04-26-10 Google Open Internet Reply Comments (GN DKT 09-191)

Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of )
)
Preserving the Open Internet ) GN Docket No. 09-191
)
Broadband Industry Practices ) WC Docket No. 07-52
)
REPLY COMMENTS OF GOOGLE INC.
Richard S. Whitt, Esq., Donna N. Lampert

Washington Telecom and Media Mark J. O’Connor
Counsel E. Ashton Johnston
Jennifer P. Bagg
Megan Anne Stull, Esq.,
Telecom Policy Counsel LAMPERT, O’CONNOR & JOHNSTON, P.C.
1776 K Street NW, Suite 700
GOOGLE INC.
Washington, DC 20006
Public Policy Department
(202) 887-6230 tel
1101 New York Avenue NW
(202) 887-6231 fax
Second Floor
Washington, DC 20005 Counsel for Google Inc.
April 26, 2010

Reply Comments of Google Inc.
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Openness has made the Internet a powerful engine of economic growth, and a
preeminent generator of ideas and creativity. As President Obama stated earlier this year
on YouTube, “We've got to keep the Internet open. . . we don't want to create a bunch of
gateways that prevent somebody who doesn't have a lot of money but has a good idea
from being able to start their next YouTube or their next Google on the Internet.”
Broadband is far too important as an essential infrastructure input to our national

economy, and to our government, social, and personal well-being, to leave it solely to a
failed market, with no government oversight or fundamental “rules of the road.” In
particular, the FCC should not allow a handful of broadband network operators to utilize
their unique market and network control over consumer access to the Internet in ways
that harm users, impede competition, or undermine the growth of Internet-based
activities.
The initial comments filed in this proceeding make clear that without appropriate
oversight, last-mile broadband providers can and will use their market and network
control to steer or limit consumer choice. Google supports the Commission’s proposed
rules because incumbent broadband providers have both a duopoly position in a largely
non-contestable market and have the technical control over the end user’s entire Internet
experience. This includes making some applications or content more or less attractive
than others, promoting or degrading certain Internet traffic, and effectively placing a
thumb on the scale by choosing the ultimate winners and losers in the Internet
applications and content marketplace. Unlike other Internet stakeholders, only last-mile
broadband providers have the ability to carry, to intercept, to inspect, to manipulate, and
to allocate capacity for other entities’ Internet traffic over their broadband access
networks. Last-mile broadband providers are still the only gateway users have to
access everything else online; as a result of this unique place in the network, last-mile
broadband providers can manipulate and interfere with users’ Internet experience,
including by determining whether consumers have access to certain content and
applications at all. Today, the evidence shows that the increasing vertical integration
between content and conduit only heightens broadband providers’ financial incentives to
use that unique network control to operate only in their private interests.
To ensure that broadband providers do not use their market incentives and unique
network control to promote only their own pecuniary interests over the far broader
interests of Internet users, the FCC needs to utilize affirmative oversight authority
regarding the consumer broadband sector. Such authority is similar to the role played by
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission with its more general jurisdiction to oversee
domestic providers of Internet applications and content.
The initial comments also show why it is vital that broadband openness rules
cover wireless as well as wired broadband networks, even if network management is
i
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
defined as allowing more flexibility for wireless. Consumers increasingly use the
Internet across all types of networks, and wireless providers today voluntarily offer
Internet access to their customers. A consistent pattern of questionable practices make it
clear that, without any FCC oversight and clear standards, true openness on wireless
broadband networks will not occur. The recent controversy over AT&T’s steadfast
unilateral refusal to allow the Sling mobile app on its 3G network only highlights the
need for a neutral third party arbiter in the mobile space to conclusively distinguish
between reasonable network management and an unacceptable anticompetitive practice.
The loud objections to codifying today’s open Internet principles by the small
number of broadband providers that control users’ broadband Internet access only
demonstrate the importance of FCC action. History teaches that FCC inaction will be
viewed as a “green light” for much more aggressive blocking, degradation,
discrimination and other practices that harm users. The time to adopt these rules is now,
as broadband providers are beginning to formulate and implement their prioritization-
based business models and deploy their networks. We cannot afford to wait until it is
effectively too late and broadband providers will claim they already have invested in
closed systems.
A wide range of parties from virtually every sector confirms that the proposed
rules would best promote the next generation of enormous “spillovers” and other material
and non-material benefits that the Internet produces. The comments also make clear that
a broadband “nondiscrimination” rule is neither new nor radical; in particular, allowing
broadband providers unilaterally and for the first time to charge priority access fees
would harm the evolution of broadband networks and services. Broadband providers
should not be permitted to leverage their control over broadband networks to extract such
“prioritization” fees from third party applications and content providers. These types of
fees will create numerous harms, ranging from creating incentives to monetize scarcity
rather than build capacity, to generating an “arms race that benefits only the arms
merchants” (where broadband providers increase their income but not overall speeds), to
fashioning an Internet where only those who can “pay to play” will fare well and others
will be relegated to a slow lane.
We continue to believe that the FCC has ample legal authority to adopt broadband
openness rules. In our initial comments, we explained that we agreed with the FCC that
Title I of the Act appears to provide such a legal foundation for its proposed rules, and
indeed for the FCC’s just-launched National Broadband Plan. Indeed, our comments
relied exclusively on legal and policy arguments premised on Title I authority.
Nonetheless, in the wake of the D.C. Circuit’s recent Comcast v. FCC decision, the FCC
has no feasible choice but to reexamine carefully all of its options. Any such responsible
review must seriously consider utilizing the agency’s longstanding direct authority under
the Communications Act.
ii
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
To be clear, Google is not wedded at this time to any particular legal theory to
justify the Commission’s oversight authority over broadband networks – whether under
Title I, Title II, Title VI, or other pertinent statutory provisions. In short, we support
whatever is most sustainable legally. Yet, while Google may be largely indifferent as to
the ultimate source of the FCC’s authority, there is no issue as to its fundamental
necessity. Consumers deserve clear and enforceable “rules of the road” to protect them
from broadband providers’ harmful practices. Further, nothing about the proposed
broadband openness rules is contrary to the First Amendment because the rules address
conduct, not speech. Rather, the rules promote core First Amendment values, allowing
anyone and everyone to speak over their broadband connections without interference.
Further, the comments make clear that it would be inappropriate to extend the
broadband openness rules to content and applications providers. While a few broadband
providers urge the FCC to extend its regulatory authority into the Internet itself, these
pleas appear to be driven solely by a cynical and self-interested attempt to prevent any
government oversight at all. As Google and Verizon agreed in their January joint filing,
there is no sound reason to impose communications laws or regulations on the robust
marketplace of Internet content and applications. Parties that urge expanding the FCC’s
rules in this way provide no sound legal, technical or policy reason to do so. Not only
does the FCC lack authority over Internet content and applications, there is no market
failure in the content and applications marketplace, such providers have no ability to
monitor and control all Internet traffic, and there is no history of legacy government
subsidies and benefits, as with last-mile broadband networks.
Finally, while a strong and enforceable transparency regime at the FCC would be
a useful tool to highlight broadband providers’ practices, this approach by itself is not
sufficient to protect consumers. The Commission must commit to adopting and
implementing a streamlined case-by-case adjudication process that allows any Internet
user to present a complaint to the FCC alleging harm to users, to competition, or to the
openness of the Internet itself.
iii
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ________________________________________1
DISCUSSION ___________________________________________________________3
I. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR THE FCC TO ADOPT

RULES NOW. _____________________________________________________3
A. THE COMMENTS REINFORCE THAT THERE IS A MARKET FAILURE FOR LAST-

MILE BROADBAND ACCESS. __________________________________________3
B. THE COMMENTS CONFIRM THAT BROADBAND PROVIDERS SUPPLY

ESSENTIAL CONNECTIVITY AND POSSESS UNIQUE NETWORK CONTROL
POINTS THAT REQUIRE SOME FORM OF GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT. ____________8
C. THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT INCREASING VERTICAL INTEGRATION

CREATES STRONG INCENTIVES THAT DEMAND SUPERVISION. ________________16
D. CURRENT AND EMERGING BROADBAND PROVIDER PRACTICES

UNDERSCORE THAT A GOVERNMENT ROLE IS NEEDED TO PRESERVE AN
OPEN INTERNET. __________________________________________________17
II. THE FCC MUST ASSERT ITS LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ADOPT

BROADBAND OPENNESS RULES. _________________________________21
A. THE FCC HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY OVER LAST-MILE BROADBAND

PROVIDERS. ______________________________________________________23
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR THE FCC FROM ADOPTING THE
PROPOSED RULES . _________________________________________________27
C. THE RULES WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A “TAKING” UNDER THE FIFTH

AMENDMENT. ____________________________________________________30
III. THERE IS BROAD SUPPORT IN THE COMMENTS FOR CODIFYING THE

PROPOSED RULES. ______________________________________________33
A. A RANGE OF INTERESTED PARTIES SUPPORT CODIFYING THE CURRENT IPS

PRINCIPLES. ______________________________________________________33
B. A SIMPLE NONDISCRIMINATION RULE WILL OPTIMIZE BROADBAND

SERVICE EVOLUTION WHILE PREVENTING HARMFUL PRACTICES. ____________34
1. A General Nondiscrimination Standard Is Well-Established __________34
iv
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
2. Third Party Paid Prioritization Is Discriminatory and Detrimental

to the Positive Evolution of Broadband Networks and Services _______36
C. THERE IS GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT TRANSPARENCY IS IN THE PUBLIC

INTEREST. _______________________________________________________41
D. THE RULES PROPERLY ALLOW FOR REASONABLE NETWORK

MANAGEMENT. ___________________________________________________44
E. FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MANAGED SERVICES IS NEEDED. __________________47
IV. THE RULES MUST EXTEND TO ALL LAST-MILE BROADBAND

PROVIDERS BUT NOT FURTHER. __________________________________48
A. WIRELESS NETWORKS MUST BE OPEN, EVEN IF RULES ARE APPLIED MORE

FLEXIBLY. _______________________________________________________48
B. THERE IS NO LAWFUL BASIS TO EXTEND THE RULES TO PROVIDERS OF

CONTENT AND APPLICATIONS.________________________________________51
V. THE RECORD SHOWS THAT SWIFT, CLEAR ENFORCEMENT BEST

SERVES THE PUBLIC INTEREST. __________________________________56
CONCLUSION _________________________________________________________59
APPENDIX A: PROF. NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES, BROADBAND OPENNESS RULES ARE

FULLY JUSTIFIED BY ECONOMIC RESEARCH
APPENDIX B: DECLARATION OF VIJAY GILL
v

Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of )
)
Preserving the Open Internet ) GN Docket No. 09-191
)
Broadband Industry Practices ) WC Docket No. 07-52
)
REPLY COMMENTS OF GOOGLE INC.
Google Inc. submits these Reply Comments in response to the FCC’s Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking 1 seeking public comment on proposed rules to preserve broadband openness. As
the extensive record highlights, tailored and flexible broadband network “rules of the road” are
needed to enable the broadband-driven Internet to reach its full potential as the dial tone of the
21st Century, promoting economic opportunity and creating novel avenues for human expression.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
In its initial Comments, Google explained why the FCC’s proposed rules are a targeted,
flexible measure to ensure that the Internet remains an open platform for all users. In these
Reply Comments, we show how and why the extensive record already developed in this
proceeding, with well over 10,000 unique submissions from myriad stakeholders, confirms that
government oversight of broadband provider practices is warranted. Further, the FCC’s
proposed rules of the road would preserve and promote open and robust access to the Internet.
In Section I, we explain why FCC action is needed now. The record demonstrates that
last-mile broadband providers supply essential connectivity and possess unique network control

1
In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 FCC Rcd. 13064
(2009) (“NPRM”).

GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
points. Further, the growing vertical integration between broadband networks and the content
and applications they deliver also compels action at this time, as broadband networks are being
deployed, in order to head off detrimental practices such as more aggressive blocking,
degradation, and discrimination. Broadband-based access to the Internet is too important to our
nation to allow broadband providers to act solely in their private interests without any
government oversight.
Section II explains that the FCC should assert its legal authority under the
Communications Act to adopt the proposed broadband openness rules. To be clear, Google
seeks only a viable and sustainable means of providing government oversight and clear “rules of
the road” for broadband networks. In our initial comments, we explained that Title I of the Act
appears to provide such a legal foundation for the proposed broadband openness rules, and
indeed for the FCC’s just-launched National Broadband Plan. Nonetheless, in the wake of the
D.C. Circuit’s recent Comcast v. FCC decision, the FCC has no feasible choice but to reexamine
carefully all of its options. This necessarily includes revisiting its determinations in the Cable
Modem Order, Wireline Broadband Order, and Wireless Broadband Order to decline to require
last-mile broadband transmission to be offered under Title II of the Communications Act. In
Section II, we also demonstrate that broadband providers’ constitutional objections raised under
the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution are unavailing and would not invalidate
the proposed rules.
In Section III, we highlight the broad support in the record for the proposed broadband
openness rules, including the general consensus that broadband provider transparency and
greater competition would benefit the public. Contrary to broadband providers’ assertions, a
“nondiscrimination” rule is neither new nor radical. Further, the record shows that allowing
2
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
broadband providers for the first time to charge fees to third party content and applications
providers for priority access would harm the positive evolution of broadband networks and
services. As the record also illustrates, the need for reasonable network management can be
addressed within the context of the proposed rules, including by expert technical bodies subject
to FCC review and enforcement.
Section IV describes why the open broadband rules should cover all last-mile broadband
networks, even if wireless broadband providers are given more flexibility to engage in network
management practices. At the same time, the record shows no basis for the FCC to extend the
rules to Internet content and applications providers; the Commission plainly lacks legal
authority, and there is no market failure in the content or applications marketplace. Further, such
providers lack the ability to control where users go or what they do on the Internet, and they have
received none of the legacy government benefits accorded to last-mile broadband network
providers. Rather, extension of the broadband openness rules beyond last-mile broadband
networks would cause serious harm to the Internet’s continuing development.
Finally, Section V confirms widespread agreement in the record that swift, clear FCC
enforcement is needed to provide meaningful redress for violations of the rules.
DISCUSSION
I. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR THE FCC TO ADOPT

RULES NOW.
A. THE COMMENTS REINFORCE THAT THERE IS A MARKET FAILURE FOR

LAST-MILE BROADBAND ACCESS.
The substantial record in this proceeding reinforces that the proposed rules are justified
and should be adopted now. The last-mile broadband access marketplace is characterized by a
lack of competition, high entry barriers and end user switching costs, and a largely non-
3
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
contestable and persistent duopoly. As many parties explain, this last-mile market failure affords
broadband providers the enhanced ability to act in discriminatory and anticompetitive ways that
harm consumers, competition, and the Internet itself. 2
Numerous commenters describe the deficient state of competition in today’s broadband
access market. Data produced by the FCC and others consistently show that broadband
transmission is overwhelmingly offered and provided only by either the incumbent wireline
telephone carrier or the incumbent cable company, presenting at best a classic economic case of
duopoly, with market control by just two dominant providers. 3 As the Department of
Commerce’s NTIA recently explained, “where residential consumers make their purchasing
decisions, they frequently have limited, and often no, choice among broadband Internet access
service providers.” 4 Earlier this year, the Department of Justice found that consumers seeking to
use the most bandwidth-intensive applications might have only a single viable choice of
broadband access provider. 5 As the FCC described in its National Broadband Plan, the current
broadband duopoly is declining to a monopoly market, as approximately 75% of U.S. consumers
“will likely have only one service provider (cable companies with DOCSIS 3.0-enabled

