects pending actions.At the
time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution
of civil actions with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111,
Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by
private respondents, under said rule, it was not required that the
damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or
information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and the
390
390

amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal

Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now
required that: When the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided
in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in
an award for actual damages. In cases wherein the amount of
damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial. The
foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure at the time private respondents appealed the civil aspect
of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the
nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies retroactively
and affects pending actions as in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the civil action is impliedly
Page 4 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages

claimed by the offended parties are not included in the computation
of the filing feesfiling fees are to be paid only if other items of
damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages
are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are not so
alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.Thus, where
the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action, the actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in
this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees.
Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such as
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged in
the complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment. Recall that the information
in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of
damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure
effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages
are a first lien on the judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said
lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The
filing fees are deemed paid from the Sling of the criminal complaint
or information. We therefore find no basis for petitioners
allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and
that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
Conrado P. Aoanan for petitioner.
391
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001
391

Jose M. De Vera for private respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January
31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240,
modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066.
Page 5 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial

court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a
ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect
of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate
court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered
him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas
and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of
support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral
damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the
death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an
information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the
municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile
bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and
operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay
Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent
manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and
ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven
and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate
No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said
automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben
Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.
1
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the

charge. Trial on the merits ensued.
_________________
1
Records, p. 1.
392
392
Page 6 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM

The prosecutions evidence, as summarized by the trial
court and adopted by the appellate court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio . .
. decided to catch shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He
invited the deceased who told him that they (should) borrow the
Ford Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also from
Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera but. . . said
that the accused also wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio
and the deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan
Technical School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to
the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they
consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00 oclock noon they
went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 oclock that afternoon,
(defense witness Miguel) Tabangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the
accused returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They
cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of beer. They
ate and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused
invited them to go bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board
the Toyota Starlet of the accused who drove the same. They went to
the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago, Isabela but
unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant
alley they drank one beer each. After waiting for about 40 minutes
and still no alley became vacant the accused invited his companions
to go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some lady
partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and
proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz caldo . . . and then
they decided to go home. Again the accused drove the car. Miguel
Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the deceased
and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased
immediately behind the accused. The accused was driving at a
speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika
Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the
highway (although according to Charles Cudamon, the car was
running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [thel wrong
lane of the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when
they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The accused
immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body
away from the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the
oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at
Page 7 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
the center of the road.

xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed
on its top at the side of the highway immediately at the approach of
the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved across
the road so that one half front portion landed on the lane of the car
while the back
393
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001
393

half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the point of
impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit A) prepared by Cudamon
the following morning at the Police Headquarters at the instance of
his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained
consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his belly with the
deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and
then he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the
deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from the car.
Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores
Clinic. The deceased died that night (Exhibit B) while Ambrocio
2
suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs.
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident

was essentially the same as that of the prosecution, except
that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that
Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the accident,
the defense claimed that:
. . . The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20
inches from the center of the road at about 30 kilometers per hour
at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when
suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright lights which was coming
from the opposite direction and running very fast suddenly
swerve(d) to the cars lane and bumped the car which turned turtle
twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while the
jeep stopped across the center of the road as shown by a picture
taken after the incident (Exhibit 1) and a sketch (Exhibit 3)
drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car was hit
on the drivers side. As a result of the collision, the accused and
Page 8 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben

Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where they were all brought for
3
treatment.
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August

4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal Case No. 066 in
petitioners favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the
Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the crime charged and
hereby acquits him.
4
SO ORDERED.
__________________
2
Id. at 56-57.
Records, p. 429.
394
394

On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of

appeal on the civil aspect of the trial courts judgment. In
their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the
Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be
modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity
and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CAG.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that
defendant-appellee is hereby held civilly liable for his negligent and
reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the
vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants
in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas.
5
SO ORDERED.
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted

that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a
state of intoxication, due to his having consumed all in all,
Page 9 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
a total of at least 6twelve (12) bottles of beer. . . between 9

a.m. and 11 p.m. It found that petitioners act of driving
while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of
the
7
Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No.
4136) and
8
pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a statutory
presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioners
act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself
because the mishap, which occurred, was the
precise
9
injury sought to be prevented by the regulation.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate
court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the
motion.
___________________
5
CA Rollo, p. 60.
Id. at 57.
SEC. 53. Driving while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug.
No person shall drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of

liquor or narcotic drug.
8
CIVIL CODE, ART. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at

the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
9
Supra note 6, at 58.

395
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001
395

Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum,
submits the following issues for our consideration:
FIRSTTHE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING
THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY
FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSEDS (PETITIONERS)
NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY
THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND
THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING
UPON THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.
SECONDTHE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE
Page 10 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO

THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE
NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF
DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA,
BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE
PETITIONERS ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE
CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE
CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER
OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT
SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL
COURT.
THIRDTHE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CA-G.R.
CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS
AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER
THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME
WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN
THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT
HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER
DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further
inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence
or reckless imprudence?
(2) Bid the court a qua err in finding that petitioners
acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in
failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R.
CV No. 19240?
396
396

On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of

Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial
court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence
under the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues
Page 11 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
that the trial courts finding that he was neither imprudent

nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not
reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for
indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only
placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in
double jeopardy.
Private respondents contend that while the trial court
found that petitioners guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal
terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on
reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in
criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of
the trial court to determine if there was a basis for
awarding indemnity and damages.
Preliminarily, petitioners claim that the decision of the
appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double
jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall10 constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act. When a person is charged
with an offense and the case is terminated either by
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the
consent of the accused, the latter 11cannot again be charged
with the same or identical offense. This is double jeopardy.
For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must
be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the
12
same offense as the first. In the instant case, petitioner
had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal
Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his
discharge. The judgment of
__________________
10
CONST., Art. III, Sec. 21.
11
Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766, 768 (1950).
12
People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166, 171 (1985).

397
Page 12 of 19
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
397

acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that
what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066.
Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240
with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense.
The records clearly show that no second criminal offense
was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying
the lower courts judgment, the appellate court did not
modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing
of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same
offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy
to speak of. Petitioners claim of having been placed in
double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author
of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to
be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot
and
13
can never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule
14
111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has
not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil
____________________
13
Almeida, et al v. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, 181 (1907).; See also Almeida
Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, 40 Phil. 1056 (1910), 218 US 476, 54 L.

Ed. 1116 (1910); Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314 (1923); Francisco v.
Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327 (1924). Article 29 of the Civil Code serves only to
limit and qualify the application of the Almeida doctrine.
14
RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 2. Institution of separate civil
action.
Page 13 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
xxx
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist, (stress supplied)
398
398

Manahtan vs. Court of Appeals
liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence
15
only. This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of
16
the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is for
the same act or omission. Although the two actions have
different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case
are similar to those discussed in the criminal case.
However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot
be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact
there determined, even
though both actions involve the
17
same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the
parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of
evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein
petitioners acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining
whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking
into the question of petitioners negligence or reckless
imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was
acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally
negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil
liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he argues
that when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil
action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the
trial courts judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal
did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence
of petitioners negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue
that his acquittal must be deemed
_________________
15
Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202, 214 (1996), citing
Page 14 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 (1984).

16
CIVIL CODE, Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted (stress supplied). Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case, the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
17
Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, supra note 13, at 1061.

399
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001
399

based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil
Code to come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower courts decision in Criminal
Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court
that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence,
petitioners civil liability was not extinguished by his
discharge. We note the trial courts declaration that did not
discount the possibility that the accused was really
negligent. However, it found that a hypothesis
inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented
itself before the Court and since said hypothesis is
consistent with the record . 18
. . the Courts mind cannot rest
on a verdict of conviction. The foregoing clearly shows
that petitioners acquittal was predicated on the conclusion
that his guilt had not been established with moral
certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the
same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages and indemnity, since
private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing
fees for their claims for damages when the civil case was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner
Page 15 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount

of the claim for damages violated the doctrine in
Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
149 SCRA 562 (1987) and
Supreme Court Circular No. 7
19
dated March 24, 1988. He avers that since Manchester
held that The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees, the
appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear and try
CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and
damages.
__________________
18
Supra note 4.
19
The subject of which reads: ALL COMPLAINTS MUST SPECIFY
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SOUGHT NOT ONLY IN THE BODY OF

THE PLEADINGS, BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER IN ORDER TO BE
ACCEPTED AND ADMITTED FOR FILING. THE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES SO SPECIFIED IN THE COMPLAINT SHALL BE THE
BASIS FOR ASSESSING THE AMOUNT OF THE FILING FEES.
400
400

Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is

inapplicable to the instant case. They ask us to note that
the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly
instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester
requirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only
with the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on
March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the amount
of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily
or legally required that the civil damages sought be stated
in the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing
the filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover,
assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied
retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for
the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment.
Hence, there is no violation of the Manchester doctrine to
Page 16 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the
implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions
was governed
by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of
20
Court. As correctly pointed out by private respondents,
under said rule, it was not required that the damages
sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or
information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111,
Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a
resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now
required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these
Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is
alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in
court for trial.
___________________
20
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless that offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves
his right to institute it separately.
401
VOL. 350, JANUARY 29, 2001
401

The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure at the time private respondents
appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the
court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative
statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects
pending actions as in this case.
Page 17 of 19
9/15/15, 11:06 PM
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted

together with the criminal action, the actual damages
claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not
included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees
are to be paid only if other items of damages such as moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged in
the complaint or information, or if they are not
so alleged,
21
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. Recall that
the information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no
specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules
of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing
fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the
judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must
retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing
fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal
complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for
petitioners allegations that the filing fees were not paid or
improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31,
1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992,
denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.Conviction for the crime of illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code does not preclude punishment under
other statutes if some other crimes or felonies are
committed in the processa
____________________
21
People v. Escano, Jr., 193 SCRA 662, 665 (1991).

402
Page 18 of 19
402
9/15/15, 11:06 PM

People vs. Bagcal
person convicted for illegal recruitment may also be

convicted for the crime for estafa. (People vs. Sanchez, 291
SCRA 333 [1998])
Conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa.
(People vs. Saley, 291 SCRA 715 [1998])
Even if several cases arose out of the same scheme, if
the fraudulent acts charged were committed against
different persons, they do not constitute the same offense.
(People vs. Balasa, 295 SCRA 49 [1998])
o0o
Page 19 of 19
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97
Sanchez vs. Far East Bank and Trust Company

*
G.R. No. 155309. November 15, 2005.
JOSEPHINE M. SANCHEZ, petitioner,

vs. FAR EAST
1
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; One who desires a review of a
criminal case must appeal within fifteen days from the date the
decision or judgment was announced in open court in the presence of
the accused, or was promulgated in the manner set forth in Section 6
of Rule 116 (now Section 6 of Rule 120) of the Rules of Court.The
period available to the accused for filing an appeal is fifteen (15)
days from the promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the
final order appealed from. As early as Landicho v. Tan, the Court
has held that one who desires a review of a criminal case must
appeal within fifteen days from the date the decision or judgment
was announced in open court in the presence of the accused, or was
promulgated in the manner set forth in Section 6 of Rule 116 (now
Section 6 of Rule 120) of the Rules of Court. This ruling was
reiterated in People v. Tamani, in which the Court has further
clarified that the word promulgation in the old provision should be
construed as referring to judgment; and notice, to order.
Same; Same; Parties; Civil Liability; The appeal period
accorded to the accused should also be available to the offended
party who seeks redress of the civil aspect of a decision.The above
ruling, however, is relevant and applicable to the accused who
appeals. In the present case, we are confronted with the Motion
filed by the private offended party for reconsideration of the civil
aspect of the
_______________
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014fd18babdcb30d0cc5000a0094004f00ee/p/AJQ191/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 30
*
1
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
THIRD DIVISION.
The Petition named the Court of Appeals as a respondent. The Court
deleted it from the title, pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
governing petitions for review.
98
98

RTC judgment. It should also be noted that she was not required to
be present during the promulgation of the judgment. In a long line
of cases as far back as People v. Ursua, this Court has ruled that the
appeal period accorded to the accused should also be available to
the offended party who seeks redress of the civil aspect of a
decision. Similarly, courts may apply this ruling to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration of a judgment. For them to do so will be
consistent with this Courts policy of giving lower tribunals a chance
to rectify their possible errors and thereby promote the speedy and
just disposition of controversies.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rules governing the period of
appeal in a purely civil action should be the same as those covering
the civil aspects of criminal judgments.The relevant question is,
when should the period for the filing of a motion by a private
offended party begin? In Neplum v. Orbeso, this Court explained
that the period begins to toll upon service of the notice of judgment
upon the offended party. Thus: Indeed, the rules governing the
period of appeal in a purely civil action should be the same as those
covering the civil aspects of criminal judgments. If these rules are
not completely identical, the former may be suppletory to the latter.
x x x. Being akin to a civil action, the present appeal may be guided
by the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Judgments; Criminal Liability; Civil Liability; Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, except in instances
when no actual damage results from an offense; Extinction of penal
liability does not always carry with it the extinction of the civil.
Article 100 of the RPC states that every person criminally liable
Page 2 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
for a felony is also civilly liable. This rule holds true, except in
instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as
espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and
crime against popular representation. Clearly, the extinction of the
penal liability does not always carry with it the extinction of the
civil.According to Article 29 of the Civil Code, if the acquittal is
made on the ground that the guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused may be held civilly liable for damages
arising from the same act or omission constituting the offense. As in
any ordinary civil case, the liability may be established by a mere
preponderance of evidence.
99
99

Same; Same; Same; Acquittals; Our law recognizes two kinds of
acquittal, with different effects on civil liability of the accusedfirst
is an acquittal on the ground that the accused was not the author of
the act or omission complained of, and, the second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
The consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the
accused are discussed by the Court in Manantan v. CA in this wise:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on
the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground
that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained
of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance
is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the
civil action for damages is for the same act or omission. x x x.
Page 3 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
Same; Same; Same; Same; A finding in a final judgment that

the fact from which civil liability may arise does not exist carries
with it the extinction of the liability.The trial court emphatically
concluded that petitioner was not the author of the frauds
allegedly perfpetrated [sic], if any. The Court of Appeals concurred
in that conclusion when it categorically held thus: We rule out the
issue of forgery as this was not satisfactorily proved x x x. Under
Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, a finding in a
final judgment that the fact from which civil liability may arise does
not exist carries with it the extinction of the liability.

De Castro and Cagampang Law Offices for petitioner.
100
100

Benedicto, Verzosa, Gealogo & Burkley for respondent

FEBTC.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
At bottom, the resolution of this case hinges on the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Since the
factual findings of the lower courts are disparate, this
Court painstakingly reviewed the records. It found no
sufficient reason to disbelieve the well-explained findings
and equally logical conclusions of the trial court. The
evidence proffered by respondent even corroborated
relevant portions of those of petitioner. Thus, the evidence
supported the ruling of the trial court that the acquittal of
petitioner was based on its reasonable finding that she had
not committed the crime imputed to her. Consequently, she
incurred no civil liability for the alleged offense.
The Case
Page 4 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the

Rules of3 Court, seeking to reverse the July
31, 2001
4
Decision and the August 30, 2002 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 53715. The challenged
Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed order is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
[Petitioner] JOSEPHINE SANCHEZ is hereby ordered to pay
[Respondent] Far East Bank and Trust Company, the amount of
One Million One Hundred Eighty Seven Thousand Five Hundred
Thirty Pesos and Eighty Six Centavos (P1,187,530.86) as actual
damages. This is without prejudice to [petitioner]s recourse of reim_______________
2
3
Rollo, pp. 7-20.

Id., pp. 22-47. Special Eleventh Division. Penned by Justice Ruben T.
Reyes (Division chair) and concurred in by Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and

Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. (members).
4
Id., p. 54.
101
101

bursement from the other persons who participated in the
5
transactions.
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts
The antecedents of the case are related by the CA as
follows:
It is undisputed that Kai J. Chin was the director and
representative of Chemical Bank. Its subsidiary, the Chemical
International Finance Limited (CIFL), was an investor in
[Respondent] Far East Bank and Trust [C]ompany (FEBTC), x x x.
In representing the interest of CIFL in FEBTC, Chin was made a
director and sr. vice president of FEBTC. [Petitioner] Josephine
Page 5 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
Sanchez was, in turn, assigned as secretary of Chin. CIFL also

maintained a checking account (CA# 0009-04212-1) in FEBTCs
investment arm, the Far East Bank Investment, Inc. (FEBII). Chin
was one of the authorized signatories in the said current and money
market accounts.
According to [respondent], [petitioner] made unauthorized
withdrawals from the account of CIFL in FEBTC through the use of
forged or falsified applications for cashiers checks which were
deposited to her personal accounts. Once credited to her account,
she withdrew the amounts and misappropriated, misapplied and
converted them to her personal benefit and advantage, to the
damage of FEBTC.
[Petitioner supposedly] employed three modes in the said
fraudulent transactions, namely:
In the First Mode, [petitioner] caused the issuance of a cashiers
check payable to bearer with number 461390, dated September 29,
1992, in the sum of P250,040.86. This is the subject of Crim. Case
No. 93-126175. She presented a forged letter of confirmation
bearing the forged signature of Chin addressed to Beatriz Bagsit,
Cash Department Head of FEBTC. This check was paid pursuant to
the said confirmation. [Petitioner] immediately deposited this check
to her FEBTC Savings Account No. 0101-39109-9 and on September
30, 1992, she withdrew P200,040.86.
_______________
5

102
102

Under the Second Mode, [petitioner] filed applications forms to

purchase cashiers checks payable to her, [with] Chin as the
supposed purchaser. Said applications were accompanied by a
forged memorandum of Chin confirming [petitioner] as the payeebeneficiary. After the approval by Bagsit of the applications and
memoranda, checks were issued, as follows:
Check No.
Date
Amount
Exhibit
461739
10/22/92
P489,450.00
Page 6 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
461963
04/11/92
160,550.00
464801
05/24/93
180,090.00
465405
06/30/93
107,400.00
In compliance with bank procedures [petitioner] signs the

checks twice, one as an endorsement and two as proof of receipt of
the proceeds which she then deposited to her FEBTC account.
The Third Mode, was frequently used which involved checks
payable to Chin.
[Petitioner] was designated as Chins representative to purchase
cashiers checks using applications which bore forged signatures of
Chin as a purchaser and the payee.
After Bagsit has approved the application and has checked the
authenticity of Chins signatures, a cashiers check is issued. Then
[petitioner] claimed the check, left then came back soon to encash it.
The check when presented for encashment already had two
signatures of Chin on its dorsal side, both signatures being forged.
The first forged signature represents Chins endorsement of the
check as payee and the second, Chins purported receipt of the
checks proceeds. The teller pays the value of the check only if
initialed by Bagsit.
In this mode, 16 checks were issued, to wit:
Check No.
Date
Amount
Exhibit
461417
10/13/92
P100,000.00
461488
10/20/92
150,000.00
462197
11/17/92
50,000.00
461318
11/26/92
190,000.00
462420
12/09/92
200,400.00
O
103
103

462482
12/12/92
220,000.00
462717
01/04/93
210,000.00
462946
01/18/93
200,000.00
463241
02/01/93
180,000.00
463606
02/26/93
180,000.00
Page 7 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
463776
03/08/93
200,000.00
463850
03/19/93
200,000.00
464108
04/01/93
150,000.00
464329
04/20/93
100,000.00
464432
04/27/93
150,000.00
464620
05/13/93
150,000.00
[Petitioner allegedly] confessed to Chin that she tampered with

the CIFL account. Chin referred the matter to the FEBTCs audit
division for further investigation. All the cashiers checks, funded by
an unauthorized debit against the CIFL account, as well as the
corresponding applications for their issuance were examined at the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory. All of Chins
signatures borne on all the checks and applications were found to
have been good forgeries. With the damage done, FEBTC had to
reimburse the CIFL account and ultimately suffered the total
6
misappropriated amount of P3,787,530.86.
The main defense of petitioner consisted of a denial of the

forgeries. She asserted that she had deposited the checks to
her account, under the authority and instructions of Kai
Chin. Afterwards,7 petitioner withdrew the amounts and
gave them to him.
Kai Chin denied that he had given that authority to her,
and insisted that she had signed the subject documents.
However, he did not rebut her testimony that she had
turned over the proceeds of the checks to him.
_______________
6
Id., pp. 3-8 & 24-29. Citations omitted.
RTC Decision penned by Judge David G. Nitafan, p. 16; Rollo, p. 112.

