T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell (2015)
T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell (2015)
T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell (2015)
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
GEORGIA
Syllabus
KENNEDY, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion in which
GINSBURG, J., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Part I.
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
No. 13975
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2.8 acres of vacant residential property in the city of Roswell, Georgia (City). Roswells city ordinances require
that any cell phone tower proposed for a residential zoning
district must take the form of an alternative tower struc
turean artificial tree, clock tower, steeple, or light
polethat, in the opinion of the city council (City Council
or Council), is compatible with the natural setting and
surrounding structures and that effectively camouflages
the tower. Code of Ordinances 21.2.2, 21.2.5(a); see
App. 68, 75. In accordance with these provisions, petition
ers application proposed a structure in the shape of an
artificial tree or monopine. Id., at 42.
The Citys Planning and Zoning Division reviewed peti
tioners application, along with a substantial number of
letters and petitions opposing it, and ultimately issued a
memorandum to the City Council concluding that the
application met all of the requirements set out in the
Citys ordinances. It recommended that the City Council
approve the application on three conditions to which peti
tioner was prepared to agree.
The City Council then held a 2-hour-long public hearing
on April 12, 2010, to consider petitioners application.
Petitioner arranged privately to have the hearing tran
scribed, and, as discussed below, the City subsequently
issued detailed minutes summarizing the proceedings. At
the hearing, after the Planning and Zoning Division pre
sented its recommendation and after petitioners repre
sentatives made a presentation in support of the applica
tion, a number of residents raised concerns. Among these
were concerns that the tower would lack aesthetic compat
ibility, that the technology was outdated and unnecessary,
and that the tower would be too tall. Petitioners repre
sentatives responded by reiterating that it had met all of
the ordinances requirements and by providing testimony
from a property appraiser that placement of cell phone
towers does not reduce property values.
1 Brief minutes had been adopted on April 19, but these only noted
that the motion to deny the application had passed with five members
in favor and one member recused. See Council Brief 041210, online at
http:// roswell.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=657578&GUID=0
8D5297C-0271-41F9-9DAA-E8E3DD6314BD&Options=&Search= (all In
ternet Materials as visited January 12, 2015, and available in Clerk of
Courts case file). According to the meeting calendar for the City
Councils May 10, 2010, meeting, it was on that day that the City
Council approved detailed minutes of the April 12 meeting that in
cluded a recitation of each members statements during the hearing. See
http :// roswell.legistar.com / MeetingDetail.aspx?ID = 101786&GUID = 63
828B21-EB83-4485-B4EA-10EE65CF48CD&Options=info|&Search=.
2 The last limitation listed in the Act provides that localities shall
act on applications to construct personal wireless service facilities
within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed . . .
taking into account the nature and scope of such request.
332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
10
11
12
5 One of petitioners amici argues that Congress has used the word
decision in the context of other communications laws to mean some
thing more than a judgment or verdict. See Brief for Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America (Chamber) et al. 913. But
while it is true that a word used across the same act should be given
the same meaning, see Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S.
___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 10), the Chambers evidence is less persua
sive because it arises out of entirely different acts and does not
involve any term of art. By relying on other parts of Title 47 of the
U. S. Codesome enacted in the Communications Act of 1934 decades
before the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 at issue
herethe Chamber stretches to invoke this canon of construction
beyond its most forceful application. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Read
ing Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 172173 (2012).
6 For example, petitioner cites 11 (FCC must notify the parties
concerned when it makes a determination and order regarding a railroad or telegraph companys failure to maintain and operate a tele
graph line for public use) and 398(b)(5) (Whenever the Secretary [of
Commerce] makes a final determination . . . that a recipient of federal
funds has engaged in impermissible discrimination, the Secretary shall
notify the recipient in writing of such determination . . .). Brief for
Petitioner 2425.
13
14
IV
Thus, we hold that the Act requires localities to provide
reasons when they deny cell phone tower siting applica
tions, but that the Act does not require localities to pro
vide those reasons in written denial letters or notices
themselves. A locality may satisfy its statutory obliga
tions if it states its reasons with sufficient clarity in some
other written record issued essentially contemporaneously
with the denial. In this case, the City provided its reasons
in writing and did so in the acceptable form of detailed
minutes of the City Council meeting. The City, however,
did not provide its written reasons essentially contempo
raneously with its written denial. Instead, the City issued
those detailed minutes 26 days after the date of the writ
ten denial and just 4 days before petitioners time to seek
judicial review would have expired.7 The City therefore
did not comply with its statutory obligations. We do not
consider questions regarding the applicability of principles
of harmless error or questions of remedy, and leave those
for the Eleventh Circuit to address on remand.
*
*
*
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment
below and remand the case for further proceedings con
sistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
No. 13975
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No. 13975
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case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings on T-Mobiles remaining challenges.
II
The Court agrees that the City was not required to
explain its reasoning in its denial letter, but it nonetheless
rules for T-Mobile. The improbable linchpin of this outcome is the Citys failure to finalize the minutes of the
April 12 city council meeting until May 10. Improbable
because, so far as I can tell, T-Mobile never even mentioned this timeline, let alone based an argument on it, in
its filings in the lower courts or its petition for certiorari.
Nor did the Eleventh Circuit address this timing question
in any way. Cf. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U. S. ___, ___
(2012) (slip op., at 12) (Ordinarily, we do not decide in the
first instance issues not decided below. (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court nonetheless rules against Roswell on this
ground, proceeding in two steps: First it concludes that a
town must provide written reasons in some form (the
minutes being the only candidate here); then it decides a
town must make those reasons available essentially
contemporaneously with its decision (the final minutes
were not). Ante, at 14. In my view, the first step is justified by the statutory text, but the second is not.
The need to provide reasons in some form follows from
the portion of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) requiring that denials be supported by substantial evidence contained in a
written record. Like the majority, I read this phrase as
specifying a familiar standard of review to be used if a
denial is challenged in court. And like the majority, I
agree that substantial evidence review requires that a
decisionmakers reasons be identifiable in the written
record. If a reviewing court cannot identify any of a towns
reasons for denying an application, it cannot determine
whether substantial evidence supports those reasons, and
No. 13975
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