2
See, e.g., Comments of Public Knowledge, et al. (“Public Knowledge”) at 23, GN Dkt. 09-191 (filed
Jan. 14, 2010); Free Press at 30; Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee (“Ad Hoc Users
Committee”) at 6-7; Sony Electronics Inc. (“Sony”) at 5; Akamai Technologies, Inc. (“Akamai”) at 9;
Independent Film & Television Alliance (“IFTA”) at 5; National Association of State Utility Consumer
Advocates (“NASUCA”) at 4; National Association of Telecommunications Officers and The Benton
Foundation (“NATOA”) at 4; American Library Association (“ALA”) at 2.
3
See, e.g., Comments of BT Americas Inc. at 1; Vonage Holdings Corp. (“Vonage”) at 7-9; Free Press at
14.
4
Letter from Lawrence Strickling, Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information, Dept. of
Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, to Julius Genachowski,
Chairman, FCC, at 3, GN Dkt. 09-51 (filed Jan. 4, 2010) (“NTIA NBP Letter”); id. at 6 (broadband is at
best a duopoly in many areas of the country).
5
See Ex Parte Submission of the Department of Justice at 14, GN Dkt. 09-51 (filed Jan. 4. 2010).
4
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
infrastructure) that can offer very high peak download speeds.”6 The National Broadband Plan
also confirmed this market is substantially non-contestable: “Building broadband networks—
especially wireline—requires large fixed and sunk investments. Consequently, the industry will
probably always have a relatively small number of facilities based competitors, at least for
wireline service.” 7
The FCC’s most recent data confirm that, while approximately two-thirds of residential
high-speed connections are at 3 Mbps or higher, only the cable and incumbent telephone
companies offer such services, with little evidence that mobile data offerings offer a competitive
alternative at this time. 8 Further, as Professor Economides points out:
The FCC’s National Broadband Plan explains: ‘Given that approximately 96% of
the population has at most two wireline providers, there are reasons to be
concerned about wireline broadband competition in the United States.’ Recent
FCC data on broadband deployment at the census tract level confirm this. For
services with download speeds from 3 mbps up to 6 mbps, DSL and cable modem
services have 93.6% share. For speeds from 6 mbps up to 10 mbps, DSL and
cable modem services have 99.7% share. Faulhaber and Farber (2010), filing for
AT&T, also recognize the duopoly nature of the market: ‘We would be remiss in
not mentioning that in most markets, there are only two wireline broadband ISPs.’
Schwartz (2010), filing for AT&T, refers to the residential broadband market’s
‘duopoly structure in many local areas.’ Moreover, due to the speed limitations
of at least one of these options, many areas effectively have only a single choice.
As FCC (2009) states, ‘50 – 80% of homes may get speeds they need from one
provider,’ and ‘in areas that include 75% of the population, consumers will likely

6
Federal Communications Commission, Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan at 42, GN
Dkt. 09-51 (rel. Mar. 16, 2010) (“National Broadband Plan”). The FCC also notes the “fragile” state of
such competition where it presently exists. Id.
7
Id. at 36.
8
FCC Report, High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of December 31, 2008, Chart 11, 13 and
Table 6 (rel. Feb. 2010). Moreover, Table 13 also shows that incumbents only enter markets where they
hold a monopoly or duopoly position. Nonetheless, some have pointed out the inadequate nature of this
latest FCC report. See Letter from Aparna Sridhar, et al., Free Press, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
FCC, at 3-9, GN Dkt. 09-137 (filed Feb. 22, 2010).
5
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
have only one service provider (cable companies with DOCSIS 3.0-enabled
infrastructure) that can offer very high peak download speeds.’ 9
Both theoretical and empirical studies show that a duopoly market leads to higher prices and
lower consumer welfare than a competitive market would produce.10 As Professor Economides
observes:
Further, fewer firms in an industry not only generally leads to higher prices, but
also facilitates explicit and implicit collusion. . . .
On the Internet, market power by broadband networks, in the absence of open
broadband rules, can lead to the imposition of fees on content and applications
providers that will reduce content provision as well as consumers’ welfare. Most
importantly, such fees will reduce the network effects on the Internet that create
the virtuous cycle that has sustained the Internet’s growth and tremendous
positive impact on the U.S. economy. 11
This highly concentrated market – combined with a lack of contestability and no future
competition on the horizon – presents a textbook case of market failure. For consumers, this has
meant that even as broadband providers’ deployment costs continue to fall, 12 consumer prices
have increased, 13 with the greatest increases in markets where only one broadband provider
offers service. 14 As Commissioner Clyburn recently remarked:

9
Prof. Nicholas Economides, Broadband Openness Rules Are Fully Justified by Economic Research,
attached hereto as Appendix B, at 2 (citations omitted) (“Economides”).
10
Id. at 3-4.
11
Id. at 4.
12
See Costs of Providing Broadband Dropping, Broadband DSL Reports (May 4, 2009), available at
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Cost-Of-Providing-Broadband-Dropping-102253 (noting, for
example, 18% drop in Time Warner Cable’s costs of providing service from 2008 to 2009).
13
See Saul Hansell, As Costs Fall, Companies Push to Raise Internet Price, NYTimes.com (Apr. 19,
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/business/20isp.html?_r=1 (while it costs
Comcast an average of $6.85 per home to double Internet capacity within a neighborhood, its upgraded
higher speed services are priced at over three times existing 8 Mbps services). See also Economides at 5-
9; National Broadband Plan at 30 (“The [ISP] price index compiled by [the Bureau of Labor Statistics]
shows a slight increase in Internet service prices between 2007 and 2009.”).
14
See John B. Horrigan, Home Broadband Adoption 2009, Pew Research Center Publications (Jun. 17,
2009), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1254/home-broadband-adoption-2009. For premium

6
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The same day we announced these important recommendations designed to usher

more Americans into the digital age, however, I learned that another major
broadband provider is raising its rates for its lowest tiers of broadband service.
This news came on the heels of plans unveiled by other major providers
throughout the country to increase prices as well. So, just as we are in the process
of proposing steps to ensure that more people are comfortable signing up for
broadband service, providers of that very service are raising prices.15
Wireless broadband providers’ pricing practices likewise reflect a market failure. For example,
the lock-step price changes by some providers for their wireless broadband services underscore
the absence of a competitive market that would otherwise discipline broadband providers’
abilities to manage prices. 16
Over the past fifteen years, “robust competition” has failed to emerge in the market for
last-mile broadband access. As the Center for Democracy & Technology explains, most
Americans have limited choices, and broadband providers’ level of market power provides
ample opportunities to act in ways, both subtly and over time, that can diminish the open
character of the Internet. 17 Put another way, “the notion that there are ‘competitive marketplace
forces’ sufficient to force monopoly or duopoly incumbents to operate in a non-discriminatory
and competitively neutral manner is not borne out by marketplace realities.”18

service, the average monthly bill increased from $38.10 to $44.60. For basic service, the average monthly
bill increased from $32.80 to $37.10.
15
Statement of Commissioner Mignon Clyburn Regarding Broadband Affordability and Competition,
FCC News Release (Mar. 10, 2010). See also Cecilia Kang, FCC Commissioner Blasts ISPs for Raising
Broadband Prices, Washington Post Tech Blog, Mar. 10, 2010, available at
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/03/fcc_commissioner_clyburn_blast.html (noting that
Comcast raised its monthly basic broadband price by $2.00).
16
See David Goldman, Your Cell Phone Company’s Dirty Little Secret, CNNMoney.com (Feb. 10, 2010),
available at http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/10/technology/cell_phone_bill/ (data costs are moving higher
for some despite recent lock-step price cuts).
17
See Comments of Center for Democracy & Technology (“CDT”) at 9; RNK Communications (“RNK”)
at 5-6.
18
Comments of Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users at 7-8.
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In fact, despite incumbent broadband providers’ claims that the FCC has found that the
market for last-mile broadband Internet access is vigorously competitive, 19 the FCC never
concluded so in either the Cable Modem Order 20 or the Wireline Broadband Order. 21 In fact,
the FCC declined to conduct a market analysis, determining that the environment was “too
dynamic” at that time to reach any conclusions. 22 Instead, the FCC’s decision to eliminate
wireline broadband service regulation flowed from the prediction – now shown to be erroneous –
that alternative broadband access technologies such as broadband over power lines would gain
robust market share, lead to more choices, and provide better terms of service. 23
B. THE COMMENTS CONFIRM THAT BROADBAND PROVIDERS SUPPLY ESSENTIAL

CONNECTIVITY AND POSSESS UNIQUE NETWORK CONTROL POINTS THAT
REQUIRE SOME FORM OF GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT.
The record additionally confirms that broadband access is an essential input to reach the
Internet, 24 with unique control points that demand government oversight. As explained by
Akamai and others, broadband providers’ control over the physical last-mile infrastructure
necessary to access the Internet allows them to “effectively determine whether end users reach
the Internet at all.” 25 Users and society as a whole must use the last-mile broadband access input
to reap the vast benefits that flow from unfettered access to the Internet.

19
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T, Inc. (“AT&T”) at 2; Comcast Corp. (“Comcast”) at 7-10.
20
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, ¶ 6 (2002) (“Cable Modem Order”).
21
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, ¶ 3 (2005) (“Wireline Broadband
Order”).
22
Wireline Broadband Order at ¶¶ 48-52. See also Cable Modem Order at ¶ 30.
23
Wireline Broadband Order at ¶¶ 57-62.
24
See Comments of the Open Internet Coalition at 19.
25
Comments of Akamai at 11; NASUCA at 12-13.
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
Last-mile broadband access is indispensable to unleashing broadband networks’
potential. As the initial comments describe 26 and the FCC confirms in its National Broadband
Plan, “broadband is a foundation for economic growth, job creation, global competitiveness and
a better way of life. It is enabling entire new industries and unlocking vast new possibilities for
existing ones. It is changing how we educate children, deliver health care, manage energy,
ensure public safety, engage government, and access, organize and disseminate knowledge.”27
Chairman Genachowski has emphasized that broadband access has “immense power to improve
the quality of lives of our citizens” 28 and is “essential to job creation in a digital economy, to
ongoing investment in vital 21st century infrastructure, and to our ability to lead the world in
innovation.” 29
Last-mile broadband providers’ control of this essential access can be conceptualized as
both horizontal and vertical control over end user traffic. The vertical control stems from
broadband providers’ single pipe to the home, in contrast to the millions of Internet destinations
available to consumers. This is the more traditional way to analyze broadband providers’ unique
place in the market: the monopoly/duopoly character of broadband-based access to and from the

26
See, e.g., Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) at 1 (“The Internet is one of the
most remarkable success stories in American history. In less than two decades it has become a ubiquitous
presence in our daily lives and a key driver of the United States economy.”); United States Telecom
Association (“USTelecom”) at 1 (“The Internet in the United States is a tremendous success story. It has
developed with speed and scope unparalleled by any prior network technology, and, with an estimated
half trillion dollars in investment predominantly from the private sector, has created jobs, spurred
innovation, and revolutionized the way Americans learn, work, communicate and shop.”).
27
National Broadband Plan at xi.
28
See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Prepared Remarks at The Clinton Presidential Library on
Connecting the Nation: A National Broadband Plan, at 2 (Nov. 24, 2009).
29
See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, Prepared Remarks at the Open Agenda Meeting on A
National Broadband Plan for Our Future, at 2 (Mar. 16, 2010). See also National Broadband Plan,
Statement of Commissioner Copps at 1 (stressing that “broadband is the Great Enabler of our time.”).
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
Internet, based in large part on legacy government benefits and the costliness of deploying
physical infrastructure. 30
Broadband Providers’ “Vertical” Control over End User Traffic
The technical nature of routing traffic from the physical layer presents another type of
control, which can be conceptualized as horizontal in nature. This horizontal control stems from
at least four unique characteristics of routing traffic as a broadband provider: (1) the ability to
transport all Internet traffic to and from the consumer; (2) the ability to intercept and inspect the
contents of other people’s Internet traffic, via deep packet inspection (“DPI”) and other new
technologies; (3) the ability to manipulate other people’s Internet traffic through the router,
including blocking, degrading, and/or prioritizing selected traffic; and (4) the ability to dictate

30
See Comments of Google at 18-24.
10
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
which traffic gets what amount of broadband capacity. Collectively, this amounts to the unique
power to carry, to inspect, to manipulate, and to ration bandwidth for all traffic flowing over the
broadband pipe, including the vast bulk of third party traffic not “owned” in any way by the
broadband provider. Crucially, no other entity in the various layers of the Internet can come
close to possessing these kinds of abilities concerning what can be thought of as “Other People’s
Packets.” 31
Broadband Providers’ “Horizontal” Control over End User Traffic
Cox Communications’ packet shaping trial in its Kansas/Arkansas system illustrates the
extent of network-based control that broadband providers possess. 32 In the trial, Cox identified
and classified all online traffic riding over its local networks, and was able to engage in a variety
of traffic management and shaping practices to study mitigation of network congestion. Cox
described the trial as a “success,” and explained that its customers’ relative silence should be

31
Declaration of Vijay Gill, attached hereto as Appendix A, at ¶¶ 15-20 (“Gill Decl.”).
32
See Comments of Cox Communications, Inc. (“Cox”) at 20-30.
11
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
interpreted as agreeing with the unilateral employment of “reasonable” practices. 33 Nonetheless,
the degree of control utilized in the trial makes it apparent that a last-mile broadband provider
like Cox has the unchecked ability to carry, intercept, inspect, and manipulate online traffic that
flows over last-mile broadband connections – in particular, traffic that is not their own. Simply
put, no other entity has this same level and extent of control within the network. Thus,
regardless of whether Cox conducted the trial consistent with “good” engineering practices, its
activities only underscore the degree to which broadband providers uniquely hold the unilateral
power to dictate end users’ Internet experience.
This unique and pervasive “horizontal” control at the last-mile physical network layer is
an additional fundamental basis for FCC oversight. Such control is inherently different from the
function of applications and content facilities, including content delivery networks (“CDNs”).34
AT&T asserts that CDNs are “non-neutral” and represent an “unprecedented shift of power
within the Internet ecosystem.” 35 This argument is incorrect. The function of a CDN is to
enhance users’ overall Internet experience by hosting and serving content from a location more
proximate to end users, thus avoiding points of possible congestion and reducing latency. By
definition, they do not and cannot involve or interfere with other traffic flows to end users. Only
last-mile broadband access providers like AT&T have such control.