104
104

Ruling of the Trial Court
Page 8 of 30
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The Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not find Kai Chin to be
a credible witness. According to the RTC, FEBTCs records
showed that, contrary to his testimony, he had expressly
authorized petitioner to8 transact matters concerning
Chemical Banks account.
The trial judge doubted the integrity of the findings and
the report of the PNP handwriting expert. He noted the
non-use during the handwriting analysis of Kai Chins
contemporaneous signatures. Besides, the examination was
initiated unilaterally by FEBTC officials, 9 who had
submitted sample signatures of their own choice.
The RTC added that the allegedly fraudulent
transactions had occurred from September 1992 to June
1993, with the use of documents bearing the signatures of
other officials and employees of respondent. In other words,
all the questioned transactions had been approved and
allowed by the bank officials
concerned, despite apparent
10
procedural infirmities. Yet, only petitioner was indicted.
Thus, the RTC disposed as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds
and so holds that the prosecution failed to prove the culpability of
the accused in any of these cases with moral certainty, and
consequently acquits her from all the charges, with costs de oficio.
Her bail bonds are released and the hold departure order as well as
11
the order of attachment are lifted.
Subsequently,
respondent
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration
of the civil aspect of the RTC Decision. In
12
an Order dated March 20, 1996, the trial court denied
reconsideration.
_______________
8
Id., pp. 19-22 & 115-118.
Id., pp. 23-25, 28-29 & 119-121, 124-125.
10
Id., pp. 28, 31 & 124, 127.
11
RTC Decision, p. 32; Rollo, p. 128.
12
Rollo, pp. 69-75.

105
105
Page 9 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM

Quoting portions of its Decision, the RTC said in its Order
that the acquittal of the accused was not exactly on the
ground of reasonable doubt, but that she was not the
author of the frauds allegedly perfpetrated (sic). Thus, it
held that no civil liability against her may properly be
made.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Granting respondents appeal, the appellate court ruled
that the trial courts judgment of acquittal did not13preclude
recovery of civil indemnity based on a quasi delict. The CA
held that the outcome of the criminal case, whether
conviction or acquittal, was inconsequential in adjudging
civil liability arising from the same act that could also be
considered a quasi delict. Moreover, FEBTC did not have to
reserve its right to file a separate civil action for damages,
because the law had
already made that reservation on
14
respondents behalf.
The CA further held that, contrary to the trial courts
clarifications in its March 20, 1996 Order, petitioner had
been acquitted merely on reasonable doubt arising from
insufficiency of evidence to establish her identity as
perpetrator of the crime. Her acquittal was not due to the
nonexistence
of the crime for which civil liability could
15
arise. Although it agreed with the RTC that forgery had
not been satisfactorily proven by FEBTC, the CA
nonetheless found petitioner liable for her failure to turn
over to respondent the proceeds of the checks.
The failure
16
supposedly constituted an actionable fraud.
Thus, the appellate court ordered petitioner to pay
respondent P1,187,530.86 as actual damages, representing
the value of the17 checks that had been paid in her name and
to her account.
_______________
13
14
Id., pp. 16-17 & 36-37.
15
Id., pp. 18 & 38.
Page 10 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
16
Id., pp. 21-22 & 41-42.
17
Id., pp. 24-26 & 44-46.

106
106

18

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts

consideration:
(1) Whether the judgment of conviction had already
become final at the time the motion for
reconsideration of the civil aspect was filed by the
complainant-appellant?
(2) Whether an appeal on the civil aspect may be made
from a decision in a criminal case acquitting the
accused for being not the author of the crime?
(3) Whether a separate civil action is necessary to be
instituted after the accused is acquitted in a
criminal case based on reasonable doubt?
(4) Whether the civil aspect of the criminal offenses
where the accused was acquitted may be pursued
by a party other than the offended parties?
Otherwise stated, whether the civil liability may be
pursued by a party which is not a real party in
interest after the 19acquittal of the accused of the
offenses charged?
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Timeliness of the
Page 11 of 30
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Motion for Reconsideration

Because the RTC Decision had been promulgated on
December 15, 1995, and respondents Motion for
Reconsideration
_______________
18
This case was deemed submitted for decision on November 11, 2004,
upon this Courts receipt of respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty.

Justino M. Marquez III. Petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty.
Arturo M. de Castro, was received by this Court on April 10, 2003.
19

107
107

was filed two months after, on February 14, 1996,
petitioner instantly concludes that the Motion was filed out
of time.
Respondent, however, contends that the time for filing
the Motion should be counted from February 1, 1996
when it received the trial courts Decisionnot
from the
20
date of notice to the public prosecutor. To determine the
period for filing from the latter date would undermine the
dual aspects of a criminal litigation, in which the right of
the offended party to appeal the civil aspect is independent
of the decision
of the accused on whether or not to appeal
21
the case.
We uphold respondent on this issue. Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Rules of Court states as follows:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.An appeal must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice
of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the
motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which
22
time the balance of the period begins to run.
Clearly, the period available to the accused for filing an

Page 12 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
appeal is fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of the

judgment or from notice of the
final order appealed from.
23
As early as Landicho v. Tan, the Court has held that one
who desires a review of a criminal case must appeal within
fifteen days from the date the decision or judgment was
announced in open court in the presence of the accused, or
was promulgated in the manner set forth in Section 6 of
Rule 116 (now Section
_______________
20
Respondents Memorandum, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 162-163.
21
Id., pp. 12-13 & 162-163.
22
The provision, while not identical, is similar to 6 of Rule 122 of the
1985 Rules. The only difference is that the present provision makes clear
that promulgation refers to judgment; and notice, to final order
appealed from. Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, 384 SCRA 466, 479, July 11,
2002.
23
87 Phil. 601, 605, November 16, 1950.

108
108

24
6 of Rule 120) of the Rules of

Court. This ruling was
25
reiterated in People v. Tamani, in which the Court has
further clarified that the word promulgation in the old
provision should be construed
as referring to judgment;
26
and notice, to order.
The above ruling, however, is relevant and applicable to
the accused who appeals. In the present case, we are
confronted with the Motion filed by the private offended
party for reconsideration of the civil aspect of the RTC
judgment. It should also be noted that she was not required
to be present during the promulgation of the judgment.
_______________
24
SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.The judgment is promulgated
by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the
court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light
Page 13 of 30
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offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel

or representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or
city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional
Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention
upon request of the court that rendered the judgment. The court
promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of
appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be
present at the promulgation of the decision. In case the accused fails to
appear thereat the promulgation shall consist in the recording of the
judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon
the accused or counsel. If the judgment is for conviction, and the
accuseds failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall
further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel.
25
55 SCRA 153, January 21, 1974.
26
Id., p. 157, per Aquino, J.

109
109

27
28
In a long line of cases as far back as People v. Ursua, this

Court has ruled that the appeal period accorded to the
accused should also be available to the offended party who
seeks redress of the civil aspect of a decision. Similarly,
courts may apply this ruling to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment. For them to do so will be
consistent with this Courts policy of giving 29lower tribunals
a chance to rectify their possible errors and thereby
promote the speedy and just disposition of controversies.
The relevant question is, when should the period for the
filing of a motion 30by a private offended party begin? In
Neplum v. Orbeso, this Court explained that the period
begins to toll upon service of the notice of judgment upon
the offended party. Thus:
Indeed, the rules governing the period of appeal in a purely civil
Page 14 of 30
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action should be the same as those covering the civil aspects of

criminal judgments. If these rules are not completely identical, the
former may be suppletory to the latter. x x x. Being akin to a civil
action, the present appeal may be guided by the Rules on Civil
31
Procedure.
In the case before us, respondent undisputedly claims that

petitioner received notice of the RTC Decision only on
February 1, 1996. Records show that FEBTC filed its
Motion for
_______________
27
People v. Rodriquez, 97 Phil. 349, July 29, 1955; People v. Coloma,
105 Phil. 1287, April 29, 1959; Torrijos v. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 395,
October 24, 1975; Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme, 157 SCRA 518, January
29, 1988.
28
60 Phil. 252, August 1, 1934.
29
Lopez Dela Rosa Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 148470, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 614; Madrigal Transport, Inc. v.
Lapanday Holdings Corp., 436 SCRA 123, August 11, 2004.
30
Supra, p. 480.
31
Id., p. 481, per Panganiban, J.

110
110

Reconsideration on February 14, 1996. The Motion was

thus filed within the reglementary period.
Second, Third and Fourth Issues:
Civil Liability in Case of Acquittal
Being interrelated, the second, third and fourth issues will
be discussed together.
Petitioner contends that her acquittal was not based
merely on reasonable doubt, but on the determination that
she was not the author of the imputed felonies. She
reiterates the trial courts ruling in its March 20, 1996
Order that she could not be held civilly liable, because she
Page 15 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
was not responsible for the crimes charged.

Arguing on the assumption that she was acquitted on
the basis of reasonable doubt, petitioner explains that the
appellate court was nevertheless precluded from taking
cognizance of the civil aspect of the case, as a separate civil
action should have been filed after the judgment of
acquittal. She contends that Article 29 of the Civil Code,
which mandates the courts to make a finding on the civil
liability in case of an acquittal based on reasonable ground,
applies only to situations when a crime has been committed
but the accused is exempt from criminal liability under the
instances enumerated
in Article 12 of the Revised Penal
32
Code (RPC).
Petitioner finally argues that the real party-in-interest
is not respondent, but Chemical Bank and/or Kai Chin, the
owners33 of the accounts from which the withdrawals were
made.
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that the offended
party may appeal the civil aspect of 34the criminal
proceeding despite the judgment of acquittal.
_______________
32
33
Id., pp. 9 & 95.
34
Id., pp. 13-14 & 163-164.

111
111
Civil Action Deemed Instituted

in the Criminal Proceeding
Article 100 of the RPC states that every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable. This rule holds true,
except in instances when no actual damage results from an
offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to
an enemy country,
and crime against popular
35
representation.
Clearly, the extinction of the penal liability does not
Page 16 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
36
always carry with it the extinction of the civil. According

to Article 29 of the Civil Code, if the acquittal is made on
the ground that the guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused may be held civilly liable for
damages arising from the same act or omission constituting
the offense. As in any ordinary civil case, the liability may
be established by a mere preponderance of evidence.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of 37
Court, the
prevailing law during the trial of this case below, provided
the
_______________
35
Regalado, Florenz D., Criminal Law Conspectus (1st ed., 2000), p.
258 (citing People v. Orais, 65 Phil. 744, June 30, 1938.)

36
2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court; People v. Velez, 77 Phil. 1026,
February 25, 1947. See Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 148; 314
SCRA 370, September 14, 1999; Sesbreo v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil.
909; 262 SCRA 345, September 23, 1996.
37
The Rules on Criminal Procedure were amended in 2000. With
respect to the changes in Section 1, the Court explained in Philippine

Rabbit Line, Inc. v. People (427 SCRA 456, April 14, 2004, per
Panganiban, J.) thus:
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxx
xxx
xxx
112
112

consequences of acts that produced both civil and criminal

liabilities, as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
Page 17 of 30
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_______________
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a
criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of
conviction meted out to the employee.
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and
allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime
charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasidelicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party maysubject
to the control of the prosecutorstill intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein.
113
113

the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
xxx
xxx
x x x.
Clearly, under the foregoing 1985 rule, an action for the

recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged is
necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1)
Page 18 of 30
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there is an express waiver of the civil action, or (2) there is

a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil
action was filed prior to the criminal complaint.
For this purpose, the offended parties are allowed to
intervene in the criminal proceedings, but solely to enforce
their right to claim indemnification
for damages
arising
38
39
from the criminal act. In Roa v. De la Cruz, in which the
offended party failed to submit evidence of damages despite
having participated in the criminal proceedings, we had the
occasion to rule in this wise:
x x x. For such failure, she has only herself or her counsel to blame.
Of course, she could have still filed a motion for reconsideration or
an appeal to rectify the error. But this she failed to do, thus
allowing the decision to become final and executory. Under the
principle of res judicata, that judgment is conclusive as to future
proceedings at law not only as to every matter which was offered
and received to sustain the claim or demand, but as to any other
admissible matter that could have been offered for that purpose.
_______________
38
Roa v. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8, February 13, 1960. Citations omitted.
39
Supra, p. 13, per Gutierrez David, J. (citing Miranda v. Tiangco, 96
Phil. 526; 51 Off. Gaz., [3] 1366; NAMARCO v. Judge Macadaeg, 98 Phil.
185; 52 Off. Gaz. 182.)
114
114

In the present case, the original action involved a

prosecution for estafa or swindling through falsification of
commercial documents, an offense defined under the RPC.
Records do not showand respondent does not claimthe
presence of any of the three instances precluding the
automatic institution of the civil action together with the
criminal complaint. Ineluctably, respondents right to
damages, if any, was deemed prosecuted in the criminal
proceeding. Thus, a separate civil action may no longer be
instituted.
Page 19 of 30
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Appeal of the Civil Aspect of the

Decision Acquitting the Accused
The consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of40the
accused are discussed by the Court in Manantan v. CA in
this wise:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on
the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground
that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained
of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on
grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance
is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the
civil action for damages is for the same act or omission. x x x.
41
In Salazar v. People, the Court further expounded thus:

_______________
40
350 SCRA 387, January 29, 2001, per Quisumbing, J.
41
411 SCRA 598, 606, September 23, 2003, per Callejo Sr., J.
115
115

The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against
him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only
civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from
or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there
Page 20 of 30
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is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or
where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court
renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the
prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it
would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved
party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from
the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period
therefor.
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is settled that the

private offended party may appeal the civil aspect of the
judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. But this
recourse may prosper only if the nature of the trial courts
judgment falls under any of the three categories stated in
Salazar.
Acquittal of Petitioner Due to the
Noncommission of the Imputed Acts
A close scrutiny of the RTC Decision and Order leads us to
the conclusion that petitioner did not commit the crime
imputed to her. Hence, her acquittal likewise extinguished
the action for her civil liability.
In support of this conclusion, we initially quote at length
these findings of the trial court:
Re: Crim. Cases No. 93-126175.This case involves the bearer
check for the amount of P250,040.86[.] This is the earliest
questionable transaction allegedly committed by the accused as it
happened on 29 September 1992. According to FEBTC records, this
was the
116
116

initial transaction concerning the Chemical account wherein a

cashiers check payable to Chemical (CIF) was used by the accused
to purchase another cashiers check payable to bearer which was
Page 21 of 30
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later deposited to the account of accused. During the investigation

by the banks Investigation Committee, Mrs. Bagsit averred that
she confirmed the transaction with Kai Chin and which was later
on supported by an authorization letter from Kai Chin. (p. 11, Exh.
1).
There is no dispute that the check was deposited to the personal
account of the accused (Exhs. C, C-1 and D) and part of the
amount thereof was subsequently withdrawn by her (Exh. E), but
accused asserted that the deposit of said check to her account and
the subsequent withdrawal of its amount were upon the authority
and instructions of Kai Chin, and that the withdrawn amount was
actually given by her to Kai Chin.
Although Kai Chin denied having signed the confirmation
memorandum (Exh. B), there is absolutely no evidence on record
that the money was never turned over to Kai Chin. Kai Chin did not
testify, on direct evidence or on rebuttal, concerning this aspect of
the case. x x x.
Re: Crim. Cases Nos. 93-126172, 93-126178, 93-126189 and 93126190.These four cases involve the Cashiers Checks applied for
and made payable to the accused (Exhs. G-1, F-2, H-2 and I2). Exhs. G-1 and F-2 were encashed by the accused because
they bear at their back two signatures of hers, and according to the
witnesses for the prosecution the first of such signatures constitutes
the indorsement while the second signifies receipt of the proceeds of
the payment thereof. On the other hand, Exhs. H-2 and I-2 were
deposited by her in her personal account. According to the accused
the drawing of the checks in her name and their encashments and
deposit to her account were upon the authority and instructions of
Kai Chin, and that the values thereof were all turned over to Kai
Chin.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Re: Crim. Case No. 93-126171.This case involves a Cashiers
Check applied for and made payable to Kai Chin, signed twice at
the back but accused nonetheless signed for the receipt of the
payment thereof. x x x While Kai Chin denied on direct evidence
that he signed the application for the purchase of this check and
also the back of the check itself, there is also no showing that the
value thereof did not reach him. Accused asserted that this check
was
117
Page 22 of 30
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117

applied for and encashed upon the authority and instruction of Kai
Chin, and that the value thereof was turned over to the latter.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Re: the rest of the other criminal cases.The remaining fifteen
other cases involve checks applied for and drawn in the name of Kai
Chin and twice signed at the back. As intimated earlier, the first
signature at the back of the check constitutes the indorsement
thereof while the second signifies receipt of the payment of the
value.
The only intervention of the accused concerning these checks, as
appearing in the documentary exhibits, was her being named as the
representative of the purchaser and she must have picked up the
checks for and in behalf of the purchaser. (See Exhs. P, N, O,
K, L, S, T, M, U, V, W, X, Y and Z). There is no
indication, at least from the documents of the prosecution, that
accused had a hand in the encashments of the checks, otherwise,
she should have been made to sign, as what was done in the case of
42
the check marked as Exh. Q-1.
As can be clearly gleaned from the above, petitioner

consistently claimed that she had acted merely upon the
instructions and authority of her superior, Kai Chin. While
admitting that she had deposited the proceeds of some of
the checks to her personal account, she firmly insisted that
she subsequently withdrew the cash proceeds and turned
them over to him. She deniedand the records do not show
that she had ever appropriated those moneys for her
personal gain.
On the other hand, as the trial judge clearly noted, Kai
Chin did not even bother to rebut the statement of petitioner
43
that she had turned over the proceeds of the checks to him.
All he asserted was that he had neither signed the
applications for the purchase of the checks nor endorsed
those checks. His credibility was assessed by the judge
thus:
_______________
42
RTC Decision, pp. 15-19; Rollo, pp. 111-115. Italics in the original.
Page 23 of 30
43
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
Id., pp. 27 & 297.

118
118

Credibility of Kai Chin.It must be noticed that, with the

exception of the bearer check involved in Crim. Case No. 93126175, the value of the Cashiers Checks involve[d] were debited
from the Chemical account. Kai Chin is undisputably one of the
authorized signatories to the Chemical account, and under ordinary
course of things, he must be the payee and/or beneficiary of the
checks.
Initially, Kai Chin sweepingly testified as follows:
Q:
In her capacity as your secretary, when she was your secretary

did Josephine Sanchez have anything to do with the Chemical
International Finance account?
A:
No, sir. (tsn, p. 9, 8 Nov 1994)
The records of the bank and FEBII, however, show otherwise.

Thus, as early as April, 1992, Kai Chin had already authorized the
accused to transact matters concerning the Chemical account,
through a memorandum he sent to Mrs. Beatriz Bagsit and one Ms.
Enriquez, reading as follows:
This is to request for the following:
1) Ms. Enriquez to partially terminate the amount of P250,000.00
from the CIFs placement (P3M) and credit the same to SA#010158459-8 maintained at Intramuros Branch.
2) Ms. Bagsit to debit SA#0101-58459-8 for P290,000.00 and entrust
the same to my Secretary, Ms. Jo Sanchez for proper disposition.
In view of my home leave/business trip scheduled on April 29-June 8,
1992, the above requests will be confirmed by Ms. Sanchez upon my
instructions before the end of May, 1992. (Memo [dated] 28 April 1992,
attached as Annex B to Exh. 2.)
Kai Chin never denied his signature on this document, either on

direct evidence or on rebuttal (as he was not presented as a rebuttal
44
witness).
Page 24 of 30
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The authority conferred by Kai Chin upon petitioner was

also borne out by the reports of the FEBTC Investigating
_______________
44
Id., pp. 19-20 & 115-116.