33
Id.
34
Applications and content facilities also include hosting and serving facilities and cloud service
providers. These facilities and services are used by commercial applications and content providers of all
sizes, as well as by educational, research, medical and government entities. See Bill St. Arnaud, A
Personal Perspective on the Evolving Internet and Research and Education Networks, Feb. 15, 2010,
available at http://docs.google.com/Doc?docid=0ARgRwniJ-
qh6ZGdiZ2pyY3RfMjc3NmdmbWd4OWZr&hl=en (“Evolving Internet”).
35
Comments of AT&T at 31.
12
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
Last‐mile broadband providers are uniquely positioned to:
! Carry all online traffic to and from the end user.
! Inspect all online traffic to and from the end user.
! Manipulate all online traffic to and from the end user.
! Allocate capacity for all online traffic to and from the end
user, including Internet access.

Controlling “Other People’s Packets”
Furthermore, unlike the routers in the last-mile broadband access network, where
prioritizing is usually zero-sum (so that speeding some packets inherently means slowing others),
there is no limit to the number of users that can enjoy the enhanced quality and speed that flow
from CDNs and other content serving facilities. Indeed, content and applications providers
ranging from start-ups and small businesses to large, established players take advantage of these
types of facilities. 36 Simply put, routers and servers are two entirely different things, and routing
someone else’s packets is not the same as storing your own packets. Content aggregation and
delivery facilities used by applications and content providers do not and cannot control the flow
of Internet traffic to end users. This is why last-mile broadband Internet access services are
properly at the heart of the issues in this proceeding. 37

36
See, e.g., Mylene Mangalindan, Small Firms Tap Amazon's Juice, Wall St. J. (Jan. 15, 2008), available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120035205794189723.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (discussing small
businesses and start-ups using Amazon’s distributed content storage services to build their business).
37
See, e.g., Comments of Akamai at 12 (noting that Akamai neither operates its own transmission
facilities nor controls last-mile broadband access).
13
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
Precisely because traffic routers and switches in last-mile access networks present unique
opportunities for control, the FCC has a long tradition of regulating last-mile communications
inputs. 38 Contrary to some parties’ claims that the proposed rules are politically motivated,39
there has been a consistent and overarching recognition that some government role is vital to
promote the public interest. Thus, following the elimination of all FCC oversight of last-mile
broadband in 2002 and 2005, both Republican and Democratic Commissioners foresaw that
enactment of rules could be necessary. 40 In fact, the Republican-endorsed “Nascent Services
Doctrine” that advocated starting from a deregulatory premise explicitly recognized that there
should not be “complete freedom from regulation.” 41 With broadband access no longer
“nascent,” but still lacking competition, the FCC should exercise its important oversight
responsibility now.

38
See, e.g., Comments of Google at 29; NASUCA at 16; Free Press at 129-133; Public Knowledge at 7-9.
39
See Comments of Competitive Enterprise Institute at 2-3.
40
Democratic Commissioners Copps and Adelstein supported government oversight, as did former
Chairman Powell and Commissioner Abernathy, both Republicans. See, e.g., Wireline Broadband Order,
Statement of Commissioner Copps; Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008) (“Comcast-BitTorrent Order”), Statement of Commissioner Adelstein;
Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Commissioner, FCC, Prepared Remarks at Catholic University Columbus School
of Law Symposium on The Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Case of Regulatory Obsolescence? (Mar.
17, 2005); IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd. 4863 (2004), Statement of
Chairman Michael Powell.
41
Kathleen Abernathy, Commissioner, FCC, Prepared Remarks at Disruptive Technologies and
Opportunities for Service Providers Panel, Telecoms Transition World Summit, Lisbon, Portugal (Jun.
27, 2005) (“When I developed the Nascent Services Doctrine, I also made clear that I was not advocating
complete freedom from regulation. Indeed, there are certain core social policy goals that are not market-
driven and probably cannot be achieved without governmental urging, and perhaps mandates.”).
14
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
Finally, we note that Google’s “Fiber for Communities” project, 42 which would provide
one Gig fiber connectivity to one or more communities with a total population of 50,000 to
500,000, is a good example of what we believe all last-mile broadband networks should be: big,
fast, and open. We also believe such networks should be subject to some form of government
oversight. For its part, Google will agree to abide by whatever federal, state, and local
government regulations are applicable to consumer-facing broadband networks. Further, while
we voluntarily have chosen to pursue an openness policy to govern the networks, we think there
is an overarching government interest in ensuring that Internet access provided over last-mile
broadband access networks is open and robust.
Thus, there are enduring structural reasons why last-mile broadband networks require
some form of government oversight. Broadband is an essential input to economic, social, and
personal activities, a scare infrastructure resource, and a beneficiary of government benefits and
subsidies. Further, the combination of “vertical” control (relatively few physical means of
getting to and from the Internet) and “horizontal” control (the unique ability to carry, intercept,
inspect, and manipulate, and dictate bandwidth for all online traffic) further buttresses the need
for a government role. As the record also shows, and as we discuss next, recent troubling market
and technology developments make that oversight role all the more imperative.

42
See Minnie Ingersoll and James Kelly, Think Big with a Gig: Our Experimental Fiber Network, Official
Google Blog, Feb. 10, 2010, available at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/think-big-with-gig-our-
experimental.html/.
15
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
C. THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT INCREASING VERTICAL INTEGRATION

CREATES STRONG INCENTIVES THAT DEMAND SUPERVISION.
Broadband network operators’ growing vertical integration with the content and
applications that ride over their networks 43 increases their incentives and opportunities to engage
in conduct antithetical to the public interest, ranging from blocking and blatant discrimination to
less obvious actions that result in reduction of competitive offerings. 44 The Independent Film &
Television Alliance, representing members worldwide that produce the vast majority of U.S.
feature films and other popular content, explains in detail how and why this growing integration
has created a tipping point, underscoring the need for the proposed rules “to ensure independent
producers and distributors an environment to compete fairly, create diverse programming and
secure commercial distribution to the public on the increasingly important digital platforms of
the Internet.” 45 Sony likewise explained:
The single most important obstacle to video convergence today is the threat of
discrimination by network operators that provide both an MVPD service and an
Internet access service to consumers. . . . Network operators that provide, and
therefore exert control over, both services have an overwhelming incentive to
undermine Internet-delivered video and diminish its competitive threat. 46
Other commenters echo this well-founded concern that control of access to last-mile
conduit can be easily manipulated to squelch or interfere with competitive content, applications

43
See, e.g., Application for Consent to the Transfer of Licenses, General Electric Company, Transferor,
to Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Application and Public Interest Statement, MB Dkt. 10-56 (filed
Jan. 28, 2010); Commission Seeks Comments of Applications of Comcast Corporation, General Electric
Company, and NBC Universal, Inc. to Assign and Transfer Control of FCC Licenses, Public Notice, DA
10-457, MB Dkt. 10-56 (rel. Mar. 18, 2010).
44
See, e.g., Comments of Netflix, Inc. (“Netflix”) at 5-7.
45
Comments of IFTA at 3, 8 (stressing that consolidation is “devastating for a nation that prides itself on
offering its citizens open access to diverse programming and competing ideas.”). See also id. at
Appendix H (describing broadband providers and affiliated services).
46
See Comments of Sony, NBP Public Notice #27 at 5, GN Dkt. 09-51 (filed Dec. 21, 2009).
16
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
and services. 47 DISH Network explained that the nation’s four largest broadband providers all
also offer video services that compete with unaffiliated video offerings.48 As the FCC noted in
the NPRM, this vertical integration creates obvious economic incentives for broadband providers
to use their control over the distribution “pipes” to favor their own services and content.49 In
these circumstances, where incentives skew broadband providers’ decisions so that they diverge
from the larger public interest, sound policy dictates an appropriate FCC role.
D. CURRENT AND EMERGING BROADBAND PROVIDER PRACTICES UNDERSCORE

THAT A GOVERNMENT ROLE IS NEEDED TO PRESERVE AN OPEN INTERNET.
Even though opponents of the proposed rules generally claim just two instances of
blocking or degrading adjudicated by the FCC, 50 the record shows that these practices are far
more numerous and pervasive. Moreover, even in these two instances, the Internet Policy
Statement (“IPS”) was not adequate to deliver effective oversight and redress. 51
Some broadband providers already have adopted practices that at least arguably are
antithetical to openness. The record also confirms that, going forward, others are likely to
engage in blocking, throttling, discrimination, degradation, preferential traffic differentiation
practices, and imposition of restrictive user terms and conditions that interfere with consumer

47
See, e.g., Comments of Sony at 2; Skype Communications S.A.R.L. (“Skype”) at 15. See also Letter
from David Tannenbaum, Special Counsel, FCC, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, at 1, GN Dkt.
09-191 (filed Jan. 15, 2010) (describing Union Square Ventures Jan. 13, 2010, ex parte meeting with FCC
staff).
48
Comments of DISH Network L.L.C. (“DISH Network”) at 3-6.
49
NPRM at ¶¶ 72-73.
50
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T at 94-95; Comcast at 17-18; National Cable and Telecommunications
Association (“NCTA”) at 22; Time Warner Cable Inc. (“Time Warner Cable”) at 19; Verizon at 31.
51
Not only was the blocking in Madison River adjudicated under the prior longstanding Title II regime,
Madison River Communications, LLC, Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, ¶ 1 (2005), in the BitTorrent situation,
Comcast maintained successfully that the FCC lacked jurisdiction to enforce the IPS. See Comcast-
BitTorrent Order at ¶ 14; Brief of Respondent Comcast at 20-27 (filed Jul. 27, 2009) in Comcast Corp. v.
Fed. Commc’n Comm, Case No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir.).
17
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
freedom and the free flow of information. 52 The point is not that every such practice is
problematic and should be barred. Rather, the market is ill-served where there is a fundamental
lack of transparency about these practices, no clear rules of the road, and no neutral, third-party
arbiter to oversee, assess and prohibit those practices that have a detrimental impact on
consumers and the marketplace.
AT&T’s initial denial and much-delayed approval of the SlingBox application only
illustrates the type of conduct that could become standard practice if broadband providers are
permitted to have free reign over which content, applications, and services can flow over last-
mile networks. 53 While AT&T ultimately allowed the SlingBox application, the episode shows
how a broadband provider can block an application or content in order to gain time to develop
and bring an affiliated, competing product to market. Indeed, some have alleged that AT&T’s
actions may have been motivated by a desire to stymie a competitor to an AT&T application
currently in production. 54 Of course, although the facts are damning on their face, it is possible
that AT&T simply was engaging in reasonable network management. The salient point is that
AT&T today can and does make such decisions unilaterally, without accountability to anyone
but itself.

52
These practices also include broadband provider lack of transparency; practices that are complex and
confusing; practices that interfere with user web activity; and the imposition of terms of service that may
have anticompetitive and detrimental impacts upon users.
53
See Matthew Shaer, Slingbox App Approved by AT&T, Just in Time for iPad Launch, Christian Science
Monitor (Feb. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Horizons/2010/0204/Slingbox-app-approved-by-AT-T-just-in-
time-for-iPad-launch.
54
See Jason Chen, Network Use Not the Only Reason for AT&T to Hate 3G iPhone Slingplayer, Gizmodo
(May 13, 2009), available at http://gizmodo.com/5253135/network-use-not-the-only-reason-for-att-to-
hate-3g-iphone-slingplayer.
18
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
Comcast’s new online backup and data storage services provide another example worth
considering. 55 Comcast’s service, Secure Backup & Share, allows users to upload and backup
their personal data. Yet, the 200GB plan comes quite close to the Comcast 250GB monthly cap;
because the uploading process almost certainly will require users to connect for more than 15
minutes, the connection may end up being throttled. 56 If Comcast waives these requirements for
customers using its own backup and storage services, it begs the question of whether it will do so
as well for customers of competing, unaffiliated backup and storage services. 57 Again, while
waiver of Comcast’s bandwidth cap for its own service may not be problematic if all similar
services are treated the same, without a government role and acknowledged network
management standards, there is simply no way for anyone to know whether Comcast has adopted
such a practice, and no place subsequently for anyone to take a legitimate complaint.
Further, what broadband providers may view as “creative and innovative” arrangements
and business models (including preferential access, revenue or cost sharing, and other forms of
prioritization, degradation and discrimination) can be harmful to the public generally, stifling
innovation, restricting choice, and constricting competitive options. 58 For example, while
preferential access for some content or applications in exchange for a share of revenue (“pay to

55
See Kelly Hodgkins, Comcast Forgets About its Bandwidth Cap, Launches Online File Backup Service,
Boy Genius Report (Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://www.boygeniusreport.com/2010/02/19/comcast-
forgets-about-its-bandwidth-cap-launches-online-file-backup-service/.
56
See Letter from Kathryn Zachem, Vice President Regulation and State Legislative Affairs, Comcast, to
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Dkt. 07-52 (filed Jan. 05, 2009) (notifying the FCC that
Comcast has instituted the congestion management practices described in the Comcast letter filed Sept.
19, 2008, in the same proceeding).
57
Further, if Comcast does allow users to exceed usage limits when they use affiliated services, it raises
an important question of whether the limits restrict the robustness of Internet access services for reasons
unrelated to technological constraints.
58
See, e.g., Comments of Verizon at 3, 7, 68; Time Warner Cable at 30-32; Comcast at 39; AT&T at 10,
105-106; NCTA at 19-20.
19
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
play”) may be considered pioneering among broadband providers, it can have the effect of
creating an unacceptable “slow lane” 59 for other content and applications, impeding user access
and success in the marketplace even if these applications are more innovative or have greater
user benefits. For consumers, broadband providers’ practices – such as the decision by Embarq
and other broadband providers to allow NebuAd to use deep packet inspection technology to
monitor subscribers' web activity and serve targeted ads based on the data collected without the
user’s consent – can be unwelcome. 60 As the broadband-driven Internet becomes even more
vital to our society, the FCC, not broadband providers in their sole discretion, must be able to
establish appropriate standards of acceptable practices.
The largest last-mile broadband providers’ objections to codification of any broadband
openness rules highlight that these providers do not believe they are constrained today by the
Internet Policy Statement principles and see no legal obligation to follow them. 61 Moreover,
broadband providers’ statements about their intended (and current) practices demonstrate why
oversight is vital. 62 This situation makes immediate FCC action imperative to prevent broadband
access practices, terms, conditions, and arrangements that are antithetical to the evolution of the
open Internet from taking root and spreading. Experience teaches that lack of action by the FCC

59
Comments of ALA at 2, 4.
60
See Wendy Davis, Customers Sue ISP For Installing NebuAd 'Spyware,' Offering Defective Opt-Outs,
Online Media Daily (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://www.mediapost.com/publications/
?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=121522.
61
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T at 1-2; Time Warner Cable at 4; USTelecom at 39, 41.
62
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T at 56; Verizon at 47; Time Warner Cable at 52; Cox at 20-30.
20
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
will be considered a “green light” for broadband providers to become much more aggressive in
restricting usage of broadband networks and services to maximize profits.63
Immediate action will avoid disruption later when it may be too late. Broadband
networks are being deployed and investments being made now, underscoring the importance of
ensuring that broadband network practices evolve consistent with (and not antithetical to)
openness. In virtually every analogous instance, including where the Commission sought to
implement cable “a la carte” channel services, the FCC has been faced with numerous claims
that it could not step in because incumbents had relied on the FCC’s existing regulatory
framework in designing their business models. Incumbents argued that any change would
unlawfully undermine their legitimate expectations.64 Adopting clear rules of the road today will
help to ensure that the next generation of broadband networks will be open.
II. THE FCC MUST ASSERT ITS LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ADOPT BROADBAND
OPENNESS RULES.
In our initial Comments, we explained that we agreed with the FCC’s own assessment
that the agency could satisfy the two-prong test for Title I “ancillary” authority to adopt the
proposed broadband openness rules. 65 Indeed, our own legal analysis there relied exclusively on
the FCC’s Title I jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit’s recent Comcast v. FCC decision, 66 however,
has dealt a serious blow to this proposed jurisdictional approach. Notably, some broadband

63
See, e.g., Comments of IFTA at 10-12.
64
See, e.g., A La Carte Q&A, NCTA, available at
http://www.ncta.com/IssueBriefs/ALaCarte.aspx?view=3 (“breaking up existing model would result in
higher costs per channel, and many networks serving important and diverse audiences would be forced
out of business.”). See also Reply Comments of NCTA – NBP Public Notice #27 and #30 at 31-34, GN
Dkt. 09-51 (filed Jan. 27, 2010) (warning the FCC not to adopt video gateway proposals that would
threaten the “basic economic underpinnings” of the cable television industry).
65
Comments of Google at 44-49.
66
Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, No. 08-1291(D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2010) (“Comcast v. FCC”).
21
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
providers already had been vigorously asserting that the Commission lacks authority to adopt the
proposed rules, including arguing that the rules would violate broadband providers’ First or Fifth
Amendment constitutional rights. 67 Undoubtedly, some of those same companies now will
assert that the D.C. Circuit’s recent Comcast v. FCC decision completely forecloses the
Commission’s Title I jurisdiction to adopt the rules.
To be clear, Google seeks only a means of providing government oversight and necessary
“rules of the road” for broadband networks. We are not wedded at this time to a specific legal
theory to justify the Commission’s authority over broadband networks. Nonetheless, the
fundamental necessity for such authority remains paramount to fully protect consumers,
competition, and the open Internet.
In the wake of the Comcast v. FCC decision, then, the Commission has no responsible
alternative but to consider all of its options, including relying on its direct authority under the
statute. In particular, reliance directly upon one or more sources of authority granted in the
statute may well offer a more straightforward and defensible jurisdictional basis than solely (or
primarily) utilizing Title I for the Commission’s oversight of last-mile broadband transmission.
Importantly, this is the case not only for consumer safeguards like broadband openness rules, but
also to ensure that the Federal Universal Service Fund and other benefits and obligations can be
extended on a lawful and expeditious basis to consumer broadband services. Thus, to provide
much needed certainty and vital direction, the FCC might prudently revisit the seminal
judgments of the Cable Modem Order, Wireline Broadband Order, and Wireless Broadband

67
See, e.g., Comments of Verizon at 111-113; AT&T at 235-248; Time Warner Cable at 44-50. See also
Tom Tauke, Executive Vice President, Verizon, Prepared Remarks at New Democrat Network, at 3 (Mar.
24, 2010) (highlighting the danger of applying “statutory provisions intended for the telephone industry of
the 1900s to the communications and Internet world of the 21st century.”).
22
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
Order, where the agency declined to require last-mile broadband transmission to be offered
under Title II of the Communications Act.
A. THE FCC HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY OVER LAST-MILE BROADBAND

PROVIDERS.
Given the considerable legal uncertainty as a result of the D.C. Circuit’s Comcast v. FCC
decision, it would be unwise for the Commission simply to continue relying solely or primarily
on its Title I authority to adopt the proposed broadband openness rules. Instead, the FCC should
consider a number of options, including pursuing a decision grounded in whole or in part on its
unquestioned authority under existing statutory titles, including Title II. Carefully considering
this approach is especially important given the tone of many broadband providers’ comments
threatening to engage the Commission and other Internet and broadband stakeholders in
protracted litigation over the extent of the Commission’s Title I jurisdiction. 68
Commenters are mistaken that the FCC cannot reverse course on its prior orders. As long
as the agency does so in a considered and reasonable manner, it is free to adapt its regulations as
circumstances dictate. 69 The FCC’s express statements in the Wireline Broadband Order
confirm that “[t]he Commission is free to modify its own rules at any time to take into account
changed circumstances. . . .” 70 Indeed, the FCC has a legal duty to revisit its predictions and
adjust its regulation according to the facts as they develop. 71 In light of the Comcast decision,

68
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T at 207.
69
Compare Comments of Verizon at 95 (“Nor could the Commission reverse course and find that
broadband Internet access is a telecommunications service.”), with Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009) (“The fact that an agency had a prior stance does
not alone prevent it from changing its view or create a higher hurdle for doing so.”).
70
Wireline Broadband Order at ¶ 81.
71
See Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 603 (1981).
23
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
the agency should take the opportunity now to do so for all broadband services, wireless and
wired.
Certainly, the state of the market, technology, and service offerings all have evolved
tremendously in the ten years since the FCC first undertook to examine broadband Internet
services. Such enormous changes might well lead the FCC to review thoroughly the record
evidence that it cited in support of its prior regulatory classification decisions under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 72 The most salient such evidence includes the ongoing and
persistent residential broadband market duopoly, and the effects it has on retail prices and access
to competing information. Further, while the Wireline Broadband Order rested on the
“predictive judgment” that a robust and innovative broadband wholesale market would develop
to better serve the retail market, 73 this judgment has proven to be considerably off base.
Moreover, from the consumer’s perspective, the last-mile providers’ broadband access services
being “held out” and “offered” are transmission functionality, i.e., speedy access between the
home and the Internet using the broadband providers’ transmission networks. 74 Thus, in light of

72
Several of the FCC’s forbearance actions turned on “predictive judgments” of market developments
that have gone awry, and so it may be appropriate for the Commission to review its broadband
forbearance decisions as well. See WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 603 (when a rulemaking decision
is based on predictive judgment, “[t]he Commission should be alert to the consequences of its policies
and should stand ready to alter its rule if necessary to serve the public interest more fully”); Am. Civil
Liberties Union v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 823 F.2d 1554, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same).
73
Wireline Broadband Order at ¶ 64 (“we expect that facilities-based wireline carriers will have business
reasons to continue making broadband Internet access transmission services available to ISPs without
regard to the Computer Inquiry requirements. . . . We believe that the convergence of these two factors –
increasing competition among facilities-based broadband providers and the potential for competition in
wholesale network access – will sustain and increase competitive choice among broadband providers and
Internet access products.”).
74
Major last-mile providers often focus solely on speed and price, key attributes of transmission, when
advertising their broadband access services. See, e.g., AT&T–Shop–Internet, available at
http://www.att.com/gen/general?pid=6431; Comcast–Shop–Internet, available at
https://www.comcast.com/shop/buyflow2/products.cspx?SourcePage=Internet&profileid=85485456-

24
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
the failed competition in the last-mile broadband access marketplace, the flawed predictive
judgments made in the prior orders, and the nature of broadband services actually offered in
today’s marketplace, the Commission is well-positioned at least to re-examine those very same
factors and predictions, as well as develop a comprehensive record that includes other salient
factors.
It is also vital that the FCC affirm that its oversight of broadband networks should apply
equally to all facilities-based last-mile broadband providers regardless of facilities. For example,
just like wireline telephone companies, when cable operators use their facilities to offer two-way
transmission of data, they too are offering a transport service that can be equally subject to the
Commission’s authority. The Communications Act confirms that cable operators must be treated
in this same manner, and enjoy no special exemption simply because they also offer cable
services under Title VI of the Act. 75 Notably, the FCC already has addressed this issue; the
Cable Modem Order held that cable modem broadband service includes a “telecommunications”
transmission component, and that cable modem service did not qualify as a “cable service” under
the Act. 76
Alternatively, or additionally, the FCC might conclude that it is still legally feasible to
utilize an “information services” regulatory classification for broadband services offered by
facilities-based last-mile providers. Such a course would appear to continue relying on the

6CF6-48AE-AFE5-2AAC7939C070&lpos=Nav&lid=2ShopHSI&; Verizon–Internet, available at
http://www22.verizon.com/Residential/Internet/ (all last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
75
47 U.S.C. §153(46) (“telecommunications service” definition applies “regardless of the facilities
used”). See also Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd
11501, ¶ 59 (1998) (noting “Congress's direction that the classification of a provider should not depend on
the type of facilities used . . . [but] rather on the nature of the service being offered to consumers.”).
76
Cable Modem Order at ¶ 39 (cable modem service includes a “telecommunications” component), ¶¶
60-69 (cable modem service is not a “cable service” under the Communications Act).
25
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
agency’s Title I ancillary authority to enact the proposed rules despite the holding in Comcast v.
FCC. Arguably, the two-prong test for use of the FCC’s ancillary authority could be met here. 77
As AT&T makes clear, it is unquestioned that with respect to the first prong, “[b]roadband
Internet access service self-evidently constitutes ‘communications by wire or radio’ and thus
falls within the Commission’s jurisdictional grant.”78 The record also shows that the proposed
rules are needed for the FCC “to perform with appropriate effectiveness certain of its other
responsibilities” set forth in Titles I, II, III and VI of the Communications Act.79 Nevertheless,
the Comcast decision, and broadband providers’ continuing criticisms of any Title I–based
approach, now has cast considerable doubt on use of ancillary authority regarding broadband
networks.
Finally, it is noteworthy that AT&T asserts that the FCC would be out of step with
European regulators if it adopts the proposed rules.80 AT&T’s assertions do not appear to
comport with actual ongoing policy responses to Internet access issues in Europe; indeed, one
expert demonstrates in this record that the FCC’s proposed response is far less prescriptive than
that of European regulators. 81 Notably, unlike the continuing deregulatory stance being

77
Comcast v. FCC slip. op. at 7; Am. Library Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 406 F.3d 689, 691-93
(D.C. Cir. 2005); Comments of Google at 44-49.
78
Letter from Gary L. Phillips, General Attorney and Associate General Counsel, AT&T, to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC, Attachment at 6, GN Dkt. 09-51 (filed Jan. 29, 2010), quoting 47 U.S.C. §
152(a).
79
United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 173 (1968). See also Comments of Vonage at 11-15; XO
Communications, LLC (“XO”) at 20; Public Knowledge at 7.
80
Comments of AT&T at 91-92.
81
See Kip Meek and Robert Kenny, Network Neutrality Rules in Comparative Perspective: A Relatively
Limited Intervention in the Market at 3, Ingenious Consulting Network, attached as Attachment A to
Comments of Computer & Communications Industry Association (“CCIA”) (FCC’s proposal is “a highly
limited intervention. The rest of the developed world generally has imposed much more significant
interventions to regulate telecoms bottlenecks, and many consider these regulations as providing

26
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
implemented in the U.S., European regulators have adopted a range of in-depth regulatory
approaches to broadband – including unbundling, separation, bitstream access, detailed price
regulation, and other more prescriptive measures – to ensure that network providers do not
leverage their network control unacceptably. In such environments, broadband openness
requirements may not be as vital to protect user interests. By contrast, such rules are necessary
in the United States precisely because the market offers consumers few to no competitive
options. Presumably, AT&T would not prefer the full “European approach.”
Thus, amidst the growing uncertainty generated over the scope of its Title I authority, the
FCC has little realistic option but to fully consider all statutory underpinnings of its authority to
protect consumers. This necessarily includes considering the comparatively more certain and
predictable jurisdictional “hook” of its existing statutory titles to preserve and promote a robust
and open Internet. 82
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR THE FCC FROM ADOPTING THE
PROPOSED RULES .
As some commenters point out, the proposed rules only would regulate certain aspects of
broadband providers’ conduct (i.e., transmission practices) in handling packets they transport

important checks on discriminatory behavior by access providers”). See also Kevin J. O’Brien, Skype in
a Struggle to Be Heard on Mobile Phones, NYTimes.com (Feb. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/technology/18voip.html (“In Europe, the new commissioner for
Digital issues, Neelie Kroes, has indicated that she might put pressure on wireless operators to allow
VoIP service on their networks. In a hearing on Jan. 14 before a European Parliament committee, Ms.
Kroes said blocking VoIP violated network neutrality. ‘It is imperative that VoIP can be done,’ Ms.
Kroes said before the Industry, Research and Energy panel.”).
82
Nonetheless, should it proceed down this path, the Commission need not and should not resurrect the
panoply of Title II statutory requirements . Instead, the FCC could exercise its Section 10 forbearance
authority to relieve broadband providers of many Title II statutory and regulatory obligations and benefits
that would be either unnecessary or inappropriate for broadband services.
27
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
across their networks, and so do not merit heightened First Amendment scrutiny. 83 As proposed,
regulation of this transmission conduct does not implicate last-mile providers’ speech rights.84
The act of routing data packets does not convey a particularized message. These actions may be
taken to clear network congestion or to favor a service provider’s own content, but no cognizable
message can be gleaned from them. For example, a user who must wait longer to download an
online movie because her broadband provider is prioritizing data packets of affiliated content
does not understand this waiting period to be a particularized message from the broadband
provider.
While broadband providers analogize their conduct at issue here to that of newspapers
and publishers deserving of First Amendment protection, 85 the analogy is inapt. Incumbent
broadband providers in this proceeding have not suggested a plan to engage in editorial functions
with Internet access, or to place general limits on the Internet access services offered to the
public today. To the contrary, major broadband providers have expressed a specific intent not to
editorialize or limit their subscribers’ access to lawful Internet content.86 The analogy to
companies that engage in editorial conduct, therefore, rings hollow.