119
119

Committee, pertinent parts of which were quoted in the
RTC Decision as follows:
4. Initial interview with the officers of FEBII disclosed the
following:
4.1 In January, 1992, Mr. Kai Chin personally went to the office of MS.
URSULA A. ALANO, Vice President of FEBII and allegedly informed the
latter that he will directly manage the CIF [also referred to as CIFL or
Chemical] account. Mr. Chin informed MS ALANO that instructions
concerning the account will either originate from his or his representative,
MS. J. M. SANCHEZ;
Based
on
Mr.
Chins
instructions,
placements/preterminations/payments of the account were transacted by

Mr. Chin himself or his authorized representative, J. SANCHEZ. (p. 9,
Exh. 1, underscoring supplied; see also p. 11 of the same exhibit.)
These facts were recited in the Memorandum of Ms. U.A. Ulano,

attached as Annex B to Exh. 1, which reads as follows:
Facts: Due to the transfer of Mr. Kai Chin to FEBTC Head Office in
Intramuros last January 1992, he personally went to see me in my office
to inform me that he was directly managing the CIF account. He also
informed me that instructions concerning the account will either originate
from him or his authorized representative, Ms. J. M. Sanchez.
Based
on
the
given
instructions
of
Mr.
Kai
Chin,
placements/preterminations/payments of the account were transacted by

Mr. Kai Chin himself or his authorized representative, Ms. J. M. Sanchez.
45
[Italics by the RTC.]
The above evidence led the trial court to conclude that Kai
Page 25 of 30
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Chin, definitely,
was less candid to the [c]ourt when he
46
testified that petitioner had nothing to do with the CIFL
account.
_______________
45
Id., pp. 21-22 & 117-118.
46
Id., pp. 22 & 118.

120
120

As regards petitioners testimony, the trial judge observed

that she had firmly and straightforwardly echoed the
material allegations in her Counter-Affidavit; and that,
furthermore, her testimony had
been corroborated by the
47
Peoples exhibits themselves. Indeed, her claim that she
had prior authorization from Kai Chin to undertake the
questioned transactions was supported by no less than the
prosecution evidence.
Thus, the trial court emphatically concluded that
petitioner was not
the author of the frauds allegedly
48
perfpetrated [sic], if any. The Court of Appeals concurred
in that conclusion when it categorically held thus: We rule
out the49 issue of forgery as this was not satisfactorily proved
x x x.
Under Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a finding in a final judgment that the fact from
which civil liability may arise does not exist carries with it
the extinction of the liability. Thus, the critical issue in the
present appeal is this: was the civil liability of petitioner
duly established by the evidence?
Answering in the affirmative, the CA explained that a
single act or omission may produce two forms of civil
liability: one is for ex delicto or that which arises from a
crime under our penal statutes; and the other is for a quasi
delict or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, civil
liability ex delicto was foreclosed by the acquittal.
Nonetheless, [a]lthough the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist due to [petitioners]
Page 26 of 30
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acquittal, [respondents]
cause of action makes out a case of
50
quasi delict.
Contrary to the trial court, the CA disbelieved
petitioners assertions that she had turned over the
proceeds of the checks to Kai Chin. Granting that she was
authorized to encash the
_______________
47
Id., pp. 27 & 123.
48
RTC Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 72.
49
Assailed Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 41.
50
Id., pp. 16 & 36.

121
121

checks, she supposedly had no like authority to deposit the
proceeds to her personal bank account. 51The appellate court
concluded that, in breach of Article 33 of the Civil Code,
she abused the confidence reposed
in her by [respondent]
52
in the performance of her duty. Thus, the CA ordered her
to pay respondent the amount of P1,187,530.86 as actual
damages, representing the total
value of five checks paid in
53
her name and to her account.
In view of the conflicting findings of the lower courts as
regards the credibility of the witnesses, we invoke the timehonored rule that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the
truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the
trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable
discretion, whose
testimony to accept and which witness to
54
disbelieve.
Barring arbitrariness and oversight of facts that might
Page 27 of 30
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affect the result of the case otherwise, the RTCs

assessment of the witnesses and their testimonies in this
case binds even
_______________
51
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.
52
Id., pp. 23 & 43.
53
Assailed Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 44.
54
People v. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93, 100-101, February 12, 1997, per
Panganiban, J.; Bugatti v. Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 335, October 17,
2000; Lorenzana v. People, 353 SCRA 396, March 1, 2001.
122
122

55
this Court. In any event, we scoured the records and,

unlike the CA, we found no sufficient reason to reject the
trial courts assessment. There was no arbitrariness or
oversight of any fact or circumstance of weight and
influence to justify a different conclusion.
Moreover, the CA based its imposition of civil liability
upon petitioner on her supposed abuse of her employers
confidence. Granting for the sake of argument that she
indeed forged the checks and misappropriated the proceeds
to her personal benefit, it must be recalled that it was Kai
Chins signatures that she purportedly forged; and CIFLs
account that she, in effect, misappropriated. Be it
remembered that respondents own documentary evidence
unequivocally concurred in the assertion of petitioner that
Kai Chin had given her express authority to transact
CIFLs account on his behalf. Consequently, it was his, not
respondents, confidence that she had exploited. In other
words, the factual premises of the CA did not support its
conclusion.
In sum, we hold that petitioners acquittal was based on
Page 28 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
the fact that she had not committed the offense imputed to
her. Consequently, she cannot be held civilly liable. In
concluding that she, as well as her testimony, was credible,
the trial court cannot be faulted with arbitrariness or
negligence. Tellingly, her testimony that she turned over
the proceeds of the subject checks to Kai Chin stands
unrebutted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and
the assailed CA Decision and Resolution SET ASIDE. The
December 15, 1995 Decision and the March 20, 1996 Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, are
hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
_______________
55
People v. Corea, 269 SCRA 76, 86, March 3, 1997; People v.
Basquez, 366 SCRA 154, September 27, 2001.

123
123
Becton Dickinson Phils., Inc. vs. National Labor Relations

Commission
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On Official Leave.
Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution set
aside. That of the Regional Trial Court reinstated.
Notes.It is reasonable to assume that the offended
party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the
party to whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of
Article 100 of the RPC, which expressly provides that
[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. (Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 678 [1997])
An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held
civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so
warrantshe may be adjudged liable for the unpaid value
of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.
Page 29 of 30
9/15/15, 11:07 PM
(Sapiera vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 370 [1999])

An accused acquitted of a criminal charge may
nevertheless be held civilly liable in the same case where
the facts established by the evidence so warrant. (Pacheco
vs. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 595 [1999])
o0o
Page 30 of 30
642
9/15/15, 11:10 PM

Manliclic vs. Calaunan
*
G.R. No. 150157. January 25, 2007.
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS

LINES, INC., petitioners, vs. MODESTO CALAUNAN,
respondent.
Evidence; Witnesses; Hearsay Evidence; Testimony at Former
Proceeding; Requisites.For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the
following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or
unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the
same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the
former case involved the same subject as that in the present case,
although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by
the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the
present case; and (e) the ad-
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
643
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
643

verse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the
former case.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014fd18de2e0d2939a8a000a0094004f00ee/p/AKQ275/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
Same; Failure to except to the evidence because it does not

conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law;
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a
suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other
evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.It
is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an
alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the
objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is
merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to
except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a
waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay,
but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be
admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein
asserted. Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a
fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any
other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves.
Same; Though Section 47 of Rule 130 speaks only of testimony
and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case
or proceeding cannot be admitteddocuments which are part of the
testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted may also be
admitted.Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal
case should not have been admitted in the instant civil case because
Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to testimony or deposition. We
find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks
only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents
from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said
documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of
witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given
the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.
Quasi-Delicts; Extinction of Civil Liability; The extinction of
civil liability referred to Section 2(b) of Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused.From the
foregoing
Page 2 of 30
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644
644

declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner

Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground
that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on
Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which
reads: (b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic
can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section
applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not
to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused.
Same; Same; Same; A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity
all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crimea distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extracontractual; It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even
if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi-delict.A quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crimea distinction
exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts
Page 3 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled

that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is
not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
based on quasi delict. In other words, if an accused is acquitted
based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising
from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a
645
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
645

final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the
crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or
delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not
possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on
grounds other than the delict complained of.
Pleadings and Practice; As a general rule, questions of fact may
not be raised in a petition for review; Exceptions.As a general rule,
questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The
factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.
Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof
unless: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
Page 4 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted

by the evidence on record.
Quasi-Delicts; Employer-Employee Relationship; Vicarious
Liability; Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury
is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee,
or in the supervision over him after selection or both.Having ruled
that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash
up, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is
negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of
a good father of a family. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code,
when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or
646
646

both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents
to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Same; Same; Same; In the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience and service records, and in the supervision of employees,
the employer must formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for
the breach thereof.In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains
that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner
Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening
process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a
Page 5 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision

of its employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators
(Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the
required due diligence in the supervision of its employees. In the
selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service
records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach
thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied
with everything that was incumbent on them.
Same; Same; Same; The presence of investigators after the
accident is not enough supervision by a public transportation
companyregular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any
accident should be shown and established.The presence of ready
investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to
exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence
of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines
set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the
investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular
supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have
been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack
of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one
set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the
drivers of PRBLI. How then
647
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
647

can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually
informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is
being lent to all the drivers.

Court of Appeals.
Page 6 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
Conrado C. Genilo, Jr. for petitioners.

Cesar M. Carino for respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1
Assailed before Us is the decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R.
CV No. 55909 which affirmed in toto the
2
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding
petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and
attorneys fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine
Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned by
petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio
Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by
Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July
1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo
Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on
board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was
likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At
approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon
Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the
two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus hit the rear left
_______________
1
Records, pp. 437-456.

648
648

side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder

on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to
further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and
Page 7 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.

Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was
unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the Manila
Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar
Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was
later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed
before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case
No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of
Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The
criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among
those who testified in the criminal case were respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties
admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to
sue and be sued as well as the venue and the
identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they
are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff
Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the medical
certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south;
the private jeep being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well
paved and straight, although there was
a ditch on
3
the right side where the jeep fell into.
_______________
3
Pre-Trial Order; Records, p. 143.

649
Page 8 of 30
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
649

When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent
4
prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) of
the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in
evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are
not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law,
respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in
November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio
Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando
Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza
testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their
residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought
her husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac,
when he did not return after one month. She went to her
husbands hometown to look for him but she was informed
that he did not go there.
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch
8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case
No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring 5 the TSNs of the6
testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
7
and Fernando Ramos in said case, together with other
documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the
Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara,
Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and
identified the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses
and
8
other pertinent documents he had brought. Counsel for
respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents
from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant
case, but since the same were not brought to the trial court,
counsel for petitioners compromised that said
_______________
4
TSNs were admitted per Order dated 13 September 1994; Records, p.
341.
5
Exhs. G-3 to G-10 (19 April 1991) and G-11 to G-36 (1 July
1991).
6
Exh. D-4 (5 February 1993).
Page 9 of 30
Exh. E-4.
Exhs. A to H, with submarkings.
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
650
650

TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for

respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic
and bus
9
conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN of the testimony
of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal
Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted
in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked,
among other documents, as
10
rebuttal evidence, the TSNs of the testimonies of Donato
Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal
Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be
held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who
should be liable while the latter is resolute in saying it was
the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial
court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the
two (2) vehicles took place. According to the plaintiff and his driver,
the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on
the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus
overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the
time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to
overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos
corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza.
He said that he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit
Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said,
the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the
plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was
running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was
Page 10 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the
plaintiff swerved to the
_______________
9
Exh. 19.
10
Exhs. M to P.
651
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
651

right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus
stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it
could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved
to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus
from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted
that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question.
However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was
about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep
swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front
of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the
criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus,
which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place
was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers
11
was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and

exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employee, specifically
petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in
favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff
jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages
for the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the
Page 11 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and

another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as
attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition,
12
the defendants are also to pay costs.
Petitioners appealed 13the decision via Notice of Appeal to

the Court of Appeals.
_______________
11
Rollo, pp. 45-47.
12
Records, p. 456.
13
Id., at p. 459.
652
652

In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of

Appeals, finding no reversible error 14in the decision of the
trial court, affirmed it in all respects.
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for
review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. They
assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING
THE
TRIAL
COURTS
QUESTIONABLE
ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW
IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS RELIANCE ON THE
VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT
SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF
Page 12 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF

DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF
ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD
OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the

pendency of this appeal with this Court, we granted the
Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife,
Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children,
Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn
15
Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.
_______________
14
CA Rollo, p. 193.
15
Rollo, pp. 59-62, 88.

653
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
653

In their Reply to respondents16 Comment, petitioners
informed this Court of a Decision of the Court
of Appeals
17
acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the
18
TSNs containing the
testimonies
of
respondent
Calaunan,
19
20
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos should not be
admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply
with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
21
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or
unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given
in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
between the same parties or those representing the same
Page 13 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as

that in the present case, although on different causes of
action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former
trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e)
the adverse party had an opportunity
to cross-examine the
22
witness in the former case.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of
all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony
given
_______________
16
CA-G.R. CR No. 19749.
17
Crim. Case No. 684-M-89.
18
Exhs. G-3 to G-10 (19 April 1991) and G-11 to G-36 (1 July
1991).
19
Exh. D-4 (5 February 1993).
20
Exh. E-4.
21
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given

in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the
adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
22
Samalio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140079, 31 March 2005, 454
SCRA 462, 470.

654
654

in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an

exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being
a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity
to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The
criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner
Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing
with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare
that, strictly speaking, they are not parties
to the criminal
23
cases instituted against their employees.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not
a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the three
Page 14 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner

PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the
time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in
evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as
waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which
the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the
evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a
waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex
gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for
being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto,
the same may be admitted and 24considered as sufficient to
prove the facts therein asserted.
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish
a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is,
like any other evidence,
to be considered and given the
25
importance it deserves.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the
TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal
case
_______________
23
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703, 14
April 2004, 427 SCRA 456, 471.

24
Tison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027, 31 July 1997, 276 SCRA
582.
25
Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED, S.A., G.R. No. 44944, 9
August 1985, 138 SCRA 118.

655
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
655

when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court.
In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan
and
26
Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners. Moreover,
petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN
containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the
criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of
Page 15 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
the testimonies of plaintiff s witnesses in the criminal case

should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it
offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given
in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI
wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that
the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse
party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at
the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the
witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow
admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of
Ganiban would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that
it will be denied due process when the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil
case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of
due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of
the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived
its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with
Section 47.
27
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,
this Court, through
28
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, admitted in evidence a
TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite
therein petitioners assertion that he would be denied due
process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the
raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules
_______________
26
Records, pp. 336-337.
27
G.R. No. 139849, 5 December 2001, 371 SCRA 466, 474-476.
28
Now Chief Justice.

656
656

Page 16 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of

the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner
waived his right to object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal
case should not have been admitted in the instant civil case
because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to testimony or
deposition. We find such contention to be untenable.
Though said section speaks only of testimony and
deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former
case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can
be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses
that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given
the same
weight as that to which the testimony may be
29
entitled.
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that
the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how the accident
occurred is more credible than respondents version. They
anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic
was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner
Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil
case for
damages was one arising from, or based on, quasi30
delict. Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or
reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while
petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the
diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of
its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The
allegations read:
_______________
29
People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 116918, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 259,
272.
30
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provision of this Chapter.
657
Page 17 of 30
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
657

4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20
A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-described
motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along
the North Luzon Expressway heading South
towards Manila together with MARCELO
MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;
5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North
Luzon Express Way, the above-described motor
vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a
Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with
plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one
Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac,
who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast
speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;
6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the
above-described motor vehicle was forced off the
North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside
where it fell on its drivers side on a ditch, and that
as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle
which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as
shown by pictures to be presented during the pretrial and trial of this case;
7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff
sustained bodily injuries which compounded
plaintiff s frail physical condition and required his
hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until
July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is
hereto attached as Annex A and made an integral
part hereof;
8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total
wreckage of the above-described motor vehicle as
well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely
due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant
driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine
Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due
regard or observance of existing traffic rules and
regulations;
Page 18 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line

Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of (sic) family in 31the selection and
supervision of its drivers; x x x
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be
found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the
Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence
on his part?
_______________
31
Records, pp. 1-3.

658
658

In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the

Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accusedappellant was negligent when the bus he was driving bumped the
jeep from behind; that the proximate cause of the accident was his
having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the
jeep; x x x We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the
vehicle in front of it was beyond the control of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant
cannot be held liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the
32
Revised Penal Code.
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it

appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on
reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the
author of the act complained of which is based on Section
2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which
reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
Page 19 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a

final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held

liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only
to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a
civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as
_______________
32
Rollo, pp. 112-114.

659
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
659

a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has33 not happened or has not been committed
by the accused.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crimea distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual.
The same negligence causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts
or culpa extra-contractual
34
under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal of
the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with 35
it the extinction of the civil liability
based on quasi delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on
reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from
Page 20 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence

only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that
he was not the author of the act or omission complained of
(or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said
acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime
or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime
or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex
delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any,
may be instituted on grounds other than the delict
complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal,
_______________
33
34
Elcano v. Hill, G.R. No. L-24803, 26 May 1977, 77 SCRA 98, 106.
Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, 6
November 1990, 191 SCRA 195, 203-204.

35
Heirs of the Late Guaring, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 274, 279;
269 SCRA 283, 288 (1997).

660
660

whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that

accused was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or
negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the
36
Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction37 in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasidelict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of
how the collision occurred and to disregard that of
respondents. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus
was in the process of overtaking respondents jeep, the
Page 21 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast)

lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus
causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in
a petition for review. The factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate38 court, are
binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. Not being a
trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof
unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
peti_______________
36
McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68102 and No. 68103, 16
July 1992, 211 SCRA 517, 536.

37
Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48541, 21 August 1989, 176 SCRA
591, 598.
38
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. John Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo,
Inc., G.R. No. 159831, 14 October 2005, 473 SCRA 151, 162.
661
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
661

tioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
39
on record.
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any

of the exceptions that would warrant our departure from
Page 22 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial

court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was
petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the
PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving
credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court
has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the
collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who
between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their
respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of
Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the Philippine Rabbit
Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the
fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when
the collision took place. The allegation that another jeep was being
overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in
Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in
Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a product
of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could
explain why he should not be held responsible for the incident. His
attempt to veer away from the truth was also apparent when it
would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine
Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the
Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his testimony
before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in
this Court, he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already
on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this
inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation
regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the
bus took place should be
_______________
39
Sigaya v. Mayuga, G.R. No. 143254, 18 August 2005, 467 SCRA 341, 352-
353.
662
662

Page 23 of 30
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
taken with caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar

Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it
was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act
of overtaking another jeep when the collision between the latter
jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact,
however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day
after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should not escape
attention. The oneday difference between the giving of the two
statements would be significant enough to entertain the possibility
of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before giving his
statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the
statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should
prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the
unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV
Cabading rear its ugly head when he did not mention in said
affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another
jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the
Philippine Rabbit bus took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio
Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the
collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have
been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear.
Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather
than having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize
that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by
40
Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence

that caused the smash up, there arises the juris tantum
presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable
only by proof
of observance of the42diligence of a good father
41
of a family. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code,
when an
_______________
40
41
Rollo, pp. 47-50.

Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
104408, 21 June 1993, 223 SCRA 521, 539.

42
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
Page 24 of 30
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whom one is responsible.

663
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
663

injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after selection or both. The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a43 family in the selection and supervision of
their employee.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it
had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly
petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed
the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent
before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due
diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that
presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is
sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence
in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience and service records. In the supervision of
employees, the employer must formulate standard
operating procedures,
_______________
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
Page 25 of 30
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The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
43
Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 8, 23; 243 SCRA 220, 230
(1995).
664
664

monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary

measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence, that they
complied with everything
44
that was incumbent on them.
In Metro
Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of
45
Appeals, it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand,
includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the
guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and the
imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in
case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of
acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their
employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the
constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable
supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it
is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence
of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the
part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has
been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the
actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such
Page 26 of 30
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presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all
employers, that the formulation of various company policies on
safety without showing that they were being complied with is not
sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence
of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in
recruiting
_______________
44
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Sarangaya III, G.R. No. 147746, 25
October 2005, 474 SCRA 191, 202.

45
Supra note 41 at pp. 540-541.
665
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
665

and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the

diligence of a good father of a family in the selection but
not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as
follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver
as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence
though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There
has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules
promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its
vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the
vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in
the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver
should behave while operating their vehicles without courting
incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is
not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
has been negligent as an employer and it should be made
responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver
involved in this case.
Page 27 of 30
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We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the

occurrence of the accident is not enough to exempt
petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence
of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the
guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The
presence of the investigators after the accident is not
enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that
is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and
established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of
supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is
only one set of manual containing
the rules and regulations
46
for all the drivers of PRBLI. How then can all the drivers
of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of
the rules and regulations when only one manual is being
lent to all the drivers?
_______________
46
TSN, 16 February 1995, pp. 23-24.