83
Comments of CDT at 31; Free Press at 137; RNK at 9-10. See also Comcast-BitTorrent Order, n.203
(prohibition against interfering with consumers’ use of peer-to-peer networking did not raise First
Amendment issues because it “does not prevent Comcast from communicating with its customers or
others”).
84
To determine whether conduct is communicative and warrants First Amendment protection, the
broadband provider must show “[1] an intent to convey a particularized message was present, [2] and in
the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it.” Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
85
See Comments of Verizon at 111.
86
See, e.g., Comments of Verizon at 81 (“Network providers have every incentive to continue to ensure
that consumers have the tools and access they want. Consumers have made it clear that they value
traditional, public Internet access services in which they can choose the content and applications that they
access.”); AT&T at 150 (even without regulation, “consumers already enjoy the ability to connect any

28
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
Further, broadband providers do not engage in editorial functions akin to those performed
by cable operators when they make channel line-up decisions for their multichannel video
offerings. Unlike cable television systems in Turner, 87 the rules at issue here do not limit the
information the broadband provider makes available via Internet access to its subscribers.88
Instead, both before and after the proposed rules are adopted, broadband providers would be in
the same position of offering a service functioning as an on-ramp to the Internet’s unlimited
content and applications.
Arguments that the proposed rules for last-mile broadband providers also must apply to
the vast array of Internet content or applications providers are unavailing.89 In Leathers v.
Medlock, the Court explained that a law singling out a certain medium, or even the press as a
whole, is “insufficient by itself to raise First Amendment concerns.”90 Like the law at issue in
Leathers that applied to cable operators, the content-neutral rules proposed here would apply to
all broadband providers and would not single out or impermissibly burden a few providers over
other providers of the same services.

network compatible handsets to the wireless broadband Internet—and to access the lawful content of their
choice”).
87
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994) (finding that an
intermediate level of scrutiny must be employed for must-carry provisions of the Communications Act).
88
See, e.g., Time Warner Entm’t, Inc. v. Fed Commc’n Comm’n, 93 F.3d 957, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(where leased access provisions do not result in the actual third-party use of channel capacity that limits
cable operators’ editorial discretion, “the provisions will have no effect on the speech of the cable
operators” and would prevent “operators from suffering any infringement of their First Amendment
rights”).
89
Comments of AT&T at 196-206; Verizon at 36-39.
90
499 U.S. 439, 452 (1991) (finding the imposition of a generally applicable sales tax to cable television
services alone, while not extending the taxes to the print media, did not violate the First Amendment
because the taxes were of general applicability, not targeted to interfere with First Amendment activities,
and content neutral).
29
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
Finally, even if the proposed rules were somehow construed as infringing upon
broadband providers’ editorial discretion, which they do not, the content neutral rules would
easily pass intermediate scrutiny. The rules are designed to address an important and concrete
governmental interest: the economic, political, and social interests of access to the widest array
of Internet-based information sources and content, without interference from last-mile broadband
providers who possess both the incentives and abilities to impair such access. 91 Further, the
rules are narrowly-tailored to address the problem, as they regulate only certain conduct of last-
mile broadband providers and fully permit such providers to engage in reasonable network
management. 92
C. THE RULES WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A “TAKING” UNDER THE FIFTH

AMENDMENT.
Contrary to some commenters’ allegations in this proceeding, 93 the proposed rules would
not violate the Fifth Amendment because they would not constitute either a physical taking or a
regulatory taking under established law. Arguments that the proposed rules would constitute a
physical taking of broadband provider property -- equating them to a form of permanent
easement on their networks -- are erroneous. The proposed rules are not analogous to the

91
“Likewise, assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental
purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.” Turner, 512 U.S. at
663.
92
Indeed, the proposed rules are far less onerous than the leased and public-educational-government
(“PEG”) access rules that require cable system operators to dedicate several channels of cable systems to
this content, which passed intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 973 (requirement for
a single PEG channel on cable system “to permit access to everyone on a nondiscriminatory, first-come,
first-serve basis. . . . would be content-neutral, would serve an ‘important purpose unrelated to the
suppression of free expression,’. . . and would be narrowly tailored to its goal”).
93
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T at 244-46; Verizon at 119-20; Qwest Communications International Inc
(“Qwest”) at 60.
30
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
regulations struck down in Loretto,94 which concerned a permanent physical occupation of real
property, because the proposed rules contemplate no invasion or physical occupation of real
property. 95 Indeed, the Loretto Court emphasized that a physical occupation of property “is
qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of the property, even a regulation that
imposes affirmative duties on the owner.” 96
The facts and holding of Qwest v. United States also are instructive. In that case, Qwest
claimed that unbundled local loops had been physically taken over by a competitive provider
with FCC approval, but without just compensation. 97 The Qwest court rejected the physical
occupation argument. 98 The court also rejected Qwest’s “electron theory” takings claim that its
property was “‘invaded’ by electrons that traverse the loops every time” a call is made.99
The regulatory taking claim under Penn Central fares no better. The Penn Central
decision identified the following factors to determine whether a regulation is so severe as to be a
“taking” of private property: the regulation’s economic impact; its interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations; and the character of the government action.100 None of these

94
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
95
Id. at 441.
96
Id. at 436. Similarly, the Loretto Court recognized the government’s “broad power to impose
appropriate restrictions upon an owner’s use of his property.” Id. at 441 (emphasis in original).
97
48 Fed. Cl. 672, 691 (Fed. Cl. 2001).
98
Id. at 691. See also Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 570 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding “the
conclusion that the transmission of WRNN's [TV broadcasting] signal does not involve a physical
occupation of Cablevision's equipment or property”).
99
Qwest Corp., 48 Fed. Cl. at 693.
100
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). In Penn Central, owners of the
historic Grand Central Terminal were restricted from certain commercial usage of the real estate by New
York’s landmark laws. The Court held that the owners could not establish a Fifth Amendment "taking"
simply by showing that they had been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they believed

31
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
factors support broadband providers’ claims with regard to the proposed rules. First, while
commenters speculate that the rules will inflict a harsh economic impact, the proposed rules
permit these companies to continue to offer and profit from Internet access. Rather, the record
indicates the rules likely will enhance consumers’ valuation of Internet access offerings.101
Further, the rules do not impact broadband providers’ other revenue sources – video, voice, or
private services – offered via broadband network infrastructure, which will continue to produce
substantial profits. 102 Notably, broadband providers have failed to submit any specific facts into
the record to support claims of a harsh economic impact. 103 In a regulated market such as last-
mile communications, providers cannot reasonably hold distinct investment-backed expectations
of a regulatory vacuum or status quo. 104 Moreover, it is ironic that the same incumbents raising
the erroneous takings claims are the annual recipients of massive government subsidies (e.g.,

was available for development. In the same way, the regulatory restrictions upon the broadband
provider’s ability to use its property for discriminatory packet routing that would not be a “taking.”
101
See Comments of Access Humboldt, et al. at 3-6; Public Knowledge at 24-30.
102
Internet video is not having a significant revenue impact on pay television services. See, e.g., Todd
Spangler, Less Than 8% of Viewers Would Cancel Pay TV: Survey, Multichannel News (Feb. 4, 2010),
available at http://www.multichannel.com/article/44702-
Less_Than_8_Of_Consumers_Would_Cancel_Pay_TV_Survey.php (“About 5.5 million U.S.
households, or less than 8% of broadband consumers, would consider dropping cable or satellite TV
service in favor of online video, DVDs and over-the-air broadcasts. . . .”).
103
See Economides at 16 (“The revenues from residential broadband Internet access represent only a
small portion of total revenues from the overall usage of last mile infrastructure.”). The broadband
providers have failed to meet the heavy burden that courts impose on Fifth Amendment claimants that a
regulation would cause severe economic harm. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 493 (1987). Speculative assertions of loss of future profits under the proposed rules are
inadequate as a matter of law. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
104
See Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958) (“Those who do business in the
regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve
the legislative end.”). In fact, AT&T and Verizon list FCC regulatory change as an expected risk in their
Annual Reports. See, e.g., AT&T 2008 Annual Report at 46-47, available at
http://www.att.com/Common/about_us/annual_report/pdfs/2008ATT_FullReport.pdf, Verizon 2008
Annual Report at 31-33, available at http://investor.verizon.com/
financial/quarterly/pdf/08_annual_report.pdf.
32
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
federal and state USF dollars) to support legacy networks that also are used to provide broadband
services.
III. THERE IS BROAD SUPPORT IN THE COMMENTS FOR CODIFYING THE

PROPOSED RULES.
A. A RANGE OF INTERESTED PARTIES SUPPORT CODIFYING THE CURRENT IPS

PRINCIPLES.
The breadth and diversity of interested parties supporting the FCC’s proposal to codify
the IPS principles for last-mile broadband Internet access service providers belie assertions that
enforceable rules are unnecessary105 or will thwart investment and innovation.106 Supporters
include operators of various last-mile broadband Internet access network technologies, including
incumbent 107 and competitive wireline service providers, 108 mobile 109 and fixed 110 wireless
service providers, and satellite providers. 111 A broad spectrum of software developers; music,
video, and applications and content creators and distributors; 112 and end-users 113 also support

105
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T at 80-83; Cox at 6.
106
See, e.g., Comments of Verizon at 51-52; Comcast at 11-12.
107
See Comments of Nebraska Rural Independent Companies at 4; Texas Statewide Telephone
Cooperative at 1-3; see also Comments of Qwest at 9-11, 29 (supporting codification of the four IPS
principles, and adoption of a new flexible end-user disclosure rule, but supporting a reasonable
discrimination standard rather than the proposed nondiscrimination rule).
108
See Comments of Covad Communications Company (“Covad”) at 1-2; PAETEC Holding Corp.
(“PAETEC”) at 7; RNK at 3; Vonage at 16; XO at 1.
109
See Comments of Clearwire Corporation (“Clearwire”) at 3; Leap Wireless International, Inc. and
Cricket Communications, Inc. (“Leap/Cricket”) at 2; Rural Cellular Association at 2.
110
See Comments of Wireless Internet Service Providers Association (“WISPA”) at 1.
111
See Comments of DISH Network at 2.
112
See Comments of Software & Information Industry Association (“SIIA”) at 5-8; Recording Industry
Association of America at 2-3; R.E.M. at 1; Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. at 2; IFTA at 21;
Independent Creator Organizations at 3; Netflix at 4; Sling Media Inc. at 1.
113
See Comments of Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users at 1; ALA at 2-3; Association of Research
Libraries, et al. (“ARL”) at 6; National Association of Realtors at 1.
33
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
codification of the rules, as do state and local regulators, 114 equipment manufacturers, 115 and
other interested stakeholders. 116 The record also reflects widespread consensus that the rules
should be narrowly tailored to encompass only entities that clearly are subject to the FCC’s
authority over last-mile broadband providers. 117
B. A SIMPLE NONDISCRIMINATION RULE WILL OPTIMIZE BROADBAND SERVICE

EVOLUTION WHILE PREVENTING HARMFUL PRACTICES.
The record also supports adoption of the proposed nondiscrimination rule and application
of the rule to last-mile broadband Internet access providers.
1. A General Nondiscrimination Standard Is Well-Established
The comments support Google’s view that proposed rule section 8.13 – requiring service
providers to treat lawful content, applications, and services in a nondiscriminatory manner,
subject to reasonable network management – fairly balances the interests of last-mile broadband
providers and users and should be adopted. 118 Although opponents of the proposed rule seek to
portray “nondiscrimination” as a new or radical legal standard, 119 it is neither. In fact,

114
See Comments of City of Philadelphia at 2; NASUCA at 1-2; NATOA at 2; New Jersey Division of
Rate Counsel (“NJ Rate Counsel”) at 4.
115
See Comments of Akamai at 1; CCIA at 10; Information Technology Industry Council (“ITIC”) at 2;
Sony at 1.
116
See, e.g., Comments of Open Internet Coalition at 47; Communications Workers of America at 13-14;
Digital Education Coalition at 4; Open Media and Information Companies Initiative, et al. (“OMICI”) at
4; CDT at 1-2; Free Press at 11; National Hispanic Media Coalition at 5; Public Knowledge at 31;
Distributed Computing Industry Association at 4; Intrado at 1; Red Hat at 2; Skype at 1.
117
See, e.g., Comments of Entertainment Software Association at 2; Open Internet Coalition at 82-83;
Skype at 20-21; VON Coalition at 4; Akamai at 3.
118
See, e.g., Comments of Netflix at 5 (“The fact that network operators control the delivery pipes and
generate significant revenue from content that travels over those pipes provides both the means and
motive for discriminating against new ventures that might threaten revenue sources of the network
operators.”).
119
See, e.g., Comments of Verizon at 66; AT&T at 105-09.
34
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
nondiscrimination is a well-settled and workable standard commonly utilized to address network
providers’ abilities and incentives to engage in anticompetitive practices 120 – which, as the
record shows, is a fundamental, valid and far-reaching concern. 121 In contrast, a “reasonable
discrimination” standard, in combination with a reasonable network management exception,
would leave the Commission, competitors, and consumers with no effective response to last-mile
Internet access providers’ discriminatory practices. 122
Indeed, it is notable that some broadband providers suggest that the “unjust and
unreasonable” discrimination standard would provide them with leeway to implement
discriminatory paid prioritization arrangements. 123 This should set off alarms that, under the
more complex and relaxed standard, these providers plan to engage in discriminatory conduct
and then, if necessary, "beg forgiveness" after the fact. For these reasons, the FCC should make
clear that most forms of prioritizing Internet traffic for a fee from third parties – as well as
blocking, impairing, or degrading other entities’ packets – should be deemed illegal under any
discrimination standard.

120
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(2)(D), 252(d)(1)(A)(ii), 271(c)(2)(B), 222(c)(3), 224(f)(1), 275(b)(1),
260(a)(2).
121
See Comments of NASUCA at 17 (“It is safe to say that neither the Commission nor even the most
knowledgeable consumer is aware of the full extent of discriminatory network conduct.”); Ad Hoc
Telecommunications Users at 7-13; IFTA at 3, 13; ALA at 2; Open Internet Coalition at 28-29; Skype at
9-11; Sling Media at 4-10; Public Knowledge at 2; Akamai at 15-16; Sony at 5-6; NJ Rate Counsel at 7-8.
122
See Comments of Free Press at 79-82; Open Internet Coalition at 16-17.
123
Comments of AT&T at 105 (“In today’s common-carrier world governed by Title II of the
Communications Act, such discrimination is generally permissible because it is ‘reasonable’. . . .”);
Comments of Verizon at 66 (nondiscrimination rule would prevent all “charges to application or content
providers” whereas “unjust and unreasonable” discrimination rule would not).
35
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
2. Third Party Paid Prioritization Is Discriminatory and Detrimental to the

Positive Evolution of Broadband Networks and Services
The record amply demonstrates that allowing blanket and unfettered third party paid
prioritization will do much harm, and no demonstrable good, in the applications and content
marketplace, ultimately redounding to the detriment of all stakeholders. As Red Hat points out,
without open broadband rules, the current last-mile cable/telco duopoly has the “unfettered
ability to charge similar content providers different prices for access.”124 Further, as Skype
shows, quality of service (“QoS”) and prioritization services should be driven by consumer
requests for service with optional consumer-based charging, and not network-centric charges on
content and applications:
Network-centric QoS models reflect the re-creation of implicit support

mechanisms designed to create additional payments to terminating carriers. It is
worth noting that the very parties that proffer pro-consumer justifications for
these models on the Internet are precisely the same parties that argue for their
elimination on the PSTN.125
Even AT&T acknowledges that “to impose unilateral ‘termination charges’ for access to their
end users” would violate the Commission’s IPS principle against “blocking” access to Internet
content, a principle AT&T claims to fully support. 126 And yet, advances in broadband router

124
Comments of Red Hat at 2.
125
Comments of Skype at 18-19 and n.29.
126
Comments of AT&T at 123-24. Globally, however, incumbents such as Telefonica have directly
stated an intention unilaterally to charge content providers for terminating access. See, e.g., Spain’s
Telefonica Considers Charging Google, ABCNews/Money (Feb. 8, 2010), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=9778220. Of course, as Google previously has explained,
assertions that Google somehow is not paying telecommunications carriers for network access are grossly
mistaken. See Richard Whitt, Response to Phone Companies’ “Google Bandwidth” Report, Google
Public Policy Blog, Dec. 8, 2008, available at http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2008/12/response-
to-phone-companies-google.html.
36
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
technology will make it even easier for AT&T and other last-mile providers to engage in a
number of prioritization techniques. 127
Nor does the record contain any evidence to support the claim that last-mile providers’
revenues generated as a result of unregulated access charges on content providers would be used
to increase investment in last-mile broadband networks, or to lower consumer Internet access
rates. 128 Significantly, broadband providers themselves have made no such commitments.129
Similarly, Verizon speculates that its paid prioritization may help smaller content providers
compete more effectively against larger ones that use CDNs.130 The evidence, however, shows
this is a “red herring,” as CDNs already help thousands of small content providers in a vibrant
market. 131
In Google’s initial comments, we set forth eleven reasons why third-party paid
prioritization is problematic. 132 Fundamentally, if last-mile broadband providers are permitted

127
For example, Cisco recently announced CRS-3 routers with “[a]pplication awareness [that] permits
service prioritization of any content from or to any device applied on a per-service basis, allowing the
network to elevate the priority of voice over IP (VoIP) or video services that cannot sustain latency or
elevate priority on a per-subscriber basis for fee-paid service enhanced performance.” See “Cisco Video
2.0: The Experience Paradigm Shifts Again Changing the Face of Video,” available at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/routers/ps6342/prod_brochure0900aecd805801a7.pdf.
128
At most, the incumbents merely speculate that the revenues generated might be used for network
upgrades. See, e.g., Comments of AT&T, Exh. 3 at 13 (“limitations on charging for prioritization and
enhancements could skew investments away from ‘smart’ functionalities. . . ”) (emphasis added).
129
While AT&T claims some end users will end up subsidizing others unless it can charge terminating
access fees to content providers, Comments of AT&T at 137-39, AT&T fails to explain why it simply
cannot roll-out optional QoS services for end-users who want them or offer tiered pricing, with
appropriate cost-causer pricing on the end user.
130
Comments of Verizon at 37, 55.
131
In fact, the deployment of content and applications facilities has been a competition success story; in
contrast to last-mile connections, content and applications providers of all sizes have many choices
among competitive companies to deliver their products and services to end users. See generally Evolving
Internet.
132
Comments of Google at 34-37, 64.
37
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
unilaterally to extract all of the economic and social value of a new software-based offering via
discriminatory charges, it will discourage innovation at the edge, which drives the greatest
economic and other benefits, because innovators will not be able to obtain appropriate value
from their inventions. Commenters agree that, in particular, the terminating access monopoly
problem is real, and increases broadband providers’ abilities to impose excessive and
discriminatory fees that harm the growth of the content and applications marketplace.133
As Professor Economides notes, the terminating access monopoly problem that the
Commission has encountered in telephone local exchange markets is present again in broadband
access markets: “Similarly, in a world without open broadband rules, broadband Internet access
providers can use their ‘captive customers’ to extract fees from distant network participants, such
as content and applications providers.” 134 The result this monopoly presents is significantly
distortive:
The degree of competition for last mile broadband access is limited. . . .

Broadband Internet access providers’ significant market power gives them the
ability to use captive customers to extract fees from content providers. This is
exactly what broadband Internet access providers have proposed and why they
oppose the proposed non-discrimination rule. Like LECs towards IXCs, last mile
broadband providers would like to exercise their monopoly power not only
towards their direct broadband customers but additionally towards other, third-
party providers of Internet services, applications and content. Broadband Internet
access providers have proposed to bypass existing markets for Internet transit and
impose fees on content and applications providers that have no contractual
relationship with them. This would create a significant market distortion and
societal welfare loss. 135

133
See, e.g., Comments of CCIA at 7-8.
134
Economides at 10.
135
Id. at 10. See also id. at 5 (describing consumers’ broadband switching costs and relatively low
broadband churn rates).
38
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
The record provides additional reasons why these practices should be prohibited under a
simple nondiscrimination standard. Sony, for example, notes that discriminatory access charges
would lead to several “negative consequences on end-users and content, application and service
providers,” including:
[i] increasing the cost to deliver content, applications or services via the Internet
may increase the cost of these services to end users, and may therefore limit
demand not just for these services but for Internet access in general; [ii] [o]n
networks that face capacity constraints, allowing access providers to favor certain
traffic would necessarily limit the bandwidth available to non-favored content,
applications and services; [iii] [a]llowing discriminatory pricing would also
reduce incentives to maximize the efficient use of available bandwidth, and would
discourage the development of technologies, like variable bit-rate encoding, that
seek to enable the best possible end-user experience for the lowest possible cost to
the network. 136
Likewise, the record demonstrates that non-profit content and application sources would
suffer under these pricing schemes because these critical sources of Internet content have no
means of paying for such costs or recouping them from users. As the American Library
Association points out, “[i]f the Internet degrades into a ‘pay to play’ environment, these
institutions [i.e., libraries, museums and historical societies] will be seriously disadvantaged
because they will almost certainly lack the ability to pay whatever the providers will charge.”137
Moreover, “[i]f access providers prioritize traffic containing their own content or content from
affiliated or fee-paying providers, unaffiliated providers will have their content relegated to an
Internet slow lane. Distance learning, telemedicine applications, and other research activities
could be compromised, along with untold numbers of future applications.” 138

136
Comments of Sony at 5-6.
137
Comments of ALA at 2.
138
Comments of ARA at 3. See also Michelle Combs, Christian Coalition of America, Statement at the
FCC Workshop on Speech and Diversity at 4 (Dec. 15, 2009) (Stating that organizations “should be able

39
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
It is also true that an arms race usually only benefits the arms merchants. If broadband
providers are free to offer paid prioritization, one of two scenarios is likely: either (i) it will
create the proverbial “dirt road” for those that cannot or do not pay the prioritization fees; or (ii)
most or all content and applications providers will feel compelled to pay, resulting in no relative
increase in speed and little or no improvement in network congestion or service quality for
consumers. In either case, the only clear “winners” would be broadband providers. Even
content and applications providers on the “fast lane” would be left with fewer economic
resources and greater investment uncertainty, and consumers also would face unimproved
service quality and diminished access to diverse content and applications.
Further, the very content providers that the incumbents claim would benefit most from
“creative” paid prioritization arrangements – companies such as Netflix, Skype, Sony, Google,
Sling Media, and the members of SIIA – in fact oppose legalizing such arrangements and support
the proposed nondiscrimination rule. 139 These very successful content companies perceive their
own best interests, and clearly understand that third-party paid prioritization would not improve
the growth of or access to their services by consumers, but rather would result only in an
additional terminating access revenue stream for broadband providers.
It is also notable that the incumbents have failed to address in this record the relevant
regulatory status of the paid QoS and prioritization access services they seek to offer to content
and applications providers. Such services essentially would offer transport and a higher level of

to continue to use the Internet to communicate with our members and with a worldwide audience without
a phone or cable company snooping in on our communications and deciding whether to allow a particular
communication to proceed, slow it down, block it, or offer to speed it up if the author pays extra to be on
the ‘fast lane.’”).
139
See Comments of Netflix at 4; Skype at 7; Google at 57; Sling Media at 1; Sony at 4-6; SIIA at 6-7.
40
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
transmission functionality. As such, they would be most readily classified as
“telecommunications” 140 that is offered “for a fee.” 141 If these services also were offered to all
content and applications providers, then such services would meet the definition of a
“telecommunications service,” 142 and be regulated under the FCC’s existing rules as an access
service offered by dominant carriers. 143 Of course, if these services were not offered to all
content providers, then they raise the issue of invidious discrimination in the content
marketplace. Indeed, for that reason, the FCC likely would have to require these broadband
transmission services to be offered on a straightforward nondiscriminatory basis, especially
because such services apparently would be provided to affiliated and favored content providers.
The regulatory difficulties and disputes that the FCC would be forced to resolve, including the
assessment of cost-based rates and other heavy governmental oversight, further auger in favor of
the simple nondiscrimination rule that would prohibit such terminating fee schemes from taking
root.
C. THERE IS GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT TRANSPARENCY IS IN THE PUBLIC

INTEREST.
The record reflects agreement that consumers need a certain level of disclosure in order
to make informed decisions about the broadband services they purchase. The critical objective
of the transparency rule is for all users to know what they are paying for and what they are
getting. Notably, AT&T’s consultants (Faulhaber and Farber) agree that consumers need

140
47 U.S.C. §153(43).
141
Id. at § 153(46).
142
Id.
143
47 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart E – General Rules for Dominant Carriers.
41
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
information to make appropriate purchasing decisions, 144 while USTelecom acknowledges that
clear consumer disclosure improves competition and enables consumers to make informed
decisions and acquire services that best fit their needs. 145 This narrow focus on consumers,
however, as urged by some broadband providers, 146 further demonstrates that a more fulsome
broadband transparency rule is necessary.
Importantly, the audience for any transparency requirement must be all broadband users,
and not just residential consumer end users. Numerous parties urge the FCC to ensure that the
transparency rule makes relevant information available for a broad range of users, including
businesses, 147 schools,148 libraries, 149 and, critically, content, applications, and software
providers. 150 While consumers have every right to know the features and limitations of the
broadband services they purchase, the record shows that applications and content providers also
must understand the limits of broadband provider services that will affect innovation and service
functionality. 151 By contrast, failure to provide information to content and application providers

144
Comments of AT&T, Exh. 1 at 40 (“Let’s ensure that customers are fully informed so that they may
make intelligent broadband market choices.”).
145
Comments of USTelecom at 52. See also, e.g., Comments of Verizon at 49 (“Transparent and
meaningful disclosures to consumers enable them to make educated choices and thereby facilitate
competition.”); Comcast at 44 (“[c]lear communication with our customers is an important part of a
successful relationship”).
146
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T at 188; Qwest at 11; Verizon at 49-50; Comcast at 46.
147
See, e.g., Comments of SIIA at 8.
148
See, e.g., Comments of Digital Education Coalition at 13.
149
See, e.g., Comments of ALA at 3.
150
See Comments of CCIA at 6; Sling Media at 2; DISH Network at 6; OMICI at 6. See also Comments
of CDT at 31; Data Foundry at 10; Free Press at 112, 117.
151
See Comments of Google at 66-67; NTIA NBP Letter at 7 (“Developers of devices, services and
applications need basic information about the way that broadband networks operate so that developers can
ensure that their products will work effectively and efficiently on those networks. As importantly,
developers need information about how broadband networks change to ensure compatibility over time.”).
42
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
would inhibit investment and lead to a decline in applications and services available on the
Internet. 152
Withholding network information also will preclude applications from being designed to
work properly on broadband infrastructure, causing consumer confusion and frustration.
Disclosure must be sufficient to allow content and application providers to better understand the
limits of last-mile services and to better inform all existing and potential content and application
users of what to expect from the service. 153 Further, transparency of network service
performance commitments, including the service’s actual transmission and capacity rates, should
be required. 154
Moreover, broadband providers should not have unfettered discretion to decide whether
the type and amount of disclosure is sufficiently transparent. 155 Instead, the creation of industry
best practices and standards, informed by the Federal Trade Commission’s experience and by
other interested parties, and adopted and enforced by the FCC, can greatly enhance

152
See Comments of Data Foundry at 10; CDT at 31.
153
Examples of the type of transparency needed for content and application providers include information
on a broadband Internet access service provider’s switch from Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) to next-
generation IPv6, which is the core of standards-based internetworking methods, and when a DOCSIS
switch occurs, which enables high-speed data transfers on cable systems.
154
See, e.g., Comments of CCIA at 33 (consumers should be able to identify “the advertised
download/upload speeds from each provider” and “the amount of time the average user experiences
speeds slower than the advertised download/upload speeds”); Netflix at 8 (“Network operators should be
required to disclose relevant information regarding their broadband access service offerings, in particular
the actual speeds and/or ranges of speeds that consumers can expect as well as network management
practices that may slow the delivery of certain traffic, including any time-of-day restrictions.”). See also
Comments of DISH Network at 6-7, 9.
155
See, e.g., Shane Greenstein, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Prepared
Statement at FCC Hearing on Innovation, Investment, and the Open Internet, Transaction Cost,
Transparency, and Innovation for the Internet (Jan. 13, 2009) (“Many participants in standards processes
participate because they believe transparency has great importance in interdependent value chains. Other
firms will not make long‐term investments if they cannot understand at a fine level of detail how their
software must interact with another firm’s software or hardware.”).
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
transparency. 156 In this context, self-regulation alone invites problems down the road, especially
where, as here, broadband providers have had every opportunity to self-regulate for the past
fifteen years and yet have failed to do so effectively.
Despite some parties’ concerns, 157 disclosure under the proposed rule would not require
detailed network architecture information that would open networks to threats from “hackers and
terrorists.” The focus, instead, should be on network outputs (i.e., the impact on network traffic),
not on network inputs (i.e., the “black box”). While network security is a real concern, years of
telecommunications network disclosures demonstrate that security concerns are not a legitimate
basis to prevent disclosure of pertinent information regarding network operations, practices and
characteristics. 158 Other than generalized claims, 159 the record fails to provide concrete evidence
that disclosures would raise legitimate security concerns.
D. THE RULES PROPERLY ALLOW FOR REASONABLE NETWORK MANAGEMENT.
AT&T and other broadband providers plead for total flexibility in managing their
networks in order to address congestion, threats to network security, and other engineering
matters. 160 These providers are extravagant in expressing their concerns about how the proposed

156
See, e.g., Comments of Level 3 at 13; NATOA at 7-8. Cf. Comments of Verizon at 49 (suggesting
only development of best practices, industry self-regulatory principles); Comcast at 46 (same).
157
See, e.g., Comments of Comcast at 47; Cox at 11; CTIA at 48.
158
See, e.g., Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communications Services and Facilities, Report and Order, 104 F.C.C. 2d 958, ¶ 246 (1986) (subsequent
history omitted) (requiring carriers to “disclose information about their networks to their enhanced
services competitors”).
159
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T at 193-94; Sprint at 15-16.
160
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T at 186; Qwest at 48-49; Cox at 19.
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
rules could limit their ability to deal with both routine and non-routine network issues. 161 At the
same time, however, they ignore the fact that the proposed reasonable network management
exception generally provides the very flexibility they seek, and is far preferable to attempting to
define in advance every practice that might be deemed reasonable.162
It is, of course, indisputable that network management can be complicated, congestion
always will be a fundamental management issue, and technology continuously evolves. 163 But,
these circumstances can be addressed within the boundaries of the inherently flexible reasonable
network management exception the Commission has proposed. 164 Notably, network providers
that support the proposed exception demonstrate that networks can be designed to preserve
Internet openness without harming broadband deployment goals, 165 and while maintaining the
flexibility necessary for nondiscriminatory network management. 166
While flexibility is important, the exception also must be clear and narrowly tailored to
address legitimate network congestion.167 Otherwise, broadband providers will have an
unfettered ability to engage in practices serving their own narrow interests – just as they have

161
See, e.g., Comments of Verizon at 9 (“Adopting any rules with respect to network management, even a
rule that generally permits reasonable network management, would undermine the ability of providers to
engage in practices needed to serve and protect consumers.”).
162
See Comments of Fiber-to-the-Home Council (“FTTH Council”) at 24-25.
163
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T at 183-84.
164
Gill Decl. at ¶ 43.
165
See, e.g., Comments of COMPTEL at 2; Covad at 6-7; WISPA at 3; Telecom Italia at 7.
166
See, e.g., Comments of RNK at 4; XO at 16-17.
167
At the same time, congestion may not be as severe as some claim. For example, Cablevision notes that
it has “plenty of bandwidth available on its network.” Cablevision to Phase Out In-Home DVRs for
Remote Storage, Comm. Daily, Feb. 26, 2010 (quoting COO Thomas Rutledge).
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
stated they will do. 168 The result will be widespread implementation of practices, in the name of
“network management,” that give priority to preferred content, applications, and services,
including those of network providers’ affiliates. A range of commenters in the record express
this well-founded concern. 169
Given their control over last-mile access facilities, broadband providers must not be
permitted to define what constitutes a reasonable network management practice. Instead, groups
of industry experts, comprised of a broad range of Internet stakeholders (such as the Technical
Advisory Groups (“TAGs”) proposed by Google and Verizon),170 and/or expert engineering
bodies, with FCC oversight and enforcement, should advise on permissible practices, which may
evolve over time as changes occur in technology and the broadband marketplace.