666
666

For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of

a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily
responsible for the damages caused by petitioner
Manliclics negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court
correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as actual
damages representing the amount47 paid by respondent for
the towing and repair of his jeep. As regards the awards
for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the
circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00
awarded by the trial 48court as moral damages must be
reduced to P50,000.00. Exemplary damages are imposed
49
by way of example or correction for the public good. The
amount awarded by the
trial court must, likewise, be
50
lowered to P50,000.00. The award of P15,000.00 for
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and
Page 28 of 30
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51
authorized by law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages
shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of
exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez
and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
_______________
47
Exhs. C to C-4 and F. Records, pp. 232-236, 288. Article 2219
(2), Civil Code.

48
Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado, G.R. No. 85331, 25 August 1989,
176 SCRA 792, 803.

49
Article 2229, Civil Code.
50
Tiu v. Arriesgado, G.R. No. 138060, 1 September 2004, 437 SCRA
426, 451; Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 120553, 17 June 1997, 273 SCRA 562, 574-575.
51
Article 2208 (1), (2) and (5), Civil Code.

667
VOL. 512, JANUARY 25, 2007
667
Cebu Salvage Corporation vs. Philippine Home Assurance

Corporation
Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.A previous decision or judgment, while
admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused
was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to
prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a
subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving
the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is
hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction
in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the
right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
Page 29 of 30
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(People vs. Ortiz-Miyake, 279 SCRA 180 [1997])

The Court of Appeals commits an error when it deletes
the lower courts award of moral damages in the dispositive
portion simply on the ground that there was no finding
thereon in the body of the decision since in criminal cases
an appeal opens the whole case for review, including a
review of the indemnity and damages involved. (People vs.
Castro, 282 SCRA 212 [1997])
o0o
Page 30 of 30
674
9/15/15, 11:10 PM

Quiambao vs. Osorio
*
No. L-48157. March 16, 1988.
RICARDO QUIAMBAO, petitioner, vs. HON. ADRIANO

OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA
GAZA BERNARDO, and FELIPE GAZA, respondentsappellees, LAND AUTHORITY, intervenor-appellant.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Forcible entry and
detainer; Prejudicial question, meaning and applicability of.A
prejudicial question. is understood in law to be that which arises in
a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into
play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are
pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so
closely-related that an issue must be preemptively resolved in the
civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence
of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal
case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final
determination of the former.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Essential elements of a prejudicial
question.The essential elements of a prejudicial question as
provided under Section 5, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court are:
[a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions in case at bar being
respectively civil and administrative in character, no prejudicial
question exists; Reason.The actions involved in the case at bar
being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is obvious
that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally
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apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2]

proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private
respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends
primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case. For
while it may be true that private respondents had prior possession
of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment
case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very
least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the
Agreement to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not private
respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is but
a
_____________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
675
VOL. 158, MARCH 16, 1988
675
Quiambao vs. Osorio

necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending
administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the
Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed
portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell
and the subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private
respondents would have every right to eject petitioner from the
disputed area. Otherwise, private respondents' right of possession is
lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ejectment proceedings should beheld
in abeyance until after a determination made in the administrative
case; Allowing parties to undergo trial despite the possibility of
petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the pending
administrative case is not proper.Faced with these distinct
possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to have
taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a
determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and
pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the
Page 2 of 10
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of

petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the pending
administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but
the court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn
out to be a sheer exercise in futility. x x x While this rule is properly
applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions, the existence
in the instant case of the same considerations of identity of parties
and issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels
and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties' right of
possession before the ejectment case may be properly determined,
justifies the rule's analogous application to the case at bar.
PETITION to review the order of the Court of First

Instance of Rizal.
FERNAN, J.:
This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals as one
involving pure questions of law pursuant to Section 3, Rule
50 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The antecedents are as follows:
In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private
respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero, Justina Gaza
Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner
Ricardo Quiambao before the then Municipal Court of
Malabon, Rizal, docketed therein as
676
676

Quiambao vs. Osorio
Civil Case No. 2526, it was alleged that private

respondents were the legitimate possessors of a 30,835 sq.
m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of the Longos
Estate situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue
of the Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor
by the former Land Tenure Administration [which later
became the Land Authority, then the Department of
Agrarian Reform]; that under cover of darkness, petitioner
surreptitiously and by force, intimidation, strategy and
Page 3 of 10
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
stealth, entered into a 400 sq. m. portion thereof, placed

bamboo posts "staka" over said portion and thereafter
began the construction of a house thereon; and that these
acts of petitioner, which were unlawful per se, entitled
private respondents to a writ of preliminary injunction and
to the ejectment of petitioner from the lot in question.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and
upon denial thereof, filed his Answer to the complaint,
specifically denying the material allegations therein and
averring that the Agreement upon. which private
respondents base their prior possession over the questioned
lot had already been cancelled by the Land Authority in an
Order signed by its Governor, Conrado Estrella. By way of
affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the
case, petitioner alleged the pendency of L.A. Case No. 968,
an administrative case before the Office of the Land
Authority between the same parties and involving the
same piece of land. In said administrative case, petitioner
disputed private respondents' right of possession over the
property in question by reason of the latter's default in the
installment payments for the purchase of said lot.
Petitioner asserted that this administrative case was
determinative of private respondents' right to eject
petitioner from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial
question which bars a judicial action until after its
termination.
After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to
dismiss contained in petitioner's affirmative defenses. It
ruled that inasmuch as the issue involved in the case was
the recovery of physical possession, the court had
jurisdiction to try and hear the case.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XII, Caloocan
City in Civil Case No. C-1576 a petition for certiorari with
injunction
677
VOL. 158, MARCH 16, 1988
677
Quiambao vs. Osorio

against public respondent Judge Adriano Osorio of the
Page 4 of 10
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Municipal Court of Malabon and private respondents,

praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the
ejectment case until after the resolution of said petition. As
prayed for, the then CFI of Rizal issued a restraining order
enjoining further proceedings in the ejectment case,
In his answer, respondent municipal judge submitted
himself to the sound discretion of the CFI in the disposition
of the petition for certiorari. Private respondents, on the
other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition,
maintaining that the administrative case did not constitute
a prejudicial question as it involved the question of
ownership, unlike the ejectment case which involved
merely the question of possession.
Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion
for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. C-1576 alleging
the pendency of an administrative case between the same
parties on the same subject matter in L.A. Case No. 968
and praying that the petition for certiorari be granted, the
ejectment complaint be dismissed and the Office of the
Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.
Finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be
one of prior possession, the CFI dismissed the petition for
certiorari and lifted the restraining order previously issued.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
order, adopted in toto by Intervenor Land Authority was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal filed by
petitioner Quiambao and intervenor Land Authority with
the Court of Appeals, and certified to Us as aforesaid.
The instant controversy boils down to the sole question
of whether or not the administrative case between the
private parties involving the lot subject matter of the
ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which
would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that
which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case and
the
1
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
doctrine of prejudicial ques______________
Page 5 of 10
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Zapata v. Montesa, 4 SCRA 510 (1962); People v. Aragon, 50 O.G. No.
10, 4863.
678
678

Quiambao vs. Osorio
tion comes into play generally in a situation where civil

and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in
both cases are similar or so closely-related that an issue
must be preemptively resolved in the civil case before the
criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a
prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal
case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final
determination of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as
provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal action; and
[b] the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being
respectively civil and administrative in character, it is
obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to
speak of. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate
correlation between said two [2] proceedings, stemming
from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject
petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on
the resolution of the pending administrative case. For
while it may be true that private respondents had prior
possession of the lot in question, at the time of the
institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession
had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the
cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to
Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not private
respondents can continue to exercise their right of
possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the
issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing
the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and
the subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner.
If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the
Page 6 of 10
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subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private

respondents would have every right to eject petitioner from
the disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's right of
possession is lost and so would their right to eject
petitioner from said portion.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent
course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the
ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a
determination of the administrative case, Indeed, logic and
pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To
allow the parties to undergo trial
679
VOL. 158, MARCH 16, 1988
679
Quiambao vs. Osorio

notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of
possession being upheld in the pending administrative case
is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as
well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out
to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:
"The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action,
hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending
in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the
same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort
for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties
to the second action cannot be properly determined until the
questions raised in the first action are settled the second action
2
should be stayed."
While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving

two [2] court actions, the existence in the instant case of
the same considerations of identity of parties and issues,
economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and
the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties right
of possession before the ejectment case may be properly
determined, justifies the rule's analogous application to the
case at bar.
Page 7 of 10
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Fortich-Celdran, et al. vs. Celdran, et al., 19 SCRA 502,

provides another analogous situation. In sustaining the
assailed order of the then Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental ordering the suspension of the criminal
case for falsification of public document against several
persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago
Catane until the civil case involving the issue of the
genuineness of the alleged forged document shall have been
decided. this Court cited as a reason therefor its own action
on the administrative charges against said Santiago
Catane, as follows:
It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed
in this Court against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was
held by Us in abeyance, thus:
'As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by
respondent attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 [Richard Ignacio
Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.] is necessarily involved in Civil
Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu Court
_____________
2
at page 622.
680
680

Quiambao vs. Osorio
of First Instance, action on the herein complaint is withheld until that

litigation has finally been decided. Complainant Celdran shall inform the
3
Court about such decision.'
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the

nature of a prejudicial question to an administrative case,
We see no reason why the reverse may not be so considered
in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar.
Finally, events occuring during the pendency of this
petition attest to the wisdom of the conclusion herein
reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel for
petitioner, it was stated that the intervenor Land Authority
which later became the Department of Agrarian Reform
Page 8 of 10
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
had promulgated a decision in the administrative case, L.A.

Case No. 968 affirming the cancellation of Agreement to
Sell No. 3482 issued in favor of private respondents. With
this development, the folly of allowing the ejectment case to
proceed is too evident to need further elaboration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the then Municipal
Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No
Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Corts, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted.
Note.A prejudicial question is one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action. it
must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
(Librodo vs. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303.)
o0o
_____________
3
Supreme Court minute resolution of April 27, 1962 in Adm. Case No.
77, Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.

681
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VOL. 205, JANUARY 30, 1992
625
Yap vs. Paras

*
G.R. No. 101236. January 30, 1992.
JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner, vs. MARTIN PARAS and

ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of
Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial question; For a
civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action, it must
appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution
of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.Section 5,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended
provides: Section 5. Elements of prejudicial question,The two (2)
essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. A prejudicial
question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in
another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. We have
held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the
determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the
civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the
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guilt or innocence of the accused."

Same; Same; Same; Suspension; The order dismissing the
criminal action without a motion for suspension in accordance with
Sec. 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended and without the accused in the civil case for the annulment
of the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also
bias on the part of the respondent judge.It is worth remarking
that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a
prejudicial question to justify
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
626
626

Yap vs. Paras
suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an

issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the
criminal action and its resolution should determine whether or not
the latter action may proceed. The order dismissing the criminal
action without a motion for suspension in accordance with Rule 111,
Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended,
and even without the accused indicating his defense in the civil case
for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of
the law but also bias on the part of the respondent judge.
Judicial Ethics; Code of Judicial Conduct; A judge shall be
faith-ful to the law and maintain professional competence and
should administer justice impartially.Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona,
Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a
judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence" and "should administer justice impartially." He is
hereby reprimanded for his questionable conduct in the case at bar,
with the warning that commission of similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
Page 2 of 10
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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the order

of the Municipal Trial Court of Glan Malapatan, South
Cotabato.
Mariano C. Alegarbes for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
This is still another dispute between brother and sister
over a piece of property they inherited from their parents.
The case is complicated by the circumstance that the
private respondent's counsel in this petition is the son of
the judge, the other respondent, whose action is being
questioned.
Petitioner Juliana P. **Yap was the sister of private
respondent Martin Paras.
_______________
**
She died pendente lite on September 2, 1991, and was by resolution
of the Court dated January 13, 1991, substituted by her children,

Ruperto, Rustico, Ignacio, Rogelio, Arsenio, Jr., all surnamed Yap,
Rainilda Yap Breta, and the children of the deceased Teodora Yap
Cuaycong.
627
VOL. 205, JANUARY 30, 1992
627
Yap us. Paras

On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her
his share in the intestate estate of their parents for
P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document.
Nineteen years later, on May 2,1990, Paras sold the same
property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a
complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the1
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City.
On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification
Page 3 of 10
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
of the said 2sale with the Regional Trial Court of General

Santos City.
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted
a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South
Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused,
the trial judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing the
criminal case on the ground that:
x x x after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant,
Juliana P. Yap and of the respondent Martin Paras and his
witnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic) that there is a
prejudicial question to a civil action, which must be ventilated in
the proper civil court. In the case of Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125,
the Supreme Court had already made a pronouncement that "a
criminal action for Estafa for alleged double sale of property is a
prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed
of Sale and defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries of their
3
signatures to the Deed."
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied

on April 30, 1991. She then came to this Court for relief in
this special civil action for certiorari.
The Court could have referred this petition to the Court
of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction under BP
129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view of the
peculiar circumstances involved.
_______________
1
Rollo, p. 8.
lbid., p. 13.
Id,pp. 30-31.
628
628

Yap vs. Paras
The petitioner's contention is that where there is a

prejudicial question in a civil case, the criminal action may
Page 4 of 10
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not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this

suspension may not be done motu proprio by the judge
trying the criminal case but only upon petition of the
defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also
stressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal would not
bar the prosecution of the accused under the double
jeopardy rule because he has not yet been arraigned.
The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent
Paras who filed the comment in his behalf is the son and
namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona,
Jr. is employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He has
made it of record that he was not the counsel of Paras at
the time the questioned order of dismissal was issued by
his father. He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias
against his father.
Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests
there may have been a basis for the order in view of the
alleged double sale of the property which was being
litigated in the regional trial court. He concedes, however,
that the order may have been premature and that it could
not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that double
jeopardy would not attach because of the lack of
arraignment, he asks that his Comment be considered a
motion for the suspension of the criminal action on the
ground of prejudicial question.
The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that
the respondent judge did indeed commit grave abuse of
discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal.
Procedure as amended by this Court on July 7, 1988,
provides as follows:
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition
for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests.
Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say

the least, in light of the clear provision of the above-quoted
rule.
Page 5 of 10
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629
VOL. 205, JANUARY 30, 1992
629
Yap vs. Paras

The rule is not even new, being only a rewording of the
original provision in the Rules of Court before they were
amended. It plainly says that the suspension may be made
only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge
alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal. One
also wonders if the person who notarized the disputed
second sale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might
be related to the respondent judge.
But more important than the preceding considerations is
the trial judge's misapprehension of the concept of a
prejudicial question.
Procedure as amended provides:
Section 5. Elements of prejudicial question,The two (2) essential
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a

case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must
be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve4 the question must be lodged
in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with5 it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
We have held that "for a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension
of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil
action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is
based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
said civil action would be
Page 6 of 10
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_______________
People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Merced vs. Diez, 109 Phil. 155;
Zapanta vs. Montesa, 114 Phil. 428; Fortich-Celdran vs. Celdran, 19

SCRA 502.
5
De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202; Mendiola vs. Macadaeg, 1 SCRA
593.
630
630

Yap vs. Paras
necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
6
accused."
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the
continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal action
that is prejudicial to the civil action.
The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order7
does not appear anywhere in the decision of Ras v. Rasul.
Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but also
wrongly applied it. The facts of that case are not analogous
to those in the case at bar.
In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land
which he later also sold to Martin. Pichel brought a civil
action for nullification of the second sale and asked that
the sale made by Ras in his favor be declared valid. Ras's
defense was that he never sold the property to Pichel and
his purported signatures appearing in the first deed of sale
were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was filed
against Ras based on the same double sale that was the
subject of the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for
Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal case), claiming
that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would
necessarily be determinative of his guilt or innocence.
Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this
Court ruled that a suspension of the criminal action was in
order because:
On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases
against petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a
prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial
Page 7 of 10
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question in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro

Ras' defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and
forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel
(plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witnesses in the criminal
case) is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily
determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in the
criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or
fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would
be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case
(if it were allowed to
_______________
6
Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125; Mendiola vs. Macadaeg, supra.
Supra.
631
VOL. 205, JANUARY 30, 1992
631
Yap vs. Paras

proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set
aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the
alleged prior dead of sale was a forgery and spurious.
xxx
The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the
complaint in Civil Case No. 73 that he had never sold the property
in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in
the alleged deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by the
plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary that the truth or falsity of such
claim be first determined because if his claim is true, then he did
not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed. The
question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate from the
crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner
in the criminal action.
In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the

criminal action on the ground that the defense in the civil
caseforgery of his signature in the first deed of salehad
to be threshed out first. Resolution of that question would
necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused in
Page 8 of 10
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
the criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for

suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the
respondent judge had not been informed of the defense
Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could
not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil
action would determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in
the civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify
suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve
an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue
raised in the criminal action and its resolution should
determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.
The order dismissing the criminal action without a
motion for suspension in accordance with Rule 111, Section
6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended,
and even without the accused indicating his defense in the
civil case for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not
only ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of the
respondent judge.
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that
under the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a judge shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence"
and "should ad632
632
Samhwa Company Ltd. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

minister justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for
his questionable conduct in the case at bar, with the
warning that commission of similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order
issued by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17,
1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the Order
dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for
reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for
further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.
SO ORDERED.
Page 9 of 10
9/15/15, 11:10 PM
Narvasa (C.J.), Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,

concur.
Petition granted; order reversed and set aside.
Note.Court finds Judge Montemayor guilty of gross
negligence and grave partiality in issuing the questioned
orders and writs. (McCormack vs. Montemayor, 187 SCRA
713.)
o0o
Page 10 of 10
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VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992
863
Tamin vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 97477. May 8, 1992.
RTC JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del
Sur and the MUNICIPALITY OF DUMINGAG,
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, represented by MAYOR
DOMICIANO E. REAL, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, VICENTE MEDINA and FORTUNATA
ROSELLON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; The allegations and not the title control
the cause of action of the complaint.The appellate court rightfully
upheld the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case
based on the allegations in the complaint. The allegations and not
the title control the cause of action of the complaint.
Same; Same; Court agrees with the petitioners that the
complaint alleges factual circumstances of a complaint for
abatement of public nuisance.Applying these criteria, we agree
with the petitioners that the complaint alleges factual
circumstances of a complaint for abatement of public nuisance.
Thus, the complaint states: that petitioner municipality is the
owner of a parcel of land covered by Presidential Proclamation No.
365 which is reserved for a public plaza; that the private
respondents by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the
former mayor occupied a portion of the parcel of land constructing
buildings thereon; that the private respondents refused to vacate
the premises despite demands; that the municipality is constructing
a municipal gymnasium in the area financed by appropriations
provided by the national government; and that the appropriations
are in danger of being reverted to the national treasury because the
construction had to be stopped in view of the refusal of the private
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Page 1 of 19
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respondents to vacate the area.