168
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T at 13 (asserting that any rules should allow broadband providers to act
in any manner that would “otherwise further a legitimate interest of the network operator”).
169
See Comments of National Association of Realtors at 1-2 (noting that the Internet has become an
integral venue for home buying, and it is important that service providers be restricted from prioritizing
content and engaging in anti-competitive behavior); WISPA at 7 (“Providers with market power. . .
should not be permitted to use over-inclusive network management techniques to hinder competition. . . .
WISPA members are concerned that unless management techniques are required to be narrowly tailored,
the FCC would be facilitating anticompetitive abuses in the name of ‘reasonable network management’”);
ARL at 2-4 (teaching, research, experiments, and innovation are driven by research libraries and higher
education, and the open Internet is necessary to continue this long history of innovation); NASUCA at 11-
12, 14-15 (broadband providers have an economic incentive to distort, block or delay transmissions; the
largest problem is vertically-integrated ILECs that have incentives to degrade transmissions from
competing services); IFTA at 5, 10, 13 (consolidation and exclusive partnerships among broadband
providers and major studio content providers limits video programming competition; a nondiscrimination
rule is needed to prevent broadband providers from using network management practices to relegate
certain independent content or applications to “slow lanes” in favor of self-owned or affiliated content
and applications); Free Press at 17-23 (discussing discriminatory “Pay-for-Play,” “Pay-for-Priority,” and
“Vertical Prioritization” business models of last-mile broadband providers); NJ Rate Counsel at 7-8
(incumbent duopoly has significant market power and strong incentives toward anticompetitive conduct).
170
See Comments of Google at 91; Google and Verizon Joint Submission on the Open Internet at 5, GN
Dkt. 09-191 (filed Jan. 14, 2010) (“Google and Verizon Joint Submission”). Comcast similarly proposes
guidance by outside experts. See Comments of Comcast at 50-58. Any such outside groups should be
broadly inclusive and subject to FCC review, and not amount merely to blessing practices adopted by
industry associations.
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
E. FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MANAGED SERVICES IS NEEDED.
The record reflects both some consensus that “managed services” should not be subject to
the proposed broadband openness safeguards at this time, 171 and that the Commission must
develop a fuller record about the nature and impact of such services before deciding whether and
how to apply the rules to them. 172
Given the lack of clarity in the record and the many questions raised surrounding the
definition and scope of “managed services,” it would be premature for the Commission to adopt
a separate regulatory category for such services at this time. Instead, the Commission should
issue a Notice of Inquiry or Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to study the current state of
the marketplace, address the potential need for a separate category of managed services, and
determine what, if any, types of services would fall into such a category. 173 In the interim,
however, such services should not receive a “free pass” around the Communications Act.
Designating any particular offering as a “managed” or “specialized” service cannot cause it
automatically to fall outside of the Commission’s oversight and authority. 174 The Commission
therefore should state explicitly that IP-based “managed service” offerings are not exempt from

171
See, e.g., Comments of USTelecom at 54; Verizon at 77; American Cable Association (“ACA”) at 13;
Comcast at 60-62; MetroPCS Communications, Inc. (“MetroPCS”) at 69; Sprint Nextel Corporation
(“Sprint Nextel”) at 37; COMPTEL at 6; Covad at 8; FTTH Council at 25; PAETEC at 30; SureWest
Communications at 45; Cisco at 16; Ericsson Inc. (“Ericsson”) at 27; National Association of
Manufacturers at 4; ALA at 4.
172
See, e.g., Comments of Akamai at 18; Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users at 28-30.
173
See, e.g., Comments of Open Internet Coalition at 92; Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users at 29-30;
Free Press at 111; Akamai at 18.
174
Cf., Comments of AT&T, Exh. 1 at 27 (“The argument for regulation of any kind for managed services
is also non-existent, and the NPRM makes no attempt to justify this regulation.”); Qwest at 24
(“Managed/specialized services are, by definition, unregulated and should remain so.”).
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
applicable Title II, III, and VI statutory obligations, pending resolution of a further proceeding
addressing such services.
IV. THE RULES MUST EXTEND TO ALL LAST-MILE BROADBAND PROVIDERS

BUT NOT FURTHER.
A. WIRELESS NETWORKS MUST BE OPEN, EVEN IF RULES ARE APPLIED MORE

FLEXIBLY.
The national wireless network operators oppose application of the proposed rules to their
broadband offerings. 175 These carriers generally cite the competitive nature of the mobile
wireless marketplace 176 as well as various technical constraints that differentiate their network
management practices from those of wireline broadband network operators.177 These parties,
however, fail to acknowledge some relevant facts. For example, while the number of mobile
wireless subscribers is increasing, the number of service providers actually is contracting. 178
AT&T and Verizon collectively control an approximately 62 percent (and growing) share of the

175
Comments of Verizon at 58-65; AT&T at 140-83 and Exh. 2 at 2; T-Mobile at 4-6. See also
Comments of Sprint Nextel at 1, 15 (if the FCC determines rules are necessary, it could support certain
rules).
176
See, e.g., Comments of AT&T, Exh. 1 at 28-29; Verizon at 12; MetroPCS at 20-24.
177
See, e.g., Comments of T-Mobile at 15-24.
178
For example, in 2009 alone, Verizon Wireless acquired nearly 13 million wireless subscribers from
Alltel Corporation, while AT&T acquired approximately 900,000 subscribers from Centennial
Communications. See Applications of Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless and Atlantis Holdings
LLC, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd. 17444 (2008); Applications
of AT&T Inc. and Centennial Communications Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 FCC Rcd.
13915 (2009). When AT&T’s and Verizon’s acquisitions require divestiture of existing wireless
properties, they frequently divest to one another. See AT&T to Gobble Up Verizon/Alltel Divested
Markets, dslreports.com (May 8, 2009), available at http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/ATT-To-
Gobble-Up-VerizonAlltel-Divested-Markets-102350. Smaller carriers will continue to merge or be
absorbed by larger carriers. As Sprint’s CEO recently noted, “consolidation in general would be healthy
for the wireless industry.” See Sprint Slows Subscriber Losses, Plans to Step up Prepaid, Comm. Daily
(Feb. 11, 2010). There is speculation that Sprint may acquire MetroPCS, see Wireless Section, Comm.
Daily, (Feb. 10, 2010), or that MetroPCS and Leap Wireless will combine, see MetroPCS Interested in
Combining with Leap, CFO Says, Comm. Daily (Mar. 11, 2010).
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
national market, 179 while enjoying tremendous profits from their wireless operations. 180 Further,
these two providers’ wireless, video, voice, and data offerings are substantially vertically
integrated with – and their motivations to discriminate are tied to – their affiliates’ wireline
networks.
More importantly, wireless broadband access providers do not acknowledge the wireless
industry’s record of dubious practices – a list that continues to grow. 181 For example, the cable
industry notes that “providers of wireless Internet access unabashedly engage in outright
blocking.” 182 Deep packet inspection “has been deployed far and wide” by various wireless last-
mile network operators. 183 Further, the contractual terms imposed by major wireless carriers
purport to prohibit the use of peer-to-peer applications, Web broadcasts, server or host
applications, tethering, and the use of wireless as a substitute for wired broadband.184
Nonetheless, wireless network operators’ practices are not transparent, the government to date

179
See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; Annual
Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services,
Thirteenth Report, 24 FCC Rcd. 6185, Table A-4 (2009). Verizon also controls approximately 55 percent
of the CDMA market in the U.S., and AT&T controls approximately 70 percent of the GSM market in the
U.S. Reply Comments of MetroPCS at 3, RM-11947 (Feb. 20, 2009).
180
Verizon’s wireless operating margin is 45 percent, see Press Release, Verizon, Verizon Reports Strong
Wireless Customer And Data Growth In 4Q; Delivers Higher Operating Cash Flows (Jan. 26, 2010),
available at http://news.vzw.com/news/2010/01/pr2010-01-26.html, and AT&T’s is 24.7 percent, see
Press Release, AT&T, AT&T Reports Fourth-Quarter Earnings Growth with a 2.7 Million Net Gain in
Wireless Subscribers, Continued Strong Growth in IP-Based Revenues, Record Full-Year Cash Flow
(Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://www.att.com/gen/press-
room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=30429. AT&T has stated that it “would expand wireless
margins [in 2010] to the low 40 percent range from below 39 percent in the fourth quarter, and it set a
long-term goal of margins around 45 percent. Verizon already produces margins in this range.” P.
Thomasch & S. Carew, AT&T Profit Rises 26 Percent, Plans More Spending, Reuters (Jan. 28, 2010),
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2810348120100128?type=marketsNews.
181
See, e.g., Sling Media at 5-11 (citing, inter alia, rejection of SlingPlayer Mobile application).
182
Comments of NCTA at 46.
183
Comments of Free Press at 145, 148-149.
184
Comments of the New America Foundation, et al. (“New America”) at 2.
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
has declined to exercise its rightful oversight authority, and effective enforcement mechanisms to
address abuses do not exist.
Wireless providers in particular fail to respond to the critical role that rules of the road,
including the proposed nondiscrimination rule, would fulfill by acting as a check on their
abilities and incentives to discriminate. Notwithstanding any technical differences between
wireline and wireless networks that may justify different application of the reasonable network
management exception on a case-by-case basis, the record is clear that all last-mile broadband
network providers have common incentives to discriminate in the absence of an effective and
enforceable rule protecting consumers and competitors. 185
Ultimately, the record contains no compelling rationale for excluding wireless broadband
providers from the scope of the proposed rules. Instead, the record supports applying openness
and transparency rules to all broadband networks, even if the reasonable network management
exception is applied differently for wireless networks.186 To the extent that wireless broadband
service simply complements the service provided by its wireline affiliate, and offers no real

185
See, e.g., Comments of DISH Network at 3-6 (vertically integrated operators can harm the video
distribution marketplace by prioritizing their own VOD services over those provided by DBS companies
and degrade competitors’ services); CDT at 7 (selling priority treatment to online content providers could
result in broadband provider effectively steering its subscribers towards particular content, applications,
or services by making them faster or more reliable. Broadband Internet access providers have a
termination monopoly with respect to their subscribers, and an innovator seeking to offer new content,
applications, or service to a consumer has no choice but to reach that consumer through its broadband
provider); CCIA at 16 (noting increased risks due to fact that the two largest wireless carriers are
affiliated with the largest ISPs); Sony at 5-6 (with multiple ways to discriminate, providers should not be
allowed to dictate through network management practices the technologies employed to deliver the
services).
186
See, e.g., Comments of NJ Rate Counsel at 16; Open Internet Coalition at 36; Clearwire at 3;
CenturyLink at 22-23; Leap/Cricket at 6; Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users at 8-9; Free Press at 125-
126; New America at 4. Google agrees that the Commission should not attempt to codify the differences
between broadband networks; case-by-case application of the rules will take these differences into
account. See Comments of Open Internet Coalition at 36-37.
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
intermodal competition, 187 the case for oversight of wireline providers is substantially buttressed.
On the other hand, to the extent wireless service may function as a substitute for wireline service,
the rules should be technology-neutral and the principle of regulatory parity should apply, just as
wireless carriers themselves repeatedly have argued, and consistent with the FCC’s traditional
regulatory approach. 188 As NCTA correctly observes, beyond possible operational network
management issues, “there is no basis for differentiating among specific broadband Internet
access technologies – current or future – with respect to the applicability of any rules ultimately
adopted.” 189
B. THERE IS NO LAWFUL BASIS TO EXTEND THE RULES TO PROVIDERS OF

CONTENT AND APPLICATIONS.
AT&T and a few others allege that there is a “blurring” between the various sectors in the
Internet “ecosystem” such that any rules should extend beyond last-mile broadband providers. 190
Even if one plays along with this popular and increasingly-abused metaphor, it is beyond
question that there are substantial differences within all ecosystems – and this one is no
exception. Just as the natural ecosystem contains both flora and fauna, daisies and dinosaurs, in
the “Internet ecosystem” content simply is not the same as conduit. These fundamental physical

187
See, e.g., Comments of Free Press at 51-52 (citing data indicating that mobile wireless at this time
remains a complement rather than a substitute). See also National Broadband Plan at 41 (“Wireless
broadband may not be an effective substitute in the foreseeable future for consumers seeking high-speed
connections at prices competitive with wireline offers.”).
188
See Wireline Broadband Order at ¶ 4. See also Comments of NCTA at 46 (it would be arbitrary and
capricious to subject only wireline ISPs to such rules while exempting wireless access providers that have
similar potential to affect accessibility of content and applications).
189
Comments of NCTA at 46-47.
190
See e.g., Comments of AT&T at 20; Verizon at 129; Time Warner Cable at 4, 74; Comcast at 30-33.
Thus, for example, while AT&T describes “Access/Aggregation Networks” as one component of the
Internet “ecosystem,” it is clearly erroneous as a factual, technical and legal matter to equate EarthLink’s
ability to aggregate and deliver its customers’ traffic with AT&T’s fundamental position of control at the
physical layer. See Comments of AT&T at 20.
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
and virtual distinctions, and the markets they have spawned, warrant decidedly different
regulatory treatment. Further, the notion that the Internet somehow is naturally and inherently
self-regulating, and thus needs no government oversight, also is misplaced. As Assistant
Secretary of Commerce Strickling noted, “Going back to the ‘ecosystem’ metaphor, the Internet
is not a natural park or wilderness area that should be left to nature.” 191
Here, the proposed rules are a logical outgrowth of key characteristics of the consumer
broadband market: broadband as an essential infrastructure input, pronounced market failure, the
broadband providers’ unique ability to carry, inspect, control, and apportion the capacity for all
third party traffic riding over their networks, and the legacy government-derived massive
subsidies and benefits broadband providers have enjoyed. Notably, all of these elements exist
solely at the last-mile, and not with Internet content and applications providers. As noted in the
joint submission of Google and Verizon, there is no sound reason to impose communications
laws or regulations on the robust marketplace of Internet content, applications, and services. 192
Further, content, applications and other Internet companies are driving jobs creation and
billions of dollars in investment, including in infrastructure, that in turn triggers further

191
See Lawrence E. Strickling, Prepared Remarks at The Media Institute on The Internet: Evolving
Responsibility for Preserving a First Amendment Miracle (Feb. 24, 2010), available at,
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/presentations/2010/ MediaInstitute_02242010.html. See also Kim Hart, Google
Reminds Verizon of Net Neutrality Differences, Hillicon Valley (The Hill’s Technology Blog), Feb. 25,
2010, available at http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/83513-google-reminds-verizon-of-
net-neutrality-differences (quoting Richard Whitt, Google, Opening Remarks at Information Technology
& Innovation Foundation Round-Table on Preserving the Open Internet: Is a Consensus Emerging? (Feb.
23, 2010)) (“[T]reating some parts of an ecosystem different from other parts is not a ‘recipe for disaster;’
it is just plain common sense.”).
192
Google and Verizon Joint Submission at 3.
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
innovation and investment. 193 This investment expands opportunity, enhances network
efficiency, lowers costs and entry barriers, and increases competition.