Civil Law; Nuisance.A public plaza is outside the commerce
of man and constructions thereon can be abated summarily by the
municipality.
PETITION for review of the decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals.
____________
*
EN BANC.
864
864

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The present petition seeks to annul and set aside the
decision and resolution dated January 21, 1991 and
February 20, 1991, respectively of the Court of Appeals
which declared as null and void the October 10, 1991 order
of the petitioner Judge in a civil case for ejectment with
preliminary injunction and damages filed by petitioner
municipality against the private respondents granting the
petitioner municipalitys motion for a writ of possession
and the writ issued pursuant to it.
On September 24, 1990, petitioner municipality
represented by its mayor Domiciano E. Real filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23,
Molave, presided by the petitioner Judge, a complaint
denominated as Ejectment with Preliminary Injunction
and Damages against respondents Vicente Medina and
Fortunata Rosellon.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff (petitioner
municipality herein) is the owner of a parcel of residential
land located at Poblacion, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur
with an area of 5,894 square meters more or less; that the
parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under
Page 2 of 19
9/15/15, 11:11 PM
Presidential Proclamation No. 365 dated March 15, 1968;

that during the incumbency of the late Mayor Isidoro E.
Real, Sr. or in 1958, the municipality leased an area of
1,350 square meters to the defendants (respondents herein)
subject to the condition that they should vacate the place in
case it is needed for public purposes; that the defendants
religiously paid the rentals until 1967; that thereafter, the
defendants refused to pay the rentals; that the incumbent
mayor discovered that the defendants filed a Cadastral
Answer over said lot; that the defendants refused to
vacate the place despite efforts of the municipality; that the
national government had alloted an appropriation for the
construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public
plaza but the said construction which was already started
could not continue because of the presence of the buildings
constructed by the defendants; that the appropriation for
the construction of the gymnasium might be reverted back
to the national government which would result to
irreparable damage, injury and prejudice to the
municipality and its people who are expected to derive
benefit from the accomplishment of the project.
865
VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992
865

The complaint prayed:
1. That a restraining order shall be issued
immediately after the filing of this case;
2. That after due notice and hearing, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction shall be issued
against the herein defendants for them (sic) from
further occupying the leased portion to them (sic),
and/or that a Writ of Possession be immediately
issued to preserve the rights of the herein plaintiff;
3. That judgment should be entered against the
herein defendants to vacate the premises of the
leased portion given to them. (CA Rollo, pp. 11-12)
Page 3 of 19
9/15/15, 11:11 PM
On the same day, September 24, 1990, the petitioner Judge

issued an order setting the preliminary hearing for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or writ of possession on October 10, 1990.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a
motion to dismiss alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court, since the complaint is for illegal detainer which
is within the original jurisdiction of the municipal court
and the pendency of a cadastral case (Cadastral Case No.
N-10, LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-108, Lot 9481 [Pls-61] TS-218)
between the parties over the ownership of the same parcel
of land.
On October 10, 1990, the petitioner Judge issued two (2)
orders. The first order denied the motion to dismiss. The
second order granted the petitioner municipalitys motion
for a writ of possession with the ancillary writ of
demolition to place in possession the plaintiff on the land
subject of this case, to the end that the public construction
thereon will not be jeopardized. (CA Rollo, p. 22)
In denying the motion to dismiss, the petitioner Judge
said:
xxx
xxx
xxx
2. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is

claiming ownership over the land which was previously
rented to defendant by the plaintiff municipality. This
action is, therefore, clearly an accion de reivindicacion, a
real action within the jurisdiction of this court.
3. As the complaint is for recovery of ownership of the land not
to enforce the contract, the Statute of Fraud does not apply.
866
866

4. The land subject of this case is covered by P.D. No. 365,
withdrawing this land from sale of settlement and reserving
the same for school site purposes under the administration
of the Director of Public School and public plaza under the
administration of the Municipality of Dumingag, therefore
Page 4 of 19
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the cadastral court has no jurisdiction over the land

involved in this case. (CA Rollo, p. 20)
The petitioner Judge justified his granting the motion for a

writ of possession with the ancillary writ of demolition by
applying the rule on eminent domain (Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court, erroneously referred to as Rule 68)
in analogy in that under this Rule the complainant is given
the right to the writ of possession in order that public
construction and projects will not be delayed. According to
the petitioner Judge, the necessity of a writ of possession is
greater in the instant case considering that the parcel of
land is covered by a Presidential Proclamation and the ongoing construction thereon is being endangered to be left
unfinished on account of the buildings standing on the
parcel of land because the appropriation for the
construction might be reverted back to the national
treasury.
The private respondents filed an omnibus motion for
reconsideration with motion to set aside order and to quash
writ of possession and demolition, but this was denied in an
order dated October 19, 1990.
On October 19, 1990, the petitioner municipality
implemented the writ of possession and ancillary writ of
demolition issued by the petitioner Judge resulting in the
dispossession of the private respondents from the parcel of
land and the demolition of structures and buildings thereon
owned by the respondents.
On October 23, 1990, the private respondents filed their
answer to the complaint alleging therein that the subject
parcel of land has been owned, occupied and possessed by
respondent Vicente Medina since 1947 when he bought the
subject parcel from a Subanan native; that the other
respondent Fortunata Rosellon leased from Medina a
portion of the parcel of land; that the respondents were
never lessees of the petitioner municipality; that
Proclamation No. 365 issued on March 15, 1968 recognized
private rights; and, that a case is pending before the
cadastral court between respondent Medina and petitioner
municipality as regards the ownership of the subject parcel
of land.
867
Page 5 of 19
VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992
9/15/15, 11:11 PM
867

Before the petitioner Judge could further act on the case,
the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals questioning the October 10 and
October 19, 1990 orders of the petitioner Judge.
In a resolution dated November 14, 1990, the petition
was given due course and a temporary restraining order
was issued enjoining the petitioner Judge from proceeding
with the hearing of the case and from enforcing the October
10, and 19, 1990 orders.
On January 21, 1990, the appellate court rendered the
questioned decision. A motion for reconsideration was
denied in a resolution dated February 20, 1991.
In a resolution dated November 26, 1991, we gave due
course to the petition.
The appellate court rightfully upheld the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court over the case based on the
allegations in the complaint. The allegations and not the
title control the cause of action of the complaint. (Andamo
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195 [1990]).
The Court said:
First, Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction over the case
brought by the Municipality of Dimangag? As already noted, the
gist of the complaint below is that the land in question is part of the
public domain which the President of the Philippines, under
Proclamation No. 365, dated March 25, (should be 15) 1968,
reserved for school site and public plaza in the Municipality of
Dumingag and that the petitioners, to whom the former town mayor
had leased a part of the land, refused to vacate and to pay rents. If
this is the theory on which the complaint is based, then the action
may really be considered one for recovery of possession. For though
a lease is alleged, the lease would be void and the municipality
could recover the possession of the land. This is the teaching of the
leading case of Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602 [1915]
in which it was held that the lease by a municipal corporation of a
public plaza is null and void because land for public use is outside
the commerce of man and, therefore, the lessee must restore
possession of the land by vacating it. As in this case, in the Rojas
Page 6 of 19
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case the action was for recovery of possession instituted in the

Court of First Instance, the counterpart of which at present is the
Regional Trial Court. We, therefore, hold that the respondent judge
has jurisdiction of the case brought against petitioners
868
868

for recovery of possession of what is alleged to be land for public use

of the respondent municipality. (CA Rollo, pp. 53- 54)
Prescinding from the finding that the complaint is for

recovery of possession the appellate court concluded that
the trial court did not have authority to issue a writ of
possession and a writ of demolition citing the case of
Mabale v. Apalisok (88 SCRA 234 [1979]), to wit:
In that connection, it should be borne in mind that the law
specifies when a writ of possession may be issued. That writ is
available (1) in a land registration proceeding, which is a
proceeding in rem (Sec. 17, Act No. 496; Estipona v. Navarro, 69
SCRA 285, 291); (2) in an extra-judicial foreclosure of a realty
mortgage (Sec. 7, Act No. 3135); (3) in a judicial foreclosure of
mortgage, a quasi in rem proceeding, provided that the mortgagor is
in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a
party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened (Rivera v. Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija and Rupac, 61 Phil. 201; Ramos v.
Maalac and Lopez, 89 Phil. 270, 275) and (4) in execution sales
(last par. of sec. 35, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
The appellate court also ruled that the trial court

committed an error when it applied by analogy the rule on
eminent domain (Rule 67, Revised Rules of Court) to justify
the issuance of the writ of possession and writ of
demolition. The appellate court pointed out that under this
rule:
xxx xxx xxx
x x x (i) There is clear statutory authority for the taking of
possession by the government and (ii) The authority is premised on
the government depositing the value of the land to be taken. For
Page 7 of 19
9/15/15, 11:11 PM
unless the taking of the land is done under these conditions, the
taking would constitute deprivation of property without due process
of law which the Constitution prohibits. (See Manila Railroad Co. v.
Paredes, 31 Phil. 118 [1915]) (CA Rollo, p. 55)
The appellate court then stated:

In the case at bar, there is neither statutory authority for the trial
courts action nor bond given to compensate the petitioners for the
deprivation of their possession and the destruction of their houses if
it
869
VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992
869

turns out that the land belongs to them. For this reason, we think
the trial courts order is arbitrary and void. For the fact is that
petitioners claim ownership of the land in question and until that
question is resolved either in the case pending before the
respondent judge or in the cadastral proceeding, it would be unjust
to deprive petitioners of its possession. (CA Rollo, pp. 55-56)
The petitioners now contend that the allegations in the

complaint constitute a cause of action for abatement of
public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code. On the
basis of this proposition, the petitioners assert that
petitioner municipality is entitled to the writ of possession
and writ of demolition.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as follows:
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property or anything else which:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
while Article 695 provides:

ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance
affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage
upon individuals may be unequal. x x x.
Page 8 of 19
9/15/15, 11:11 PM
Applying these criteria, we agree with the petitioners that

the complaint alleges factual circumstances of a complaint
for abatement of public nuisance. Thus, the complaint
states: that petitioner municipality is the owner of a parcel
of land covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 365 which
is reserved for a public plaza; that the private respondents
by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the former
mayor occupied a portion of the parcel of land constructing
buildings thereon; that the private respondents refused to
vacate the premises despite demands; that the
municipality is constructing a municipal gymnasium in the
area financed by appropriations provided by the national
government; and that the appropriations are in danger of
being reverted to the national treasury because the
construction had to be stopped in view of the refusal of the
870
870

private respondents to vacate the area.

The issue, however, is not the nature of the cause of
action alleged in the complaint. The more important
question is whether or not the petitioner municipality is
entitled to a writ of possession and a writ of demolition
even before the trial of the case starts.
Article 699 of the Civil Code provides for the following
remedies against a public nuisance:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local
ordinance; or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
The petitioner municipality had three remedies from which
to select its cause of action. It chose to file a civil action for
the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by
the private respondents. Obviously, petitioner municipality
was aware that under the then Local Government Code
(B.P. Blg. 337) the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an
Page 9 of 19
9/15/15, 11:11 PM
ordinance before the municipality may summarily abate a

public nuisance. (Sec. 149(z) (ee).
On the premise that the parcel of land forms part of a
public plaza, the petitioners now contend that the Judge
was justified in issuing the writ of possession and writ of
demolition.
A public plaza is outside the commerce of man and
constructions thereon can be abated summarily by the
municipality. We ruled in the case of Villanueva v.
Castaeda, Jr. (154 SCRA 142 [1987]):
Exactly in point is Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio,
(102 Phil. 869-870) where the Supreme Court declared:
There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for
the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such
structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law.
Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use
and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the
commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the
municipality to private parties.
871
VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992
871

Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that petitioners had
no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and
cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their
alleged lease contracts. They should have realized and accepted this
earlier, considering that even before Civil Case No. 2040 was
decided, the municipal council of San Fernando had already
adopted Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, declaring the area as the
parking place and public plaza of the municipality.
It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said resolution of
the municipal council of San Fernando that respondent Macalino
was seeking to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the stalls
constructed in the disputed area. As officer-in-charge of the office of
the mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its
intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality
of San Fernando, conformably to the aforementioned orders from
the court and the council. It is, therefore, not correct to say that he
Page 10 of 19
9/15/15, 11:11 PM
had acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in
issuing his order.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court observes that even without such investigation and
recommendation, the respondent mayor was justified in ordering
the area cleared on the strength alone of its status as a public plaza
as declared by the judicial and legislative authorities. x x x.
If, therefore, the allegations in the complaint are true and

that the parcel of land being occupied by the private
respondents is indeed a public plaza, then the writ of
possession and writ of demolition would have been
justified. In fact, under such circumstances, there would
have been no need for a writ of possession in favor of the
petitioner municipality since the private respondents
occupation over the subject parcel of land can not be
recognized by any law. A writ of demolition would have
been sufficient to eject the private respondents.
However, not only did the municipality avoid the use of
abatement without judicial proceedings, but the status of
the subject parcel of land has yet to be decided.
We have to consider the fact that Proclamation No. 365
dated March 15, 1968 recognizes private rights which may
have been vested on other persons, to wit:
872
872

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROCLAMATION NO. 365
RESERVING FOR SCHOOL SITE, PUBLIC PLAZA AND

PLAYGROUND PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
DUMINGAG, PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, ISLAND
OF MINDANAO.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by
law, I FERDINAND E. MARCOS, PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and
Page 11 of 19
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under the administration of the Director of Public Schools

administration of the Municipal Government of Dumingag, subject
to private rights, if any there be, certain parcels of land of the public
domain situated in the Municipality of Dumingag, Province of
Zamboanga del Sur, Island of Mindanao, xxx. (CA Rollo, pp. 41-A 42) Emphasis supplied).
It is to be noted that even before the Proclamation, the

parcel of land was the subject of cadastral proceedings
before another branch of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur. At the time of the filing of the instant
case, the cadastral proceedings intended to settle the
ownership over the questioned portion of the parcel of land
under Proclamation No. 365 were still pending. One of the
claimants in the cadastral proceedings is private
respondent Vicente Medina who traced his ownership over
the subject parcel of land as far back as 1947 when he
allegedly bought the same from a Subanan native.
Under the cadastral system, the government through
the Director of Lands initiates the proceedings by filing a
petition in court after which all owners or claimants are
compelled to act and present their answers otherwise they
lose their right to their own property. The purpose is to
serve the public interests by requiring that the titles to any
lands be settled and adjudicated. (Section 1 Cadastral Act
[No. 2259] Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural,
39 Phil. 996 [1919]. It is a proceeding in rem somewhat
akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a
judicial decree. (Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of
Manila, 41 Phil. 120 [1920]).
Considering therefore, the nature and purpose of the
cadastral proceedings, the outcome of said proceedings
becomes a
873
VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992
873

prejudicial question which must be addressed in the
resolution of the instant case. We apply by analogy the
ruling in the case of Quiambao v. Osorio (158 SCRA 674
Page 12 of 19
9/15/15, 11:11 PM
[1988]), to wit:
The instant controversy boils down to the sole question of whether
or not the administrative case between the private parties involving
the lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial
question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which
arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. (Zapanta v. Montesa, 4 SCRA 510 [1962]; People v.
Aragon, 50 O.G. No. 10, 4863) The doctrine of prejudicial question
comes in to play generally in a situation where civil and criminal
actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are
similar or so closelyrelated that an issue must be pre-emptively
resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed.
Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged
in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending
final determination of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided
under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil
and administrative in character, it is obvious that technically, there
is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is
the intimate correlation between said two [2] proceedings,
stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents to
eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the
resolution of the pending administrative case. For while it may be
true that private respondents had prior possession of the lot in
question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment case, such
right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least,
suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the
Agreement to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not private
respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is but
a necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending
administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the
Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed
portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the agreement to Sell and
the subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private
respondents right of possession is lost and so would their right to
eject petitioner from said portion.
Page 13 of 19
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874
874

Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for
the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in
abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case.
Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such
move. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the
possibility of petitioners right of possession being upheld in the
pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the
parties but the court as well to expend time, effort in what may
turn out to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells
us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the
action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another
court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there
is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its
dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be
properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are
settled the second action should be stayed.
While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two

[2] court actions, the existence in the instant case of the same
considerations of identity of parties and issues, economy of time and
effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need
to resolve the parties right of possession before the ejectment case
may be properly determined, justifies the rules analogous
application to the case at bar.
Technically, a prejudicial question shall not rise in the

instant case since the two actions involved are both civil in
nature. However, we have to consider the fact that the
cadastral proceedings will ultimately settle the real
owner/s of the disputed parcel of land. In case respondent
Vicente Medina is adjudged the real owner of the parcel of
land, then the writ of possession and writ of demolition
would necessarily be null and void. Not only that. The
Page 14 of 19
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demolition of the constructions in the parcel of land would

prove truly unjust to the private respondents.
Parenthetically, the issuance of the writ of possession
and writ of demolition by the petitioner Judge in the
ejectment proceedings was premature. What the petitioner
should have done was to stop the proceedings in the instant
case and wait for the
875
VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992
875

final outcome of the cadastral proceedings.
At any rate, affirmative relief based on the above
discussions is no longer possible. The demolition of the
buildings owned by the private respondents is now a fait
accompli.
In the case of Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of
Appeals (199 SCRA 595 [1991]) we awarded just
compensation the amount of which was for the trial court
to determine in favor of the petitioner whose building was
demolished by the municipality even before a proper
tribunal could decide whether or not the building
constituted a nuisance in law. Our ruling was premised on
the ground that the owner of the building was in lawful
possession of the lot and the building by virtue of the
permit from the authorized government agency when the
demolition was effected.
We cannot, however, apply this ruling to the present
case. The legality of the occupation by the private
respondents of the subject parcel of land is still to be
resolved in the cadastral proceedings. In the event that
respondent Vicente Medina is declared owner of the subject
parcel of land, necessarily, the private respondents would
be entitled to just compensation for the precipitate
demolition of their buildings. On the other hand, if private
respondent Medina is declared to have no rights over the
subject parcel of land then, the private respondents would
not be entitled to any compensation for the demolition of
their buildings. In such a case the private respondents are
considered squatters and therefore, the demolition of their
Page 15 of 19
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buildings would turn out to have been justified.

Faced with these alternative possibilities, and in the
interest of justice, we rule that the petitioner municipality
must put up a bond to be determined by the trial court to
answer for just compensation to which the private
respondents may be entitled in case the demolition of their
buildings is adjudged to be illegal.
Moreover, the appellate court correctly ruled that Rule
67 of the Revised Rules of Court on eminent domain can
not be made a subterfuge to justify the petitioner Judges
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner
municipality. In the recent case of National Power
Corporation v. Hon. Enrique T. Jocson, et al. (G.R. No.
94193-99, February 25, 1992) we said:
876
876

In Municipality of Bian v. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al. (180 SCRA

576 [1989]) this Court ruled that there are two (2) stages in every
action of expropriation:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. (Citing Sections 1,
2 and 3, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.) It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has
a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. (Citing Section 4, Rule 67; Nieto v. Isip, 97 Phil. 31; Benguet
Consolidated v. Republic, 143 SCRA 466). An order of dismissal, if this be
ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the
action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits.
(Citing Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 147 SCRA 334) So,
too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the
rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no
objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety
thereof) shall be filed or heard.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
Page 16 of 19
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determination by the Court of the just compensation for the property

sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. (Citing Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court) The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It
would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing
more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. x x x.
However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any time

thereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the property involved upon compliance with P.D. No.
42 which requires the petitioner, after due notice to the defendant,
to deposit with the Philippine National Bank in its main office or
any of its branches or agencies, an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. This
assessed value is that indicated in the tax declaration.
Hence, even if we concede that Rule 67 is applicable to the

instant case and that petitioner municipality had the
lawful
877
VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992
877

right to eject the private respondents from the subject
parcel of land the issuance of a writ of possession in favor
of petitioner municipality would still not be legal if the
petitioner municipality really owns the land. The Judge did
not require petitioner municipality to deposit an amount
equivalent to the just compensation due the private
respondents as provided for under Presidential Decree 42.
It is only after the deposit of the just compensation that
petitioner municipality would be entitled to a writ of
possession.
Another point raised by the petitioners questions the
alleged ruling of the appellate court that the petitioners
are personally liable for damages to the private
respondents for the abatement of public nuisance. (Rollo,
p. 50)
The petitioners misread the appellate courts decision.
Page 17 of 19
9/15/15, 11:11 PM
The records show that the private respondents prayed for,

in their petition for certiorari filed with the appellate court,
among others:
It is likewise prayed that respondents be ordered to pay jointly and
severally the value of the house illegally demolished in the amount
of P1,000,000.00, attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in
the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs, x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(CA Rollo, p. 6)
In response to this prayer, however, the appellate court

stated:
We do not, however, have jurisdiction over petitioners claim for
damages. This must be pursued in an appropriate action instituted
in the Regional Trial Court. (Rollo, p. 26)
Moreover, the dispositive portion of the decision does not

mention any personal liability for damages against the
petitioners. The apprehension of the petitioners lacks
factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The
questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. The trial court is ordered to require the
petitioner municipality to put up a bond to be determined
by the court after hearing to answer, for just compensation
due the private
878
878

Oporto vs. Court of Appeals
respondents in case the demolition of their buildings is

adjudged to be illegal. The Motion to Declare in Contempt
filed by petitioner Judge is referred to the Regional Trial
Court of Pagadian City, Branch 18 in Civil Case No. 3156
for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Page 18 of 19
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Narvasa (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Petition dismissed; decision and resolution affirmed.
o0o
Page 19 of 19
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G.R. No. 147902. March 17, 2006.
SPOUSES VICENTE YU AND DEMETRIA LEE-YU,

petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK, respondent.
Civil Law; Loans; Mortgages; Foreclosures; What the law proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion of the property or a
number of the several properties mortgaged corresponding to the
unpaid portion of the debt where, before foreclosure proceedings,
partial payment was made by the debtor on his total outstanding
loan or obligationthe debtor who has paid a part of the debt
cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the mortgage as
long as the debt is not completely satisfied.What the law
proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion of the property or a
number of the several properties mortgaged corresponding to the
unpaid portion of the debt where, before foreclosure proceedings,
partial payment was made by
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
57
VOL. 485, MARCH 17, 2006
57
Yu vs. Philippine Commercial International Bank

the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation. This also
means that the debtor cannot ask for the release of any portion of
the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014fd191452394333dea000a0094004f00ee/p/AKY832/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 20
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mortgaged unless and until the loan thus secured has been fully
paid, notwithstanding the fact that there has been partial
fulfillment of the obligation. Hence, it is provided that the debtor
who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate
extinguishment of the mortgage as long as the debt is not
completely satisfied. In essence, indivisibility means that the
mortgage obligation cannot be divided among the different lots, that
is, each and every parcel under mortgage answers for the totality of
the debt.
Mortgages; Foreclosures; Venues; The venue for the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is the place where each of the
mortgaged property is located, as prescribed by Section 2 of Act No.
3135.The venue of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is the
place where each of the mortgaged property is located, as prescribed
by Section 2 of Act No. 3135, to wit: SECTION 2. Said sale cannot
be made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is
situated; and in case the place within said province in which the
sale is to be made is subject to stipulation, such sale shall be made
in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in
which the property or part thereof is situated.
Same; Same; Same; A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, the Procedure on
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, lays down the guidelines for
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties
located in different provinces.A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, the Procedure
on Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, lays down the guidelines
for extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties
located in different provinces. It provides that the venue of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is the place where each of the
mortgaged property is located. The indivisibility of the real estate
mortgage is not violated by conducting two separate foreclosure
proceedings on mortgaged properties located in different provinces
as long as each parcel of land is answerable for the entire debt.
Civil Procedure; Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions;
Prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a
civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists
in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the
58
58
Page 2 of 20
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criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.A
prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes
into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle
of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. In the
present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of
Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the respondents petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land registration
case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of the two actions. A similar issue was raised in Manalo v.
Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 752, 766 (2001), where we held that: At
any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case
No. 98-0868 must be considered determinative of Case No. 9011.
The basic issue in the former is whether the respondent, as the
purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, may be
compelled to have the property repurchased or resold to a
mortgagors successor-in-interest (petitioner); while that in the
latter is merely whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, is entitled to a writ of
possession after the statutory period for redemption has expired.
The two cases, assuming both are pending, can proceed separately
and take their own direction independent of each other. In the
present case, Civil Case No. 99-01369-D and Spec. Proc. No. 9900988-D are both civil in nature. The issue in Civil Case No. 9901369-D is whether the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent and
the sale of their properties at public auction are null and void,
whereas, the issue in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D is whether the
respondent is entitled to a writ of possession of the foreclosed
properties. Clearly, no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of the two actions. The two cases can proceed separately
Page 3 of 20
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and take their own direction independently of each other.

59
VOL. 485, MARCH 17, 2006
59

Mortgages; Foreclosures; Writs of Possession; The mortgagor
may file a petition to set aside the sale and for the cancellation of a
writ of possession with the trial court which issued the writ of
possession within 30 days after the purchaser mortgagee was given
possession.The mortgagor may file a petition to set aside the sale
and for the cancellation of a writ of possession with the trial court
which issued the writ of possession within 30 days after the
purchaser mortgagee was given possession. It provides the plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in opposing the issuance of a writ of
possession. Thus, this provision presupposes that the trial court
already issued a writ of possession.
Civil Procedure; Litis Pendentia; Litis pendentia refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of actions and that the second action
becomes unnecessary and vexatious.Litis pendentia refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of actions and that the second action
becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For litis pendentia to be
invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in
the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other.
Same; Same; A separate case for annulment of mortgage and
foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata.
The issuance of the writ of possession being a ministerial
function, and summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a judgment
on the merits, but simply an incident in the transfer of title. Hence,
a separate case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale
cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata.
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Writs of Possession; The issuance
Page 4 of 20
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of a writ of possession over the properties by the trial court is merely

a ministerial function whereby the trial court neither exercises its
official discretion nor judgment. Any question regarding the validity
of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for
refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.The issuance of a writ
of possession over the properties by the trial court is merely a
ministerial
60
60

function. As such, the trial court neither exercises its official

discretion nor judgment. Any question regarding the validity of the
mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the
issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of the pending suit for
annulment of the certificate of sale, respondent is entitled to a writ
of possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of
said case.

Millora & Maningding Law Offices for petitioners.
Narciso, Jimenez, Gonzales, Liwanag, Bello, Valdez
and Caluya for private respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of
1
the Decision dated November 14, 2000 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58982 and the CA
Resolution dated April 26, 2001, which denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
2
Under a Real Estate Mortgage dated August 15, 1994
and Amendments
of Real Estate
Mortgage dated April 4,
3
4
1995 and December 4, 1995, spouses Vicente Yu and
Demetria Lee-Yu (petitioners) and spouses Ramon T. Yu
Page 5 of 20
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and Virginia A. Tiu, or Yu Tian Hock aka Victorino/Vicente

Yu, mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over
several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon
City, in favor of the
_______________
1
Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in
by Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now Associate Justice of this

Court) and Romeo A. Brawner (now retired).
2
Records, pp. 7-8.
Id., at pp. 11-13.
Id., at pp. 20-23.

61
VOL. 485, MARCH 17, 2006
61

Philippine Commercial International Bank (respondent) as
security for the
payment of a loan in the amount of
5
P9,000,000.00.
As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest,
and the penalties due thereon, respondent filed on July 21,
1998 with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City a
Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of6 Real Estate
Mortgage on the Dagupan City properties. On August 3,
1998, the City Sheriff issued a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale
scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998 at 10:00
oclock in the morning or soon thereafter in front
of the
7
Justice Hall, Bonuan, Tondaligan, Dagupan City.
At the auction sale on September
10, 1998, respondent
8
emerged as the highest bidder. On September 14, 1998,
a
9
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of respondent. On
October 1, 1998, the sale was registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Dagupan City.
About two months before the expiration of the
redemption period, or on August 20, 1999, respondent filed
an Ex Parte Petition for Writ of Possession before the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 99-00988-D and raffled to Branch 43 (RTC
Page 6 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM
10
Branch 43). Hearing was conducted on September

14,
11
1999 and respondent presented its evidence ex parte. The
testimony of Rodante Manuel was admitted ex parte and
thereafter the petition was deemed submitted for
resolution.
_______________
5
Id., at p. 19.
Id., at p. 52.
Id.
Id., at p. 64.
Id., at pp. 58-64.
10
Id., at p. 1.
11
Id., at p. 74.
62
62

On September 30, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to

Dismiss and to Strike Out Testimony of Rodante Manuel
stating that the Certificate of Sale dated September 14,
1998 is void because respondent violated Article 2089 of the
Civil Code on the indivisibility of the mortgaged by
conducting two separate foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgage properties in Dagupan City and Quezon City and
indicating in the two notices of extrajudicial
sale that
12
petitioners obligation is P10,437,015.20 as of March 31,
1998, when petitioners are
not indebted for the total
13
amount of P20,874,031.56.
In the meantime, petitioners filed a complaint for
Annulment of Certificate of Sale before the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 9903169-D and raffled to Branch 44 (RTC Branch 44).
On February 14, 2000, RTC Branch 43 denied
petitioners Motion to Dismiss and to Strike Out Testimony
of Rodante Manuel, ruling that the filing of a motion to
dismiss is not allowed in petitions for issuance
of writ of
14
possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135.
On February 24, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for
Page 7 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM
Reconsideration, further arguing that the pendency of Civil

Case No. 99-03169-D in RTC Branch 44 is a prejudicial
issue to Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D in RTC Branch 43, the
resolution of which is determinative
on the propriety of the
15
issuance of a writ of possession.
On May 8, 2000, RTC Branch 43 denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration, holding that the principle of
prejudicial question is not applicable because the case
pending before16 RTC Branch 44 is also a civil case and not a
criminal case.
_______________
12
Should be P10,437,015.29 per Notice of Extrajudicial Sale, Records,
p. 52.
13
Id., at p. 135.
14
Id., at p. 188.
15
Id., at p. 195.
16
Id., at p. 327.
63
VOL. 485, MARCH 17, 2006
63

On June 1, 2000,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari
17
with the CA. On November 14, 2000, the CA dismissed
petitioners Petition for Certiorari on the grounds that
petitioners violated Section 8 of Act No. 3135 and
disregarded the rule against multiplicity of suits in filing
Civil Case No. 99-03169-D in RTC Branch 44 despite full
knowledge of the pendency of Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D in
RTC Branch 43; that since the one-year period of
redemption has already lapsed, the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of respondent becomes a ministerial
duty of the trial court; that the issues in Civil Case No. 9903169-D are not prejudicial questions to Spec. Proc. No. 9900988-D because: (a) the special proceeding is already fait
accompli, (b) Civil Case No. 99-03169-D is deemed not filed
for being contrary to Section 8 of Act No. 3135, (c) the filing
of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D is an afterthought and
dilatory in nature, and (d) legally speaking what seems to
Page 8 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM
18
exist is litis pendentia and not prejudicial question.19

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but it
20
was denied by the CA on April 26, 2001.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners pose two issues for resolution, to wit:
A. Whether or not a real estate mortgage over several
properties located in different locality [sic] can be
separately foreclosed in different places.
B. Whether or not the pendency of a prejudicial issue
renders the issues in Special Proceedings
No. 9921
00988-D as [sic] moot and academic.
Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that since a real
estate mortgage is indivisible, the mortgaged properties in
_______________
17
CA Rollo, p. 1.
18Id.,
at p. 130.
19Id.,
at pp. 134-137.
20Id.,
at p. 158.
21
Petition, Rollo, p. 15; and Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 143-144.

64
64

Dagupan City and Quezon City cannot be separately

foreclosed. Petitioners further point out that two notices of
extra-judicial sale
indicated that petitioners obligation is
22
P10,437,015.20 23 each as of March 31, 1998 or a total of
P20,874,030.40, yet their own computation yields only
P9,957,508.90 as of February 27, 1998.
As to the second issue, petitioners posit that the
pendency of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D is a prejudicial
issue, the resolution of which will render the issues in Spec.
Proc. No. 99-00988-D moot and academic. Petitioners
further aver that they did not violate Section 8 of Act No.
3135 in filing a separate case to annul the certificate of sale
since the use of the word may in said provision indicates
Page 9 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM
that they have the option to seek relief of filing a petition to

annul the certificate of sale in the proceeding involving the
application for a writ of possession or in a separate
proceeding.
24
Respondent contends that, with respect to the first
issue, the filing of two separate foreclosure proceedings did
not violate Article 2089 of the Civil Code on the
indivisibility of a real estate mortgage since Section 2 of
Act No. 3135 expressly provides that extrajudicial
foreclosure may only be made in the province or
municipality where the property is situated. Respondent
further submits that the filing of separate applications for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage involving several
properties in different locations is allowed by A.M. No. 9910-05-0, the Procedure on Extrajudicial Foreclosure of
Mortgage, as further amended on August 7, 2001.
As to the second issue, respondent maintains that there
is no prejudicial question between Civil Case No. 99-03169D and Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D since the pendency of a
civil action questioning the validity of the mortgage and the
extra-judicial foreclosure thereof does not bar the issuance
of a writ
_______________
22Id.,
at p. 143.
23Id.
24
Comment, Rollo, p. 114; and Memorandum, Rollo, p. 152.

65
VOL. 485, MARCH 17, 2006
65

of possession. Respondent also insists that petitioners
should have filed their Petition to Annul the Certificate of
Sale in the same case where possession is being sought,
that is, in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D, and not in a
separate proceeding (Civil Case No. 99-01369-D) because
the venue of the action to question the validity of the
foreclosure is not discretionary since the use of the word
may in Section 8 of Act No. 3135 refers to the filing of the
Page 10 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM
petition or action itself and not to the venue. Respondent

further argues that even if petitioners filed the Petition to
Annul the Certificate of Sale in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D,
the writ of possession must still be issued because issuance
of the writ in favor of the purchaser is a ministerial act of
the trial court and the one-year period of redemption has
already lapsed.
Anent the first issue, the Court finds that petitioners
have a mistaken notion that the indivisibility of a real
estate mortgage relates to the venue of extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings. The rule on indivisibility of a real
estate mortgage is provided for in Article 2089 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though the debt
may be divided among the successors in interest of the debtor or of
the creditor.
Therefore, the debtors heir who has paid a part of the debt
cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or
mortgage as the debt is not completely satisfied.
Neither can the creditors heir who received his share of the debt
return the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the prejudice of the
other heirs who have not been paid.
From these provisions is excepted the case in which, there being
several things given in mortgage or pledge, each one of them
guarantees only a determinate portion of the credit.
The debtor, in this case, shall have a right to the extinguishment
of the pledge or mortgage as the portion of the debt for which each
thing is specially answerable is satisfied.
66
66

This rule
presupposes several heirs of the debtor or
25
creditor and therefore not applicable to the present case.
Furthermore, what the law proscribes is the foreclosure of
only a portion of the property or a number of the several
properties mortgaged corresponding to the unpaid portion
of the debt where, before foreclosure proceedings, partial
payment was made by the debtor on his total outstanding
Page 11 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM
loan or obligation. This also means that the debtor cannot

ask for the release of any portion of the mortgaged property
or of one or some of the several lots mortgaged unless and
until the loan thus secured has been fully paid,
notwithstanding the fact that there has been partial
fulfillment of the obligation. Hence, it is provided that the
debtor who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the
proportionate extinguishment of the mortgage
as long as
26
the debt is not completely satisfied.
In essence,
indivisibility means that the mortgage
obligation cannot be
27
divided among the different lots, that is, each and every
parcel
under mortgage answers for the totality of the
28
debt.
On the other hand, the venue of the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings is the place where each of the
mortgaged property
is located, as prescribed by Section 2 of
29
Act No. 3135, to wit:
_______________
25
Rose Packing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33084,
November 14, 1988, 167 SCRA 309, 322; Central Bank of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45710, October 3, 1985, 139 SCRA 46, 57.
26
Philippine National Bank v. De los Reyes, G.R. Nos. 46898-99,
November 28, 1989, 179 SCRA 619, 626; Philippine National Bank v.
Amores, G.R. No. L-54551, November 9, 1987, 155 SCRA 445, 451;
Gonzales v. Government Service Insurance System, 194 Phil. 465, 475;
107 SCRA 492, 502 (1981).
27Aquino
28
v. Macondray & Co. Inc., 97 Phil. 731, 741 (1955).
Philippine National Bank v. Mallorca, 128 Phil. 747, 752; 21 SCRA
694, 698 (1967); Goquiolay v. Sycip, 108 Phil. 947, 974 (1960).
29
Entitled An Act To Regulate the Sale of Property under Special
Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages, approved on

March 6, 1924.
67
VOL. 485, MARCH 17, 2006
67

SECTION 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the
province in which the property sold is situated; and in case the
Page 12 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM
place within said province in which the sale is to be made is subject

to stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the
municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part
thereof is situated.
30
A.M. No. 99-10-05-0,
the Procedure on Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage, lays down the guidelines for extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties located in different
provinces. It provides that the venue of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings is the place where each of the mortgaged property is
located. Relevant portion thereof provides:
Where the application concerns the extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages of real estates and/or chattels in different locations
covering one indebtedness, only one filing fee corresponding to such
indebtedness shall be collected. The collecting Clerk of Court shall,
apart from the official receipt of the fees, issue a certificate of
payment indicating the amount of indebtedness, the filing fees
collected, the mortgages sought to be foreclosed, the real estates
and/or chattels mortgaged and their respective locations, which
certificate shall serve the purpose of having the application
docketed with the Clerks of Court of the places where the
other properties are located and of allowing the
extrajudicial foreclosures to proceed thereat. (Emphasis
supplied)
The indivisibility of the real estate mortgage is not violated

by conducting two separate foreclosure proceedings on
mortgaged properties located in different provinces as long
as each parcel of land is answerable for the entire debt.
Petitioners assumption that their total obligation is
P20,874,030.40 because the two notices of extrajudicial sale
31
indicated that petitioners obligation is P10,437,015.20
each, is therefore
_______________
30
Dated December 14, 1999 and further amended by the Resolutions
of January 30, 2001 and August 7, 2001.

31
Supra, note 12.

68
68
Page 13 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM

flawed. Considering the indivisibility of a real estate
mortgage, the mortgaged properties in Dagupan City and
Quezon City are
made to answer for the entire debt of
32
P10,437,015.29.
As to the second issue, that is, whether a civil case for
annulment of a certificate of sale is a prejudicial question
to a petition for issuance of a writ of possession, this issue
is far from novel33 and, in fact, not without precedence. In
Pahang v. Vestil, the Court said:
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes
into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle
of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for
Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the
respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot
No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07-021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident
in the land registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial question
can arise from the existence of the two actions. A similar issue was
raised in Manalo v. Court of Appeals, where we held that:
At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case
No. 98-0868 must be considered determinative of Case No. 9011. The
basic issue in the former is whether the respondent, as the purchaser in
the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, may be compelled to have the
property repurchased or resold to a mortgagors successor-in-interest
(petitioner); while that in the latter is merely whether the respondent, as
the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, is entitled to a
writ of possession after the statutory pe_______________
32
Id.
33
G.R. No. 148595, July 12, 2004, 434 SCRA 139.
Page 14 of 20
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69
VOL. 485, MARCH 17, 2006
69

riod for redemption has expired. The two cases, assuming both are
pending, can proceed separately and take their own direction
34
independent of each other.
In the present case, Civil Case No. 99-01369-D and Spec.