Simplified View of Internet Network and Connections, National Broadband Plan, Exh. 4‐I
Last-mile broadband providers’ connections are still the only gateway users have to
access everything else online; as a result of this unique place in the network, last-mile broadband
providers can manipulate and interfere with users’ Internet experience, including by determining
whether consumers have access to certain content and applications at all. As Akamai and others
note, beyond the last-mile, there is no “ability to block, degrade or impair content transmission
over the Internet.” 194 The deployment of infrastructure and services beyond the last-mile cannot
negatively impact the user experience. Rather, evidence shows that competition and investment

193
See Comments of the Open Internet Coalition at 2; Skype at 4.
194
Comments of Akamai at 13. See also Comments of Open Internet Coalition at 86.
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GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
in these areas have improved service delivery and reliability. 195 Far from affording a “privilege,”
these “edge” players enhance the efficiency, utility, and quality of the Internet for everyone,
including last-mile broadband providers.
Some broadband providers also mistakenly (or deliberately) conflate caching one’s
content with last-mile prioritization of all Internet traffic. 196 Yet, as discussed above, CDNs
allow content and application providers to have their services provided from a location that is
more proximate to the end-user. However, neither CDNs, nor content and applications providers
themselves, have the ability to interfere with the routing of other entities’ traffic – they have no
ability to make some packets go faster (which necessarily slows other packets) at the last-mile
router, the critical area of control. In terms of ability to control end-user Internet traffic, there are
sharp distinctions between last-mile broadband provider access and router control over all traffic
on the one hand, and servers, CDNs, and aggregation facilities limited to one’s own traffic on the
other. As Free Press notes, “unlike the CDN market where there is no upper limit on the amount
of content that can be locally cached, as discussed above, the zero-sum game nature of packet
switching does mean that there is an upper limit to the amount of content that can be given
priority routing status.” 197 Likewise, servers, data centers and private fiber backbone networks
do not possess the unique advantages or ability to control “Other People’s Packets” that last-mile
broadband providers have.

195
Comments of Akamai at 6.
196
See, e.g., Comments of Verizon at 67.
197
See Comments of Free Press at 20; see also id. at 19-22.
54
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
Critically, despite the heavy-handed posturing of AT&T and others, 198 the FCC does not
have jurisdiction over Internet content and applications. 199 Where online activity by these
providers becomes problematic, oversight authority can be found with the Federal Trade
Commission or the Department of Justice. In Computer II, the Commission expressly rejected
the position that all information services fell within its jurisdiction, noting that not “any service
or activity in which communications is a component is within the subject matter jurisdiction of
Section 2(a) of the Communications Act.”200 As one example, the FCC is not free to regulate
stored data or the content of the stored information.201 Moreover, not all information services
are the same, making it inappropriate to equate, for example, last-mile broadband Internet access
with search engines or an app store. This means that even if the FCC were to decide (wrongly)
that it should attempt to regulate the range of Internet content, applications and information
services, such regulation would need to be varied, creating a highly complex and ultimately
unworkable regime.
Further, while some parties urge the FCC to require “search neutrality” and advocate
FCC regulation beyond last-mile broadband networks, 202 these calls ignore the fundamental

198
See Comments of AT&T at 196; Verizon at 36; Time Warner at 38; Comcast at 30; ACA at 7-8; Reply
Comments of Foundem at 1, GN Dkt. 09-191(filed Feb. 23, 2010).
199
See Google and Verizon Joint Submission at 3; Comments of VON Coalition at 4. See also
Comments of Entertainment Software Association at 3; Open Internet Coalition at 83; Skype at 20
(explaining that rules should not extend to Internet content and applications).
200
Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, ¶¶ 121, 122 (1980) (Computer II), aff’d, Computer and
Communications Industry Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
201
See GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 730-32 (2d Cir. 1973) (statutory silence does not preclude
regulation of the interaction between common carriers and data processors, but does preclude regulation
of data processors themselves).
202
See, e.g., Comments of Comcast at 34-36; Reply Comments of Foundem at 1-9, GN Dkt. 09-191 (filed
Feb. 23, 2010).
55
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
nature of Web search in a hugely-contestable market. In fact, it is hard to imagine what “neutral
search” would even look like; “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”203 Google, for instance,
uses complex mathematical algorithms that incorporate users’ queries to generate its search
results. 204 Other search engines choose to produce search results using a measure of human
judgment. 205 This is why a search of “President Obama” using different search engines produces
different results. Which one is more “neutral” – a Wikipedia entry, the official White House site,
a pro- or anti-Obama blog, or a news site? These practical and unsolvable complexities highlight
the absurdity (and unconstitutionality) of government rules in this area, especially by the agency
responsible for overseeing communications networks and services. In short, the FCC should not,
and could not lawfully, decide the answer. Instead, thousands of different search engines should
be free, as they are today, to choose different approaches, so that consumers with a click of their
mouse ultimately may decide which search engine they prefer.
V. THE RECORD SHOWS THAT SWIFT, CLEAR ENFORCEMENT BEST

SERVES THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
The proposed rules are silent on the precise means of enforcing the broadband openness
rules. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus that the FCC should adjudicate claims of alleged
violations of the rules on a case-by-case basis, 206 and adopt specific procedures for adjudicating

203
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
204
See Amit Singal, This Stuff Is Tough, Google Public Policy Blog, Feb. 25, 2010, available at
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/.
205
See, e.g., http://www.seekfind.org/ (a Christian-oriented web search engine “to provide God-honoring,
biblically-based, and theologically-sound Christian search engine results in a highly accurate and well-
organized format.”).
206
See Comments of TDS Telecommunications Corp. at 7; National Grange at 3; Ericsson at 24; ITIC at
5; Telecommunications Industry Association at 44; Art + Labs at 1; Netflix at 11; Skype at 1; SIIA at 9.
Google and Verizon agree that there should be some mechanism for federal authorities to address bad
actors on a case-by-case basis. Google and Verizon Joint Submission at 4.
56
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
complaints. 207 As stated in our initial Comments, Google urges the Commission to adopt a
streamlined complaint process for enforcing the rules that is subject to fixed deadlines. The
record supports Google’s proposal that once a complainant demonstrates a prima facie showing
of a rule violation, the burden of proof should shift to the broadband provider to provide its
defenses. 208
Proposals to require complainants to make a showing that a broadband provider’s
practice is unreasonable should be rejected, 209 as should suggestions that otherwise place the
ultimate burden of proof on complainants. 210 Instead, the complainant should be required first to
make a prima facie case that a rule has been violated, which then would shift the burden to the
broadband provider to demonstrate why its practice is in fact lawful. Broadband providers
possess and control the bulk of the evidence regarding their own network practices. Placing the
ultimate burden of proof on complainants would make it nearly impossible for aggrieved parties
successfully to adjudicate their claims against broadband providers. As a result, the FCC
complaint procedures effectively would be eliminated as a mechanism to provide redress for
consumers and small businesses, which lack the “inside” information on the practices at issue,
and the financial resources necessary to mount a full-scale investigation of broadband network
provider practices. As the Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee states, “[t]he
Commission should minimize the burdens associated with bringing complaints to ensure that

207
Comments of WISPA at 14; Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users at 27; Public Knowledge at 71.
208
See Comments of Google at 90; Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users at 27; Public Knowledge at 71
and Appendix B; Open Internet Coalition at 68-69; WISPA at 14.
209
Comments of NTCA at 4-5.
210
See Comments of Charter Communications (“Charter”) at 19; Free State Foundation at 13.
57
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
individuals and small businesses that rely on their Internet access have a prompt hearing and
resolution.” 211
Further, while the Commission should clarify that aggrieved parties are permitted to
pursue both informal and formal complaint mechanisms, it also should acknowledge that these
enforcement mechanisms alone are not sufficiently tailored to properly redress complainants.212
As Public Knowledge et al. state,
A goal of the enforcement mechanism must be to allow the average consumer to

file complaints alleging violations of the open Internet rules. However, by
contrast with the too-loose pleading standards of the informal complaint system,
the formal complaint system described in Sections 1.720 through 1.736 is far too
burdensome for the average consumer. 213
Netflix further notes that delays in adjudicating claims through the formal complaint process
“could be the difference between an entrepreneur’s success and failure,”214 and explains that the
informal complaint process “provide[s] relatively little guidance as to the format and substance
of such complaints, [and] the timeline for addressing them.” 215
Finally, the FCC should reject proposals that would prohibit the recovery of monetary
damages by complainants 216 as well as proposals asking the FCC to impose costs, including legal
fees, on complainants. 217 These suggestions are excessively punitive, inconsistent with
American standards of civil litigation, and would discourage consumers and small businesses

211
See Comments of Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users at 26.
212
Cf. Comments of ACA at 19-20; Rural Cellular Association at 25-26.
213
Comments of Public Knowledge at 70-72.
214
Comments of Netflix at 10.
215
Id. at 11.
216
See Comments of WISPA at 15 (“The Commission should not assess damages, fines or forfeitures for
violations of the network neutrality rules.”).
217
See Comments of Charter at 19.
58
GN Dkt. 09-191; WC Dkt. 07-52
from presenting legitimate grievances to the FCC. The requirement that a complainant must
establish a prima facie showing of a rule violation will ensure that the complaint system is not
saddled with frivolous complaints. 218
CONCLUSION
All parties to this proceeding publicly recognize the enormous benefits the Internet has
brought to the economic and social fabric of our society. The record underscores that Internet
openness and freedom are not guaranteed. Without government oversight and some rules of the
road, it cannot be taken as given that the next generation of the Internet’s evolution will provide
robust Internet-based services and “spillovers” and other benefits to all segments of our nation.
Accordingly, the FCC should take immediate action to adopt the proposed broadband openness
rules.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard S. Whitt, Esq., Donna N. Lampert

Washington Telecom and Media Mark J. O’Connor
Counsel E. Ashton Johnston
Jennifer P. Bagg
Megan Anne Stull, Esq.,
Telecom Policy Counsel LAMPERT, O’CONNOR & JOHNSTON, P.C.
1776 K Street NW, Suite 700
GOOGLE INC.
Washington, DC 20006
Public Policy Department
(202) 887-6230 tel
1101 New York Avenue NW
(202) 887-6231 fax
Second Floor
Washington, DC 20005 Counsel for Google Inc.
April 26, 2010

218
See Comments of Free Press at 70.
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Before the

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

REPLY COMMENTS OF GOOGLE INC.

Richard S. Whitt, Esq., Donna N. Lampert

April 26, 2010

Broadband is far too important as an essential infrastructure input to our national

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ________________________________________1

I. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR THE FCC TO ADOPT

A. THE COMMENTS REINFORCE THAT THERE IS A MARKET FAILURE FOR LAST-

B. THE COMMENTS CONFIRM THAT BROADBAND PROVIDERS SUPPLY

C. THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT INCREASING VERTICAL INTEGRATION

D. CURRENT AND EMERGING BROADBAND PROVIDER PRACTICES

II. THE FCC MUST ASSERT ITS LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ADOPT

A. THE FCC HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY OVER LAST-MILE BROADBAND

C. THE RULES WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A “TAKING” UNDER THE FIFTH

III. THERE IS BROAD SUPPORT IN THE COMMENTS FOR CODIFYING THE

A. A RANGE OF INTERESTED PARTIES SUPPORT CODIFYING THE CURRENT IPS

B. A SIMPLE NONDISCRIMINATION RULE WILL OPTIMIZE BROADBAND

1. A General Nondiscrimination Standard Is Well-Established __________34

2. Third Party Paid Prioritization Is Discriminatory and Detrimental

C. THERE IS GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT TRANSPARENCY IS IN THE PUBLIC

D. THE RULES PROPERLY ALLOW FOR REASONABLE NETWORK

E. FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MANAGED SERVICES IS NEEDED. __________________47

IV. THE RULES MUST EXTEND TO ALL LAST-MILE BROADBAND

A. WIRELESS NETWORKS MUST BE OPEN, EVEN IF RULES ARE APPLIED MORE

B. THERE IS NO LAWFUL BASIS TO EXTEND THE RULES TO PROVIDERS OF

V. THE RECORD SHOWS THAT SWIFT, CLEAR ENFORCEMENT BEST

APPENDIX A: PROF. NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES, BROADBAND OPENNESS RULES ARE

APPENDIX B: DECLARATION OF VIJAY GILL

REPLY COMMENTS OF GOOGLE INC.

Rulemaking 1 seeking public comment on proposed rules to preserve broadband openness. As

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

government oversight of broadband provider practices is warranted. Further, the FCC’s

last-mile broadband transmission to be offered under Title II of the Communications Act. In

the proposed rules.

to FCC review and enforcement.

networks would cause serious harm to the Internet’s continuing development.

enforcement is needed to provide meaningful redress for violations of the rules.

I. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR THE FCC TO ADOPT

A. THE COMMENTS REINFORCE THAT THERE IS A MARKET FAILURE FOR

harm consumers, competition, and the Internet itself. 2

Numerous commenters describe the deficient state of competition in today’s broadband

broadband duopoly is declining to a monopoly market, as approximately 75% of U.S. consumers

also confirmed this market is substantially non-contestable: “Building broadband networks—

alternative at this time. 8 Further, as Professor Economides points out:

offers service. 14 As Commissioner Clyburn recently remarked:

The same day we announced these important recommendations designed to usher

abilities to manage prices. 16

forces’ sufficient to force monopoly or duopoly incumbents to operate in a non-discriminatory

and competitively neutral manner is not borne out by marketplace realities.”18

B. THE COMMENTS CONFIRM THAT BROADBAND PROVIDERS SUPPLY ESSENTIAL

Last-mile broadband access is indispensable to unleashing broadband networks’

Last-mile broadband providers’ control of this essential access can be conceptualized as

interpreted as agreeing with the unilateral employment of “reasonable” practices. 33 Nonetheless,

power to dictate end users’ Internet experience.

last-mile broadband access providers like AT&T have such control.

properly at the heart of the issues in this proceeding. 37

enactment of rules could be necessary. 40 In fact, the Republican-endorsed “Nascent Services

government regulations are applicable to consumer-facing broadband networks. Further, while