Proc. No. 99-00988-D are both civil in nature. The issue in
Civil Case No. 99-01369-D is whether the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the
petitioners in favor of the respondent and the sale of their
properties at public auction are null and void, whereas, the
issue in Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D is whether the
respondent is entitled to a writ of possession of the
foreclosed properties. Clearly, no prejudicial question can
arise from the existence of the two actions. The two cases
can proceed separately and take their own direction
independently of each other.
Nevertheless, there is a need to correct the CAs view
that petitioners violated Section 8 of Act No. 3135 and
disregarded the proscription on multiplicity of suits by
instituting a separate civil suit for annulment of the
certificate of sale while there is a pending petition for
issuance of the writ of possession in a special proceeding.
Section 8 of Act No. 3135 provides:
Sec. 8. Setting aside of sale and writ of possession.The debtor
may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested,
but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given
possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of
possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him,
because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in
accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take
cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary
procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act
Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the
complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all
or part of the
Page 15 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM
_______________
34
Id., at pp. 145-146, citing Yulienco v. Court of Appeals, 441 Phil. 397, 405-
407; 393 SCRA 143, 151-152 (2002) and Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil.
215, 232; 366 SCRA 752, 766 (2001).
70
70

bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the

parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with
section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but
the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency
of the appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the provision above cited, the mortgagor may file a

petition to set aside the sale and for the cancellation of a
writ of possession with the trial court which issued the writ
of possession within 30 days after the purchaser mortgagee
was given possession. It provides the plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy
in opposing the issuance of a writ of
35
possession. Thus, this provision presupposes that the trial
court already issued
a writ of possession. In Sps. Ong v.
36
Court of Appeals, the Court elucidated:
The law is clear that the purchaser must first be placed in
possession of the mortgaged property pending proceedings assailing
the issuance of the writ of possession. If the trial court later finds
merit in the petition to set aside the writ of possession, it shall
dispose in favor of the mortgagor the bond furnished by the
purchaser. Thereafter, either party may appeal from the order of the
judge in accordance with Section 14 of Act 496, which provides that
every order, decision, and decree of the Court of Land Registration
may be reviewed . . . in the same manner as an order, decision,
decree or judgment of a Court of First Instance (RTC) might be
reviewed. The rationale for the mandate is to allow the purchaser
to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such
37
possession being founded on his right of ownership.
Accordingly, Section 8 of Act No. 3135 is not applicable to

the present case since at the time of the filing of the
Page 16 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM
separate
_______________
35
Samson v. Rivera, G.R. No. 154355, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 759,
770; Marcelo Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 153 Phil. 362, 373; 54
SCRA 89, 100 (1973).
36
388 Phil. 857; 333 SCRA 189 (2000).
37
Id., at p. 865; p. 197. Reiterated in Philippine National Bank v.
Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA
287, 303.
71
VOL. 485, MARCH 17, 2006
71

civil suit for annulment of the certificate of sale in RTC
Branch 44, no writ of possession was yet issued by RTC
Branch 43.
Similarly, the Court rejects the CAs application of the
principle of litis pendentia to Civil Case No. 99-03169-D in
relation to Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D. Litis pendentia
refers to that situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of actions and
that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
For litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the
following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties or
at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity
in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may
be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is
38
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
Applying the foregoing criteria in the instant case, litis
pendentia does not obtain in this case because of the
absence of the second and third requisites. The issuance of
the writ of possession being a ministerial function, and
summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a judgment on
the merits, but simply an incident in the transfer of title.
Hence, a separate case for annulment of mortgage and
foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res
Page 17 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM
39
judicata. Thus, insofar as Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D and

Civil Case No. 99-03169-D pending before different
branches of RTC Dagupan City are concerned, there is no
litis pendentia.
_______________
38
Agilent Technologies Singapore (Pte.) Ltd. v. Integrated Silicon
Technology Philippines Corporation, G.R. No. 154618, April 14, 2004, 427
SCRA 593, 601; Intramuros Administration v. Contacto, 450 Phil. 704,
713; 402 SCRA 581, 586 (2003).
39
Arquiza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160479, June 8, 2005, 459
SCRA 753, 765; Sps. Ong v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 36 at pp. 867868; p. 199.
72
72

To sum up, the Court holds that the rule on indivisibility of

the real estate mortgage cannot be equated with the venue
of foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties located
in different provinces since these are two unrelated
concepts. Also, no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of
sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in
nature which can proceed separately and take their own
direction independently of each other.
Furthermore, since the one-year period to redeem the
foreclosed properties lapsed on October 1, 1999, title to the
foreclosed properties had already been consolidated under
the name of the respondent. As the owner of the properties,
respondent
is entitled to its possession as a matter of
40
right. The issuance of a writ of possession over the
properties by the trial court is merely a ministerial
function. As such, the trial court
neither exercises its
41
official discretion nor judgment. Any question regarding
the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a
legal ground
for refusing the issuance of a writ of
42
possession. Regardless of the pending suit for annulment
Page 18 of 20
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of the certificate of sale, respondent is entitled to a writ of

possession, without 43prejudice of course to the eventual
outcome of said case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
_______________
40
De Vera v. Agloro, G.R. No. 155673, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA
203, 214; Chailease Finance Corporation v. Ma, G.R. No. 151941, August
15, 2003, 409 SCRA 250, 253.
41
Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, supra,
note 37 at p. 303.
42
Idolor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161028, January 31, 2005, 450
SCRA 396, 403; Sps. Ong v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 36 at p. 866; p.
198.
43
Idolor v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 42 at p. 403; Sps. Ong v.
Court of Appeals, supra, note 36 at pp. 866-867; p. 198.

73
VOL. 485, MARCH 17, 2006
73

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago,
Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.The requisites for litis pendentia to be a ground
for the dismissal of an action are: (a) identity of parties or
at least such as to represent the same interest in both
actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
(Cebu International Finance Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 316 SCRA 488 [1999])
In cases of extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate
mortgage, the issuance of a writ of possession is governed
Page 19 of 20
9/15/15, 11:13 PM
by Section 7 of Act No. 3135. (Chailease Finance

Corporation vs. Ma, 409 SCRA 250 [2003])
Only substantial identity is necessary to warrant the
application of res judicatathe addition or elimination of
some parties does not alter the situation. (Dela Rama vs.
Mendiola, 401 SCRA 704 [2004])
o0o
74
74

Espino vs. Legarda
Page 20 of 20
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VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000
747
Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis

*
G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D.

BOBIS, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; Elements; Words
and Phrases; A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein.A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the
civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but
also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the
defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the
same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its
two essential elements are: (a) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; A party who raises a
prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that
all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in
the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet
presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have
rested its case.A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve
the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency
of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014fd19086388a0d8647000a0094004f00ee/p/AKR918/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 13
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prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial

question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the
essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented
a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its
case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground
of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the
criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
Same; Same; Bigamy; Family Code; Article 40 of the Family
Code requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage before a party may remarry.Article 40 of the Family
Code, which was effective at
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
748
748

the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior

judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the
parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or
invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was
void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still
no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage
was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concurtwo of
which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which
would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the
material time of the first marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Parties to a marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
having such authority.Respondents clear intent is to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to
Page 2 of 13
9/15/15, 11:12 PM
invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for

bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that
an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the
Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that
the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a
marriage aware of the absence of a requisiteusually the marriage
licenseand thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that
the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority.
Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage
is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Same; Same; Same; Elements.People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246
(1935). The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved,
or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a
subsequent marriage; (4) the subsequent marriage would have been
valid had it not been for the existence of the first. The exception to
prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the Family
Code and by PD 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides that penal laws
relative to the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a person married
x x x under Muslim Law where the requirements set therein are
749
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000
749

met. See also Sulu Islamic Association v. Malik, 226 SCRA 193
(1993); Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960).
Same; Same; Same; Concubinage; The pendency of a civil case
for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question in
Page 3 of 13
9/15/15, 11:12 PM
a prosecution for concubinage or bigamy.Parties should not be

permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for
the same must be submitted to the determination of competent
courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter how obvious,
manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of
the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a final judgment, which only the courts can
render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground
of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent
case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This
ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the
subsistence of a marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Ignorance of Law; The legality of a
marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know
the law.Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family
Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse. The
contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law
have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of
a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.
The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is
presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial
declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage,
why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial
declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and
subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he
wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a
matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial
proper in the criminal case.
Same; Same; Same; A marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again,
otherwise the second marriage will also be void.In the light of
Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can
not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per
current jurisprudence, a marriage though void
Page 4 of 13
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750
750

still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can
marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The
reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar,
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him.

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 226.
Francisco L. Daria for petitioner.
Josieline A. Tia for private respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first
marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said
marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated,
the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-affidavit, an
information for bigamy was filed against respondent on
February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226,
Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a
Page 5 of 13
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civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of

his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated
without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion
to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first
marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal ease. The
trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case
in an Order dated Decem751
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000
751

1
ber 29, 1998. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,

but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner
argues that respondent should have first obtained a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before
entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged
prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy
case is no longer2 a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of
the Family Code.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the
subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity
of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to
a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue
3
involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it 4that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It must appear not only that the civil case
involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but
also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil
action
would necessarily be determinative of the criminal
5
case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue
similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the
criminal action and its resolution de_______________
Page 6 of 13
Rollo, pp. 29-30.
Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 23.
9/15/15, 11:12 PM
Fortich-Celdran v. Celdran, 19 SCRA 502 (1967); Zapanta v.
Montessa, 114 Phil. 428 (1962); Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960); See
also People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357 (1954) cited in Dichaves v. Judge
Apalit, AM-MTJ-00-1274, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 54.
4
Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1992); Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441
(1998); Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA 674 (1988); Mendiola v.

Macadaeg, 1 SCRA 593 (1961); Aleria v. Mendoza, 83 Phil. 427 (1949);
Berbari v. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837 (1920).
5
Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 (1980); Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr.,2
SCRA 178 (1961) citing De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202 (1940).

752
752

terminative
of whether or not the 7latter action may
6
proceed. Its two essential elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the
guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the
sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to
sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a
crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a
single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have
rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the
information on the ground of prejudicial question is in
effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the
time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior
Page 7 of 13
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judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before

a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it
is not for the parties, particularly the accused,
to determine
8
the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not
the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter
of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its
nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It
should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be
prosecuted provided all its elements concurtwo of which
are a
_______________
6
Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1992).
Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question.
The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (See also Prado v.
People, 218 Phil. 571).
8
Nial v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 122.
753
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000
753

previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would
have been valid had it not been for
the existence at the
9
material time of the first marriage.
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent
his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and
eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has
to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract
a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even
enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite
usually the marriage licenseand thereafter contract a
Page 8 of 13
9/15/15, 11:12 PM
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of

nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provisions
on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v.
10
Relova:
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority.
Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage
is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
_______________
9
People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935). The elements of bigamy are: (1)
the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not
been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he
contracts a subsequent marriage; (4) the subsequent marriage would
have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. The
exception to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the
Family Code and by P.D. 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides that penal laws
relative to the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a person married x x x
under Muslim Law where the requirements set therein are met. See
also Sulu Islamic Association v. Malik, 226 SCRA 193 (1993); Merced v.
Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960).
10
22 SCRA 731, 735 (1968).

754
754

Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case

before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner,
on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent
was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license.
More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their
marriage, they had already attained the age of majority
and had been living
together as husband and wife for at
11
least five years. The issue in this case is limited to the
Page 9 of 13
9/15/15, 11:12 PM
existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called

upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as
it may, suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which
the first marriage was celebrated, provides that every
intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of
12
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.
Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must
be submitted to the determination of competent courts.
Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
be held as void, and so long as there is no such13 declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter
how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element
is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted
to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a
final judgment, which only the
courts can render. Thus,
14
as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we
held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration
of
15
nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This
ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes
presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
_______________
11
Civil Code, Article 76.
12
13
Landicho v. Relova, supra.
14
Supra.
15
Beltran v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000,
334 SCRA 106.

755
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000
755

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code
Page 10 of 13
9/15/15, 11:12 PM
16
cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse. The

contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of
the law have not been complied with or that the marriage
is in disregard of a legal impediment
is an act penalized by
17
the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a
matter of law and every person is presumed to know the
law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of
nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why
should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial
declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and
subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law?
If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he
can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his
evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first
marriage before the
second marriage was contracted rests
18
upon the defense, but that is a matter that can be raised
in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should
be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action
may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the
suspension of the criminal action. The lower court,
therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy.
Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the
fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies
appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by
petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious
intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the
civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the
purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution.
As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent,
without first having obtained the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly
entered into the second marriage. Per current
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact before any party can marry
_______________
16
17
Revised Penal Code, Article 350.
Page 11 of 13
18
9/15/15, 11:12 PM
People v. Dungao, 56 Phil. 805 (1931).

756
756

19
again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.

The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the20 time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for
nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential
to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore,
not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent
cannot be permitted to use his 21own malfeasance to defeat
the criminal action against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order
dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed
with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and
Pardo, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, order reversed and set aside.
Note.American jurisprudence, on cases involving
statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with
ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed,
the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute
provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. (Pilapil vs.
Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 [1989])
Page 12 of 13
9/15/15, 11:12 PM
_______________
19
Apiag v. Judge Cantero, 268 SCRA 47, 61 (1997).
20
Wiegel v. Hon. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499, 501 (1986).
21
People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357, 360 (1954).
Page 13 of 13
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G.R. No. 84516. December 5, 1989.
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner, vs. HON. SERGIO

DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV, Zamboanga
City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.
Criminal Law; Employers subsidiary liability under Art 100 of
the Revised Penal Code; Case at bar.The law involved in the
instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads thus: Art. 103. Subsidiary civil
liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons,
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties. Respondent contends
that the case of Pajarito v. Seeris cannot be applied to the present
case, the former being an action involving culpa-contractual, while
the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a declaration is
erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be
distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is
quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New
Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On
the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa
aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpacontractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the
SECOND DIVISION.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014fd191b3df87ec3b85000a0094004f00ee/p/AJR423/?username=Guest
Page 1 of 11
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Carpio vs. Doroja
Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a civil action

for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New
Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa aquiliana.
Same; Same; Requisites that must concur in order that an
employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employees civil liability
in the criminal action; Case at bar.In order that an employer may
be held subsidiarily liable for the employees civil liability in the
criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is
engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent
(Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary
liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the
employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employees
conviction and upon proof of the latters insolvency. Needless to say,
the case at bar satisfies all these requirements.
Same; Same; Same; Execution; Employers subsidiary liability
may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the
execution proceedings against the employee.Furthermore, we are
not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day
in court, because the case before us is not one wherein the operator
is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which
the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
employees criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering
the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in
substance and in effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the
employers subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in
the criminal case as part of the execution proceedings against the
employee. This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seeris,
supra, that The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary
civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been
issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the
execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the
court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory
control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it
the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be
involved in the execution.
Page 2 of 11
9/15/15, 11:14 PM
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgment; A judgment of conviction

sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence
of collusion, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for
enforcement of the latters subsidiary liability.The argument that
the owner3
Carpio vs. Doroja

operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of
subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the
appellate courts decision made no mention of such subsidiary
liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a
separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary
liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision
against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for
the question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the
appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already implied from
the appellate courts decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v.
Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following
pronouncement: A judgment of conviction sentencing a defendant
employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion
between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon
the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latters
subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but
also with regard to its amount. This being the case, this Court
stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, that the court has no other
function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded
in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if
in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision. A
separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and
would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Incumbent upon the court to
grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution after hearing the
employer, and upon conviction of the employee and after execution is
returned unsatisfied due to employees insolvency.Finally, the
position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the
Page 3 of 11
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motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend

its decision which has already become final and executory cannot be
sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his
subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the
judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a
separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be
enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does
not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes
incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of
execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon
conviction of the employee and after execution is returned
unsatisfied due to the employees insolvency.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the

Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Br. 4. Doroja, J.
4

Carpio vs. Doroja

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision
of the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV,
which denied petitioners motion for subsidiary writ of
execution against the owner-operator of the vehicle which
figured in the accident.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent
Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney
owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio
Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence
of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as
reflected in the medicolegal certificate and sustained
injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3)
three months.
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Page 4 of 11
9/15/15, 11:14 PM
Serious Physical Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez

with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch
IV. On January 14, 1987, the accused voluntarily pleaded
guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical
Injuries under an amended information punishable under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive
portion of the decision handed down on May 27, 1987 reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE
guilty as a principal beyond reasonable doubt of the Amended
Information to which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and appreciating
this mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of One (1) month and One (1) day to Two (2)
months of Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is
likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio
the amount of P45.00 representing the value of the 1/2 can of
tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant paid to the
Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay complainant the amount of
P1,500.00 as attorneys fees and to pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo)
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.

5
Carpio vs. Doroja

At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor
manifested his desire to present evidence to establish the
civil liability of either the accused driver or the owneroperator of the vehicle. Accuseds counsel moved that the
court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a
day in court, on the ground that the accused is not only
indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil
liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The
private prosecutor, however, did not move for the
appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was
appealed by the private prosecutor to the Regional Trial
Page 5 of 11
9/15/15, 11:14 PM
Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in

the amount of P10,000.00, compensatory damages at
P6,186.40, and attorneys fees of P5,000.00. The appellate
court, on January 20, 1988, modified the trial courts
decision, granting the appellant moral damages in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), while
affirming all other civil liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10,1988 was
duly served upon the accused but was, however, returned
unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown
by the sheriffs return. Thus, complainant moved for a
subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability
of the owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was denied
by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the decision of
the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary
liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the nature of the accident
falls under culpa-aquiliana and not culpa-contractual. A
motion for reconsideration of the said order was disallowed
for the reason that complainant having failed to raise the
matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said
court rendered its decision which has become final and
executory and the trial court has no power to alter or
modify such decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v.
Seeris, 87 SCRA 275, which enunciates that the
subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the
judgment, because if a case were to be filed against said
operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other
function than to render a decision based on the indemnity
award in the criminal case without power to amend or
modify it even if in his opinion an error has been
6

Carpio vs. Doroja
committed in the decision. Petitioner maintains that the

tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary
liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same
proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in
Page 6 of 11
9/15/15, 11:14 PM
order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that

said employer was not made a party in the criminal action.
It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator
cannot be validly held subsidiarily liable for the following
reasons, namely: (a) the matter of subsidiary liability was
not raised on appeal; (b) contrary to the case of Pajarito v.
Seeris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not
arise from the so-called culpa-contractual but from
culpa-aquiliana; (c) the judgments of appellate courts
may not be altered, modified, or changed by the court of
origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party to the
criminal proceedings.
Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is;
whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owneroperator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding
against the driver where the award was given, or in a
separate civil action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in
relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal Code,
which reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
duties.
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seeris

cannot be applied to the present case, the former being an
action involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being
one of culpa-aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous.
The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished
from the primary liability of employers, which is quasidelictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New
Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a
delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is
founded on culpa aquiliana. The present case is neither an
action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is
basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from
crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In
7
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Carpio vs. Doroja

no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the
primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the
New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily
liable for the employees civil liability in the criminal
action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is
engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3)
that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117
SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer,
however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the
criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer
becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employees
conviction and upon proof of the latters insolvency.
Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these
requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owneroperator has been deprived of his day in court, because the
case before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a
primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the
subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
employees criminal negligence is sought to be enforced.
Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the
employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to
the criminal case. Ergo, the employers subsidiary liability
may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as
part of the execution proceedings against the employee.
This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seneris,
supra, that The proceeding for the enforcement of the
subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the
proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in
which an execution has been issued is regarded as still
pending so that all proceedings on the execution are
proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court
which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory
control over its process of execution, and this power carries
with it the right to determine every question of fact and
law which may be involved in the execution.
The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held
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subsidiarily liable because the matter of subsidiary liability

was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate
courts decision made no mention of such subsidiary
liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of
a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of
subsidiary liability is
8

Carpio vs. Doroja
not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision

against the accused. Such being the case, it is not
indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be
passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary
liability is already implied from the appellate courts
decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seeris,
115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following
pronouncement: A judgment of conviction sentencing a
defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of
any collusion between the defendant and the offended
party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the
enforcement of the latters subsidiary liability not only with
regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v.
Halili, 109 Phil. 495, that the court has no other function
than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded
in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify
it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the
decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore,
unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of
the heirs of the victim.
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate
court that to grant the motion for subsidiary writ of
execution would in effect be to amend its decision which
has already become final and executory cannot be
sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the
basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an
amendment of the judgment because in an action under
Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites
as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso
Page 9 of 11
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facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action.

Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced
in the same case where the award was given, and this does
not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes
incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary
writ of execution (but only after the employer has been
heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution
is returned unsatisfied due to the employees insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court
disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of execution is
hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear
and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability
of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. Costs
against private respondent.
9
Perez vs. Sandiganbayan

SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., On leave.
Order set aside.
Note.A prevailing party is entitled as a matter of
right to a writ of execution, and its issuance is a ministerial
duty compellable by mandamus. (Abbott vs. NLRC, 145
SCRA 206.)
o0o
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Page 11 of 11
690
9/15/15, 11:14 PM

Bantoto vs. Bobis
No. L-18966. November 22, 1966.
VICENTE BANTOTO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.

SALVADOR BOBIS, ET AL., defendants. CRISPIN
VALLEJO, defendant-appellant.
Civil liability; Employer's subsidiary civil liability for crimes
committed by his servants or employees is not predicated upon the
latter's insolvency; When insolvency is required. The master's
liability, under the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes committed by
his servants and employees in the discharge of their duties, is not
predicated upon the insolvency of the latter. Such insolvency is
required only when the liability of the master is being made
effective by execution levy, but not for the rendition of judgment
against the master. The subsidiary character of the employer's
responsibility merely imports that the latter's property is not to be
seized without first exhausting that of the servant. And by analogy
to a regular guarantor, the master may not demand prior
exhaustion of the servant's properties if he can not "point out to the
creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine territory,
sufficient to cover the amount of the debt" (Cf. Civil Code, Article
1060). This rule is logical, for as between the offended party (as
creditor) and the culprit's master or employer, it is the latter who is
in a better position to determine the resources and solvency of the
servant or employee. Consequently, in a complaint against the
employer to enforce his subsidiary civil liability, it is not necessary
to allege that the employee is insolvent.
Same; Conclusiveness of judgment sentencing servant or
employee to pay indemnity; Admissibility of writ of execution and
sheriff's return.The writ of execution and the sheriff's return in
the criminal case against the employee are material and admissible
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when the issuance of a writ of execution of the appealed judgment is

demanded. It is well to note that the Supreme Court has ruled that,
in the absence of collusion, the judgment convicting and sentencing
the servant to pay indemnity is conclusive in an action to enforce
the subsidiary liability of the master or employer (Martinez vs,
Barredo, 81 Phil. 1).
691
691
Bantoto vs. Bobis

Same; When award of exemplary damages is improper. Where
the case was predicated upon the sentence of conviction in the
criminal case against the driver, the award of exemplary damages
would be improper if no such damages were imposed on the driver.
The master, as a person subsidiarily liable, can not incur greater
civil liability than his convicted employee, any more than a
guarantor can be held responsible for more than the principal
debtor (Cf. New Civil Code, Article 2064).
Same; Attorney's fees; When award of attorney's fees is proper.
Attorney's fees were properly adjudged against the employer in
the action for the enforcement of his subsidiary civil liability. The
award could be doubled if the trial court's award contemplated only
the lawyer's services in the trial court.
Same; Award in separate civil action is allowed.Article 2208,
paragraph 8, of the Civil Code authorizes the award of counsel fees
"in a separate civil action to recover the civil liability arising from a
crime".
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of

Occidental Negros.
The facts are stated in the, opinion of the Court.
Arturo M. Glaraga for plaintiffs-appellees.
Casiano P. Laquihon "for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Crispin Vallejo appeals from a decision rendered in Civil
Case No. 5422 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros, sentencing him to pay to Vicente Bantoto and
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Florita Lanceta, parents of the late Damiana Bantoto, civil

indemnity in the sum of P3,000.00, plus P1,000.00
exemplary damages and the further sum of P500.00
attorneys' fees, without pronouncement as to costs.
The basic facts are not controverted. Appellant Crispin
Vallejo was the registered owner of a "jeepney" named
"Jovil 11", with plate TPU-20948, that was operated by him
in Bacolod City through driver Salvador Bobis. On 24
October 1948, through the driver's negligence, the
"jeepney" struck a 3-year old girl, Damiana Bantoto, a
daughter of appellees, inflicting serious injuries that led to
her death a few days later. The City Fiscal of Bacolod filed
an information charging Bobis with homicide through
reckless imprudence, to which Bobis pleaded guilty. He
was, accordingly, sentenced to :& months and :& day of
692
692

Bantoto vs. Bobis
arresto mayor and to indemnify the deceased girl's heirs

(appellees herein) in the sum of P3,000.00.
By amended complaint of 8, October 1959, appellees
Vicente Bantoto and Florita Lanceta, for themselves and
their other children, instituted the present action against
Salvador Bobis, Juan Maceda (later absolved) and Crispin
Vallejo in the court of first instance, pleading the foregoing
facts and seeking to have the three defendants declared
solidarily responsible for damages, consisting of the civil
indemnity required of the driver Bobis in the judgment of
conviction, plus moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys' fees and costs,
Vallejo moved to dismiss on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action against him, for the reason that the
amended complaint did not aver that the driver, Bobis, was
insolvent. The court overruled the motion to dismiss, and
on 20 February 1960 Vallejo answered the complaint,
setting up denials and affirmative defenses, specifically
averring that the brothers and sisters of the deceased were
not real parties in interest; that the complaint stated no
cause of action against Vallejo; that his liability was only
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subsidiary; that the action was barred by; prior judgment;

and that the liability had been satisfied. Bobis was
declared in default,
At the trial, the court of origin (overruling Vallejo's
objections) admitted as Exhibit "A" for plaintiffs the writ of
execution against the driver, Salvador Bobis, issued in the
criminal case, and as Exhibit "B" the sheriff's return nulla
bona. Vallejo presented no evidence. Wherefore, the court
absolved defendant Maceda and rendered judgment against
Crispin Vallejo in the terms described at the start of this
opinion.
Vallejo appealed directly to this Supreme Court,
assigning three errors:
"I
The trial Court erred in not dismissing the

complaint for lack of a cause of action.
II
The trial Court erred in admitting as evidence

Exhibits "A" and "B" of the appellees,
III The trial Court erred in condemning the

defendants-ppellant to pay to the appellees the sum
of P3,000.00 as indemnity, F. 1,000.00 as moral
damages, P1,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P500.00 as attorney's fee."
693
693
Bantoto vs, Bobis

The first alleged error, predicated upon the lack of
allegation in the complaint that driver Bobis was insolvent,
is without merit. The master's liability, under the Revised
Penal Code, for the crimes committed by his servants and
employees in the discharge of their duties, is not predicated
upon the insolvency of the latter. Article 103 of the Penal
Code prescribes that:
"ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employees, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
Page 4 of 9
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servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the

discharge of their duties."
The insolvency of the servant or employee is nowhere

mentioned in said article as a condition precedent. In truth,
such insolvency is required only when the liability of the
master is being made effective by execution levy, but not for
the rendition of judgment against the master. The
subsidiary character of the employer's responsibility
merely imports that the latter's property is not be seized
without first exhausting that of the servant. And by
analogy to a regular guarantor (who is the prototype. of
persons subsidiarily responsible), the master may not
demand prior exhaustion of the servant's (principal
obligor's) properties if he can not "point out to the creditor
available "property of the debtor within Philippine
territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt" (Cf.
Civil Code, Article 1060). This rule is' logical, for as
between the offended party (as creditor) and the culprit's
master or employer, it is the latter who is in a better
position to determine the resources and solvency of the
servant or employee.
Appellant invokes the following passage in our decision
in Marquez vs. Castillo, 68 Phil. 571:
"The subsidiary liability of the master, according to the provisions of
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, arises and takes place only
when the servant, subordinate, or employee commits a punishable
criminal act while in the actual performance of his ordinary duties
and service, and he is insolvent thereby rendering him incapable of
satisfying by himself his own civil liability"
The underlined passage is, however, mere obiter because

694
694

Bantoto vs. Bobis
the part immediately preceding the quotation shows that

the ratio decidendi of the case was that the accident
involved, unlike in the case at bar, did not occur in the
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performance of the driver's assigned duties.

"It should be noted that in said stipulation, there is a provision
appearing in paragraph 3, thereof, which reads as follows:
'That the defendant Bernardo Castillo was not riding in the car
at the time of the accident, and he did not know that his car was
taken by -the chauffeur Mariano Capulong.'
"This fact decides the question because it clearly shows that the
accident did not occur in the course of the performance of the duties
or service for which said chauffeur Mariano Capulong had been
hired. The defendant did not hire him to do as he pleased, using the
defendant's car as if it were his own. His duties and service were
confined to driving his master's car as the latter ordered him, and
the accident did not take place under said circumstances."
As to the second error assigned, the same is, nonprejudicial, if at all committed, Supposing, in gratia,
argumenti, that Exhibits ."A" and "B", the execution and
the sheriff's return, in the criminal case were not
admissible at the trial of the case against the master, they
would certainly be material and admissible when issuance
of a writ of execution of the appealed judgment is
demanded. It is well to move here that this, Court has
ruled that in the absence of collusion the judgment
convicting and sentencing the servant to pay indemnity is
conclusive in an action to enforce the subsidiary liability of
the master or employer (Martinez vs. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1).
Anyway, since Bobis, the driver, was also a defendant, the
writ of execution issued in the criminal case to enforce the
civil indemnity, and its return without satisfaction, are not
irrelevant evidence in the action against him and his
employer.
Anent the third error, we agree with appellant, that, as
the case was predicated upon the sentence of conviction in
the criminal case, the award of exemplary damages was
improper. No such damages were imposed on the driver,
and the master, as person subsidiarily liable, can not incur
greater civil liability than his convicted employee, any
more than a guarantor can be held responsible for more
than the principal debtor (Cf. Civil Code, Article 2064).
695
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695
Bantoto vs. Bobis

But we do not agree that the award of attorney's fees
should be disallowed. Appellant had reason to know that
his driver could not pay the P3,000.00 indemnity imposed
in the criminal case, because if he could, or if he had money
or leviable property worth that much, Bobis would be
operating his own jeepney instead of another's. In fact,
Article 2208, paragraph 9, authorizes the award of
counsel's fees "in a separate civil action to recover the civil
liability arising from a crime."
As in awarding only P500.00 attorney's fees the court
below could envisage only the services of counsel up to the
date of its judgment, and it could not know then that the
decision would be appealed, we are of the opinion that
counsel fees should now be at least doubled.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision under appeal is
modified by eliminating the award of P1,000.00 exemplary
damages and doubling the award for counsel fees, with the
result that appellant shall pay the indemnity of P3,000.00,
with interest at 6% from the filing of the complaint, plus ?
1,000.00 attorney's fees,. In all other respects, said decision
is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.
Decision modified.
ANNOTATION
Employer's subsidiary civil liability.The employee's
insolvency may be shown by the circumstance that the writ
of execution issued against him was returned unsatisfied
(Manalo vs. Robles Transportation Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729;
Quiambao vs. Mora, L-12690, May 25, 1960) or by the
certificate of the Director of Prisons that the employee is
serving, or has served, subsidiary imprisonment by reason
of insolvency and by the certificate of the Sheriff that the
employee has not satisfied his pecuniary liability and that
Page 7 of 9
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no properties were "f ound registered in his name

(Nagrampa vs. Mulvaney, McMillan & Co., Inc., 97 Phil.
724; Martinez vs. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1).
The subsidiary civil liability of the employer is coexten696
696

Tse Viw vs. Republic
sive with that of the judgment rendered against the

employee in the criminal case (Gonzales vs. Halili, 104
Phil. 1059). If the employer's liability cannot be
diminished, neither can it be increased (Arambulo vs.
Manila Electric Company, 55 Phil. 75).
The rule in Bantoto vs. Bobis, supra (the case under
annotation), that the employer's subsidiary civil liability
does not include exemplary damages was announced in
Rotea vs. Halili, 60 O.G. 7549, where it was held:
"The rule is that exemplary damages are imposed primarily upon
the wrongdoer as a deterrent in the commission of similar acts in
the future. Such punitive damages cannot be applied to his master
or employer except only to the extent of his participation or ratif
fication of the act because they are penal in character. Moreover, in
this jurisdiction, exemplary damages may only be imposed when
the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances
(Art. 2230, New Civil Code),
"According to the rule adopted by many courts, a principal or
master can be liable 'for exemplary damages or punitive damages
based upon the wrongful act of his agent or servant only where he
participated in the doing of such wrongful act or has previously
authorized or subsequently ratified it with full knowledge of the
facts. Reasons given for this rule are that, since such damages are
penal in character, the motive authorizing their infliction will not be
imputed by presumption to the principal when the act is committed
by an agent or servant, and that since they are awarded, not by way
01 compensation, but as a punishment to the offender and as a
warning to others, they can only be awarded against one who has
participated in the offense, and the principal therefore cannot be
held liable for them merely by reason of wanton, oppressive, or
malicious intent on the part of the agent." (15 Am. Jur. 730).
Page 8 of 9
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As to attorney's fees see annotation under Firestone Tire &

Rubber Company of the Philippines vs. Ines Chaves :& Co.,
Ltd., L- 17106, Oct. 19, 1966, ante.
______________
Page 9 of 9
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VOL. 255, MARCH 29, 1996
397
Yonaha vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 112346. March 29, 1996.
EVELYN YONAHA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and HEIRS OF HECTOR CAETE,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Damages; Civil Liability; Employer-Employee
Relationship; Due Process; While the Supreme Court has sanctioned
the enforcement of the employers subsidiary liability in the same
criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty,
execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of
courseit behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the
employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the
purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employers
liability.The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability
is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This Court has
since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the
same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged
guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an
incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution
against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and
it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer,
to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose,
the legal applicability and propriety of the employers liability. The
requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that
execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The
court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in
the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an
industry of some kind; that the employee has committed the crime
to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his
duties as such; and that execution against the employee is
unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The employer must be given

his full day in court.The assumption that, since petitioner in this
case did not aver any exculpatory facts in her motion to stay and
recall, as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which could
save her from liability, a hearing would be a futile and a sheer
rigmarole is unacceptable. The employer must be given his full day
in court.
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
398
398

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for the enforcement

of subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code.To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an
employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires: (a)
the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee
is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any
offense he commits while in the discharge of such duties); and (d)
that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the
employee, of course, concludes the employer and the subsidiary
liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford the
employer due process, the court should hear and decide that
liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by law.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Jose Ray T. Bael and Cornelio C. Mercado for
petitioner.
Moises A. Casul, Jr. for private respondent.
VITUG, J.:
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From the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing for

lack of merit the petition for certiorari, with prayer for
preliminary injunction, filed by Evelyn Yonaha against an1
order, dated 29 May 1992, of the Regional Trial Court
which had granted private respondents motion for the
issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution, the instant
appeal was taken.
In Criminal Case No. 01106-L, Elmer Ouano was
charged with the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting
In Homicide in an information which averred
That on April 14, 1990, at or about 11:45 A.M., in Basak, Lapulapu
City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the aforenamed accused, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw sporting
Plate No. GCX-237 duly registered in the name of Raul
_______________
1
RTC, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City, Hon. Teodoro K.
Risos, Presiding.
399
VOL. 255, MARCH 29, 1996
399

Cabahug and owned by EK SEA Products, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously maneuver and operate it in a negligent
and reckless manner, without taking the necessary precaution to
avoid injuries to person and damage to property, as a result thereof
the motor vehicle he was then driving bumped and hit Hector
Caete, which caused the latters instantaneous death, due to the
2
multiple severe traumatic injuries at different parts of his body.
When arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and, on 09

March 1992, the trial court pronounced its judgment
Finding therefore the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged against him and taking into account the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty
which the prosecuting fiscal readily accepted, the Court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer and undergo an imprisonment of 1
year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months and to pay the heirs of the
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victim the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of the victim; P30,000.00
for actual damages incurred in connection with the burial and the
nightly prayer of the deceased victim and P10,000.00 as attorneys
3
fees.
On 27 April 1992, a writ of execution was issued for the

satisfaction of the monetary award. In his Return of
Service, dated 07 May 1992, the MTCC Deputy City Sheriff
stated that he had served the writ on accused Elmer Ouano
but that the latter had manifested his inability to pay the
money obligation.
Forthwith, private respondents presented a motion for
subsidiary execution with neither a notice of hearing nor
notice to petitioner. Acting on the motion, nevertheless, the
trial court issued an order, dated 29 May 1992, directing
the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution. The sheriff
went to petitioners residence to enforce the writ, and it
was then, allegedly for the first time, that petitioner was
informed of Ouanos conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to
stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution
principally anchored on
_______________
2
Rollo, pp. 22-23.
Rollo, pp. 29-30.

400
400

the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the
employers liability had yet to be established. Private
respondents opposed the motion.
On 24 August 1992, the trial court denied petitioners
motion. On 23 September 1992, petitioners plea for
reconsideration of the denial was likewise rejected.
Petitioner promptly elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals (CA-GR SP No. 29116) for review. The appellate
court initially restrained the implementation of the
assailed orders and issued a writ of preliminary injunction
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upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond. Ultimately, however,

the appellate court, in its decision of 28 September 1993,
dismissed the petition for lack of merit and thereby lifted
the writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated:
We are not unmindful of the ruling in the aforecited case of Lucia
Pajarito vs. Seeris, supra.that enforcement of the secondary or
subsidiary liability of employer maybe done by motion in the same
criminal case, a recourse which presupposes a hearing. But even
assuming that issuance of writ of subsidiary execution requires
notice and hearing, we believe a hearing in the present case would
be sheer rigmarole, an unnecessary formality, because, as employer,
petitioner became subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of her
accused driver, Elmer Ouano, and proof of the latters insolvency.
And if she had any defense to free herself from such subsidiary
liability, she could have ventilated and substantiated the same in
connection with her (petitioners) motion to stay and recall the writ
of subsidiary execution in question. But from her said motion, it can
be gleaned that except for the protestation of violation of due
process, and absence of notice to her of the motion for issuance of a
writ of subsidiary execution, petitioner intimated no defense which
could absolve her of subsidiary liability under the premises. Then,
too, after the denial of her motion to stay and recall subject writ,
petitioner moved for reconsideration but in her motion for
reconsideration, she averred no exculpatory facts which could save
her from subsidiary liability, as employer of the convicted Elmer
4
Ouano.
_______________
4
Rollo, p. 27.
401
VOL. 255, MARCH 29, 1996
401

In the instant appeal, petitioner additionally reminds the
Court that Ouanos conviction was not the result of a
finding of proof beyond reasonable doubt but from his
spontaneous plea of guilt.
Page 5 of 8
9/15/15, 11:15 PM
We find merit in the petition.

The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability
5
is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This
Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this
subsidiary liability in the same criminal
proceedings in
6
which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it
really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution
process of the judgment. But, execution against the
employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and it
behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the
employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing
set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of
the employers liability. The requirement is mandatory
even when it appears prima facie that execution against
the convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court must
convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in
the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an
industry of some kind; that the employee has committed
the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the
performance of his duties as such; and that execution
against the
employee is unsuccessful by reason of
7
insolvency.
The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did
not aver any exculpatory facts in her motion to stay and
recall, as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which
could save her from liability, a hearing would be a futile
and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The employer must
be given his
_______________
5
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to

employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
6
Pajarito vs. Seeris, 87 SCRA 275.
Ozoa vs. Vda. de Madula, 156 SCRA 779.

402
402
Page 6 of 8
9/15/15, 11:15 PM

full day in court.
To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an employer under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires: (a) the
existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that
the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that
the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and
found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties (not necessarily any offense he commits while in
the discharge of such duties); and (d) that said employee is
insolvent. The judgment of conviction
of the employee, of
8
course, concludes the employer and the subsidiary liability
may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford
the employer due process, the court should hear and decide
that liability on
the basis of the conditions required
9
therefor by law.
WHEREFORE, finding the order, dated 29 May 1992, as
well as the order of 24 August 1992 to have been
improvidently issued, said orders are hereby SET ASIDE.
Petitioner shall be given the right to a hearing on the
motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution
filed by private respondents, and the case is REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings conformably with
our foregoing opinion. No costs.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and
Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Orders set aside, case remanded to court a quo for
further proceeding.
Notes.Where no allegations were made as to whether
or not the company took the steps necessary to determine
or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of its
employee to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a
company car, said company, based on the principle of bonus
pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with
the former for the injuries caused to third persons.
(Valenzuela vs. Court of
_______________
Page 7 of 8
9/15/15, 11:15 PM
See Ozoa vs. Vda. de Madula, ibid.
See Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709.

403
VOL. 255, MARCH 29, 1996
403
People vs. Cartuano, Jr.

Appeals, 253 SCRA 303 [1996])
The rules on extraordinary responsibility of common
carriers remain basically unchanged even when the
contract is breached by tort although noncontradictory
principles on quasi-delict may then be assimilated as also
forming part of the governing law. (Sabena Belgian World
Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 38 [1996])
o0o
Page 8 of 8

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 371

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 129282. November 29, 2001.

DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC.,

VOL. 371, NOVEMBER 29, 2001

DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. vs. Velez

Same; Criminal Procedure; Actions; Under the present rule,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 371

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 371

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ment of the order of the Regional Trial Court, Misamis

In Civil Case No. CV-94-214.

Petition, Annex D, Rollo, p. 21.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 371

Petition, Annex E, Rollo, pp. 23-27.

Petition, Annexes F and H, Rollo, pp. 28-33 and pp. 37-41.

Petition, Annex J, Rollo, pp. 45-46.

Petition, Annex K, Rollo, pp. 47-48.

Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 14-16.

VOL. 371, NOVEMBER 29, 2001

DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. vs. Velez

Hence, this petition.

The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiff s failure to

On the first issue, Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 371

the petition (Rollo, pp. 102-103).

Civil Case No. CV-94-214.

Court and the Court of Appeals to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple

By Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which took effect on April 1,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

reason that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 371

Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that

SCRA 449 (1998).

Ramos v. Gonong, 72 SCRA 559, (1976), citing Guevarra,

Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 5th Ed., p. 159.

Article 100, Revised Penal Code.

Article 104, Revised Penal Code.

VOL. 371, NOVEMBER 29, 2001

DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. vs. Velez

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 371

liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

Justice Oscar M. Herrera (Ret.), Treatise on Criminal Procedure:

Supra, Note 17, pp. 44-45.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 371

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.

In Civil Case No. CV-94-214 of the Regional Trial Court, Misamis

Oriental, Branch 20.

Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 388

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO,

VOL. 388, AUGUST 26, 2002

Casupanan vs. Laroya